Technical ReportPDF Available

Abstract and Figures

Milanez, B.; Magno, L.; Wanderley, L. J. (2021) O Projeto de Lei Geral do Licenciamento (PL 3.729/2004) e seus efeitos para o setor mineral. Versos - Textos para Discussão PoEMAS, 5(1), 1-32. O Congresso Nacional, junto com o governo Bolsonaro, vem avançando em pautas de desregulação ambiental. O Projeto de Lei (PL) 3.729/2004 aprovado pela Câmara dos Deputados, em maio de 2021, é uma dessas medidas e pretende institucionalizar, no nível federal, procedimentos de licenciamento menos rigorosos do que os atualmente existentes na legislação. O presente texto identifica algumas das prováveis consequências da aprovação do PL sobre o licenciamento ambiental do setor mineral. Argumentamos que a exclusão de empreendimentos minerários de grande porte e/ou de alto risco não se mostra como uma garantia de que não haverá considerável flexibilização do licenciamento de tais atividades no Brasil no médio prazo, uma vez que se trata de um interesse particular do governo e do setor. Ainda, indicamos que a flexibilização do licenciamento das atividades de mineração incluídas no escopo do PL, pequena e média operações, tenderá a gerar ainda mais impactos negativos para as comunidades e para o meio ambiente, tendo como consequência um aumento dos conflitos envolvendo as atividades de extração mineral. Além disso, indicamos que os municípios minerados e os Povos Indígenas ainda sem regularização de suas terras poderão ser gravemente impactados com as novas medidas.
Content may be subject to copyright.
O projeto mineral no Governo Temer: menos Estado, mais mercado
Versos, 2017, 1(2)
Textos para Discussão
The PL (Bill) 3729/2004 on
Environmental Licensing and its effects
on the mining sector
Bruno Milanez
Lucas Magno
Luiz Jardim Wanderley
v. 5
n. 1
Textos para Discussão
Bruno Milanez (Universidade Federal de Juiz
de Fora)
Lucas Magno (IF Sudeste MG)
Luiz Jardim de Moraes Wanderley
(Universidade Federal Fluminense)
Maíra Sertã Mansur (Universidade Federal do
Rio de Janeiro)
Raquel Giffoni Pinto (Universidade Federal
Ricardo Junior de Assis Fernandes Gonçalves
(Universidade Estadual de Goiás)
Rodrigo Salles Pereira dos Santos
(Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro)
Tádzio Peters Coelho (Universidade Federal
de Viçosa)
How to cite:
Milanez, B.; Magno, L.; Wanderley, L. J. (2021)
The PL (Bill) 3729/2004 on Environmental
Licensing and its effects on the mining sector.
Versos - Textos para Discussão PoEMAS, 5(1),
ISSN: 2526-9658
Versos aims at bringing
analytical texts that debate,
from the perspective of the
humanities, different aspects
of the mining sector. This
initiative seeks to stimulate
critical debate about the role
of this sector in local, regional
and national development in
the Brazilian contex.
The Politics, Economy, Mining,
Environment and Society
Research Group (PoEMAS) is a
multidisciplinary and inter-
institutional group formed by
academics who reflect on the
multiple interfaces between
the mining sector and society..
For more information:
The PL (Bill) 3729/2004 on Environmental Licensing and its effects on the mining sector
Versos, 2021, v.5, n. 1
The PL (Bill) 3729/2004 on
Environmental Licensing and its effects
on the mining sector
Bruno Milanez
Lucas Magno
Luiz J. Wanderley
The National Congress, jointly with the Bolsonaro government, has been advancing
their agendas of environmental deregulation. PL (Bill) 3729/2004 approved by the
Chamber of Deputies in May 2021, is one of those measures and aims to
institutionalize, at the federal level, licensing procedures less stringent than those in
current legislation. This paper identifies some of the likely consequences of the
approval of the Bill on environmental licensing in the mining sector. We argue that
the exclusion from the Bill of large and/or high-risk mining ventures is not a
guarantee that there will not be considerable loosening of the licensing of such
activities in Brazil in the medium term, since this is part of the agenda of the
government and the mining sector. Furthermore, we indicate that the loosening of
licensing of mining activities included in the scope of the PL, namely small and
medium operations, will tend to generate negative impacts on communities and the
environment. and in consequence an increase in conflicts involving activities of
mineral extraction. In addition, we indicate that municipalities with mining, and
Indigenous Peoples whose land-holdings have not yet been regularised, may be
severely impacted by the new measures.
Brazil, Mining Policy, Environmental licensing
The authors would like to thank Paul Robson (London Mining Network) for the support in preparing
the English version of this article.
PhD in Environmental Policy. Associate Professor at the Department of Industrial and Mechanical
Engineering and Graduate Programme in Geography at the Juiz de Fora Federal University.
Coordinator of the Politics, Economy, Mining, Environment and Society Research Group (PoEMAS).
PhD in Geography. Lecturer at the Federal Institute of Education, Science and Technology of the
Southeast of Minas Gerais, Muriaé Unit and at the Graduate Programme in Geography at the Viçosa
Federal University. Member of PoEMAS. E-mail:
PhD in Geography. Lecturer at the Geography Department at Universidade Federal Fluminense
(UFF) and at the Graduate Programme in Geography at the Rio de Janeiro State University.
Coordinator of PoEMAS. E-mail:
Milanez, B.; Magno, L.; Wanderley, L. J.
The aim of PL (Bill) 3729/2004 is to institutionalize, at the federal level, less
restrictive procedures, some of which are in practice already being carried out in
different states.
Although every mining activity can be considered to be highly polluting, the Bill
excludes only large and/or high-risk ventures. These categories do not have an
exact definition and, depending on the criteria, might represent only 12% of the
Regardless of specific legislation, future changes in the regulation of
environmental licensing of large and/or high-risk mining ventures may occur in
three ways:
taking into consideration Decree 10,657/2021, which established a policy of
support of environmental licensing of "strategic minerals" production projects,
imposing limited deadlines for licensing approval;
changing the classification system of IBAMA though the presidency of the
agency, reducing the classification of the degree of risk of mineral projects
modifying CONAMA's own standards, where the government has a majority.
The Bill puts in place new modalities of environmental licensing such as the
Single Environmental License (LAU), Environmental License by Adhesion and
Commitment (LAC) and the Corrective Operation License (LOC) - which
eliminate part or all of the phases of licensing and which authorise operations
that were unauthorised.
Authorizations through the Usage Guide, which have already been deregulating
the environmental licensing of small activities, may serve as justification for
reducing licensing requirements, when considering mining works as a simple
expansion of a project.
The Bill reinforces the use of mediation and conciliation instruments, such as the
of Conduct Adjustment (TACs), which have already proven ineffective in cases
of disasters caused by mining in Brazil.
The plan is to eliminate the need for environmental licensing for emergency
activities when the need arises for preventive and corrective measures arising
from the risk of failure of tailings dams, despite the institutional inability to check
the real risk of such structures.
Restrictions for the creation of conditions related to the execution of public
services may make it impossible to mitigate the impacts of the increased demand
for public services (health, safety, infrastructure etc.), arising from mining
PL 3729/2004 ignores Indigenous Lands (TIs) in the process of regulation, which
may affect more than 237 TIs in this condition (33%).
The PL (Bill) 3729/2004 on Environmental Licensing and its effects on the mining sector
Versos, 2021, v.5, n. 1
The approval of PL 3729/2004 by the Chamber of Deputies in May 2021 generated
a series of questions and criticisms by various organizations and entities. To a large
extent this was because it institutionalized, at the federal level, licensing procedures
that are less stringent than those currently in place. In this way, it would tend to
promote the implementation of potentially polluting projects and activities to the
detriment of environmental protection (ABA, 2021; ABRASCO, 2021; SBPC,
To understand the objectives of PL 3729/2004, it is important to look at the profile
of the rapporteur, Neri Geller, a deputy elected for the Progressives of Mato Grosso
(PP/MT). Geller has a strong connection with agribusiness; he is the coordinator of
the nucleus of soya producers of Lucas do Rio Verde (MT) and was vice president
of the Producers Association of Soybean Production of Mato Grosso (FGV CPDOC,
2021). In the Chamber of Deputies (Câmara dos Deputados, 2021b) he is part of the
Parliamentary Group for Armaments, Agriculture and Mining, but he is absent from
the Environmentalist Group. The interests to which Geller is linked tend to be against
what should be the core of environmental licensing: ensuring the maintenance of
environmental integrity a
Also, for the assessment of the impacts of PL 3729/2004, it is necessary to take into
consideration that its eventual approval will not necessarily mean an immediate
change in environmental licensing processes in Brazil. According to the Federal
Constitution, the Union, states and municipalities have common competence to
protect the environment and concurrent competence to legislate on protection of the
environment and the control of pollution (Brasil, 1988). So, according to the
legislation (Brasil, 2011), with some exceptions, the standardization and
implementation of the environmental licensing are largely the responsibility of state
Within this context, there is an understanding that it is the responsibility of the
Federal Government to establish the most general environmental legislation, with
states and municipalities preparing complementary and detailed regulations. Also
there is an understanding that, while respecting the formal competences, in case of
conflict between norms of different federative entities, the more restrictive rule
prevails (Figueiró and Colau, 2014).
Starting from this understanding, and because PL 3729/2004 is in many aspects less
restrictive than the legislation of many states, the Bill does not need to be
automatically put into practice. On the other hand, it should be expected that,
considering the low institutional capacity (and institutional vulnerability) of many
states (Scardua and Bursztyn, 2003), the flexibility created by this norm will trigger,
According to the legislation, it is the competence of the Federal Government to license projects and
activities: located in a border area; in the territorial sea, on the continental shelf or in the exclusive
economic zone; in Indigenous Lands; in federal areas, in two or more states; of a military character,
associated with the exploration and processing of radioactive material or that meet a specific typology
defined by an Executive act, such as oil exploration and extraction, large-scale energy generation and
transmission systems, among others (Brasil, 2011, 2015).
Milanez, B.; Magno, L.; Wanderley, L. J.
in the medium term, a ripple effect, and many states and municipalities will change
their environmental regulations to also make them more permissive and less
protective. To some extent, this movement is already provided for in PL 3729/2004,
in its 4th article Paragraph 1:
       
