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The Specter of the Past: Reconstructing Conservative Historical Memory in South Korea

September 2021
Politics and Society 49(3):337-362

Authors:

University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa

Through the case of the New Right movement in South Korea in the early 2000s, this article explores how history has become a battleground on which the Right tried to regain its political legitimacy in the postauthoritarian context. Analyzing disputes over historiography in recent decades, this article argues that conservative intellectuals—academics, journalists, and writers—play a pivotal role in constructing conservative historical narratives and building an identity for right-wing movements. By contesting what they viewed as “distorted” leftist views and promoting national pride, New Right intellectuals positioned themselves as the guardians of “liberal democracy” in the Republic of Korea. Existing studies of the Far Right pay little attention to intellectual circles and their engagement in civil society. By examining how right-wing intellectuals appropriated the past and shaped triumphalist national imagery, this study aims to better understand the dynamics of ideational contestation and knowledge production in Far Right activism.

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https://doi.org/10.1177/00323292211033082

Politics & Society

2021, Vol. 49(3) 337 –362

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DOI: 10.1177/00323292211033082

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Article

The Specter of the Past:

Reconstructing Conservative

Historical Memory in South

Korea*

Myungji Yang

University of Hawai‘i–Mānoa

Abstract

Through the case of the New Right movement in South Korea in the early 2000s, this

article explores how history has become a battleground on which the Right tried to

regain its political legitimacy in the postauthoritarian context. Analyzing disputes over

historiography in recent decades, this article argues that conservative intellectuals—

academics, journalists, and writers—play a pivotal role in constructing conservative

historical narratives and building an identity for right-wing movements. By contesting

what they viewed as “distorted” leftist views and promoting national pride, New

Right intellectuals positioned themselves as the guardians of “liberal democracy”

in the Republic of Korea. Existing studies of the Far Right pay little attention to

intellectual circles and their engagement in civil society. By examining how right-

wing intellectuals appropriated the past and shaped triumphalist national imagery,

this study aims to better understand the dynamics of ideational contestation and

knowledge production in Far Right activism.

Keywords

right-wing intellectuals, the New Right, historical narratives, Far Right activism, South

Korea

Corresponding Author:

Myungji Yang, Department of Sociology, University of Hawai‘i –Mānoa, 2424 Maile Way, Saunders 640,

Honolulu, HI 96822, USA.

Email: myang4@hawaii.edu

*This is one of four articles and an introduction that form a special issue of Politics & Society titled

“Right-Wing Activism in Asia: Cold War Legacies, Geopolitics, and Democratic Erosion.” The four

articles developed from the earlier versions presented at a symposium titled “Rise of Illiberal Politics in

Asia” organized by Yoonkyung Lee, director of the Centre for the Study of Korea at the University of

Toronto, on November 15, 2019. The authors would like to thank Professors Takashi Fujitani, Sida Liu,

Andre Schmid, and Jack Veugelers, who participated in the symposium as discussants and offered critical

comments.

1033082PASXXX10.1177/00323292211033082Politics & SocietyYang

research-article2021

338 Politics & Society 49(3)

One book caused a huge sensation in South Korean society in the summer of 2019.

Titled Anti-Japan Tribalism (Panil Chongjokchuŭi) and written by several right-wing

authors, it makes many provocative assertions about Japanese colonialism.1 The

authors claim that the existing Korean historiography on aspects of colonialism such

as forced labor, the plundering of rice, and the exploitation of comfort women is based

on fabrications by leftist and nationalistic South Korean historians. Accusing South

Korean academics and citizens critical of Japanese exploitation of being infected with

“anti-Japan tribalism”—strong anti-Japanese sentiments and nationalistic political

propaganda—the authors maintain that anti-Japan tribalism is the product of an

“uncivilized” Korean culture rampant with shamanism and lies, a culture that will

continue to be a barrier to civilization and advancement unless it is overcome.

The book created heated debate and received polarizing assessments. Historians,

liberal intellectuals, and the media all criticized it for distorting historical facts and

supporting arguments made by the extreme right in Japan.2 Some conservative politi-

cians also expressed unease about the book and did not agree with its main arguments.3

But much of the conservative media welcomed the book’s “new” perspectives. It was

one of the best-selling books of 2019, and the same authors published a second book

in 2020 that responded to the criticisms that the first received. The publication of

Anti-Japan Tribalism exemplifies the efforts of right-wing intellectuals to provide a

historical analysis that counters what they view as a dominant leftist, “totalitarian”

perspective. In the wake of left-leaning reformist governments and the mainstreaming

of former student activists as a political force, right-wing intellectuals and politicians

have tried to delegitimize their political counterparts over the last two decades.

The interpretation of unsettled historical matters has been a major arena of conflict

between the Left and the Right. Historical events are constantly invoked in contem-

porary political discourse and often spark vehement debates among politicians, aca-

demics, and journalists. Looking at intellectual movements on the New Right

(nyurait’ŭ)—of which the authors of Anti-Japan Tribalism were an important part—

in South Korea beginning in the early 2000s, this article explores how history has

become a battleground on which the Right hopes to restore its political legitimacy

and symbolic power. Analyzing disputes over historiography in the recent decade

relating to the founding of the Republic of Korea (1948) and the Park Chung Hee

regime (1961–79), I argue that conservative intellectuals—academics, journalists,

writers, and political analysts—play a pivotal role in constructing conservative his-

torical narratives and building an identity for right-wing movements. Promoting

national pride and contesting what they view as “distorted” leftist views, the Korean

intellectual right has positioned itself as the guardian of “liberal democracy” in the

Republic of Korea—the most important ideological tenet among the South Korea

right.4 As the Right has believed that “freedom” (chayu) is unattainable in a commu-

nist country, “liberal democracy” in South Korea has been understood as an antithesis

to communism or socialism. Given the confrontation with North Korea and the con-

tinuing threat from that country, the Right argues that opposing communism and

North Korea is fundamentally synonymous with protecting freedom and democracy

in South Korea.

Yang 339

While terms such as “Far Right,” “right wing,” and “conservative” may represent

different positions within conservative politics at large and often in the mainstream

conservative party framework, I use these terms interchangeably in the South Korean

context, which will be explained in depth later. Further, unlike the New Right in most

Western European countries, which is usually associated with the Far Right, the New

Right in South Korea originally emerged to reform the existing right and was not more

extreme than mainstream conservatives.

This article tries to tackle two main weaknesses in the existing literature on the Far

Right. First, scholarship has mainly focused on globalization and neoliberalism as the

driving force of the recent, worldwide, right-wing mobilization, which it sees as a

reactionary response to rising social inequality and eroding national identity.5 Yet this

explanation tends to overlook historical legacies and past experiences that have shaped

political processes in particular national contexts. Second, in contrast to the literature

on progressive social movements, which emphasizes the roles of ideas and knowledge,

right-wing movements have often been associated with anti-intellectualism.6 Thus,

existing studies of the Far Right and conservative movements do not pay adequate

attention to the role of intellectuals who provide ideological resources and discursive

frameworks. By studying the role of right-wing intellectuals in rewriting modern

Korean history, this article deepens our understanding of the production of historical

knowledge and narratives—positive images of the past—on the Far Right.

Methods and Data

This article employs qualitative research methods combining ethnographic observa-

tion, in-depth interviews, and archival research. I undertook one and a half years of

field research in Seoul between December 2016 and July 2020. Seeking a view from

inside,7 I listened to right-wing intellectuals and tried to understand why they believe

what they do. I attended right-wing protests, political meetings, and special lectures

organized by right-wing politicians and activists. I conducted in-depth interviews with

thirty-one intellectuals involved in right-wing activism in both online and off-line set-

tings, including college professors, journalists, lawyers, and political analysts in think

tanks. Lastly, I analyzed news articles, columns, and op-ed pieces in conservative

newspapers and magazines, as well as books and personal memoirs written by right-

wing authors. I have used three major conservative newspapers—the Chosun Ilbo, the

Dong-A Ilbo, and the JoongAng Ilbo—as sources for mainstream conservative views.

I also examined the Monthly Chosun (Wŏlgan Chosun)—a sister monthly magazine

published by the Chosun Ilbo—for the postauthoritarian period (1987–present).

Collectively these publications illustrate conservative intellectuals’ worldviews and

perspectives on national history and political identity.

This wide range of data allowed me to closely observe the on-the-ground internal

dynamics of right-wing groups and the views and feelings shared by their members:

how they make sense of Korean politics and history (including both Koreas), what

views they have of the Korean nation, how they define democracy, and what they think

it means to belong to the Right in South Korea. I tried to account for ideological bias

340 Politics & Society 49(3)

in the data by consulting a wide range of sources. For example, where possible I cross-

checked and confirmed information from conservative sources, often consulting lib-

eral as well as conservative authorities in order to minimize bias and obtain the most

accurate picture possible of right-wing politics.

In the following section, I will discuss existing scholarship on the rise of the Far

Right and suggest how studying the South Korean case of conservative intellectuals

invoking historical justifications can bridge gaps in the literature. After sketching how

the official history was written by the authoritarian regimes, I describe the new demo-

cratic governments’ efforts to come to terms with the past in the postauthoritarian

period and the strong backlash from the Right. Through two cases of battles over his-

torical figures and memory—Syngman Rhee and the founding of the Republic of

Korea, and Park Chung Hee and the national modernization project—I analyze the

historical narratives promoted by New Right intellectuals.

