Mercenaries in Africa legality and geopolitics

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frican J. Economic and Sustainable Development, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2022 23
Copyright © 2022 Inderscience Enterprises Ltd.
Mercenaries in Africa: legality and geopolitics
Ashutosh Singh
Amity School of Liberal Arts,
Amity University Rajasthan,
Jaipur, Rajasthan, India
Email: ashusingh84@gmail.com
Anurag Singh*
School of Business,
University of Petroleum and Energy Studies (UPES),
Dehradun, Uttarakhand, India
Email: anuragonmail110@gmail.com
*Corresponding author
Abstract: The role and legality of mercenaries in Africa has been a matter of
intense debate. The academic debate over the legality of mercenaries or their
more modern equivalents called private military companies continues and the
right of a nation state to use them is part of a larger debate over national
sovereignty versus international law. The research paper attempts to
objectively assess the contemporary role of mercenaries in Africa in a historical
context, and whether it is practically possible and desirable to completely end
the use of mercenaries.
Keywords: mercenaries; Africa; legality; geopolitics.
Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Singh, A. and Singh, A.
(2022) ‘Mercenaries in Africa: legality and geopolitics’, African J. Economic
and Sustainable Development, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp.23–36.
Biographical notes: Ashutosh Singh is academician with over four years of
Post-PhD university teaching experience. His domain expertise and
international publications are on topics of nuclear security, terrorism, missile
proliferation and UN Peacekeeping.
Anurag Singh is academician with research interests including policy studies,
behavioural studies, strategic management and human resource management
having more than five years of experience in academics.
1 Introduction
The use of mercenaries – combatants ready to fight for money or other remunerations of
the highest bidder, irrespective of political affiliation is probably as old as conflict itself.
The use of mercenaries in wars is a well-documented phenomenon in warfare. Monetary

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and ideological reasons have motivated mercenaries in the 19th and 20 centuries. It got a
new lease of life in post-world war II Africa in various small wars of liberation during
the decolonisation phase of its history when the continent became a cold war
battleground. The definition of a mercenary and their rights as prisoners of war have been
hotly debated in the field of international law.
2 Methodology
Various international conventions that have been passed with respect to Mercenarism
have been evaluated in this research paper to better understand the issues facing the
definition of a mercenary. Countries which are home to most mercenary organisations are
disinterested in inserting clauses which may hinder the latter’s operations while countries
at the receiving end of actions of such mercenaries tend to take a stronger stance against
them; this usually results in a failure of international consensus and a definition which
may not cover the entire ambit of mercenary operations. Therefore, this paper will
analyse the various international conventions, and their impact on the evolution in the
way mercenaries operate.
Secondly, this paper will seek to understand the impact mercenary actions have had
on the security scenario in Africa and the future role of mercenaries in African states. On
several occasions in Africa, mercenaries were used to prevent war crimes, were
economically more viable and were militarily effective. At other times, they themselves
were involved in illegal activities like overthrowing legitimate governments and criminal
activities. It is also necessary to understand if mercenary organisations can be more
productively employed through greater regulatory control. The research paper seeks to
answer these questions through an analysis of the historical use of mercenaries during the
cold war and post-cold war period.
3 International law regarding mercenaries
The primary impetus to develop a legal framework to regulate mercenary activity
developed during the African conflicts of the 1960s, specifically, the Congo crisis which
saw the extensive use of mercenaries as well as large scale human rights violations by
them. It was accepted by the world community, that mercenaries were a threat to the idea
of national sovereignty and territorial integrity.
