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THE BEDOUIN COMMUNITIES OF EASTERN JERUSALEM: A NEW LOCUS
OF POWER IN THE POST-OSLO BATTLE FOR PALESTINE?
Ahmad Amara, Brendan Ciarán Browne, Triestion Mariniello, Munir Nuseibah, Alice
Panepinto, Tamara Tamimi
L'Harmattan | « Confluences Méditerranée »
2021/2 N° 117 | pages 101 à 117
ISSN 1148-2664
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Dossier Variations
101
Numéro 117 • Été 2021
Ahmad Amara, Brendan Ciarán Browne, Triestion Mariniello,
Munir Nuseibah, Alice Panepinto, Tamara Tamimi*
The Bedouin Communies of Eastern
Jerusalem: A New Locus of Power
in the Post-Oslo Bale for Palesne?
This article investigates the precarious position of Palestinian
Bedouin communities of Eastern Jerusalem in the post-Oslo
geopolitical and legal context of the battle for Palestine. The
humanitarian vulnerabilities and precarious nature of life for
these communities (and further aeld) is the result of Israel’s
on-going attempts to forcibly transfer Bedouin groups in areas
slated for settlement expansion and annexation. The Israeli quest
for a ‘Greater Jerusalem’ makes Bedouin in Eastern Jerusalem
particularly at risk. Repeated land grabs driven by the Israeli
settler-colonial project in Palestine have intensied post-Oslo.
Lands inhabited by Bedouin communities in Eastern Jerusalem
constitutes a new locus of power to resist attempts to erase
Palestinians from the Greater Jerusalem area, including through
international courts.
Cet article analyse la position précaire des communautés
bédouines palestiniennes de Jérusalem-Est dans le contexte
géopolitique et juridique postérieur à la signature des accords
d’Oslo. La vulnérabilité de ces populations et la situation
humanitaire précaire dans laquelle elles se trouvent résultent
d’une politique israélienne continue de déplacement forcé de
ces populations résidant dans des zones prévues à l’expansion
des colonies et à l’annexion. La quête israélienne d’établir
un « Grand Jérusalem » rend les Bédouins de Jérusalem-Est
particulièrement vulnérables. L’accaparement répété des
terres, motivé par le projet colonial israélien en Palestine, s’est
intensié après les accords d’Oslo. Les terres habitées par les
communautés bédouines de Jérusalem-Est constituent dès
* The authors are affiliated to Al-Quds Human Rights Clinic, Al-Quds University (Jerusalem), Tri-
nity College (Dublin), Liverpool John Moore’s University, Al-Quds University (Jerusalem), Queens
University Belfast and Al-Quds University (Jerusalem), respectively.
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Pouvoir(s) enPalestine
102 Numéro 117 • Été 2021
lors un nouveau lieu de pouvoir où s’expriment les résistances
aux tentatives d’expulsion des Palestiniens de la zone du Grand
Jérusalem, y compris par le biais des tribunaux internationaux.
J
ust days before the 2021 Israeli election, ten Israeli political leaders,
including MPs and ex-ministers, gave interviews in a studio erected
in the vicinity of the Bedouin community of Khan al-Ahmar.
1
ese
politicians condemned the government’s delay in demolishing homes and
evicting Palestinian Bedouins in the Greater Jerusalem area. Khan al-Ah-
mar, located east of Jerusalem on the road to Jericho, has become a new
focal point for Israeli-Palestinian politics in and around Jerusalem, and also
an issue of intra-Israeli politics, as this moment in the Israeli electoral cam-
paign illustrates. ese Palestinian communities in the geographic heart of
occupied Palestine are facing yet another iteration of Israeli dispossession
and erasure operating as a historic and spatial continuum. is locality,
therefore, emerges as a current locus of power in Palestine, and in particu-
lar in the Jerusalem periphery: the steadfastness of a small, vulnerable and
marginalised community within Palestinian society in Bedouin hamlets has
become a symbol of Palestinian resistance against Israeli expansionism.
e “Saga” of Khan al-Ahmar
2
began in 2009 with the issuance of dem-
olition orders to the community.
3
As the actual demolition did not take
place, a petition to force Israeli authorities to carry out demolitions against
Palestinians, including Khan al-Ahmar, without further delay was brought
by Regavim, a right-wing Israeli NGO whose work seeks to defend the
(Jewish) National lands. In response, Israeli authorities have explained that
the reasons for the deferral of the demolitions are political, in an attempt to
negotiate a solution with the local community for “relocation”. is case has
resonated internationally too: even the ICC Prosecutor issued a statement
to make it known that she had been “following with concern the planned evic-
tion of the Bedouin community of Khan al-Ahmar, in the West Bank”, recalling
that “that extensive destruction of property without military necessity and popu-
lation transfers in an occupied territory constitute war crimes”.
4
e case of Khan al-Ahmar oers a high-prole example of Palestinian
dispossession within the process of on-going Israeli colonization of Palestin-
ian land.
5
It is one of 46 Bedouin communities in the Central West Bank
under threat of forcible displacement.
6
It symbolises Israeli eorts to trans-
form Palestinian space, and to establish Israeli geo-demographic hegemony
and domination in the Jerusalem environs and across Palestine. At the same
time, the case of Khan al-Ahmar has its own particularities. e Bedouin
communities are Palestinian refugees who were displaced more than once,
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Dossier Variations
The Bedouin Communities of Eastern Jerusalem
103
Numéro 117 • Été 2021
and thus they are not claiming historical land ownership over the lands they
settle on. Further, due to their Bedouin identity as well as the continuous
displacement, the communities are socially and politically marginalized,
with no meaningful political role within the contemporary Palestinian na-
tional institutions or leadership. Finally, the case is directly linked to the
contemporary Palestinian-Israeli struggle over Jerusalem and Israeli recent
attempt of declaring sovereignty over occupied Palestinian territories. is
article interprets these developments as reective of a post Oslo shift of
power, evidenced in the recent Israeli State’s policies pertaining to expand-
ing settlements around Jerusalem in order to full what is called the “Great-
er Jerusalem” plan.
