Russo-African Relations and electoral democracy: Assessing the implications of Russia's renewed interest for Africa

Abstract

After decades of diplomatic disengagement from Africa, Russia is making a strong bid to facilitate bilateral relations with more African states. Many analysts regard this as an attempt to project power and influence outside of Russia's immediate borders in Eastern Europe and to whittle down the West's influence in Africa. The deepening ties between Russia and African states have led to the incursion of Russian political operatives and disinformation experts who have meddled in the political and electoral processes of countries such as Zimbabwe, Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. However, while Russian election interference in advanced western democracies has attracted extensive scholarly interest, similar meddling by Russian agents on the African continent has been subject to little scrutiny. This article sheds light on the methods used by Russian political operatives to meddle in elections in Africa. It concludes that Russia's renewed interest in Africa could have grave consequences for democracy on the continent if left unchecked.

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Russo-African Relations and electoral democracy:
Assessing the implications of Russia's renewed
interest for Africa
Akinlolu E. Akinola & Olusola Ogunnubi
To cite this article: Akinlolu E. Akinola & Olusola Ogunnubi (2021): Russo-African Relations and
electoral democracy: Assessing the implications of Russia's renewed interest for Africa, African
Security Review, DOI: 10.1080/10246029.2021.1956982
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2021.1956982
Published online: 02 Aug 2021.
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Russo-African Relations and electoral democracy: Assessing the
implications of Russia’s renewed interest for Africa
Akinlolu E. Akinola
a
and Olusola Ogunnubi
b,c
a
Department of Political Science, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria;
b
Centre for Gender and African
Studies, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa;
c
Department of Political Science, Carleton
University, Ottawa, Canada
ABSTRACT
After decades of diplomatic disengagement from Africa, Russia is
making a strong bid to facilitate bilateral relations with more African
states. Many analysts regard this as an attempt to project power and
influence outside of Russia’s immediate borders in Eastern Europe and
to whittle down the West’sinfluence in Africa. The deepening ties
between Russia and African states have led to the incursion of Russian
political operatives and disinformation experts who have meddled in
the political and electoral processes of countries such as Zimbabwe,
Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. However,
while Russian election interference in advanced western democracies
has attracted extensive scholarly interest, similar meddling by Russian
agents on the African continent has been subject to little scrutiny.
This article sheds light on the methods used by Russian political
operatives to meddle in elections in Africa. It concludes that Russia’s
renewed interest in Africa could have grave consequences for
democracy on the continent if left unchecked.
KEYWORDS
Russia; election interference;
sharp power; Russo-African
relations; democracy;
political operatives
Introduction
At the end of the Cold War, Africa lost its strategic relevance as an arena for great power
influence.
1
This made the US and its allies in the West the dominant power on the continent
in the last decade of the twentieth century. The new Russian Federation that emerged from
the collapsed Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) discontinued Soviet-era policies of
engaging with Africa in order to focus on pressing domestic political and economic problems.
However, as its economic conditions improved and bolstered by a more assertive foreign
policy, Russia is making a comeback to the continent it abandoned decades ago. The
timing of Russia’s re-engagement (a period when America’s interest is declining) raises eye-
brows with many questioning the strategic aspects of Russia’s renewed interest in Africa.
Of all the foreign powers currently engaged in Africa, Russia has been identified as one of
the major threats to the current liberal democratic order.
2
Evidence abounds that, in a bid to reassert itself as a global hegemon, Russia is discretely
embarking on a mission to undermine public faith in democracy through the manipulation
of electoral processes to facilitate the emergence of pro-Russian leaders.
3
Through disinforma-
tion campaigns on social media and the hacking and release of private information ‘in ways
© 2021 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
CONTACT Akinlolu E. Akinola akinlo.akinola1@gmail.com
AFRICAN SECURITY REVIEW
https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2021.1956982

designed to affect electoral outcomes’, Russia has interfered in the 2016 presidential election in
the United States (US).
4
Similar tactics (with varying results) were also adopted in the 2017 pre-
sidential election in France, the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom, and parliamentary
elections in Germany and Holland.
5
Moscow’s strategy of interfering in the electoral processes
of advanced democracies in the West has been described as ‘sharp power’.
6
The term explains
illiberal regimes’efforts to influence the electoral processes in democracies through the
manipulation of their information and political environments Russia’s sharp power projection
in Africa enables it to take advantage of the vulnerabilities and weaknesses inherent in many
political systems across the continent for the advancement of its geopolitical goals.
As Moscow pushes for more engagement with African states, there are indications that it is
doing more than just signing bilateral agreements. Russia also seeks to penetrate the informa-
tional and political space on the continent like it did in Europe. In a number of African states
such as Madagascar, Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of Congo, Russian sponsored
political consultants and disinformation experts have interfered in the electoral processes
to facilitate the electoral victory of leaders with pro-Russian leanings (see Table 1).
Table 1. Russia’s sharp power projection in Africa.
Region/country Regime type Russia intervention method
West Africa
Ghana Flawed
democracy
Setting up troll factory base in the country in order to exacerbate existing social
divisions in the United States through social media posts
Ivory Coast Hybrid Penetration of the media environment to push pro-Russia view
Disinformation campaign on Social Media to defame political opposition
Guinea Authoritarian The use of Russian political consultants or spin doctors by the ruling party for
electioneering purpose
Nigeria Hybrid Setting up troll factory base in the country in order to exacerbate existing social
divisions in the United States through social media posts
Central Africa
D. R. Congo Authoritarian Penetration of the media environment to push pro-Russia view
Using bias election observer mission to lend credibility to fraudulent electoral
processes that favour its allies
Central Africa
Republic
Authoritarian Using Russia political consultants as government advisors
Penetration of the media environment to push pro-Russia view
The deployment of Russia Private military and security contractors (Wagner Group)
to guard political elites and mining sites
Cameroon Authoritarian Penetration of the media environment to push pro-Russia view
East Africa
Eritrea Authoritarian Penetration of the media environment to push pro-Russia view
North Africa
Sudan Authoritarian The deployment of Russia Private military and securitycontractors (Wagner Group) to
guard Oman Bashir in his final months in power
Disinformation campaign on Social Media to defame political opposition
Libya Authoritarian The deployment of Russia Private military and security contractors (Wagner Group)
to support Gen. Haftar’s bid to seize Tripoli
Disinformation campaign on Social Media platforms to push Russian agenda
Southern Africa
Madagascar Flawed
Democracy
The use of Russian political consultants or spin doctors to meddle in election
The use of bias election observer mission with links to the Kremlin to conduct illegal
polls
Financing renegade political activists to push Russia views
Mozambique Authoritarian The use of bias election observer mission with links to the Kremlin to conduct illegal
polls
Disinformation campaign on Social Media to defame political opposition
Zimbabwe Authoritarian The use of Russian political consultants or spin doctors to meddle in election
The use of bias election observer mission with links to the Kremlin to conduct illegal
polls
Using bias election observer to lend credibility to a controversial and fraudulent
election
Source: Authors’compilation.
2A. E. AKINOLA AND O. OGUNNUBI

