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On the Relationship between Fertility, Development and Gender Equality: A Comparison of Western and MENA Countries

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The changing macro-level relationship between fertility and development (i.e., the standard of living, health and education) from negative to positive for the most advanced economies has received considerable attention recently. Using aggregate data, we compare the relationship between fertility and development in Western countries with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, where fertility rates are higher than in other regions with identical levels of development. To understand the drivers of this association, we further link fertility to the components of development as well as female labour force participation separately. Our fi ndings show that fertility and development were positively associated for only a short period in Western countries and that the relationship turned negative again in recent years. Recent data also show that there is no signifi cant relationship between fertility and development in MENA countries. These fi ndings indicate that the well-acknowledged theories of fertility and development do not apply in every context.
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On the Relationship between Fertility, Development and Gender
Equality: A Comparison of Western and MENA Countries
Zafer Buyukkececi, Henriette Engelhardt
Abstract: The changing macro-level relationship between fertility and development
(i.e., the standard of living, health and education) from negative to positive for the
most advanced economies has received considerable attention recently. Using
aggregate data, we compare the relationship bet ween fertility and development
in Western countries with the Middle East and Nor th Africa (MENA) region, where
fertility rates are higher than in other regions with identical levels of development. To
understand the drivers of this association, we further link fer tility to the components
of development as well as female labour force participation separately. Our ndings
show that fertility and development were positively associated for only a short
period in Western countries and that the relationship turned negative again in
re cent yea r s. R e cen t dat a also show that the r e is no s igni cant relationship between
fertility and development in MENA countries. These ndings indicate that the well-
acknowledged theories of fertility and development do not apply in every context.
Keywords: Fertility · Human Development Index · MENA region
1 Introduction
Seminal demographic literature, such as on the rst and second demographic
transition theories, have postulated a negative relationship between fer tility and
development (Kirk 1996; Lesthaeghe 2010). To explain this negative association
between fertilit y and development, mechanisms such as declining mortality and
increasing child survival (Notestein 1945), investment in the quality rather than
quantit y of children and opportunity costs of motherhood in con ict with female
employment (Becker 1960) have been proposed.
One recognized mechanism used to explain the fertility-development nexus
is gender equality, which has been highlighted as a necessary condition for “the
transition from very high fertility to fertility around replacement level” (McDonald
2000b: 432). More recently, however, new theoretical considerations suggest that
Comparative Population Studies
Vol. 46 (2021): 245-268 (Date of release: 21.07.2021)
Feder al Ins titu te for Populat ion Res earch 2 021 URL: www.compara tivep opula tion studies.d e
DOI: https://doi.org/10.12765/CPoS-2021-09
URN: urn:nbn:de:bib-cpos-2021-09en9
• Zafer Buyukkececi, Henriette Engelhardt
246
the established negative correlation between fertility and development has turned
positive for the most advanced economies (Anderson/Kohler 2015; Goldscheider
et al. 2015). Rising levels of gender equality with development are emphasized
as the potential driver of the emerging positive association bet ween fertility and
development (Esping-Andersen/Billari 2015; McDonald 2000a/b). This is empirically
supported by Myrskylä et al. (2009), who, in their study published in Nature, found
that the relationship bet ween the Human Development Index (HDI) and total fertility
rate (TFR) reverses from negative to positive at advanced HDI levels. Although
these ndings are consistent with theoretical expectations suggesting a reversal
of the relationship between fer tility and development from negative to positive due
to advanced levels of gender equality, it remains unclear whether the observed
as soci ation i s act uall y dr ive n by ge nder equ ali t y or othe r fa c tor s , inclu din g pr ogr ess
in living standards, education and health.
Moreover, these theories and empirical assessments have focused mainly on
Western countries (e.g., Anderson/Kohler 2015; Fox et al. 2019; Luci-Greulich/
Thévenon 2014; Myrskylä et al. 2009, 2011). Yet the evolutionary process of social
change can be modi ed by cultural and institutional context and is not the same
across all societies (McDonald 1994; McNicoll 1980). Countries of the Middle
East and North Africa (MENA), for instance, showed considerable improvements
in economic standard of living, education and health, which comprise the three
main indicators of development. Despite the development progress, the region
falls considerably short of indicators of gender equality such as womens labour
force participation and political empowerment (World Bank 2004), contrary to
theoretical expectations and empirical evidence for other countries (Forsythe et
al. 2000; Inglehart/Norris 2003). According to the World Economic Forum (2017),
the MENA region globally ranks last in terms of gender equality with an average
remaining gender gap of 40 percent. At the same time, the demographic pat terns
suggested by the demographic transition theory are not followed by all countries
and some countries such as Algeria, Egypt and Lebanon have actually experienced
an increase in fertility rates in recent years (Engelhardt
et al. 2018), although these
countries have made signi cant progress toward development. Moreover, evidence
indicates that MENA countries have higher fertility rates than would be the case
in other countries at identical levels of development and the fertility-development
link is weaker in MENA countries (Tabutin/Schoumaker 2005). This asserts that
fertility and development trends in the MENA region may be dif ferent from Western
countries and what established theories suggest.
In this study, we examine how the fertility-development relationship has evolved
over time in MENA countries and compare it to the relationships in Western
countries. We also separately assess how the three components – living standards,
education and health – of development, as well as female labour force participation1
as an indicator of gender equality are related to fertilit y in these two contexts to test
1 Similar to the previous studies (e.g., Luci-Greulich/Thévenon (2014), female labour force
participation has been used as an indicator of gender equalit y in our analyses.
On the Relationship between Fertility, Development and Gender Equality • 247
the relevance of each component of development as well as gender equality. Our
study contributes to the literature in two regards.