Conservative Intellectuals and National Identity

The resurgence of Far Right parties and movements has become a global trend during

the past decade, threatening democratic institutions and norms in developed countries,

particularly in Europe and the United States. Existing studies commonly see this phe-

nomenon as a backlash to increasing economic inequality, political insecurity, and

cultural concerns in the context of globalization and neoliberalism.8 In a globalized

and postindustrial economy, workers and low-level managers whose economic posi-

tions are deteriorating develop a sense of resentment and frustration toward an estab-

lishment that is seemingly unable to offer solutions. The simplistic and nativist rhetoric

of the Far Right often appeals to those who feel betrayed by mainstream politics. Far

Right movements and leaders are able to exploit working people’s sense of deprivation

and social injustice by accusing immigrants of “stealing” jobs and abusing the gener-

ous benefits of Western welfare states. They also highlight the (alleged) incompatibil-

ity of immigrant behavioral norms and cultural values with those of the native

population.9 The core political programs and ideologies that the Far Right commonly

shares are thus ethno-nationalist xenophobia and antiestablishment populism.10 Many

studies also argue that the Left’s shift to the center and a general failure to manage

social discontent combined to open up fertile ground for the Far Right.11

Despite its explanatory power, existing scholarship on the Far Right has some

weaknesses. First, Western-centric scholarship—dominated by studies on both

Western and Eastern European countries as well as the United States—has a limited

capacity to explain non-Western countries where the Far Right is gaining traction but

immigration is not a prominent political issue. Moreover, Asian cases are generally

missing in the study of the Far Right, even though the Far Right has always been part

of mainstream politics, particularly in South Korea and Japan as an anticommunist

bulwark under American hegemony after the end of World War II. Through the South

Korean case, this article will add a comparative perspective to the existing literature.

Second, the existing literature has difficulty explaining why, despite similar struc-

tural forces—neoliberal economics, rising social inequality, increasing migration, and

Yang 341

economic integration—the Far Right in some countries is more successful than in

others.12 The success of Far Right politics depends on the extent to which the political

opportunity structure—for instance, electoral rules, party competition, the media envi-

ronment, ideological structures—is favorable to the Far Right.13 Further, it also

depends on the mobilization capacity of Far Right actors and organizations, which

includes membership in Far Right organizations, the strength of alliances among dif-

ferent groups, the proximity of political organizations to ordinary citizens, and so on.

Thus, particular domestic contexts such as political configurations and institutional

arrangements shape the patterns of Far Right politics in different countries. Looking at

how the Right in South Korea tries to accrue political currency by mobilizing particu-

lar historical figures and events, I will shed light on the importance of the politics of

the past in right-wing activism.

Lastly, many empirical studies focus on Far Right parties and their electoral

performances.14 There has been considerably less attention to nonparty sectors and

civil society. The success of Far Right politics does not depend only on the parties

themselves but also on ways in which Far Right parties work together with other right-

ist organizations and networks to promote their values and ideas. In highlighting the

roles of right-wing intellectuals, this essay trains its attention on nonparty and nonstate

actors, who are relatively autonomous from particular political institutions but no less

important in building ideological infrastructure.

Some scholarship emphasizes the importance of historical experience and national

identity—and particularly, the ways in which the past is perceived and framed—in

shaping contemporary Far Right politics.15 For example, David Art demonstrates how

differences in the ways in which Germany and Austria confronted their Nazi past have

shaped divergent support for the Far Right in those two countries.16 In Germany, the

“contrition frame,” widely shared among political elites and ordinary citizens, effec-

tively marginalized the Far Right party that pursued National Socialism and revisionist

interpretations of the Hitler era. By contrast, in Austria the “victim frame”—a defense

of Austrian history rooted in apologetic interpretations of the fascist period—became

a part of the Right’s agenda, polarizing public opinion about the Nazi past. Instead of

enforcing antifascist discursive norms as in Germany, the introduction of nationalist-

chauvinist language into mainstream politics created a more hospitable political envi-

ronment for the Far Right in Austria. An unsettled past often becomes a contested

space, and political elites and intellectuals alike can exploit the past by framing histori-

cal events in ways that achieve their immediate political gains and legitimize their

worldviews. Far from fading into history, ideas about and interpretations of the past

can significantly shape the political present by creating intense debates and ideational

contestation. Thus, historical interpretation often becomes an important tool with

which political elites and entrepreneurs attempt to mobilize support.

Further questions can be raised as to who leads public debates on the lessons of

history—who shapes the discursive space. These conversations are often sparked by

political elites and then filtered down to the general population.17 Elite messages are

both disseminated and framed by the mass media, which in turn shape public opin-

ion. Although in democratic societies ordinary citizens can participate in public

342 Politics & Society 49(3)

deliberation and discussion, and although the internet has created a new space for

ordinary citizens to engage in political debates, everyone’s voice is not given the same

weight. It is mainly social and political elites who lead discussion in a particular direc-

tion. Among the various groups of elites, in this article I particularly focus on

intellectuals.

In contrast to the literature on progressive and transformative social movements,

which emphasizes the roles of ideas and intellectuals,18 the study of right-wing politics

and activism tends to ignore them. Intellectuals are often considered to be critical of

power or, as Said put it, thinkers who “speak truth to power.”19 “True” intellectuals

defend universal values and uphold the rights of man against the claims of the state

and the social order; hence they dare to challenge authority and raise their voices, as

seen in the case of the Dreyfus affair.20 Conservative activists and thinkers, on the

other hand, aim to uphold the existing social order, and those on the far right often use

racist and discriminatory rhetoric against minority groups—that is, they are speaking

for power. In this sense, those on the right do not seem to perfectly fit within the cat-

egory of intellectuals as it is commonly understood. Yet, if we are not restricted to this

normative sense of intellectuals and view them rather as “men of ideas”—those who

take ideas very seriously and seek to provide moral standards, as Coser put it—we can

find many examples on the right.21

Throughout the article, I use the term “intellectuals” in a neutral way to refer to

those who possess expertise in the production of moral and political ideas.22 As ideo-

logical brokers, intellectuals—academics, journalists, writers, political analysists, and

activists—play a leading role in setting agendas, producing knowledge, and building a

collective identity.23 Intellectuals provide interpretive frames that enable individuals to

locate, perceive, and identify both historical and current events. As Benford and Snow

noted, these frames help to render events or occurrences meaningful and thereby guide

actions and garner support.24

While the Far Right is often associated with anti-intellectualism because of its vio-

lent actions, seemingly unrefined ideas, attacks on expertise and scientific knowledge,

and constituency of less educated citizens, it also deploys knowledge for its own

ends.25 Indeed, an intellectual Far Right has long existed. Many prominent thinkers—

Edmund Burke, Martin Heidegger, Ernst Jünger, and Carl Schmitt, to name a few—

have provided ideological resources and interpretative frameworks for the Right.26

Some scholars examine how right-wing intellectuals have sparked public debate,

shaped the public sphere, and disseminated counternarratives against their ideological

counterparts.27 For example, libertarian economists provided academic critiques of

Keynesian economics, promoted laissez-faire economic theories, and shaped the

American conservative movement.28 Asserting that the upheavals of 1968 were

responsible for moral stagnation and social ills in Western societies, conservative his-

torians and philosophers in France and Germany have built a tradition of antileftist

scholarship and provided major theoretical resources for the New Right.29 More

recently, leaders of the contemporary Far Right, such as Greg Johnson and Richard

Spencer, have founded think tanks, established magazines and websites, and built

ideological foundations and infrastructures for the Far Right. Using the internet and

Yang 343

social media, they have promoted rightist principles and criticized liberal ideas about

race, Islam, and elites. They also target college campuses as key sites to “challenge the

limits of free speech, spread propaganda, recruit youth, and polarize campus commu-

nities in ways that contribute to overall far-right goals.”30

Although some studies analyze the thoughts and logics of conservative thinkers and

theorists from a political theory perspective,31 studies on the role of right-wing intel-

lectuals in invoking the past and building an identity are relatively lacking except for

some case studies focused on Germany.32 Through an “alternative” interpretive frame-

work about the Nazi past, some reactionary German intellectuals tried to normalize

German nationalism and to provide ideological resources for Far Right movements.

Likewise, right-wing intellectuals in South Korea play a crucial role in framing his-

torical events in such a way as to enhance the Right’s political legitimacy. Traditionally

considered influential opinion leaders, South Korean intellectuals—both on the right

and on the left—write op-eds in mainstream newspapers and magazines, establish and

advise grassroots organizations, and consult for politicians and policy makers. By

examining how right-wing intellectuals appropriated the past and shaped triumphalist

national imagery, this study aims to better understand the dynamics of ideational con-

testation and historical disputes in right-wing activism.

