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Follow the Herd: Individualism and Social Distancing Compliance in the U.S.
Abstract
Does individualism hamper collective compliance with regulations? With the hypothesis that individualists show less herd behavior, I construct a dynamic Bayesian coordination game model that predicts a heterogeneous relation between individualism and social distancing compliance depending on the mainstream risk perception of the pandemic. Individualism discourages compliance only when the majority treats COVID-19 as a serious threat. Using difference-in-differences and triple-difference approaches, I find that, consistent with the hypothesis, individualism was negatively associated with compliance across counties where people showed high mask wearing frequency, but the relation reversed or diminished to non-significance among counties with infrequent mask wearing. The differential remains significant even after accounting for potentially confounding demographic and socio-economic factors or employing an instrumental variable. The results suggest a non-negligible role of herding tendencies in the effects of the individualismcollectivism dimension on population behavior.
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A clear understanding of community response to government decisions is crucial for policy makers and health officials during the COVID-19 pandemic. In this study, we document the determinants of implementation and compliance with stay-at-home orders in the USA, focusing on trust and social capital. Using cell phone data measuring changes in non-essential trips and average distance traveled, we find that mobility decreases significantly more in high-trust counties than in low-trust counties after the stay-at-home orders are implemented, with larger effects for more stringent orders. We also provide evidence that the estimated effect on post-order compliance is especially large for confidence in the press and governmental institutions, and relatively smaller for confidence in medicine and in science.
Background
The global COVID-19 pandemic has been characterized by marked variations in prevalence, mortality and case fatality across nations. The available evidence to date suggests that social factors significantly influence these variations. The sociological concepts of individualism and collectivism provide a broad explanatory framework for the study of these factors. There is evidence to suggest that cross-cultural variations in collectivism may have emerged via a process of natural selection, as a protective mechanism against infectious diseases. As a test of this hypothesis, this paper examined the association between indices of individualism and collectivism and the prevalence, mortality and case fatality rates of COVID-19 across nations.
Study design
This study was a population-level association study based on data in the public domain and from prior publications.
Methods
Data on four standard measures of individualism/collectivism were obtained from the original publications. These were correlated with estimates of the nation-wide prevalence, mortality and fatality rates for COVID-19 in 94 countries, obtained from the Johns Hopkins Medical University real-time dashboard.
Results
Individualism was positively correlated with COVID-19 prevalence, mortality and case fatality rates; conversely, measures of collectivism were negatively correlated with these parameters. The strongest association was between scores for individualism and mortality rate, and remained significant after correcting for several potential confounders.
Conclusions
These findings are consistent with the prior hypothesis of a relationship between individualism-collectivism and the impact of infectious disease across populations, and have implications in terms of social strategies aimed at minimizing the impact of COVID-19.
The outbreak of COVID-19 has called for swift action by governments, often involving the adoption of restrictive measures such as lockdowns. In this context, leaders have faced a trade-off between imposing stringent measures to limit the contagion, and minimizing the short-run costs on their national economy, which could impact their electoral prospects. Leveraging on both the timing of elections and the constitutional term limits faced by leaders in presidential systems, we document how incumbents who can run for re-election implement less stringent restrictions when the election is closer in time. The effect is driven by measures more likely to have a negative economic impact. This shows how electoral concerns help explain the observed differences in the response to the onset of the COVID-19 epidemic across different countries.
Individualistic values are often presented as promoting economic development; however, their links to relevant behaviour and preferences at the micro-level remain under-explored. Here we investigate the relationship between individualistic values and personal attitudes towards reporting corruption. Unlike much of the previous research which focuses on attitudes towards corruption, we analyse the micro-level mechanisms relating to one's willingness to escape the status quo and act against corruption. We also focus on a region associated with persistently high levels of perceived corruption. Our findings indicate that individualism is associated with a greater likelihood to act against corruption. The effect estimated is small but highly significant and robust to changes in estimators and specifications. We also find evidence that institutional trust and individualism strengthen each other to generate greater willingness to report corruption.