First, we test the importance of development for fer tility in two contex ts with
substantially different levels and progress in gender equality and fer tility: MENA
countries with the lowest levels of gender equality and relatively high levels of
development and Western countries with advanced levels of gender equality and
development. Given the relevance of gender equalit y to the fertility-development
nexus as suggested by theoretical arguments ( Anderson/Kohler 2015; Esping-
Andersen/Billari 2015; Goldscheider et al. 2015; McDonald 2000b), these two
contexts might have different fertility-development patterns. We test this by
comparing how the correlation between fertility and development differs between
Western and MENA countries.
Second, we revisit the relationship bet ween fertility and development in
advanced economies. Harttgen and Vollmer (2014) showed that the reversal in the
TFR-HDI relationship found by Myrskylä et al. (2009) is not robust for the UNDP
revision of the HDI calculation method. Using more recent data, we test whether a
reversal from negative to positive exists between TFR and HDI.
We combine Human Development Index datasets (HDI; UNDP 2019), which
contain information on various development indicators with datasets from the
World Development Indicators (WDI; World Bank 2018), which contain annual
information on fertility. We rst estimate the time-series association bet ween
fertility and development (or its components and female labour force par ticipation)
while controlling for country-speci c xed effects. Second, we apply the difference-
in-differences strategy of Myrskylä et al. (2009) to examine the overall relationship
between fertility and development.
2 Fertility, Development and Gender Equality
Western countries
In the historical decline in fertility, the key pre-transitional factor was mortality,
especially infant mortality (Davis 1945; Mason 1997). Western countries have
achieved remarkable reductions in mort ality rates with rising incomes, urbanization
and industrialization. For instance, evidence from four European countries shows
that whilst infant mortality rates ranged from 100 deaths per 1,000 live births in
the late 19th century, by the 1950s they ranged from 20 to 50 deaths per 1,000 live
births (Corsini/Viazzo 1993). Subsequently, the decline in mortality led to a shift
from a high to a low fertility regime between the late 19th to the early 20th century.
Over the course of the demographic transition, Europe’s distinct past characterized
by Malthusian cycles that emphasize a positive fertility-economic growth link
started breaking down with the exception of the baby boom as a period when
development was accompanied by a rise in fertility (Caldwell 1982; Guinnane 2011).
Recent research, indeed, has empirically con rmed the importance of childhood
• Zafer Buyukkececi, Henriette Engelhardt
248
survivorship in childbearing decisions (Reher et al. 2017). Mortality has not only
in uenced childbearing decisions, but also the timing and prevalence of marriage.
Althou gh “truly moder n demographic beha viour could not begin b efore childhood
mortality declined to insigni cant levels” (Reher 2021: 4), mortality alone does not
explain the shift from ver y high to very low fertility rates. Many other factors, such
as the gender revolution (Goldin 2006), the interaction between women’s labour
force participation and the lack of institutional adjustment, cultural and ideological
innovations that led to greater behavioural freedom (Lesthaeghe 1983) and more
individualistic attitudes (Van De Kaa 1987), have attracted the at tention of scholars.
In the 20-30 years that followed the end of the baby boom, Western countries
experienced rapid social and cultural changes. The trend converged in most
advanced countries, albeit with visible dif ferences in timing, tempo and degree
accompanied by rapid economic growth. For instance, the shift away from the
male breadwinner model had begun in the 1960s and accelerated in the 1970s in
Scandinavia and North America, whereas similar transitions in countries like West
Germany and Spain occurred with a delay of one or two decades (Esping-Andersen
2009). Reher (2021) emphasized the historical baggage of societies that drives these
differences. The key determinant s of historical baggage were the relative importance
of the individual, family and religion in society (Derosas/van Poppel 2006; Inglehart/
Baker 2000; Reher 1998).
These progressive tendencies clashed with norms shaped by the regime of male
breadwinner/female housewife. Neither the status nor the bargaining power of
women increased at the same pace, despite their non-negligible involvement in the
economy (Goldin 1990). Consequently, a con ict arose between individual-oriented
social institutions with a high degree of gender equality and family-oriented social
institutions with persistent gender inequality, resulting in very low fertility among
Western countries (McDonald 2000a/b). Having children and starting a family was
associated with child-rearing, domestic work and male breadwinner roles. This in
turn was perceived as a barrier to women’s careers. The marketable skills of men
and women began to converge as women became more involved in the economy.
As a result, the cost of childbearing for women increased substantially, which
reduced the returns of marriage (Becker 1974). Subsequently, new ways of living
together such as cohabitation started emerging, whereas partnerships became less
stable and fertility declined (Lesthaeghe 2010).
Rising levels of development and gender equality were paralleled by fertility
decreases in societies with high levels of gender inequality. Most Western countries
had low fertilit y rates at the end of the 20th century with some exceptions such as
France where fertilit y rates remained relatively high, despite low levels of gender
inequality (Population Reference Bureau 2007). Yet Rindfuss and Brewster (1996)
argued that changes in the social organization of work and childcare arrangements
would alter these trends and that easing women’s con icts in balancing work and
family life courses would lead to an increase in fer tilit y. Similarly, McDonald (2000b)
pointed to a reversal of the macro relationship between fertility and gender equality
in the long run. He argued that institutions would develop reforms that support
rising fertility at advanced levels of gender equality. This is more recently supported
On the Relationship between Fertility, Development and Gender Equality • 249
by Esping-Andersen and Billari (2015) who suggested that the declines in fertility
with the increasing number of women involved in the economy would be reversed
as societies approach gender egalitarianism. Increasing gender equality at both
institutional and household levels would allow individuals to have their desired
number of children while ensuring the reconciliation of work and family life courses
(Anderson/Kohler 2015; Myrskylä et al. 2011). Goldscheider et al. (2015) further
emphasized the male involvement in family life for reversing fertility trends. In line
with these theoretical expectations, the focus of family policies in many Western
countries has shifted to the expansion of parental leave for both men and women
and the provision of childcare that aimed at reducing work-family con icts.