Throughout this essay, I use the terms conservative and right wing interchangeably

and do not necessarily differentiate the Far Right from mainstream conservative poli-

tics at large. In the US context, Blee and Creasap distinguish “conservative” from

“right wing”: conservatives support patriotism, free enterprise capitalism, and a tradi-

tional moral order, whereas the right wing focuses on race and ethnicity.33 The former

takes more moderate stances and does not engage in violent action, while the latter

promotes violence as a tactic or a goal. More specifically, Miller-Idriss defines the Far

Right as “a fluid spectrum of groups and individuals who represent more extreme and

less extreme version of the antidemocratic and illiberal ideals, practices, and beliefs—

exclusionary, hierarchical, and dehumanizing ideals that prioritize and seek to pre-

serve the superiority and dominance of some groups over others.”34 But both

conservatism and right-wing politics focus on preservation and the restoration of the

rights and privileges of relatively advantaged societal groups,35 and they share an ani-

mus against the agency of subordinate classes.36 While acknowledging the divisions

and differences within the broad conservative sector, Robin focuses on the “counter-

revolutionary” and “reactionary” character that conservatives commonly display.37

Similarly, the South Korean Right is not monolithic as in other countries, and dif-

ferent factions and cleavages within the Right exist. For example, the traditional Old

Right (or Far Right) focuses on anticommunism and takes a hawkish position toward

North Korea,38 whereas the more moderate center-right claims that it pursues less

ideological, more practical issues, particularly related to the economy. However, while

it is possible to conceptually distinguish the Far Right from moderate conservativism,

doing so is practically difficult and not analytically useful in the South Korean context,

for a couple of reasons. First, the unique geopolitical context where the Cold War

remains influential and the fact that the two Koreas are still technically at war have

shaped the ideological terrain in South Korea in an extremely restrictive way, as for

344 Politics & Society 49(3)

many years only anticommunist, rightist ideology could be represented in mainstream

politics, and progressive, left political activists could easily be accused of pro–North

Korean or communist sympathies—a situation that political scientist Jangjip Choi

terms “conservative hegemony.”39 Given this structural condition, the so-called left-

reformist party (the current ruling party) is not especially left in the classical Western

sense. It is centrist at best, although its political opponents always condemn it as radi-

cal or socialist.40 What would be the Far Right in other countries could be seen as

mainstream conservativism in South Korea, as extremist right-wing ideas have been

normalized in mainstream politics. As the Far Right occupies the ideological space of

mainstream conservativism, even the center-right is vulnerable to ideological accusa-

tions from the more extreme right and has had difficulty in broadening its base within

the Right. The moderate or center-right has at times attempted to reform the conserva-

tive party in order to keep up with changing society, but such experiments have never

been successful.41

Second, despite the existence of factions and tensions within the Right, the Far

Right and the more moderate center-right have remained allied in practice. Not only

do they both coexist in the same party and identify themselves as “conservative right”

(posu up’a), but they also share similar historical views as well as the goal of defeating

the so-called left radicals. For example, mainstream conservative lawmakers have par-

ticipated in recent massive antigovernment protests over the past few years,42 and

there is a deep connection between the conservative party and Far Right civic organi-

zations and figures.

All these terms are used in a context-specific way and can be understood properly

only in this particular political context. The definitions familiar in Western contexts

cannot be directly transferred, as the ways in which Left and Right are understood are

historical and social constructs that vary across time and space.43 Unlike in Western

countries, the distinction between the Far Right and mainstream conservativism is

blurred in South Korea.

Two Contested Histories: Official versus Minjung

(Common People) History

The experiences of national division and the Korean War profoundly affected the

political sphere in South Korea.44 The confrontation with North Korea endowed the

South Korean state with enormous power, and anticommunism became the official

state ideology. North Korea was identified as “absolute evil,” and the defeat of com-

munism was considered the top national priority.45 The South Korean state could eas-

ily discipline the behaviors of the populace and suppress oppositional activities in the

name of “national security.”46 Legislation such as the National Security Law became

a powerful means of labeling anybody critical of the South Korean government as

“communists” and “North Korean spies” who would destroy South Korean society.

Thus, the freedom of speech and association was extremely restricted.

The authoritarian state monopolized the production of historical memory. Certain

events were completely obliterated, and people were forced to remember very specific

Yang 345

versions of history. State violence against innocent civilians was often legitimized as

a necessary suppression of “commies” that would ensure national security and public

safety. The survivors and families of victims suffered from trauma, yet they had to

remain silent out of a fear of being accused themselves, with no hope of compensation

or apology.

Many historical incidents remained little known to the public or were falsely repre-

sented as antistate and procommunist. The cases of the April 3 Jeju Uprising in 1948

and the Kwangju prodemocracy movement in 1980 are worth mentioning here because

they demonstrate how the authoritarian state identified ordinary people’s resistance as

illegitimate and completely repressed popular memory. Only vaguely known until the

late 1980s, the April 3 Jeju Uprising started on Jeju Island in 1948, when leftists, pro-

testing the US military government’s decision to hold an election on May 10 to start a

separate government in South Korea, attacked police and right-wing paramilitary

groups.47 The US military and the South Korean police countered this armed rebellion

with extremely brutal tactics, including torture, mass detention, the burning down of

entire villages, and the indiscriminate killings of civilians.48 The violent conflict lasted

until 1954 and resulted in an estimated thirty thousand deaths—about 10 percent of the

entire population of Jeju.49 Throughout the authoritarian era, massacres were system-

atically censored and covered up, and the event was officially known as a “communist

guerrilla insurgency.” For several decades, the people of Jeju feared even mentioning

the event, let alone commemorating their lost loved ones. It was almost half a century

before the deaths of innocent civilians were recognized and a democratic government

officially offered an apology to the victims and their families.

Similarly, the Kwangju prodemocracy movement was organized by citizens of the

long-marginalized southwestern city of Kwangju against the martial law government

in 1980. During this period, the city was blockaded and its citizens were completely

isolated for ten days, allowed no communication with the outside world.50 Paratroopers

violently suppressed street demonstrations, and hundreds of civilians were beaten,

fired upon, and killed by special government troops. The new Chun Doo-Hwan regime

defined this incident as a riot instigated by communist sympathizers connected to

North Korea. Because of severe censorship by the Chun regime, the news media barely

covered what happened in Kwangju, and when they did, they only emphasized the

violent and disordered aspects of the demonstrations and casualties among the troops.51

Most Korean citizens knew only that the chaos in Kwangju was stopped by military

operations. The Chun government accused the long-time dissident Kim Dae Jung of

plotting the rebellion, and Kim was sentenced to death. Until the late 1980s when

democratization took place, this incident was commonly understood as a violent riot

agitated by radical leftists. It was not until 1995 that the National Assembly passed a

special law that enabled prosecution of those responsible for the Kwangju massacre.

The official history under authoritarianism was nothing but a state-sanctioned nar-

rative that emphasized the South Korean state’s struggle and the victory of capitalist

development and “liberal democracy” against communism and South Korean radical

leftists. School textbooks and other official discourses were monopolized by the

authoritarian state, yet critical intellectuals and student activists struggled to construct

346 Politics & Society 49(3)

a dissenting popular narrative in opposition to the official historical accounts.

Developed in the 1980s, this counterhistoriography by the minjung movement tried to

reveal what had been veiled by the state-imposed official history—ordinary citizens’

unyielding efforts of resistance against brutal state violence and repression.52

Influenced by Marxism and liberal theology, labor activists and college students orga-

nized minjung movements in the 1980s to overthrow the authoritarian regime. Literally

referring to the common people or the masses, such as rank-and-file workers, peasants,

and the urban poor, minjung has a normative connotation that people who are usually

marginalized and occupy the bottom rung of the social hierarchy carry a potential for

instigating social change (or revolution). In this alternative view, the minjung’s suffer-

ing was not necessarily due to communism or North Korea, as the official story had it.

Rather, parts of the minjung movement saw the Great Powers, particularly the United

States and the South Korean ruling classes who allied with them, as the greatest con-

cern. Japanese colonialism and the intervention of the Great Powers in the Korean

peninsula prevented Koreans from building an independent, unified nation. Meanwhile,

self-interested and opportunistic South Korean elites colluded with the imperial pow-

ers to maintain the status quo by ignoring popular demands. Minjung were the main

protagonists who challenged imperialism and the authoritarian state and who led the

fight for democracy throughout modern Korean history. For example, social science

books like Logics of the Transitional Era (Chŏnhwan sidae ŭi nolli) and Understanding

Pre- and Post-Independence History (Haebang chŏnhusa ŭi yinsik) delivered minjung

historiography and were influential texts for college students in the 1970s and 1980s.53

Despite severe government censorship under the authoritarian rule of the 1970s and

1980s, college students in the underground circulated, read, and discussed various

texts that critically analyzed the contradictions of capitalism and American imperial-

ism and their impacts on the Korean peninsula in the twentieth century. These texts

opened the eyes of young people, who had hitherto been inculcated with anticommu-

nism, and led them to seek anti-imperialist, revolutionary alternatives to unrelenting

capitalist development and South Korea’s “neocolonial” status. While the movement

sector and college campuses were fertile ground where minjung historiography and

progressive thought flourished, it was rare for the general public to be exposed to these

so-called radical and dangerous views, given South Korea’s extremely restrictive

political environment.

The Politics of the Past during the Postauthoritarian

Period

Democratization and the transition to a civilian government expanded civil society in

the early 1990s, and the reformist Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun governments

opened new opportunities for former student activists and prodemocracy movement

activists to enter mainstream politics in the early 2000s.54 These new political forces

began to challenge the official history—hitherto monopolized by the Right—and the

new democratic governments tried to address the issues of state violence and the inno-

cent deaths of civilians in the past.

Yang 347

The first “civilian” government, led by Kim Young Sam (1993–98), attempted to

deal with past wrongdoing by the military regimes and to restore the victims’ honor.

Under the banner of “getting history right” (yŏksa paro seugi), the Kim government

rearticulated modern Korean history. Not only did President Kim Young Sam, a for-

mer antidictatorship politician, affirm that Park Chung Hee had come to power through

a military coup—thereby calling the Park regime’s legitimacy into question—but he

also emphasized the legacies of the antidictatorship struggles and prodemocracy

movements. In 1995, the National Assembly passed a special law providing for an

investigation of the Kwangju massacre, and Chun and Roh—two military leaders—

were jailed for the role they played in the tragedy. It was the first time that the govern-

ment had officially acknowledged violence against innocent civilians and tried to

address wrongdoing. Additionally, the Kim government demolished the colonial

buildings in the heart of the capital. In doing so, President Kim tried to end the colonial

and authoritarian legacies. Yet Kim, who had allied himself with authoritarian military

forces to win the presidency in 1990, was not able to completely settle the issue. After

only two years, the military protagonists were pardoned and released from jail.

