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Truth feels easy: Knowing information is true enhances experienced processing fluency
Abstract
Information is more likely believed to be true when it feels easy rather than difficult to process. An ecological learning explanation for this fluency-truth effect implicitly or explicitly presumes that truth and fluency are positively associated. Specifically, true information may be easier to process than false information and individuals may reverse this link in their truth judgments. The current research investigates the important but so far untested precondition of the learning explanation for the fluency-truth effect. In particular, five experiments (total N = 712) test whether participants experience information known to be true as easier to process than information known to be false. Participants in Experiment 1a judged true statements easier to read than false statements. Experiment 1b was a preregistered direct replication with a large sample and again found increased legibility for true statements-importantly, however, this was not the case for statements for which the truth status was unknown. Experiment 1b thereby shows that it is not the actual truth or falsehood of information but the believed truth or falsehood that is associated with processing fluency. In Experiment 2, true calculations were rated as easier to read than false calculations. Participants in Experiment 3 judged it easier to listen to calculations generally known to be true than to calculations generally known to be false. Experiment 4 shows an effect of truth on processing fluency independent of statement familiarity. Discussion centers on the current explanation for the fluency-truth effect and the validity of processing fluency as a cue in truth judgments.
... Alternatively, the reversal effect observed for the incorrectly classified statements might reflect the fact that when participants disposed of no objective elements to determine whether a statement was repeated or new, truth judgments informed exposure judgments (i.e., "if I judged it true (false), it must be repeated (novel)", Nahon et al., 2021). Experiment 1, however, also introduced a potential confound. ...
... Along this line, one could argue that because repetition and truth correlate, the effect of one variable on the other is potentially bidirectional. If this is the case, then statement classification could also be influenced by the level of truth assigned to each statement (e.g., "if I judged it true, then it must be repeated"; see Nahon et al., 2021). ...
Past research indicates that people judge repeated statements as more true than new ones. An experiential consequence of repetition that may underly this “truth effect” is processing fluency: processing statements feels easier following their repetition. In three preregistered experiments (N=684), we examined the effect of merely instructed repetition (i.e., not experienced) on truth judgments. Experiments 1-2 instructed participants that some statements were present (vs. absent) in an exposure phase allegedly undergone by other individuals. We then asked them to rate such statements based on how they thought those individuals would have done. Overall, participants rated repeated statements as more true than new statements. The instruction-based repetition effects were significant but also significantly weaker than those elicited by the experience of repetition (Experiments 1 & 2). Additionally, Experiment 2 clarified that adding a repetition status tag in the experienced repetition condition did not impact truth judgments. Experiment 3 further showed that the instruction-based effect was still detectable when participants provided truth judgments for themselves rather than estimating other people’s judgments. We discuss the mechanisms that can explain these effects and their implications for advancing our understanding of the truth effect.
... According to a functional explanation, a true statement is more probably familiarone has more likely heard or read it beforeand fits better with a person's representational network of other statements compared to a false statement (see Unkelbach & Rom, 2017). Indeed, readers thought that the font in which a statement was written showed higher contrast to the background when they believed a statement was true rather than false, indicating that true statements feel more fluent (Nahon et al., 2021). Therefore, hearing or reading a statement fluently may signal truth. ...
... However, based on the similarity of our findings to the ones of Mattavelli et al. (2022), who experimentally manipulated and compared factual with instructed repetition, a causal effect of recognition on truth judgments seems plausible. Yet, this does not rule out a bidirectional relationship (Mattavelli et al., 2022;Nahon, 2021). That is, truth judgments might have also affected recognition judgments in our experiments, especially as the truth judgment always preceded the recognition judgment. ...
Repeatedly seen or heard statements are typically judged to be more likely true than statements not encountered before, a phenomenon referred to as truth effect. Similarly, statements judged to be old typically receive higher truth judgments than statements judged to be new. However, it is unclear whether and how this recognition-based truth effect depends on the latent memory states underlying observed recognition judgments. In order to investigate this question, we used a model-based approach to compare truth judgments as a function of recognition judgments ('old' versus 'new') and their underlying memory states (state of memory certainty vs. state of uncertainty). In three experiments, we observed a recognition-based truth effect and found this effect to be larger in the state of memory certainty than in the state of uncertainty. This result also replicated for subjective instead of modeled memory states. Moreover, we found effects of recognition judgments on judged truth to be stronger than effects of factual repetition in all three experiments. Taken together, our research highlights the role of episodic memory processes in the truth effect and provides a methodological tool that takes underlying memory states into account.