Why have some countries done significantly better than others in fighting the Covid-19 pandemic? Had some countries been better prepared than others? This paper attempts to shed light on these questions by examining the role of climate risk and culture in explaining the cross-country variation in the Covid-19 mortality, while controlling for other potential drivers. In our analysis, we consider climate risk, readiness to climate change and individualism as main indicators reflecting the climate and culture status of individual countries. Using data from 110 countries, we find that the greater the climate risk; the lower the readiness to climate change and the more individualistic the society, the higher the pandemic mortality rate. We also present a series of sensitivity checks and show that our findings are robust to different specifications, alternative definitions of the mortality rate; and different estimation methods. One policy implication arising from our results is that countries that were better prepared for the climate emergency were also better placed to fight the pandemic. Overall, countries in which individuals look after each other and the environment, creating sustainable societies, are better able to cope with climate and public health emergencies.
Rampant partisanship in the United States may be the largest obstacle to the reduced social mobility most experts see as critical to limiting the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. Analyzing a total of just over 1.1 million responses collected daily between 4 April and 10 September reveals not only that partisanship is more important than public health concerns for explaining individuals’ willingness to stay at home and reduce social mobility but also that the effect of partisanship has grown over time—especially among Republicans. All else equal, the relative importance of partisanship for the increasing (un)willingness of Republicans to stay at home highlights the challenge that politics poses for public health.
Confidence in the health care system implies an expectation that sufficient and appropriate treatments will be provided if needed. The COVID-19 public health crisis is a significant, global, and (mostly) simultaneous test of the behavioral implications arising from this confidence. We explore whether populations reporting low levels of confidence in the health care system exhibit a stronger behavioral reaction to the COVID-19 pandemic. We track the dynamic responses to the COVID-19 pandemic across 38 European countries and 621 regions by employing a large dataset on human mobility generated between February 15 and June 5, 2020 and a broad range of contextual factors (e.g., deaths or policy implementations). Using a time-dynamic framework we find that societies with low levels of health care confidence initially exhibit a faster response with respect to staying home. However, this reaction plateaus sooner, and after the plateau it declines with greater magnitude than does the response from societies with high health care confidence. On the other hand, regions with higher confidence in the health care system are more likely to reduce mobility once the government mandates that its citizens are not to leave home except for essential trips, compared to those with lower health care system confidence. Regions with high trust in the government but low confidence in the health care system dramatically reduce their mobility, suggesting a correlation for trust in the state with respect to behavioral responses during a crisis.
Background: Concern for the development of actions against COVID-19 has continued to grow since February 2020. Government responses remain a crucial part of preventing virus transmission through policy formulation and strengthening national capacity.
Methods: This study has used quantitative analysis, using secondary data from 177 countries. The variables consist of Global Health Security (GHS) category and COVID-19 pandemic. An analysis of the appropriateness of the government’s policy response in dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic was carried out by comparing the two variables.
Results: The study indicated a significant relationship between global health security category and pandemic score (P < 0.01). There were 37 countries out of 177 (20.9%) categorized as under-reaction and least-reaction.
Conclusion: Pandemic COVID-19 score, rated based on doubling time, is directly significant with the health security category. The government should improve its responsiveness and preparation to improve national capacity during the novel coronavirus pandemic.
Governments around the world are responding to the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic¹ with unprecedented policies designed to slow the growth rate of infections. Many actions, such as closing schools and restricting populations to their homes, impose large and visible costs on society, but their benefits cannot be directly observed and are currently understood only through process-based simulations2–4. Here, we compile new data on 1,717 local, regional, and national non-pharmaceutical interventions deployed in the ongoing pandemic across localities in China, South Korea, Italy, Iran, France, and the United States (US). We then apply reduced-form econometric methods, commonly used to measure the effect of policies on economic growth5,6, to empirically evaluate the effect that these anti-contagion policies have had on the growth rate of infections. In the absence of policy actions, we estimate that early infections of COVID-19 exhibit exponential growth rates of roughly 38% per day. We find that anti-contagion policies have significantly and substantially slowed this growth. Some policies have different impacts on different populations, but we obtain consistent evidence that the policy packages now deployed are achieving large, beneficial, and measurable health outcomes. We estimate that across these six countries, interventions prevented or delayed on the order of 62 million confirmed cases, corresponding to averting roughly 530 million total infections. These findings may help inform whether or when these policies should be deployed, intensified, or lifted, and they can support decision-making in the other 180+ countries where COVID-19 has been reported⁷.