              
Based on these assumptions, the main objective of this text is to assess what are the
likely consequences of a possible approval of PL 3.729/2004 (in the form as
approved by the Chamber of Deputies in May 2021) for the environmental licensing
of mineral extraction activities
. In this text, we argue that the exclusion of large-
scale and/or high-risk mining projects is not a guarantee that there will not be
considerable loosening of licensing of such activities in Brazil in the medium term.
We also argue that looser licensing of mining activities included in the scope of the
Bill will tend to generate even more negative impacts for the communities and the
environment, resulting in an increase in conflicts involving mineral extraction
For the presentation of this argument, the text is organized into four sections, in
addition to this one (introduction). In Section 2, we describe and interpret the deletion
of some specific mining activities from the Bill. Then we discuss the creation of new
licensing modalities with special attention to their effect on the issuing of User
Guides (GU). Section 4 deals with a number of detailed points of PL 3729/2004 and
assesses how they may impact the licensing of mineral activities. Finally, the last
section presents some developments and possible practical scenarios for the Brazil
of this Bill is approved.
It should be noted that this is a preliminary text and, therefore, is not exhaustive and
should serve as a starting point for deeper debates about the interface between
changes in environmental licensing and activities of mineral extraction.
Among the different existing economic activities, mineral extraction receives a
different treatment in the wording of PL 3729/2004. Thus, in article 1, 3rd paragraph,
the Bill defines that:
    
According to the documentation available on the Chamber of Deputies website
(Câmara dos Deputados, 2021c), the different treatment for activities of mineral
For broader debates on the Bill, we recommend the assessments prepared by the Brazilian
Association of Anthropology (ABA, 2021) and by the Brazilian Society for the Progress of Science
(SBPC, 2021).
The PL (Bill) 3729/2004 on Environmental Licensing and its effects on the mining sector
Versos, 2021, v.5, n. 1
extraction was due to the Parliamentary Amendment 89, authored by the deputies
Rogério Correia (PT/MG), Júlio Delgado (PSB/MG) and Silva
              
   
Thus, it can be seen that, contrary to what had been proposed in the amendment to
PL 3729/2004, which excluded all mineral extraction activities, the rapporteur chose
to withdraw only a part of these activities. However, it should be kept in mind that
this differentiation between mineral activities, either by risk or by size, adopted by
the rapporteur is a novelty, at least in federal legislation, and contravenes the rules
in force.
For example, Law 6938/1981, which defines the National Environment Policy, after
the changes defined by Law 10,165/2000, established that the extraction and
treatment of minerals are activities with high polluting potential and high degree of
use of environmental resources and, as such, would depend on prior environmental
licensing (Brasil, 1981). At the same time, the CONAMA Resolution 001/1986 states
that the extraction of ore will depend on licensing by competent authorities, preceded
by an Environmental Impact Study and an Impact Environmental Report
(CONAMA, 1986). In addition, the CONAMA Resolution 237/1997 reinforced this
by saying that mineral prospecting with a Utilization Guide, open-pit mining,
underground mining and garimpo are subject to environmental licensing
(CONAMA, 1997). Therefore, current federal regulations consider all mineral
extraction activity as having high pollution potential and a high degree of use of
natural resources, regardless of their size or level of risk.
Furthermore, the creation of this differentiation for "large and/or high-risk activities"
is vague, since the Bill does not explicitly establish the criteria to be adopted in this
classification, which may generate a series of legal disputes on the subject.
For the analysis presented here, it will be adopted as a hypothesis that such
parameters would follow, at least for federal licensing, the MMA/IBAMA Ordinance
2231/2020 (MMA and IBAMA, 2020). This Ordinance was approved in the context
of the deepening of the ultraliberal model defended by the Minister of Economy
Paulo Guedes and is an offshoot of Law 13,874/2019, called the Declaration of
Economic Freedom Rights (Brasil, 2019b). This law established that there would be
a differentiated involvement and control by public bodies over the private sector,
according to the degree of risk associated with economic activities. At the regulation
stage of the Law, Decree 10178/2019 created the following typology:
Milanez, B.; Magno, L.; Wanderley, L. J.
The same decree established that specific entities would define proposed risk
classifications for different activities. In compliance with this requirement,
MMA/IBAMA Ordinance 2231/2020 was published, which established risk levels
for various activities. Table 1, in the annex, lists the risk classification adopted by
MMA/IBAMA for some of the main activities associated with mineral extraction.
Thus, activities that would be within the scope of the Bill and subject to a more
flexible licensing would be those considered to be of moderate or low risk. These
activities would include the raising of small dams, the installation of a Mineral
Treatment Unit (UTM) with small-scale dry treatment, small-scale underground
mining, small-scale open-pit mining of minerals, pipelines located in the internal
areas of the enterprises, among others (MMA and IBAMA, 2020).
However, this risk level analysis is still incomplete since, according to art. 3 of PL
3729/2004, the size would be defined by "dimensioning of the activity or enterprise
based on criteria pre-established by tCâmara dos
Deputados, 2021a). The MMA/Ibama Ordinance 2.231/2020 does not establish
objective criteria for a definition of small-scale in the context of a mine, a UTM, or
a dam
In mining there is no consistency in the way that size is defined in Brazil. As can be
seen in Table 2 (annex), different units of the federation adopt different criteria to
establish the size of extractive industries. Thus, it can be expected that, given this
situation, PL 3729/2004 will generate considerable legal uncertainty about which
projects would be included in its scope and which would still be licensed in
accordance with CONAMA rules.
At the same time, it is possible to imagine that, making conditions easier using the
regulations of PL 3729/2004, mineral extraction projects may be divided into
subprojects to meet the criteria of being small-scale. Alternatively, such projects may
be started at the maximum size of a small project and be later expanded. This kind
of project division may make the environmental licensing process even less
demanding, since "extensions" to projects tend to be treated less rigorously by the
environmental licensing bodies, because they have already caused the transformation
of the original environment.
Within this context, it should also be noted that the exception created by article 1 of
the Bill would exclude a tiny part of extractive projects. Heider (2019), based on the
classification criteria used by the National Agency of Mining (ANM), estimated that
in 2017, 135 large mines were in operation. 992 medium, 2750 small, and 5653 micro
projects. If a similar proportion applies to new projects, it can be concluded that the
rules of PL 3729/2004 may be adopted in the licensing of 88% of projects of mineral
The National Mining Agency (ANM) classifies dams into very small, small, medium, large and very
large size; however, more critical for environmental licensing would be to assess the Associated
Potential Damage (DPA). However, the MMA/Ibama classification disregards this variable. Data
from the ANM show that, concerning very small and small dams (with a volume of less than 5 million
m3) and of unknown size, there are 169 dams with high DPA, 147 with medium DPA, and also 442
dams which DPA is unknown (ANM, 2021a).
The PL (Bill) 3729/2004 on Environmental Licensing and its effects on the mining sector
Versos, 2021, v.5, n. 1
extract-sized projects, as
mentioned above, this percentage could be even higher.
A second issue that deserves further debate concerns the possible strategies to ensure
the change of licensing of "large and/or high-risk 
mentions the possibility of a specific law.
One possibility is that, at least for mineral extraction activities, this "law" has already
been created "in fact" from the publication of Decree 10,657/2021 (Brasil, 2021)
This decree established the policy of supporting the environmental licensing of
investment projects for "strategic minerals"
, and came in the wake of Law
13,334/2016, which said that state entities "have the duty to act" for these investment
pr             
         
indigenous, u
   sil,
2016). Thus, what might happen after such a Decree is that limited deadlines for
approval are imposed for the approval of the environmental licensing of projects for
Considering the growing precariousness of environmental licensing bodies, this
scenario can significantly reduce the rigour of assessing the viability of these
criteria close to those of PL 3.729/2004, since there has already been an effort by the
ANM, in partnership with IBAMA, and with the involvement of the Organization
for Cooperation and Economic Development (OECD), for the "downsizing" of the
environmental regulations for mining, as explained by former ANM director
Eduardo Leão:
           
For a more detailed discussion of Decree 10.657/2021 see Milanez (2019).
          
aluminium ore, cobalt ore, copper ore, tin ore, iron ore, phosphate ore, graphite ore, lithium ore,
manganese ore, molybdenum ore, niobium ore, nickel ore, gold ore, potassium ore, silicon ore,
thallium ore, tantalum ore, rare earth ore, titanium ore, ore of tungsten, uranium ore, vanadium ore
and platinum group ores (SGM/MME, 2021).
Milanez, B.; Magno, L.; Wanderley, L. J.
  
