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A Structure-Analytical View of the Relationship
between Social Capital and Deviant Behaviour
Benjamin Gröschl
Introduction
Deviant behaviour and the norms or rules of society, social relationships, the influence of peers as
well as the potential benefits and sanctions of deviant behaviour have been linked with one another
since the foundation of social sciences. These influences can be seen as specific forms of social
capital, as will be shown later. Social capital seems to be a relevant factor in explaining deviant
behaviour (cf. Savage/Kanazawa, 2002; Akçomak/ ter Weel, 2008). However deviant behaviour
only occurs in society through the reciprocal labelling of some behaviour as deviant behaviour. “We
should not say that an act offends the common consciousness because it is criminal, but that it is
criminal because it offends that consciousness. We do not condemn it because it is a crime, but it is
a crime because we condemn it” (Durkheim, 1997: 40).
Since the 1970s social capital slowly became a widely used theoretical and empirical concept in
sociological research (cf. Loury, 1977; Jacobs, 1961). Some perspectives in this context focus either
on social capital as a resource in the individual setting of opportunities or in a sense of collective,
primary-group bonded, trust, seen as a significant factor altering transaction costs in individual or
group-related trading acts (cf. Coleman, 1994; Putnam, 1993; Carpiano and Fitterer, 2014). Others
define social capital as the amount of economic capital or beneficial information one can acquire
through the individual social network (cf. Bourdieu, 1997; Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1982). From a
different point of view, social capital could be described as a function of a specific social structure.
In this perspective, social capital refers to the characteristics of reciprocal behavioural expectations,
their patterns and distributions. This attributes as some relevant characteristics the liability of social
norms, as well as the structures and power of social control, and the differences and developments
in punishing deviant behaviour to this theoretical conceptualization of social capital (cf. Durkheim;
Coleman; Portes, 1998).
Between different theoretical concepts and levels of analysis social capital appears as a container
with a very diffuse content. From the 1990s on, the expression “social capital” even became a
popular export from sociological theory into everyday language and political debates (cf. Portes,
1998: 1). It seems that “the point is approaching at which social capital comes to be applied to so
many events and in so many different contexts as to lose any distinct meaning” (Portes, 1998: 1).
But despite its current popularity and ambiguous usage, the meanings embodied in the term can be
traced back to the initial steps of establishing sociology as an independent field of science. So it
would be beneficial to analyse the concept of social capital in a structural manner.
This will show differences in the level of analysis and therefore the conceptions of social capital,
but also reveal similarities in the underlying axioms. Accordingly, it is constructive for cumulative
research to integrate the analytical structure of the different concepts of social capital and the ideas
or classical theories behind social capital in a common formal-mathematical model with respect to
the different levels of relevance and impact. Therefore, the following section starts with disclosing
the model-specific premises of individual behaviour. It attempts to show how a utility maximizing
and rationally acting individual, sometimes implicitly, builds the common ground of the different
concepts of social capital. Afterwards the simplest form of the structure-analytical model will be
extended and generalised to include more complex developments, such as social networks,
collective actors or norms, and these perspectives will be combined. As the most influential
concepts of social capital are described by Bourdieu (1997), Coleman (1973; 1974; 1994) and,
building on this, Putnam (1993; 1995), these three concepts will be used for integration in the
model (cf. Portes, 1998: 3-8). “The final source of social capital finds its classical roots in
Durkheim’s ([1893] 1984) theory of social integration” (Portes, 1998: 8). A synthetic integration of
these classical concepts of social capital in a one structure-analytical model is realised in this
section. This article continues with the formal integration of the structure-analytical model into a
generalised formal model of deviant behaviour and comes to an end with a conclusion.
The Emergence of Social Capital
To analyse the emergence and the development of social capital in a structure-analytical way, it is
expedient to reduce the initial formal model of social action to a minimal set of assumptions. This
article is therefore based on two premises. The first one is that people exist at all and they act
consciously and rationally in any way. If subjects are not able to act rationally, there is no
possibility of making a conscious choice and social life is either deterministic or completely
stochastic and sociologically unexplainable. “Between God and society lies the choice” (Durkheim,
2006: 246).