We construct a model of revolution and transition to democracy under individualistic and collectivist cultures. The main result is that, despite facing potentially more challenging collective action problems, countries with individualistic cultures are more likely to end up adopting democracy earlier than countries with collectivist cultures. Our empirical analysis suggests a strong and robust association between individualistic cultures and average polity scores and durations of democracy, even after controlling for other determinants of democracy emphasized in the literature. We provide evidence that countries with collectivist cultures also are more likely to experience autocratic breakdowns and transitions from autocracy to autocracy.
This paper considers a modification of the standard Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) model of epidemic that allows for different degrees of compulsory as well as voluntary social distancing. It is shown that the fraction of population that self-isolates varies with the perceived probability of contracting the disease. Implications of social distancing both on the epidemic and recession curves are investigated and their trade off is simulated under a number of different social distancing and economic participation scenarios. We show that mandating social distancing is very effective at flattening the epidemic curve, but is costly in terms of employment loss. However, if targeted towards individuals most likely to spread the infection, the employment loss can be somewhat reduced. We also show that voluntary self-isolation driven by individual's perceived
risk of becoming infected kicks in only towards the peak of the epidemic and has little or no impact on flattening the epidemic curve. Using available statistics and correcting for measurement errors, we estimate the rate of exposure to COVID-19 for 21 Chinese provinces and a selected number of countries. The exposure rates are generally small, but vary considerably between Hubei and other Chinese provinces as well as across countries. Strikingly, the exposure rate in Hubei province is around 40 times larger than the rates for other Chinese provinces, with the exposure rates for some European countries being 3-5 times larger than Hubei (the epicenter of the epidemic). The paper also provides country-specific estimates of the recovery rate, showing it to be about 21 days (a week longer than the 14 days typically assumed), and relatively homogeneous across Chinese provinces and for a selected number of countries.
Places where geographic mobility declined more rapidly have seen fewer cases of COVID-19. However, there is significant variation in people’s compliance with the lockdown measures introduced by governments in order to curb the spread of the virus. In this paper, we show that much of this variation can be explained by different cultural traits. Specifically, we advance the hypothesis that individualism, which rewards deviant behaviour, makes government intervention harder, whereas collectivism, which emphasises the wellbeing of the group, makes collective action easier. We find support for these ideas across countries, across counties within the United States, as well as across cities within China. Our findings show that people were less abiding by the lockdown rules in places with greater prevalence of individualistic cultural traits. We conclude that cultural factors play a critical role in successful policy implementation.
We study how individual decisions are affected by those of other members of the society. We use the vaccine against COVID-19 as a case study and empirically estimate the magnitude of three key forces: Herding, Social Norms, and Free-riding. We find that Free-riding is dominated by the other two forces, and that Social Norms are a key driver of behavior. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity and systematic differences between people by demographics and their political preferences.
US federal transfers to individuals are large, countercyclical, vary geographically, and are often credited with helping to stabilize regional economies. This paper estimates the short-run effects of these transfers using plausibly exogenous regional variation in temporary stimulus payments and permanent Social Security benefit increases. States that received larger transfers tended to grow faster contemporaneously, with a multiplier of around 1.5 for permanent transfers and 1/3 for temporary transfers. Results are broadly consistent with an open-economy New Keynesian model. At business cycle frequencies, cross-region transfer multipliers are not large, suggesting only modest gains in regional stabilization from US federal automatic stabilizers. (JEL E12, E32, E62, H23, H55, R12)
We use the state-mandated stay-at-home orders during the coronavirus pandemic as a setting to study whether political beliefs inhibit compliance with government orders. Using geolocation data sourced from smartphones, we find residents in Republican counties are less likely to completely stay at home after a state order has been implemented relative to those in Democratic counties. Debit card transaction data shows that Democrats are more likely to switch to remote spending after state orders are implemented. Heterogeneity in factors such as Covid-19 risk exposure, geography, and county characteristics do not completely rule out our findings, suggesting political beliefs are an important determinant in the effectiveness of government mandates. Political alignment with officials giving orders may partially explain these partisan differences.