... In addition, the brand message from the no values-conditions also consisted of fewer components compared to the brand messages used in the other conditions since the value-statements were not used. This may have helped the processing uency of the no values-brand messages, increasing their attractiveness and effectiveness (Alter, & Oppenheimer, 2008;Nahon, Teige-Mocigemba, Reber & Greifeneder, 2021). These are interesting topics for future studies. ...
This study is based on research focused on the importance of values in marketing communication. It looks into the effects of self-transcendent values as used by purpose brands, in comparison to self-enhancement values. In this context, values are important life goals on which the attitudes and actions of people in various situations are based. The results of an experiment (N = 1000) set up to this end show that self-transcendental values are considered to be more important than self-enhancement values. Also, the use of self-transcendental values leads, both directly and indirectly, to stronger perceived product quality, a more positive brand attitude and increased consideration to buy than the use of self-enhancement values. The indirect and positive effect of values on the dependent variables is the result of mediation through consumer brand identi cation. The current study complements previous research conducted into the importance of different value types in consumer behavior and provides new insights into which value type is more bene cial for purpose marketing efforts.
Repeatedly seen or heard statements are typically judged to be more likely true than statements not encountered before, a phenomenon referred to as truth effect. Similarly, statements judged to be old typically receive higher truth judgments than statements judged to be new. However, it is unclear whether and how this recognition-based truth effect depends on the latent memory states underlying observed recognition judgments. In order to investigate this question, we used a model-based approach to compare truth judgments as a function of recognition judgments (“old” vs. “new”) and their underlying memory states (state of memory certainty vs. state of uncertainty). In three experiments, we observed a recognition-based truth effect and found this effect to be larger in the state of memory certainty than in the state of uncertainty. This result also replicated for subjective instead of modeled memory states. Moreover, we found effects of recognition judgments on judged truth to be stronger than effects of factual repetition in all three experiments. Taken together, our research highlights the role of episodic memory processes in the truth effect and provides a methodological tool that takes underlying memory states into account.
One view of heuristics is that they are imperfect versions of optimal statistical procedures considered too complicated for ordinary minds to carry out. In contrast, the authors consider heuristics to be adaptive strategies that evolved in tandem with fundamental psychological mechanisms. The recognition heuristic, arguably the most frugal of all heuristics, makes inferences from patterns of missing knowledge. This heuristic exploits a fundamental adaptation of many organisms: the vast, sensitive, and reliable capacity for recognition. The authors specify the conditions under which the recognition heuristic is successful and when it leads to the counterintuitive less-is-more effect in which less knowledge is better than more for making accurate inferences.
This open-access book examines the phenomenon of fake news by bringing together leading experts from different fields within psychology and related areas, and explores what has become a prominent feature of public discourse since the first Brexit referendum and the 2016 US election campaign. Thanks to funding from the Swiss National Science Foundation, all chapters can be downloaded free of charge at the publisher's website:
https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9780429295379
There is also an Amazon Kindle edition that's free of charge:
https://www.amazon.com/Psychology-Fake-News-Correcting-Misinformation-ebook-dp-B08FF54H53/dp/B08FF54H53/ref=mt_other?_encoding=UTF8&me=&qid=
People believe repeated statements more compared to new statements – they show a truth by repetition effect. In three pre-registered experiments, we show that repetition may also increase perceptions that statements are used as fake news on social media, irrespective of the factual truth or falsehood of the statements (Experiment 1 & 2), but that repetition reduces perceptions of falsehood when the context of judgment is left unspecified (Experiment 3). On a theoretical level, the findings support an ecological account of repetition effects, as opposed to either a fluency-as-positivity or to an amplification account of these effects. On a practical level, they qualify the influence of repetition on the perception of fake news.
Repetition increases belief in false statements. This illusory truth effect occurs with many different types of statements (e.g., trivia facts, news headlines, advertisements), and even occurs when the false statement contradicts participants’ prior knowledge. However, existing studies of the effect of prior knowledge on the illusory truth effect share a common flaw; they measure participants’ knowledge after the experimental manipulation and thus conditionalize responses on posttreatment variables. In the current study, we measure prior knowledge prior to the experimental manipulation and thus provide a cleaner measurement of the causal effect of repetition on belief. We again find that prior knowledge does not protect against the illusory truth effect. Repeated false statements were given higher truth ratings than novel statements, even when they contradicted participants’ prior knowledge.