There are certain difficulties in setting a common definition for who may be a
mercenary. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was one of the earliest
organisations to arrive at a common definition of a mercenary when in 1977, it adopted
the ‘Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism’ in Africa in Liberville.1 Under the
new definition, it classified anyone as a mercenary who was not the citizen of a state
against which his actions were directed and whose aim is:
(a) to overthrow by force or arms or by any other means the government of that Member
State of the Organisation of African Unity;
(b) to undermine the independence, territorial integrity or normal working of the
institutions of the said State;

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(c) to block by any means the activities of any liberation movement recognised by the
Organisation of African Unity.1
There were naturally disagreements over this definition as foreign military advisors could
also be classified under this definition by an opposing faction in a strife torn country in
Africa during the cold war. Moreover, this definition was not to the liking of western
countries as most mercenaries had their origins there and naturally such countries
favoured a narrower definition of mercenaries. On the other hand, the African states
bearing the brunt of mercenary activities naturally wanted a definition which was as wide
encompassing as possible.
In the Conference on Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian
Law at Geneva in 1977, it was felt necessary to relook the issue of mercenaries by some
African delegations. The Conference was primarily aimed at the protection of victims of
international and domestic armed conferences. Protocol I of the UN Charter goes on to
define the various parties in conflict and their rights including those of civilians, military
personnel, spies and finally mercenaries. Article 47 of Protocol I defines mercenaries and
their rights as:
1 A mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or a prisoner of war.
2 A mercenary is any person who:
a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;
b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;
c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private
gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material
compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of
similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party;
d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory
controlled by a Party to the conflict;
e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict and
f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty
as a member of its armed forces.2
Therefore, the Geneva Convention for the first time declared that a mercenary would not
have the rights given to a combatant as a prisoner of war. It still left a great deal of
ambiguity on the status of military advisors and technicians who were often sent by third
parties and had an indirect military role. Moreover, they may be given additional
financial remuneration by one of the parties to the conflict.
This debate on who exactly constitute a mercenary would continue with various
revisions of the basic convention resulting finally in a 1989 UN convention which is also
the only document of the organisation which directly deals with the issues of
mercenaries. Article 1 of the Convention states that:

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1 A mercenary is any person who:
a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;
b) Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private
gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a party to the conflict, material
compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of
similar rank and functions in the armed forces of that party;
c) Is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory
controlled by a party to the conflict;
d) Is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; and
e) Has not been sent by a State which is not a party to the conflict on official duty
as a member of its armed forces.
2 A mercenary is also any person who, in any other situation:
a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad for the purpose of participating in a
concerted act of violence aimed at:
(i) Overthrowing a Government or otherwise undermining the constitutional
order of a State; or
(ii) Undermining the territorial integrity of a State;
b) Is motivated to take part therein essentially by the desire for significant private
gain and is prompted by the promise or payment of material compensation;
c) Is neither a national nor a resident of the State against which such an act is
directed;
d) Has not been sent by a State on official duty; and
e) Is not a member of the armed forces of the State on whose territory the act is
undertaken.3
This definition is further elaborated under Article 2 that:
Any person who recruits, uses, finances or trains mercenaries, as defined in
Article 1 of the present Convention, commits an offence for the purposes of the
Convention.3
Article 3 and 4 of the above convention go onto add that anyone engaging in the above
activity is committing a crime and that any accomplice of the above would also be
considered to be a criminal respectively. While this new revision was a major
improvement over the earlier definitions, it still left a lot desired by ambiguity over the
question of ‘intention’ of a mercenary. It was clear that the classic ‘monetary’ definition
of a mercenary was inadequate in most cases and the question of establishing intent could
be quite ambiguous and difficult.

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4 Mercenaries in African conflict in the Cold War
Post-World War II, the world was entering the era of decolonisation. Africa, too was
subject to the forces of nationalism, but unlike India, where a robust political parties and
a limited parliamentary system had evolved, there was nothing comparable in Africa. So
while there were important political leaders like Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana and Patrice
Lumumba in Congo, there were no political systems to support them. Therefore, most
anti-colonial movements naturally came to be supported by radical groups backed by
communist regimes. On the other hand, former western colonial masters wanted to retain
control over the rich mineral resources of their colonies. Control over such resources
would become the objective of both sides during this period of instability and this heady
concoction of ideology, nationalism and money would fuel conflict throughout Africa
during this period of instability and the continent would become a major theatre of the
Cold War.