“Rugged individualism”—the combination of individualism and anti-statism—is a prominent feature of American culture with deep roots in the country’s history of frontier settlement. Today, rugged individualism is more prevalent in counties with greater total frontier experience (TFE) during the era of westward expansion. While individualism may be conducive to innovation, it can also undermine collective action, with potentially adverse social consequences. We argue that America’s frontier culture hampered responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. Across U.S. counties, greater TFE is associated with less social distancing and mask use as well as weaker local government effort to control the virus. We argue that frontier culture lies at the root of several more proximate explanations for the weak collective response to public health risks, including a lack of civic duty, partisanship, and distrust in science.
The comparatively poor U.S. response to COVID-19 was not due to federal inaction or a flawed federal system per se but to party polarization and presidential and gubernatorial preferences that frustrated federalism’s capacity to respond more effectively. The U.S. response is examined in terms of four models: coercive or regulatory federalism, nationalist cooperative federalism, non-centralized cooperative federalism, and dual federalism--finding that state-led dual federalism was the predominant response. The crisis also raised questions about interpretations of “federal inaction” because party divisions led some to regard the federal government’s response as inadequate while others viewed it as appropriate.
Homogeneous societies usually provide more public goods. Voluntary social distancing in a pandemic is also a public good, but it has private benefits, too. Theoretically, we show that presence of population groups with different rationales for social distancing can lead to stricter observance of social distancing in more diverse societies. Empirically, we find that mobility reduction following the first local COVID-19 case was stronger in Russian cities with higher ethnic fractionalization and xenophobia. For identification, we predict the timing of the first case using historical patterns of internal migration. Using the United States data on mobility produces similar results.
While degraded trust and cohesion within a country are often shown to have large socio-economic impacts, they can also have dramatic consequences when compliance is required for collective survival. We illustrate this point in the context of the COVID-19 crisis. Policy responses all over the world aim to reduce social interaction and limit contagion. Using data on human mobility and political trust at regional level in Europe, we examine whether the compliance to these containment policies depends on the level of trust in policy makers prior to the crisis. Using a double difference approach around the time of lockdown announcements, we find that high-trust regions decrease their mobility related to non-necessary activities significantly more than low-trust regions. We also exploit country and time variation in treatment using the daily strictness of national policies. The efficiency of policy stringency in terms of mobility reduction significantly increases with trust. The trust effect is nonlinear and increases with the degree of stringency. We assess how the impact of trust on mobility potentially translates in terms of mortality growth rate.
The presence of a westward‐moving frontier of settlement shaped early U.S. history. In 1893, the historian Frederick Jackson Turner famously argued that the American frontier fostered individualism. We investigate the “frontier thesis” and identify its long‐run implications for culture and politics. We track the frontier throughout the 1790–1890 period and construct a novel, county‐level measure of total frontier experience (TFE). Historically, frontier locations had distinctive demographics and greater individualism. Long after the closing of the frontier, counties with greater TFE exhibit more pervasive individualism and opposition to redistribution. This pattern cuts across known divides in the United States, including urban–rural and north–south. We provide evidence on the roots of frontier culture, identifying both selective migration and a causal effect of frontier exposure on individualism. Overall, our findings shed new light on the frontier's persistent legacy of rugged individualism.
