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Criminological Perspectives on the
Toronto 18
T I A N A G A U D E T T E, G A R T H D A V I E S,
A N D R Y A N S C R I V E N S *
ABSTRACT
Historically, research in terrorism studies has drawn from a variety of
disciplines including, but not limited to, political science, psychology, and
security studies. More recently, however, researchers have argued that
* Tiana Gaudette is an incoming PhD student in the School of Criminal Justice at
Michigan State University. She is also a Research Associate at the International
CyberCrime Research Centre at Simon Fraser University and a Research Assistant on
a Public-Safety Canada funded project exploring the landscape of right-wing extremism
in Canada. Her research has been published in peer-reviewed journals such as New
Media and Society, Terrorism and Political Violence, and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, as
well as in several edited book collections.
Garth Davies is an Associate Professor in the School of Criminology at Simon Fraser
University and is the Associate Director of the Institute on Violence, Extremism and
Terrorism at Simon Fraser University. His current work involves developing a database
for evaluating programs for countering violent extremism, the social psychology of
radicalization, the statistical modeling and projection of violent right-wing extremism,
misogynist terrorism, and the evolution of left-wing terrorism. He has also been
involved in the development of the Terrorism and Extremism Network Extractor
(TENE), a web-crawler designed to investigate activities on the internet. The crawler is
presently being used to examine violent extremism on the dark net. Dr. Davies earned
his Ph.D. in Criminal Justice from Rutgers University.
Ryan Scrivens is an Assistant Professor in the School of Criminal Justice at Michigan
State University. He is also an Associate Director at the International CyberCrime
Research Centre at Simon Fraser University, a Research Fellow at the VOX-Pol
Network of Excellence, and an Associate Fellow at the Global Network on Extremism
and Technology. His research has been funded by Public Safety Canada, the Canadian
Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society, and VOX-Pol. He has
presented his findings before the U.K. Home Office, the Swedish Defence Research
Agency in Stockholm, and the United Nations in New York City and Vienna, among
others.
56 MULTI-DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON THE TORON TO 18 TERRORISM TRIALS
criminological approaches can and should inform terrorism studies as well.
In this chapter, we apply four criminological perspectives to the case of the
Toronto 18: the general strain theory of terrorism, social learning theory,
situational crime prevention, and situational action theory. Drawing from
news media accounts and court documents as well as extensive personal and
background details about the offenders, we examine what inspired members
of the Toronto 18 to join the cell, as well as the internal dynamics of the
cell and why they selected certain targets, all through a criminological lens.
The complexities of the Toronto 18 cases clearly demonstrate why it would
be unrealistic at best, and foolhardy at worst, to expect any single
orientation to “explain” terrorism. But used in concert, criminological
theories and perspectives clearly have a role to play in advancing our
understanding of the dynamics of terrorism.
I. INTRODUCTION
n the summer of 2006, 18 individuals, inspired by al-Qaeda, were
arrested for planning large-scale terrorist attacks on Canadian soil. More
specifically, the individuals, known collectively as the “Toronto 18,”
were arrested for two plots: one against a number of prominent buildings
in southern Ontario, including Parliament Hill, the headquarters of the
Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Toronto Stock Exchange
(TSE), and the Canadian Broadcasting Centre (CBC). The group also
targeted political leaders, including then-Prime Minister of Canada Stephen
Harper, whom they planned to behead.
1
Although these attacks were pre-
empted, the case of the Toronto 18 sparked significant national and
international media attention. This notoriety, in turn, prompted a number
of questions, ranging from how and why such a terrorist cell could form in
Canada, to questions about where these individuals came from and how
they became inspired by al-Qaeda, to questions about the internal dynamics
of the cell and why they selected certain targets. The goal of this chapter is
to address questions such as these through the application of criminological
theories and perspectives. Space limitations preclude a thorough
examination of each theories’ application to radicalization. Rather, the
1
Ian Austen, “Man Guilty in Canada Terror Plot,” New York Times, September 26, 2008,
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/26/world/americas/26canada.html.
I
Chapter 3 – Criminological Perspectives 57
objective is to identify the facets of particular theories that may be useful in
understanding the Toronto 18.
Historically, research in terrorism studies has drawn from various
disciplines including, but not limited to, political science, psychology, and
security studies. More recently, however, researchers have convincingly
argued that terrorism and political violence also fall within the realm of
criminology and that criminological approaches, therefore, can and should
inform terrorism studies.
2
Perspectives that have been extended to account
for various aspects of terrorism include general strain theory,
3
social learning
theory,
4
the situational crime prevention framework,
5
and situational action
theory.
6
Thus far, these perspectives have addressed terrorism in a
predominantly generalized manner. In this chapter, each of these
criminological perspectives (i.e., general strain theory of terrorism, social
learning theory, situational crime prevention, and situational action theory)
will, first, be briefly summarized and, second, be applied specifically to the
Toronto 18 case. This was accomplished by drawing from news media
accounts and court documents of the case, which included trial decisions,
trial transcripts, expert witness reports, and sentencing reports, amongst
other records. Extensive personal and background details for whom
information was available were collected for each individual, with the
exception of the youth offenders because of their ages. The information
2
See Gary Lafree and Joshua D. Freilich, “Bringing Criminology into the Study of
Terrorism,” in The Handbook of the Criminology of Terrorism, eds. Gary LaFree and Joshua
D. Freilich (Chichester, U.K.: Wiley Blackwell, 2017), 3–14. See also Joshua D. Freilich
and Gary Lafree, “Criminological Theory and Terrorism: An Introduction to the
Special Issue,” Terrorism and Political Violence 27 (2015): 1–8.
3
Robert Agnew, “A General Strain Theory of Terrorism,” Theoretical Criminology, 14
(2010): 131–53; Robert Agnew, “General Strain Theory and Terrorism,” in The
Handbook of the Criminology of Terrorism, eds. Gary LaFree and Joshua D. Freilich
(Chichester, U.K.: Wiley Blackwell, 2017), 121–32.
4
J. Keith Akins and L. Thomas Winfree, “Social Learning Theory and Becoming a
Terrorist: New Challenges for a General Theory,” in The Handbook of the Criminology of
Terrorism, eds. Gary LaFree and Joshua D. Freilich (Chichester, U.K.: Wiley Blackwell,
2017), 133–49.
5
Henda Y. Hsu and Gary R. Newman, “The Situational Approach to Terrorism,” in The
Handbook of the Criminology of Terrorism, eds. Gary LaFree and Joshua D. Freilich
(Chichester, U.K.: Wiley Blackwell, 2017), 150–61.
6
Per-Olof H. Wilkström and Noémie Bouhana, “Analyzing Radicalization and
Terrorism: A Situational Action Theory,” in The Handbook of the Criminology of Terrorism,
eds. Gary LaFree and Joshua D. Freilich (Chichester, U.K.: Wiley Blackwell, 2017),
175–86.