In other words: there are actors and events or acting-possibilities. Actors can control events by
choices and resources, but actors are also subject to the consequences of events (cf. Coleman, 1973:
1). The second premise is that actors have and need resources to achieve their interests, but the
different resources are distributed unequally and shape different individual opportunities of action.
Starting with physical differences between people or geographical factors and finishing with
economic conditions, cultural and educational differences or differences in the access to
information or technical infrastructure, the evidence of the second premise can be observed
everywhere. “Actors are not fully in control of the activities that can satisfy their interests, but find
some of those activities partially or wholly under the control of other actors. Thus pursuit of one's
interests in such a structure necessarily requires that one engage in transactions of some type with
other actors” (Coleman, 1994: 29). As a result, people have to trade their, not necessarily material
or economic, resources with others to achieve their own, not necessarily material or economic,
interests.
Figure 1: Symmetrical, synchronous and direct transactions. Source: author’s own.
These trading acts are initially unrelated to other trading acts, are non-recurrent and are not
influenced by norms or other social processes and are entirely selfish. “Self interest is a key driver
of human behaviour” (Keuschnigg/Wolbring, 2015: 97). But through the exchange of resources,
both sides can achieve benefits from these interactions. In fact, only interactions and exchange
relationships are carried out in which both sides benefit directly. In this system of social exchange
only actions with “rationality under certainty” (Coleman, 1994: 30) would be realised. The
transaction has to be symmetrical in the (subjective) value of resources. It also has to be
synchronous and direct (cf. fig. 1). Otherwise the outcome does not follow the action with absolute
certainty and risk occurs. Thus only trading acts with both actors and their resources together in a
face-to-face setting are carried out.
Through repeated trading acts, the system of interactions becomes more stable and reliable. “The
reproduction of social capital presupposes an unceasing effort of sociability, a continuous series of
exchanges in which recognition is endlessly affirmed and reaffirmed” (Bourdieu, 1997: 52).
“Repeated exchange over a period of time tends to encourage the development of a norm of
generalised reciprocity” (Putnam, 1993: 172). Reciprocal behavioural expectations emerge between
the actors and enable trading acts which are asymmetrical and asynchronous. “For the same reason
that exchange takes place among them easily, they take place frequently; being habitual, they
regularise themselves accordingly, and become consolidated” (Durkheim, 2006: 184). The repeated
success of the trading acts increases the subjective assessment of successes in further trading acts
(cf. Coleman, 1994: 97ff).
Asymmetrical and asynchronous transactions have to be described as decisions with “rationality
under risk” (Coleman, 1994: 30). One can give resources at T1 and receive only a promise of
getting resources in return at T2 (cf. fig. 2). On the one hand this enables more possible transactions
and also greater benefits because the trading act itself could be split into two separate, not directly
reciprocal actions. “The profits which accrue from membership in a group are the basis of the
solidarity which makes them possible” (Bourdieu, 1997: 51). On the other hand, through the timely
decoupling of the exchanges, transaction costs accrue. They reflect the leap of faith actor A makes
Exchange at T1:
Exchange at T2:
Figure 2: Asynchronous and asymmetrical transactions. Source: author’s own.
by giving resources to actor B without receiving any outcomes immediately (cf. Coleman, 1994:
91). Here, social capital could be seen as the (group-specific) validity of informal agreements,
which are shared between the members. In this view social capital creates reciprocal behavioural
expectations, a kind of mutual trust (cf. Coleman, 1988, 1994).
The Development of Social Capital
Under these premises, a system of mutual commitments and recognition arises (cf. Bourdieu, 1997:
52). On the one hand truthfulness becomes a highly-valued individual resource, on the other hand
the opportunities in realising one’s own interests increase with the amount of possible actors and
their resources. “In other words, the network of relationships is the product of investment strategies,
individual or collective, consciously or unconsciously aimed at establishing or reproducing social
relationships that are directly usable in the short or long term” (Bourdieu, 1997: 52). Failing to fulfil
the expected transaction would not be sanctioned directly, but may lead to exclusion from
prospective trading acts. This aspect of social capital could be described as an individual-based
exchange-network. “Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are
linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual
acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu, 1997: 51). Trading acts become more indirect because the
transaction costs decrease and enable exchanges mediated by third parties. Actor A gives resources
to actor B and B gives some to actor C, so A later receives the outcomes from C instead from B
directly. Trust becomes transitive and the network of reciprocal behaviour commitments grows as
well as the potential resources one can acquire through this network. Nevertheless transaction costs
will decrease because of the growing amount of experience in trading with other people and the
information provided through the network of trust. Solidarity (in the sense of acquaintance and
recognition) will be transferred from an attribute of a single exchange-partner to the network of
trust or the trading-group itself (cf. fig. 3).