7
We dedicate special attention to the manner by which
legal structures operate in the region, being apparent in both Israeli colonial
policies and in the Bedouin communities’ contestation of such policies.
As widely discussed in the literature, the Oslo Accords have enabled Israel
to consolidate its grip over Palestinian people and their space; as a result,
the majority of land in the West Bank (Area C – over 60% of the West
Bank) is under Israeli military and administrative control, facilitating the
settler project which in turn drives Palestinian displacement.
8
e Oslo Ac-
cords were designed, in principle, to have a temporary lifespan of ve years.
Nonetheless, more than two decades later, facts on the ground reveal a tight-
er Israeli grip on large swathes of the West Bank, including a signicant in-
crease of a settler presence in Area C and East Jerusalem and obstruction of
Palestinian life. As the Israeli settler colonial project advances unequally over
variegated Palestinian geographies, Khan al-Ahmar is one of the front-line
confrontations. ese expansion plans have annexationist features involving
the eviction of the Bedouin communities and is thus further evidence of the
new and ever-moving ‘lines in the sand’ drawn in the post-Oslo era around
and beyond Jerusalem.
9
Within the context of settler-colonial politics and practices since 1948,
there is a historical continuum of Palestinian displacement: the Bedouin
communities in the wider Jerusalem area is one example that illustrates how
this reality continues in the post-Oslo period. As such, the parallels between
the displacement and dispossession of Palestinian Bedouins in the Eastern
Jerusalem periphery in recent years and the political and lived experience
of the rest of the Palestinian communities become apparent. All Palestin-
ian people and spaces are subjects to the same historic, yet on-going, pro-
gramme of displacement and dispossession. As one of the new loci of power
in the post-Oslo period, Jerusalem and Area C of the West Bank are at the
sharp end of the evolving Israeli Judaization policies and political objectives.
Palestinians in Area C are further marginalized in comparison as they fall
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Pouvoir(s) enPalestine
104 Numéro 117 • Été 2021
under Israeli civil and security jurisdiction, and the Palestinian Authority
almost has no involvement in these areas. Such developments have brought
to the surface new Israeli political objectives of annexation in and around
Jerusalem, with the case of the E-1 Israeli zoning plan between Jerusalem
and the Maale Adumim settlement chosen as a tting case study.
is paper oers, rstly, an overview of the Bedouin communities in Pal-
estine in general and around Jerusalem in particular; second, it critically
discusses the political implications of the widely-criticised Israeli ‘E1’ plan
that would put an end to the territorial viability of a future Palestinian State;
nally, we analyse the post-Oslo Israeli policies and practices towards the
Bedouin communities and the resulting interactions of the dierent actors
(community, lawyers, NGOs, State agents) around the question of eviction
and displacement of the Bedouin communities from the E-1 area.
Continuous displacement: The Bedouin Communities of
Palestine between the Negev and Jerusalem
e Bedouin Arabs have inhabited southern Palestine as far back as the
seventh century.
10
Most of Palestine’s Bedouin communities lived in south-
ern Palestine, known today as the Naqab or the Negev, and belonged to
eight main tribal confederations (qabīla) namely, the Tayaha, ‘Azazma, Tara-
bin, Jbarat, Ḥanajra, Jahalin, Aḥiwat, and S'aidiyin. e population esti-
mates by the end of the Ottoman rule suggest between 50,000, and 90,000
at the eve of the 1948 Nakba.
11
Like the rest of the Palestinian communities,
the Bedouin Arabs of southern Palestine experienced social collapse and
physical destruction of their space because of the Nakba. During this time,
approximately 85% ed or were expelled by Zionist paramilitary groups,
and after 1948 by Israeli forces.
12
It is estimated that only 13,000 Bedouins
remained within what became the State of Israel, many of whom were later
internally displaced, subjected to forced urbanization projects and informal
housing conditions.
13
ose who were expelled from their lands became refugees in the Gaza
Strip, Egypt, Jordan, and the West Bank. e majority of the Bedouin ref-
ugees in the West Bank, and in the Jerusalem area in particular, are refugees
displaced from the Tel-Arad area, south of Hebron as well as from the Ja-
halin tribal confederation. In an Ottoman ‘index of the tribes’ which has
listed the various tribes in the Ottoman Jerusalem governorate, the follow-
ing tribes were documented within the Hebron sub-district: Jahalin (800),
Saraya’a (500), and the Kaabna (800); they were said to have lived in the
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Dossier Variations
The Bedouin Communities of Eastern Jerusalem
105
Numéro 117 • Été 2021
Masfara lands.
14
ese communities subsisted on an integrated agro-pasto-
ralist system.
15
As refugees, their reliance on animal-husbandry grew. Since
1948, they moved and lived in dierent locations and sites within the West
Bank. ere are today close to 8,200 Bedouins living in the Central West
Bank in 46 dierent communities, most of whom (close to 6,000) are ref-
ugees, living in precarious humanitarian conditions.
16
As will be shown
below, these communities are continuously at risk of displacement, reloca-
tion and forced urbanisation at the hands of Israeli authorities, including
unlawful home demolitions to make way for the expansion of illegal Israeli
settlements and related land grabs.