The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has not only caused significant challenges for health systems all over the globe but also fueled the surge of numerous rumors, hoaxes, and misinformation, regarding the etiology, outcomes, prevention, and cure of the disease. Such spread of misinformation is masking healthy behaviors and promoting erroneous practices that increase the spread of the virus and ultimately result in poor physical and mental health outcomes among individuals. Myriad incidents of mishaps caused by these rumors have been reported globally. To address this issue, the frontline healthcare providers should be equipped with the most recent research findings and accurate information. The mass media, healthcare organization, community-based organizations, and other important stakeholders should build strategic partnerships and launch common platforms for disseminating authentic public health messages. Also, advanced technologies like natural language processing or data mining approaches should be applied in the detection and removal of online content with no scientific basis from all social media platforms. Furthermore, these practices should be controlled with regulatory and law enforcement measures alongside ensuring telemedicine-based services providing accurate information on COVID-19.
While there is an ample amount of consumer behavior research that recruits processing fluency as an explanatory construct, the question how to best measure the fluency experience has received little attention. Therefore, there is a lack of consistency in measuring the construct, particularly with regard to the use of single‐item versus multi‐item measures. The current research, thus, aims to investigate how processing fluency can be consistently measured across different experimental fluency manipulations and which type of measure has the highest validity. Based on classic scale development procedures, we propose a reliable and valid multi‐item measure and compare this measure against a single‐item measure in terms of predictive validity. We show that both measures mediate the effect of five established fluency manipulations and that the single‐item measure is sufficient. In addition to providing a measure for future research that can be adapted to different empirical settings, we provide empirical evidence on the replicability of fluency effects and on the theoretical conjecture that people have a uniform fluency experience across different manipulations of fluency.
Feelings and cognitions influence judgment through attribution. For instance, the attribution of positive feelings and cognitions to a stimulus leads to a positive judgment of that stimulus. We examined whether misattribution is moderated by the applicability of a distractor to the judgment question. For instance, when are people more likely to attribute to a target person the affective and cognitive experiences triggered by a kitten – when trying to judge the person’s cuteness or trustworthiness? The kitten triggers experiences specifically relevant to cuteness, but people might more easily suspect the kitten’s potential influence when judging cuteness rather than trustworthiness. Using the Affect Misattribution Procedure, we found that applicability increases the effect of misattribution on valenced judgments. The results emphasise the importance of specific information (rather than only general valence) in attribution and suggest that high applicability of distractors to the judgment question does not elicit effective correction.
Researchers often mention the utility and need for R-squared measures of explained variance for multilevel models (MLMs). Although this topic has been addressed by methodologists, the MLM R-squared literature suffers from several shortcomings: (a) analytic relationships among existing measures have not been established so measures equivalent in the population have been redeveloped 2 or 3 times; (b) a completely full partitioning of variance has not been used to create measures, leading to gaps in the availability of measures to address key substantive questions; (c) a unifying approach to interpreting and choosing among measures has not been provided, leading to researchers’ difficulty with implementation; and (d) software has inconsistently and infrequently incorporated available measures. We address these issues with the following contributions. We develop an integrative framework of R-squared measures for MLMs with random intercepts and/or slopes based on a completely full decomposition of variance. We analytically relate 10 existing measures from different disciplines as special cases of 5 measures from our framework. We show how our framework fills gaps by supplying additional total and level-specific measures that answer new substantive research questions. To facilitate interpretation, we provide a novel and integrative graphical representation of all the measures in the framework; we use it to demonstrate limitations of current reporting practices for MLM R-squareds, as well as benefits of considering multiple measures from the framework in juxtaposition. We supply and empirically illustrate an R function, r2MLM, that computes all measures in our framework to help researchers in considering effect size and conveying practical significance.
B. W. A. Whittlesea and L. D. Williams (1998, 2000) proposed the discrepancy-attribution hypothesis to explain the source of feelings of familiarity. By that hypothesis, people chronically evaluate the coherence of their processing. When the quality of processing is perceived as being discrepant from that which could be expected, people engage in an attributional process; the feeling of familiarity occurs when perceived discrepancy is attributed to prior experience. In the present article, the authors provide convergent evidence for that hypothesis and show that it can also explain feelings of familiarity for nonlinguistic stimuli. They demonstrate that the perception of discrepancy is not automatic but instead depends critically on the attitude that people adopt toward their processing, given the task and context. The connection between the discrepancy-attribution hypothesis and the "revelation effect" is also explored (e.g., D. L. Westerman & R. L. Greene, 1996).