58 MULTI-DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON THE TORON TO 18 TERRORISM TRIALS
collected included offenders’ upbringing, family life, and psychiatric
evaluations. In addition, extensive information was gathered on numerous
aspects related to the terrorist cell. The purpose of this approach was to try
to understand what inspired the members of the Toronto 18 to join the cell,
as well as why the group functioned the way it did, through a criminological
lens.
II. GENERAL STRAIN THEORY
A. Overview of General Strain Theory
Robert Agnew’s
7
general strain theory (GST) posits that a wide range of
strains – or “stressors” – contribute to crime and delinquency. According to
Agnew’s GST
8
, strain may be experienced as a result of the introduction of
negative stimuli (e.g., neglect or abuse), the removal of positive stimuli (e.g.,
the death of a loved one), or the failure to achieve positively valued goals
(e.g., financial or status-related). Put simply, a strain is an unfavourable
condition or event experienced by an individual; as such, GST is situated at
the “social-psychological” level, which focuses on an individual’s
interactions with their immediate surrounding environment.
9
When
confronted with one or more strains, individuals feel a range of negative
emotions, including frustration, anger, and desperation. As a result,
individuals may resort to crime and delinquency to alleviate the negative
emotions they experience due to strain (e.g., drug or alcohol abuse) or to
escape the source(s) of strain (e.g., monetary theft).
10
In particular, GST
maintains that strains that are higher in magnitude, more recently
encountered, longer in duration, and more clustered in time have greater
influence in producing a criminal coping strategy.
11
7
Robert Agnew, Pressured into Crime: An Overview of General Strain Theory (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2006).
8
Agnew, Pressured into Crime.
9
See Robert Agnew, “Foundation for a General Strain Theory of Crime and
Delinquency,” Criminology 30 (1992): 47–88; Agnew, Pressured into Crime.
10
Agnew, Pressured into Crime.
11
Agnew, “Foundation for a General Strain Theory of Crime and Delinquency,” 64–66.
Chapter 3 – Criminological Perspectives 59
B. General Strain Theory in Terrorism Studies
Agnew
12
has elaborated upon GST to provide an explanation for (1) the
strains that are most likely to result in terrorism; (2) why these strains are
likely to result in terrorism; and (3) why so few who experience these strains
use terrorism as a coping strategy. Referred to as the general strain theory of
terrorism (GSTT), this approach posits that “collective strains,” or strains
that are experienced by an identifiable group based on racial, ethnic, classist,
or political grounds, increase the likelihood of terrorism.
13
The collective
strains that are most likely to result in terrorism include those that are “(a)
high in magnitude, with civilians affected; (b) unjust; and (c) inflicted by
significantly more powerful others, including ‘complicit’ civilians, with
whom members of the strained collectivity have weak ties.”
14
Collective
strains, according to the GSTT, contribute to terrorism because they
increase negative emotions, as well as reduce social and self-controls and the
ability to cope through both legal and military channels, thus fostering the
social learning of terrorism by strengthening group ties and the formation
of terrorist groups.
15
Additionally, potential terrorists do not need to
personally experience collective strains. Rather, they may be vicariously
experienced through membership in a group with which they closely
identify.
16
Although Agnew (2010) acknowledges that collective strains do
not lead to terrorism in every case, the GSTT does, however, provide a
number of subjective factors that “condition” the effect of collective strains
and, resultantly, influence an individual’s likelihood of engaging in
terrorism.
17
These factors include the extent to which they identify with the
strained collectivity, personally-experienced strains associated with that
collectivity, possess attitudes favourable to terrorism, or associate with those
who either support or engage in terrorism themselves.
18
12
Agnew, “A General Strain Theory of Terrorism.”
13
See Agnew, “A General Strain Theory of Terrorism.” See also Agnew, “General Strain
Theory and Terrorism.”
14
Agnew, “A General Strain Theory of Terrorism,” 132.
15
See Agnew, “A General Strain Theory of Terrorism.”
16
Agnew, “A General Strain Theory of Terrorism.”
17
Agnew, “A General Strain Theory of Terrorism.”
18
Agnew, “A General Strain Theory of Terrorism.”
60 MULTI-DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON THE TORONTO 18 TERRORISM TRIALS
III. GENERAL STRAIN THEORY AND THE TORONTO 18
The members of the Toronto 18 strongly identified themselves with the
global Muslim community (the “ummah”). The wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq triggered many of the youth, producing feelings of a “collective strain”
for the Muslims across the globe. They perceived that Muslims were being
mistreated and/or oppressed at the hands of the American military and the
West more generally. To illustrate, Fahim Ahmad, for example, believed
that the West was in a “global fight” with Islam and identified Canada, with
its military presence in Afghanistan, as part of the problem.
19
The 2004
invasion of Iraq was apparently “the straw that broke the camel’s back,” as
all of Ahmad’s resentment towards the West and United States (US) for
having invaded Afghanistan became manifest in intense anger with the
invasion of Iraq.
20
Zakaria Amara was similarly affected by the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq, which seemed to precipitate within him “a roller coaster ride of
conflicting emotions… including confusion, shock, sorrow, helplessness and
outrage of images of conflict and barbarous stories of slaughter of
Muslims.”
21
It was further noted that Amara’s “self-concept seemed to have
hyper-identified with the cause of defending the aimless Muslims against
oppression.”
22
Saad Khalid also was primarily concerned with Canada’s
involvement in Afghanistan, particularly its combat role after 9/11. As a
result, he “felt there were hypocritical and unfair policies towards Muslims
in Afghanistan. He emphasized that he was not angry at and did not hate
Americans. However, he was angry about the policies.”
23
As with other
members, it was noted at trial that Saad Gaya’s actions were not attributable
to any sort of cognitive or personality conditions, such as anti-sociality,
impulsivity, or psychopathy. Instead, he was motivated by “his religious
beliefs, his sympathy towards the suffering ‘limbs’ of the Muslim Nation,
and his perceived sense of duty to stand up to the Canadian Government
toward change in foreign policy.”
24
19
See Isabel Teotonio, “Toronto 18,” Toronto Star, July 3, 2010, http://www3.thestar.com
/static/toronto18/index.1.html.
20
Julian Gojer, “Psychiatric Report for Sentencing,” (2010): 2.
21
R v. Amara, 2010 ONSC 441 at para 62 [Amara].
22
Arif Syed, “Psychiatric Report Regarding Amenability to Treatment,” (2009): 7–8.
23
R v. Khalid, 2009 O.J. No. 6414 at para 22 [Khalid].
24
R v. Gaya, 2010 ONSC 434 at para 43 [Gaya].
Chapter 3 – Criminological Perspectives 61
A common topic of discussion among members of the terrorist cell, and
their larger Ontario Muslim community, related to the collective strains
they experienced through their Muslim brothers and sisters around the
world. Notably, these strains were experienced vicariously, since most
members themselves spent portions of their childhood in Canada and did
not directly experience the strains associated with military occupation. Still,
these strains became central to the members. For instance, within “their
gatherings and conversations, the group would ‘just want to talk about
grievances.’”