Several studies supported these recent theories suggesting a reversal/U-shaped
pattern for the relationship between fertility and development empirically. Myrskylä
et al. (2009) showed that the relationship between development and fertility reverses
from negative to positive after a certain threshold. In the same vein, Luci-Greulich
and Thévenon (2014) found a change in the relationship bet ween fertility and GDP per
capita above a certain threshold of economic development for 30 OECD countries.
Moreover, by decomposing GDP per capita into several components, they identi ed
fe mal e emp loy ment as a co-var ying fac t or i n the fer tility re boun d. T his c onc lusi on i s
consistent with theoretical expectations ( Anderson/Kohler 2015; Esping-Andersen/
Billari 2015; Goldscheider et al. 2015; McDonald 2000a/b; Myrskylä et al. 2011;
Rindfuss/Brewster 1996): Countries with high levels of development as measured
by health, income and education, but low levels of gender equality, continue to
experience declining fertility.
Empirical ndings on the relationship between fertility, development and gender
equality, however, are not entirely consistent. Furuoka (2009) found a negative
association bet ween fertility and development in countries with lower levels of
development, whereas the relationship remained negative, albeit weak, in countries
with a high HDI. In the same vein, Harttgen and Vollmer (2014) found no evidence for
the inverse J-shaped association using the recent revision of the HDI calculation. By
utilizing gender equality, Kolk (2019) examined the in uence of gender equality on
fertility in 35 developed countries. The results showed that a U-shaped pat tern was
only observed across countries and that changes within countries did not lead to a
reversal of fertility and gender equality.
MENA countries
In contrast to Western countries, mor tality in MENA countries was very high in the
rst half of the 20th century. Crude death rates were close to 25 percent and life
expectancy was about 40 years until the 1950s. In the same vein, fertilit y rates were
very high, reaching seven or eight children per woman. In the second half of the 20th
century, mortality in the MENA countries was signi cantly reduced. Infant mortality
rates fell from about 200 deaths per 1,000 live births in the 1950s to less than 50
deaths per 1,000 live births by the end of the century (Roudi 2001) reaching levels
that Western countries had half a decade ago. Along with the decline in mortality,
fertility fell to below six and ve in the 1980s and 1990s, respectively and then to
• Zafer Buyukkececi, Henriette Engelhardt
250
3.1 in the early 2000s (World Bank 2017). Nevertheless, these rates were still higher
than the average fertility rates that developed countries had in the 1950s (i.e., 2.8;
World Bank 2018).
The fertility decline occurred late in comparison to other regions and concealed
diversity in the pace of change bet ween countries and sub-regions. For instance,
in 2016, Saudi Arabia had a total fertility rate of 2.4, whereas women in Jordan had
3.5 children on average (World Bank 2017). Tabu tin and Schoumaker (2005) further
showed that the relationship between fertility and development is very weak. At
same HDI level, total fertility rates ranged from 2.0 in Tunisia to 4.1 in Saudi Arabia.
Moreover, fertility in many MENA countries is signi cantly higher than it would be
elsewhere at the same level of development.
While the rapid decline in fertility in MENA countries is not negligible, fertility
in several countries such as Jordan, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia has stabilized
since the mid-2000s (Bel Air 2017). Some countries such as Algeria and Egypt
even experienced an increase in fertility in this period (Engelhardt et al. 2018).
Krafft (2020) recently argued that Egypt’s demographic transition is not stalling but
reversing by showing that Egypt ’s fertility rate reached 3.5 in 2012 after reaching
a low of 3.0 in 2008. Even in the rst decade of the 21st centur y, about 3 out of 4
MENA countries had fertility rates well above the replacement level (World Bank
2018), despite declining infant mortality rates and development progress. One
explanation for these obser ved trends could be that the cultural and ideological
innovations that triggered gender equality in Western countries were not yet present
in the MENA region. Women’s participation in the economy remained considerably
low, while the returns of marriage for women were still high. Moghadam (2001)
emphasized that the kind of development that was witnessed in the MENA countries
reinforced patriarchal gender contracts in the MENA region. The idea is consistent
with McDonald’s (2000b: 432) proposition, which posits that “[t]he transition from
high fertility to fertility around replacement level is accompanied by an increase in
gender equity within the institution of family.”
To explain the low level of gender equality in the region, scholars pointed out, on
the one hand, that this low level of gender equality is due to the Islamic traditions in
the region (e.g., Sharabi 1992) and the poor treatment of Muslim women (Inglehart/
Norris 2003; Landes/Landes 2001). On the other hand, Ross (2008) argued that low
female employment and gender equality and high fertility are not solely due to
Islamic traditions, but to s tructural opportunities. He pointe d to the oil revenue-based
economies in the region that triggered a shift from expor t-oriented sectors such as
agriculture and manufacturing to non-export-oriented sectors such as construction
and retail. Subsequently, economic grow th in the region was mainly generated by
ows from oil-producing countries. While oil-producing countries mainly comprise
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, other countries bene tted indirectly
from oil through remittances from migrant labourers and shared the characteristics
of a rentier economy (World Bank 2013).
Historically, authoritarian regimes provided public sector jobs and the MENA
region had one of the largest public sectors in the world (Amin et al. 2012).
Nevertheless, with this type of economic growth a growing scal burden of
On the Relationship between Fertility, Development and Gender Equality • 251
an oversized public sector emerged that affected budgetar y sustainability and
prompted calls for downsizing and cuts in the public sector (Assaad/Barsoum
2019). For instance, the pause in public sector hiring began in Egypt in the 1970s and
the share of public sector employment in total employment declined from about
35 percent in 2002 to about 20 percent in 2018 (Assaad/Barsoum 2019). Accordingly,
the public sector share in hiring new entrants has fallen steadily in most MENA
countries, despite progress in educational attainment and development.