The subsequent progressive, reformist governments of Kim Dae Jung (1998–2003)

and Roh Moo Hyun (2003–8) addressed the crimes of the authoritarian era more

extensively and founded government agencies to systemically deal with human rights

violations dating from that time. Kim Dae Jung, a long-time dissident and opposition

party leader, was finally elected president in 1997, after three attempts. Kim was Park

Chung Hee’s political adversary and had been kidnapped by an agent of the Korean

Central Intelligence Agency in Japan and almost killed. Under the Chun regime, Kim

was also accused of being a communist and instigator of the Kwangju uprising, found

guilty of treason, and sentenced to death. Throughout the authoritarian period, he was

jailed several times, put under house arrest, and exiled to the United States. Thus, his

election was symbolic: until then, no opposition party leader and no one from the long-

excluded and long-marginalized Chŏlla province had ever been elected president, and

right-wing hegemony had never been challenged before.

Often nicknamed the Mandela of South Korea, Kim Dae Jung instituted the National

Human Rights Commission and the Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious

Deaths, and he tried to deal with the dark history of state violence and human rights

violations committed by the authoritarian regimes. After a thorough investigation of

these cases, the Kim government offered compensation to the families of the victims

and restored the honor of those unjustly accused and killed. Revealing truths that had

been buried for a long time, the Kim government aimed at redressing historical injus-

tices and promoting national reconciliation and forgiveness.

Roh Moo Hyun, Kim Dae Jung’s successor, continued what the Kim government

had initiated. Beyond particular cases such as the Jeju Uprising and a number of suspi-

cious deaths, President Roh emphasized the need for extensive investigations and

insisted that this tragic history should not be repeated. The biggest contribution made

during the Roh presidency in this regard was the passage of a special law on truth and

reconciliation and the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The

issues investigated included (but were not limited to) Japanese collaborators, forced

348 Politics & Society 49(3)

conscription during the Japanese colonial period, mass killings during the Korean War,

and fabricated espionage cases during the Park and Chun regimes.55 President Roh

often emphasized the need for state power to be held accountable and claimed that,

unless the state acknowledged and corrected wrongs, it would be impossible to make

a better future. In his 2006 address at the memorial ceremony for the Jeju Uprising, he

remarked,

Whether it is a proud or shameful history, historical matters should be revealed as they

really happened. In particular, the wrongs perpetrated by state power should be settled at

any cost. . . . State power should be exercised in a legitimate way in any case, and abuse

should be dealt with in a particularly serious manner. Further, before we talk about

forgiveness and reconciliation, we should heal the wounds of those who unjustly suffered

and restore their honor. This is the government’s minimal duty and responsibility. Then

citizens’ trust in state power can be secured and on that ground we can all live together,

and social integration will happen.56

The democratic governments’ initiatives to “settle the past,” however, would not

have been possible without progressive civic organizations and intellectuals, who

played a significant role in pushing the government to take action.57 In the newly

democratized environment, former prodemocracy movement activists ran for office

and won seats in the National Assembly. Candidates who had protested authoritarian

regimes campaigned on the necessity of uncovering unspoken truths and disclosing

past injustices, as many had themselves been victims of atrocities. At the same time,

former student activists and intellectuals also formed civic organizations and local

advocacy groups, some of which demanded investigations and sought transitional jus-

tice. Not only did they hold press conferences and issue statements, they also orga-

nized a variety of public events, including public forums, academic conferences, field

trips, exhibitions, and cultural performances to instill a sense of human rights, social

justice, peace, and democracy in the general public. The efforts of the reformist gov-

ernments and civil society actors began to break through the state-monopolized his-

torical narratives, and unspoken truths finally surfaced to become a part of public

knowledge.

The Rise of the New Right and the War on History

The process of this government-initiated “settling of the past” was far from smooth.

The movement to right past wrongs met with a fierce backlash from conservative

forces, especially the conservative Grand National Party (the Hannara Party) and

mainstream conservative media. Conservative successors of the authoritarian Park and

Chun regimes saw their political legitimacy and symbolic currency as dependent on

economic development and a capitalist victory over North Korea; consequently, the

actions of the reformist Kim and Roh governments were seen as attacking their politi-

cal identity and raison d’être. Further, the rise of former student and labor activists,

whom conservatives considered pro–North Korea “commies,” as a new mainstream

political force in the early 2000s enhanced a sense of fear and crisis among

Yang 349

conservatives. The ten years of the Kim and Roh presidencies constituted a “lost

decade,” according to conservatives, who had until the democratic transition held a

monopoly on state power and were easily able to repress oppositional voices. Faced

with this new challenge, conservatives found they had to recast their politics and

develop different strategies to win their ideological battles with liberal-leftists.

Thus, the emergence of the New Right around 2004 and its attempt to rewrite

Korean history should be understood as a conservative project to wage ideological

warfare and to mobilize conservative citizens on a large scale. It might actually be

considered the first serious intellectual movement of the Right: while there had been

top–down ideological campaigns organized by the state or the conservative party in

the past, the New Right movement was initiated and organized spontaneously by non-

state actors. Led by former student activists converted to conservative politics, along

with college professors, writers, journalists, and Christian pastors, the New Right

aimed at establishing a new, refreshing, and internationally respectable brand of con-

servatism.58 By founding conservative-minded publishing houses, creating new jour-

nals, forming civic organizations and networks, and taking advantage of existing

conservative media, New Right intellectuals tried to promote conservative values and

renew conservative politics at large. Some founding members of New Right organiza-

tions had been involved in student activism in the 1980s, and their prior experiences

on the opposite side taught them the important lesson that grassroots organizing and

building cultural hegemony were critical in shaping public opinion and mobilizing

civil society.

Ideologically, the New Right presented itself as an alternative political force that

could be differentiated from both the anticommunist Old Right and the dogmatic

nationalistic Old Left. On the one hand, the New Right distanced itself from the

extreme Old Right, which was obsessed with anticommunism, North Korea, and

national security without any clear political or economic vision. On the other hand, the

New Right also criticized the Left for its pursuit of “old and unrealistic” socialist prin-

ciples emphasizing redistribution and egalitarianism. They were skeptical about the

reformist governments’ policy of engagement with North Korea and promotion of

peace in the Korean peninsula, which were seen as “naive” and “nationalistic”

approaches that ignored the North Korean regime’s human rights violations and devel-

opment of nuclear weapons.59

Proposing advancement (sŏnjinhwa) and (neo)liberalism as its motto, the New

Right supported small government and probusiness, progrowth economic policies

such as privatization and market deregulation, which they viewed as necessary in a

competitive global economy. Politically, the New Right emphasized liberalism and

patriotic cosmopolitanism.60 It put up the banner of “liberal democracy” as an antidote

to leftist populism and a people’s democracy (minjung minjujuŭi). Rather than target-

ing North Korean socialism, which they saw as having already failed, the New Right

turned its attention to the “radical” left-liberal forces as the enemy of “liberal democ-

racy.” Accusing the Kim and Roh governments of implementing populist redistribu-

tive policies, the New Right denounced the Left for following in the footsteps of failed

Latin American states like Argentina or Venezuela.61 Further, equating participatory

350 Politics & Society 49(3)

democracy with a totalitarian political system, the New Right perceived the govern-

ments’ emphasis on participatory democracy as conflictual with “liberal democracy.”

While the New Right claimed that its political programs of liberalism and “liberal

democracy” would overcome the problems of the anticommunist Old Right and the

populist left, the specific contents of its political visions did not fully materialize.

Further, the New Right’s elevation of authoritarian figures contradicted its own notion

of liberalism and “liberal democracy.”

As architects of a new conservatism, New Right intellectuals played a crucial role

in condemning the left-leaning reformist governments and providing a conservative

discursive framework. The New Right perceived modern Korean history as a crucial

battlefield, as the ways in which history is written and interpreted shape how people

think about politics. The state project of “settling the past” was thus seen as dangerous,

as it damaged the legitimacy of the Republic of Korea and threatened the principles of

“liberal democracy.” Referring to leftist interpretations as a “masochist historical

view,”62 Ji-Ho Shin, a former radical student activist and leading New Right figure,

criticized liberal-reformist forces for highlighting only the dark and shameful past and

omitting positive aspects of Korean history.63 By claiming that leftist historical analy-

sis shares features with North Korean propaganda,64 the New Right not only labeled

liberal-leftists as anti–Republic of Korea but it also positioned itself as the legitimate

guardian of the Republic of Korea. In a book published by New Right intellectuals,

one author criticized the “dangerous” historical views of the Left:

The revisionist65 historical view and support for people’s democracy prevalent in

movement circles and among left intellectuals penetrated everywhere by the 1990s and

even influenced descriptions of modern Korean history in high school history textbooks.