             
       
However, there are still other possible alternatives, in addition to the creation of a
specific law. Another strategy would be to change IBAMA's own classification
system, reducing the degree of risk of mining projects. In this sense, it should be
remembered that changing an ordinance is a prerogative of the president of IBAMA.
In September 2020, when the MMA/IBAMA Ordinance 2,231/2020 was signed, the
president of the institute was Eduardo Fortunato Bim who, according to Bragança
(2018), was critical of Three-Phase Environmental Licensing (LAT)
and the
requirement for compliance with conditions imposed on companies by
environmental licenses.
There is still a third possibility for future flexibility in the process of licensing of
mining projects, which could occur through changes in the CONAMA
standardization itself, as warned by Vervloet (2021).
In this sense, it is important to take into account that, in May 2019, there was a
restructuring of this Board, which went from 96 to 22 members, mostly in line with
Federal Government guidelines (Firmiano, 2020). In the current composition of
CONAMA, the federal government has eight seats, in addition to the presidency and
executive secretariat, the others being occupied by state governments (5),
environmental entities (4), municipal governments (2), business entities (2), and the
Federal Public Ministry (1), the latter not having the right to vote (CONAMA, 2021).
Therefore, the federal government, in coalition with the business entities, would not
find it very difficult to make any changes they wanted.
Therefore, the exclusion, at first, of mineral extraction activities that are large or of
high risk from PL 3,729/2004 does not guarantee that the licensing of such activities
will not change in the near future. Considering the current situation of prioritization
given by the Federal Government to the sector (Milanez, 2021), it is possible that
new initiatives are still adopted in the short or medium term to make the licensing of
projects that have so far been excluded more flexible and easier through this Bill.
PL 3.729/2004 (Câmara dos Deputados, 2021d) also brings new modalities of
environmental licensing, including the Single Environmental License (LAU) and the
Environmental License by Adhesion and Commitment (LAC); it still regulates the
License Corrective Operation (LOC).
The Three-Phase Environmental Licensing comprises the sequential issuance of the Preliminary
License, the Installation License and the Operation License.
The PL (Bill) 3729/2004 on Environmental Licensing and its effects on the mining sector
Versos, 2021, v.5, n. 1
The LAU would allow in a single step the installation, expansion and operation of a
project, and would establish the environmental conditions to be met without,
however, these being decisive conditions for obtaining the intended licence.
It would also approve the Environmental Control Plan (PCA), which details the
programmes, the projects and actions to mitigate, control and monitor the
compensation of the resulting environmental impacts; and the Environmental
Control Report (RCA), which should contain the data and general information of the
project and its impacts (Câmara dos Deputados, 2021d) which, in our view, would
replace Environmental Impacts Assessments (EIAs).
On the other hand, the LAC would authorize the installation, expansion and
operation of an activity or enterprise upon declaration of adhesion and commitment
of the entrepreneur (Câmara dos Deputados, 2021d). This is the modality that
researchers, organizations and environmental entities have called self-licensing
(ABA, 2021; SBPC, 2021). To support the granting of this licensing method,
according to PL 3.729/2004, it would be sufficient for the entrepreneur to present the
Enterprise Characterization Report (CER) with the technical information on the
installation and operation of the activity to the licensing agency. This report, in
addition to defining the contents of the necessary environmental analyses (a kind of
Terms of Reference) for projects that would pass through the LAC and that would
no longer be subject to EIA, would only be checked by sampling the information
sent by the entrepreneur without full surveys (Câmara dos Deputados, 2021d).
In relation to the LOC, intended for the regularization of activities that are operating
without a license, PL 3729/2004 in practice regularises environmental crimes
provided for in the Law No. 6905/1998, which provides for criminal and
administrative sanctions for actions and activities that are harmful to the
The LOC could also be by adhesion and commitment, which would leave it up to the
entrepreneur to regularize or not certain actions previously considered irregular. If
this is not considered possible by the environmental agency, the entrepreneur must
sign a term of commitment for the licensing, such as the Environmental Control
Report (RCA) and the Environmental Control Plan (PBA). As for the LOC for
activities or ventures considered of public utility, a specific regulation will define the
method of regularization (Câmara dos Deputados, 2021d). If the Bill is approved,
mineral extraction activities might be included in the latter case, based on Decree
9,406/2018 (Brasil, 2018).
It is also worth mentioning the possibility of two-phase environmental licensing,
which consists of the fusion of two licenses into a single one. This would be possible
for new enterprises or activities in the same area of direct influence of similar
ventures already licensed. Area of Direct Influence (AID) is understood to mean an
area affected by the geographic scope of the direct environmental impacts of an
activity or enterprise subject to environmental licensing (as defined in the
environmental study and approved by a competent body). For mining activity, this
could enable new pits and dams, for example, to be licensed in a biphasic way, if
they are not high risk and large, if a link can be established to a project already
operating in the same region.
Milanez, B.; Magno, L.; Wanderley, L. J.
As well as spelling out licensing methods provided for in PL 3729/2004, we are
interested in analysing its possible consequences for the mining sector, and
especially understanding its effects on the issuance of the Use Permit (GU), since, as
shown in Table 1 (Annex), the activities of mineral prospection with a GU, of any
size, are considered Risk Level II (moderate risk) and, therefore, would be subject to
the rules created by the PL.
The GU is provided for in Law No. 9314/1996 (Brasil, 1996), which modified the
provisions of the Code of Mines, established by Decree-Law No. 227/1967 (Brasil,
1967). However, the DNPM Ordinance 155/2016 (DNPM, 2016) which, later, was
amended by ANM Resolution 37/2020 (ANM, 2020b), brought significant flexibility
for issuing GUs. In general, the GU is an extraordinary authorization for extraction
of specific quantities of specified minerals (see Table 3 in the Annex) in authorised
areas before the concession to mine by the responsible agency.
The use of GUs incorporated, after ANM Resolution 37/2020, the permission to use
minerals of interest to the National Mining Plan - 2030 and/or related to government
economic strategies
. Its objective was to reduce the requirements for the start of
operations and speed up the processing of requests for the concession of mining,
which depended on obtaining a specific license.
The issuance of the GU is considered a binding administrative act, that is, there is no
Room for judgment about its value by the public servant and, once the requirements
are met legally, the public administration will be obliged to put it into????? effect,
without an actual inspection. It turns out that ANM Resolution 37/2020 waived the
need to present a previous environmental licensing protocol for the issuance of the
GU, maintaining the license only as a condition of its effectiveness (necessary to
ensure the effective extraction and validity of the GU). That is, the requirement of
environmental licensing for mining activities requiring a GU was put back in time
which, in practice, widens the existing time for extraction of certain minerals without
an environmental license. In this sense the speech by Eduardo's Leão, former
Director of ANM, is illustrative:
      
      
 
   
           
ANM Resolution 37/2020 amended §2 of Art. 102 of DNPM Ordinance No. 155/2016 to specify
the public policies whose observance is decisive in the application for issuing a GU. Among the
changes, it started to demand that: i) the area under analysis is in a situation of formalizing the activity
and strengthening of micro and small companies, following the National Mining Plan - 2030; ii) aim
to promote the development of small and medium mining; iii) is intended for the research of strategic
minerals (abundant, needy or with a future); iv) guarantee of supply of inputs for infrastructure works,
for agricultural development and civil construction; v) has investments in sectors relevant to the
Brazilian trade balance; and vi) relate to projects that promote the diversification of the Brazilian
export agenda and contribute to the trade balance surplus (ANM, 2020b).
The PL (Bill) 3729/2004 on Environmental Licensing and its effects on the mining sector
Versos, 2021, v.5, n. 1
      
In 2019, 1,450 GU were issued nationwide by ANM, the highest number since 1988.
Authorizations for this type of license have increased over the last two decades.
Substantial growth was identified in 2019, in the first year of the Bolsonaro
government, which, despite the fall in the previous year, remained at a high level, as
shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Use Permits issued between 1988-2020
Source: ANM (2021b)
An emblematic example of the gaps that already occur due to the use of GU can be
identified in the municipality of Itaituba (PA), in the case of the mining company M.
M. Gold Mining, known as Ghana Gold. According to the ANM (2021d), M.M. Gold
does not have any mining concession, only three requests for authorization to
. Associated with one of these requirements is a GU, published in March
2020. The company attracted attention because, in that same year while still
supposedly in the prospection phase, it reached the position of sixth largest mining
company in gold in the area, and 27th in the country, with a declared operation of
R$ 234 million (ANM, 2021c). Considering that the average gram of gold traded at
R$ 295.10, the company's extraction can be estimated at approximately 796 kg of
gold. That level is very similar to that of the mining company Serabi Gold, 907 kg
(Serabi Gold, 2021), which operates in the same municipality, but with state
environmental licensing and mining authorization in force. In June 2021, M.M. Gold
Cases 850.397/2016, 851.105/2020, 850.907/2021. Among these, two are in the exploration
authorization phase and, together, add up to 5,400 hectares (ANM, 2021d).
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025
Number of permits
Milanez, B.; Magno, L.; Wanderley, L. J.
has already become the highest value in gold operation in the area and 19th of the
Brazil (ANM, 2021c).
In this case, we are talking about an environmental flexibility that has already been
accepted by the ANM. At first an enterprise operating with this volume of extraction,
 
mine, nor should it work without a three-phase licensing issued by the State agency.
Situations like this may be even easier in the case of the approval of the
PL3729/2004. As we warned at the beginning of the text, it will not necessarily mean
an instantaneous change in the environmental licensing processes in Brazil, but it
can generate loosening of state and municipal norms. If the states and municipalities
follow the new licensing modalities (LAU, LAC and, above all, LOC) for the mineral
sector, they can be requested after the entrepreneur is already performing mineral
extraction in certain areas via GU. That is, from the ownership of the area and even
before the mining grant, mining companies, especially small ones, will be able to
extract a considerable quantity of specific minerals while awaiting environmental
licensing. Practices of this nature have already been taking place, not yet widely, in
some states and tend to generalize with the approval of the PL.
For example, in Minas Gerais, after the publication of State Law 21,972/2016 (Minas
Gerais, 2016), a mining company can start the licensing process and, upon obtaining
the Advance License or even the licensing protocol, it would be able to ask for a GU,
to later apply for concomitant licenses in two phases (LI +LO) or even in just one
phase (LP+LI+LO). There is also the possibility for companies to start extractive
activity with a GU and, subsequently, request an LOC.
Similarly, in 2020, the State Environmental Council of Pará regulated the licensing
procedure for the User Guide with issuance LP, LI and LO licenses in parallel
(COEMA, 2020). In the case of the state of Sã
License will lead to a Permit for Prospection and to a favourable opinion for the issue
of a GU " (CETESB, 2021).
In general, what we can see is that the flexibility of issuing the GU by ANM without
the proper environmental license, in line with the new modalities of licensing, could
significantly increase the social and environmental impacts caused by mining. On
the one hand, due to the low inspection capacity of the environmental agencies, it
widens the opportunitie
environmental licenses. On the other hand, even if the institutions work well, mineral
prospection could, with less difficulty, obtain a simplified license as it is considered
obtaining of the mining concession, it would be even easier to obtain another
shortcuts have been created for licensing of activities with high potential
for environmental degradation, without the studies necessary or evaluation by the
State or social participation (since the public hearings would also cease to take
place). Finally, the creation of these short-cuts (Mello, Martins, and Neffa, 2015)
could make environment licensing in practice difficult to understand.
The PL (Bill) 3729/2004 on Environmental Licensing and its effects on the mining sector
Versos, 2021, v.5, n. 1
In addition to more general issues, such as the definition of which activities of
mineral extraction are affected by PL 3729/2004 and the new modalities of licensing
using UGs, the PL is related to other aspects of the mineral sector. Throughout this
section we examine some of them, including the preferential adoption of mediation
and conciliation, the facilitation of the construction of pipelines, the special treatment
to emergency control activities, the restrictions on the requirement of conditions
environmental issues and the licensing of activities in Indigenous Lands (TIs).
Regarding the first point, the preferential adoption of mediation and conciliation, the
Article 2 IV states that:
            