In this context social capital “refers to features of social organization such as networks, norms, and
social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam, 1995: 66).
Since there are still some beneficial trading acts where the actors are not in the same exchange
network and trust is transitive within the group, these networks of trust are expansive. If actor A
needs some resources repeatedly from actor D to achieve his interests and no other network element
has had a trading act with D before, A has to start trading (synchronously, symmetrically and
directly) with D nevertheless. If A begins to trust D, because of the repeated success of the
individual trading acts, B and C will start to trust D as well. “Social networks allow trust to become
transitive and spread” (Putnam, 1993: 169). As a result, trust becomes more general and
dependencies become more impersonal. Therefore the conditions of membership become more
formal and the networks of trust grow further and further.
“Since a body of rules is the specific form which is assumed by spontaneously established relations
between social functions in the course of time” (Durkheim, 2006: 184), exchange networks based
on reciprocity and personal or group-bounded trust turn into institutionalised groups based on
formal rules and membership. “Every group has its more or less institutionalized forms of
delegation which enable it to concentrate the totality of the social capital, which is the basis of the
existence of the group […] to exercise a power incommensurate with the agent's personal
contribution” (Bourdieu, 1997: 53). “The collective personality must be thought of as something
other than the totality of individuals that compose it” (Durkheim, 2006: 245).
Figure 3: Network of trust. Source: author’s own.
The consequences of compromising trust are no longer only indirect sanctions like exclusion from
prospective transactions. Through the delegation of individual rights and resources to the
institutionalised group, they also get the power to impose sanctions for deviant behaviour (cf. fig.
4). In turn this reduces result uncertainty and, straightforwardly, transaction costs and creates a
competitive advantage in favour of the proprietor group, sometimes even in contrast to the public
interest (cf. Gambetta,1988,1993; Fukuyama, 1995, 2001). “The power of the corporate actor
relative to its environment may be sufficiently great to better realize his interests […] than he could
alone. Indeed, this is why a rational individual will join a collectivity and yield to it his individual
control over events” (Coleman, 1973: 6). The costs of becoming a member or of ending
membership vary a lot and can be very high.
Institutionalised groups also differ in the number and liability of their members, the conditions of
membership, their level of organisation and formalisation and their sanction capabilities. They
include families, associations and parties as well as trade unions, criminal gangs, companies and
nations (cf. Bourdieu, 1997: 53; Coleman, 1973: 3; Putnam, 1993: 172ff). They concentrate the
resources of the members into one acting person, the corporate actor. Institutionalised groups can
act as one person with the power of the social capital of the members, but they can use this power
also against deviant members to ensure the liability of the reciprocal behaviour expectations
between the members (cf. Coleman, 1974; Bourdieu, 1997). “The decision is between acting
independently with more freedom or collectively with more power” (Coleman, 1973: 3).
So if the power of the corporate actor or the institutional group fails to ensure successful trading
acts between the members, or trading acts which injure the group commitments but are more
profitable, the group could lose the common ground it is founded on and may decompose into
smaller networks of trust. This is because the transaction costs increase again and subsequently the
Figure 4: Institutionalised groups and corporate actors. Source: author’s own.
benefits of the membership shrink. As a result, the maximum amount of resources the single actors
are willing to invest in the group decreases and therefore the power of the corporate actor decreases
as well.
If the institutionalised group conserves its integrity, it could act like a person and therefore develop
its own networks of trust with other, single or corporate, actors and trade resources with them (cf.