Women in particular prefer public sector employment to the private sector in
most MENA countries. There are several reasons for this, including the fact that
public sector jobs are more hospitable and offer favourable and exible working
conditions such as short working hours, job security and social bene ts (Barsoum
2016). Considering the norms that prioritize women’s domestic responsibilities,
such characteristics make public sector jobs more popular among women than
men (Barsoum 2019). As a result, despite the feminized public sector, women’s
em ploy m ent o p portuni t ies h a ve b e en ne g ative l y im p acted a s pub l ic se c t or jo bs th a t
traditionally employed women have declined and private-sector jobs dominated in
many MENA countries ( Assaad/Krafft 2015). These emerging jobs in the private
sector such as construction require physical strength and are dominated by men.
Even the other economic pillars of the private sector that do not require physical
strength are signi cantly dominated by men. For instance, in 2020, less than
9 percent of the tourism labour force was women in the MENA region (UNWTO
2020). This mismatch between women’s rising educational attainment and stagnant
labour force participation rates has been termed the “MENA paradox” (Assaad et
al. 2020). As a result, women’s structural opportunities have not increased despite
economic grow th. Overall, the fertility-development nexus in MENA countries may
show different patterns than in Western countries if progress towards development
is not complemented by gender equality.
3 Data
We include time series of 19 MENA and 24 Western countries in our analyses.
As there is no standardized list, we include those that are generally referred to
as MENA countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United
Arab Emirates (UAE) and Yemen.2 Western countries refer to the countries included
by Myrskylä et al. (2009): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the
United Kingdom and the United States of America (USA).
2 Iran and Turkey are included among MENA countries, given that they are located in the Middle
East an d share similar s tructur al (i.e., type o f economy) and cul tural (i.e., rel igion) charact eristics .
Yet, as a ro bustnes s ch eck, we only cons idere d count ries w here Arabic i s the of cial language.
Findings are reported in the A ppendix, Table A2.
• Zafer Buyukkececi, Henriette Engelhardt
252
We use HDI data from the International Human Development Indicators
database (UNDP 2019). It contains information on HDI and its components annually
between 1990 and 2018. We use the revised version of HDI in which the calculation
method was changed to the geometric mean. The HDI revision provides consistent
measurements that are comparable over time and this time consistent index
included: (i) gross domestic product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity
(PPP) referring to the standard of living, (ii) average of the adult literacy rate and the
combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross school enrolment ratio referring to
the human capital endowment and (iii) annual life expectancy at birth, referring to
the health component of development.
Fertility data, which is available yearly between 1960 and 2018, comes from
the World Development Indicators (WDI; World Bank 2018). It is measured by the
country-speci c annual tot al fertilit y rate re ec t in g th e n um b er of ch il dr e n t ha t w ou ld
be born to a woman during the considered age window if she experienced the age-
speci c fertility rates observed in a particular year. The main weakness of the TFR
is that it is subject to tempo effects of fertility (Bongaarts/Feeney 1998; Sobotka/
Lutz 2011). Tempo adjusted fertility measures may provide a more comprehensive
overview of the fer tility trends and may (partly) explain changing TFR (Bongaarts/
Sobotka 2012). Yet fertility changes in MENA countries differ greatly from those
in advanced societies (see Balbo et al. 2013 for a review of fertility in advanced
societies). Age-speci c fertility rates have not experienced a shift to the right in
most MENA countries, suggesting that the mean age at rst birth has not changed
considerably in this region (Engelhardt et al. 2018). Accordingly, tempo effects are
likely to be an issue only for the analysis of Western countries. While acknowledging
this critique, other indicators of fertility such as age at rst birth are only available
in time-series data every ve years between 1990 and 2015 and the TFR is the only
available fertility measure for MENA countries that allows a longitudinal analysis
of the fertility-development relationship.3 Moreover, it is plausible that the TFR
provides extensive insight into fer tility comparison between MENA and Western
countries because it “is the most widely used indicator of fertilit y, as TFR is a key
de termi nan t of t he num ber of c h ildren bor n in a calend ar y e ar and t h us of p opu latio n
aging and population growth/decline” (Myrskylä et al. 2011: 38) and most public
debates on fertility trends focus on the TFR.
4 Method
We estimated the relationship between fer tility and development using two
approach es. While the rst approa ch focused on how the a ssociation be tween fer tility
and development varies between dif ferent periods, the overall association between
3 Nevertheless, in additional robustness checks, we replicated our models while controlling for
the mean age at childbearing. Findings did not deviate strongly from the main outcomes and
are reported in the Appendix.
On the Relationship between Fertility, Development and Gender Equality • 253
these two indicators was examined with the second strategy. More speci cally, we
rst applied linear regression models with xed effects at country-level separately
for MENA and Western countries to examine the relationship bet ween fertility and
development with the following formula using time-series annual data:
where t indicated the year and c the country. The terms γc represented time invariant
country-speci c effects, which are accounted for with country xed effects and
εtc is the error term. To examine how the fer tility-development link evolved since
1990, we compared the estimated coef cients of HDI(β) between six periods: 1990-
1994, 1995 -1999, 2000 -2004, 2005-2009, 2010-2014 and 2015-2018. We used robust
standard errors clustered by country in all models to account for heteroscedasticity
and deal with atypical countries.
We then examined the fertility-development link by adopting the difference
estimation strategy of Myrskylä et al. (2009). Speci cally, we estimated a piecewise
linear model where the coef cient of HDI (or subindices of HDI and FLFP) can differ
above and below a predetermined threshold value with the following equation:
where t indicated the year and c the country. The coef cients
βpre and βpost estimated
the effects of HDI on TFR above and below the threshold value, respectively.
referred to the difference indicator: Xt = Xt - X(t-1) and .
Differencing allows us to control for country xed-effects and account for the unit
root from the residual autocorrelation. and were dummy variables
indicating whether the HDI was below and above threshold value, respectively. γt
denoted year-speci c ef fects common to all countries. We tested whether there is a
signi cant reversal in the fertility-development relationship with this speci cation.