Territorial Overview of the E1 Plan
e 1995 Oslo II Interim Agreement, signed between the government of
Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, divided the West Bank
into three administrative areas, A, B, and C, until a nal status agreement
was to be reached within the following ve years. Area “A”, constituting
mainly Palestinian cities and urban centres came under full Palestinian civil
and military control. Area “B”, constituting mainly rural areas and villages
outside Palestinian urban centres, was placed under Palestinian civil con-
trol and Israeli military control. Area “C”, comprising 59% of the area of
the West Bank, and consisting of 63% of the agricultural land in the West
Bank, was placed under full Israeli civil and military control.
17
e Israeli government’s expansionist and settler colonial policy in Area
“C” of the West Bank seeks to acquire maximum Palestinian land with
the minimum number of Palestinians on it through the employment of
three main strategies: appropriation and conscation of Palestinian land,
increasing the number of Jewish settlers through settlement expansion, and
removing Palestinians through forcible displacement and concentration.
18
e strategy of settlement expansion can be clearly seen in the increase in
the number of settlers in the West Bank during the commencement of the
so-called ‘Peace Process’. At the outset of the ‘Peace Process’ the number of
settlers in the West Bank stood at 238,060,
19
rising to 671,007 by the end
of 2018
20
, reecting a 182% increase.
e E-1 area, located in the West Bank Area “C” to the east of Jerusalem,
serves as a microcosm of Israeli government policy in the entirety of the
area. e plan, denoted as Mavasseret Adummim, refers to a 12 km
2
narrow
undeveloped land corridor that is bordered by the settlements of French
Hill (west), Kedar (south), Ma’ale Adummim (east) and Almon (north),
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Pouvoir(s) enPalestine
106 Numéro 117 • Été 2021
and the Palestinian town of Abu Dis to the south west (see gure 1). Fur-
thermore, the E-1 Plan is an integral component of the Greater Jerusalem
Master Plan, which is the rst planning framework that treats east and west
Jerusalem as one urban unit, and serves as a mandatory map for land use
and a blueprint for other municipal planning purposes. Demographically
motivated, the plan contemplates a Jewish majority by 70% to 30% Arabs
in Jerusalem by 2030.
21
e E-1 plan, if implemented, will connect Ma’ale Adummim, estab-
lished in 1975 and located 7 km to the east of Jerusalem, with East Jerusa-
lem (see gure 1), foreseeing up to 15,000 housing units.
22
Most of the land
within the E-1 area is privately owned land that was conscated and de-
clared by Israel as State land in the 1980s.
23
In 1994, the borders of Ma’ale
Adummim were expanded by the Yitzhak Rabin government
24
to include
the E-1 area. Within this framework, the expansion of Ma’ale Adummim
from the mid-1990s severely aected the Bedouin communities in the area
and led to the relocation of some 150 families from the Jahalin tribe to
Al-Jabal site between 1997 and 2007.
25
Furthermore, the E-1 masterplan
(Plan no. 420/4) was approved in 1999,
26
and signed into law in 2002 by
then Defence Minister Benyamin Ben Eliezer.
27
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Dossier Variations
The Bedouin Communities of Eastern Jerusalem
107
Numéro 117 • Été 2021
Figure 1: E-1 Area and Borders
28
e settlement of Ma’ale Adummim today houses over 40,000 settlers
on lands conscated from Abu Dis, Al-Izzariya, Al-Issawiya, Al-Tur and
Anata.
29
While its current built-up area is some 7 km
2
, its municipal plan
covers a total area of 55 km
2
, extending almost to the Dead Sea and in-
cluding to the north the 12 km
2
E-1 area.
30
Israeli ocial statements, their
approach towards the area in bilateral negotiations, their practices of Jewish
settlements and Palestinian displacement, together with the route of the
Separation Wall indicate that Israel envisages the area as part of Greater Je-
rusalem and the Jerusalem-Dead See corridor.
31
is is clearly seen in steps
taken to consolidate control over the area by the rst and latter Netanyahu
governments, Ehud Barak, Ariel Sharon and Ehud Olmert, as well as the
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Pouvoir(s) enPalestine
108 Numéro 117 • Été 2021
construction of the Wall 15 km into the West Bank in order to annex the
entire Adummim bloc to the “Israeli side” of the Wall.
32
e E-1 plan, if implemented, would eectively encircle Jerusalem with
a ring of Israeli settlements, and thus sever the intended Palestinian capital
from the remainder of the West Bank making Palestinian access to the city
impossible. is would bisect the West Bank dividing the north and central
part from the south,
33
rendering territorial contiguity of the West Bank and
agreement of permanent borders impossible.
34
For these reasons, the US
Administration and EU have applied signicant pressure on Israel to refrain
from implementing the plan.
35
Notwithstanding such pressure, the Israeli
authorities have steadily consolidated their control over the area.
36
Further-
more, the E1 proposal designates areas for tourism, industry, commerce,
regional services, a regional cemetery (see gure 2), with plan for a police
headquarters.
37
Pending sub-plans (see gure 2), the Ma’ale Adummim
master plan further envisages another 6,000 units, thus bringing the total
possible housing units in E-1 up to 15,000,
38
with the view of doubling the
population of Ma’ale Adummim.
39
e adoption and implementation of these plans is based on maximizing
the acquisition of land through land conscation with the least percentage
of Palestinians on them through both direct means (house demolitions and
displacement) and the creation of a coercive environment, as elaborated
below. is highlights how the E-1 area serves as a microcosm of Israeli set-
tler-colonial expansionist policy throughout Area C of the West Bank. e
steady increase of settlement housing units in the E-1 area and in particular
the Ma’ale Adummim bloc places the Bedouin communities in a critical
locality of Palestinian Sumoud and the viability of the two-State solution.
