The article provides a description of the Autonomous ship, studies existing relevant projects, and examines the related Operational, Regulatory, and Quality assurance challenges raised due to the development and actual deployment of such vessels in the near future. After reviewing the main operational procedures, existing regulations, and quality assurance standards, a number of possible solutions and approaches to overcome the identified challenges are indicated. Some of the conclusions may be used not only in the Autonomous ships but also in traditionally manned vessels.
The MUNIN project is doing a feasibility study on an unmanned bulk carrier on an intercontinental voyage. To develop the technical and operational concepts, MUNIN has used a risk-based design method, based on the Formal Safety Analysis method which is also recommended by the International Mari-time Organization. Scenario analysis has been used to identify risks and to simplify operational scope. Systematic hazard identification has been used to find critical safety and security risks and how to address these. Technology and operational concept testing is using a hypothesis-based test method, where the hypotheses have been created as a result of the risk assessment. Finally, the cost-benefit assessment will also use results from the risk assessment. This paper describes the risk assessment method, some of the most important results and also describes how the results have been or will be used in the different parts of the project.
Future developments specific to the sustainability of the global shipping and transportation industries need to be revolutionary; whether pressured by economic survival or a result of a natural evolution driven by socio-technical realities. Mankind has just landed a spacecraft on a comet, so concepts regarding E-navigation and unmanned vessels are only several technological solutions away from operational realities.
Conventional thinking suggests that we augment operator decision making with artificially intelligent support systems. Whether these technologies keep the operator “in-the-loop” or diminish overall situation awareness remains to be seen and is dependent upon the quality and robustness of Human-Machine-Interface (HMI) to monitor and control the automation systems.
Automation of a control system, notwithstanding best of the developer(s)’ intentions, is not fail-proof. A sudden failure in automation of a highly complex system, whose “artificial intelligence” is not transparent to the operator, may prove beyond the cognitive means of a highly stressed (cognitive overloaded) operator to troubleshoot the situation and recover on time.
This paper will discuss three elements:
The “ironies of automation” and their implications upon HMI design.
Credible scenarios of trans-ocean, unmanned vessel passages as described in the European Union sponsored project “MUNIN” (http://www.unmanned-ship.org/munin). These scenarios include:
two collision avoidance scenarios where in one instance a target ship adheres to collision regulations (COLREG) and the ownship (unmanned) is to give-way and a second where the target ship does not act according to COLREG and ownship requires evasive maneuvers.
two engine room scenarios, including a pump injection failure and a carry water overflow occurrence in the engine.
three tactical scenarios including precise maneuvering, heavy weather handling and pilot embarkation.
The scenario data will provide insight into how the current HMI keeps the shore-based operator in-the-loop and how the Shore Control Centre maintains an adequate distributed situation awareness.
Previous studies have discovered that the tacit but indispensable “ship sense” from seafarers is intensively involved in creating and maintaining “harmony” to assure the safety. The concept of “harmony” reveals the continuous balanced effect by tuning the ship to the dynamic environment under different situations that ship handlers strive for.
While the notions of ship sense and harmony is originally created for onboard ship maneuvering, this paper extends it to the domain of shore-based control centers for unmanned ship handling from the perspective of human factors. With the loss of direct ship-sense, the harmony is also lost. This paper analyzes the challenges from having the operator onboard to onshore during ship maneuvering and explores the changing aspects of human factors we need to focus on, in order to facilitate shore-based ship-handlers to regain the harmony. The EU project Maritime Unmanned Ship though Intelligence in Networks (MUNIN) provides the context to conduct the focus group interview of participants with seagoing experience. The shifted human factors in shore-based unmanned ship handling are discussed. The results highlight several differential aspects in human factors that should be considered, such as situation awareness. It provides keys to design shore-based control center for remote monitoring and control in accordance with user-centered design principles.
