Religious Violence Through Lens of Cavanaugh's Theory: The Case of Burning Vihara in Tanjungbalai

Abstract

The incident of burning houses of Buddhist worship and destruction of ethnic Chinese dwellings in Tanjungbalai occurred on 29-30 July 2016. Local communities, regional leaders, security forces and some religious leaders considered this incident to be motivated by religious issues and ignored several other factors such as ethnicity, social political economy and so on, while many observers-academic, researchers, policy-makers, journalists, NGO workers, political commentatirs, among others- argues that religious violence analysis really motivated by material-based political interests, socio-economic reason, and others factor of secular ones and dismissed the religious framing of the violence. This research is based on Cavanaugh's theory that there is no purely religious or other ideological factor that is seen as dominant for the occurrence of violence. This article argues that religion plays a role in conflict dynamics in Tanjungbalai as an instrumental reason, but at the same time, attacks on Buddhist temples in Tanjungbalai are complex issues that do not purport to reveal the true state of affairs. What is apparent in riot in Tanjungbalai is competition from religion and secular factor including competition over public space, socioeconomic status, religious zoning are suggested as reasons why violent tension may exist in Tanjungbalai.

Full text

Intizar
Vol. 26, No. 1, Juni 2020
Website: http://jurnal.radenfatah.ac.id/index.php/intizar
ISSN 1412-1697, e-ISSN 2477-3816
Religious Violence Through Lens of Cavanaugh’s Theory:
The Case of Burning Vihara in Tanjungbalai
Mufdil Tuhri
Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, mufdiltuhri@gmail.com
DOI: doi.org/10.19109/intizar.v26i1.5787
Abstract
The incident of burning houses of Buddhist worship and destruction of ethnic Chinese dwellings in Tanjungbalai occurred
on 29-30 July 2016. Local communities, regional leaders, security forces and some religious leaders considered this
incident to be motivated by religious issues and ignored several other factors such as ethnicity, social political economy
and so on, while many observers-academic, researchers, policy-makers, journalists, NGO workers, political
commentatirs, among others- argues that religious violence analysis really motivated by material-based political interests,
socio-economic reason, and others factor of secular ones and dismissed the religious framing of the violence. This research
is based on Cavanaugh's theory that there is no purely religious or other ideological factor that is seen as dominant for the
occurrence of violence. This article argues that religion plays a role in conflict dynamics in Tanjungbalai as an
instrumental reason, but at the same time, attacks on Buddhist temples in Tanjungbalai are complex issues that do not
purport to reveal the true state of affairs. What is apparent in riot in Tanjungbalai is competition from religion and secular
factor including competition over public space, socioeconomic status, religious zoning are suggested as reasons why
violent tension may exist in Tanjungbalai.
Keywords: Religion, Violence, Cavanaugh, Tanjungbalai
Introduction
On July 29-30 2016 an incident burning
Buddhist temple occurred in one area in South
Tanjungbalai Subdistrict, Tanjungbalai City caused
3 monasteries, 8 Pagodas, and 2 offices get a horrible
damage (Gunawan, 2016). This event is interesting
to examine from the perspective of religious conflict.
Because there are indications (as will be explained
later) that local leaders, from the police and from the
religious community, have attempted to portray this
event as a form of criminal behavior, devoid of
religious, socio-political and racial motivation. We
know that some members of the community are local
Malay Muslims and the Chinese Buddhist
community, however do hold inter-ethnic prejudice.
We also know that strong economic disparities in
Tanjungbalai are like controlling economic resources
by a group of Indonesian Chinese encourage groups
to gather act violence under religious guise.
The Discussion begin with an introduction to
Tanjungbalai’s Democraphic and to the cultural
settings, giving particular attention to native
Indonesian people and Chinese culture including the
acculturation of chinese culture and the position of
Tanjungbalai as “Islamic City” rather than “Chinese
city”. It then turns to the wider reading of the
complexity of the riots includes an examination of
the political economy of the people of the Muslims
and Buddhists, the local tension between Chinese
and Muslim Malay in Tanjungbalai in the broad and
varied social field of Tanjungbalai.