However, while Russian election interference in advanced western democracies has
attracted extensive scholarly interest, similar meddling by Russian agents on the African con-
tinent has been subject to little scrutiny. This is in spite that such political meddling dampens
genuine domestic opposition to authoritarian rule and strengthens the hands of despots on
the continent. This article examines the methods used by Russian political operatives to
meddle in the politics of some African states. In so doing, the authors argued that
Moscow’s renewed interest in the continent poses a significant danger for the sanctity of elec-
toral democracy in Africa. This is because Moscow’s sharp power projection is distinct from the
aggressive economic approach of other foreign powers on the continent such as China. We
also contend that Russia’s sharp power efforts go beyond political and electoral meddling,
as it also involves causing political disruptions in states that Moscow regard as an opponent.
The paper is divided into five sections; the first part focuses on the theoretical examination
of the strategic and opportunistic aspects of Russia- African relations. The second section dis-
cusses the state of electoral democracy in Africa. In the third section, the theory of sharp
power is adopted to explain Russia’s motive of meddling in the electoral processes of demo-
cratic states. An analysis of Moscow’s array of sharp power tools (methods of political med-
dling) for gaining influence in African states is discussed in the fourth section. In the
conclusion, we summarise and draw attention to the implications of Russian’s renewed inter-
est for electoral democracy on the continent.
Russia’s return to Africa: Strategic foreign policy objective or diplomatic
‘opportunism’?
Russo-African relations received a massive boost with Russia’s hosting of the first-ever Pan-
African summit in October 2019. The summit was an indication of the Kremlin’s push for
influence on the continent through deeper ties with African leaders.
7
Moscow’s stepped-up
activity in Africa has been described as late in coming
8
considering that its rivals had for
long staked a claim on the continent in terms of trade and investment.
9
However, Moscow
can hardly be described as a newcomer in the global competition for resources and
influence in Africa. Russia’s predecessor, the USSR, enjoyed close ties with many African
states and its Marxist-Leninist ideology was a potent soft power resource deployed by
many African states in their domestic economic system.
10
The period, 1960–1980 is the
‘golden era’of Soviet-African relations. During this period, the Soviet Union provided much
needed economic, political and military support to a host of African states in its bid to dimin-
ish the influence of the US and its western allies.
11
Following the disintegration of the USSR, Russia-African relations reached their lowest
ebb.
12
The Russian Federation that emerged discontinued aid and other technical assistance
to African states due to the problems it encountered in its transition from a socialist system to
capitalist multi-party democracy. In the words of Fidan and Aras, ‘Africa left the orbit of
Russian Foreign Policy’.
13
Thus, in its formative years (1991–98), Russia withdrew from
Africa in order to focus on pressing domestic problems.
Russia rekindled relations with Africa in the 2000s, when improved economic conditions
and the emergence of Putin helped revive Moscow’s interest in Africa. The Kremlin’s push
for influence was initially limited to South Africa and Algeria, and the African Union- a
move many believe was consolidated only recently with the Russia-Africa summit in Sochi.
Is Russia’s return to Africa a strategic policy design or opportunistic leverage to use Africa
for the realisation of its interests?
AFRICAN SECURITY REVIEW 3