         
           
The mediation and conciliation instruments, particularly the Terms of Adjustment of
Conduct (TACs), are already widely used in the relationship between environmental
agencies and companies in the mineral sector, having presented unsatisfactory
results, from the perspective of the affected communities. González (2019) identifies
that different Latin American governments began to adopt methods of conflict
resolution based on mediation and arbitration as a way of trying to deal with the
increase in conflicts between communities and projects that are mineral resource
intensive. He explains that such instruments would be legitimized by the discourse
          
Pinto, and Garzon
(2014), in turn, warn that the search for efficiency, effectiveness and speed in the
arguments in defence of negotiated resolutions of environmental conflicts does not
work out in practice. In this sense, Ferreira (2020) explained that the adoption of
these instruments tries to rule out the judicial sphere and reinforce the principle of a
minimal state (in line with neoliberalism). Thus, for the author, the main motivation
for the adoption of these instruments is a reduction of costs for companies and the
state avoiding full compensation for affected people. Thus, one of its results would
          
acceptance of the projects.
Within the history of Brazilian mining, the most emblematic example of failure in
the use mediation and conciliation instruments is the case of disaster in the Rio Doce
Doce River basin, involving the Samarco mining company. After the collapse of the
Fundão Dam, four main agreements were signed between companies, representatives
of the Federal Government and the governments of the states of Minas Gerais and
Espírito Santo, as well as Justice Institutions (Public Ministries and Defenders
Public). More than five years after the disaster, these agreements were unable to to
guarantee the minimum rights of the affected people, such as identification and
Milanez, B.; Magno, L.; Wanderley, L. J.
recognition of all those who are entitled to reparation, fair payment of indemnities
for moral and material damages and the definitive resettlement of those who lost
their homes (Milanez, Ali, and Puppim de Oliveira, 2021; Roland, Faria Júnior,
Mansoldo, Senra, and Ferreira, 2018; Santos and Milanez, 2017).
Indicating the strong preference of the mineral sector to mediation and conciliation,
in May 2021 ANM began a process of support on its website for " encouraging
adjustments in behaviour between miners and the ANM, as well as the discharge of
           
Adjustment of Conduct 
A second specific aspect of PL 3729/2004 that can be seen is the loosening of control
on and the facilitating of the licensing of pipelines. Thus, article 5 of the Bill says
    
The differential treatment of "linear projects" is partly associated with their extensive
linear form and the way in which they are constructed. The way that they are treated
can be explained in the case of highway and railway construction, since once a
section of these works was completed, they would be used for continuity of the
installation of the subsequent section. In other words, it would not be possible to
terminate the work without the operating license.
The creation of this exception is not exclusive to PL 3729/2004, since a similar
situation is also found in the state of Minas Gerais, where the Instruction Sisema
01/2018 lists a series of activities in which, in the understanding of the Secretary of
State for Environment and Sustainable Development, the installation implies the
operation of the enterprise (ASNOP/SISEMA, 2018).
The inclusion of pipelines in this group, however, proves to be a distortion of this
reasoning, since the operation of the pipeline in no way contributes to its installation.
The pipelines do not even fit in the flexibility used to include transmission lines. To
some extent, it can be argued that a part of a transmission line can be used before the
completion of another and, therefore, the operating license could be concomitant
with the installation license. However, this logic does not apply to pipelines, since,
due to the nature of the material transported, they rarely have "extensions" or
intermediary destination points along their path.
Thus, the flexibility for pipelines seems to be just a simplification of licensing
processes without proper guarantee of environmental viability. The technical
challenges in the construction of pipelines implies that there is a high potential for
failure. This aspect was demonstrated in the case of Anglo American's Minas-Rio
Project. According to a report by Benevides-Guimarães, Pedlowski, and Terra
(2019), just over four years after the start of operations, there were two subsequent
The PL (Bill) 3729/2004 on Environmental Licensing and its effects on the mining sector
Versos, 2021, v.5, n. 1
disruptions of the pipeline in 2018, which affected the lives of more than 4,000
people and led to stoppage of the mining company's activities for almost a year.
According to the authors, the failure to identify the failures that led to these
disruptions was associated with the speed of its environmental licensing process.
Similarly, leakage problems along the pipeline and contamination from the cleaning
of pipelines were also reported by Saavedra (2019), in the case of the kaolin miner
Imerys in Pará.
A third point that deserves to be highlighted in PL 3729/2004 concerns the abolition
of the need for environmental licensing for emergency activities. In Article 8, the
text of the Bill states that:
           
     
With regard to mineral extraction activities and emergency situations, this article
raises concerns about the lack of transparency in the risk assessment of collapse of
tailings dams and the preventive and corrective measures taken.
Recent studies and news have demonstrated limited technical and political capacity
of the ANM to regulate, in practice, the performance of mining companies in general
and particularly in managing the safety of tailings dams (Abu-El-Haj, 2020; Lobato
Junior, 2021; Maciel, 2020). In this way, they have had the freedom, with little or no
independent assessment, to define the impacted areas, the level of risk and corrective
measures for such situations.
For example, after the B1 collapsed at Vale S.A.'s Córrego do Feijão mine, in
Brumadinho (MG), a series of dams were identified, also in the Iron Quadrangle, in
a situation of instability in areas like Itatiaiuçu, Barão de Cocais, Nova Lima,
Itabirito, among others. In some of these cases, such as in Barão de Cocais and in the
locality of Macacos (city of Nova Lima) Vale S.A. claimed there was a need for the
construction of security walls, and defined their characteristics and location. These
decisions were made without consultation of the communities involved, or even a
careful and participatory evaluation of technological or locational alternatives by the
competent licensing bodies (Laschefski, 2020). On the other hand, if environmental
licensing processes were adopted, despite their limitations (Zhouri, 2008), it would
be possible for communities at least to participate in the design of such works.
However, this will not be possible in the case of the approval of PL 3729/2004.
A fourth issue that needs to be better discussed in the text of the Bill is related to the
restriction of the use of environmental conditions in the process of licensing.
            
Milanez, B.; Magno, L.; Wanderley, L. J.
            
          
On this issue, in the first place, it should be noted that the current system for granting
licenses based on the list of conditions has been shown to be very ineffective in
relation to the mineral sector. For example, surveys elaborated by Dias (2001), as
well as by Enríquez, Fernandes, and Alamino (2011), indicated that state
environmental agencies do not have the capacity to verify properly if mining
companies comply with the conditions established in the licensing process. Prado
Filho and Souza (2004, p. 348), in turn, went further and, in Minas Gerais, identified
             
implemented even though they are provided for and approved in the Preliminary
License (LP) phase, while others are only listed as impact mitigation proposals, and
Within this context, considering the proposal of the Bill, the definition of restrictions
on the creation of conditions will possibly have the main effect to further expand the
negative impacts of the projects on the quality of life of the people who live in mining
areas, as well as in the budget of city halls in these locations.
Mineral extraction projects have significant social and environmental impacts during
the deployment and operational phases. Just like any other big project, the
installation of a mine tends to generate the migration of a large contingent of people
looking for work, which ends up increasing the pressure for a series of public services
such as housing, sanitation, transport, health and safety (Milanez, 2019). Without the
possibility of conditions to mitigate such impacts, the extra cost for these services
will be borne by city halls.
In addition to the issue of constraints, Article 16 of PL 3729/2004 has implications
Câmara dos
Deputados 2021d). Although it is not explicit, this article might be used to waive the
requirement of consent of the municipal administrations to obtain an environmental
license. This has been an important instrument on the part of municipal
administrations and communities to impede projects or, at least, to increase their
bargaining power in the negotiation of mitigation and compensation actions, as in
the cases of Viçosa (Folha da Mata, 2014) and Santa Bárbara (G1, 2017), in Minas
Gerais. If this is really the effect of this article, municipal governments will lose their
ability to influence and decide on the licensing of polluting activities in their
territories and the relationship of power with mining companies will become even
more unbalanced.
Even in the current context, there are different examples of how the implementation
of mineral extraction projects had the result of overloading municipal services,
generating significant damage to local communities or town councils. In the case of
the operation of mines, a special relationship exists with the impacts on water. For
The PL (Bill) 3729/2004 on Environmental Licensing and its effects on the mining sector
Versos, 2021, v.5, n. 1
example, the construction and operation of the Anglo American tailings dam, in
Conceição do Mato Dentro (MG), had the result of compromising access to water
from the Agua Quente community. In the licensing process, one of the established
conditions was that the company would be responsible for the supply of the people
who lived there. This condition was fulfilled inadequately (Tôrres, 2014), but at least
it was recognized as the responsibility of the company, which was triggered by the
people affected or by judicial entities when there were supply failures. Under PL
3729/2004, the mitigation of this impact caused by the mining company would have
been transferred to the town council.
Similarly, in Itabira (MG), access to water has historically been a central element of
the dispute between the community and the mining company Vale SA., which started
operating in the area in the 1940s, but only got its Corrective Operational License
(LOC) granted in 2000, subject to a list of 52 corrective or compensatory actions
(Guimarães and Milanez, 2017). Among them was the guarantee of access to water
for city dwellers, since the high consumption by the mining company competed with
public supply. However, the participation of the mining company in the expansion
of the collection network was only guaranteed in 2020, after long negotiation and
involvement of the Public Ministry of the State of Minas Gerais (MPMG, 2020; Vila
de Utopia, 2019).
Although the cases mentioned above are related to large projects, there is a
possibility that the cumulative effects of small and medium-sized companies will
also compromise water supply or quality in specific communities. The identification
of such impacts, however, would only be feasible in the case of adopting a tool
known as Strategic Environmental Assessment (Sánchez, 2017). However, the
possibility of carrying out this type of environmental assessment was not considered
by PL 3729/2004 (Parliamentary Environmentalist Front, 2021).
Finally, the way in which the Bill addresses the issue of Indigenous Lands (TIs).
    