25
Ahmad spoke often about Muslims whose countries were
being attacked by the U.S. and its allies, as well as how “Muslims everywhere
needed to stand up for their faith.”
26
As noted earlier, the GSTT proposes
that a collective strain, such as that experienced by members of the Toronto
18, is most likely to result in terrorist acts. In the case of Gaya, for example,
religiously motivated moral outrage superseded his perceived need to abide
by secular laws.
27
In a similar vein, Amara’s “need to attempt terrorist acts
may have included his determined need to follow through on commitments
of Muslim loyalty.”
28
IV. SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY
A. Overview of Social Learning Theory
At its core, social learning theory (SLT) posits that certain processes
govern the learning of both pro-social and anti-social (criminal) behaviour.
29
In particular, SLT has four key theoretical elements. First, differential
association refers to the direct social contact between an individual and
members of their peer group, which provides the context for social learning.
Second, SLT considers imitation to be the most basic form of learning,
which occurs when an individual observes, and models, the behaviour of
their peers. Third, the definitions element of SLT refers to an individual’s
own attitudes, values, and orientations about what are and are not
acceptable forms of behaviour. And fourth, differential reinforcement refers
to the experienced, expected, or perceived rewards and punishments that
25
Arif Syed, “Psychiatric Report Regarding Amenability to Treatment,” (2009): 7.
26
R v. Ahmad, 2010 ONSC 5874 at para 28 [Ahmad].
27
Gaya, ONSC at para 43.
28
Amara, ONSC at para 52.
29
Edwin H. Sutherland, Principles of Criminology, 4th ed. (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott,
1947).
62 MULTI-DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON THE TORONTO 18 TERRORISM TRIALS
follow the performance of a particular behaviour and functions to push an
individual toward or pull them away from criminal behaviour.
30
Akers
31
later elaborated upon traditional SLT by adding a structural component
called social structural learning theory (SSSL). SSSL adds four structural
dimensions to SLT: (1) differential social organization; (2) differential
location in the social structure; (3) theoretically defined structural causes;
and (4) differential social location in groups.
B. Social Learning Theory in Terrorism Studies
SLT maintains that all behaviour, including terrorism, is learned
behaviour. Understandably, then, SLT has been applied to explain how
individuals learn to be terrorists and understand the process by which they
engage in terrorist actions, from recruitment and building kinships to
suicide attacks.
32
According to Akers and Silverman,
33
the “extremist
subculture provides identity, ideational and physical resources, and a more
or less coherent perspective on the disputes and grievances that are so
important to the person in which violent struggle is an integral part of his
life.” In particular, through differential association “terrorists learn an
ideology that the ends justify the means; violence for political ends is
accepted and rewarded.”
34
In Western nations, individuals or even “groups
of friends” may be socialized into terrorism through friends or relatives who
are “connected” to terrorist groups.
35
In addition, online social media
platforms play a role in radicalized learning; empirical research on applying
social learning theory to the radicalization of violent and non-violent
30
See Ronald L. Akers, Deviant Behavior: A Social Learning Approach (Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth, 1973).
31
Ronald L. Akers, Social Learning and Social Structure: A General Theory of Crime and
Deviance (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1998).
32
See Akins and Winfree, “Social Learning Theory and Becoming a Terrorist.”
33
Ronald L. Akers and Adam L. Silverman, “Toward a Social Learning Model of Violence
and Terrorism,” in Violence: From Theory to Research, eds. Margaret A. Zahn, Henry H.
Brownstein, and Shelly L. Jackson (Cincinnati: LexisNexis and Andersen Publishing,
2004), 26.
34
Akers and Silverman, “Toward a Social Learning Model of Violence and Terrorism,”
27.
35
Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).
Chapter 3 – Criminological Perspectives 63
extremists has concluded that the Internet offers “a source of social
connections and messaging that enabled acceptance of radical ideas.”
36
C. Social Learning Theory and the Toronto 18
1. Evidence of Differential Association
There appear to have been multiple pathways through which
differential association influenced members of the Toronto 18. One
important avenue was provided by local mosques. To illustrate, the
psychiatrist who performed a psychiatric evaluation of Fahim Ahmad ahead
of his trial found that Ahmad’s interest in more radical Islam was, at least
to some extent, initiated and supported by senior members of the
Meadowvale Mosque.
37
Moreover, some of those sermons propagated
aggression in response to Muslim persecution.
38
Ahmad also sought out
information from other mosque attendees, but the information they offered
him was oftentimes incorrect. For example, when Ahmad discussed his
political grievances with other mosque attendees, some would offer him
religious advice in the form of misinterpreted Koran verses such as “fight
wherever you find them, wait for them at every place of ambush.”
39
Both
Ahmad and Zakaria Amara were drawn to the mosque because they enjoyed
the company and preachings of the centre’s janitor, Qayyum Abdul Jamal,
who was 20 years their senior. Jamal has been characterized as a social tie
that provided access to radical messaging. For instance, Jamal’s views were
known to sometimes be extreme and, at one public event, he railed against
Canadian soldiers raping Muslim women.
40
In addition, as Amara became
“increasingly disconnected from his overworked and unhappy parents, the
enigmatic Jamal became a sort of father-figure.”
41
Another important trajectory of differential association was the online
milieu. One member of the Toronto 18 for whom online connections
36
Thomas J. Holt et al., “Examining the Utility of Social Control and Social Learning in
the Radicalization of Violent and Non-Violent Extremists,” Dynamics of Asymmetric
Conflict 11 (2018): 142. See also Akins and Winfree, “Social Learning Theory and
Becoming a Terrorist.”
37
Julian Gojer, “Psychiatric Report for Sentencing,” (2010), 3.
38
Gojer, “Psychiatric Report for Sentencing,” 3.
39
Gojer, “Psychiatric Report for Sentencing,” 4.
40
Isabel Teotonio, “Toronto 18: The Brothers of Meadowvale,” Toronto Star, July 3, 2010,
http://www3.thestar.com/static/toronto18/index.1.html.
41
Teotonio, “Toronto 18: The Brothers of Meadowvale.”
64 MULTI-DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON THE TORONTO 18 TERRORISM TRIALS
would prove crucial was Jahmaal James. Within James’ “cyber-circle”, for
example, was “Aabid Khan, known as a Mr. Fix-It because he was a
facilitator for the Pakistan-based terrorist organizations Lashkar-e-Tayyiba
and Jaish-e-Mohammed.”
42
Like Jamal, Khan operated as a social tie that
increased radicalization.
43
Khan claimed to have contacts in paramilitary
training camps in Pakistan and began speaking with James and others about
overseas training. After some time, “they decided to meet in Toronto for
about a week in March 2005 to plan.”
44
In November 2005, James travelled
to Pakistan to meet with Khan and join a training camp that provided him
training in both firearms use and making explosives – knowledge that James
planned to share with the rest of the terrorist cell back in Canada.