Policy experts, cautious of Russia’s aggressiveness, highlight the strategic aspect of Russia’s
pivot to Africa. Russia seeks an alternative to the current US-led, liberal world-order
14
in the
form of a polycentric global order and it regards Africa as a vital partner in this quest as
well as an avenue to project power.
15
Africa’s 54 member-states constitute the largest
voting bloc in the United Nations and Moscow sought to cultivate an alliance with Africa
as a counterweight to neutralise sanction votes in the United Nations General Assembly.
Stronski argues that through its debt relief programmes, Russia has been able to ‘buy’
African states’support in key United Nations votes such as ‘the 2014 General Assembly Res-
olution critical of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in which 35 African states either voted against
or abstained in support of Russia’.
16
By 2019, when the Russia-Africa summit was held, Moscow had signed military cooperation
deals with 20 African states.
17
As the largest supplier of military equipment to Africa,
18
Moscow seeks to extend such engagement to resource extraction and energy development
in Africa. Russian state-owned companies have negotiated deals with African governments
to mine valuable mineral resources such as bauxite, chrome, diamonds, etc. Russia seeks to
offer African countries nuclear technology through bilateral agreements to develop nuclear
plants. The planned construction of nuclear power plant in Nigeria by Rosatom, a Russian
firm, is a case in point.
19
The objective of deepening ties with Africa is to improve the
volume of trade between Moscow and the continent.
To those who highlight the strategic aspect of Russia-African relations Moscow’s re-
engagement with Africa is the result of policy design aimed at establishing a polycentric,
world-order.
20
However, Moscow’s approach to the continent also suggests that Russia’s
Africa engagement is also dictated by the opportunistic search for influence ‘dictated in
essence by economic imperatives’.
21
For instance, Africa was not regarded as an area of stra-
tegic interest in any of Russia’s foreign policy documents. Indeed, the continent was ranked
ninth out of the ten important regions for Russian foreign policy.
22
Kremlin’s renewed interest
in Africa began in 2014 when western states imposed sanctions on it following its annexation
of Crimea. The sanctions, which targeted members of Putin’s inner circle for their role in inter-
ference in the 2016 US presidential election, further isolated Moscow, creating the need for
more alliances and (new) markets. With its abundant natural resources and need for low-
tech, low-cost military technology, Africa presented Moscow with a unique opportunity to
offset the loss of access to western markets.
Russia is also leveraging on its non-colonial past as a way to forge ties with African states.
Russia regards western governments’promotion of democracy on the continent as a form of
neocolonialism. African governments are also aware that, unlike the West, the Kremlin’soffer
of military technology is not tied to respecting human rights. Although Moscow’s approach in
Africa is less ideological, its appeal to conservative social values and anti-liberal policies with
respect to Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Queer (LGBTQ) rights is popular among
African leaders and the public.
23
Notwithstanding, Russia’s return to Africa was made possible
by the United States’declining interest in Africa under Trump’s administration.
24
Moscow has
taken advantage of the resultant ‘power vacuum’, justifying the view that opportunism is the
hallmark of Russia’s foreign policy in Africa.
Authors on Russia-African relations view Moscow’s stepped-up activity on the continent as
modest and limited with no strategic significance in the international community. We argue
that Russia’s engagement with the continent will have grave consequences for electoral
democracy in Africa, where democratic institutions are weak. Russia’s partnerships with net-
works of non-state actors and mercenaries in the form of political consultants, disinformation
4A. E. AKINOLA AND O. OGUNNUBI

specialists, and private military companies enabled it to interfere in or manipulate elections on
the continent.
The state of electoral democracy in Africa
The termination of the Cold War greatly impacted the spread and acceptability of liberal
democracy. The United States, the principal beneficiary of the post-Cold War, uni-polar
order, became the promoter of liberal democracy around the world.
25
It is no coincidence
that many African states adopted multiparty democracy during this period. While not under-
rating the roles played by domestic actors such as civil society groups and ordinary citizens in
the realisation of democracy on the continent, many African States joined the ‘bandwagon’to
be in the good book of western donors and enhance their reputation as democratising
nations.
26
Relying on the minimalist conception of democracy which mainly identifies it
with elections, many states transformed from one-party, autocratic rule to electoral
democracy.
Notwithstanding the intent of African governments for democratisation, a review of the
past three decades suggests progress has been made. The holding of elections is now com-
monplace on the continent. Furthermore, African states are demonstrating the capacity to
conduct free, fair and credible elections. In Senegal (2000), Ghana (2008, 2016), Nigeria
(2015) and Malawi (2020), elections have led to the alternation of power between the
ruling and opposition parties. In countries such as Benin, Cape Verde, Mauritius, Botswana,
South Africa and Malawi, the administration of elections is largely peaceful and regular and
appears to be consolidating democracy. The ‘tonic effect
’27
of elections can be seen in the
decline in the number of military dictatorships on the continent.
28
This clearly shows that
the democratic culture of voting is gradually becoming entrenched.
29
However, scholars on African elections are divided on the question of whether elections
will further consolidate democracy in Africa.
30
Not all elections mimic the success stories
cited above. Approximately one-fifth of African elections are marred by violence.
31
Electoral
violence has emerged as the ‘unfortunate reality’of African elections.
32
As an indication of
flawed voting processes, electoral violence mainly stems from the neo-patrimonial nature of
African states,
33
which raises the stakes as politics offers the fastest route to self-enrichment.
Thus, both incumbent and opposition figures resort to violence as a tool to win elections at
all costs. Several African states experienced electoral violence in the past. Notable examples
include but are not limited to Nigeria (2011), Kenya (2008), Zimbabwe (2000, 2007) Congo
(2016), and Ivory Coast (2000, 2007). In most cases, such violence arises from weak technical
and institutional arrangements of election administration.
While African election patterns are not uniform, three trends can be observed. These are
instances of elections consolidating democracy (such as witnessed in Senegal, Ghana, Bots-
wana, and South Africa); elections bringing about peaceful change of power (as in Kenya,
Nigeria, Niger and Malawi) and elections being used to camouflage despotism, to legitimize
autocratic regimes (Uganda, Congo, Cameroon, Zimbabwe, and Burundi). Based on this cat-
egorisation, we argue that African elections, especially those in the second and third trends
are particularly vulnerable to Russian interference. This is so because the Kremlin relies on
a network of non-state actors to further its national objectives. The first trend of elections
in Africa is relatively safe due to well-established institutions of election administration.
However, in the second trend, things could go wrong when Russian disinformation experts
back a candidate who is viewed as pro-Russian. In the third category, the concern is not
AFRICAN SECURITY REVIEW 5