To determine the threshold value, we also followed the strategy of Myrskylä et
al. (2009) and used maximum likelihood methods. Equation 1 was estimated using a
wide range of potential threshold values and the threshold value with the maximum
log-likelihood function was used in the main analyses.
5 Results
As the rst step of the analysis, we made a cross-country comparison of the
relationship between TFR and HDI. We tted linear and polynomial prediction
plots to display cross-country associations in Figure 1-4. These predicted plots
describe the cross-country associations between fertility and development at two
points in time (i.e., 1990 and 2018). Panel A and B of Figure 1 plot how the linear
relationship varies across Western countries in 1990 and 2018, respectively. In both
periods, Western countries’ fertility levels increased with development. Polynomial
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• Zafer Buyukkececi, Henriette Engelhardt
254
prediction plots of Western countries illustrated in Figure 2, however, imply that the
positive relationship between fertilit y and development reversed to negative at ver y
advanced levels of development in 2018. Yet these ndings should be interpreted
with caution given that the reversal is driven by a few countries.
On the contrary, cross-country analyses of MENA countries indicate that fertility
declined at higher levels of development, as shown in Figure 3. The predicted
polynomial plots of MENA countries, shown in Figure 4, were similar to Figure 3
with the exception that the negative relationship bet ween fertility and development
became weaker at the higher levels of development in 1990. Moreover, most MENA
countries experienced notable declines in TFR between 1990 and 2018. While the
average TFR of MENA countries was 4.88 in 1990, it decreased to 2.60 in 2018.
Table 1 shows the estimates of the linear regression models with country-level
xed effec ts. Unlike the cross-sec tional analysis in Figure 1, fertility and development
trends of Western countries was negative in 1990-1994. This relationship became
insigni can t in the nex t tw o 5-year periods. Con siste nt w i th t he r e cen t dem ogr aphi c
theories (Anderson/Kohler 2015; Esping-Andersen/Billari 2015; Goldscheider et
al. 2015), the negative relationship bet ween fertility and development reverses
to positive in 2005-2009. This period relates to the most recent data analysed by
Myrskylä et al. (2009), who found a reversal of the relationship between fertility
and development from negative to positive. Yet the main ndings of Myrskylä et al.
(2009) disappeared when we examined the most recent periods. In fact, fertility in
Fig. 1: Cross-country association between fer tility and development (Western
countries)
AUS
AUT
BEL
CAN
DNK
FIN
FRA
DEU
GRC
ISL
IRL
ISR
ITA
JPN
LUX NLD
NZL
NOR
KOR
ESP
SWE
CHE
GBR
USA
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
.7 .75 .8 .85 .9
HDI
Panel A: 199 0 Panel B: 2018
Source: UNDP (2017), World Bank (2018)
AUS
AUT
BEL
CAN
DNK
FIN
FRA
DEU
GRC
ISL
IRL
ISR
ITA
JPN
LUX
NLD
NZL
NOR
KOR
ESP
SWE
CHE
GBR
USA
1
1.5
2
2
.5
3
.88 .9 .92 .94 .96
HDI
TFR TFR
On the Relationship between Fertility, Development and Gender Equality • 255
Western countries was negatively associated with development in 2010-2014 and
2015-2018. These ndings suggest that the positive association between fertility
and development in Western countries was temporary. In MENA countries, fertility
declined signi cantly and noticeably at the higher levels of development between
1990 and 2004. Yet this relationship became insigni cant in 2005-2009. In the
subsequent periods (i.e., 2010-2014 and 2015-2018), unlike in Western countries there
was also no longer a systematic relationship between fertility and development.
Fig. 2: Cross-country association between fer tility and development with
polynomial prediction plots (Western countries)
AUS
AUT
BEL
CAN
DNK
FIN
FRA
DEU
GRC
ISL
IRL
ISR
ITA
JPN
LUX NLD
NZL
NOR
KOR
ESP
SWE
CHE
GBR
USA
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
.7 .75 .8 .85 .9
HDI
Panel A: 199 0 Panel B: 2018
Source: UNDP (2017), World Bank (2018)
TFR TFR
AUS
AUT
BEL
CAN
DNK
FIN
FRA
DEU
GRC
ISL
IRL
ISR
ITA
JPN
LUX
NLD
NZL
NOR
KOR
ESP
SWE
CHE
GBR
USA
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
.88 .9 .92 .94 .96
HDI
HDI 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2014 2015-2018
Western -2.416** -0.966 0.032 4.404** -4.980*** -9.267***
(0.753) (0.794) (0.979) (1.494) (0.986) (2.260)
MENA -15.948*** -14.977*** -10.575*** -3.572 0.830 -2.137
(4.456) (3.156) (2.126) (1.921) (1.402) (4.401)
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Source: UNDP (2017), World Bank (2018)
Tab . 1: Regression results (robust standard errors in parentheses)
• Zafer Buyukkececi, Henriette Engelhardt
256
Results for the three HDI subindices and female labour force par ticipation (FLFP)
are presented in Table 2. For the education and health indices, ndings are very
similar to Table 1, except that the negative relationship between fertilit y, on the
one hand, and education and health, on the other hand, became signi cant during
the 2015-2018 period. In contrast, both Western and MENA countries’ standard of
living was weakly associated with fertility.4 Only in 2005-2009 – the period when
the fertility-development link became positive, were estimated coef cients of
the FLFP signi cant for Western countries. This is in line with Luci-Greulich and
Thévenon (2014), who found a positive relationship between female employment
and fertility for within-country variation.
So far, we have examined how the association between TFR and HDI has
changed over time. In Table 3, we adopted the difference-in-differences strategy of
Myrskylä et al. (2009) and examined the overall relationship. In line with the ndings
of Harttgen and Vollmer (2014), the estimated threshold value of HDI was 0.808 and
there was no reversal in the fertility-development link among Western countries.