           
              
PL 3729/2004 seems to adopt the same premise as PL 191/2020 which proposes to
regulate mining in TIs. In both texts, what is verified is the predisposition to ignore
the existence of TIs in the process of regulation. Thus, PL 191/2020 is restricted to
regulating mining in TIs already ratified, disregarding the others, as if they could not
be considered as TIs. According to the text of PL 191/2020:
            
    
Milanez, B.; Magno, L.; Wanderley, L. J.
In this context, among the 724 TIs listed by the ISA (2021), there are still 237 (33%)
in the process of regularization. In other words, due to the bureaucratic slowness of
the regularization process, or by the explicit violation of this right by Executive
Power (Resende, 2018), the proposals prepared by the Chamber of Deputies for
environmental licensing and the Executive's Project for IT mining, arbitrarily,
exclude 33% of the TIs existing in Brazil from protection systems.
However, it should be borne in mind that the Federal Constitution recognizes the
right of Indigenous Peoples to the lands they traditionally occupy, and proposals to
limit recognition at any time frame, for example the date of ratification, represent
attempts to restrict this right (Osowski, 2017).
In short, even excluding large or high risk mineral projects, specific points of PL
3729/2004 have the potential to modify considerably aspects of mineral extraction
activity. In this sense, the issues listed here, among others, should be even more
deeply debated by the groups that discuss the mineral issue in its different nuances
and perspectives.
In this text, we discuss some aspects that relate the proposed changes to
environmental licensing presented in PL 3729/2004 and the activities of mineral
extraction. This is a complex topic and the intention was to support a debate rather
than be the final word., Within this context, we present four arguments as final
First, we understand that the Bill in the format that was approved by the Chamber of
Deputies will contribute to legal uncertainty regarding mineral extraction activities.
As presented throughout the text, the decision to exclude from the scope of the new
standard some specific types of mining not only goes against current regulations, but
also, due to the complexity of the topic, shows ambiguity and is open to varied
interpretations. Therefore, there is a strong possibility that, after an eventual approval
of the PL, long debates will start to define which mineral extraction activities are
subject to regulation of the new standard and which should be licensed by the
previous standards.
In addition, the approval of this standard could lead to an entire readjustment of
standards at the state level, causing even more confusion and insecurity about the
legality of different licensing modalities.
Second, we argue that there will be significant harm to the municipal administrations
of municipalities. As discussed, the immediate loss will be due to the change in the
rules of environmental conditions. At the same time, it is to be expected that the
reduction in the rigour of the proposed licensing by PL 3729/2004 will generate less
structured projects for which it will be more difficult to monitor and control the
The PL (Bill) 3729/2004 on Environmental Licensing and its effects on the mining sector
Versos, 2021, v.5, n. 1
environmental impact, and this will eventually intensify the negative impacts of
mineral extraction on communities and the environment, generating more damage
and costs which will eventually be assumed by local authorities.
As a third point, we warn that the increase in environmental degradation will lead to
an increase in environmental conflicts involving communities and mining. Over the
last few decades, with the intensification of mineral extraction in the country
(Milanez and Felippe, 2020), conflicts involving mining have also increased. In 2004
there were only four conflicts associated with mining in Brazil noted by the Pastoral
Land Commission (CPT), while in 2018 they totalled 211 (Wanderley and
Gonçalves, 2019). Considering only conflicts over water listed by the CPT between
2011 and 2020, there were more conflicts involving mining companies (885) than
hydroelectric plants (365) or farmers (140) (Wanderley, Leão, and Coelho, 2021).
Even assuming that conflicts are inevitable in the implementation of mineral
extraction projects, we believe that the expansion and intensification of such
conflicts would not be in the interests of mining companies. A detailed study in this
regard was prepared by Davis and Franks (2014), based on more than 50 case studies.
The authors identified that, as a consequence of the environmental impacts of
extractive projects, conflicts materialize in the form of protests, negative
propaganda, lawsuits, blockades and damage to property. As a consequence,
companies face project modification, work stoppage, risk management, damage
repair, lost productivity, personnel, reputation and application of fines.
Thus, if the flexibility proposals in PL 3729/2004 materialise in the area of mining,
there will be a direct consequence of increased environmental degradation and
increased conflicts with local communities. At the same time, the indirect result for
companies will be an increase in the risks of projects, the impossibility of obtaining
the sector itself, by defending such flexibility, contributes not only to worsen the
lives of many communities, but acts against its own medium-term interests.
Milanez, B.; Magno, L.; Wanderley, L. J.
Table 1: Risk classification of mining-related activities (selected activities)
Mineral exploration without Use Permit (GU) without opening
accesses in the researched area, of any scale (small, medium or large)
in sensitive or non-sensitive area.
Installation and operation of small-scale tailings/waste rock (non-inert
material) piles (sensitive or non-sensitive area)
Mineral exploration of any size (small, medium or large) with Use
Permit in sensitive or non-sensitive area.
Mineral exploration without Use Permit (GU) with opening accesses
in the researched area, of any scale (small, medium or large) in
sensitive or non-sensitive area.
Pipeline within the limits of the mining enterprise, of any size (small,
medium or large) in sensitive or non-sensitive area.
Small scale alluvium mining (except sand and gravel) sensitive or non-
sensitive area
Small scale clay extraction used in the manufacture red ceramics
(sensitive or non-sensitive area) or medium scale extraction in a non-
sensitive area
Small scale extraction of gravel, rock for the production of gravel, sand
outside water courses, for application exclusively in road works
(sensitive or non-sensitive area)
Small scale Mineral Treatment Unit (UTM) with dry treatment
(sensitive or non-sensitive area) or medium scale UTM (non-sensitive
Small scale mining tailings dam elevation (not foreseen in the original
environmental licensing process or with project change), in sensitive
or non-sensitive area.
Small scale open pit mining of metallic minerals (sensitive or non-
sensitive area)
Small scale rock extraction for the production gravel (sensitive or non-
sensitive area)
Small scale underground mining (sensitive or non-sensitive area)
The PL (Bill) 3729/2004 on Environmental Licensing and its effects on the mining sector
Versos, 2021, v.5, n. 1
Small, medium or large-scale sand and gravel extraction in riverbeds
(sensitive or non-sensitive area)
Installation and operation of medium and large-scale tailings/waste
rock (non-inert material) piles (sensitive or non-sensitive area)
Installation and operation of small, medium or large-scale Mineral
Treatment Unit (UTM) with wet treatment and associated tailings dam
(sensitive or non-sensitive area)
Installation, operation or decommissioning of small, medium or large-
scale tailings dam (sensitive or non-sensitive area)
Medium and large-scale alluvium mining (except sand and gravel)
sensitive or non-sensitive area
Medium and large-scale extraction of gravel, rock for the production
of gravel, sand outside water courses, for application exclusively in
road works (sensitive or non-sensitive area)
Medium and large-scale mining tailings dam elevation (not foreseen in
the original environmental licensing process or with project change),
in sensitive or non-sensitive area.
Medium and large-scale open pit mining of metallic minerals (sensitive
or non-sensitive area)
Medium and large-scale rock extraction for the production gravel
(sensitive or non-sensitive area)
Medium and large-scale underground mining (sensitive or non-
sensitive area)
Medium scale clay extraction used in the manufacture red ceramics
(sensitive area) or large-scale extraction in sensitive or non-sensitive
Medium scale Mineral Treatment Unit (UTM) with dry treatment
(sensitive area) or large scale UTM (sensitive or non-sensitive area)
Source: Based on MMA and Ibama (2020)
Milanez, B.; Magno, L.; Wanderley, L. J.
Table 2: Examples of classification of mining activities (selected activities)
Medium scale
AP > 1
million t
1 million t >
AP > 100
thousand t
thousand t
> AP
mining, except
AP > 500
thousand t
500 thousand t
AP > 100
thousand t
thousand t
Open pit metallic
mining, except
iron ore
AP > 500
thousand t
500 thousand t
AP > 50
thousand t
thousand t
Open pit iron ore
AP > 1,5
million t
1,5 million 
AP > 300
thousand t
thousand t
Open pit mining
with explosives
AP 
120 thousand
m3 > AP > 24
thousand m3
m3 > AP
Iron ore
AP 
million t
1,5 million t >
AP 
thousand t
thousand t
> AP
Manganese ore
AP 
thousand t
500 thousand t
> AP 
thousand t
thousand t
> AP
Other metallic ores
AP 
thousand t
500 thousand t
> AP 
thousand t
thousand t
> AP
Note: AP: Annual Production
Source: Based on ANM (2020a); Bahia (2014); COPAM (2017); IMA (2020).
The PL (Bill) 3729/2004 on Environmental Licensing and its effects on the mining sector
Versos, 2021, v.5, n. 1
Table 3: Limits of extracted amounts with Use Permit (GU)
Agates, druses and other decorative stones
Bauxite (aluminum ore)
Calcitic or dolomitic limestone, dolomite
Cassiterite (tin ore)
Chrome (ore of)
Clays (ceramics)
Cobalt (ore of)
Columbite tantalite
Copper (ore from)
Diamond (primary ore)
Diamond (processed)*
Gemstones *
Gold (ores of)
Gravel (aggregate or paving)
Industrial sand
Iron (ore of)
Lead (ore of)
Limestone shells
Milanez, B.; Magno, L.; Wanderley, L. J.
Manganese (ore from)
Monazitic sands or monazite
Nickel (ores of)
Ornamental and coating rocks - carbonate (marble, travertine)
Ornamental and coating rocks - others (slates, sandstones and friable quartzites)
Ornamental and coating rocks - silicate (granites and gneisses, quartzites, serpentinites
and basalts)
Refractory clays
Rock salt
Sand (aggregate)
Silicon (Metallic/Ore of)
Special clays
Titanium (ore of)
Tungsten (ore of)
Vanadium (ore of)
Zinc (ore of)
Zirconium (ore of)
* All substances in metric tons, except processed diamonds (carats) and gemstones
Source: DNPM (2016)
The PL (Bill) 3729/2004 on Environmental Licensing and its effects on the mining sector
Versos, 2021, v.5, n. 1
ABA. (2021, 10 mai). Parecer técnico-científico sobre proposta de votação da nova