Processing fluency—the experienced ease with which a mental operation is performed—has attracted little attention in educational psychology, despite its relevance. The present article reviews and integrates empirical evidence on processing fluency that is relevant to school education. Fluency is important, for instance, in learning, self-assessment of knowledge, testing, grading, teacher–student communication, social interaction in the multicultural classroom, and emergence of interest. After a brief overview of basic fluency research we review effects of processing fluency in three broad areas: metacognition in learning, belief formation, and affect. Within each area, we provide evidence-based implications for education. Along the way, we offer fluency-based insights into phenomena that were long known but not yet sufficiently explained (e.g., the effect of handwriting on grading). Bringing fluency (back) to education may contribute to research and school practice alike.
One of the frequent questions by users of the mixed model function lmer of the lme4 package has been: How can I get p values for the F and t tests for objects returned by lmer? The lmerTest package extends the 'lmerMod' class of the lme4 package, by overloading the anova and summary functions by providing p values for tests for fixed effects. We have implemented the Satterthwaite's method for approximating degrees of freedom for the t and F tests. We have also implemented the construction of Type I - III ANOVA tables. Furthermore, one may also obtain the summary as well as the anova table using the Kenward-Roger approximation for denominator degrees of freedom (based on the KRmodcomp function from the pbkrtest package). Some other convenient mixed model analysis tools such as a step method, that performs backward elimination of nonsignificant effects - both random and fixed, calculation of population means and multiple comparison tests together with plot facilities are provided by the package as well.
In the accompanying article (B. W. A. Whittlesea & L. D. Williams, 2001), surprising violation of an expectation was observed to cause an illusion of familiarity. The authors interpreted that evidence as support for the discrepancy-attribution hypothesis. This article extended the scope of that hypothesis, investigating the consequences of surprising validation of expectations. Subjects were shown recognition probes as completions of sentence stems. Their expectations were manipulated by presenting predictive, nonpredictive, and inconsistent stems. Predictive stems caused an illusion of familiarity, but only when the subjects also experienced uncertainty about the outcome. That is, as predicted by the discrepancy-attribution hypothesis, feelings of familiarity occurred only when processing of a recognition target caused surprise. The article provides a discussion of the ways in which a perception of discrepancy can coma about, as well as the origin and nature of unconscious expectations.
Despite the old adage not to 'judge a book by its cover', facial cues often guide first impressions and these first impressions guide our decisions. Literature suggests there are valid facial cues that assist us in assessing someone's health or intelligence, but such cues are overshadowed by an 'attractiveness halo' whereby desirable attributions are preferentially ascribed to attractive people. The impact of the attractiveness halo effect on perceptions of academic performance in the classroom is concerning as this has shown to influence students' future performance. We investigated the limiting effects of the attractiveness halo on perceptions of actual academic performance in faces of 100 university students. Given the ambiguity and various perspectives on the definition of intelligence and the growing consensus on the importance of conscientiousness over intelligence in predicting actual academic performance, we also investigated whether perceived conscientiousness was a more accurate predictor of academic performance than perceived intelligence. Perceived conscientiousness was found to be a better predictor of actual academic performance when compared to perceived intelligence and perceived academic performance, and accuracy was improved when controlling for the influence of attractiveness on judgments. These findings emphasize the misleading effect of attractiveness on the accuracy of first impressions of competence, which can have serious consequences in areas such as education and hiring. The findings also have implications for future research investigating impression accuracy based on facial stimuli.
An error was present in the Matlab code used to standardize the data matrix. Here the instruction is corrected.
What determines what we see? In contrast to the traditional “modular” understanding of perception, according to which visual processing is encapsulated from higher-level cognition, a tidal wave of recent research alleges that states such as beliefs, desires, emotions, motivations, intentions, and linguistic representations exert direct top-down influences on what we see. There is a growing consensus that such effects are ubiquitous, and that the distinction between perception and cognition may itself be unsustainable. We argue otherwise: none of these hundreds of studies — either individually or collectively — provide compelling evidence for true top-down effects on perception, or “cognitive penetrability”. In particular, and despite their variety, we suggest that these studies all fall prey to only a handful of pitfalls. And whereas abstract theoretical challenges have failed to resolve this debate in the past, our presentation of these pitfalls is empirically anchored: in each case, we show not only how certain studies
could
be susceptible to the pitfall (in principle), but how several alleged top-down effects
actually are
explained by the pitfall (in practice). Moreover, these pitfalls are perfectly general, with each applying to dozens of other top-down effects. We conclude by extracting the lessons provided by these pitfalls into a checklist that future work could use to convincingly demonstrate top-down effects on visual perception. The discovery of substantive top-down effects of cognition on perception would revolutionize our understanding of how the mind is organized; but without addressing these pitfalls, no such empirical report will license such exciting conclusions.