Furthermore, the involvement and central role played by the Israeli judicial
system in propagating Israeli expansionist settler-colonial policy, as illustrat-
ed in the next section, renders the Bedouin communities in the area a new
locus of power and resistance in the post-Oslo era.
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Dossier Variations
The Bedouin Communities of Eastern Jerusalem
109
Numéro 117 • Été 2021
Figure 2: E-1 Master plan Sub-Plans (Peace Now, e E-1 Plan- Information and Planning Status,
Peace Now, 2011 <https://peacenow.org.il/en/the-e1-plan-information-and-planning-status>)
40
The Palestinian Bedouins in E-1
e Bedouins in the E-1 area reect the composition of Bedouin com-
munities throughout historical Palestine described in the rst part of the
paper. e E-1 area is home to almost 3,000 Bedouins in over 20 commu-
nities, the vast majority of them (2,700) belongs to the Jahalin tribe, while
another 80 are aliated with the Ka’abneh tribe and 150 belongs to the
Sawahra tribe.
41
Since 2011, there has been increased reporting of settler
violence and harassment, house demolitions and issuance of stop-building
orders and property conscation against 2,300 Bedouins living in the area,
particularly against those in the Khan Al-Ahmar and Wad Abu Hindi com-
munities.
42
Between 2009 and 2020, Israel demolished 315 structures in 10
Bedouin communities within the E-1 area,
43
161 of which are residential
structures, rendering 842 Bedouins displaced; over 60% of the residential
demolitions have taken place in Khan Al-Ahmar, Jabal Al-Baba and Abu
Nuwar communities.
44
UN-OCHA has described this situation as a “coer-
cive environment”, and recalled the UN Secretary General’s statement that
“relocation may amount to a forcible transfer, a grave breach of the fourth Gene-
va Convention, even in the absence of direct physical force”.
45
Israel is targeting all Palestinian Bedouins within the E-1 area, particularly
those in Khan Al-Ahmar, to relocate them, together with other Bedouin
communities outside the E-1, to three main sites: an existing site near the
Abu Dis garbage dump called Al-Jabal (known also as Jahlain-East), and a
new site at Nu’eimeh, north of Jericho, which was approved by the Israe-
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Pouvoir(s) enPalestine
110 Numéro 117 • Été 2021
li Civil Administration in May 2013 but rejected by both the Bedouins
and the Palestinian Authority.
46
An additional less known site, Armonot
Hashmonaim (known also as al-Fasayil), is also located in the Jordan Valley,
north of Jericho.
47
As discussed below, Palestinian Bedouins and their repre-
sentatives have demonstrated a high level of resilience despite the pressure of
this coercive environment, and have responded in various ways.
e Palestinian Bedouin living in the Eastern Jerusalem periphery have
become central players in the struggle for Palestine while facing a range of
adversities. As Palestinians, these communities face the double burden of
ensuring daily survival by maintaining a presence and livelihood on their
habitation land, as well as carrying the weight of being the Palestinians ‘on
the front line’ in the Jerusalem area. As Israel’s settler colonial mission in
Jerusalem intensies, the Bedouin became bearers of Palestinian sovereignty
to counter Israel’s annexationist policies. e Post-Oslo period has brought
about constant changes in the political and physical landscapes around Je-
rusalem, and transformed the lives and positionality of the Bedouin com-
munities in the Eastern Jerusalem periphery.
Since their expulsion from the Tel Arad area in the Negev between 1949-
1953 by the Israeli forces, the Bedouin communities settled in various loca-
tions across the West Bank, and until 1967 they continued to practice their
habitation and economic practices with large degrees of liberty and autono-
my under Jordanian rule.
48
Even after 1967, these communities were left to
manage their lives without serious involvement or interruption from Israeli
authorities. ey faced few house demolitions, and the seasonal movement
of some of these communities for reasons of pasture was not seriously ob-
structed.
49
However, moving from this state of apathy towards Israeli direct
involvement in the Bedouin communities’ aairs, brought with it policies
and practices of displacement, eviction, various restrictions, house demo-
litions, and forced urbanization. Such transformation occurred with the
adoption of the Oslo Accords in the mid-1990s, and continues to intensify.
Israeli authorities have enforced discriminatory land and zoning measures,
50
framed it through a formal legalistic approach that disguises settler-colonial
underpinnings, and relies on the threat or use of force to take control of
these areas.
Similar to Israeli policies in the rest of the West Bank, the Israeli au-
thorities started with declarations of lands in the Eastern Jerusalem region
as State lands and re zones.
51
Such declarations laid the ground for the
eviction of the Bedouin Palestinians communities by criminalizing their
presence on these lands and turning them into trespassers on “State land.”
Concurrently, zoning plans came into play: rstly, planning for Israeli set-
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Dossier Variations
The Bedouin Communities of Eastern Jerusalem
111
Numéro 117 • Été 2021
tlements or expansion of existing settlements, and secondly, the planning
of new settlements for the concentration of the Bedouin communities into
new urban centres.
52
Using the temporary tri-partition of Palestine in the
Oslo Accords to its strategic advantage, and exceeding the letter and spirit
of those documents, Israel governs the Eastern Jerusalem periphery as if
it were within its sovereign territory, in ways that directly impact on the
Bedouin communities. Instead of occasional demolitions and sporadic re-
strictions, what has become normalised is a signicant increase in the num-
ber of demolition orders, comprehensive forced urbanization plans, as well
as major zoning change for Israeli settlements and their attached purported
infrastructural needs, including roads, industrial zones and more.