Most African nations would gain their independence during the decolonisation era
but western powers directly or indirectly would try to maintain control over resources in
Africa through their proxies in Africa. Almost immediately after the Second World War,
Colonel Stirling (Hagedorn, 2015) established an organisation, chiefly of elitist white and
some blacks called Capricorn Africa under the aegis of WatchGuard International. Its
objective was to persuade nationalist blacks in the countries of Tanganyika, Kenya,
Rhodesia and Nyasaland to reject majority rule in favour of ‘responsible’, elitist and
importantly pro-white rule. The French also established the underground group called
Organisation Armée Secrète or OAS in the Algerian war for independence in the 1950s
(Rosemary, 2012). This organisation would go on to play an important role in the later
conflict in Congo and Angola (Musah, 2000).
But the real dawn of Mercenarism in Africa would start after the Congo crisis of
1961. The popular Congolese leader, Patrice Lumumba had been assassinated in January
1961. The murder had an unmistakeable foreign imprint in the form of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Belgian troops. Belgian officers like Julien Gat belonged
to the entourage of Lumumba before he vanished (Hoare, 1989). Later Belgian supported
Katangese leader Tshombe, would become the Prime Minister of Congo and would
liberally employ former foreign military personnel as mercenaries against opposition
groups in his country. Over 500 mercenaries formed what would infamously be known as
5 Commando led by South Africa Mike Hoare, Belgian-born Frenchman Christian
Tavernier and Belgian Jacques Schramme (Rogers, 1960). This mercenary outfit
consisting chiefly of South Africans, but also consisting of former Nazis like Siegfried
Muller. 5 Commando was extensively used by the CIA in countering Soviet influence in
Congo and also used successfully during Operation Dragon Rouge in 1964 in support of
Belgian paratroopers (Stapleton, 2013).
In the Nigerian Civil War from 1967–1970 roughly 50 French mercenaries would
side along with separatists while Egypt which under Nasser was a strong opponent of
colonialism sent mercenaries as pilots to fly air cover to government forces (Stremlau,
2015). The use of mercenaries, especially against popular regimes had begun to attract
international condemnation by the 1970s yet the former would continue to play an
increasingly important role in African conflicts.
The Angolan Civil War would be the next major theatre witnessing the use of foreign
mercenaries. The Civil War was characterised by the large scale use of mercenaries many
of whom were ex Special Air Service (SAS) or colonial troops. The colonial character of

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these men was obvious and most of them had been part of efforts to suppress the various
freedom movements going on in Africa. They became the soldiers of choice for the
Western Bloc against the chief Communist group in the region, the Movimento Popular
de Libertação de Angola (MPLA). The Western proxy in the region was the Front for the
National Liberation of Angola (FNLA) led by Holden Roberto who came to increasingly
rely on the combat effectiveness of such mercenaries in battle (Tesi, 2017). It is no
wonder that such foreign mercenaries who were overwhelmingly white, came from
colonial backgrounds and fought against local popular anti-colonial movements came to
be seen as agents of the former colonial powers, repressing anti-colonial struggle. The
truth, however, was more monetary than ideological. Many of the foreign mercenaries
who were fighting in in Angola would end up getting captured by the MPLA including
Callan Georgiou, Daniel Gearhart and John Nammock among others and be presented
before an international tribunal (Musah et al., 2000). The testimonies of the mercenaries,
well documented would clearly establish a tacit correlation between the activities of the
mercenaries and their countries of origin for the first time.