45
In this
way, Khan provided James with training that Holt and colleagues
46
may
characterize as a “resource to offend.”
2. Social Bonds
According to Sageman,
47
friendship and kinship ties are significant
factors that drive individuals to join the global Islamist terrorist movement.
As a result of the informal self-organization of “bunches of guys,” according
to Sageman,
48
the movement is formed from the bottom-up. Some members
of the Toronto 18 described turning to their extremist peers for a sense of
identity and belonging. For Saad Khalid, as an example, it was suggested
that “[i]n his quest for meaning he developed a need to belong to a group,
which led to his eventual involvement in a terrorist organization,
culminated with the behaviour leading to his arrest.”
49
It was similarly noted
that Amara “turned to his practicing Muslim peer group for his source of
intimacy, consistency, and loyalty.”
50
For members of the Toronto 18,
membership in the group served to provide them with a “more or less”
42
Isabel Teotonio, “Toronto 18: Soldier of Allah,” Toronto Star, July 3, 2010, http://www3
.thestar.com/static/toronto18/index.1.html.
43
Holt et al., “Examining the Utility of Social Control and Social Learning in the
Radicalization of Violent and Non-Violent Extremists,” Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict,
11 (2018).
44
Teotonio, “Toronto 18: Soldier of Allah.”
45
Teotonio, “Toronto 18: Soldier of Allah.”
46
Holt et al., “Examining the Utility of Social Control.”
47
Sageman, Leaderless Jihad.
48
Sageman, Leaderless Jihad.
49
Khalid, O.J. at para 31.
50
Arif Syed, “Psychiatric Report Regarding Amenability to Treatment,” (2009): 3.
Chapter 3 – Criminological Perspectives 65
coherent perspective on their grievances or the Afghanistan/Iraq wars.
Amara, for example, stated that:
Ahmad began to recruit the agent by indoctrinating him with emotional
arguments about the oppression of Muslims. Ahmad defined “the enemy” as the
Americans, and because of the “close local connection between Canada and the
United States, Canada was also the enemy.”
51
Sageman
52
has further suggested that joining a homegrown terrorist
group is largely a “bottom-up” process, where groups of friends, or “bunches
of guys,” informally organize to join the global terrorist movement. This was
certainly the case with the Toronto 18, as members were not recruited by
formal organizations. Ahmad himself declared “we’re not officially Al
Qaeda but share their principles and methods.”
53
Instead, members came
to know about the group and its objectives through friendship ties with local
boys in their community. Interestingly, the foundation of the group was the
bond formed between Amara and Ahmad at school, where they joined the
Muslim Student Association and were drawn to other troubled or
disaffected Muslim youth. This context “proved fertile for the seeds of
extremism and militancy.”
54
Through joining the terrorist cell, members
came to believe that violence for political ends could be rewarded.
55
Khalid
declared that “Ahmad and Amara intended to show the tape to “higher up
Mujahadeen people who would be impressed with us” if they could be
convinced the group was “the real deal.”
56
Shareef Abdelaheem commented
that the intended bombings could both prompt Parliament to reconsider its
(then) recent decision to extend the military mission in Afghanistan
57
and
produce a financial gain, noting that “there’s money to be made here.”
58
3. The Role of the Internet
It is increasingly understood that the Internet has played a role in the
radicalization of violent extremists, functioning as what Holt et al.
59
describe
as “a source of social connections and messaging that enabled acceptance of
51
Zakaria Amara, “R. v. Zakaria Amara Agreed Statement of Facts,” (2009): 1.
52
Sageman, Leaderless Jihad.
53
Isabel Teotonio, “Toronto 18: The Camp,” Toronto Star, July 3, 2010.
54
Teotonio, “Toronto 18: The Brothers of Meadowvale.”
55
Akers and Silverman, “Toward a Social Learning Model of Violence and Terrorism.”
56
Saad Khalid, “Statement of Uncontested Facts: R. v. Saad Khalid,” (2009): 1.
57
Khalid, “Statement of Uncontested Facts,” 17.
58
Hy Bloom, “Independent Psychiatric Evaluation: Sentencing Issues,” (2010): 38.
59
Holt et al., “Examining the Utility of Social Control,” 142.
66 MULTI-DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON THE TORONTO 18 TERRORISM TRIALS
radical ideas.” It is clear that some of the members of the Toronto 18 were
also exposed to Jihadist ideology via the Internet. Ahmad, for example,
spent increasing time online, including on sites dedicated to highlighting
“atrocities” being committed against Muslims by Western forces overseas.
He was also influenced by online lectures from the US-born Yemeni
preacher Anwar al-Awlaki.
60
Ahmad “became convinced it was his duty to
assist the Afghani people and his faith by becoming involved in the
conflict.”
61
At the same time, Toronto 18 members explored Islamic-based
forums (i.e., Clear Guidance) as well as other Internet forums (i.e., Paltalk)
where they were able to actively engage with like-minded peers and exchange
(and come to further embrace) radical ideas.
62
Although online interactions
do not replace the importance of face-to-face social dynamics in the
radicalization process,
63
their discussions amongst like-minded peers within
these forums further entrenched members into their extremist belief system.
For instance, when Ahmad was feeling lonely, he would “go on Islamic sites
and forums as a means of gaining further religious knowledge and also
meeting other Muslims feeling similar alienation from school and society.”
64
Ahmad met his wife on the Islamic forum Clear Guidance, which she later
characterized as inciting young Muslims to hate “non-believers” and
promoted violence against them.
65
V. SITUATIONAL ACTION THEORY
A. Overview of Situational Action Theory
Situational Action Theory (SAT) is often referred to as a “general,”
“dynamic,” and “mechanism-based” theory of crime because it may be used
to explain all forms of crime: it focuses on the “person-environment
interaction,” and it identifies the basic explanatory processes behind crime
causation.
66
To explain the mechanisms behind criminal acts, SAT
60
See Michelle Shepherd, “What Happened to the Toronto 18 Plotters?,” Toronto Star,
May 29, 2016.
61
Ahmad, ONSC at para 29.
62
Jeremy Kowalski, Domestic Extremism and the Case of the Toronto 18 (New York: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2016), 139.
63
See Paul Gill et al., “Terrorist Use of the Internet by the Numbers: Quantifying
Behaviors, Patterns, and Processes,” Criminology & Public Policy 16 (2017): 99–117.
64
Fahim Ahmad, “Fahim Ahmad’s Letter to Justice Dawson,” (2010): 2.
65
Ahmad, ONSC at para 30.
66
Wilkström and Bouhana, “Analyzing Radicalization and Terrorism,” 178.
Chapter 3 – Criminological Perspectives 67
incorporates four key theoretical elements: (1) the “person” and their
propensity for crime; (2) the “setting” or environmental inducements; (3)
the “situation” or the “perception-choice process” that is sparked when the
“person” meets the “setting”; and (4) the “action” or, more specifically,
bodily movements.