with interference per se, as these autocratic regimes already have the capacity to manipulate
the electoral process in order to produce favourable outcomes. Rather, the Kremlin’sinfluence
as a model for authoritarian regimes in Africa is the issue. In this sense, Moscow offers auto-
cratic regimes innovative ways of using elections to legitimize their rule without recourse to
violence.
From soft power to sharp power
Since Joseph Nye coined the term ‘soft power’, the term has gained wide popularity among
policymakers and academia to refer to all forms of non-military power that nations seek to
generate in a bid to promote a positive global image. Defined as ‘the ability to get others
to want what you want through attraction rather than coercion’,
34
soft power is exercised
by states as a means of winning hearts and minds globally. To be effective, a country’s soft
power depends on its possession of soft power resources -national assets that generate
attraction for a state- identified by Nye as culture (in places where it is attractive to others),
political values (where it lived up to them at home and abroad) and its foreign policy
(where it is seen as having moral and legitimate authority).
35
It is thus apparent that democracies, rather than authoritarian regimes, are better suited to
exercise soft power. Democratic ideals of individual liberties, political equality and public
accountability are popular across the globe to the extent that demands for democratic prin-
ciples have caused political revolutions in many countries. Even states with questionable
democratic credentials wish to be described or describe themselves as democracies.
36
In con-
trast, due to their repression of civil society and disregard for individual rights, authoritarian
regimes lacked the necessary soft power resources to engender the attraction, aspiration and
admiration of other states in the current liberal-democratic international order. Put differently,
authoritarian states do a poor job of winning hearts and minds internationally. However, the
rise in the international profile of Russia and China, two of the world’s leading authoritarian
regimes, suggests that these regimes have come up with innovative ways to by-pass their
‘soft power inadequacies’, by projecting influence abroad in ways that cannot be explained
using the soft power paradigm.
The term sharp power has been adopted to describe authoritarian regimes’efforts to shape
international perceptions in ways that run counter to democratic ideals. At a time when demo-
cratic values are popular, there is evidence that these regimes are working to make democracy
less attractive through the manipulation of electoral processes within democratic states. Sharp
power refers to strategies that include manipulation to ‘sap the integrity of independent insti-
tutions’within democracies. It is deployed by authoritarian states to undermine people’s trust in
democratic institutions and values.
37
As explained in the 2017 report of the National Endow-
ment for Democracy, which first introduced the concept, it is called ‘sharp because it seeks
to “pierce”,“penetrate”or “perforate”the political and informational environment of targeted
countries’.
38
Authoritarian regimes harness sharp power to project their anti-democratic
values abroad through malicious manipulation of institutions (both political and informational)
to polarise opinions within democracies. Nye notes that sharp power ‘is the deceptive use of
information for hostile purposes’.
39
It is a form of nonmilitary political warfare used by author-
itarian states domestically and internationally ‘to persuade, intimidate, coerce and weaken pol-
itical opponents’in a bid to silence opposition to their rule and value systems.
40
Having insulated their political systems, autocrats are taking advantage of the openness
that characterises the informational and cultural space within democracies to project their
6A. E. AKINOLA AND O. OGUNNUBI

values internationally. Russia and China have invested billions in overseas media infrastructure
as a strategy to influence public opinion.
41
This is in addition to public diplomacy efforts
which involve people-people exchanges, educational and cultural programmes and think
tanks. While this fits soft power narratives, authoritarian regimes are merely using these
soft power tools for sharp power gains- unscrupulous manipulation of perceptions and elec-
toral processes within democracies to tarnish democratic values. The autocrats’intention is
not so much to attract, but to manipulate or distract members of the public (within democ-
racies) through disinformation.
42
Moscow and Beijing are increasingly resorting to sharp power (despite possessing impress-
ive soft power resources) for strategic reasons. First, through sharp power, authoritarian
values that emphasise state dominance over individual rights are projected outward, allowing
autocrats to influence the opinions and perceptions of citizens in democracies. Second, it
takes a relatively long time for soft power initiatives to yield results and when they do, it
becomes difficult to understand how the attraction engendered can translate into political
gains. With sharp power, the gains are immediate and can be seen in how the political
environment of targeted states has been manipulated to promote views and social disruption
favourable to the political objectives of authoritarian states. The aim is to undermine the
credibility and viability of international opponents; be they state or non-state actors.
Democratic states are vulnerable to authoritarian sharp power. Authoritarian states are
engaging in unilateral competition in the space of ideas within democratic states while
raising barriers to such external influence within their own systems. The informational
environment in democracies is treated as ‘fair game’to be exploited. Russia, which is the
focus of this article, has shown that it has not forgotten the ‘Cold War game’of influence
(sharp power practice). The regime in Moscow has demonstrated a remarkable ability to
take advantage of globalisation to cause harm to the brand of democracy both at home
and abroad. Moscow has interfered in the electoral processes of democracies in Europe
and North America and spread disinformation using its international media outlets and an
army of social-media trolls to exacerbate existing socio-political divisions. While Russia’s
sharp power efforts in these regions have gained the attention of scholars, its similar cam-
paigns in Africa have not been subjected to the same level of scrutiny. In most cases, they
are treated as an isolated incidence of Moscow’sinfluence outside of its immediate
borders. We contend that the Kremlin’s sharp power efforts in Africa (no matter how isolate-
d)is capable of reversing democratic gains and have grave implications for the growth and
survival of the democratic project on the continent where democracy is at best fragile.
Sharp power: Russia’s strategy for winning influence in Africa
African is historically a centre for super-power influence competition. Its vast reservoir of
mineral resources and huge population means that whoever has control gains access to
resources and markets for finished goods. The European colonialists were the first to
compete for influence in Africa. Following the commencement of the Cold War and African
states’attainment of political independence, the US and the Soviet Union joined the
contest to gain political and economic influence on the continent.
43
The struggle for influence in Africa has attracted new foreign powers. Most notable are
China, Turkey and the Gulf states.
44
Russia’s re-entry into the superpower competition in
Africa has been described as late.
45
Moscow’s foray into Africa comes when foreign powers
have carved out spheres of influence for themselves. Only ‘left over’countries under economic
AFRICAN SECURITY REVIEW 7