How to deal with this such a violence? In the
discourse of social sciences, conflicts occur because
of many factors such as religious sentiments,
material interests, political motivations that interact
with each other, exaggerating and altering each of the
effects that may not appear on the surface. There is a
view that religion has a set of symbols and normative
ideological values that contain elements of violence
(Avalos, 2005; Jurgensmeyer, 2000; Kimball, 2002).
Kimball (2002) identifies signs that can be the reason
why religion is so important in shaping violence. In

Mufdil Tuhri
Religious Violence Through Lens of Cavanaugh’s
Theory: The Case of Burning Vihara in Tanjungbalai
10 Intizar, Vol. 26, No. 1, Juni 2020
line with Kimball, Avalos (2005) argues that religion
creates new scarcity based on unverifiable criteria or
illusions. Meanwhile, Juergensmeyer describes very
systematically how people commit acts of terror
based on theological and ideological legitimacy
derived from values in certain religious doctrines.
The main argument put forward by Jurgensmeyer
(2000) is that Religion becomes the dominant factor
that causes violence because in the holy book
religion and religious traditions there are values and
doctrines that invite the perpetrators to carry out
violence on behalf. The most popular idea of
Jurgensmeyer is the cosmic war.
While a more moderate view holds that religion
plays a role in several levels as a trigger for violence
(Appleby, 2012; Hasenclever & Rittberger, 2000).
Appleby (2012) divides the three categories (strong
religion, weak religion, and pathological religion) in
looking at the evaluation of religion and religious
agency as a factor that causes violence. Furthermore,
Andreas Hassenclever and Volker Rittberger (2000)
are suing important questions that are often
considered to be established in relation to the
relationship between religion and violence. They
argue that the problem when looking at the impact of
religion on conflict is when religion has its influence.
To answer this question, Hassenclever and Rittberger
provide an important perspective on the theory of
looking at the impact of faith on political conflict
which is formulated in three main areas, namely
Primordialist, Instrumentalist and constructivist.
Primordialists hold that differences in religious
traditions should be seen as one of the most
important independent variables to explain the
interaction of violence within and between nations.
Instrumentalists conclude that religious violence is
the result of economic and socio-political injustice.
When a change in society that leads to a collision is
a result of the distribution of power and the unjust.
Constructivist argues that in many situations,
religion is influenced by an alignment between the
perpetrator of good and the sinner. In many ways this
is influenced by the power of religious leaders.
Constructivists exist between primordialism and
instrumentalism. It considers social conflict inherent
in cognitive structures such as ideology, ethnicity,
religion.
If the above views emphasizes that in one
particular condition, religion plays a role or delegates
the violence. Therefore, the writer considers it
necessary to propose a new reading with the theory
put forward by Cavanaugh. According to
Cavanaugh, the idea of religion has a tendency that
causes violence is one of the essential constructions
of religion. The tendency to insulate between
religious violence and secular violence should be
avoided because it is unhelpful, misleading, and
mystifying. Cavanaugh proves that religious
violence is a myth. William Cavanaugh (2009, p. 17)
“examine three different, overlaping types of
arguments for the link between religion and violence,
and show how the argument fail”. For Cavanaugh
“there is no reason to suppose thet so-called secular
ideologies such as nationalism, patriotism,
capitalism, Marxism and liberalism are any less
prone to be absolutist, divisive and irrational than in,
for example, the biblical God” (2009, p. 55).
I tends to see the issue of violence as a complex
phenomenon. Nothing can be considered the
dominant factor in conflict or violence. Especially to
make religion an irrational reason for violence
without considering other factors. Such a view tends
to be essentialist in looking at the causes of religious
violence. In my opinion, the conclusion of
Cavanaugh's thesis is relevant to be used in
questioning the idea of secular and religious
separation. Cavanaugh concluded that there is no
difference between secular and religious ideas as a
cause of violence. So there is the potential for reading
to the phenomenon of conflict in a broader level.