Their historical views basically deny the foundation and legitimacy of the Republic of

Korea. They identify the Republic of Korea as a country founded by divisive, pro-

Japanese opportunists allied with the external power of the United States. The government-

sponsored project of settling the past has made the Republic of Korea a battleground of

history. The overwhelming nationalism and emphasis on equality has not only distorted

[the meaning of] liberalism since democratization, but it has also threatened

constitutionalism and the rule of law as the fundamental pillars of liberal democracy.66

As seen above, most New Right intellectuals identified the ongoing situation in the

early 2000s as a grave crisis, with anticonservative ideas pervading South Korean

society and people’s minds being manipulated by leftists. To reverse the situation, the

New Right believed that waging ideological warfare in this “distorted” discursive

landscape was critical.67

From this perspective, one of the most important projects was to revise history

textbooks and revive debates over modern Korean history. Criticizing existing histori-

ography as nonscientific, nonpositivist, and emotionally driven by leftist nationalism

and a passion for social revolution, New Right historians argued that modern Korean

history needed to be based on empirical data and objective facts. By applying positiv-

ist and scientific historical analysis, they claimed, Koreans could overcome the self-

negating historical views of the Left. Leading New Right scholars published an edited

Yang 351

volume titled A New Understanding of Pre- and Post-Independence History (Haebang

Chŏnhusa ŭi Chaeinsik) in 2006. This book clearly targeted Understanding Pre- and

Post-Independence History (Haebang Chŏnhusa ŭi Insik), a six-volume critical read-

ing of modern Korean history written by progressive scholars and published between

1979 and 1989 that had influenced and inspired college students and prodemocracy

movement activists. In the preface, the editors of A New Understanding problematize

“dominant” leftist historiography:

It was early in the fall in 2004 when we came to think about publishing this book. After

reading a news report that President Roh said that he became hot-blooded after reading

Understanding Pre- and Post-Independence History, I realized that I would fail in my

historian’s duty if I did not do anything. Though historians have relentlessly raised

questions and revisited erroneous arguments in Understanding for the last twenty years,

it was limited to academics, while popular readers still accepted Understanding. . . . We

are concerned with two fundamental problems in Understanding—ethno-nationalism

(minjok chisangjuŭi) and minjung revolutionary determinism (minjung hyŏngmyŏng

piryŏnnon)—that have adversely influenced historical interpretation. Ethno-nationalism

and left-leaning interpretations of history have overwhelmed our intellectual class.68

The editors were extremely concerned about the leftist historical perception that

“opportunism won and social justice lost in modern Korea.”69 New Right intellectuals

tried to stem the tide of so-called revolutionary historiography. For example, New

Right scholars demonstrated that the Korean economy benefited from Japanese colo-

nialism and argued that Korean history is a story of success and victory in terms of

economic growth and modernization. Yet their arguments surprisingly shared much in

common with Holocaust denialists in their extreme skepticism of historical evidence

that did not support their positions, especially their insistence that victims’ testimonies

were too incomplete to be considered factual.70 In the name of historical positivism

and objectivism, the New Right selectively cited particular data and deliberately

diminished or denied the victims’ sufferings.71

Rebuilding a Self-Confident Nation of the New Right:

Syngman Rhee’s Founding of the Republic of Korea and

Park Chung Hee’s National Modernization

New Right intellectuals aimed to promote national pride and a positive image of the

past by glorifying two historical figures who had been denounced by the liberal-left-

ists—Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee. The two former presidents are polarizing

figures who receive very different assessments from the Left and the Right. The Left

believes that Rhee and Park broke the democratic system, operating brutal dictator-

ships that were finally overthrown by popular protest. However, for the Right, these

two figures symbolize the greatest legacies of “liberal democracy”: the founding of the

Republic of Korea and the “economic miracle” of the 1970s. Rhee and Park are seen

as having paved the way for the advancement and “civilizing” of the Republic of

352 Politics & Society 49(3)

Korea. Presenting them as heroes who successfully overcame national tragedy and

made the Republic of Korea great, the Right has tried to project a sense of optimism

about the national future and to legitimize its current political position.

Syngman Rhee was the first president of the Republic of Korea (1948–60). His

government oversaw the most tragic period of modern Korean history—the era of

national division, the Korean War, and the consequent economic hardship and emo-

tional trauma. In the midst of rampant poverty, social chaos, and ideological polariza-

tion, Rhee tried to consolidate his power through a focus on anticommunism and a

reliance on help from the US military government. Rhee’s leadership was often

described as corrupt and incompetent;72 his regime did not address urgent social issues

and instead focused on the elimination of political enemies. Rhee was overthrown by

the April 19 student uprising in 1960, which originated in protests against Rhee’s

scheme to prolong his rule through rigged elections. Until relatively recently, Rhee has

not been particularly esteemed, even within the broader conservative sector.

It was the New Right that emphasized Rhee as the founding father (kukpu) of the

free Republic of Korea and praised his achievement of establishing “liberal democ-

racy” in the South in opposition to communist North Korea. The cosmopolitan Rhee—

educated in the United States and with a PhD from Princeton—was lauded as a pioneer

who knew what was best for the nation and built civilization in the Korean peninsula.

Given the overwhelming influence of communism after independence in 1945, the

New Right argued that the imperatives of preventing communist revolution had to be

prioritized and that the building of “liberal democracy” had to precede national

unification.73 Thus, his refusal to collaborate with the Left or even centrists was an

astute decision, made in the interest of South Korea’s national destiny. They believed

that today’s South Korea was only possible because Rhee, unlike other Third World

leaders, was an unwavering believer in “liberal democracy” and because his uncom-

promising anticommunism incorporated South Korea under the umbrella of the “free”

world.

By publishing books, holding academic forums, and collaborating with conserva-

tive media, the New Right disseminated positive ideas about Rhee. In order to oppose

existing history textbooks, which critically assessed the establishment of the South

Korean state as a pro-American restoration of the colonial order, New Right professors

formed the “Textbook Forum” in 2005 in order to shed positive light on Rhee’s found-

ing of the Republic of Korea in 1948. In 2008 the Textbook Forum published a book

titled Alternative Textbook: Modern and Contemporary Korean History. In it, the New

Right aimed to contest what it deemed “pessimistic and self-tormenting” historical

views and to provide a “correct” perspective on the history of South Korea.74

The year 2008 marked the sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the Republic of

Korea. To celebrate, New Right scholars organized large academic conferences and

forums that shed light on the meanings and implications of the year 1948. Most pre-

senters viewed the founding of the Republic of Korea as a “miraculous” historic event

that saved half the Korean population from the evil of communism.75 They also

emphasized the historical continuity between the founding of the Republic of Korea

and the subsequent achievements of industrialization and national modernization,

Yang 353

which would not have been possible without Rhee’s strong political will. For example,

one presenter remarked,

Through the establishment and promulgation of the Constitution in July 1948, the

Republic of Korea, a modern nation state, was born. Though it was limited to the south

of the Korean peninsula, the Republic of Korea was based on liberal democracy as an

official ideology, and clearly distinguished from the Chosun Dynasty. Due to a legal

system and institutions based on liberal democracy and market economy, economic

development in the 1960s was possible.76

As New Right scholars sought to put the focus on Rhee’s achievements in anticom-

munist nation-building, they tried to deemphasize or defend Rhee’s prolonged authori-

tarian rule and countervail leftist criticisms of Rhee.

Among New Right intellectuals, Younghoon Yi’s role in promoting Syngman

Rhee’s achievements is worth mentioning here. A former professor of economics at

Seoul National University and one of the central figures in the New Right, he has

published several books on modern Korean history for popular readers, including A

New Understanding of Pre- and Post-Independence History and Anti-Japan

Tribalism—the books I discussed earlier. These books were intended to correct leftist

historical views and rewrite modern Korean history in what he considers a more “unbi-

ased” manner. For instance, contrasting the Republic of Korea as a “liberal demo-

cratic” system to its counterpart, the “totalitarian” Democratic People’s Republic of

Korea, he emphasizes the essential role of Rhee in building the “superior” South

Korean state.

In addition to writing books, Yi also founded the Syngman Rhee Academy (Rhee

Syngman haktang) in 2018 to educate ordinary citizens about Rhee’s political life and

achievements. Spending his retirement funds to establish the academy, he has dedi-

cated himself to delivering “objective” and “correct” knowledge about Rhee. The

academy offers ten lectures per semester for those interested in learning about Rhee

and modern Korean history. Yi is the main lecturer, but other right-wing academics

and journalists also give lectures. On the day I visited the Syngman Rhee Academy in

2018, about forty students—both young and old—filled the classroom. Yi gave a lec-

ture on the social and political landscape in the early period of the Republic of Korea

and emphasized Rhee’s authoritarian rule as an inevitable outcome. According to Yi,

despite the establishment of the Republic of Korea as a modern and democratic nation-

state, traditional hierarchies and familial order still dominated South Korean society,

and autonomous individuals did not exist in the late 1940s. Under these circumstances,

Rhee adopted an authoritarian political system reliant on his personal charisma. This

was not because of his personal greed for power, Yi insisted, but rather due to the sup-

ply and demand of goods exchanged in the political realm—a very economically

reductive interpretation. Yet he did not explain why many of those illiterate citizens

who were not “ready for real democracy,” as he put it, rose up against Rhee’s authori-

tarian regime and eventually brought it down. Yi’s lectures are streamed on a Syngman

Rhee TV channel on YouTube, hosted by Yi, and reach well beyond the students at the

354 Politics & Society 49(3)

academy. (Currently, the channel has almost one hundred thousand subscribers.) Yi’s

recent book, Anti-Japan Tribalism, was based on these lectures.

Along with Rhee, conservatives also revere Park Chung Hee as one of the founders

of a strong, modernized nation. Park was an iron-fisted dictator who ruled South Korea

for almost two decades. In the 1970s he established the Yushin system, which elimi-

nated formal democratic institutions and guaranteed his lifetime tenure in office.

During this period, he promulgated nine emergency decrees and carried out a reign of

terror. People were completely deprived of the freedom of speech and association, and

opposition leaders and activists were ruthlessly suppressed. But at the same time, it

was also a period when the South Korean economy saw explosive growth and a major-

ity of the population improved their standard of living. For many people, Park was the

man who rebuilt South Korea and enhanced the “can-do” spirit; for others, he was a

brutal authoritarian who was eventually assassinated by his own right-hand man in

1979.