sanctions remain. Zimbabwe, Libya and Sudan where Russia operates fit this description.
Russia is outmatched in the areas of trade and finance. The Kremlin lacks the financial
muscle enjoyed by other foreign powers to foster trade or drive infrastructure development
on the continent. Notwithstanding this limitation, Russia is pushing for influence through
other means. Moscow’s shrewd understanding of the political needs of African elites and
its willingness to meet these needs however unethical gives it an edge in the superpower
competition. Russia is using its sharp power resources to penetrate the informational and pol-
itical space in Africa. The goal is not just to trade and win foreign markets, but to warm its way
into the hearts of African elites to gain international allies. This section discusses Russia’s array
of sharp power tools for influence in Africa.
Penetrating communication markets in Africa
Having perfected media manipulation in Europe,
46
Moscow is investing in Africa’s informa-
tional sector. The objective is to ‘hijack’public opinion through disinformation. Using non-
state actors, known as ‘The Company’, Russia covertly penetrated the communication
markets of some African states. ‘The-Company’does this by buying existing media outlets
which then feed pro-Russian editorials and content to the public. Locals working for these
media platforms help disguise their objectives. For instance, in Madagascar, the largest news-
paper is reportedly owned by Russian operatives.
47
In the CAR, through its control of print
media outlets and a radio station, the Kremlin is pushing its narrative as a world power
and alternative to France, the erstwhile colonial power in that country.
48
Russian international
media such as Russia Today (RT) and Sputnik have also been identified as key to its sharp
power efforts.
49
As satellite TV stations, Russia Today(RT) enjoy global coverage through
their access to European and American communication markets. In Africa, it has entered
into agreements with local media entities in Eritrea, Ivory Coast and Cameroon with the objec-
tive of reaching African audiences. As international media platforms, RT and Sputnik are often
portrayed as soft power initiatives in the same mould as the British Broadcasting Cooperation
(BCC) or Cable Network News (US). In reality, they are sharp power resources used by the
Kremlin to promote its global agenda. Although financed by the Russian government, this
is not why they constitute sharp power; after all, the BBC is also funded by taxpayers’
money. While the BBC and CNN are known for occasionally airing views critical of their
home government, RT and Sputnik amplify the Kremlin’s messages. Aside from feeding
African audiences with pro-Russian views, RT provides alternative international media
outlets to African autocrats.
Russia has demonstrated a remarkable ability to use disinformation on social media to
polarise opinion and to cause confusion in targeted countries. Indeed, it has crafted a tem-
plate to do so. The Russian troll-factory, Internet Research Agency was exposed by the
Robert Mueller-led inquiry into Russian election meddling in the US as the principal agent
of disinformation targeted at social media users during the 2016 US election. Russia
employs similar tactics in Africa, where communication systems are open to manipulation,
due to ‘misinformation- the mistaken, rather than the deliberate sharing of inaccurate infor-
mation’.
50
Russia’s disinformation campaign is most active on social media platforms where
botnets and individual accounts are set up to influence public opinion in ways that align
with Kremlin’s views. Moscow has also begun using social media for election meddling in
Africa. In 2019, Facebook announced that it had shutdown networks of Facebook pages
with links to the IRA (the troll factory that carried out disinformation campaign in the 2016
8A. E. AKINOLA AND O. OGUNNUBI

US election), targeting eight African countries.
51
According to Facebook, the operation tar-
geted Madagascar, the CAR, Mozambique, DRC, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Sudan and Libya.
The Facebook pages were set up by Russian operatives as a ‘cheerleading’platform to
canvass support for ruling parties or rulers and to defame opposition in targeted countries
through disinformation. In the recently concluded Mozambican election, Facebook pages
set up by the IRA falsely accused RENAMO (the opposition party) of signing a contract with
China to use Mozambique as storage for its nuclear waste, if it wins the election, in exchange
for Chinese support.
52
Clearly, such posts were designed to influence people to vote for
FRELIMO. A foreign power expressing support for a party or ruling elite is not a breach of inter-
national law per se. However, when such support is disguised on social media as ordinary citi-
zens or local groups’private accounts, it becomes an attempt to manipulate opinion to favour
Moscow’s interests. Such acts breach the line between good and bad international practices.
Russia’s media penetration of Africa consists of both online and offline mechanisms. The
Kremlin’s push for a share of communication markets in Africa goes beyond the usual narra-
tive of telling its story to African audiences. It involves a carefully thought-out effort to alter
political perceptions and portray a malicious narrative that promotes Moscow’s interests.
While these efforts have been curtailed to some extent by social media platforms’proactive
stance on fake news, the danger is intensified when fake news generated on social media is
given credence by ‘reputable’Russian international media platforms like RT and Sputnik. This
tends to cause problems in Africa. Russia’s use of RT to give credibility to fake news generated
on German social media led to anti-immigrant protests on the streets of Berlin.
53
If the Kremlin
is able to influence the opinions of a sophisticated European public, it is likely to face few
hurdles in doing so in Africa.
The use of political consultants to meddle in elections
The holding of elections is now so popular across Africa that military coup d’états that were
once the norm on the continent are a rarity. Regional bodies in Africa that once tolerated mili-
tary rulers now frown against non-electoral political interventions. However, as the conduct of
elections becomes more competitive, politicians are increasingly finding it difficult to rig elec-
tions and are resorting to violence to tilt electoral odds. African politicians are also embracing
western democracies styled electioneering, especially the American model. It is now
common-place for political parties and politicians on the continent to employ the services
of political consulting firms in the US to advise on campaign methods, social media outreach
and media coverage of their campaign.
54
Moscow is preying on the need of the political class in Africa to hang on to power at all
costs. Russian political consultants offer African elites state-of-the-art technologies to
perfect electoral fraud without resulting to violence. The holding of elections in Russia,
while a regular and predictable affair, is far from credible and fair. The state has dominated
the electoral process to the extent that elections hardly reflect the will of the populace.
The political opposition is discredited, jailed or assassinated. We argue that Russian political
consultants are seeking to do the same thing in Africa. There is a clear incentive on the
part of African elites to accept this form of ‘electoral’assistance. Unlike their western counter-
parts, who sell their consulting services to anyone who can afford them, Russian political tech-
nologists mainly work with ruling elites as political advisors and disinformation specialists.
They render their services not in exchange for payment, but as a means to co-opt the
rulers of targeted states. Unlike Cambridge Analytical and others in the West, Russian political
AFRICAN SECURITY REVIEW 9