4 Further analyses of MENA countries (not shown) where fertility was regressed on the three
components of HDI together had illustrated that standard of living is positively associated
with fertility when controlling for health and education in 2015-2018. This suggests that MENA
region’s insigni cant association bet ween fertilit y and development in 2015-2018 was related
to socioeconomic development.
Fig. 3: Cross-country association between fertility and development (MENA
countries)
DZA
BHR
EGYIRN
IRQ
JOR
KWT
LBY
MAR QAT
SAU
SDN
SYR
TUN
TUR
ARE
YEM
2
4
6
8
10
.3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8
HDI
Panel A: 199 0
Source: UNDP (2017), World Bank (2018)
TFR TFR
Panel B: 2018
DZA
BHR
EGY
IRN
IRQ
JOR
KWT
LBN
LBY
MAR
OMN
QAT
SAU
SDN
SYR
TUN
TUR
ARE
YEM
1
2
3
4
5
.5 .6 .7 .8 .9
HDI
On the Relationship between Fertility, Development and Gender Equality • 257
Moreover, while fer tility was negatively related to education and health, standard
of living was insigni cantly associated with fertility in line with the ndings shown
in Table 2.
Findings for MENA countries showed different patterns than those for Western
countries. The calculated threshold was strikingly low, suggesting that the
difference-in-differences strategy of Myrskylä et al. (2009) was not well suited for the
MENA region. Moreover, development was insigni cantly associated with fertility
below the certain threshold value we determined. Yet fertilit y started increasing
above this threshold value. While increasing levels of education and health were
negatively linked to fertility below the threshold value we identi ed, fertility rates
were positively associated with education and health above this threshold value.
Strikingly, fertility rates in MENA countries were positively related to socioeconomic
development below the determined threshold value. For both Western and MENA
countries, the overall relationship between fertility and FLFP was negative above
the determined threshold value.
To s trengthe n con dence in our ndings, we performed several additional
analyses including controlling for mean age at childbearing, focusing only on Arabic-
speaking countries, using quinquennial fertility data, inclusion of a quadratic term
and replicating the rst model by focusing on 10- and 15-year intervals. Findings
were qualitatively robust to these speci cations and are repor ted in the Appendix.
Fig. 4: Cross-country association between fer tility and development with
polynomial prediction plots (MENA countries)
DZA
BHR
EGYIRN
IRQ
JOR
KWT
LBY
MAR QAT
SAU
SDN
SYR
TUN
TUR
ARE
YEM
2
4
6
8
10
.3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8
HDI
Panel A: 199 0
Source: UNDP (2017), World Bank (2018)
TFR TFR
Panel B: 2018
DZA
BHR
EGY
IRN
IRQ
JOR
KWT
LBN
LBY
MAR
OMN
QAT
SAU
SDN
SYR
TUN
TUR
ARE
YEM
1
2
3
4
5
.5 .6 .7 .8 .9
HDI
• Zafer Buyukkececi, Henriette Engelhardt
258
6 Conclusion
In this study, we examined the association between fertility and development among
Western and MENA countries. The main contribution of the present study is twofold.
First, we showed that well-established theories of fertility and development may
not apply in every context. While fertility and development have been negatively
associated in Western countries in recent years, there was no signi cant relationship
in MENA countries during the same period. Indeed, fur ther analyses where we
focused on the overall relationship rather than speci c periods implied that fertility
and development is positively associated above the identi ed threshold. A separate
examination of the HDI components suggested that this association was mainly
related to the standard of living component. These ndings of MENA countries are
in line with McDonald (1994) a nd McNicoll (1980) who emphasize that the process
of social change may not be the same across all societies and may be in uenced by
cultural and institutional contexts.
Tab . 2: Regression models with HDI components and FLFP rates (robust
standard errors in parentheses)
1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2014 2015-2018
Panel A: Education
Western -1.196** -0.463 -0.022 1.579* -2.145** -6.818**
(0.326) (0.458) (0.382) (0.736) (0.533) (2.038)
MENA -10.238** -9.215* -7.176*** -1.888 0.200 -4.639***
(3.4 5 7) (3 .141) (1.259) (1.031) (0. 975) (0.6 8 2)
Panel B: Standard of living
Western -0.931 -1.277 0.638 0.304 -2.345 -6.182**
(1.564) (0.990) (2.598) (1.416) (2.539) (1.709)
MEN A -2 .111 -7. 9 7 0** -1.511 -2.3 5 3 0. 8 86 1.747
(1.603) (2.271) (2.465) (2.223) (0.751) (1.191)
Panel C: Health
Western - 4.227* -2.449 -0.050 6.124*** -7.572*** -9.991***
(1.752) (1.3 64) (1.5 45) (1.079) (1.5 45) (2.39 5)
MENA -26.570*** -25.713*** -12.642*** -4.296 -0.196 -7.567**
(3.071) (5.007) (2.691) (3.333) (3.826) (2.217)
Panel D: FLFP
Western -0.005 0.004 0.007 0.032** -0.015 -0.025
(0.010) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.014) (0.018)
MENA -0.092 -0.076 -0.016 -0.012 -0.009 0.022
(0.080) (0.061) (0.042) (0.023) (0.020) (0.016)
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Source: UNDP (2017), World Bank (2018)
On the Relationship between Fertility, Development and Gender Equality • 259
Secondly, our analyses focusing on Western countries have shown that the
relationship bet ween fertility and development were signi cantly positive for a
short period (i.e., 2005-2009), yet afterwards the relationship became negative
again. Moreover, analyses where we employed the difference-in-differences
strategy of Myrskylä et al. (2009) indicated no reversal from negative to positive
in the fertility-development link. Accordingly, we found no empirical evidence
supporting recent demographic theories that suggest a reversal from negative to
positive in the fertility-development link (Anderson/Kohler 2015; Esping-Andersen/
Billari 2015; Goldscheider et al. 2015). Furthermore, the difference-in-differences
strategy implied that the overall association between fer tility and female labour
force participation was negative among both Western and MENA countries above
the threshold value we determined. Yet these ndings should be interpreted with
caution because we observed no signi cantly negative relationships in the analyses
where we focused on how this relationship changed over time in both Western
and MENA countries. Moreover, the identi ed threshold for MENA countries was
considerably low, suggesting that the strategy of Myrskylä et al. (2009) is not
particularly compatible.
