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Open Letter
Call for a Comprehensive Investigation of the Origin of
SARS-CoV-2, if Possible with Chinese Government Participation
Embargoed for Release at 7 AM USA EDT on June 28, 2021
On June 12, 2021, World Health Organization Director General Dr. Tedros Adhanom
Ghebreyesus stated that the families of the many millions who have died from COVID-19
“deserve knowing what the origin of this virus is, so we can prevent it from happening again."
In line with this critical aspiration, G7 leaders released a joint statement on the following day
calling for “a timely, transparent, expert-led, and science-based WHO-convened Phase 2
COVID-19 Origins study including, as recommended by the experts’ report, in China.”
As scientists and science communicators who have called for a comprehensive investigation
into pandemic origins in three open letters earlier this year (#1,#2 and #3), we welcome these
statements and again call for a comprehensive scientific and forensic investigation into all
plausible origin hypotheses with unrestricted access to all relevant records, samples, and
personnel in China and, as appropriate, beyond.
All people and every nation, including China, have a direct interest in the origin of the pandemic
being identified and our greatest vulnerabilities being addressed. It is therefore particularly
unfortunate that no comprehensive investigation of all plausible origins has yet been carried out
and that none is currently planned.
For reasons articulated in earlier letters, we believe that the WHO-convened joint-study process
currently in place does not in its present form clear the bar of credibility due to grave structural
shortcomings (Annex A).
Although the WHO-convened joint-study has been called by many a “WHO investigation,” it was
neither led by the WHO nor intended to be an investigation. As Dr Tedros recently clarified,
“there is a misunderstanding. The [study] group came from different institutions and different
countries, and they’re independent. There were only two WHO staff who joined them. They
came up with their study.” The leader of this independent expert committee, Peter Ben
Embarek, has also repeatedly explained that the joint study process was neither an
investigation nor designed to be one.
Further, the Chinese government's well documented measures to hide records and prevent
Chinese experts from sharing critical information and granular data make it very clear that the
current process has no possibility, without significant changes, of fully and credibly investigating
all plausible origin hypotheses.
Because failing to comprehensively investigate pandemic origins puts everyone and future
generations at unnecessary risk, we call on world leaders to adopt a two-track approach for
ensuring the fullest possible investigation of pandemic origins.
---
p.1/8
The first track is to invite China to fully cooperate with an improved WHO-convened
investigation that is data-driven, independent, and meets essential conditions for a credible
process. Such an investigation should:
● Be based on an explicit mandate to fully investigate all plausible origin hypotheses,
including all plausible scenarios for both a zoonotic spillover (in the wild or at a farm or
market) and a research-related incident. It is important to note that a research-related
incident need not necessarily involve a non-natural virus, as multiple research-related
accidental infection scenarios are compatible with a virus that was collected in the wild
and not voluntarily genetically altered in a laboratory. These include researchers getting
infected on a bat sampling field-trip, researchers becoming infected while working in one
of the various Wuhan laboratories, and people outside laboratories becoming infected
due to an accidental pathogen leak from faulty wastewater treatment, an air filter failure,
or some other source of environmental contamination (Annex B);
● Be led by a multidisciplinary team of international experts with the expertise domains
necessary for an examination of both the zoonotic spillover and the research-related
incident pathways, such as virology, epidemiology, zoology but also traditional forensics
skills, laboratory audit experience, engineering skills, data acquisition and data analysis
skills;
● Avoid any conflict of interest and undue bias within the experts team, which may be
suggested by unsubstantiated statements and repeated dismissal of plausible
non-zoonotic origins or by previous strong research partnership with parties of interest;
● Empower the experts team to carry out a full scientific and forensic investigation, which
must include being given full access to all relevant records, samples, and personnel,
upon request (anonymized if necessary) and being able to hold confidential interviews
with Chinese experts without Chinese government oversight or control with the
assistance of independent translators; and
● Share raw data with international experts for further studies, whenever possible, for
constructive feedback and transparency.
Because these represent the most basic conditions under which any credible process can be
carried out, the full acceptance of all of these terms by the Chinese government should be a
necessary precondition for any next phase of the WHO-convened joint-study.