consultants are not independent organisations; they are ‘state-backed’entities created for the
purpose of perpetuating autocratic rule in Africa.
In Madagascar, where Russian election interference was first recorded in Africa, Russian pol-
itical consultants funded the electoral campaign of six of the 35 candidates contesting the
presidential election in 2018.
55
This was clearly calculated to divide the opposition so as to
give former president, Rajaonarimampianina, a chance at the polls. When the president
failed to win the first ballot, the consultants put pressure on the remaining candidates to with-
draw from the poll and to support the new preferred candidate, Rajoelina, who eventually
won the election.
56
Likewise, Russian political operatives played an active role in the election
campaign of President Mnangagwa of Zimbabwe in 2018
57
by acting as political advisors and
campaign strategists. Russian interference in Zimbabwe’s election became clear when Russian
advisors facilitated a meeting between the chair of the Russian Electoral Commission and his
Zimbabwean counterpart to discuss issues of electoral sovereignty on the eve of the election.
Opposition parties in Zimbabwe alleged that the country’s Electoral Commission had been co-
opted by Russia to do the bidding of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic
Front party (ZANU-PF).
58
Alpha Conde, the president of Guinea made use of Russian political
consultants to carry out a disinformation campaign and other electoral malpractices in the
2020 presidential election, having already amended the country’s constitution to allow him
to run for a third term of office. Thus far, the activities of Russian spin doctors have mainly
been confined to poor, resource-rich countries with fragile democratic institutions such as
Zimbabwe, Madagascar, the CAR, Mozambique and Libya. Moscow’s intention is to lend
support to autocrats in these states so as to help them shake offsanctions of western
powers and ultimately gain access to exploit their natural resources in exchange for Kremlin’s
support.
Biased election observers- the Association for Free Research and International
Cooperation (AFRIC)
Independent election monitoring groups –both local and international –have become inte-
gral stakeholders of the electoral process in countries across the world. Their assessment,
evaluation and report of the electoral processes of a given state help shed light on the credi-
bility and fairness of elections. More often, international organisations and policymakers use
the reports of election observers to make a judgment about the democratic credential of
states. Because the report of international election observers carried the weight of credibility
and impartiality, international media outlets use their election assessment in their reportage.
Moscow views Western international election observers in a less favourable light. To the
Kremlin, western election observer groups are foreign agents used to critique the holding
of elections. In Eastern Europe, which is a sphere of Moscow’sinfluence, Russia has created
what is called bias election observer groups to counteract the negative reports from
western election observers and shore up support for pro-Kremlin regimes.
59
According to She-
khovtsov, these biased observers underemphasise or cover up fraud for audiences at home
and abroad by lending credibility to elections criticised as illegal by the international commu-
nity.
60
In other words, Moscow uses fake election observers as instruments of election
interference.
African autocrats share Moscow’s views on election observers from Western Europe and
North America and have in some cases appointed observers to give credence to the fraudu-
lent electoral processes they supervise. Russia has taken the game a step further by extending
10 A. E. AKINOLA AND O. OGUNNUBI