The use of mercenaries in African conflicts would actually go onto see an explosion
in various conflicts throughout local wars in Africa after the late 1970s. Mercenaries
would see extensive use against the Marxist regime of Matthew Kerekou in Benin
(Mgbeoji, 2003); Colonel Mike Hoare would return to the aid of his old patron in Zaire,
President Mobutu Sese Seko to crush a revolt in the troublesome province of Katanga.
The infamous French mercenary Bob Denard would succeed in toppling the regime of
Comoros Islands. Colonel Hoare would go onto Seychelles in 1981 in a failed attempt to
topple the regime of President Albert Rene there (Axelrod, 2013). These mercenary
groups would no doubt on many occasions operate with the support of Western
intelligence agencies and would therefore be directly or indirectly their agents. These
actions would provide plenty of ‘plausible deniability’ for the western powers.
5 Post-Cold War mercenaries in Africa
This style of mercenary operations in African conflicts was however unknowingly,
drawing to a close in the last days of the cold war. The ideological struggle would end
and also along with it the support of different proxy groups in Africa – state or otherwise.
These mercenaries would have to reinvent themselves as a new brand of corporate
entities in the late 1980s. The most important among the new generation of mercenary
organisations was Executive Outcomes (EO) established by Eeben Barlow (Hirsch, 2001)
and Sandline international of Tim Spicer4 operating out of London. These organisations
did not portray themselves as ‘mercenaries’, but rather as net security providers, who
positioned themselves as providing ‘packaged support’ and professional military
services. These organisations tended to have a specialised skill set. EO specially used the
end of the cold war and the apartheid regime in South Africa to access a vast pool of
extremely well trained manpower. The founder of EO, Eeben Barlow had been an
intermediary to firms like Chevron and Texaco (Hooper, 2002) for recruiting South
African mercenaries by British businessman, Anthony Buckingham, himself formerly in
the Special Boat Service (SBS) (Musah et al., 2000). The African National Congress
(ANC) government in South Africa was actively supporting the disbanding and
dissolution of several key elements of the apartheid machinery including elite
South African Armed Forces (SADF) units such as 32 Battalion (McGovern and Manby,

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1993). These ex-SADF special forces personnel would go onto form the bulk of EO
personnel as they were ready to work at extremely low pay compared to other applicants,
had a good knowledge of the African countryside were extremely well trained.
EO emerged on the international arena after it was involved in taking the port city
of Soyo on behalf of the Angolan government against the União Nacional para a
Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) under Jonas Savimbi in 1993. The
effectiveness of the mercenaries against overwhelming numerical superiority of the
UNITA forces surprised the Angolan government. Only roughly 50–80 Executive
Outcome mercenaries succeeded in capturing Soyo although (Madsen, 1999), later the
latter was recaptured by UNITA. However, the performance of the mercenaries in Soyo
resulted in an offer from the Angolan government for an even larger number of
mercenaries. In the subsequent operation, EO with about 500 mercenaries completely
routed the UNITA rebels and secured most of the countryside. The mercenaries were
paid monetarily and in kind – several companies associated with EO were given
concessions in carrying out operations from the diamond mines in the country. EO would
go onto establish numerous affiliated organisations including Saracen International and
Bridge International. Later former EO employees would establish. Incidentally, since
1992 it was illegal for foreign owned private military contractors to operate in Angola
thereby, providing a source of profit for high ranking Angolan nationals.