This chapter reviews the ecological validity of processing fluency; that is, the extent to which we can draw valid inferences about the external world by paying heed to our internal experience of fluency. As a proximal cue, fluency can help us navigate an uncertain world because it reflects the statistical structure of our environment. We can use the ecological connection between fluency and the world to inform our judgments and decisions. For example, retrieval fluency---the speed with which we retrieve objects from memory--- reflects numerical quantities of importance, the truth of statements, the danger of objects and social information about what other people are doing. We hope to complement our descriptive understanding of how and when people use fluency with an understanding of where fluency is an ecologically valid cue and where it is not.
Maximum likelihood or restricted maximum likelihood (REML) estimates of the
parameters in linear mixed-effects models can be determined using the lmer
function in the lme4 package for R. As for most model-fitting functions in R,
the model is described in an lmer call by a formula, in this case including
both fixed- and random-effects terms. The formula and data together determine a
numerical representation of the model from which the profiled deviance or the
profiled REML criterion can be evaluated as a function of some of the model
parameters. The appropriate criterion is optimized, using one of the
constrained optimization functions in R, to provide the parameter estimates. We
describe the structure of the model, the steps in evaluating the profiled
deviance or REML criterion, and the structure of classes or types that
represents such a model. Sufficient detail is included to allow specialization
of these structures by users who wish to write functions to fit specialized
linear mixed models, such as models incorporating pedigrees or smoothing
splines, that are not easily expressible in the formula language used by lmer.
Repeated statements are more frequently judged to be true. One position relates this so-called “truth effect” to metacognitive experiences of fluency, suggesting that repeated statements are more frequently judged to be true because they are processed more fluently. Although most prior research focused on why repetition influences truth judgments, considerably less is known about when fluency is used as information. The present research addresses this question and investigates whether reliance on fluency is moderated by learning experiences. Specifically, we focus on changes in the reliance on fluency over the course of time. A series of experiments reveals that fluency is more likely to be used in truth judgments when previous reliance on fluency has resulted in valid judgments, compared with when previous reliance on fluency was misleading. These findings suggest that reliance on fluency in judgments is a finely tuned process that takes prior experiences with fluency-based judgments into account. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Two studies to assess the strength of the “halo effect” of physical attractiveness on person perception examined the ratings of 24 male and female targets by 155 male and 155 female American college students. Both the first study and its replication indicate that the halo effect is much more limited than previously implied. However, three attributions, sexiness, femininity/masculinity, and liking showed a strong relationship to physical attractiveness, especially for female targets.
Evaluations of handwritten essays or exams are often suspected of being biased, such as by mood states or individual predilections. Although most of these influences are unsystematic, at least one bias is problematic because it systematically affects evaluations of handwritten materials. Three experiments revealed that essays in legible as compared to less legible handwriting were evaluated more positively. This robust finding was related to a basic judgmental mechanism that builds on the fluency with which handwriting can be processed. The present research further revealed that this evaluative bias is not inevitable but can be controlled for. Given the importance of evaluations based on handwritten work samples for individual success throughout school, college, university, and work life, it is important for individuals to be aware of this bias.
In semantic coherence judgements individuals are able to intuitively discriminate whether a word triad has a common remote associate (coherent) or not (incoherent) without consciously retrieving the common associate. A processing-fluency account for these intuitions is proposed, which assumes that (a) coherent triads are processed more fluently than incoherent triads, (b) this high fluency triggers a subtle positive affect, and (c) this affect may be experienced as a cognitive feeling and used in explicit judgement. In line with this account, it was shown that coherent triads (a) are processed faster than incoherent triads (Study 1), (b) serve as positive affective primes (Study 2), and (c) are liked more than incoherent triads (Study 3). When participants were provided with an irrelevant source of their affective reactions, they lost the ability to intuitively discriminate between coherent and incoherent triads (Study 4). Finally, an item-based analysis found that triads that are processed faster are liked more and are more likely to be judged coherent, irrespective of their actual coherence (Study 5).