its network of international bias election observers to willing states in Africa. The Association
for Free Research and International Cooperation (AFRIC) has been exposed as a pro-Kremlin
fake election observer mission in Africa. On its website, AFRIC describes itself as a community
of independent researchers, experts and activists.
61
In reality, the group was created as a
Russian front to push African narratives. Many of its members have links to oligarchs with
close ties to the Kremlin and the group receives donations from Russia.
In all the African countries it has worked in, AFRIC has demonstrated willingness to collab-
orate with Russian political operatives on the ground, underreported or ignored the extent of
electoral fraud and shown a clear bias for the ruling elite.
62
For instance, in the Zimbabwean
election, notable election observers such as the EU gave the electoral process the thumbs up
while expressing misgivings about political intimidation, the incumbent’s misuse of state
resources and the bias of state media houses. However, in a joint statement on the election,
AFRIC was full of praise for the Zimbabwean Electoral Commission for its proper handling of
the electoral process. It went further to proclaim that, ‘observers had not seen any signs of
electoral fraud, voter intimidation or external interference in the election’. State media
houses and other pro-Mnangagwa media outlets aired only AFRIC reports to justify the ‘credi-
bility’of the election. In the DRC, nearly all the observer missions expressed misgivings about
the country’s electoral process. International media coverage highlighted instances of elec-
toral fraud, especially given that the eventual winner, Mr. Felix Tsisekedi, finished second in
the first ballot with 19% of the vote. AFRIC underplayed the incidence of electoral fraud
reported in the media and stated in its review that the ‘election was (sic) organised in accord-
ance with the electoral law of the country’.
63
A rehash of this sentence was repeated in its
report on the Mozambican election despite large scale electoral malpractices.
AFRIC has also conducted illegal polls as part of its election observation. The Electoral Com-
mission in Madagascar withdrew AFRIC’s accreditation following its conduct of exit polls
during the first ballot. In Mozambique, despite being considered unlawful, AFRIC’s election
poll which predicted victory for the ruling Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique (FRELIMO)
party was condoned by the government. The link showing the result of the illegal poll was
widely shared by the FRELIMO party faithful.
64
Through its conduct of polls, AFRIC aims to
project how a ruling party would win an election, rather than genuinely forecast how the elec-
torate will vote. The conduct of illegal polls is quite common in Russia
65
and it helps to vali-
date the subsequent rigging of votes and landslide victories that usually follow such polls. It is
clear that AFRIC is employing such tactics when called upon to observe elections in Africa. Bias
election observer groups like AFRIC, with the backing of a foreign power in the form of Russia,
help to whitewash electoral fraud committed by African autocrats that enjoy the Kremlin’s
support.
Cultivation of personal ties with renegade political activists
According to Barnett, Russia’s political warfare weapon rests on three legs, namely disinforma-
tion, financial and human.
66
The human aspect comprises spotting, recruiting and running
agents. This extends to the cultivation of personal ties and sponsorship of thought leaders,
journalists and activists (that suit Moscow’s agenda) in young democracies. Such connections
offer local activists, access to resources and prestige.
67
Cultivation of ties with thought leaders
enables Moscow to shape policy and gives it access to wider audiences. Furthermore, these
activists help push the Kremlin’s agenda in their country without the direct involvement of
Moscow’s operatives.
AFRICAN SECURITY REVIEW 11

Examples of Russian sponsored political activists or thought leaders are few and far
between due to the secretive nature of such engagement. One well-known example is the
Beninois-French Pan-Africanist, Kemi Saba, whose real name is Stellio Capo Chichi. Often
described as a convicted anti-Semite and black racist leader,
68
he commands a handful of fol-
lowers in many Francophone countries. The anti-western, anti-French and anti-Semite posts
which are central to his message resonate with Russian political operatives, who see him as
a useful ally in bolstering anti-French sentiments. During the Madagascar election, he was
invited to speak at conferences organised by Russian operatives. During one of these he
proclaimed:
France, get out of our territories, you have no right to there (sic). Africans have more trust in Russia
than in US or France …we don’t need to ask the permission of the west to gain the lands that are
our right. We just need ally ourselves with good geostrategic and geo-political forces …free Africa
or death. We will be victorious.
69
Another instance of Russian agents cultivating ties with renegade political activists on the
continent is the relationship between the Ghana-based non-governmental organization Elim-
ination of Barriers for the Liberation of Africa (EBLA) and the Moscow-based troll factory, the
Internet Research Agency (IRA). Given the paucity of credible groups and individuals willing to
openly identify with Russia and its values, cultivating personal ties with renegade political acti-
vists on the continent would not yield much success.
Conclusion
The theory of sharp power describes authoritarian states’efforts of winning influence in
democratic states through the manipulation of their political and informational environments.
Through sharp power, authoritarian states seek to undermine democratic values and insti-
tutions of targeted states to facilitate public opinion or elites’tolerant of their anti-democratic
dispositions. Adopting the sharp power theory, the paper contends that Russia’s renewed
interest in Africa portends great danger for democracy on the continent. Moscow engage-
ment with more democratic states across Africa and its offer of ‘electoral assistance’, which
undermines electoral integrity, is something only a few politicians could resist. While disinfor-
mation campaign during electioneering is not new in Africa, the use of online tools to spread
disinformation is novel. Russian political operatives have shown the capacity to use social
media, through botnets and troll factories, to hijack public opinion. Moreover, Russian political
operatives in the continent have sought to cultivate ties with renegade political activists in
few countries to carry out disinformation campaigns as well as create biased election observer
missions to legitimatise electoral fraud. It can be posited that it is only a matter of time before
these operatives start to operate in relatively established African democracies as they offer
services that the political class can benefit. This threat can reverse democratic gains in
Africa. Russia’s sharp power efforts go beyond granting support to allies to maintain or get
them in power; it also involves causing political disruptions in targeted countries that
Moscow sees as opponents.
70
African states that opposed Kremlin’s sharp power effort in
the future risk their religious and ethnic fault lines being exacerbated to cause conflict.
This article also argued that instances of Russian electoral interference in African states,
which are regarded by some analysts as isolated occurrences, should be seen as quite the
opposite. Although Russian political operatives and disinformation specialists have demon-
strated a willingness to work with autocratic leaders on the continent, it would be wrong
12 A. E. AKINOLA AND O. OGUNNUBI