The basic assumption of this research confirms
that religion influences the dynamics of violence
occurring in Tanjungbalai. In addition, this article is
not the sole source of violence. There are other
factors which can cause communal violence.
However, religion provides doctrines, ideologies,
rituals, symbols, metaphors, discourses that can
easily be used, misused, or manipulated by people
(such as actor of violence, agents or managers of
conflict and interest groups) immaterial interest (Al
Qurtuby, 2015, p. 314).

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Result and Discussion
1. The Brief Chronology of the Riots
Although news reports about the incident at
Tanjungbalai offer many perspectives of outsiders
about their first glimpse. According to Jakarta Globe:
the rioting on the Buddhist temples in Tanjungbalai,
a city near Indonesia's fourth-biggest city of Medan,
start on Saturday when resident were reportedly
angry at a woman of Chinese descent who allegedly
protested againts a mosque using loudspeakers to
broadcast calls to prayer in front of her house
(Fawnia, 2016). This view was agreed by many
people that the riots were based on the issue of voice
speakers protested by Chinese Indonesian women.
According to National Commision of Human Right
(HAM, 2016a) suspected the riot caused by a
resident of Tanjungbalai town who objected to the
volume of adzan voice from a mosque in front of his
house which then triggered the anger of the residents.
Meanwhile, North Sumatera Police spokeperson Sr.
Comr. Rina Sari Ginting said that riot occurred when
41-year-old Chinese chinese ladies identified as
Meliana, reprimanded and administrator of the Al
Makshum Mosque to lower microphone volume
(Gunawan, 2016). The meeting of Mosque officials
of Al-Makhsum and Meliana triggered tension and
forced the police to secure Meliana and her husband
at the police station. The mob was angry and pelted
Meliana's house and but the attempt to set fire to his
house was prevented by the police who were there.
According to Rina, the mob attempted to set ablaze
the vihara but the police managed to prevent them.
They could only pelt the house of wording with
projectiles, damaging it. This is the start of the
anarchic acts “People are angry then destroy the
Juanda Vihara located approximately 500 meters
from the house Meliana” (Gunawan, 2016).
Riot broke out in Tanjungbalai, North Sumatra
allegedly due to provocation done by unscrupulous
elements through social media. Mass emotion that
has been unstoppable again finally burned a number
of places of worship around the site (Panjaitan,
2016). At the same time, the masses began to gather
together, led by student group elements. Here, the
mass with students doing protest to the Chinese
women. Furthermore, the masses are encouraged to
order and had to disperse. Allegedly this mass
gathered due to information through social media
(facebook) posted by one of the activists (Panjaitan,
2016). This opinion was confirmed by The Chief of
National Police, General Tito Karnavian, suspecting
“the incident in Tanjungbalai was caused by
misscommunication. A person who is of minority
ethnic may have said some things that upset other
resident during azan” (News, 2016).
Explanation about the trigger of violence above
can be taken important factor that is religion in
general become symbolic and retoric factor
escalating the conflict in Tanjungbalai. However
religion in this case is only a symptom that tends to
see it as an instrument for provokating a widespread
issue in social media involving students and youths
who are active in cyberspace to engage in action.
2. Demographic Overview and Introduction to
Tanjungbalai Culture
The Province of North Sumatra (North Sumatra)
is one of the largest provinces in Indonesia in terms
of population and area. The largest city in North
Sumatra is Medan, as its capital. According to census
records, the population of North Sumatera reached in
2010 a total of 12,985,075 people. North Sumatra
also represents the diversity of its people in terms of
race, ethnicity and religion. Population of North
Sumatra recorded consists of various ethnicities such
as Batak (Toba, Pakpak Simalungun Karo and
Angkola), Nias, Malay, Java, Aceh, Minagkabau,
Tamil, Tionghoa, and several other ethnicities that all
spread throughout the region of North Sumatra
(Padang, 2011).