Linear mixed-effects models (LMEMs) have become increasingly prominent in psycholinguistics and related areas. However, many researchers do not seem to appreciate how random effects structures affect the generalizability of an analysis. Here, we argue that researchers using LMEMs for confirmatory hypothesis testing should minimally adhere to the standards that have been in place for many decades. Through theoretical arguments and Monte Carlo simulation, we show that LMEMs generalize best when they include the maximal random effects structure justified by the design. The generalization performance of LMEMs including data-driven random effects structures strongly depends upon modeling criteria and sample size, yielding reasonable results on moderately-sized samples when conservative criteria are used, but with little or no power advantage over maximal models. Finally, random-intercepts-only LMEMs used on within-subjects and/or within-items data from populations where subjects and/or items vary in their sensitivity to experimental manipulations always generalize worse than separate F1 and F2 tests, and in many cases, even worse than F1 alone. Maximal LMEMs should be the ‘gold standard’ for confirmatory hypothesis testing in psycholinguistics and beyond.
Examined whether physically attractive stimulus persons, both male and female, are (a) assumed to possess more socially desirable personality traits than physically unattractive stimulus persons, and (b) expected to lead better lives (e.g., be more competent husbands and wives and more successful occupationally) than unattractive stimulus persons. Sex of Subject * Sex of Stimulus Person interactions along these dimensions also were investigated. Results with 30 male and 30 female undergraduates indicate a "what is beautiful is good" stereotype along the physical attractiveness dimension with no Sex of Judge * Sex of Stimulus interaction. Implications of such a stereotype on self-concept development and the course of social interaction are discussed.
According to the processing-fluency explanation of aesthetics, more fluently processed stimuli are preferred (R. Reber, N. Schwarz, & P. Winkielman, 2004, Processing fluency and aesthetic pleasure: Is beauty in the perceiver's processing experience? Personality and Social Psychology Review, Vol. 8, pp. 364-382.). In this view, the subjective feeling of ease of processing is considered important, but this has not been directly tested in perceptual processing. In two experiments, we therefore objectively manipulated fluency (ease of processing) with subliminal perceptual priming (Study 1) and variations in presentation durations (Study 2). We assessed the impact of objective fluency on feelings of fluency and liking, as well as their interdependence. In line with the processing-fluency account, we found that objectively more fluent images were indeed judged as more fluent and were also liked more. Moreover, differences in liking were even stronger when data were analyzed according to felt fluency. These findings demonstrate that perceptual fluency is not only explicitly felt, it can also be reported and is an important determinant of liking. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).
Processing fluency, the experienced ease of ongoing mental operations, influences judgments such as frequency, monetary value, or truth. Most experiments keep to-be-judged stimuli ambiguous with regards to these judgment dimensions. In real life, however, people usually have declarative information about these stimuli beyond the experiential processing information. Here, we address how experiential fluency information may inform truth judgments in the presence of declarative advice information. Four experiments show that fluency influences judged truth even when advice about the statements' truth is continuously available and labelled as highly valid; the influence follows a linear cue integration pattern for two orthogonal cues (i.e., experiential and declarative information). These data underline the importance of processing fluency as an explanatory construct in real-life judgements and support a cue integration framework to understand fluency effects in judgment and decision making.
Following the 2016 US presidential election, many have expressed concern about the effects of false stories ("fake news"), circulated largely through social media. We discuss the economics of fake news and present new data on its consumption prior to the election. Drawing on web browsing data, archives of fact-checking websites, and results from a new online survey, we find: 1) social media was an important but not dominant source of election news, with 14 percent of Americans calling social media their "most important" source; 2) of the known false news stories that appeared in the three months before the election, those favoring Trump were shared a total of 30 million times on Facebook, while those favoring Clinton were shared 8 million times; 3) the average American adult saw on the order of one or perhaps several fake news stories in the months around the election, with just over half of those who recalled seeing them believing them; and 4) people are much more likely to believe stories that favor their preferred candidate, especially if they have ideologically segregated social media networks.
Mixed-effects models are being used ever more frequently in the analysis of experimental data. However, in the lme4 package in R the standards for evaluating significance of fixed effects in these models (i.e., obtaining p-values) are somewhat vague. There are good reasons for this, but as researchers who are using these models are required in many cases to report p-values, some method for evaluating the significance of the model output is needed. This paper reports the results of simulations showing that the two most common methods for evaluating significance, using likelihood ratio tests and applying the z distribution to the Wald t values from the model output (t-as-z), are somewhat anti-conservative, especially for smaller sample sizes. Other methods for evaluating significance, including parametric bootstrapping and the Kenward-Roger and Satterthwaite approximations for degrees of freedom, were also evaluated. The results of these simulations suggest that Type 1 error rates are closest to .05 when models are fitted using REML and p-values are derived using the Kenward-Roger or Satterthwaite approximations, as these approximations both produced acceptable Type 1 error rates even for smaller samples.