to state that Moscow’sinfluence is limited to these states and is therefore not a threat to states
where democracy has been relatively entrenched. Instead, such political interference should
be seen as a testing ground for more effective political and election meddling in Africa in the
future. If Moscow’s history in Eastern Europe is anything to go by, it can be argued that
Russian operatives are using these authoritarian hotspots to understand the African political
environment.
The study benefited immensely from theoretical insights gained from the sharp power
theory. However, the study’s reliance on the sharp power paradigm means it could not evalu-
ate Russia’s soft power projection in Africa. Admittedly, Moscow deploys both soft and sharp
power measures in its engagements with African states and a focus on sharp power as done in
this paper may not capture the extent and effectiveness of Russia’s soft power initiatives on
the continent. The study’s theoretical shortcomings can be strengthened by future studies
that incorporate other theoretical insights from the soft power paradigm. Given that the
current geopolitical power competition in Africa also involves the race for winning hearts
and minds, future studies on the Russo-Africa relations should focus on Russia’s soft power.
These studies should examine the impacts and influence of Moscow’s soft power initiatives
in the areas of higher education (scholarship for African students), cultural exchange pro-
grammes and medical diplomacy (donation of Covid-19 vaccines to African states) on Afri-
cans. For instance, it will be interesting to examine whether Moscow’s soft power resources
in this regard, engender the expected attraction, aspiration and admiration from African
nationals and to what extent the use of Russia’s soft power consolidates or detracts from
its sharp power?
Notes
1. Jackson, ‘Great Power in Africa’.
2. Diamond, ‘Russia and the Threat to Liberal Democracy’.
3. Gvosdev, ‘Is Russia Sabotaging Democracy’.
4. Blackwill and Gordon, Containing Russia.
5. Bratteberg and Maurer, Russian Electoral Interference.
6. Walker, ‘What Is “Sharp power”?’
7. Kuczynski, Russia in Africa.
8. Stronski, Late to the Party.
9. Gathara, Russia Has Joined the ‘Scramble’for Africa.
10. Fukuyama, The New Marxists Leninists States in the Third World.
11. Mills and Pienaar, ‘Nazdorovva?’
12. Fidan and Aras, ‘The Return of Russia-Africa Relations’.
13. Ibid., 4.
14. Gotz and Merlen, ‘Russia and the Question of World Order’.
15. Kuczynski, Russia in Africa.
16. Stronski, Late to the Party.
17. Kalika, Russia Great Return to Africa?
18. Kuczynski, Russia in Africa.
19. BBC, Russia to Build Nuclear Power Plans in Nigeria.
20. Gides, Russian in Sub-Saharan Africa.
21. Kalika, Russia Great Return to Africa?
22. Fidan and Aras, The Return of Russia-Africa Relations.
23. Adibe, What Does Russia Really Want from Africa?
24. Stronski, Late to the Party.
25. Rakener et al., Democratisation’s Third Wave.
26. Adejumobi, ‘Elections in Africa’.
AFRICAN SECURITY REVIEW 13

27. The ‘tonic’effect of elections describes Lindberg’s (2006) thesis which posits that an ‘uninter-
rupted series of election has a “self-reinforcing power”to inculcate society with democratic qual-
ities’. Lindberg, Democracy and Elections in Africa.
28. Ighobor, ‘African Democracy Coming of Age’.
29. Maendeleo, Elections in the Sub-Saharan Africa.
30. Appiah-Thompson, ‘Electoral Politics and Democracy in Africa’.
31. IPI, ‘Elections in Africa’.
32. IFES, Elections Worth Dying For?
33. Omotola, ‘Elections and Democratic Transition in Nigeria’.
34. Nye, Soft Power.
35. Ibid.
36. Enumeo, ‘Democracy, Human Rights and the Rule of Law’.
37. Walker, ‘What Is “Sharp Power”?’
38. Walker and Ludwig, ‘The Meaning of Sharp Power’.
39. Nye, ‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power’.
40. Foxall and Hemmings, ‘Introduction’.
41. Nye, How Sharp Power Threathens Soft Power.
42. Janda and Vichova, ‘Russia’s Manipulation of European Media’.
43. Metz, ‘Great Power Competition’.
44. Yachshen, ‘Great Power Competition and the Scramble for Africa’.
45. Stronski, Late to the Party.
46. Janda and Vichova, ‘Russia’sManipulation of European’.
47. Harding and Burke, ‘Leaked Documents’.
48. Arbunies, Russia Sharp Power in Africa.
49. Ibid.
50. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Russia Disinformation Campaigns Target Africa.
51. CNN, ‘Russia Election Meddling Is Back’.
52. Ibid.
53. Janda and Vichova, ‘Russia’s Manipulation of European’.
54. Searcey, ‘Political Handlers with Trump Ties’.
55. Borgia, ‘Did Russia Meddle in Madagascar Election?’
56. Ibid.
57. Zwicewicz, ‘Russia in Africa’.
58. Ibid.
59. Shekhovtson, Fake Election Observation.
60. Ibid.
61. AFRIC, https://web.archive.org/web/20180815142259/https://afric.online/about/
62. Shekhovtson, Fake Election Observation.
63. AFRIC, ‘Report of the International Observation Mission’.
64. Ibid
65. Smyth and Oates, ‘Russia’s Rigged Elections’.
66. Barnet, ‘The Tripod’.
67. Walker and Ludwig, ‘The Meaning of Sharp Power’.
68. Poller, ‘The Wrath of Ka’.
69. Roxhdestvensky et al., ‘Npoekt’.
70. Airbunies, Russia Sharp Power in Africa.
14 A. E. AKINOLA AND O. OGUNNUBI

Notes on contributors
Akinlolu Akinola is a PhD candidate at the department of Political Science,
Obafemi Awolowo university, Ile-Ife, Nigeria. His research interest covers com-
parative poltics and international relations. His most recent work was published
by The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs.
Olusola Ogunnubi is a Research Fellow with the University of the Free State and a Visiting Scholar at
Carleton University, Ottawa. His research has been published in journals including South African
Journal of International Affairs, African Security, Politikon, Journal of Contemporary African Studies
and Journal of Asian and African Studies.
ORCID
Akinlolu E. Akinola http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8906-3803
Olusola Ogunnubi http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5005-9519
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