Coleman, 1974). But it could also exclude other actors and groups from resources or trading acts or
define formal rules against special groups. Actors can be members of different groups with different
and even conflicting commitments, conditions of membership or benefits. “It is possible, for
example, that social capital in the form of social control may clash with social capital in the form of
network-mediated benefits” (Portes, 1998: 15). It depends on the power and liability of the groups,
the interests of the actor and the risk of detection of the deviant action which rules are affected. The
results do not have to be beneficial for other actors, like the state or neighbourhood-families, or
even for the society at all. The Mafia in areas of a weak government, criminal gangs in their urban
districts, but also subcultural groups, industrial lobby associations and monastic communities are
some examples (cf. Gambetta, 1993; Portes, 1998: 17f; Durkheim, 1982: 100), as well as states or
nations themselves. (cf. Bourdieu, 1997: 53f). “These corporate rights constituted further
emancipation from a hierarchical structure or the state, because corporate persons could and did
exercise power vis-a-vis the state” (Coleman, 1973: 2).
But there is also the possibility for individual and corporative actors to transmit the whole or even
Figure 5: Generalised trust and social norms. Source: author’s own.
parts of the valid commitments to other groups, actors or all human beings (Fukuyama, 2001: 14).
The less distinctive the in-group definition becomes or the more groups are included in the informal
or formal agreements, the more general validity the commitments get and, in the end, they become
social norms. From this viewpoint social norms are the institutional manifestation of the general
social capital, or in other words the “generalized trust” (Carpiano / Fitterer, 2014: 227) in a specific
society. Reciprocal behaviour expectations become generalised because the transaction costs, seen
as the transaction risk, sink below the costs of searching for information about the other actor.
Social norms decrease the transaction costs in the whole society, as long as they remain valid. So
the realisable benefits increase as well as the potential resources. The chance of “success in
overcoming dilemmas of collective action” (Putnam, 1993: 167) increases as well.
Through extending behavioural expectations from the institutionalised group to general images of
humanity or human nature, the liability of these norms no longer has to be ensured by the group's
power of sanction, but by the individual's belief in them. Social norms are therefore not external but
internal behavioural expectations of the actors themselves and all other possible actors. “A norm
may be embedded in a social system in a more functional way: The norm may be internal to the
individual carrying out the action, with sanctions applied by that individual to his own actions. In
such a case a norm is said to be internalized. An individual feels internally generated rewards for
performing actions that are proper according to an internalized norm or feels internally generated
punishment for performing actions that are improper according to an internalized norm” (Coleman,
1994: 243).
These norms could be seen as social capital on the macro-level of analysis or as a resource of
society. “In reality the duties of the individual to himself are duties to society. They correspond to
certain collective sentiments which it is no more permissible to offend when the offended person
and the offender are one and the same person than when they are two distinct individuals”
(Durkheim, 1997: 332). Of course, there are also social norms which additionally are group-covered
commitments. Then they will be sanctioned internally by the subject itself and through the group.
Deviant Behaviour and Social Capital
In the last section a structure-analytical model of social capital was developed out of parsimonious
premises and the classical theoretical concepts were synthetically integrated. It was shown that
social capital, as a widely used concept in social sciences, operates on different levels of social
order. At the individual based level, it could be described as a personal exchange network, which
alternates access to resources. Acquaintance and recognition over time build networks of trust and
group-bounded solidarity. Institutionalised groups, on the level of organisations and collective
actions, influence the benefits and success of trading acts between members and with others,
decrease transaction costs and can ensure the liability of behavioural expectations through
sanctions. On the structural or macro level, norms appear out of generalised behavioural
expectations or trust and images of human nature. They may become internalised and influence the
subjective costs, risks and interests of the actors directly.
To integrate the different influences of social capital in a formal-mathematical model of deviant
behaviour, it is necessary to analyse and separate the conditions which affect the personal decision
to perform a particular action. Deviant behaviour in this context can be described as every
transaction which offends any reciprocal behavioural expectations. These include expectations in
direct face to face interactions as well as generalised ones. “The approach taken here follows the
economists' usual analysis of choice and assumes that a person commits an offense if the expected
utility to him exceeds the utility he could get by using his time and other resources at other
activities. Some persons become "criminals," therefore, not because their basic motivation differs
from that of other persons, but because their benefits and costs differ” (Becker, 1968: 176).