Beginning in the late 1990s, conservatives deliberately promoted Park as a national

hero and instigated nostalgia for his regime. Mainstream conservative newspapers

such as the Chosun Ilbo and the Dong-A Ilbo tapped the economic hardship and emo-

tional distress brought by the economic crisis in 1997 as an opportunity to idealize the

past and to laud Park’s successful development projects. These conservative newspa-

pers published survey results that showed Park as one of the most respected figures in

Korean history and as the favorite president.77 A veteran right-wing journalist, Gapje

Cho, serialized a biography of Park titled Spit on My Grave (Nae Mudŏm e Ch’im ŭl

Paetŏra) in the Chosun Ilbo and later wrote an eight-volume book based on the biog-

raphy, published by the Chosun Ilbo’s press. In 1997, the conservative writer Inhwa Yi

published a novel titled The Road of a Human Being (In’gan ŭi Kil) based on Park’s

life story as a “solitary revolutionary,” which became a best seller. Some conservative

presidential candidates tried to emulate Park’s look to appeal to voters, and the conser-

vative Grand National Party also emphasized its lineage as Park’s legitimate succes-

sor. It was at this point that Park’s oldest daughter, Park Geun-hye, who had been in

seclusion for twenty years, debuted as a politician and became a conservative icon.

While dismissing what they saw as “incompetence” and “amateurism” in the eco-

nomic performances of the reformist governments, conservatives tried to elevate the

economic achievements of the Park regime and thus to revive conservative hegemony

in the newly democratized political setting.

As Park was without question an authoritarian leader, conservative commentators

usually defended his undemocratic rule as an “inevitable” choice to prioritize indus-

trialization over political freedom and democracy, given the threat of North Korea.

Beyond simply defending Park’s undemocratic rule, fervent right-wing intellectuals

made a bold claim that Park had actually contributed to the birth of democracy in

South Korea because he promoted economic development. Borrowing the logic of

modernization theory, they claimed that without economic development, political

democracy would not have been possible. A notable New Right activist, Ji-Ho

Shin, claimed that authoritarian economic development was necessary for political

democratization:

Yang 355

Authoritarian economic development produces its own grave-diggers.78 From this

perspective, in the early phase of industrialization, which absolutely needed political

stability and public trust for economic policies, an authoritarian system can be seen as a

temporarily necessary evil. In a similar context, Park’s era should be seen as a period that

cultivated socioeconomic conditions for democratization, not as a dark age of democracy.79

This kind of logic, however, produces the contradictory position that the authoritarian

Park actually deserved credit for the democratization he vociferously opposed.

Regarding human rights violations and labor exploitation during the Park regime,

some New Right intellectuals denied that workers suffered at all. For example, an avid

New Right sociologist, Seok-Choon Lew, defends Park’s labor policy, arguing that it

helped skilled workers gain middle-class status:

Did South Korean capitalism exacerbate monopoly, deepen dependence, and eventually

exploit minjung [as the Left argues]? Not at all. Rather than exploiting minjung, it

produced the middle class. Rather than driving out workers and farmers to the urban

poor, it instead made them the middle class that enjoyed “my car” and “my home.”

Millions of industrial warriors created in the 1970s and 80s now became a labor

aristocracy that earns six figures [100,000,000 won], which is discussed as something

needing to be reformed.80

Pointing out the fact that wages increased drastically during the Park regime, Lew and

others tried to refute the widely accepted argument that workers suffered from low pay

and were excluded from the benefits of industrialization and instead argued that Park’s

labor policy was benevolent.81 Highlighting only rising wages, New Right intellectu-

als argue that labor exploitation was exaggerated or nonexistent, while evading discus-

sion of the severe repression of labor activism and unionism.

New Right intellectuals promoted the achievements of Syngman Rhee and Park

Chung Hee and disseminated their historical perspectives through diverse venues,

including books, op-ed pieces in conservative newspapers, and new social media.

Having learned from their counterparts, the New Right tried to build cultural hege-

mony through engagement with the public at large. In addition to founding new civic

organizations linking together New Right figures and activists and creating new maga-

zines (Zeitgeist, Sidae Chŏngsin) to represent their political views, the New Right also

used existing conservative media to deliver their ideas to a wider audience. The two

mainstream conservative newspapers, the Chosun Ilbo and the Dong-A Ilbo, spon-

sored events and conferences organized by New Right academics and heralded the

importance of the New Right movement as an alternative political force. They also

provided outlets for movement leaders to write op-eds and columns.82 The former

editor-in-chief of the Chosun Ilbo also founded a publishing house called Kip’arang

and committed his postretirement life to publishing conservative-minded books, par-

ticularly books extolling the great achievements of Rhee and Park. Many New Right

books were released by this publisher. Relentlessly promoting their historical perspec-

tive both in traditional and new media, the New Right accumulated their own histori-

cal “facts,” now widely cited by conservatives.

356 Politics & Society 49(3)

As a top–down political project led by elite intellectuals, the New Right movements

were quite effective in building new political infrastructure independent from the con-

servative party and strengthening networks among rightist activists and organizations.

Conservative civic organizations have proliferated, many new conservative books

have been published, and conservative ideas have been widely disseminated in cyber-

space. Inspired by these developments, ordinary conservative citizens have committed

themselves to the movement and vigorously promoted conservative viewpoints on the

internet—in effect becoming what Gramsci terms organic intellectuals.83 The publica-

tion of Anti-Japan Tribalism and its wild success were the outcome of the New Right’s

incessant efforts to revitalize its production of knowledge and normalize its ideas.

However, the New Right was not successful in providing a new political vision and

a complete departure from the Old Right. The movement’s purpose was to orient con-

servatives to a new and forward-looking direction, but the New Right was not signifi-

cantly different from the anticommunist Old Right in its programs and contents. The

New Right’s project of rewriting Korean history through the promotion of Rhee and

Park differed little from the Old Right’s emphasis on anticommunism and national

development.84 Their fixation on the authoritarian past did not clearly demonstrate a

new political vision for a democratic country. Moreover, the New Right criticized the

Left for its supposed ethno-nationalism, which they argued was not only anachronistic

in the age of globalization but also irrational, engaging too readily with totalitarian

North Korea. Yet, instead of overcoming exclusionary nationalism, the New Right

fully embraced an idea of statism that deifies the South Korean state and its historical

legitimacy,85 thus simply replacing the nation with the state.86 The New Right’s focus

on the state and on glorification of the Republic of Korea’s positive history goes

against the very notion of liberalism that it tried to pursue.

Conclusion

Through the case of the New Right movement in South Korea beginning in the early

2000s, I have analyzed how conservative intellectuals constructed right-wing histori-

cal narratives and discourses in the postauthoritarian period. As a response to the

reformist Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun governments—a period dominated by

the rise of former student activists as new political elites and the political project of

“settling the past”—the New Right tried to reconstruct conservative political legiti-

macy. Against what they viewed as self-negating and pessimistic left-leaning histori-

cal interpretations, these intellectuals reignited historical debates in the media and

academic circles and promoted positive aspects of the anticommunist nation-building

project and rapid economic development accomplished by two former presidents,

Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee. By various means, New Right intellectuals dis-

seminated conservative knowledge and a sense of national pride among the general

public. Juxtaposing its optimistic picture of the past with darker leftist views, the

New Right aimed to project a hopeful future while revealing leftist incompetence.

Though a problematic understanding of “liberal democracy” and a fixation on author-

itarian leaders caused the New Right to fail in its attempt to provide a completely new

Yang 357

vision, its decades-long project successfully built a stronger right-wing ideological

infrastructure.

This article has emphasized the crucial roles of conservative intellectuals in provid-

ing ideological resources and producing “alternative” discourses to defeat their politi-

cal counterparts. Many existing studies of the Far Right focus on institutional party

politics or extra-institutional street rallies, leaving out the intellectual circle and its

engagement in civil society. Drawing from Gramsci’s idea of cultural hegemony for

their own political ends, Far Right intellectuals believed that it was critical to change

how people think and made efforts to promote their ideas and framework through vari-

ous means. The Far Right’s deep engagement with metapolitics—a prepolitical cul-

tural and intellectual project to shape mainstream ideas—aims to incubate political

and social change through dissemination of Far Right ideas.87 By addressing the ide-

ational struggles over the unsettled past that Far Right intellectuals have tried to use to

legitimize their political positions, our understanding of rightist mobilization and vari-

ations in Far Right politics across different countries will be enriched.

The case of the New Right in South Korea demonstrates its distinctive position

about nationalism. Unlike its Western and Japanese counterparts, who appropriate

aggressive ethno-nationalism as a main weapon in their ideological arsenals, the New

Right in South Korea has adopted an antinationalist narrative. The Left, conversely, has

engaged with nationalism as a form of anticolonial and anti-imperial resistance through

critical historiography since the late 1970s as a way of delegitimizing the authoritarian

regimes and ruling elites that allied themselves with Japan and the United States. The

New Right tried to weaken the Left’s legitimacy by rejecting nationalism as an emo-

tionally driven, divisive, and barbaric ideology. As a consequence, defending the legiti-

macy and superiority of the South Korean state—the Republic of Korea—as the

antithesis of leftist nationalism and North Korea became an ideological strategy for the

New Right. The New Right’s unique stance on nationalism in South Korea reveals how

specific domestic political struggles can affect discursive strategies on the right.

This article has focused on intellectual interactions at the national level, yet some

recent cases in Europe and the United States suggest that there are increasing transna-

tional connections among Far Right intellectuals and that transnational capital funds

Far Right movements and organizations in many countries. In the age of the internet

and social media, this trend is becoming more salient. Analyzing how Far Right intel-

lectuals obtain funds from foreign sources and how Far Right narratives and knowl-

edge travel transnationally may be an important issue for future research.

Acknowledgments

I thank Sinem Adar, Kevin Gray, Yoonkyung Lee, Andre Schmid, Jinwook Shin, and the edito-

rial board members of Politics & Society for their helpful comments. Unless otherwise indi-

cated, all translations are mine.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship,

and/or publication of this article.

358 Politics & Society 49(3)

Funding

The author disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/

or publication of this article: This research was supported by the Northeast Asia Council of the

Association for Asian Studies, the Center for Korean Studies at UH Mānoa, the Korea

Foundation for Field Research, the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in Humanities and

Social Sciences, and the Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market

Societies.