Among the areas that quite represent the
diversity of the people of North Sumatra is the City
of Tanjungbalai. The city of Tanjungbalai is a city
near Indonesia's fourth-biggest city of Medan.
According to the 2010 census, the data shows the
spread of tribes in Tanjungbalai consisting of 15.14%
Malay, Batak 42.56%, Minang 3.58%, Java 17.06%,
Aceh 1.11%, China 9.33%, Nias 0, 15%, Madura 8,
39%, karo 0.73%. While based on religion, the
population in the city of Tanjungbalai consists of:
81.99% Islam, 7.78 Protestants, 1.06 Catholics, 9.07
Buddhists, 0.08 Hindu, 0.02 others (BPS
Tanjungbalai 2010). These data show that the
demographic condition of the people in Tanjungbalai
is still dominated by Muslims. However, the spread
of religion is quite evenly distributed. For the scale

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Theory: The Case of Burning Vihara in Tanjungbalai
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of Indonesian society in general, the percentage of
religious minorities exceeding 5% can be considered
a unique diversity phenomenon in compare with
other regions in Sumatra.
Another important factor for depicting people in
North Sumatra is also the worker's level. Based on
the projection result, the population in Tanjungbalai
City in 2016 amounted to 169,084 people consisting
of 85,213 male and 83,871 female population with
36 households, 151 households spread over six
objects. 50.39% male (Balai, 2017b). The working
age population of 2015 in Tanjungbalai (15 years old
) is 110,888 of this amount 64.83 percent of them or
71,893 people are classified as labor and the rest are
classified as non-labor. Of 71,893 residents of the
city of Tanjungbalai which includes the labor, 64,659
people or 89.94 percent of whom work and the rest
of 7,234 people are open unemployment (Balai,
2017c).
According to the data of Tanjungbalai City's
public employment level In 2015, the most dominant
sectors absorbing labor in Balai Tanjungbalai are
from trade, hotel and restaurant sector,
ommunications and financial and services which
absorb 77.83 percent (86. 273 people) of the aged 15
and older who are employed, while the rest is
absorbed in the agricultural sector 6.02 percent
(6,672 persons) and the secondary mining and
quarrying sector, Industry, electricity, gas and water
and construction reach 16.11 percent (17,840
people). From the 2015 data show that most workers
have not/have not attended school/not/ have not
graduated from primary school. There are 29.17
percent (18,860 people) of high school education
workers, while diploma/university-educated workers
are a small percentage of 1.86 percent (1,200 people)
of the total working population. In total there are still
10.17 percent (6,576 people) workers who have not /
have not attended school/no/have not graduated from
elementary school (Balai, 2017a).
Looking at above data on the level of
community working in Tanjungbalai City, it shows
that the dominant workers are in the trade and
services sector. According to Irwansyah (2013, p.
163) the success of ethnic Chinese in doing business
and mastering the economy is unlikely to be offset
by indigenous people. The shipowner of “Tongkang”
is almost all Chinese, only one “Malay” has a
“Barge” ship, and even then there is only one
remained. Compared to Christianity, the jealousy of
Buddhism is stronger due to the Chinese domination
of the economy in almost every sectors. This fact was
also conveyed by Nasution (2005, p. 90) that in the
field of hotel service and Bengawan restaurant, the
fact shows that those are owned by the Chinese while
the native community as the worker. This note is
interesting that the dominance of ethnic Chinese who
controls trade shows that there is an economic
disparity in society.
3. A Suppression of the Religion and Race
The religious factor as the dominant cause of
violence is also recognized by Nasaruddin Umar
(Muslim Figures) in his interview with MetroTV. He
asserts there is an indication that inclusive Buddhism
is not represented by Meliana as a Buddhist
(Metrotvnews, 2016). Subsequently, Umar empahize
that the religious factor is more dominant as an
instrument for the violence. However Nasaruddin
also acknowledges that there is a geographical role
of coastal communities that tend to be heterogeneous
and open. This also make is more potential for
disputes (Metrotvnews, 2016). In line with that,
Suhadi Sanjaya (Buddhist figure) also emphasized
the role of religion as a motivator for peaceful life is
not work optimally. Sanjaya blame the religions as
the instrument factor for triggering inter-religious
conflict in community (Metrotvnews, 2016).