This chapter reviews the processing fluency theory of aesthetic pleasure and introduces a new account of socially shared tastes based on this theory. Processing fluency - or simply fluency - is defined as the ease with which information flows through the cognitive system. This ease of processing is affectively positive: People prefer things they can perceive or apprehend easily. This finding spurred the development of a processing fluency theory of aesthetic pleasure, a theory that helps explain why people find an artwork beautiful. Although beauty is not the only aesthetic quality, it was a prominent one in the history of aesthetics, and it remains an important notion in what laypeople think about art. The first part reviews the fluency theory of aesthetic pleasure, and evidence in its favor. The second part discusses challenges to the fluency theory: Some findings apparently contradict the fluency theory, and some theories put forward mechanisms that could be alternatives to fluency. Another central challenge for every theory of empirical aesthetics is the question: What does it tell us about art? The answer lies in the fact that artists can use disfluency strategically to express negative meaning, such as disorder, struggle, or meaninglessness. The final part combines the fluency theory of aesthetic pleasure with the sociology of taste by Pierre Bourdieu and presents a new account of culturally shared taste that explains how individuals within a culture or social class develop similar tastes and feel pleasure towards the same artistic objects.
Introduction Part I: Theoretical Foundations 1. The Elements of Epistemology 2. Skepticism 3. Knowledge 4. Justification: A Rule Framework 5. Justification and Reliability 6. Problem Solving, Power, and Speed 7. Truth and Realism 8. The Problem of Content Part II: Assessing Our Cognitive Resources 9. Perception 10. Memory 11. Constraints on Representation 12. Internal Codes 13. Deductive Reasoning 14. Probability judgments 15. Acceptance and Uncertainty 16. Belief Updating 17. Production Systems and Second-Order Processes Conclusion: Primary Epistemics and Cognitive Science Notes Illustration Credits Author Index Subject Index
The subjective ease, or fluency, that is experienced during the cognitive processing of information has a large impact on the outcome of the processing. Research on judgment in a variety of domains shows that such fluency effects depend less on the (absolute) level of experienced fluency than on the relative fluency—that is, the change in fluency or the deviation from the expected level of fluency. Changes in an internal state are often more noticeable and perhaps more relevant as a diagnostic cue regarding the environment than the absolute level of that state. Relative experience is therefore particularly informative and accounts for ease-of-retrieval effects as well as classic fluency effects such as the truth effect and the mere-exposure effect.
The influence of memory on the subjective experience of later events was investigated in two experiments. In one experiment, previously heard sentences and new sentences were presented against a background of white noise that varied in intensity. In a second experiment, a cue set of words was presented either before or after a target set that was embedded in noise. The cue set was either the same as or different from the target set. In both experiments, one of the tasks was to judge the loudness of the noise. The data show that subjects were unable to discount the contribution of memory to perception when judging the noise level. Subjects appeared to base their noise judgments on ease of interpretation of the message presented through noise, with differences in ease being misattributed to a difference in noise level. The advantages of subjective experience as a measure of memory, and the role of subjective experience and misattribution in confusions between cognitive and physical deficits are discussed.
Feelings of familiarity are not direct products of memory. Although prior experience of a stimulus can produce a feeling of familiarity, that feeling can also be aroused in the absence of prior experience if perceptual processing of the stimulus is fluent (e.g., Whittlesea, Jacoby, & Girard, 1990). This suggests that feelings of familiarity arise through an unconscious inference about the source of processing fluency. The present experiments extend that conclusion. First, they show that a wide variety of feelings about the past are controlled by a fluency heuristic, including feelings about the meaning, pleasantness, duration, and recency of past events. Second, they demonstrate that the attribution process does not rely only on perceptual fluency, but can be influenced even more by the fluency of conceptual processing. Third, they show that although the fluency heuristic itself is simple, people's use of it is highly sophisticated and makes them robustly sensitive to the actual historical status of current events.