67
A key underlying premise of SAT is that crime cannot
be understood by solely examining the “person” and the extent to which
their personal morals and lack of self-control allow them to see crime as an
“action alternative,” or the “setting,” which has its own set of moral norms
that may encourage an individual to break a rule of law.
68
Rather, according
to SAT, it is the “situation” – i.e., the bridge between the “person” and the
“setting”– that explains the “action.”
69
Simply put, SAT proposes that “[a]cts
of crime are most likely to happen when crime-prone people take part in
criminogenic settings (environments).”
70
B. Situational Action Theory in Terrorism Studies
According to Wilkström and Bouhana, SAT can shed light on “why
some people see acts of terrorism as acceptable” or even why some people
become “externally pressurized to carry out acts of terrorism.”
71
To illustrate,
SAT considers radicalization to terrorism as a process of moral education,
where a person comes to understand what right or wrong conduct is, in a
given scenario, through the sub-mechanisms of instruction, observation,
and trial and error.
72
To explain what causes a radicalized individual to
participate in terrorist attacks more specifically, SAT proposes that “the
direct causes of a person's involvement in acts of terrorism have to do with
their morality and the moral context in which they operate.”
73
At the most
basic level, then, a person who has the propensity to engage in terrorism
may commit a terrorist act if they perceived that act to be a viable “action
67
See Per-Olof H. Wilkström, “Why Crime Happens: A Situational Action Theory,” in
Analytical Sociology: Actions and Networks, ed. Gianluca Manzo (Chichester: John Wiley
& Sons, 2014), 74–94.
68
Wilkström, “Why Crime Happens: A Situational Action Theory,” 74–79.
69
Wilkström and Bouhana, “Analyzing Radicalization and Terrorism.”
70
Wilkström, “Why Crime Happens,” 76.
71
Wilkström and Bouhana, “Analyzing Radicalization and Terrorism,” 178.
72
Wilkström and Bouhana, “Analyzing Radicalization and Terrorism,” 178.
73
Noémie Bouhana and Per-Olof H. Wilkström, “Theorizing Terrorism: Terrorism as
Moral Action: A Scoping Study,” Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice 2 (2010):
60.
68 MULTI-DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON THE TORONTO 18 TERRORISM TRIALS
alternative,” and if they also make the (moral) choice to commit the act.
74
Bouhana and Wilkström further argue that whether a person believes that
terrorist acts are an acceptable “action alternative” is dependent upon “their
moral education (their history of moral learning and moral experiences),
and these experiences depend, in turn, on the individual's history of
exposure to moral contexts promoting engagement in acts of terrorism.”
75
Few empirical studies, however, have tested SAT’s general theory of
crime to explain terrorism. One study that examined SAT’s notion of the
“moral context” in relation to acts of eco- and animal-rights terrorism found
that, following only some high-profile attacks by such groups, moral rules
and their enforcement were significantly altered to produce a reduction in
subsequent terrorist events.
76
Another study found empirical support for
SAT’s “person-setting interaction” and violent extremism, concluding that
“[a]dolescents that rank high on individual violent extremist propensity are
by and large far more susceptible to exposure to violent extremist moral
settings than their counterparts with low individual violent extremist
propensity.”
77
C. Situational Action Theory and the Toronto 18
1. Motivation for the Planned Terrorist Attacks
Members of the Toronto 18 appear to have had their action processes
initiated by a number of external, precipitant events.
78
First, the motivation
for the attack emerged, in part, in the period following the 9/11 terrorist
attacks. Following this event, members of the cell generally became more
sensitive to how “Muslim people were being perceived and treated” in
Canada.
79
Fahim Ahmad, in particular, perceived a climate of hatred
developing in Canada against Muslims. In this post-9/11 setting, Ahmad
observed how Muslims were increasingly being perceived as terrorists and,
74
See Wilkström and Bouhana, “Analyzing Radicalization and Terrorism.” See also Nele
Schils and Lieven Pauwels, “Explaining Violent Extremism for Subgroups by Gender
and Immigrant Background, using SAT as a Framework,” Journal of Strategic Security 7
(2014): 27–47.
75
Bouhana and Wilkström, “Theorizing Terrorism,” 60.
76
See Jennifer V. Carson and Brad Bartholomew, “Terrorism Outside the Proverbial
Vacuum: Implications for the Moral Context,” Deviant Behavior 37 (2016): 557–72.
77
Schils and Pauwels, “Explaining Violent Extremism for Subgroups,” 45.
78
Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics 13 (1981): 379.
79
Julian Gojer, “Psychiatric Report for Sentencing,” (2010): 1–2.
Chapter 3 – Criminological Perspectives 69
as a result of this climate, Muslim men and women were physically assaulted
and harassed.
80
As an example, Muslims’ religious attire was being targeted,
where Muslim women had their headscarves pulled and forcibly removed.
81
Ahmad himself was once stopped and questioned by the police while
dressed in traditional robes.
82
The setting in which the targeted harassment
and bullying of Muslims in Canada was observed provided a grievance that
drove some members of the Toronto 18 to become further affiliated with
their faith.
Second, members of the terrorist cell were motivated by U.S. and
Canadian foreign policy decisions. Here, members were provoked by
Canada’s perceived involvement in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
83
For
members of the group, the wars against Iraq and Afghanistan had the effect
of bringing about an awareness of the state of the global Muslim
community. For instance, the 2003 invasion of Iraq was the “straw that
broke that camel’s back” for Ahmad.
84
The U.S. and Canada’s role in these
wars, then, may have provided some degree of environmental inducement
for members to be willing to prepare an attack.
However, not all those who experience such provocations will be driven
to perceive terrorism as an acceptable “action alternative.”
85
What drove
members of the Toronto 18 to perceive terrorism as an acceptable action
alternative in response to their grievances, then, was due in part to their
criminal propensities. Members’ criminal propensities in favour of
terrorism appear to have developed, to some extent, through processes of
self and social selection. These processes “are crucial to our understanding
of how people come into contact with particular moral contexts... that,
through their moral education, promote ‘radicalization’.”
86
To illustrate,
members of the Toronto 18 situated themselves within radicalizing moral
contexts among peers who helped to develop their propensity for terrorism.
2. Radicalization as a Process of Moral Education
The leaders of the Toronto 18 developed their “propensities” for
terrorism in a variety of settings. One radicalizing environment in which
80
Gojer, “Psychiatric Report for Sentencing,” 10.
81
Gojer, “Psychiatric Report for Sentencing,” 10.
82
Gojer, “Psychiatric Report for Sentencing,” 10.
83
Gojer, “Psychiatric Report for Sentencing,” 2.
84
Gojer, “Psychiatric Report for Sentencing,” 2.
85
Wilkström and Bouhana, “Analyzing Radicalization and Terrorism.”
86
Wilkström and Bouhana, “Analyzing Radicalization and Terrorism,”181.
70 MULTI-DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON THE TORONTO 18 TERRORISM TRIALS
Ahmad, for example, received instruction was from radical high-level
members at the local mosque. Ahmad frequently interacted with these
individuals who “believed Islam was under attack” by the U.S. and its
allies.