However, either Umar or Sanjaya do not show what
aspect of religion might tend to the conflict.
If the religious figure above emphasizes the
dominant religious factor causing violence, then this
opinion is also in line with the comments of the
Governor of North Sumatra in his interview with
Kompas TV (KOMPASTV, 2016a). Tengku
Governor Erry Nuradi revealed that riot occurred
because of a trigger caused by sentimental comments
from a Buddhist Chinese women against the volume
of azan in Muslim place of worship (Mushalla) near
her house (KOMPASTV, 2016b). This view
reinforces that the dominant factor in the form of
religious symbols such as mosques, muslim ritual
(prayer), azan as symbolic values in the Islamic
religion triggered the Muslim community to fight
againts other community.

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The above data show that the significance that
Buddhists have triggered the Islamic group's
offended so that Muslim-majority citizens in the area
play a role in making religious symbols and identities
the basis of the riot. This confirms that religion
becomes the frame of the violence. This fact is
confirmed by a circular of the Fatwa Commission of
the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) of North
Sumatera (North Sumatra) officially regarding the
blasphemy of Islam by Meliana in Tanjungbalai City.
In the first fatwa in 2017, the MUI of North Sumatra
established a religious blasphemy committed by
Meliana in the town of Tanjungbalai (Rahma, 2017).
However, what appears to be a religious war on is
closing analysis is not the only factor that can be
recognized as a trigger for conflict. Therefore this
simplistic and reductionist opinion is inadequate.
4. The Political and Economic Interest
Previous works on Tanjungbalai riot have
focused on the historical-social roots of violence,
highlighting how and why previously peaceful and
peaceful religious community conflicts are now
beginning to reveal symptoms of social vulnerability.
They argue that religion is used as a symptom, but
the act is really motivated by material-based political
interest and socio-economic reason. Among these
opinions is Surya (2017) which discusses the
problem of diversity in society that can cause
conflict. According to him, this complexity is not
only a matter of religion but also political affiliation,
economic motives, and different cultural
orientations.
Mulyartono et al (n.d.) asserted that there is a
hateful spin as the causes of hatred among the people
in Tanjungbalai. Mulyartono et al considered the
process of escalation of the conflict occurred due to
the hate and disguised spin that had been missed.
This study then argues that the hate spin is effective
because it is supported by a range of factors such as
previous conflict history, economic anxiety, social
interaction patterns other than primarily acts of state
actors.
A more explicit analysis by Fawnia (2016)
suggests, although on the surface it appears to be a
religious issue, more people suspect unrest due to
ethnic sentiment or economic inequality. He
reasoned that Tanjungbalai was closer to the
predominantly Chinese-Indonesian field. According
to Fawnia there are indications that the Chinese
population in Tanjungbalai that often employ local
people in their businesses indicates a general
economic gap. Chinese businessmen explain one
report that the fact is true that Chinese living in the
region are better than the indigenous people. This
view is simmilar with Harahap (2017) who
concluded that in this conflict, the economic interest
and power issues of each group play significantly to
optimize influence and control the relations between
groups. Basically, according to him, this is a struggle
of domination. Harahap here emphasizes the identity
politics as well as the political economy struggle.
Yew-Foong (2016) considers that at the social
level, low education, socio-economic stagnancy and
job-related inequalities also contribute as a factor to
unfavorable episodes as well. religion is used as a
protector of public reforestation for such vengeance.
Besides the fact factor of Chinese people's general
superiority in economic factors, as well as in other
parts of Indonesian society are starting to fear that
they will start to dominate politics as well.
To conclude, scholars of the Tanjungbalai
conflict have generally emphasized the political role
of state consitutional change on political oppurtunity
for citizens to have equal rights to gain political
positions in the government including previous
Chinese groups experiencing marginalization.