Lei Geral do Licenciamento Ambiental (Projeto de Lei 3.729/2004).
Associação Nacional de Antropologia. Acessado em: 06 Jun 2021,
Disponível em:
ABRASCO. (2021, 11 Jun). Nota da Abrasco sobre a nova Lei Geral (da extinção)
do Licenciamento Ambiental. Associação Brasileira de Saúde Coletiva.
Acessado em: 21 Jun 2021, Disponível em:
Abu-El-Haj, G. F. (2020). Aplicação de regulação responsiva e redes de governança
na regulação da segurança de barragens de rejeitos de mineração no Brasil.
Revista de Direito Setorial e Regulatório, 6(1), 68-98.
ANM. (2020a). Anuário mineral brasileiro: principais substâncias metálicas.
Brasília: Agência Nacional de Mineração.
ANM. (2020b). Resolução no 37 de 4 de junho de 2020. Brasília: Agência Nacional
de Mineração.
ANM. (2021a). Classificação Nacional de Barragens de Mineração. Agência
Nacional de Mineração. Acessado em: 26 Jun 2021, Disponível em:
ANM. (2021b, 02 Fev). Coleção de planilhas: Guias de Utilização autorizadas.
Agência Nacional de Mineraçao. Acessado em: 26 Jun 2021, Disponível em:
ANM. (2021c). Maiores Arrecadadores CFEM. Agência Nacional de Mineração.
Acessado em: 23 Mai 2021, Disponível em:
ANM. (2021d). Pesquisar processos. Agência Nacional de Mineração. Acessado
em: 23 Jun 2021 Disponível em:
ANM. (2021e). Tomada de subsídios nº 3/2021. Agência Nacional de Mineração.
Acessado em: 05 Jun 2021, Disponível em:
ASNOP/SISEMA. (2018). Instrução de Serviço SISEMA 01/2018 - Procedimentos
para aplicação da Deliberação Normativa COPAM nº 217/2017. Belo
Horizonte: Assessoria de Normas e Procedimentos do Sistema Estadual de
Meio Ambiente e Recursos Hídricos.
Milanez, B.; Magno, L.; Wanderley, L. J.
Bahia. (2014). Decreto no 15.682 de 19 de novembro de 2014. Acessado em: 24
Mai 2021, Disponível em:
Benevides-Guimarães, R. M. A., Pedlowski, M. A., e Terra, D. C. T. (2019).
Dependência e expropriação estatal de terras no contexto
neodesenvolvimentista/neoextrativista: implicações para a reprodução das
comunidades afetadas pelo mineroduto Minas-Rio e o Complexo Portuário
do Açu. Desenvolvimento e Meio Ambiente, 51, 180-201.
Bragança, D. (2018, 20 Dez). Procurador da AGU, Eduardo Fortunato Bim presidirá
o Ibama. O Eco. Acessado em: 04 Jun 2021, Disponível em:
Brasil. (1967). Decreto-lei nº 227 de 28 de fevereiro de 1967. Brasília.
Brasil. (1981). Lei no 6.938 de 31 de agosto de 1981. Acessado em: 23 Mai 2021,
Disponível em:
Brasil. (1988). Constituição Federal. Brasília.
Brasil. (1996). Lei nº 9.314 de 14 de novembro de 1996. Brasília.
Brasil. (2011). Lei Complementar nº 140 de 8 de dezembro de 2011. Brasília.
Brasil. (2015). Decreto no 8.437 de 22 de abril de 2015. Brasília.
Brasil. (2016). Lei nº 13.334 de 13 de setembro de 2016. Brasília.
Brasil. (2018). Decreto no 9.406 de 12 de junho de 2018. Braíslia.
Brasil. (2019a). Decreto no 10.178 de 18 de dezembro de 2019. Acessado em: 23
Mai 2021, Disponível em:
Brasil. (2019b). Lei no 13.874, de 20 de setembro de 2019. Acessado em: 23 Mai
2021, Disponível em:
Brasil. (2021). Decreto nº 10.657 de 24 de março de 2021. Brasília.
Câmara dos Deputados. (2021a). Emenda nº 89 ao Projeto de Lei nº 3.729 de 2004.
Câmara dos Deputados. (2021b). Frentes Parlamentares da 56ª Legislatura.
Acessado em: 23 Mai 2021, Disponível em:
Câmara dos Deputados. (2021c). Parecer às emendas de Plenário ao PL n.º 3729,
de 2004 e apensados. Brasília.
Câmara dos Deputados. (2021d). Projeto de Lei 3.729/2004. Texto aprovado em 18
de maio de 2021. Brasília.
The PL (Bill) 3729/2004 on Environmental Licensing and its effects on the mining sector
Versos, 2021, v.5, n. 1
CETESB. (2021). Extração mineral: documentos necessários para solicitação de
Licença Prévia. Acessado em: 26 Jun 2021, Disponível em:
COEMA. (2020). Resolução COEMA no 159 de 07 de dezembro de 2020. Belém:
Conselho Estadual de Meio Ambiente do Pará.
CONAMA. (1986). Resolução CONAMA no 1 de 23 de janeiro de 1986. Conselho
Nacional de Meio Ambiente. Acessado em: 23 Mai 2021, Disponível em:
CONAMA. (1997). Resolução CONAMA no 237 de 19 de dezembro de 1997.
Conselho Nacional de Meio Ambiente. Acessado em: 23 Mai 2021,
Disponível em:
CONAMA. (2021). Quem é quem no CONAMA. Conselho Nacional de Meio
Ambiente. Acessado em: 05 Jun 2021, Disponível em:
COPAM. (2017). Deliberação Normativa COPAM 217/2017. Belo Horizonte:
Conselho Estadual de Política Ambiental.
Davis, R., and Franks, D. (2014). Costs of company-community conflict in the
extractive sector. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy School.
Dias, E. G. C. S. (2001). Avaliação de impacto ambiental de projetos de mineração
no Estado de São Paulo: a etapa de acompanhamento. (D.Eng.),
Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo.
DNPM. (2016). Portaria 155 de 12 de maio de 2016. Brasília: Departamento
Nacional de Produção Mineral.
Enríquez, M. A. R. S., Fernandes, F. R. C., and Alamino, R. C. J. (2011). A
mineração das grandes minas e as dimensões da sustentabilidade. In F. R. C.
Fernandes, M. A. R. S. Enríquez, e R. C. J. Alamino (Eds.), Recursos
minerais & sustentabilidade territorial: Vol. I Grandes minas (pp. 1-17). Rio
de Janeiro: CETEM/MCTI.
do rio Doce. Revista Eletrônica Direito e Sociedade-REDES, 8(2), 163-180.
FGV CPDOC. (2021). Neri Geller. Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História
Contemporânea do Brasil, Fundação Getúlivo Vargas. Acessado em: 23
Mai 2021, Disponível em:
Figueiró, F. S., and Colau, S. G. (2014). Competência legislativa ambiental e
aplicação da norma mais restritiva como forma de resolução de conflitos:
uma análise crítica. Veredas do Direito, 11(25), 255-280.
Milanez, B.; Magno, L.; Wanderley, L. J.
Firmiano, F. D. (2020). " Quem lamenta os estragos-se os frutos são prazeres?" O
bloco de poder agro do governo Bolsonaro. Estudos Sociedade e Agricultura,
28(2), 364-387.
Folha da Mata. (2014, 20 Nov). Prefeito se posiciona contra passagem do mineroduto
por Viçosa. Folha da Mata. Acessado em: 25 Jun 2021, Disponível em:
Frente Parlamentar Ambientalista. (2021, 11 Mai). Frente ambientalista solicita
retirada do PL que flexibiliza licenciamento ambiental no país. Acessado
em: 06 Jun 2021, Disponível em:
G1. (2017, 30 Jun). Santa Bárbara não assina carta que permitiria a Samarco ter
licença para voltar a operar. G1. Acessado em: 25 Jun 2021, Disponível em:
González, N. (2019). La conflictividad vinculada a los recursos naturales en América
Latina: tendencias y mecanismos institucionales de respuesta. In R. J.
Sánchez (Ed.), La bonanza de los recursos naturales para el desarrollo:
dilemas de gobernanza (pp. 359-372). Santiago: Comisión Económica para
América Latina.
Guimarães, C. L., and Milanez, B. (2017). Mineração, impactos locais e os desafios
da diversificação: revisitando Itabira. Desenvolvimento e Meio Ambiente, 41,
Heider, M. (2019, 23 abr). Perfil da mineração de grande porte no Brasil. In the mine.
Acessado em: 14 Jun 2021, Disponível em:
IMA. (2020). Instrução Normativa 07: atividades de iineração. Florianópolis:
Instituto de Meio Ambiente de Santa Catarina.
ISA. (2021). Terras Indígenas no Brasil. Instituo Socioambiental. Acessado em: 06
Jun 2021, Disponível em:
Laschefski, K. A. (2020). Rompimento de barragens em Mariana e Brumadinho
(MG): Desastres como meio de acumulação por despossessão. Ambientes:
Revista de Geografia e Ecologia Política, 2(1), 98-143.
Leão, E. (2020, 05 Jun). Webchat - O Plano Lavra e as medida da ANM para o setor
mineral. FFA Legal. Acessado em: 06 Jun 2021, Disponível em:
Lobato Junior, R. S. (2021). [Meta] Regulação minerária: a interferência do
Tribunal de Contas da União na Agência Nacional de Mineração. (M.Sc.),
Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro.
The PL (Bill) 3729/2004 on Environmental Licensing and its effects on the mining sector
Versos, 2021, v.5, n. 1
Maciel, A. (2020, 8 Set). Empresa contratada para fiscalizar barragens é cliente das
mineradoras que precisa fiscalizar. APública. Acessado em: 06 Jun 2021,
Disponível em:
Mello, D. S., Martins, M. B., and Neffa, E. (2015). Vaudeville ambiental: Um estudo
sobre estratégias e táticas em licenciamento de empreendimentos, o caso do
Campo de Dunas do Peró, Cabo Frio RJ. In: 5º Seminário Interdisciplinar
em Sociologia e Direito, Nietrói.
Milanez, B. (2019). Mineração e impactos socioambientais: as dores de um país
mega-minerador. In J. S. Weiss (Ed.), Movimentos socioambientais: lutas,
conquistas, avanços, retrocessos, esperanças (pp. 383-417). Formosa, GO:
Editora Xapuri Socioambiental.
Milanez, B. (2021, 06 Abr). Notas sobre o licenciamento ambiental de projetos
minerais estratégicos. Le Monde Diplomatique Brasil. Acessado em: 05 Jun
2021, Disponível em:
Milanez, B., Ali, S. H., and Puppim de Oliveira, J. A. (2021). Mapping industrial
disaster recovery: Lessons from mining dam failures in Brazil. The Extractive
Industries and Society, 8(2), 100900.
Milanez, B., and Felippe, M. F. (2020). Quando soa o rio: água, recursos hídricos e
extrativismo mineral no contexto brasileiro. In H. A. Sant'Ana Júnior e R. M.
Rigotto (Eds.), Ninguém bebe minério : águas e povos versus mineração (pp.
47-73). Rio de Janeiro: 7Letras.
Minas Gerais. (2016). Lei Estadual nº 21.972 de 21 de janeiro de 2016. Belo
MMA, e Ibama. (2020). Portaria no 2.231 de 24 de setembro de 2020. Ministério de
Meio Ambiente, Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos
Naturais Renováveis. Acessado em: 24 Mai 2021, Disponível em:
MME. (2020). Projeto de no Lei 191/2020. Brasília: Ministério de Minas e Energia.
MPMG. (2020, 27 Ago). Acordos firmados entre o MPMG e a Vale vão garantir a
qualidade e a restruturação do sistema de abastecimento hídrico de Itabira.
Ministério Público do Estado de Minas Gerais. Acessado em: 06 Jun 2021,
Disponível em:
Nader, L. (1990). Harmony ideology: Justice and control in a Zapotec mountain
village: Stanford University Press.
Osowski, R. (2017). O marco temporal para demarcação de terras indígenas,
memória e esquecimento. Mediações-Revista de Ciências Sociais, 22(2),
Milanez, B.; Magno, L.; Wanderley, L. J.
Prado Filho, J. F. d., and Souza, M. P. d. (2004). O licenciamento ambiental da
mineração no Quadrilátero Ferrífero de Minas Gerais: uma análise da
implementação de medidas de controle ambiental formuladas em
EIAs/RIMAs. Engenharia Sanitária e Ambiental, 9(4), 343-349.
Resende, S. M. (2018, 05 Nov). 'No que depender de mim, não tem mais demarcação
de terra indígena', diz Bolsonaro a TV. Folha de S. Paulo. Acessado em: 14
Jun 2021, Disponível em:
Roland, M. C., Faria Júnior, L. C. S., Mansoldo, F. F., Senra, L. M., and Ferreira, L.
F. (2018). Negociação em contextos de violações de Direitos Humanos por
empresas: Uma breve análise dos mecanismos de solução negociada à luz do
caso do rompimento da barragem de Fundão. Versos: Textos para Discussão
PoEMAS, 2(1), 3-25.
Saavedra, M. P. C. (2019). Imerys em Barcarena: os efeitos colaterais perversos da
mineração nos recursos hídricos do município. In E. R. Castro e E. D. Carmo
(Eds.), Dossiê desastres e crimes da mineração em Barcarena (pp. 169-179).
Belém: NAEA, UFPA.
Sánchez, L. E. (2017). Por que não avança a avaliação ambiental estratégica no
Brasil? Estudos Avançados, 31(89), 167-183.
Santos, R. S. P., and Milanez, B. (2017). The construction of the disaster and the
   