87
As a result of Islam being under attack, they argued, Muslims
everywhere were instructed to stand up for their faith.
88
This form of
instruction by high-level members appeared to be one of many factors that
effectively influenced Ahmad’s moral education. An additional influential
factor at play was the online realm. To illustrate, virtual interactions with
extremists in web forums (like Clear Guidance) served as influential forms
of instruction for Ahmad. There, Ahmad was frequently exposed to and
influenced by Muslims imparting extremist ideology.
89
Although these on- and offline sources of instruction were effective
methods of instruction for the leaders of the Toronto 18, other methods of
instruction were given to the recruits that may have also been effective. For
instance, the winter training camp, held by the terrorist cell, provided its
members with instruction that was meant to influence attendees’
propensities to gradually favour terrorism as a morally acceptable “action
alternative.” Various methods of instruction were given to attendees at the
training camp, the most notable of which included both lectures (halaqaat)
and Jihadi videos imparting extremist ideology. One video, for example, at
the training camp featured the former leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq as well as
“masked and armed mujahideen fighters and firing weapons” to instruct
attendees on the importance of fighting for their religion.
90
Together, the
lectures and videos generally sought to “encourage them [attendees] to fight
for Islam.”
91
As a result, those who attended the training camp (or at least
those who were aware of the “true” purpose of the camp) may have come to
believe that terrorism was an acceptable “action alternative” in response to
the atrocities committed against Muslims. In other words, the training camp
was an opportunity for the leaders of the Toronto 18 to influence attendees’
moral education by instructing them on the appropriate moral response to
the perceived oppression of Muslims.
Finally, the life histories of group members also situated them in
settings where their criminal propensities may have been reinforced.
87
Ahmad, ONSC at para 28.
88
Ahmad, ONSC at para 28.
89
Ahmad, ONSC at para 29.
90
Zakaria Amara, “R. v. Zakaria Amara Agreed Statement of Facts,” (2009): p. 13.
91
Amara, “R. v. Zakaria Amara Agreed Statement of Facts,” 2.
Chapter 3 – Criminological Perspectives 71
Ahmad’s religious background, for example, discouraged him from
questioning religious authorities and prevented him from thinking critically
about the nature of what was being taught to him. The elders at his mosque
“challenged his loyalty to the faith and said everything just short of ‘you are
not going to Heaven’ if he did not believe them wholly.”
92
Similarly, Amara
isolated himself in a “very tight circle” of like-minded Muslim peers, where
they were “sequestered from the refreshing currents of the broader Muslim
and non-Muslim community.”
93
As a result of being isolated in these
radicalizing environments, Ahmad and Amara’s morality was continuously
pushed toward accepting violence as an acceptable “action alternative.”
VI. SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION
A. Overview of Situational Crime Prevention
Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) is a primary prevention orientation
that is comprised of three main elements: (1) a theoretical framework, (2) a
methodology, and (3) a set of “opportunity-reducing” techniques.
94
First, the
theoretical frameworks associated with SCP include routine activities and
rational choice approaches.
95
Second, SCP methodology is characterized by
the “action research” paradigm, which provides a framework to collect and
analyze data, and to implement the findings from the analysis.
96
Third, SCP
seeks to inform prevention measures for specific crimes using opportunity-
reducing techniques that would reduce the rewards or increase the risk and
difficulties for offenders.
97
SCP techniques were later expanded upon by Cornish and Clarke who
developed 25 unique techniques, each of which falls under one of five
prevention themes: (1) increasing the effort; (2) increasing the risks; (3)
92
R v. Ahmad, 2010 ONSC 5874 (Evidence, Dr. Julian Gojer’s psychiatric evaluation of
Mr. Ahmad for sentencing), 2, Terrorismcases.ca.
93
R v. Amara, 2010 ONSC 441 (Evidence, Dr. Arif Syed’s psychiatric report regarding
amenability to treatment for Zakaria Amara), 6–7, Terrorismcases.ca.
94
See Ronald V. Clarke, “Situational Crime Prevention,” Crime and Justice 19 (1995): 91–
150.
95
Hsu and Newman, “The Situational Approach to Terrorism.”
96
Clarke, “Situational Crime Prevention.”
97
Clarke, “Situational Crime Prevention.”
72 MULTI-DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON THE TORONT O 18 TERRORISM TRIALS
reducing the rewards; (4) reducing provocations; and (5) removing excuses.
98
Each technique aims to prevent an offender from reaching their target.
Here, one of the most common techniques to increase the effort expended
by an offender is to use “target hardening,” such as tamper-proof packaging
on products.
99
B. Situational Crime Prevention in Terrorism Studies
SCP is adaptable to all forms of crime, including terrorism. In fact,
terrorism, according to SCP, is not necessarily distinct from other forms of
crime in that an explanation of it does not necessarily rely on an
understanding of a terrorist’s political, religious, or ideological
motivation.
100
Rather, SCP states that a more significant factor is
understanding a terrorist offender’s immediate motivations or the most
effective and efficient way to “reach and destroy the target.”
101
According to
Clarke and Newman, the most attractive targets to terrorists are those that
lie in close proximity to their base of operations.
102
Apart from this,
however, Clarke and Newman argue that terrorists commonly seek out
targets that are exposed, vital, iconic, legitimate, destructible, occupied, and
easy. Not only can SCP help to explain the targets of terrorism, but theorists
have also applied this framework to explain how terrorists choose their
weapons, using the acronym MURDEROUS (multipurpose, undetectable,
removable, destructive, enjoyable, reliable, obtainable, uncomplicated, and
safe).
103
SCP measures have generally been supported by empirical research on
terrorist attacks. Gruenewald, Allison-Gruenewald, and Klein, for example,
applied Clarke and Newman’s targets framework to eco-terrorism targets,
finding support for exposed, easy, and legitimate measures.
104
Gruenwald
98
Derek B. Cornish and Ronald V. Clarke, “Opportunities, Precipitators and Criminal
Decisions: A Reply to Wortley's Critique of Situational Crime Prevention,” Crime
Prevention Studies 16 (2003): 41–96.
99
See Cornish and Clarke, “Opportunities, Precipitators and Criminal Decisions.”
100
Hsu and Newman, “The Situational Approach to Terrorism.”
101
Hsu and Newman, “The Situational Approach to Terrorism,” 151.
102
Ronald V. G. Clarke and Graeme R. Newman, Outsmarting the Terrorists (Westport:
Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006).
103
See Clarke and Newman, Outsmarting the Terrorists.
104
Jeff Gruenewald, Kayla Allison-Gruenewald, and Brent R. Klein, “Assessing the
Attractiveness and Vulnerability of Eco-Terrorism Targets: A Situational Crime
Prevention Approach,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38 (2015): 433–55.
Chapter 3 – Criminological Perspectives 73
and colleagues also found that eco-terrorists often chose non-vital,
indestructible, and unoccupied targets.