53
ese
developments have been accompanied by diverse restrictions on movement,
on grazing, on family unication, and the revocation of residency or its
denial thereof, to establish a coercive living environment.
54
With the view of pushing Bedouins o their land and breaking up com-
munities, the coercive environment includes the continuous denial of basic
social and economic rights and utilities to the communities, including run-
ning water, electricity, educational and health services, a functioning road
system and public transportation.
55
e lack of access to healthcare and
higher education is further exacerbated by the economic disempowerment
of these communities.
56
Furthermore, the conscation and deprivation of
access to grazing land has impacted Bedouin livelihood and lifestyle and
contributed to their economic disempowerment. Firstly, it has forced Bed-
ouins to buy highly expensive fodder in order to feed the livestock.
57
is
in turn has led to a decrease in the size of livestock, as well as an increase in
the cost of dairy production, thus forcing Bedouins to look for regular em-
ployment jobs, usually in the form of cheap labour in nearby illegal Israeli
settlements.
58
Bedouin Sumoud, Jerusalem, and accountability for
international law violations
ese Israeli practices operate within a settler colonial logic of elimination
and replacement of the Palestinian people and space.
59
In E-1, to make
room for Israeli Jewish settlers, the Israeli authorities developed plans for
the relocation and concentration of the Bedouin communities.
60
ese at-
tempts to erase Palestinians from these parts have assumed dierent forms.
In certain circumstances, the Israeli authorities negotiated with the Bedouin
communities for their relocation; yet, these deals occur in the context of
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Pouvoir(s) enPalestine
112 Numéro 117 • Été 2021
a coercive environment under the threat of demolition and displacement
and thus raise serious concerns on the free and informed consent of those
families agreeing to move. An example of this is the 1997 relocation of ap-
proximately 150 families of the Jahalin tribe to the site known as “al-Jabal”
or “Jahalin-East” near al-Ezariya, whereas the rest of the tribe and the other
communities rejected all Israeli relocation proposals.
61
As reported by UN-
RWA (and others) the move has been catastrophic for these communities at
economic, social, and human level.
62
Alongside retaining a Bedouin presence on the ground, a primary ex-
ample of Palestinian resistance, there are other examples of agency by the
local communities to remain on their land. Despite the Palestinian lack
of trust in the Israeli judiciary and the possible political implications of
legitimation and Israeli implied sovereignty,
63
the Bedouin and their repre-
sentatives have turned to legal recourse and led dozens of petitions to the
Israeli Supreme Court against the legality of Israeli decisions pertaining to
demolition, eviction, and relocation.
64
e Israeli Supreme Court, however,
declared that the Bedouin presence was illegal and their structures on what
it described as State lands were thus subject to demolition. Nonetheless, the
judiciary deferred a decision with regard to the actual demolitions, passing
the responsibility over to the Israeli political and military leadership. e
delay in the physical enacting of demolitions of the Bedouin communities
such as that in Khan al-Ahmar has triggered much criticism from Israeli
settler groups, including Regavim which have brought several cases before
the Israeli court to enforce the demolitions.
65
Finally, as the Israeli author-
ities planned for Israeli settlements and Bedouin relocation, some of the
Bedouin communities, such as Abu Nuwar, took the initiative with other
partners to propose an alternative zoning plan to legalize their presence on
particular lands.
66
However, the Israeli Civil Administration never approved
any of the alternative plans.
Recognizing the centrality of Bedouin Sumoud (steadfastness) for the in-
tegrity of Palestinian nation, the PA has attempted, with some success, to
bring the struggle of the Bedouin communities under its national aegis.
67
Still wishing to save the shady two-State solution, the PA has attempted to
resist Israeli policies through mainly political support and limited material
support of the local Bedouin communities in light of the location of these
communities in Area “C”, as well as through political mobilization vis-a-vis
the international community.
68
It is interesting to note in this regard the
arising Palestinian dilemma pertaining to the right of return. Similar to
arguments against Palestinian refugees’ re-settlement in Arab States, Pales-
tinian Sumoud and tenure in their current location would obstruct Israeli
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Dossier Variations
The Bedouin Communities of Eastern Jerusalem
113
Numéro 117 • Été 2021
colonization around Jerusalem, but it also could negate their right of return
to the Negev. With its limited power and resources, the PA is unable to
provide adequate educational and health services to the Palestinian Bedouin
communities in area C.
A new player in this locus of power is the International Criminal Court
(ICC), which impacts dynamics on the ground with regards to the possible
investigations and prosecutions of a range of violations of international law,
which allegedly amount to international crimes.
69
Nonetheless, since its ac-
cession to the Rome Statutein January 2015, the State of Palestine has pur-
sued prospects oered by international criminal law.
70
e State referred the
“Situation of Palestine” to the Oce of the Prosecutor on May 22
nd
, 2018;
71
the list of alleged crimes includes the settlement enterprise
72
and, relatedly,
the situation of the Bedouin communities in the E-1.
73
e ICC conrmed
its territorial jurisdiction in Palestine in 2021,
74
on the basis of which the
Prosecutor ocially commenced the investigation.
75
Notably, through its
international legal advocacy eorts, the PA and in particular the Negotia-
tions Aairs Department issued factsheets, media briefs, and statements on
the Israeli policies and practices towards the Bedouin communities in the
Eastern Jerusalem area.