Sierra Leone would be the next important theatre in Africa where mercenaries would
operate with varying degrees of success. The Sierra Leone junta in 1995 called the
National Provisional ruling council would decide to call upon the services of a British
agency called the Gurkha Security Guards (GSG) to provide training to officers and
special forces of the former’s military. The GSG had been formed by ex-British army
officers and a former US army Col. Robert Mackenzie (Alao, 2007). The primary
opposition in Sierra Leone consisted of the infamous United Revolutionary Front (RUF)
whose ranks consisted of a large number of minors and even children. In February 1995,
some GSG contractors and Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF) soldiers
were ambushed during which Mackenzie and 20 other soldiers were killed. Mackenzie’s
body was never recovered and according to some accounts, he was eaten by the RUF
(Riley, 1996). Following this incident, the GSG would refuse to get involved in any
further combat operations as elements of the RSLMF were suspected of having passed on
information leading to the ambush. GSG would withdraw from Sierra Leone in April
1995. Other Private Security Contractors (PSC) as mercenary outfits would now begin to
call themselves would also refuse to get involved in combat in Sierra Leone, with the
exception of EO. EO would go onto get engaged in combat operations against RUF in
May 1995 and would deploy at least 300 operatives supported by helicopter gunships at
the peak of their deployment (Woods and Reese, 2011). Within nine months of their
arrival, EO along with the retrained government troops had recapture major mining
centres formerly under RUF control. Under the subsequent Abidjan Peace Accord of
November 1996, a special emphasis was placed upon the withdrawal of all foreign
mercenary outfits including EO.
Both EO and Sandline International would enjoy close ties with various oil drilling
companies such as heritage oil and the former provide security for the over ground
operations of the latter. Sierra Leone would continue to have a great deal of economic
value, owing to its vast reserves of diamonds, bauxite, titanium and gold. The elected
government of Tejan Kebbah in Sierra Leone would be overthrown by a coup in 1997 led

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by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC); allegedly this happened because
of his termination of EO’s contract under pressure from the international community
(Koga, 2017).
Congo, which had witnessed the introduction of modern Mercenarism in Africa in the
1960s would witness its metamorphosis in the mid-1990s as a result of the Congo civil
war. These mercenaries were not really representing Western colonial interests based in
Europe as they had been in the 1960s, but rather corporate interests operating out of
Africa, especially South Africa, Rwanda and Uganda. The mercenaries in post-1996
Zaire were part of a large corporate network of mercenaries in Africa unlike the ‘dogs of
war’ of the 1960s who mostly tended operated under individual personalities and a cult
of leadership. The Mobutu government in Zaire would go on to become one of the most
important patrons of mercenaries in Africa. One of the most important mercenary groups
during this period was called the ‘White Legion’ and led by former Belgian Army, Col.
Christian Tavernier who himself was a junior associate of the legendary mercenary Bob
Denard (Prunier, 2008). This choice of French speaking mercenaries must be seen in the
background of the Francophone-Anglophone rivalry in the region, especially between
Congo and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) led Rwanda; French speaking mercenaries
formed the largest group in Zaire. The second group of mercenaries under Mobutu during
this period consisted of former Bosnian-Serb soldiers who were looking for better
prospects abroad after their country collapsed in the mid-1990s.
Former Serb officers like Colonel Dominic Yugo with close links to French
intelligence services and French armament firms began to get increasingly involved in
the Congo crisis (Venter, 2006). Yugo had also been accused of various war crimes
during the Yugoslav Civil War as well as torturing and killing several civilians in the
Congolese capital of Kisangani (French, 2004). This three-way network of former
Yugoslav army officials, French mercenaries and Zairean government figures played an
important role in procuring several large shipments of arms from Serbia while the French
firms would provide funding channelled from lucrative contracts in Congo. This East
European foray into Mercenarism in Congo was however lacklustre compared to South
African and even French mercenaries. A small South African firm called Stability
Control Agencies (Stabilico) would attempt to prevent a collapse of the Mobutu regime
(Cooper, 2013).
This was a part of a larger failure of mercenaries in the Zairean conflict who along
with the Mobutu regime was unable to stem the advance of the Alliance for Democratic
Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL) led by Kabila backed by the new
Anglophone Rwandan government. The Mobutu regime in Zaire would now be replaced
by the Kabila regime starting a new phase of instability in Congo as well as in the larger
Great Lakes region. Kabila would continue giving out lucrative mining contracts to
foreign firms engaged in mining of resources in Congo such as to America Mineral
Fields (AMF) in 1997 (Musah et al., 2000).