Doce Basin, Brazil. Vibrant: Virtual Brazilian Anthropology, 14(2),
SBPC. (2021, 11 Mai). Carta aberta da SBPC e de seu Grupo de Trabalho Meio
Ambiente sobre a Nova Lei Geral do Licenciamento Ambiental (PL
3729/2004). Sociedade Brasileira para o Progresso da Ciência. Acessado
em: 06 Jun 2021, Disponível em:
Scardua, F. P., and Bursztyn, M. A. A. (2003). Descentralização da política
ambiental no Brasil. Sociedade e Estado, 18(1-2), 291-314.
Serabi Gold. (2021, Jan 15). Serabi reports improving gold production for the fourth
quarter of 2020. Acessado em: 23 Jun 2021, Disponível em:
SGM/MME. (2021). Resolução nº 2 de 18 de junho de 2021. Brasília: Secretaria de
Geologia, Mineração e Transformação Mineral, Ministério de Minas e
Tôrres, M. A. (2014). Histórias de água e minério: os efeitos do Projeto Minas-Rio
em Água Quente, Conceição do Mato Dentro. (Bch.), Universidade Federal
de Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte.
The PL (Bill) 3729/2004 on Environmental Licensing and its effects on the mining sector
Versos, 2021, v.5, n. 1
Vervloet, R. J. H. M. (2021, 25 Mai). Conversa sobre Política Ambiental - PL3729.
Organon - Núcleo de Estudo, Pesquisa e Extensão em Mobilizações Sociais.
Acessado em: 14 Jun 2021, Disponível em:
Viegas, R. N., Giffoni Pinto, R., and Garzon, L. F. N. (2014). Negociação e acordo
ambiental: o termo de ajustamento de conduta (TAC) como forma de
tratamento dos confitos ambientais. Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Heinrich Böll.
Vila de Utopia. (2019, 27 Mai). Com CPI, Câmara enfim quer saber se a Vale
cumpriu todas as condicionantes ambientais da LOC das minas de Itabira.
Vila de Utopia. Acessado em: 06 Jun 2021, Disponível em:
Wanderley, L. J. M., and Gonçalves, R. J. A. F. (2019). Mineração e as escalas dos
conflitos no espaço agrário brasileiro. In Centro de Documentação Dom
Tomás Balduino (Ed.), Conflitos no Campo Brasil 2018 (pp. 134-143).
Goiânia: Comissão Pastoral da Terra.
Wanderley, L. J. M., Leão, P. C. d. R., and Coelho, T. P. (2021). A apropriação da
água e a violência do setor mineral no contexto do neoextrativismo brasileiro.
In Centro de Documentação Dom Tomás Balduino (Ed.), Conflitos no
Campo Brasil 2020 (pp. 158-169). Goiânia: Comissão Pastoral da Terra.
Zhouri, A. (2008). Justiça ambiental, diversidade cultural e accountability: desafios
para a governança ambiental. Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais, 23(68),
... The environmental monitoring system in Brazil has been gradually weakened in the last few years, resulting in a reduced ability of environmental agencies to accurately assess the impacts of different projects and prevent environmental degradation in Brazil (Fearnside, 2019). Considering the mineral sector, the attempt to speed up the licensing of enterprises what is noticeable (Milanez, Magno, and Wanderley, 2021), in addition to considerable resistance to increasing the rigor in the safety monitoring of tailings dams . Therefore, unlike what is expected by some international institutions (IEA, 2021), the Brazilian reality points out that the expansion in the extraction of "critical" or "strategic" minerals will possibly come at the expense of more environmental impacts and more territorial conflicts, and that it is unlikely to be classified as "responsible". ...
Technical Report
Full-text available
- Restringir o debate sobre crise climática a uma simples substituição de fontes energéticas terá como consequência ampliar os conflitos ambientais envolvendo o setor mineral, principalmente em países do Sul Global. - Os novos patamares de extração de alguns minérios e a velocidade com que tais projetos serão implantados tenderão a aumentar significativamente a quantidade e a intensidade dos conflitos territoriais. - A Amazônia é a principal fronteira mineral no Brasil e a expansão da mineração tem contribuído significativamente para o desmatamento na região com repercussão na crise hídrica que o país atravessa. - A avaliação da extração atual e potencial de minerais críticos no Brasil indica uma série de conflitos instalados e o provável crescimento de disputas por água, do desmatamento e da pressão sobre Terras Indígenas. - A proposta brasileira de minerais “estratégicos” deve ser vista como uma distorção do conceito de minerais críticos, que criaria condições excepcionais para expansão da mineração em geral no país. - Confining the debate on the climate crisis to a simple substitution of energy sources will cause an increase in environmental conflicts involving the mineral sector, especially in countries in the Global South. - The new levels of extraction of some ores and the speed with which such projects will be implemented tend to significantly increase the number and intensity of territorial conflicts. - The Amazon is the main mineral frontier in Brazil, and the expansion of mining has significantly contributed to deforestation in the region, affecting the water crisis the country is currently going through. - Assessments of the current and potential extraction of critical minerals in Brazil indicate a series of ongoing conflicts and the likely growth of disputes over water, of deforestation and of pressure on Indigenous Lands. - The Brazilian proposal for "strategic" minerals should be seen as a distortion of the concept of critical minerals itself, as it would create exceptional conditions for the expansion of mining in general in the country (An English version is available as "linked data")
Full-text available
O presente artigo tem como objetivo debater algumas políticas públicas e projetos de lei para a mineração que estiveram em pauta nos governos de Michel Temer e Jair Bolsonaro, bem como suas consequências. A partir de revisão bibliográfica, dados secundários e análise documental o texto faz, inicialmente, uma breve caracterização da espacialização dos conflitos associados à mineração, em particular envolvendo povos indígenas, e apresenta os Territórios Livres de Mineração como uma outra forma de se pensar o uso dos territórios. Em seguida, uma avaliação institucional descreve a influência corporativa sobre o Estado e seus principais resultados. Então, o artigo sistematiza questões que carecem de uma discussão crítica, incluindo, a mineração em Terras Indígenas, a insegurança dos complexos minerários; a injustiça fiscal e tributária; as fragilidades do licenciamento ambiental; e os retrocessos causados pela reforma trabalhista. Por fim, são organizadas propostas para o aprofundamento do debate sobre esses temas.
Full-text available
Neste texto apresentamos os conflitos pela água decorrentes da atividade mineral deflagrados pelo avanço dos agentes do neoextrativismo brasileiro na última década. A partir da análise dos dados do CEDOC-CPT, entre 2011 e 2020, identificamos o incremento em mais de sete vezes dos conflitos relacionados à água no campo brasileiro. As violações de diferentes formas de apropriações e negações do acesso aos bens hídricos recaíram sobre as populações tradicionais, em especial pescadores e ribeirinhos. Nessa década, as mineradoras assumiram o protagonismo nos conflitos pela água, com destaque para os grandes desastres sociotécnicos de barragens de mineração: as bacias do rio Doce e do rio Paraopeba e em Barcarena. Soma-se a esses o derramamento de petróleo no litoral brasileiro. Todos esses eventos vêm produzindo efeitos de grande amplitude espacial e duradouros no tempo, que não se limitam ao ano da ocorrência.
Full-text available
Argumentamos que a relação entre mineração e recursos hídricos deve ser encarada a partir de múltiplas relações, dentre as quais muitas são passíveis de gerar conflitos socioambientais. Mais do que isso, à medida que o país aprofunda seu caráter extrativista, há forte tendência de que tais conflitos se aprofundem.
Full-text available