76
Although the ICC constitutes a new player in this locus of power that tips
the scale of power-relations against Israeli colonization, the possible demo-
lition and eviction orders against the Bedouin communities in the Eastern
Jerusalem periphery remain in force. At the same time, and although the
political and military power is clearly in the hands of Israel, the Bedouin
communities also remain on their current habitation sites despite the con-
stant threat of displacement. Hence, though post-Oslo period paved the
road for further Israeli colonization in area C, and despite the political mar-
ginalization of the Bedouin communities, there is a combination of forces
and players, locally and internationally, that shaped this Israeli colonization
front in the Eastern periphery of Jerusalem.
Conclusion
e struggle of the Palestinian Bedouin in the Eastern Jerusalem periph-
ery has become a central component within Palestinian and Israeli political
agendas, with the result being that the Palestinian Bedouins represent a pri-
mary locus of power within the complex and shifting dynamics in Palestine.
While the applicability of Oslo remains moot,
77
it is being relied on by Israel
to establish further domination and hegemony in the West Bank through
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Pouvoir(s) enPalestine
114 Numéro 117 • Été 2021
a policy of continuous imposition of facts on the ground. Israel claims that
Area C is under its full jurisdiction, without formal sovereignty yet, and
thus it is operating to enforce the rule of law. us far, none of the Bedouin
communities has been allowed to return to their original lands in the
Tel-Arad area in the Negev, or allowed to remain in their current location
and for their structures to be legalized. Fractures within Palestinian society,
the ongoing impact of the Israeli occupation, and the international commu-
nity’s reticence in enforcing international law, pose several hurdles. Further,
the current strength of the Israeli right-wing and religious Zionist political
parties domestically, and involvement of settler NGOs in mainstream Israeli
and international politics over the last two decades, have played a part in
consolidating Israeli sovereignty in and around Jerusalem. Consequently,
the dispossession and displacement of the Bedouin communities paves the
way for further Israeli colonization and annexation of the eastern Jerusalem
periphery and beyond. e Bedouin communities of Eastern Jerusalem,
therefore, will remain key actors in the new loci of power in the post-Oslo
battle for Palestine. Supporting their steadfastness locally and ensuring in-
ternational eorts to hold to account those responsible for the coercive en-
vironment in which they live so precariously should be a priority for anyone
committed to justice in Palestine and beyond.
Notes
1 Election media conference, Srugim News. Available: https://www.srugim.co.il/546673-
%D7%91%D7%A0%D7%98-%D7%9C%D7%A1%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%92%D7%99%D7
%9D-3
2 Israeli Supreme Court Justice, Noam Sohlberg, used the term “saga”. It is worth noting that
Justice Sohlberg lives in the Israeli settlement of Alon Shvut.
3 HCJ 2387/19 Regavim v. Israel’s Prime Minister et. al., Justice Sohlberg described the Israeli
attorney’s request to postpone the hearing as embarrassing. For an earlier discussion of the
significance of this case, see Alice Panepinto, “Jurisdiction as Sovereignty Over Occupied Pales-
tine: The Case of Khan-Al-Ahmar”, New York, Social & Legal Studies, Vol. 26, n°3, 2017, p. 311
4 “Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, regarding
the Situation in Palestine”, The Hague, International Criminal Court, October 17th, 2018. Availa-
ble: https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/item.aspx?name=181017-otp-stat-palestine
5 OmarJabary Salamanca,MeznaQato,KareemRabie,SobhiSamour, “Past is Present: Settler
Colonialism in Palestine”, Settler Colonial Studies, Vol. 2, n°1, 2012, pp. 1-8 ; Elia Zureik, Israel’s
Colonial Project in Palestine: Brutal Pursuit, London, Routledge, 2015 ; Patrick Wolfe, “Settler
Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native”, Abingdon-on-Thames, Journal of Genocide Re-
search, Vol. 8, n°4, 2006, pp. 387-409 ; Lorenzo Veracini, Israel and Settler Society, London,
Pluto Press, 2006
6 “46 Bedouin Communities at Risk of Forcible Transfer in the Central West Bank: A Vulnerability
Profile”, New York, OCHA, 2017. Available: https://www.ochaopt.org/page/46-bedouin-commu-
nities-risk-forcible-transfer-central-west-bank-vulnerability-profile
7 Nadav Shargai, Demography, Geopolitics, and the Future of Israel’s Capital: Jerusalem’s Pro-
posed Master Plan, Jerusalem, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2010, p. 21-22. Available:
https://jcpa.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Jerusalem-Master-Plan.pdf
8 Edward W. Said, The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and After, New York, Pantheon Books,
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Dossier Variations
The Bedouin Communities of Eastern Jerusalem
115
Numéro 117 • Été 2021
2000 ; Sara Roy, “Why Peace Failed: An Oslo Autopsy”, New York, Current History, Vol. 101,
n°651, 2002, pp. 8-16 ; Johnny Manour, Israel and the Settlements: The Fixed and The Change-
able Positions of Governments, Political Parties and General Public (Arabic), Ramallah, Madar
Center, 2013 ; Raja Shehadeh, From Occupation to Interim Accords: Israel and the Palestinian
Territories, London, University of London Press, 1997. Reflecting on the legacy of Oslo, see
Chapter 4 in Noura Erakat, Justice for Some, California, Stanford University Press, 2019.