In 1998, EO would close its official business, and mercenary activity would become
less visible, but would by no means stop. The mercenary business in Africa would still be
brisk, and most of the new Private Security Companies (PSC) as they would now
increasingly be known as would have close ties with EO. Another major change was that
increasing numbers of black African mercenaries came to be employed by these firms
post 1997–1998 providing a greater degree of deniability as well reduced visibility. This

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situation would continue till 2006, when Russia would begin to emerge from its self-
imposed isolation from Africa since the collapse of the USSR (Gebrewold-Tochalo,
2009).
In 2006 Vladimir Putin would visit South Africa, and attempt to reassert Russia as a
major geopolitical force in the region. Post-2006, several African countries’
peacekeeping troops would receive training in Russia and the country would also act as
an important source of military equipment in the region. Russian firms, especially those
owned by oligarchs began to see Africa as a source of important mineral wealth and
began to aggressively seek infrastructure and mining contracts with state support.
Russian firms like Rosneft, Rusal, Lukoil and Zarubezhneft have been interested in
exploiting mineral resources in the Continent and enjoy state sponsorship (Bugayova
et al., 2019). Between 2012 and 2016, Russia would emerge as the largest weapons
supplier in Africa accounting for roughly 35% of arms sale to the region
(Warsawinstitute, 2019). After 2018, Russia would unofficially go onto see itself as a
security provider in Africa under its ‘eksport bezopasnosti’ policy (Sukhankin, 2019).
There are two main aspects of this policy – firstly to supply arms and equipment to
various sub-Saharan countries in Africa, and the second is security consultancy services.
It is the second aspect of this policy that is adding a new dimension to mercenary
business in Africa.
Whereas post-cold war mercenary firms like EO and Sandline International did enjoy
unofficial links with the intelligence agencies and corporate interests in their home
countries, their governments attitudes towards such firms was marked by a degree of
ambivalence and a show of ignorance. On the other hand, what makes the Russian policy
qualitatively different is that it translates into effective state sanction of the activities of
such mercenary firms; such a government position would be untenable in modern
western democracies as well as international scrutiny. The Russian policy is based on the
assumption that a large number of insurgencies in Africa and recent spread of radical
Islamic terrorism in the region has created a large market for security consultancy
services in anti-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations. This Russian move is a part
of Russian policies under what is called the ‘grey zone’ – an imaginary space between
legitimate diplomacy and open warfare; the idea is not new, but the term is
(Hicks, 2019).
The Wagner Group was established around 2014 by Dmitri Utkin, a former member
of the Russian Spetsnaz as a Private Military Company (PMC) (Sukhankin, 2019). The
Russian businessman Yevgeny Prigozhnin who has close ties with Vladimir Putin, also
has major stakes in the Wagner Group. The group was heavily involved in the takeover
of Crimea in 2014 and was indistinguishable from the unmarked regular Russian units in
the operation (Bingham, 2018). Recently, its operations have expanded to other regions
of Russian interests notably Syria. Since 2017, the group has been active in Africa,
especially in Libya; it has also aggressively expanded its operations into Mozambique,
Burundi, Sudan and the Central African Republic in Sub-Saharan Africa (Sauer, 2020).
The Wagner Group was successfully able to displace traditional players in the
mercenary market in Mozambique like the South African firms ‘Black Hawk’ and
‘OAM’, chiefly because of the recent political clout of Russian business tycoons and the
political support that it got them from the Kremlin.5 On August 22, 2019, Mozambique
Filipe Nyusi, reached an agreement with Vladimir Putin for Russian military advisors;
however, Russian PMCs like the Wagner Group had already been operating in the region

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and provided Moscow with a deniable and disposable asset to influence its policies and
interests on the ground without putting its regular forces at risk (Sukhankin, 2019).