We conclude with limitations and suggestions for further research. TFR is used
to measure fertility throughout the analyses. Yet TFR is an imperfect measure
given that it is affected by the timing of childbearing and both Western and MENA
countries have experienced notable shifts in age of rst childbirth (Bongaarts 1999).
At the same time, union formation was postponed in the MENA region in the 2000s
together with development, resembling the nuptialit y pat terns of the Western
world in the 1970s (Kuhn 2012; Ortega 2014). Moreover, evidence indicates that no
Tab . 3: Regression results: Difference-in-differences (standard errors in
parentheses)
HDI Education Standard of living Health FLFP
Western
Pre -0.656 -0.017 1.070 -1.332 0.000
(0.976) (0.448) (2.042) (2.762) (0.003)
Post -1.093* -0.390* -0.231 -4.784* -0.024**
(0.446) (0.161) (0.472) (1.873) (0.008)
Threshold value 0.808 0.716 0.806 0.866 0.737
MENA
Pre 0.059 -1.583* 3.657*** -5.581*** 0.003
(0.571) (0.806) (0.902) (1.518) (0.005)
Post 1.604* 0.541* 0.230 2.745* -0.022***
(0.628) (0.260) (0.207) (1.060) (0.005)
Threshold value 0.675 0.383 0.478 0.775 0.416
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Source: UNDP (2017), World Bank (2018)
• Zafer Buyukkececi, Henriette Engelhardt
260
marriage regime has been able to reduce fertility in the MENA region (Engelen/
Puschmann 2011). Given that childbearing is mostly within marriage in MENA
countries, fertility could be reduced due to the postponement of marriages among
younger generations, leading to rebounds in the latter period. Accordingly, we note
that TFR could not capture these trends. However, additional analyses where we
controlled for timing of childbearing supported our main ndings, although these
ndings should be interpreted cautiously due to limited available data on the timing
of childbearing. Moreover, annual UN data on TFR is primarily based on a later
interpolation of the quinquennial base data in most developing countries. Thereby,
there could be less variabilit y in TFR among MENA countries leading to biased
standard errors. To acknowledge this, we replicated our analyses using the original
quinquennial fertility data as a robustness check.
We assumed that development af fects fertility in the analyses. Yet the effects
could work in both directions: Fertility may affect development. We also expected
that the fertility-development link of MENA countries is different from Western
countries due to the distinct progress and evolution of gender equality in the region.
Indeed, fertility-development trends of MENA countries are noticeably dif ferent
from ndings on Western countries (Fox et al. 2019; Myrskylä et al. 2009, 2011)
and theoretical expectations (Anderson/Kohler 2015; Esping-Andersen/Billari 2015;
Goldscheider et al. 2015). Consequently, there could be factors such as barriers in
the use of contraception, problems in women’s reconciliation of work and family
life or unwanted fertility af fecting these trends. These factors are not tested in this
study. Why MENA countries show different fertility trends and have not become
more gender-equal societies with increasing levels of development is beyond the
scope of this paper and it would be interesting to elicit the drivers such as religion
and/or structural opportunities of this trend. In conclusion, future research may
elicit the drivers of a positive fertility-development link among Western countries
that only emerged for a short period.
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World Bank 2018: World Development Indicators. Washington, DC: World Bank.
World Economic Forum 2017: The global gender gap report.
Date of submission: 20.10.2020 Date of acceptance: 14.05.2021
Zafer Buyukkececi (). Universität zu Köln, Institut für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie
(ISS). Cologne, Germany. E-mail: bueyuekkececi@wiso.uni-koeln.de
URL: https://iss-wiso.uni-koeln.de/de/institut/personen/b/zafer-bueyuekkececi
Prof. Dr. Henriette Engelhardt. University of Bamberg, Faculty of Social Sciences,
Economics, and Business Administration. Bamberg, Germany.
E-mail: henriette.engelhardt-woel er@uni-bamberg.de
URL: https://www.uni-bamberg.de/en/demogra e/professorship/prof-dr-engelhardt-
woel er/
On the Relationship between Fertility, Development and Gender Equality • 265
Appendix
Additional analyses
Table A1 presents the ndings where we replicated the models focusing on 5-year
intervals by considering 10- and 15-year intervals, respectively. In Table A2, we
rep lic ate d th e main m ode ls fo cus ing on 5 -y ear i nte rv al s wi th d if fe re nt sp eci cations.
In Panel A, we included only Arabic-speaking MENA countries by excluding Turkey
and Iran and including Mauritania and Palestine. Although Malta has different
structural and cultural characteristics than the MENA countries considered, we
additionally used the World Bank de nition of MENA countries and included Djibouti
and Malta (not shown). In Panel B of Table A2, we examined how the TFR-HDI
relationship changed in every ve year between 1990 and 2015 while controlling
for timing of childbearing.5 The models were replicated using quinquennial fertility
data in Panel C, given that the UN’s annual information on fertility is based on a
later interpolation of the quinquennial base data in most developing countries.6
Using these three speci cations included in Table A2, we replicated the difference-
in-differences models of Myrskylä et al. (2009) and ndings are reported in Panel
A-C of Table A3. All these models supported the conclusions drawn from the main
models.
In Table A4, we estimated the non-linear time series association between fertility
and development separately for Western and MENA countries by introducing a
quadratic term of HDI with the following form:
where t indicated the year and c the country. The terms γc represented country-
speci c ef fects, λt denoted year-speci c effects common to all countries and εtc
is the error term. The models focused on the period between 1990 and 2018 and
included country-level and period xed ef fects to account for unobserved time-
constant country heterogeneity and variation in outcome over time that is not
attributed to the predictors, respectively. For a better illustration of the results,
we plotted the marginal effects obtained from the regression models in Figure A1.