9 Ahmed Heneiti, “Bedouin Communities in Greater Jerusalem: Planning or Forced Displace-
ment”, Jerusalem, Jerusalem Quarterly, Vol. 65, n°1, 2014, pp. 51-68 ; Nir Shalev, Alon Co-
hen-Lifshitz, The Prohibited Zone: Israeli Planning Policy in the Palestinian Villages in Area C,
Jerusalem, Bimkom, June 2008. Available: http://bimkom.org/eng/wp-content/uploads/Prohib-
itedZone.pdf
10 Emanuel Marx, Bedouin of the Negev, New York, Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1967, p. 9
11 Justin McCarthy, The Population of Palestine, New York, Columbia University Press, 1990,
p. 35 ; Yasemin Avci, “The Application of Tanzimat in the Desert”, Abingdon-on-Thames, Middle
Eastern Studies, Vol. 45, n°6, 2009, p. 969-983, 973
12 Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949, Cambridge, Cam-
bridge University Press, 2003
13 On the Israeli policies and practices towards the Bedouin of the Negev, see Alexander Kedar,
Ahmad Amara, Oren Yiftachel, Emptied Lands: Legal Geography of Bedouin Rights in the Negev,
California, Stanford University Press, 2018
14 The Index seemingly was prepared just before the First World War. Copy of the index is
available at the National Library in Ankara. The authors would like to thank Erdal Ciftci for sharing
a copy.
15 Economic system relying on a combination of agricultural activity and pastoralism.
16 “46 Bedouin Communities at Risk of Forcible Transfer in the Central West Bank: A Vulnera-
bility Profile”, op. cit.
17 “H.E Ms. Awad Highlights the 43rd Annual Commemoration of Land Day in Statistical Fig-
ures”, Ramallah, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, March 28th, 2019. Available: http://
www.pcbs.gov.ps/post.aspx?lang=en&ItemID=3429
18 Elia Zureik, Israel’s Colonial Project in Palestine: Brutal Pursuit, London, Routledge, 2015
19 “Press Release by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) on the eve of the Forty
Two annual commemoration of Land Day”, Ramallah, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics,
March 30th, 2018. Available: http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/post.aspx?lang=en&ItemID=3102
20 “H.E. Dr. Awad, Highlights the Forty Four Annual Commemoration of Land Day in Statistical
Figures”, Ramallah, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, March 30th, 2020. Available: http://
www.pcbs.gov.ps/post.aspx?lang=en&ItemID=3700
21 The Palestine Question in Maps: 1878- 2014, Jerusalem, Palestinian Academic Society for
the Study of International Affairs, 2014, p. 169
22 Ibid., p. 166
23 Ibid., p. 134
24 Ibid.
25 Al-Jabal: A Study on the Transfer of Bedouin Palestine Refugees, Jerusalem, UNRWA / Bim-
kom, 2013, p. 8. One of the Bedouin communities destroyed to make way for the expansion of
Ma’ale Addummim was al-Murassas (or Umm Rassas).
26 “The E1 plan and its implications for human rights in the West Bank”, Jerusalem, B’Tselem,
November 27th, 2013. Available: https://www.btselem.org/settlements/20121202_e1_human_
rights_ramifications
27 The Palestine Question in Maps: 1878- 2014, op. cit., p. 134
28 “E-1 Development Plan”, Jerusalem, PASSIA. Available: http://www.passia.org/maps/
view/66
29 Arab East Jerusalem: A Reader, Jerusalem, PASSIA, 2013, p. 132
30 Ibid., p. 133
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Forced Population Transfer: The Case of Palestine: Discriminatory Zoning and Planning,
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Pouvoir(s) enPalestine
116 Numéro 117 • Été 2021
Bethlehem, BADIL, 2014, p. 27
34 Settlements Factsheet, Ramallah, MIFTAH, 2018, p. 7. Available: http://www.miftah.org/Doc/
Factsheets/Miftah/English/Settlements_Factsheet_V2_24October2018.pdf
35 Matt Spetalnick and Andrew Quinn, “U.S. Intensifies Criticism of Israel on Settlement Plan”,
London, Reuters, December 4th, 2012
36 Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of Israel, Geneva, Human Rights
Committee of the United Nations, 2014, p. 2. Available: http://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/
FilesHandler.ashx?enc=6QkG1d%2FPPRiCAqhKb7yhsjE8R4c4NRTnrnvejYEy%2FQ%2FTfsN-
hC%2FVcCyV6AaesRq4RWflg0Oz033dIQseGF57fWmil1potdJupmspjFKEg7x4Qa1y8YjI8hYsH-
0DDwpVxN
37 The three sub-plan numbers, respectively are: (420/4/1), 420/4/2, 420/4/9. See further,
Forced Population Transfer: The Case of Palestine: Discriminatory Zoning and Planning, op. cit. ;
“The E1 plan and its implications for human rights in the West Bank”, op. cit. ; Arab East Jeru-
salem: A Reader, op. cit., p. 133. Pending sub-plans: 420/4/3, 420/4/7 and 420/4/10, include
over 3,700 housing units and over 2,000 hotel rooms.
38 Arab East Jerusalem: A Reader, op. cit., p. 133
39 Forced Population Transfer: The Case of Palestine: Discriminatory Zoning and Planning, op.
cit.
40 “The E-1 Plan- Information and Planning Status”, Tel Aviv, Peace Now, November 21st, 2011.
Available: https://peacenow.org.il/en/the-e1-plan-information-and-planning-status
41 Forced Population Transfer: The Case of Palestine: Discriminatory Zoning and Planning, op.
cit.
42 Ibid.
43 Abu Nuwwar, Wadi Al-Jimel, Jabal Al-Baba, Al-Muntar, Wadi Abu Hindi, Khan Al-Ahmar (5
communities), Az-Za’ayem, Abu George Bedouins, Wadi Sneysel and Bir Maskoob.