Libya, has been the most important theatre for the Wagner Group in Africa in terms
of the numbers of men involved where they have been fighting for Khalifa Hafter’s
Libyan National Army (LNA) against UN backed Government of National Accord
(GNA) (Assad, 2020). Libya has also witnessed large numbers of casualties among the
ranks of the Wagner Group. Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir’s closeness with Putin
has also resulted in military support for the regime; since 2018, the Wagner Group has
operated in the region providing security services to the regime (McGregor, 2019). Sudan
also provides land access to the minerals rich Central African Republic (CAR) where a
similar story has played out; the country’s president Faustin-Archange Touadera has
entered discussions with Russia for military arms sales and a possible Russian military
base in the country. At the same time, an estimated 150 members of the Wagner Group
are already deployed in the CAR with some of them being killed in action
(Olivier, 2019).
Since the disastrous Syrian battle of Khasham of 2018 in which allegedly over a
hundred members of the Wagner Group were killed in an attack on a Syrian opposition
outpost including embedded US troops (Gibbons-Neff, 2019); a realisation seems to have
dawned on the Kremlin, that such large PMCs if left unchecked can be destabilising and
dangerous. Since 2018, a host of newer and smaller Russian PMCs have emerged such as
Shield, Patriot and Vega which consist mostly of former members of the Wagner Group,
with a greater emphasis on training and personal security than direct warfare (Hauer,
2019). These new PMCs seem to be the latest face of Russian mercenary activity in
Africa, although data on their activities is scarce.
6 Debate on the role of mercenaries
The debate over the use of mercenaries in Africa is part of a larger debate on the use of
mercenaries in general. The debate over mercenaries, therefore is to understand that
under which situations, are mercenaries more effective than national or international
forces, to whom are they accountable, can they replace traditional militaries in any role
and is there a legitimate place for mercenaries in the international system.
In Africa, mercenary activity has traditionally been seen as forces not answerable for
their actions to any government or organisation acting out of selfish monetary interests.
In many situations, the mercenaries in Africa were involved in fighting against the
internationally recognised state actors while at other times, such mercenary forces have
been known to be involved in drug and human trafficking, arms smuggling and terrorism
among other things. The inherently extra-national nature of mercenary actors makes them
unaccountable for their actions and constitute a destabilising factor in already unstable
political environment of Africa. Echoing this position, Antonio Guterres, the UN
Security Council on 4th February, 2019 stated that mercenaries constitute a major
challenge to peace in Africa and that the international community had been unable to
define a commonly acceptable definition of a mercenary.
Additionally, the definition of mercenaries is often open to interpretation and may
leave several loopholes. For instance, the legal status of mercenaries who may have been
employed by the state itself is debatable; moreover, if a state is overthrown by
mercenaries and a new regime installed, the mercenaries who till now were operating

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illegally, may now acquire legitimacy under law. International law cannot under any
circumstances overrule national sovereignty unless it involves a gross violation of human
rights.
On the other hand, there have been several instances during various conflicts in
Africa when mercenaries have played an important role in preventing loss of life. An
excellent example of such a scenario is when EO was employed to combat the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone; composed mostly of child soldiers,
the RUF was engaged in gross human rights violations and extreme brutality.
Mercenaries belonging to EO were successful in containing the insurrection at the behest
of the government, however, the latter under pressure from international organisations
replaced EO with an international force which proved completely ineffective in dealing
with the RUF. After the Abidjan Peace Accords between the Sierra Leone and the RUF, a
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) would be deployed to the country
which was quite ineffective in countering the latter. Former members of EO have also
been actively involved in war against the Boko Haram in Nigeria, where they have been
contracted by the country’s government to support the Nigerian army and have proved
themselves instrumental in stemming Boko Haram’s tide.
Small numbers of mercenaries have often proven that small numbers of highly
trained and motivated fighters can be more effective in situations where large multi-
national forces constrained by international laws and rules of engagement may prove
ineffective. Countries with a weak state and institutions are likely to employ trained
mercenary forces as policy tools. For large states, mercenaries provide effective
deniability for actions and provide a strategic presence without deploying military forces.