To prevent a situation where the negotiation and planning process is drawn out over many
months or even years, a firm deadline of two months following the articulation of these terms
should be set for their acceptance by Chinese authorities and for the commencement of a full
investigation on the ground in China. It is our sincere hope that, for the good of humanity, the
Chinese government will join such a comprehensive and science-based investigation process
as a full partner.
---
p.2/8
Should Chinese authorities not allow this type of comprehensive investigation within this time
frame, however, it would then be clear that a second track would need to be established,
under which groups of nations, coordinating around some other organization or mechanism,
should set up an alternative science-based and data-driven investigation.
Although the decision of how to best mandate and coordinate such an investigation should be
left to interested governments and partners, possible entities might include the OECD, G7, the
Quad, or other structures and institutions.
While this type of alternate investigation, by unfortunate necessity carried out without the full
participation of the Chinese government, would suffer from a lack of access to many important
records, samples, and personnel inside China, a great deal of highly relevant information could
still be gathered without the participation of Chinese authorities.
In fact, many governmental and individual investigators around the world have already gathered
and begun analysing significant amounts of relevant data. A well organized and concerted
effort, free of interference and drawing on all available information sources and involving a large
pool of experts, could well end-up providing unambiguous evidence supporting one particular
origin hypothesis or another.
An investigation carried out without the assistance of Chinese authorities should include:
● Careful testing and analysis of hospital samples and environmental samples from various
countries to better understand the initial emergence and the early spread of SARS-CoV-2
around the world;
● A thorough evaluation of the farm-animal and wild-life trades from South-East Asia to
China, and within China, and their potential roles in the pandemic;
● A detailed analysis of all the known coronaviruses related to SARS-CoV-2 to reconstruct
the evolutionary history of SARS-CoV-2 (its geography and its phylogenetic relationships);
● A systematic quantitative evaluation of the key features of SARS-CoV-2 in order to clarify
statements about its origin;
● A broad semi-quantitative assessment of the current weights of evidence in favor of each
possible scenario in order to foster a rational debate and help drive further research
efforts on key points;
● A systematic search for documents and missing information about key virus sequences,
including:
○ The main WIV database of pathogens, samples and isolates that was taken offline in
Sep. 2019 and never reinstated, and the other databases managed by the WIV
which were taken offline;
○ Materials from NCBI GenBank sequence database, including the emails exchanged
regarding the submission of the first genome sequence of SARS-CoV-2
(MN908947.1) by Zhang et al and made accessible on Genbank on 12th Jan 2020;
○ Materials from the GISAID database, including the virus sequence and metadata
associated with accession number EPI_ISL_402122, which is no longer available at
GISAID and which likely corresponds to an early COVID-19 patient;
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● The acquisition and review, in accordance with the joint statements in favor of a full and
transparent investigation by the United States and the European Commission, of relevant
communications, documents and data from the following parties:
○ North-American partners of the WIV:
- EcoHealth Alliance, in particular studies in Asia of pangolins trade and of bats.
- United States Agency for International Development (USAID), particularly with
regard to their work in China under the projects “PREDICT” and “PREDICT-2”,
and sampling collection in Asia;
- National Institutes of Health, especially regarding projects 1R01AI110964-01 and
2R01AI110964-06 entitled “Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus
Emergence”;
○ European partners of the WIV:
- European Commission, in particular the documents related to funds allocated to
WIV within the framework of Horizon 2020 and EVA-G, including those reserved
until the period of 2023, the correspondence with the WIV, plus the WIV interim
report which was mentioned by the European Commission;
- French research institutions (Inserm, Institut Pasteur, Fondation Mérieux),
regarding the documentation related to their cooperation established in 2014
with the WIV, and also the funds that were allocated to the WIV since;
● The inspection of documents (submitted manuscripts, submitted sequences, cover letters,
reviewers’ comments, authors’ replies) associated with the peer review process of the key
scientific articles listed in Annex C, which may recover additional data and relevant
information;
● The creation of a secure whistleblower program allowing for the safe sharing of
information from within China and abroad;
● The examination of the forensic evidence collected by intelligence agencies and Open
Source Intelligence specialists, including a detailed mapping out of key research teams,
their stated objectives, their work at the time of the outbreak, their means, and an
evaluation of the safety conditions within their laboratories, and any events of interest
within or around these laboratories.