The feasibility of unmanned, autonomous merchant vessels is investigated by the EU project MUNIN (Maritime Unmanned Navigation through Intelligence in Networks). The ships will be manned during passage to and from port and unmanned during ocean-passage. When unmanned, the ships will be controlled by an automatic system informed by onboard sensors allowing the ship to make standard collision avoidance manoeuvres according to international regulation. The ship will be continuously monitored by a remote shore centre able to take remote control should the automatic systems falter. For the humans in the shore control centre the usual problems of automations remains as well as a pronounced problem of keeping up adequate situation awareness through remote sensing.
This project was aimed at identifying strategies for improving current U. S. Coast Guard (USCG) procedures for investigating, reporting, and analyzing fatigue contributions to marine casualties. The focus was on evaluating the contribution of fatigue in vessel and personnel injury casualties. A total of 397 casualties were investigated. Fatigue contributed to 16 percent of the critical vessel casualties and 33 percent of the personnel injury casualties. These estimates were substantially greater than the ones currently available from the USCG Marine Investigations Module (MINMOD) database. Analyses identified three potential indicators of fatigue: (1) the number of fatigue symptoms reported by mariners, (2) the number of hours worked in the 24 hours prior to a casualty; and (3) the number of hours slept in those 24 hours. This study demonstrated the feasibility of using simple procedures to obtain meaningful data on the contribution of fatigue in transportation accidents.
Towards the Autonomous Ship is a study of existing relevant projects and an identification of the related Operational, Regulatory and Qualityassurance challenges raised due to the development and actual deployment of such vessels in the near future; a number of possible solutions andapproaches to overcome the identified challenges and conclusions whichmay be used not only in the Autonomous Ships, but also in traditionallymanned vessels. Additional maritime transportation related issues areincluded such as Breach of Warranties (Ch2), Deviation (Ch3), ArrivedShip (Ch4), Bill of Lading (Ch5), Salvage, Towage (Ch6) and Major Tanker Accidents (Ch7).
In the previous edition of this special series on robotics and law, we explored some of the legal, regulatory and ethical implications of robotic systems and applications. We continue on that theme in this edition, focusing on specific types of robotic systems (medical device robots and nanorobotics) and core legal and regulatory issues, including intellectual property, employment and cyber security. In exploring these areas, our objective remains to start a dialogue about how our existing legal frameworks might need to adapt and change to meet the demands of the robotics age. We then conclude this special series with our views on the future of robotics law and the development of legal practice in this area.
In this edition, we explore some of the legal, regulatory and ethical implications of robots and robotic systems and applications. We begin by giving our view of why this emerging technology will become increasingly prevalent and why it is important that lawyers and regulators play an important role in its development. We go on to address the key legal, regulatory and ethical issues in respect of specific types of robotics, including automated vehicles and healthcare robots. We also focus on the impact that robotics will have on core legal practice areas, including data protection, intellectual property, consumer protection and commercial contracting. Our objective is to identify the key legal and regulatory implications of robotics, and to start a dialogue about how our existing legal framework might need to adapt and change to meet the demands of the robotics age. In the next edition, we will continue our focus on key legal issues in respect of different types of robotics and core legal practice areas relevant to the discussion.
This paper addresses theoretical, empirical, and analytical studies pertaining to human use, misuse, disuse, and abuse of automation technology. Use refers to the voluntary activation or disengagement of automation by human operators. Trust, mental workload, and risk can influence automation use, but interactions between factors and large individual differences make prediction of automation use difficult. Misuse refers to over reliance on automation, which can result in failures of monitoring or decision biases. Factors affecting the monitoring of automation include workload, automation reliability and consistency, and the saliency of automation state indicators. Disuse, or the neglect or underutilization of automation, is commonly caused by alarms that activate falsely. This often occurs because the base rate of the condition to be detected is not considered in setting the trade-off between false alarms and omissions. Automation abuse, or the automation of functions by designers and implementation by managers without due regard for the consequences for human performance, tends to define the operator's roles as by-products of the automation. Automation abuse can also promote misuse and disuse of automation by human operators. Understanding the factors associated with each of these aspects of human use of automation can lead to improved system design, effective training methods, and judicious policies and procedures involving automation use.
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