Although frontline customer service employees play a vital role in many firms, their part in service delivery is often underappreciated. The interaction between frontline employees and customers creates an impression of what is to come in the service experience. A key question is whether this interaction spills over to other unrelated aspects of the business. We conduct a quasi-experiment across two medical clinics, one of which had its frontline employees trained to improve their interpersonal skills. We find that not only does the training create positive perceptions of the service provided by frontline employees, but also increases perceptions of service quality attributes not related to these employees. That is, customer perceptions of the interpersonal skills of frontline employees spillover to other service quality attributes. However, this spillover effect does not impact all service attributes uniformly; rather, it is restricted to only credence attributes which customers find difficult to evaluate. We term this a selective halo effect. This finding demonstrates that customer perceptions of the interpersonal skills of frontline employees extend well beyond the range in which they perform their expected duties. Our article builds on attribute evaluability theory and information economic theory by demonstrating the existence of a selective halo effect. Further, we develop a classification system that managers can use to predict which attributes are most likely to be influenced by a selective halo effect. We encourage managers to think of frontline employees as barometers of the business, and to invest in continued training for these key personnel.
Existing findings on the truth effect could be explained by recollection of the statements presented in the exposure phase. In order to examine a pure fluency account of this effect, we tested a unique prediction that could not be derived from recollection of a statement. In one experiment, participants judged the truth of a statement that had the same surface appearance as a statement presented earlier but contradicted it, for example “crocodiles sleep with their eyes open” one week after having heard “crocodiles sleep with their eyes closed”. We predicted and found that participants judged contradictory statements as being more false than new statements after a delay of only a few minutes, but judged them as more likely to be true after one week. In contrast to earlier findings, this result cannot be explained by accounts relying on recollection of the previously presented statements.
This vignette presents a brief review about the existing approaches for the post-hoc analysis of interactions in factorial experiments, and describes how to perform some of the cited calculations and tests with the functions of package phia in R. Those functions include the calculation and plotting of cell means, and testing simple effects, residual effects, and interaction contrasts, among other possibilities. They can be applied to linear and generalized linear models, with or without covariates, and to mixed or multivariate linear models for repeated measures experiments.
Experienced ease of thought generation was found to affect the impact of thought valence on attitude judgments. Participants generated either three or seven arguments that were either in favor or opposed to a specific issue. After generating three arguments, which was experienced as easy, participants' reported attitudes reflected the implications of their arguments, but this was not the case after generating seven arguments, which was experienced as difficult. In contrast, yoked participants who had read the arguments generated by the first group and consequently had lacked the subjective experience in thought generation were influenced more strongly by having been exposed to seven arguments rather than three. The results suggest that individuals use their subjective experience that accompany thought generation for the construction of their attitudes.
The stimulating commentaries by Huber (2004), Lee (2004), and Pham (2004) raised important questions. This response elaborates on some of their themes by addressing the assessment of naive theories, the role of expectations, the influence of metacognitive experiences on consumer choice, as well as parallels between different metacognitive experiences and moods. Receiving thoughtful and stimulating commentary from three of my favorite consumer researchers, whose work has influenced my own thinking, is a great privilege. In this response, I elaborate on some of the themes of their commentaries (Huber, 2004; Lee, 2004; Pham, 2004), although space constraints do not allow me to do full justice to their thoughts.
Experiments were designed to produce illusions of immediate memory and of perception, in order to demonstrate that subjective experience of familiarity and perceptual quality may rely on an unconscious attribution process. Subjects saw a short and rapidly presented list of words, then pronounced and judged a target word. We influenced the fluency of pronouncing the target through independent manipulation of repetition and visual clarity. Judgments of repetition were influenced by clarity (Experiments 1 and 2), but not when subjects knew that clarity was manipulated (Experiment 3). Conversely, judgments of clarity were influenced by repetition (Experiment 4). We interpret these symmetric illusions to mean that fluent performance is unconsciously attributed to whatever source is apparent and that feelings of familiarity and perceptual quality result when fluency is attributed respectively to past experience or current circumstances.
According to a two-step account of the mere-exposure effect, repeated exposure leads to the subjective feeling of perceptual fluency, which in turn influences liking. If so, perceptual fluency manipulated by means other than repetition should influence liking. In three experiments, effects of perceptual fluency on affective judgments were examined. In Experiment 1, higher perceptual fluency was achieved by presenting a matching rather than nonmatching prime before showing a target picture. Participants judged targets as prettier if preceded by a matching rather than nonmatching prime. In Experi- ment 2, perceptual fluency was manipulated by figure-ground contrast. Stimuli were judged as more pretty, and less ugly, the higher the con- trast. In Experiment 3, perceptual fluency was manipulated by presen- tation duration. Stimuli shown for a longer duration were liked more, and disliked less. We conclude (a) that perceptual fluency increases liking and (b) that the experience of fluency is affectively positive, and hence attributed to positive but not to negative features, as reflected in a differential impact on positive and negative judgments. 0