44 Data on West Bank Demolitions, Jerusalem, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs in Occupied Palestinian Territory. Available: http://data.ochaopt.org/dbs/demolition/login.
aspx
45 UN-OCHA OPT, “Tightening of coercive environment on Bedouin communities around Ma’ale
Adumim settlement”, Jerusalem, Monthly Humanitarian Bulletin, February 2017. Also see UN’s
Secretary-General, “Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jeru-
salem, and in the Occupied Syrian Golan”, New York, United Nations General Assembly, January
20th, 2016, p. 16, para. 68. Available: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/
G1600802.pdf
46 Arab East Jerusalem: A Reader, op. cit.
47 Forced Population Transfer: The Case of Palestine: Discriminatory Zoning and Planning, op.
cit., p. 28
48 Ahmed Heneiti, Bedouin Communities in the Middle of the West Bank As a Case Study
(Arabic), Ramallah, Institute for Palestine Studies, 2018, p. 39-43
49 Ibid.
50 Nir Shalev, Alon Cohen-Lifshitz, op. cit.
51 Areas designated for military training; civilians are prohibited from entering these areas.
52 Nir Shalev, Alon Cohen-Lifshitz, op. cit. ; Ahmed Heneiti, “Bedouin Communities in Greater
Jerusalem: Planning or Forced Displacement”, op. cit.
53 For data on demolition and displacement in the West Bank, see: https://www.ochaopt.org/
data/demolition ; for data on Israeli settlements since 1967 see: https://peacenow.org.il/en/
category/settlements
54 Field interviews by the Al-Quds Human Rights Clinic with Bedouin Communities, March
2021.
55 Field interviews by Al-Quds Human Rights Clinic with Bedouin Communities, February 2021.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Patrick Wolfe, op. cit.
60 Arab East Jerusalem: A Reader, op. cit. ; Forced Population Transfer: The Case of Palestine:
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Dossier Variations
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Discriminatory Zoning and Planning, op. cit., p. 28
61 Al-Jabal: A Study on the Transfer of Bedouin Palestine Refugees, op. cit.
62 Ibid.
63 Alice M. Panepinto, “From extraterritorial jurisdiction to sovereignty: The Annexation of Pales-
tine”, in The Extraterritoriality of Law: History, Theory, Politics, London, Routledge, 2019
64 For example, H.C.J. 5950/15 & 6137/15 Yunis al-Hamadin et. al., v. Israeli Army Command-
er et. al. ; H.C.J 2966/95 Mohammad Hirsh et. al. v. Minister of Security et. al. ; H.C.J Ibrahim
Jahalin et. al. v. Israeli Army Commander in Judea and Samaria et. al. ; Brief by the petitioners of
Abu Nuwar, in H.C.J. 5950/15 & 6137/15 Yunis al-Hamadin et. al., v. Israeli Army Commander
et. al (in hand with the authors) ; See also, H.C.J 2966/95 Mohammad Hirsh et. al. v. Minister
of Security et. al.
65 H.C.J. 2031/13 Regavim et. al. v. Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s Prime Minister et. al.; HCJ
2387/19 Regavim v. Israel’s Prime Minister et. al.
66 Nuwar Planning Guidelines (Hebrew), Jerusalem, Bimkom. Available: https://bimkom.org/
wp-content/uploads/Abu-Nwar-planning-guidlines.pdf
67 Field interviews by the Al-Quds Human Rights Clinic with Bedouin Communities, February
2021.
68 Field interviews by the Al-Quds Human Rights Clinic with Bedouin Communities, February
2021.
69 See on Palestine generally Noura Erakat, Justice for Some, op.cit.
70 Valentina Azarova and Triestino Mariniello, “Why the ICC Needs A ‘Palestine Situation’ (More
Than Palestine Needs the ICC): On the Court’s Potential Role(s) in the Israeli-Palestinian Context”,
Milan, Diritti Umani e Diritto Internazionale, Vol. 11, n°1, 2018, pp. 115-150
71 State of Palestine, The Hague, International Criminal Court, 2018. Available: https://www.
icc-cpi.int/palestine
72 Referral by the State of Palestine Pursuant to Articles 13(a) and 14 of the Rome Statute,
Palestine, State of Palestine, May 15th, 2018. Available: https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocu-
ments/2018-05-22_ref-palestine.pdf
73 “Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, regarding
the Situation in Palestine”, op. cit.
74 Decision on the ‘Prosecution request pursuant to article 19(3) for a ruling on the Court’s
territorial jurisdiction in Palestine’, The Hague, International Criminal Court, February 5th, 2021.
Available: https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2021_01165.PDF
75 “Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, respecting an investigation of the Situation
in Palestine”, The Hague, International Criminal Court, March 3rd, 2021. Available: https://www.
icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=210303-prosecutor-statement-investigation-palestine
76 Joint Statement by Palestinian Presidency Bureau, The Palestine Liberation Organization and
the Office of the Prime Minister on the Imminent Threat of Forcible Transfer Facing the Palestin-
ian Bedouin Community of Khan al-Ahmar Abu al-Helu, Palestine Liberation Organization, July
3rd, 2018. Available: https://www.nad.ps/en/media-room/statements/joint-statement-palestini-
an-presidency-bureau-palestine-liberation
77 Jeff Handmaker and Alaa Tartir, “ICC and Palestine Symposium: The (Non) Effects of Oslo
on Rights and Status”, Geneva, Opinio Juris, February 6th, 2020 ; Yassir Al-Khudayri, “Are the
Oslo Accords Still Valid? For the ICC and Palestine, It Should Not Matter”, Geneva, Opinio Juris,
June 10th, 2020
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