Using mobile phone and survey data, we show that during the early phases of COVID-19, voluntary social distancing was greater in areas with higher civic capital and amongst individuals exhibiting a higher sense of civic duty. This effect is robust to including controls for political ideology, income, age, education, and other local-level characteristics. This result is present for U.S. individuals and U.S. counties as well as European regions. Moreover, we show that after U.S. states began re-opening, high civic capital counties maintained a more sustained level of social distancing, while low civic capital counties did not. Finally, we show that U.S. individuals report a higher tendency to use protective face masks in high civic capital counties. Our evidence points to the importance of considering the level of civic capital in designing public policies not only in response to pandemics, but also more generally.
We use party-identifying language—like “liberal media” and “MAGA”—to identify Republican users on the investor social platform StockTwits. Using a difference-in-difference design, we find that partisan Republicans remain relatively unfazed in their beliefs about equities during the COVID-19 pandemic, while other users become considerably more pessimistic. In cross-sectional tests, we find Republicans become relatively more optimistic about stocks that suffered the most during the COVID-19 crisis, but more pessimistic about Chinese stocks. Finally, stocks with the greatest partisan disagreement on StockTwits have significantly more trading in the broader market, explaining 28% of the increase in stock turnover during the pandemic.
Authors have furnished data and an Internet Appendix, which are available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
This paper examines the relationship between the individualism-collectivism dimension of culture and political instability using a dataset covering around 100 countries. To shed light on the causal effect of culture on political instability, the identification strategy exploits the variation in historical pathogen prevalence and the information provided by the genetic distance between countries. The results reveal that individualism has a negative and statistically significant impact on the degree of political instability, which means that this cultural trait contributes to making the political environment more stable. This finding is robust to the inclusion in the analysis of a substantial number of controls that may be correlated with both individualism and political instability, including other cultural dimensions. In fact, the relationship between individualism and political instability does not depend either on the specific measures used to quantify the level of individualism and political instability within the various countries or the estimation strategy adopted. The estimates also show that part of the observed effect of individualism is due to the impact of institutional quality, which acts as a transmission channel linking this cultural trait and political instability.
How effective are restrictions on mobility in limiting COVID-19 spread? Using zip code data across five U.S. cities, we estimate that total cases per capita decrease by 19% for every ten percentage point fall in mobility. Addressing endogeneity concerns, we instrument for travel by residential teleworkable and essential shares and find a 25% decline in cases per capita. Using panel data for NYC with week and zip code fixed effects, we estimate a decline of 30%. We find substantial spatial and temporal heterogeneity; east coast cities have stronger effects, with the largest for NYC in the pandemic’s early stages.
By April 2, 2020, >1 million persons worldwide were infected with severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2. We used a mathematical model to investigate the effectiveness of social distancing interventions in a mid-sized city. Interventions reduced contacts of adults >60 years of age, adults 20–59 years of age, and children <19 years of age for 6 weeks. Our results suggest interventions started earlier in the epidemic delay the epidemic curve and interventions started later flatten the epidemic curve. We noted that, while social distancing interventions were in place, most new cases, hospitalizations, and deaths were averted, even with modest reductions in contact among adults. However, when interventions ended, the epidemic rebounded. Our models suggest that social distancing can provide crucial time to increase healthcare capacity but must occur in conjunction with testing and contact tracing of all suspected cases to mitigate virus transmission.
Why do 20% of Swedes report having adopted a clean energy system while the corresponding share of Spaniards equals 0.4%? Using data for about 25,000 individuals across 33 countries, this study tests which cultural trait, individualism or collectivism, is associated with greater levels of clean technology adoption. Our fractional probit estimates suggest that individualistic individuals are more inclined to adopt clean energy systems for home and transport purposes. This finding is not driven by country-specific tax or subsidy policies or market-specific determinants and is robust to controlling for individual and household characteristics, attitudes, social and personal norms and other significant dimensions of cultural differences. The results, therefore, facilitate an understanding of how the decision to adopt clean energy technologies can be driven by cultural factors.