Notes

1. Younghoon Yi, Naknyun Kim, Yongsam Kim, Ikjong Joo, Angi Chung, and Wooyoun

Lee, Anti-Japan Tribalism: The Origin of the Crisis in the Republic of Korea [in Korean]

(Seoul: Miraesa, 2019).

2. See, e.g., Seong-Hyun Kang, The Age of Post-Truth, Asking the Denial of History: A

Critique of “Anti-Japan Tribalism” [in Korean] (Seoul: P’urŭn Yŏksa, 2020); Hyekyung

Chung, Kwangmu Heo, Gun Cho, and Sang-ho Lee, Discuss Opposition: Beyond Historical

Denialism of “Anti-Japan Tribalism” [in Korean] (Seoul: Seonin, 2020).

3. Kwangsu Park, “Conservatives Also Criticize ‘Anti-Japan Tribalism,’” JoongAng Ilbo,

August 12, 2019.

4. I use quotation marks in referring to liberal democracy (chayu minjujuŭi), as South Koreans

use the term differently from how it is generally understood in Western societies, where

it denotes a political system that embraces pluralism, political freedom, and civil rights.

Throughout the essay, I will use quotation marks when referring to the Korean notion of

liberal democracy; the phrase without quotation marks will refer to the concept as it is

generally understood outside Korea or when I directly quote it in primary sources.

5. Mabel Berezin, Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times: Culture, Security and Populism in

the New Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Manuel Castells, The

Power of Identity (Malden: Blackwell, 2004); Jens Rydgren, “The Radical Right: An

Introduction,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right, ed. J. Rydgren (New York:

Oxford University Press, 2018), 1–13.

6. Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (New York: Vintage Books,

1963).

7. Kathleen M. Blee and Kimberly A. Creasap, “Conservative and Right-Wing Movements,”

Annual Review of Sociology 36 (2010): 269–86; Katherine J. Cramer, The Politics of

Resentment: Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin and the Rise of Scott Walker (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 2016); Arlie R. Hochschild, Strangers in Their Own Land:

Anger and Mourning on the American Right (New York: The New Press, 2016).

8. Berezin, Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times; Castells, The Power of Identity; Ray Kiely

and Richard Saull, “Neoliberalism and the Far-Right: An Introduction,” Critical Sociology

43, no. 6 (2017): 821–29; Rydgren, “Radical Right”; Duane Swank and Hans-Georg Betz,

“Globalization, the Welfare State and Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe,” Socio-

Economic Review 1, no. 2 (2003): 215–45.

9. Matt Golder, “Far Right Parties in Europe,” Annual Review of Political Science 19 (2016):

477–97; Rydgren, “Radical Right.”

10. Rydgren, “Radical Right.”

11. Sheri Berman and Maria Snegovaya, “Populism and the Decline of Social Democracy,”

Journal of Democracy 30, no. 3 (2019): 5–19.

12. Lenka Bustikova, “Revenge of the Radical Right,” Comparative Political Studies 47, no. 12

(2014): 1738–65; Roger Eatwell, “The Rebirth of the Extreme Right in Western Europe?,”

Yang 359

Parliamentary Affairs 53, no. 3 (2000): 407–25; Cas Mudde, “The Populist Radical Right:

A Pathological Normalcy,” West European Politics 33, no. 6 (2010): 1167–86; Cas Mudde,

Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

13. Golder, “Far Right Parties in Europe.”

14. Rydgren, “Radical Right.”

15. David Art, The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 2006); Jürgen Habermas, The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism

and the Historians’ Debate (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, [1991] 1997); Jan-Werner

Müller, Another Country: German Intellectuals, Unification, and National Identity (New

Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000); Nitzan Shoshan, The Management of Hate:

Nation, Affect, and the Governance of the Right-Wing Extremism in Germany (Princeton,

NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016).

16. Art, Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria.

17. Ibid.

18. Michiel Baud and Rosanne Rutten, Popular Intellectuals and Social Movements: Framing

Protest in Asia, Africa, and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005);

Gil Eyal and Larissa Buchholz, “From the Sociology of Intellectuals to the Sociology of

Interventions,” Annual Review of Sociology 36 (2010): 117–37; Pamela Oliver and Hank

Johnson, “What a Good Idea! Ideologies and Frames in Social Movement Research,”

Mobilization: An International Quarterly 5, no. 1 (2000): 37–54.

19. Edward Said, Representations of the Intellectual (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994), 110.

20. Lewis A. Coser, Men of Ideas: A Sociologist’s View (New York: The Free Press, [1965]

1997), 215.

21. Ibid.

22. Charles Camie and Neil Gross, “The New Sociology of Ideas,” in The Blackwell Companion

to Sociology, ed. J. R. Blau (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 237.

23. Neil Gross, Thomas Medvetz, and Rupert Russell, “The Contemporary American

Conservative Movement,” Annual Review of Sociology 37 (2011): 325–54.

24. Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An

Overview and Assessment,” Annual Review of Sociology 26 (2000): 611–39.

25. Cynthia Miller-Idriss, Hate in the Homeland: The New Global Far Right (Princeton, NJ:

Princeton University Press, 2020), 125.

26. Mark Sedgwick, ed., Key Thinkers of the Radical Right: Behind the New Threat to Liberal

Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019).

27. Nancy MacLean, Democracy in Chains: The Deep History of the Radical Right’s Stealth

Plan for America (New York: Penguin Books, 2017); Corey Robin, The Reactionary Mind:

Conservatism from Edmund Burke to Sarah Palin (New York: Oxford University Press,

2011); David L. Swartz, “The Academic Trumpists: American Professors Who Support the

Trump Presidency,” Theory and Society 49 (2020): 493–531.

28. Mark Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

2013).

29. Jacob Heilbrunn, “Germany’s New Right,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 6 (1996): 80–98;

Müller, Another Country.

30. Miller-Idriss, Hate in the Homeland, 113.

31. Robin, Reactionary Mind; Sedgwick, Key Thinkers of the Radical Right.

32. Julian Göpffarth, “Activating the Socialist Past for a Nativist Future: Far-Right Intellectuals

and the Prefigurative Power of Multidirectional Nostalgia in Dresden,” Social Movement

Studies (2020), DOI: 10.1080/14742837.2020.1722628; Heilbrunn, “Germany’s New

Right”; Müller, Another Country.

360 Politics & Society 49(3)

33. Kathleen M. Blee and Kimberly A. Creasap, “Conservative and Right-Wing Movements,”

Annual Review of Sociology 36 (2010): 269–86, 270–71.

34. Miller-Idriss, Hate in the Homeland, 8.

35. Rory McVeigh, The Rise of the Ku Klux Klan: Right-Wing Movements and National

Politics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 32.

36. Robin, Reactionary Mind, 7.

37. Ibid., 34.

38. The Old Right consists of veterans’ groups, North Korean defectors, and politicians who

have served since the former military regimes. Quite a few members in the mainstream

conservative party can be categorized as Old Right.

39. JangJip Choi, Democracy after Democratization: The Conservative Origin of Korean

Democracy and Its Crisis [in Korean] (Seoul: Humanitas, 2002).

40. In addition to their positions on government intervention in the market economy—govern-

ment regulation of the economy and expansion of welfare spending for redistribution and

equality—what mainly distinguishes the Right and the Left in South Korea is their position

toward North Korea. The Right generally believes that the Left’s policy to engage with the

“totalitarian” North Korean regime threatens the legitimacy of the Republic of Korea.

41. When Park Geun-hye was impeached in 2017, the moderate center-right split with the con-

servative party (the Saenury Party back then) and formed a new party (the Bareun Party),

claiming to be the “real” conservatives under the banner of reform and distinguishing

themselves from the old, extreme right wing. This experiment completely failed, attracting

only a small number of votes; many members of the party quickly returned to the main

conservative party.

42. The so-called T’aegŭkki (the South Korean national flag) rallies began as a response to

the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye in 2017 and the following massive candle-

light protests. The Far Right protests developed into a general antigovernment movement

(protesting the current Moon Jae-in government) and lasted for more than three years—

the longest and biggest Far Right mobilization ever. For more details, see Myungji Yang,

“Defending ‘Liberal Democracy’? Why Older South Koreans Took to the Streets against

the Candlelight Protests in 2016-17,” Mobilization: An International Quarterly 25, no. 3

(2020): 365–82.

43. Herbert Kitschelt, “The Contemporary Radical Right,” in The Populist Radical Right: A

Reader, ed. C. Mudde (London: Routledge, 2017), 352–85.

44. For further details on one of the subjects of this section, minjung, see Namhee Lee, The

Making of Minjung: Democracy and the Politics of Representation in South Korea (Ithaca,

NY: Cornell University Press, 2007).

45. Hyukbum Kwon, “Reading the Anti-communist Matrix: The Meaning System of Korean

Anti-Communism and Its Social Political Roles” [in Korean], Tangdae Pip’yŏng 8 (1999):

46–78, 50.

46. Hee-Yeon Cho, “The Structure of the South Korean Developmental Regime and Its

Transformation: Statist Mobilization and Authoritarian Integration in the Anticommunist

Regimentation,” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 1, no. 3 (2000): 408–26.

47. Lee, Making of Minjung, 59.

48. Hun Jun Kim, The Massacres at Mt. Halla: Sixty Years of Truth Seeking in South Korea

(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008).

49. Ibid., 2.

50. Suk-Young Hwang, Jae-Ui Lee, and Yong-Ho Jeon, Beyond Deaths, Beyond Darkness of

the Age: A Record of the Kwangju May Uprising [in Korean] (Paju: Changbi, 2017).