Accordingly, we present the expected instantaneous changes in the outcome as a
function of a change in the main predictors. Overall, estimated results supported
our main ndings. While fertility insigni cantly decreased at higher levels of
development among Western countries, MENA countries had higher fertility rates
with increasing development.
5 These ndings should be interpreted with caution, given that the timing of childbearing data is
available ever y ve years for the period 1990 to 2015.
6 Information on timing of childbearing and quinquennial base data is available until 2015.
Therefore, these models were not estimated for the 2015-2018 period.
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• Zafer Buyukkececi, Henriette Engelhardt
266
Tab . A1: Regression results focusing on 10- and 15-year periods (robust
standard errors in parentheses)
HDI 1990-1999 1995-2004 2000-2009 2010-2018
Western -2.238** -0.364 2.472** -2.633*
(0.735) (0.624) (0.766) (1.098)
MENA -15.856** -14.134*** -7.281** -0.204
(4.730) (2.104) (1.93 4) (1.915)
HDI 1990-2004 1995-2009 2000-2018
Western -1.387* 0.982 -0.048
(0.526) (0.631) (0.552)
MENA -16.078*** -10.885*** -3.177
(2.951) (1.925) (1.743)
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Source: UNDP (2017), World Bank (2018)
Tab . A 2: Robustness checks focusing on 5-year periods with different
speci cations (robust standard errors in parentheses)
HDI 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015 2015-2018
Panel A: Focusing on Arabic-speaking countries
MENA -13.267** -14.920*** -10.884*** - 4.642 0.585 -0.170
(4.014) (3.265) (2.301) (2.432) (1.647) (0.199)
Panel B: Controlling for the timing of childbearing
Wes te rn -1.117 1.4 97 1.071 0.571 - 6.474**
(1.2 31) (0.991) (1.6 65) (2. 017) (2.144)
MENA -21.106*** -15.812*** -9.798*** -1.932 1.297
(3.421) (2.958) (2.307) (2.121) (1.752)
Panel C: Using quinquennial fertility data
Western -1.921* -0.387 2.967*** 0.572 -3.985***
(0.736) -0.641 -0.595 -0.959 -0.882
MENA -16.647*** -12.835*** -6.602* -1.221 -0.248
(2.920) (1.770) (2.506) (2.015) (1.144)
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Source: UNDP (2017), World Bank (2018)
On the Relationship between Fertility, Development and Gender Equality • 267
Tab . A3: Robustness checks with difference-in-differences strategy and different
speci cations (robust standard errors in parentheses)
Panel A: Focusing Panel B: Controlling Panel C: Using
on Arabic-speaking for the timing of quinquennial fertility
countries childbearing data
Western
Pre -0.747 -4.711*
(0.888) (2.215)
Post -2.723 4.474
(2.758) (2.282)
Threshold value 0.906 0.823
MENA
Pre 2.041 6.009 0.759
(1.161) (4.812) (1.3 96)
Post -1.105 -4.661 1.435
(1.2 37) (4 .910) (1.9 89)
Threshold 0.4 0.53 0.6
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Source: UNDP (2017), World Bank (2018)
Tab . A4: Non-linear association between fertilit y and development (robust
standard errors in parentheses)
Western MENA
HDI 1.803 -0.069
(14.999) (11.556)
HDI x HDI -2.074 3.128
(8.581) (9.363)
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Source: UNDP (2017), World Bank (2018)
• Zafer Buyukkececi, Henriette Engelhardt
268
Fig. A1: Non-linear association between fertility and development (estimated
marginal effects)
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
.75 .8 .85 .9 .95 1
HDI
Panel A: Wes tern countries Panel B: MENA countries
Source: UNDP (2017), World Bank (2018)
TFR TFR
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
.5 .55 .6 .65 .7 .75
HDI
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2021
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Book
The impact of religion on family and reproduction is one of the most fascinating and complex topics open to scholarly research. The linkage between family and religion has received no systematic treatment on a comparative basis, either in the social sciences or in historical studies. This book provides new insights into the relationships between religion and demography during the crucial period of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Apart from providing a wealth of descriptive information on family life and fertility in different national and religious settings, the major strength of the book lies in its conceptual insights. The book will attract and stimulate readers at the advanced undergraduate or at the graduate level in history, religious studies, women’s studies, family studies, social demography, sociology, and anthropology due to its subject matter (moral issues related to fertility decline and family change played an important role in processes like secularisation, and religious secessions in the19th and 20th century), its analytical approach (all chapters make use of micro-level data on family and family size and use comparable statistical methods specifically suited for these kinds of data), and its theoretical orientation (the chapters explicitly focus on the variety of mechanisms via which religions had an effect on family life and fertility). The book is truly cross-cultural, showing the similarities as well as the differences in the positions of the various churches on matters important for reproduction in Western Europe, the US and Canada in the period 1850-1950. The consideration of the causes of variations in family size in the past provides a refreshing perspective on contemporary effects of religion on reproductive behaviour and the family. "This volume successfully promotes an agenda for research on the complex and diverse historical relationships between fertility, identity, community and religion." Simon Szreter, Fellow of St John's College, Cambridge "These well-researched and lucidly argued papers will provide important reading for all those interested in the religious history of the nineteenth century." Hugh McLeod is Professor of Church History at the University of Birmingham "This is a very valuable new resource for scholars, both established and new, to understand the role of religious institutions in family and demographic behavior and the ways in which those behaviors change across long periods of time." Arland Thornton, Director, Population Studies Center, University of Michigan "This book shows also that modern demographic and social history is able to revive the past in ways unthinkable only a generation ago." Massimo Livi-Bacci is Professor of Demography, University of Florence, and honorary president of the "International Union for the Scientific Study of Population".