Argumenta-se pelo reconhecimento do Brasil como país extrativista; Caracterizam-se os impactos socioambientais das atividades de mineração como espacialmente extensos, ecologicamente complexos e temporalmente permanentes; Questionam-se as mudanças recentes na legislação ambiental que tendem a reforçar o modelo de automonitoramento e enfraquecer os instrumentos públicos de licenciamento e controle ambiental; Identifica-se que as atuais instituições ambientais não têm sido capazes de evitar ou mitigar os impactos socioambientais da mega-mineração no Brasil; Demonstra-se como os atuais sistemas de licenciamento e monitoramento se mostram incapazes de evitar ou mitigar tragédias do rompimento das barragens de rejeito do Fundão e da Barragem I (Mariana e Brumadinho); Defende-se o fortalecimento das agências de controle ambiental; Propõe-se o desenvolvimento de instrumentos de real participação social nas decisões
Full-text available
O presente artigo analisa os conflitos envolvendo a atividade de mineração no espaço agrário brasileiro, a partir de dados históricos inéditos disponibilizados pela Comissão Pastoral da Terra, entre 2004 e 2018.
Full-text available
Há a necessidade de se rever o jogo político estabelecido no âmbito do paradigma da adequação ambiental, principalmente no que se refere à crença na irreversibilidade da condução de um modelo de desenvolvimento que, em seu processo de acumulação de riquezas, distribui desigualmente em sociedade os benefícios e danos ambientais. Nos marcos da garantia de condução desse modelo, dispositivos legais são “contornados” ou “flexibilizados” e decisões políticas são tomadas reservadamente em nome do que determinados agentes privados consideram economicamente viável. Ao seguir-se essa crença na irreversibilidade da condução de um modelo de desenvolvimento excludente e produtor de desigualdades, o potencial de politização do conflito ambiental esvai-se diante de espaços de negociação para o seu tratamento, espaços esses que, com frequência, descartam aqueles que põem em risco a racionalidade que se quer fazer vigorar nesse ambiente de acordo, o que contribui para obscurecer as questões mais fundamentais a respeito do tipo de futuro que estamos tentando alcançar.
Industrial disasters are a test of human and ecological resilience and offer a complex set of choices for restorative activity after their occurrence. Unlike natural calamities, industrial disasters have greater human agency associated with their prevention and remediation. In this paper, we analyze two major disasters that occurred within a period of five years in Brazil involving similar mine tailings dams, particularly the role of participatory processes in shaping reparation. We examine the lessons from the divergent compensation mechanisms instituted afterwards and the reasons for community dissatisfaction. Our analysis reveals that ex post efforts at community participation in disaster recovery have gaps in participation. We identified some specific aspects to explain the gaps in participatory processes: power relations, role of the public sector, the timing of the process, and access to information and representation. There is danger of these recovery processes getting "lost in participation" and delivering suboptimal outcomes. There is a major trust deficit between industry and communities legacies in Latin America, further exacerbating the challenge. We conclude with global lessons from this case that can be incorporated into international processes such as creation of a new global institute and certification body on mining waste facilities, as recommended by the Global Tailings Review, which was initiated as a result of these disasters.
O modelo de solução negocial foi a opção das empresas e dos órgãos do sistema de justiça para o tratamento dos danos decorrentes do desastre da Samarco/Vale/BHP Billiton. Assim, no plano macro, via Termo de Ajustamento de Conduta (TAC), foram negociados acordos sobre acordos, cujos termos têm sido reiteradamente descumpridos pelas empresas; e, no plano micro, a reparação dos atingidos foi individualizada, a partir da técnica da mediação negociada, empregada no Programa de Indenização Mediada (PIM). Com efeito, a opção por soluções contratuais ou negociadas foi propositada e têm permitido a privatização do tratamento do desastre e a sua gestão empresarial (ROJAS; PEREIRA, 2017), sob a batuta da Fundação Renova, o que diminui os custos da reparação para as empresas causadoras dos danos. Embora a solução alternativa de conflitos, neste caso, apresente um verniz de legalidade, na prática, as empresas são desresponsabilizadas, o que perpetua a acumulação por espoliação (HARVEY, 2005) em favor das empresas mineradoras também no momento da (não) reparação dos danos causados. Além disso, o discurso jurídico e economicista, que desqualifica a via judicial como morosa e burocrática, tem legitimado a pilhagem dos territórios da bacia do rio Doce, pela negligência dos direitos da população atingida.
A eleição de Jair Bolsonaro à Presidência da República capitaneou frações expressivas dos agronegócios para a composição de seu bloco de poder, sugerindo uma importante modificação no plano da hegemonia interna do setor. Buscamos argumentar que é a posição ocupada pela economia nacional na nova estrutura global do capital que confere ao setor um lugar permanente no bloco de poder na contemporaneidade. Ao mesmo tempo, são as condições políticas internas da luta de classes que fazem emergir as forças que dirigem os agronegócios sob determinadas circunstâncias históricas, operando a gestão político-institucional do setor desde o Estado. Nossa investigação está fundamentada na análise de conjuntura como um tipo de pesquisa interdisciplinar que visa à identificação de tendências e forças operantes na sociedade, articulada à análise histórico-crítica. Com isto, visamos indicar quais são as forças políticas deste setor que se afirmam no governo Bolsonaro, bem como sua agenda programática.
Conference Paper
Resumo: A ruptura de duas barragens em Mariana (MG), 2015, e Brumadinho (MG), 2019, custou centenas de vidas e destruiu a maior parte das bacias do Rio Doce e do Paraopeba. Esses eventos são o auge dos desastres que começaram com o licenciamento ambiental e continuaram com a gestão ineficiente da reparação de danos, causando ainda mais sofrimento social. Após os desastres, as instituições públicas não fortaleceram o marco regulatório, mas aceleraram sua flexibilização. Como resultado, as empresas de mineração são capazes de introduzir a cultura do neocoronelismo nos sistemas de governança. Dessa forma, as empresas não somente fortaleceram seus interesses frente às demandas das vítimas, mas também o controle territorial em áreas afetadas por desastres por meio de "grilagem oculta de terras". Palávras chave: Barragem de rejeito; desastre, accumulação por epoliação; mineração; licenciamento ambiental; reparação de danos. ---------------------------------------------------------------- Abstract: The rupture of two dams in Mariana (MG), 2015, and Brumadinho (MG), 2019, cost hundreds of lives and destroyed most of the Rio Doce and Paraopeba basins. These events are the climax of the disasters that began with environmental licensing and continued with the inefficient management of damage repair, causing even more social suffering. After the disasters, public institutions did not strengthen the regulatory framework but accelerated its flexibilization. As a result, mining companies are able to introduce the culture of neocoronelism into governance systems. In this way, companies have not only strengthened their interests in the face of victims' demands, but also the territorial control in areas affected by disasters through "hidden land grabbing". Keywords: Tailings dam; disaster, accumulation by dispossession; mining; environmental licensing;reparation of damage