105
A second study, which explored
successful and unsuccessful assassination incidents by terrorists, found
support for SCP measures in successful terrorist assassinations, including
the number of fatalities, weapon type, and proximity between terrorists and
their targets.
106
Another study explored the impact of “target hardening”
techniques on airplanes and U.S. embassies, finding that such measures did
not increase either the frequency or proportion of casualty attacks.
107
Lastly,
researchers studying the situational prevention of terrorism found that the
construction of the West Bank Barrier on the Palestinian-Israeli border,
alongside related security activities, was effective in preventing terrorist
attacks and fatalities.
108
C. Situational Crime and the Toronto 18
1. Target Selection
Members of the Toronto 18 placed significant value on one of the most
important features of a target according to Newman and Clarke’s SCP
framework: nearness. Proximity is crucial because it allows terrorists to
gather detailed information on the target to aid in their attack.
109
To
illustrate, despite naming Americans “the enemy,” members of the Toronto
18 instead chose Canadian targets located near Mississauga and
Scarborough – the group’s “separate suburban Toronto satellite
communities.”
110
Here, the terrorist cell was attracted to two nearby high-
profile Canadian targets: the TSE and the CSIS headquarters on Front
Street.
111
Additionally, members’ less concrete plan was to target Parliament
105
Gruenewald, Allison-Gruenewald, and Klein “Assessing the Attractiveness and
Vulnerability.”
106
See Marissa Mandala and Joshua D. Freilich, “Disrupting Terrorist Assassinations
through Situational Crime Prevention,” Crime & Delinquency 64 (2018): 1515–537.
107
See Henda Y. Hsu and David McDowall, “Does Target-Hardening Result in Deadlier
Terrorist Attacks against Protected Targets? An Examination of Unintended Harmful
Consequences,” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 54 (2017): 930–57.
108
See Simon Perry et al., “The Situational Prevention of Terrorism: An Evaluation of the
Israeli West Bank Barrier,” Journal of Quantitative Criminology 33 (2017): 727–51.
109
Hsu and Newman, “The Situational Approach to Terrorism.”
110
John McCoy and W. Andy Knight, “Homegrown Terrorism in Canada: Local Patterns,
Global Trends,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38 (2015): 263.
111
R v. Amara, 2010 ONSC 441 (Agreed Statement of Facts, R. v. Zakaria Amara), 6,
Terrorismcases.ca.
74 MULTI-DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON THE TORONTO 18 TERRORISM TRIALS
Hill in the close-by national capital of Ottawa. Members of the group
carefully chose these targets because each were located “near” their groups’
base of operations, despite naming Americans as “the enemy.”
In deciding on specific targets located near their base of operations,
members of the Toronto 18 selected the TSE and the CSIS headquarters
on Front Street because they were believed to be destructible – which is
another important component of target selection. For instance, during the
planned attack that members referred to as the “Battle for Toronto,” they
envisioned that a significant amount of destruction would occur against
their intended target. There would be “blood, glass, and debris everywhere”
from the buildings following the attack, according to members of the
terrorist cell.
112
The destruction of these buildings and the surrounding area would
have inevitably led to the death and injury of civilians. A high number of
casualties was an important objective of the group’s planned attack to
demonstrate their commitment to violence and their cause. As a result,
members chose targets that they knew to be “occupied” with civilians. For
instance, members chose buildings in downtown Toronto because they were
likely to be occupied with civilians and lead to mass casualties.
113
Armed
with information gathered from their “near” target, members of the
Toronto 18 decided to strategically detonate the bombs during a period
when the city was most likely to be densely populated with civilians. To
cause as many casualties as possible, the bombs would have been detonated
in the city centre at 9 a.m.
114
Yet another site, Parliament Hill, was targeted
so members could “go and kill everybody”
115
because it would be “occupied”
with government officials and politicians whom Ahmad would behead “one
by one.”
116
Although the “occupied” characteristic of downtown Toronto proved
to be an attractive feature of the targets, members of the Toronto 18 also
selected these targets based on their perception that they were “iconic” and
“vital” to Canada. First, the intended targets in downtown Toronto hold
112
Amara, Agreed Statement of Facts, 20.
113
McCoy and Knight, “Homegrown Terrorism in Canada.”
114
McCoy and Knight, “Homegrown Terrorism in Canada.”
115
Isabel Teotonio, “Toronto 18: In Search of a Safe House,” Toronto Star, July 3, 2010,
http://www3.thestar.com/static/toronto18/index.1.html.
116
Isabel Teotonio, “Toronto 18: Fahim Ahmad ‘The Ideologue’,” Toronto Star, July 3,
2010, http://www3.thestar.com/static/toronto18/index.1.html.
Chapter 3 – Criminological Perspectives 75
symbolic value to Canada. The CSIS building on Front Street, for instance,
is an iconic representation of the security of the nation. Second, not only
were the targets attractive because they were iconic, but they could also be
considered to be “vital.” Although the SCP framework normally refers to
transportation grids and electricity networks as “vital,” members of the
Toronto 18 envisioned that the attack would have an impact on what they
thought to be vital to Canada: its economy. For example, when the city of
Toronto would be “shut down” following the attack, Shareef Abdelhaleem
believed that the attack against the TSE would “close the stock exchange for
days.”
117
Abdelhaleem estimated the Canadian economy would, as a result,
“lose half a trillion dollars.”
118
Clearly, choosing destructible targets that are
vital to functioning society would help to clearly send the Toronto 18’s
message to Canadian and American governments while instilling fear
among civilians.
2. Weapon Selection
Members of the Toronto 18 chose certain weapons to effectively reach
and destroy their selected targets. First, members of the terrorist cell chose
a “destructive” weapon to effectively destroy their targets in downtown
Toronto. To illustrate, the powerful blast from the bombs located inside
rented U-Haul vans would not only cause significant damage to the targeted
buildings but also injury and death to the civilians inside the buildings – or
even those simply on their way to work.
119
Further, there is evidence that
members of the Toronto 18 wanted to exploit the destructive capabilities of
the bomb and maximize the destruction of “the whole building and the
surrounding three blocks” of downtown Toronto.
120
Here, Abdelhaleem
suggested using a two tonne, rather than one tonne, bomb outside of the
TSE.
121
Explosive tests from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)
that replicated the effects of the bomb blast only served to confirm the
terrorists’ cells’ potential to cause considerable damage to their intended
targets. In fact, the RCMP Explosives Disposal Unit determined that the
117
R v. Gaya, 2010 ONSC 434 (Agreed Statement of Facts, R. v. Saad Gaya), 9,
Terrorismcases.ca.
118
Gaya, Agreed Statement of Facts, 9
119
Isabel Teotonio, “Toronto 18 Attack was to Mimic 9/11,” Toronto Star, June 23, 2009
https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2009/06/23/toronto_18_attack_was_to_mimic_
911.html.
120
Amara, Agreed Statement of Facts, 20.
121
Amara, Agreed Statement of Facts, 20.