Yang 361

51. Jung-Woon Choi, The Social Sciences of May [in Korean] (Seoul: P’ulbit, 1999).

52. Lee, Making of Minjung.

53. Jung-Hwan Cheon and Chong-Hyun Jung, A History of Reading in the Republic of Korea

[in Korean] (Seoul: Seohaemunjip, 2018), 164.

54. Those who participated in prodemocracy movements in the 1980s are referred to as the

386 generation—they were born in the 1960s, went to college in the 1980s, and were in

their thirties and forties in the early 2000s. This term became viral in the early 2000s, as

many student activist leaders were recruited by mainstream political parties—both liberal

and conservative—and became lawmakers. Those who did not enter mainstream politics

played a major role in establishing NGOs and engaging in civic activism.

55. Jongcheol Ahn, “Policies on Human Rights and Transitional Justice during the Kim Dae

Jung and Roh Moo Hyun Administrations” [in Korean], Naeil ŭl yŏnŭn yŏksa 37 (2009):

39–59.

56. Office of Presidential Secretary, President Roh Moo Hyun’s Speeches, vol. 4 [in Korean]

(Seoul: Office of Presidential Secretary, 2007), 155.

57. Hee-Yeon Cho, “Political Sociology of Kwagŏ Chŏ’ngsan in South Korea,” Review of Korean

Studies 6, no. 1 (2003): 11–49; Dong-Choon Kim, “Looking Back to the Activities at the Truth

and Reconciliation Commissions” [in Korean], Hwanghae Munhwa 72 (2011): 215–38.

58. Hae-Gu Jung, “A Critical Review: Consciousness of the Current Situation by the New

Right Movement” [in Korean], Critical Review of History 8 (2006): 215–37; Vladimir

Tikhonov, “The Rise and Fall of the New Right Movement and the Historical Wars in

2000s South Korea,” European Journal of Korean Studies 18, no. 2 (2019): 5–36. For the

analysis of the Christian New Right, see Myung-Sam Suh, “The Political Turn as an Act

of Transgression: The Case of Left-Turned-Right Christian Activists,” in Transgression

in Korea: Beyond Resistance and Control, ed. Juhn A. Ahn (Ann Arbor: University of

Michigan Press, 2018), 139–63.

59. Ji-Ho Shin, The New Right’s Looking at the World [in Korean] (Seoul: Kip’arang, 2006).

60. Shin, New Right’s Looking at the World, 170.

61. Citing Venezuela and Argentina as prime examples where left populist policies wrecked

economies, the Right often claimed that the reformist governments were patterning them-

selves after the likes of Hugo Chávez or Juan Perón.

62. This term was often used by Japanese right-wing historians to refer to critics of the Imperial

Japanese Army’s wartime exploitations. The Korean New Right’s ideas are very similar to

those of the Japanese extreme right wing.

63. Jongmoon Ha, “Anti-Japanese Nationalism and the New Right’s Textbook Forum” [in

Korean], Critical Review of History 78, no. 2 (2007): 175–97.

64. Shin, New Right’s Looking at the World, 5.

65. While in many cases “revisionism” may refer to historical reinterpretations made by con-

servative historians—e.g., Germany’s New Right and its views of Nazi Germany and the

Holocaust—the Korean Right refers to its counterparts’ historical views as “revisionist.”

For instance, Bruce Cumings’s Origins of the Korean War is considered the representative

revisionist work. Cumings challenges the orthodox view that the Korean War broke out

because of the North Korean leader Kim Il Sung’s political ambition and his collaboration

with Stalin. Instead, Cumings argues that the Korean War was a civil war that had started

before 1950 and later developed into an international conflict.

66. Seong-Hwan Cho, “The Republic of Korean That Are Shaking” [in Korean], in 2008 the

New Right Korean Report, ed. The Committee on New Right Policies (Seoul: Mal kwa

Changjosa, 2008), 12–35, 23.

362 Politics & Society 49(3)

67. Shin, New Right’s Looking at the World, 206.

68. Jihyang Park, Ilyoung Kim, Cheol Kim, and Younghoon Yi, A New Understanding of Pre-

and Post-Independence History [in Korean] (Seoul: Chaeksesang, 2006), 11–13.

69. Younghoon Yi, “Why Pre- and Post-Independence History Again?,” in A New Understanding

of Pre- and Post-Independence History [in Korean] (Seoul: Chaeksesang, 2006), 25–63,

36.

70. Ji-Hyun Lim, War on Memory: How Perpetrators Became Victims [in Korean] (Seoul:

Humanist, 2019).

71. Kang, Age of Post-Truth, Asking the Denial of History.

72. Alice Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York:

Oxford University Press, 1989); Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial

Transformation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).

73. Author’s interview, December 21, 2017.

74. Byunghoon Ahn, Nevertheless, I Am Dreaming Again [in Korean] (Seoul: Kip’arang,

2017), 394-8.

75. Chang-Gyun Kim, “The Founding of the Republic of Korea Was to Save Half of Koreans

from the Communist Bloc,” Chosun Ilbo (August 10, 2007).

76. Ibid.

77. Woo-Jin Kang, Park Chung Hee Nostalgia and Korean Democracy [in Korean] (Seoul:

The Asiatic Research Institute, 2019), 23.

78. Shin, a former socialist, here uses Marxian rhetoric to advocate a rightist argument.

79. Shin, New Right’s Looking at the World, 57 (emphasis added).

80. Seok-Choon Lew, “The Miracle on the Han River, the Current Authorized History

Textbooks Cannot Explain,” Chosun Ilbo, October 31, 2015.

81. Hagen Koo, Korean Workers: The Culture and Politics of Class Formation (Ithaca, NY:

Cornell University Press, 2001).

82. Nami Lee, The Conservatives and Reactionaries in Korea: History of Ideologies [in

Korean] (Seoul: Jisungsa, 2011), 180.

83. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (New York: International

Publishers, 1971), 6.

84. Jin-Wook Shin, “The Conceptual Structure of Ideologies of Korean Conservative

Associations, 2000-2006” [in Korean], Economy and Society 6 (2008): 163–93; Min Jae

Yoon, “Activation of the Conservative Force: New Right, an Alternative for Conservative

Forces?” [in Korean], Simin kwa Segye 4 (2008): 46–65.

85. Statism subordinates individual liberty and rights to state authority and considers any

activities that challenge the state to cause severe social harm—positions that can be con-

sidered characteristic of fascism.

86. Namhee Lee, “Social Memories of the 1980s: Unpacking the Regime of Discontinuity,” in

Revisiting Minjung: New Perspectives on the Cultural History of 1980s South Korea, ed.

S. Park (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2019), 17–45.

87. Sedgwick, Key Thinkers of the Radical Right, xviii; Miller-Idriss, Hate in the Homeland,

129.

Author Biography

Myungji Yang (myang4@hawaii.edu) is associate professor of sociology at the University of

Hawai‘i–Mānoa. She specializes in social movements, class politics, and the political economy

of development, especially in South Korea. She is the author of From Miracle to Mirage: The

Making and Unmaking of the Korean Middle Class, 1961–2015 (2018).

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Jan 2020

Julian Göpffarth

A widespread view on the success of populist far-right parties is that they mobilise economically left-behind voters via a backward-looking, nostalgic and thus illegitimate agenda. Yet, recent research has shown that it is often wealthy areas that vote for the German populist far-right AfD. Drawing on nationalism, memory-studies and social-movement literature, this article examines how nostalgia drives the activism of well-off local intellectual far-right groups. Based on ethnographic data gathered in Dresden, I argue that far-right intellectual activism in East Germany is facilitated by the convergence of two distinct but related forms of nostalgia. First, a positive nostalgia for a guilt-free past. Second, a negative nostalgia characterized not by a celebration of socialism, but the resistance to it. As multidirectional nostalgia this convergence makes the far right’s political memory resonate with local individual and social memories providing the cultural opportunity structure for electoral success. Infused with a forward-looking ‘anxious hope’, it prefigures an alternative far-right future.

The radical right: An introduction

Chapter

Feb 2018

Jens Rydgren

Neoliberalism and the Far-Right: An Introduction

Article

Aug 2017

Far Right Parties in Europe

Article

May 2016

Matt Golder

The far right party family is the fastest-growing party family in Europe. In addition to describing the ideological makeup of the far right party family, this review examines demand-side and supply-side explanations for its electoral success. Demand-side explanations focus on the grievances that create the "demand" for far right parties, whereas supply-side explanations focus on how the choices that far right parties make and the political opportunity structure in which they act influence their success. The review finishes by suggesting that far right scholars must recognize the interaction between demand-side and supply-side factors in their empirical analyses in order to draw valid inferences and that it would be productive to pay more attention to the political geography of far right support and the different stages of far right success.

Democratic Performance and Park Chung-hee Nostalgia in Korean Democracy

Article

Jan 2016

W.J. Kang

Why, a quarter century after democratization, are Korean citizens so nostalgic about the former authoritarian Park Chung-hee government? What are the implications of this support for Korea's democratic deepening? To answer these questions, I offer empirical analyses of selected data from the Korea Democracy Barometer 2010 survey that confirm the relevance of two dimensions of political support to authoritarian nostalgia in Korea: the life biography model and the economic performance model at the system level. The results suggest a double-sided phenomenon: on the one hand, nostalgia based on a retrospective collective memory; on the other, citizens' critical view of the performance deficits of post-Park democratic governments in dealing with inequality in Korean society. As the findings elucidate, in spite of the challenges they face, emergent democratic governments must perform more effectively if they are to win citizens' support. KEYWORDS: democratic performance, Park Chung-hee nostalgia, Korean democracy, inequality, democratic consolidation.

The Specter of the Past: Reconstructing Conservative Historical Memory in South Korea

Abstract

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