---
While the Chinese government must be offered every opportunity to join a comprehensive
investigation into pandemic origins, it should not be afforded a veto over whether or not the rest
of the world carries out the fullest possible investigation.
The two-track process proposed here encourages China to participate in a comprehensive,
science-based, and data-driven investigation should it wish to do so, as other countries have
done before both with zoonotic outbreaks and laboratory-related accidents.
In the unfortunate case the Chinese government chooses not to join this process, however, a
thorough investigation into the origins of SARS-CoV-2 is still possible, has a realistic chance of
success, and must be pursued for the common good.
p.4/8
Signatories:
1. Parise Adadi, PhD candidate, Department of Food Science, University of Otago, Dunedin,
New Zealand (0000-0003-4724-9463)
2. Rahul Bahulikar, PhD, Senior Scientist, BAIF Development and Research Foundation,
Pune, India (0000-0002-0442-4607)
3. Colin D Butler, Honorary Professor of Population Health, Australian National University,
Canberra, Australia (0000-0002-2942-5294)
4. Jean-Michel Claverie, Professor Emeritus of Medicine, virologist, Aix-Marseille University,
France (0000-0003-1424-0315)
5. Fabien Colombo, PhD Candidate, Communication and sociology of science, MICA,
Université Bordeaux Montaigne, France
6. Virginie Courtier, Evolutionary geneticist, Research Director, Institut Jacques Monod,
CNRS, Paris, France (0000-0002-9297-9230) (Co-Organizer)
7. Francisco A. de Ribera, Industrial Engineer, MBA, MSc(Res), Data scientist,
(0000-0003-4419-636X), Spain
8. Yuri Deigin, Youthereum Genetics Inc., Toronto, Canada
9. Gilles Demaneuf, Engineer and Data Scientist, Auckland, New Zealand
(0000-0001-7277-9533) (Co-Organizer)
10. Richard H. Ebright, Professor of Chemistry and Chemical Biology, Rutgers University, USA
11. Yvette Ghannam, CEO of M.F. & E. Investigative Services. Doctor of Public Health
(Epidemiology) & MS Forensics Science & MA Biotechnology, USA (0000-0002-0919-1750)
12. Andre Goffinet, Professor Emeritus, University of Louvain Med School, Brussels, Belgium
13. François Graner, biophysicist, Research Director, CNRS and Université de Paris, France
(0000-0002-4766-3579)
14. José Halloy, Professor of Physics, Biophysics and Sustainability, Université de Paris,
France (0000-0003-1555-2484)
15. Sk.Sarif Hassan, PhD, Assistant Professor in Mathematics, Pingla Thana Mahavidyalaya,
West Bengal, India
16. Makoto Itoh, Full Professor, University of Tsukuba, Japan (0000-0002-4904-1466)
17. Bernd Kaina, Professor Emeritus of Toxicology, University of Mainz, Germany
18. Hideki Kakeya, Associate Professor, University of Tsukuba, Japan (0000-0003-3788-9133)
19. Milton Leitenberg, Senior Research Fellow,University of Maryland, USA
20. Kenneth Lundstrom, Ph.D., CEO, PanTherapeutics, Lutry, Switzerland
21. Rodolphe de Maistre, MSc engineering, MBA, France
22. Jamie Metzl, Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council, USA (Co-Organizer)
23. Kazunobu Oyama, Professor, University of Kanagawa, Japan
24. Giorgio Palù, MD, Professor Emeritus of Microbiology and Virology, University of Padova,
Former Head of the European and Italian Society for Virology, Department of Molecular
Medicine, Italy
25. Steven Quay MD, PhD, Formerly Asst. Professor, Department of Pathology, Stanford
University School of Medicine, USA (0000-0002-0363-7651)
26. Monali C. Rahalkar, Dr.rer.nat. Scientist D, Agharkar Research Institute, Pune, India
(0000-0003-0945-4378)
27. Rossana Segreto, PhD, Department of Microbiology, University of Innsbruck, Austria
(0000-0002-2566-7042)
28. Ángel Serrano-Aroca, Professor of Biotechnology, Universidad Católica de Valencia San
Vicente Mártir, Spain
29. Koichi Sumikura, Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Japan
30. Günter Theißen, Professor of Genetics, Friedrich Schiller University Jena, Germany
31. Jacques van Helden, Professor of Bioinformatics, Aix-Marseille Université, France
(0000-0002-8799-8584)
32. Roland Wiesendanger, Dr. phil., Professor of Physics, University of Hamburg, Germany
(0000-0002-0472-4183)
p.5/8
Annex A: Shortcomings of the WHO-China joint-study process