The attractiveness provided by mercenary forces, is therefore understandable, and the
right of a sovereign state to employ anyone in its services is undeniable. The problems
begin to develop, however, when mercenaries begin to act as agents of non-state actors
and start engaging in illegal activities; the very existence of mercenary organisations
allows such situations to manifest due to their lack of accountability.
It can be argued that mercenary organisations like EO have acted professionally, in so
far as having not engaged in any activities that could be claimed to be war crimes, yet
member of the organisation including people like Simon Mann have been accused of
attempting to carry out coups against national governments. The same accusation can
however, be levied against many state backed intelligence agencies, the latter often using
mercenaries as their tools for regime change. However, this is mostly on account of the
self-restraint of EO rather than on account of any regulatory mechanism; indeed, after the
dissolution of EO, many of its former members formed splinter organisations which may
not be motivated by the same values as EO.
7 Conclusions
The unstable political scenario of Africa has provided a fertile environment for the use of
mercenaries in the region. The frequent civil wars and the blatant use of proxies in the
region during the cold war has left behind a political environment in which many states
are incapable of exerting their writ in their land; they additionally face threats by state
and non-state actors. These states often endowed with phenomenal natural resources find
it attractive to use such wealth to purchase elements of military power off shelf including
trained manpower in the form of mercenaries.

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. Singh and A. Singh
Such mercenaries, have on more than one occasion engaged in activities which would
be classified as war crimes; however, on several occasions, these mercenaries have saved
countless lives where international organisations encumbered by protocols and rules of
engagement have proven to be ineffective. The most comprehensive definition of
mercenaries under the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing
and Training of Mercenaries dated December 1989 was signed by only 36 countries. This
symbolised an international failure to agree on a common definition of Mercenarism and
underlined the differences between the member states on the issue.
It is clear that the era of private military and security companies (PMC and PSC), the
modern corporate form of an age old occupation is here to stay. While PMCs are
involved in more traditional forms of mercenary type operations including offensive
roles, PSCs are usually limited to VIP security and other such operations. This not
necessarily an unwelcome development as it allows nations to defend themselves against
various internal and external threats while the state builds up necessary capacity. While
this strategy is not without its risks, it is clear that it is often the best available option to
such weak states. Moreover, the corporate nature of modern mercenary outfits makes
them easier to monitor and regulate in contrast to their older format of individual
mercenaries acting individually. The issue of a lack of regulatory oversight has been the
most common criticism of mercenary organisations and an argument against their
existence. It would therefore be better to legalise and regulate private security contractors
instead of trying to ban them – this approach would have the benefit of having greater
international acceptability as well as provide more oversight to mercenary activities.
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Notes
1 OAU (2020) OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa, Libreville,
3rd July 1977, Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries, International Committee of the Red
Cross. Available online at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/485?OpenDocument
(accessed on 28 February 2020).
2 UNTS (1977) No. 17512 Multilateral Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I), Treaties, United Nations. Available online at: https://treaties.un.org/doc/
Publication/UNTS/Volume%201125/volume-1125-I-17512-English.pdf (accessed on 1 March
2020).
3 Treaties (2020) International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and
Training of Mercenaries, New York, 4 December 1989, Treaties, United Nations. Available
online at: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1989/12/19891204%2008-54%20AM/Ch_
XVIII_6p.pdf (accessed on 1 March 2020).
4 Hirsch, J.L. (2001) Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy, Lynne Rienner
Publishers, p.38.
5 Sauer, P. (2020) Mercenaries are out of their depth in Mozambique, The Moscow Times.
Available online at: https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/11/19/in-push-for-africa-russias-
wagner-mercenaries-are-out-of-their-depth-in-mozambique-a68220 (accessed on 11 March
2020).