As mentioned above, direct, simultaneous and symmetrical transactions could be described as
“rationality under certainty” (formula 1.0). EUj is the subjectively anticipated result of an action. Yj
is defined as the benefit that arises out of the specific action and Cj as the costs of it.
For a given set of actions, rational actors execute exactly the one which maximises the benefit or
minimises the costs to achieve their interests. Alternative actions, which could not be carried out at
the same time, are usually defined as opportunity costs (O). This is consistent with classical
economic theory (1.1).
“Rationality under risk” could be formalised analogically (1.2). Since the success of an action is not
certain, pj reflects the subjectively assessed probability of the success of an action and 1-pj the risk
of an unsuccessful transaction. In this case only the costs accrue. Uj is defined as the individual
utility function, which depends on the interest in the resources one can acquire. It reflects the
individual usefulness of the benefits.
In turn, deviant behaviour is defined as a non-reciprocal transaction. The costs that occur are
therefore the expected sanctions, not the resources which are supposed to be given away. As Becker
(1968: 177) explained, the subjectively expected benefits of a deviant act could be described as
where Sj is to be interpreted as the costs of the sanctions, or the punishment the individual expects
to receive, and pj as the probability of being discovered and punished. Analogically, the first part of
the term reflects the benefits of a deviant action without getting discovered.
On the one hand, individual and collective actions depend on structural boundary conditions, like
demographic factors, the infrastructural environment or regional specific resources and deficits.
They have impact on the benefits and costs of an action and restrict options for action in general.
Without telecommunication networks there is no possibility of calling a service hotline and without
a pavement you cannot sweep it, even though you can build one. So structural boundary conditions
(SB) take effect on the utility function and the benefits of a transaction and also restrict the options
for action and therefore the opportunity costs.
On the other hand, the benefits, costs and risks of actions depend on the individual resources (IR),
as well as the opportunity costs.
The varying functions of social capital, as described above, have different effects on different levels
of social order and affect the conditions of individual actions in several ways. For recent emphasis,
it is reasonable to integrate them separately into the model of deviant behaviour.
Deviant Behaviour and Personal Exchange Networks
Social capital, seen as the personal exchange network (EN), affects the individual decision to act
deviantly in two different ways. Firstly it modifies the individual opportunity costs. The resources
of the network make alternative trading acts possible, which would not have been possible without
it.
If one actor's interest is to have a bicycle to drive to work one day, the options for action are buying
one or becoming deviant and stealing one. But maybe it is possible, through the resources of the
exchange network, to borrow one from a friend.
Secondly, personal exchange networks, based on acquaintance and recognition, could increase the
costs of deviant behaviour and reduce the subjectively expected benefits of the deviant action. The
group may withdraw its confidence and exclude the deviant actor from further trading acts. So the
actor’s personal resources could decrease. But the action would not necessarily be marked as
deviant. On the one hand there are no exact formal rules of expected behaviour in exchange
networks and maybe the indirect sanction through exclusion from future actions is costly for the
group, because they lose resources as well. On the other hand the deviant action must be discovered
by the group in the first place to enable reactions. This influence therefore has to be modelled as
“rationality under risk”.
In this case pk reflects the risk of indirect sanctions or costs through the exchange network. The
formal integration of 3.0 and 3.1 follows in 3.2.
Deviant Behaviour and Institutionalised Groups
Institutionalised groups (IG) are based on membership and formal rules. Deviant behaviour which
injures the commitments of the group could be sanctioned directly by the group's power. Sanctions
which are only anticipated future restrictions, like the ones provided through exchange networks,
underlie stronger psychological valuation effects than sanctions directly linked to the deviant action.
Instead of restrictions in further trading acts, the sanction through the institutionalised group has
direct effects on the costs of action, which depend on the sanction probability or the risk of getting
discovered. More precisely, pl is defined as the subjective estimated risk of getting sanctioned. As
actors are members of different institutionalised groups, there are several independent, and in some
cases even diverging, sanctions.