The main shortcomings of the joint-study process and its resulting Phase 1 report include:
○ The World Health Assembly mandate called for a joint study of “the zoonotic origin of the
virus” rather than a comprehensive investigation into all plausible origins, setting the stage
for a process predominantly focused around examining the natural origins hypotheses
with extremely little effort expended on a research-related accident;
○ The Terms of Reference (ToRs) for that essential process were negotiated behind closed
doors between China and the WHO, without known input from member states other than
China, and were only rendered public months after they were finalized;
○ The ToRs granted the Chinese government an effective veto over who could participate in
the international expert committee;
○ The selection process for the international expert committee was not transparent;
○ Several members of the international committee had significant conflicts of interest;
○ No provisions were made ensuring international experts had access to all relevant
records, data, and personnel;
○ The raw data was not provided to the international expert committee, including upon
request;
○ No provisions were made allowing Chinese experts the opportunity to provide confidential
input to international experts without fear of retribution by Chinese government authorities;
○ A mere 2 paragraphs in the 120 pages of the main body of the Phase-1 report were
dedicated to a possible research-related origin;
○ The likelihood of each scenario was decided by a show of hands in front of Chinese
government officials;
○ Multiple inconsistencies have been noticed in Annex D7 of the report and were listed in
the Supplement of our letter #2.
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Annex B: The three accidental infection scenarios
The laboratory-related accident hypothesis includes three scenarios of accidental infection
which were detailed in the Annex A of of our letter #3:
1. A researcher or assistant getting infected on a bat sampling site and bringing the infection
back to Wuhan.
2. A researcher, student or employee getting infected in one of the various Wuhan
laboratories known to be working on Bat Coronaviruses, typically at level P2 or P3 (a
Laboratory Acquired Infection - LAI). Examples of previous LAIs include:
○ Hantavirus outbreak at a College in Yunnan (China) in 2003, associated with
laboratory rats and lax safety practices (paper by Shi Zhengli et al)
○SARS LAIs in a Singapore P3 and a Taiwan P4 in 2003, fully investigated by the
WHO.
○ Several SARS LAIs at the top P3 in China in 2004, with a limited investigation from
which the WHO eventually dropped out.
○Brucellosis LAI in Harbin (China) in 2011 due to lax safety practices.
3. Someone outside of a laboratory getting infected due to an escaped pathogen, without
anybody in the laboratory itself being infected - for instance due to bad wastewater
treatment or to an air filter failure (a Laboratory Escape without LAI).
Examples:
○ Respiratory anthrax accident in Sverdlovsk (ex USSR) in 1979, covered up for
many years.
○ Foot and Mouth outbreak in Britain in 2007
○ Brucellosis outbreak in Lanzhou in China in Nov 2019
For the various scenarios about the virus (natural vs. product of research), see
Annex B of our letter #3.
p.7/8
Annex C: Scientific papers of interest
Here is a list of articles for which documents associated with the peer review process may help
retrieve additional data and information, for instance in relation to early sequences of
SARS-CoV-2 and to related viruses:
-Andersen et al. 2020,
-Calisher et al. 2020,
-Hong Zhou et al. 2020,
-Lam et al. 2020,
-Latinne et al. 2020,
-Li et al. 2020,
-Liu et al. 2019,
- Xiao et al. 2020
- Xiao et al. 2021,
- Zhang et al. 2020,
- Zhang & Holmes 2020,
- Zhou et al. 2020
Annex D: Previous Open Letters
Open Letter 1 (4-Mar-21): http://dx.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.26695.83368/1
Open Letter 2 (7-Apr-21): http://dx.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.25018.11206/1
Open Letter 3 (30-Apr-21): http://dx.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.18097.51041/2
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