76 MULTI-DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON THE TORONTO 18 TERRORISM TRIALS
blast would “have caused catastrophic damage to a multi-storey glass and
steel frame building 35 metres from the bomb site, as well as killing or
causing serious injuries to people in the path of the blast waves and force.”
122
According to Clarke and Newman’s
123
MURDEROUS framework, the
Toronto 18’s choice of weapon was not necessarily easy, uncomplicated, or
obtainable. Although a bomb is a relatively destructive weapon, members of
the group required skills to create a bomb and a detonator, rendering it
relatively complicated. Since Amara wanted to create the bomb “with his
own hands,” it would require certain skills and materials to manufacture.
124
Having said that, the members of the group had to make sure the final
product was reliable.
125
As Abdelhaleem explained, “it would be terrible if
it doesn’t explode because they got the concentration wrong.”
126
Although
there is little evidence that members of the Toronto 18 tested the actual
bomb’s reliability or explosivity, the bomb’s detonator was tested multiple
times to ensure it would be functional on the day of the attack.
127
On one
occasion, Amara demonstrated the detonators functionality to
Abdelhaleem by dialing his cell phone, which caused “a spark from the end
of the wires that ignited matches, and burned the carpet.”
128
Eventually,
Amara configured the detonator so that members wouldn’t have had to be
so close to the bomb in order to detonate it. Amara claimed that “you could
call from anywhere and it will just explode.”
129
In addition, the chemicals needed to create such a powerful bomb were
not easily obtainable. Amara initially wanted to create the bombs out of the
more powerful material, “RDX2”, but since it was more difficult to obtain,
“he ruled it out and decided to use ammonium nitrate.”
130
In effect, Amara
had to sacrifice destructiveness for the sake of finding more easily obtainable
materials. There was also the question of how to store the quantity of
chemicals required to make the bombs. Members of the group identified a
nearby storage unit to house the material; however, the potential for security
cameras located near the storage unit increased the risk and difficulty of
122
Gaya, Agreed Statement of Facts, 34.
123
Clarke and Newman, “Outsmarting the Terrorists.”
124
Amara, Agreed Statement of Facts, 6.
125
Clarke and Newman, “Outsmarting the Terrorists.”
126
Gaya, Agreed Statement of Facts, 10.
127
Amara, Agreed Statement of Facts, 6.
128
Gaya, Agreed Statement of Facts, 11.
129
Gaya, Agreed Statement of Facts, 6.
130
Amara, Agreed Statement of Facts, 6.
Chapter 3 – Criminological Perspectives 77
storing the illegal material in this location. Here, although “Amara had
wanted to rent a storage unit for the chemicals... Abdelhaleem had told him
that was a stupid idea because storage units have security cameras.”
131
The
security cameras, then, produced a deterrent effect on members of the
group.
The Parliament Hill attack was to have taken a different approach than
the Battle of Toronto. Rather than engaging their target from a safe distance
like the Toronto plot, members of the group would need to be present to
reach their target at Parliament Hill. To take over Parliament Hill and reach
the politicians, Ahmad opted for the use of handguns. The handguns
selected by Ahmad offered a number of advantages to the group. For
example, they would have been relatively undetectable during the
Parliament Hill attack, capable of being concealed under clothing or in bags.
To obtain the handguns and ammunition required for the attack, then,
Ahmad instructed Dirie to travel to the U.S. “with the intention of bringing
them back to Canada illegally.”
132
Additionally, members would need to
receive weapons training and undergo military training exercises.
133
At a
training camp, members of the group were taught how to use guns. The
camp included “activities included firearms training and target practise with
a black 9mm handgun... shooting with an air rifle at various targets, mock
war games that involved paintball guns, marching and running through
various obstacle courses.”
134
As a result of this training, the use of guns
during the Parliament Hill attack was made “safer” and “uncomplicated.”
VII. CONCLUSION
The comparatively recent application of criminological perspectives has
provided useful insights into terrorism. Each of the frameworks identified
in this chapter advances our understanding of key aspects of this
phenomenon. General Strain Theory of Terrorism (GSTT), an extension of
general strain theory, highlights the effect that “collective strain” often plays
in the process of radicalization toward terrorism. Simply put, violent
extremism is predominantly a group-based phenomenon. Even so-called
131
Amara, Agreed Statement of Facts, 28.
132
R v. Dirie, [2009] O.J. No. 6526 (Agreed Statement of Facts, Ali Dirie), 1,
Terrorismcases.ca.
133
Ahmad, ONSC.
134
Ahmad, ONSC at para 5.
78 MULTI-DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON THE TORONTO 18 TERRORISM TRIALS
“lone wolves” are usually connected to some broader, often online, network
or community.
135
As Agnew
136
has posited, the collective strains experienced
by the members of the Toronto 18, in relation to their Muslim identities
and their identification with what they perceived to be oppressed Muslims
around the world, increased the likelihood of terrorism by increasing
negative emotions and reduced social and self-controls and their ability to
cope through both legal channels. Social learning theory illustrates the
importance of understanding the social context of radicalization to violence.
Terrorism, like any other social behaviour, is learned behaviour.
137
The case
of the Toronto 18 illustrates how the processes requisite to acts of terrorism
– including recruitment, the strengthening of group ties and kinship bonds,
and the learning of various terrorist techniques – led to the formation of
fledgling terrorist groups. Situational action theory (SAT) further adds to
the puzzle by focusing on radicalization to violence as a process of moral
education. Through training camps and both offline and online discussion,
group member propensities gradually came to favour terrorism as a morally
acceptable “action alternative.”
138
Finally, situation crime prevention (SCP)
alerts us to key facets of the commission of terrorist acts. Targets of
terrorism, and the weapons used in those attacks, are chosen with a
particular logic in mind,
139
and uncovering that logic would go a substantial
way toward assisting with the prevention of terrorism.
Given its complexity, to expect any single orientation to “explain”
terrorism would be unrealistic at best, foolhardy at worst. While this
exploration of the Toronto 18 clearly demonstrates that criminology has
much to offer in the way of theorizing about terrorism, much work remains.
First, other criminological approaches could fruitfully be applied to
terrorism. To give but one example, the life course perspective is potentially
relevant in this context. Second, the Toronto 18 case also points to the need
to establish broader connections between various criminological
perspectives. Just as theoretical integration continues to be a challenge for
criminology generally, so too will it prove difficult in the realm of terrorism
studies. Finally, more studies are needed to extend the application of
135
See Bart Schuurman et al., “End of the Lone Wolf: The Typology that Should Not Have
Been,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 42 (2019): 771–78.
136
Agnew, “A General Strain Theory of Terrorism.”
137
See Akins and Winfree, “Social Learning Theory and Becoming a Terrorist.”
138
See Wilkström and Bouhana, “Analyzing Radicalization and Terrorism.”
139
See Hsu and Newman, “The Situational Approach to Terrorism.”
Chapter 3 – Criminological Perspectives 79
criminology perspectives and to continue building the criminology of
terrorism.