5. Local Muslim-Buddha Tension
Ethnic violence in Indonesia experienced
different symptoms post 1998 where rampant
violence in the name of religion as a veil of various
other factors behind (Schiller & Garang, 2002).
The issue at Tanjungbalai is not the first
time. In 2010 the comfort of Buddhists was disturbed
by several mass organizations who were acting on
behalf of the United Islamic Movement (Gerakan
Islam Bersatu) to demonstrate to the offices of the
DPRD and Mayor of Tanjungbalai. They urged the
government to bring down the Buddha Statue at the
Tri Ratna Monastery. they reasoned that the
existence of the statue does not reflect the Islamic
impression in Tanjungbalai City and can disrupt
harmony in the midst of society (Irwansyah, 2013, p.
162). Irwansyah pointed out that social conflict
occurred after the establishment of the statue of

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14 Intizar, Vol. 26, No. 1, Juni 2020
Buddha is the main factor that is streotype
dominating sentiment in a society where Buddhist
perceptions similar to China actually have the
potential to crack the Muslim-Buddhist social
relationship in Tanjungbalai. According to
Irwansyah (2013, p. 163), the political identity factor
is strongly characterized by the suspicion that ethnic
Chinese want to make Tanjungbalai a “Buddish
Chinese City”.
According to Mustagfirin (2012) when
commenting on the issue of Buddha statue decline
caused by two things that is because they are the
fourth largest tribe and control the economy.
Heterogeneous potentials affect the Malay and
Chinese conflict Islam vs Buddha. In Nasution's
(2005, p. 90) research, Bengawan's hotels and
restaurants are owned by Chinese and indigenous as
Chinese workers in Tanjungbalai, their numbers are
small but the economy is controlled by all of them.
This resulted in the magnificence of the Buddhist
temple buildings compared to the Great Mosque of
Tanjungbalai that had long been neglected. So there
is a tendency to strengthen local Muslim-Buddhist
tension in Tanjungbalai.
This historical factor further emphasizes that
there is a background conflict of dominance between
Islam and Buddhism in Tanjungbalai. The opinion
about the dominant factor that caused the conflict in
Tanjungbalai as an ethno-religious conflict was
raised by National Commission of Human Rights
(HAM, 2016b) report in 2016. Komnas HAM
believes that there has been destruction and burning
of houses of worship and homes ethnic hatred
(HAM, 2016c). Komnas HAM in this case further
strengthen the factor of ethnicity as the cause of the
destruction and burning of houses and houses of
ethnic Chinese worship.
Conclusion
There are indications that the unique conflict in
Tanjungbalai is no dominant factor. It seems clear
that there are emerging subjects who want to
articulate their identity to the public sphere. Not
because they have been dominated by the
government but an opportunity for them to fight.
This article acknowledges that there has been a
trigger to violence caused by religion that occurred
in Tanjungbalai in 2016. However, it is too simplistic
and reductionist to say that there is only one factor
that led to the event. This article concludes that the
riots on Tanjungbalai are nestled in a complex web
of local tension, religious differences, economic-
political interests, inter ethnic conflict and symbolic
representations including identity politic and also
roumors in social media.
I realizes that religion plays a role in triggering
for the conflict. The religious factor provides a
powerful and effective force in mobilizing the
masses from other collective identities as Scott
Appleby (2012, pp. 57–61) says that religious loyalty
is able to translate the religious identity and symbols
of society so as to ignore rational calculations, at the
same time religion are indeed manufactured or
invented within particular historical and political
contexts. If religion is recognized as influential in the
dynamics of violence, it affirms that religion is not
the only factor that causes violence, in other words
not the dominant factor in conflict and violence. If
religion becomes a trigger and a symptom of conflict
at the surface level then the same can also be to other
factors such as economic, political, social and so
forth. This is in line with what Cavanaugh (2011, p.
685) said that war and violence are not the struggles
between religion and secularism, but between the
two skewed visions of social order that are both, in
different ways, sacred.
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