Deviant Behaviour and Norms
Norms arise out of generalised reciprocal behavioural expectations. Institutionalised groups expand
the liability of their rules of behaviour to other actors, groups or the whole of humanity. Indeed,
they could have the power to punish even non-members for breaking their rules. Injuring norms of
reciprocal behaviour expectations produce costs if it gets discovered because it could be sanctioned
by corporate actors. Additionally some reciprocal behavioural expectations attain internal validity.
The actor believes in these norms and generalises the sphere of validity to human nature, including
himself. As there are two different mechanisms to ensure the liability of norms, they have to be
modelled separately.
On the one hand, there are commitments of liability which are not valid from the actor’s point of
view, but these norms are externally valid (NE). The individual need not believe in them or even
accept them or their validity, nonetheless the deviant behaviour has a probability of getting
sanctioned. This increases the costs of a deviant action. In the formal model they could be treated
like the other sanction costs from institutionalised groups. The only difference is the group-
membership of the actor.
On the other hand, social norms can get internalised (NI). They need no longer be ensured by
external sanctions, but the actor will punish this kind of deviant behaviour himself immediately, as
described earlier. Therefore, they must not be modelled as “rationality under risk”, but as
“rationality under certainty”. The sanction does not depend on the probability of being discovered,
because the actor always detects his own actions. Internalised norms increase the costs of a deviant
behaviour and these costs always occur.
The sanction costs of internalised social norms therefore not only appear in one term of the model.
They occur on both sides of the formal model, in the probability term with the anticipated sanctions
for deviant behaviour and the probability term without them, because they occur always. This
results in the formal model of individual deviant behaviour with the different influences of social
capital integrated (5.0)
Conclusion
In the previous section a formal model of deviant behaviour was developed based on classical
economic perspectives. The integration of the different variations of social capital into this model
has shown firstly, that exchange networks alternate the costs of deviant behaviour and the options
for actions. Secondly, sanctions of institutionalised groups and external norms could be treated
similarly in the model of deviant behaviour. They only affect the costs of an action. Thirdly,
internalised norms also affect the costs of deviant behaviour, but with certainty rather than probably
like the other sanction costs. Accordingly, there is a good case to believe that internal norms have a
greater effect on the individual decision to act deviantly than the other forms of social capital have,
assuming all other variables, including the sanction itself, are held constant. This is especially true
when the probability of the additional validity of these norms in some other institutionalised groups
and individual actors are taken into account.
The possibility of integrating additional factors into the formal model was also briefly discussed,
but it was not the aim of this article to examine all relevant factors which influence deviant
behaviour, there is still a need for further research and theoretical development. Structural boundary
conditions as well as the effects of different individual resources are some factors which could be
analysed in more detail.
To separate the influences covered in the container “social capital” analytically, it was necessary to
reduce the presumptions to a minimum and synthesise the initially mentioned classical perspectives
in a joint structure-analytical model. This issue was focused on in the first section. It was possible to
describe them as different but often intersecting parts that fit together in the same theoretical
framework. They all describe the emergence and development of social capital out of the same
premises: a rational subject, unequally distributed resources and exchange benefits. Nevertheless,
they differ in their structural level of analysis and their mode of action. It will be necessary to
discuss the distinguishable aspects of social capital in more detail. Furthermore, factors which
alternate the liability, the sanction costs, and the probability of getting discovered will have to be
exposed.
On the individual level, such indicators could be the density of the exchange networks, the
centrality of the actor and the stock of capital the network provides to him. “The volume of the
social capital possessed by a given agent thus depends on the size of the network of connections he
can effectively mobilize and on the volume of the capital (economic, cultural or symbolic)
possessed in his own right by each of those to whom he is connected” (Bourdieu,1997: 51). On the
level of corporate actors and institutionalised groups, there are suggestions to describe their
differences through the number of members, their degree of formalisation and their sanction
capability. There is also a lack of research of factors alternating the validity and internalisation of
norms.
Nonetheless, the model synthesises different sociological perspectives in one common model and
provides the possibility of integrating other concepts too. For cumulative research this could be
beneficial, as the influences on deviant behaviour could be modelled with even more detail and with
different focuses within the same structure-analytical model. Additionally, it creates the possibility
of integrating further empirical results or theoretical developments into the empirical or statistical
models.
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