Media outlets often present diverging, even conflicting, perspectives on reality — not only informing, but potentially misinforming audiences. We study the extent to which misinformation broadcast on mass media at the early stages of the coronavirus pandemic influenced health outcomes. We first document large differences in content between the two most popular cable news shows in the US, both on the same network, and in the adoption of preventative behaviors among viewers of these shows. Through both a selection-on-observables strategy and an instrumental variable approach, we find that areas with greater exposure to the show downplaying the threat of COVID-19 experienced a greater number of cases and deaths. We assess magnitudes through an epidemiological model highlighting the role of externalities and provide evidence that contemporaneous information exposure is a key underlying mechanism.
Shelter-in-place ordinances were the first wide-spread policy measures aimed to mitigate the spread of COVID-19. Compliance with shelter-in-place directives is individually costly and requires behavioral changes across diverse sub-populations. Leveraging county-day measures on population movement derived from cellphone location data and the staggered introduction of local mandates, we find that economic factors have played an important role in determining the level of compliance with local shelter-in-place ordinances in the US. Specifically, residents of low income areas complied with shelter-in-place ordinances less than their counterparts in areas with stronger economic endowments, even after accounting for potential confounding factors including partisanship, population density, exposure to recent trade disputes, unemployment, and other factors. Novel results on the local impact of the 2020 CARES Act suggest stimulus transfers that addressed economic dislocation caused by the COVID-19 pandemic significantly increased social distancing.
In response to the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, 107 countries had implemented national school closures by March 18, 2020. It is unknown whether school measures are effective in coronavirus outbreaks (eg, due to severe acute respiratory syndrome [SARS], Middle East respiratory syndrome, or COVID-19). We undertook a systematic review by searching three electronic databases to identify what is known about the effectiveness of school closures and other school social distancing practices during coronavirus outbreaks. We included 16 of 616 identified articles. School closures were deployed rapidly across mainland China and Hong Kong for COVID-19. However, there are no data on the relative contribution of school closures to transmission control. Data from the SARS outbreak in mainland China, Hong Kong, and Singapore suggest that school closures did not contribute to the control of the epidemic. Modelling studies of SARS produced conflicting results. Recent modelling studies of COVID-19 predict that school closures alone would prevent only 2–4% of deaths, much less than other social distancing interventions. Policy makers need to be aware of the equivocal evidence when considering school closures for COVID-19, and that combinations of social distancing measures should be considered. Other less disruptive social distancing interventions in schools require further consideration if restrictive social distancing policies are implemented for long periods.
Previous studies establish that reputation concerns play an important role in outgroup giving. However, it is unclear whether the same is true for ingroup giving, which by some accounts tends to be motivated by empathic concerns. To explore this question, we tested the extent to which 5 to 9-year-old children (Study 1: N = 164) and adults (Study 2: N = 80) shared resources with ingroup and outgroup members, either when being watched by an observer (where we expected reputation concerns to be salient) or in private (where we expected no effect of reputation concerns). We also assessed whether children and adults differ in their beliefs about which form of sharing (ingroup or outgroup giving) is nicer. Although we found that both children and adults exhibited an ingroup bias when sharing, there was no evidence in either group that reputation concerns were greater for outgroup members than for ingroup members. We also found that, in contrast to adults, children shared more resources when observed than in private. Additionally, children evaluated ingroup giving as nicer across different sharing scenarios, whereas adults identified outgroup giving as nicer when the two forms of giving were contrasted. These results are the first to suggest that reputational concerns influence children's sharing both with ingroup and outgroup members, and that children differ from adults in their reasoning about which form of group sharing is nicer.
We argue that individualism promotes gender equality. Individualist values of autonomy and self-determination transcend gender identities and serve to legitimize women’s goals and choices. In contrast, collectivist values may subordinate women’s personal goals to their social obligations, generating greater acceptance of gender inequality. Using individual level data from World Values Surveys, we find that individualism is significantly associated with support for gender equal attitudes regarding employment, income, education, and political leadership. Individualism is also associated with greater levels of female employment and educational attainment, and lower levels of fertility. These results are robust to controlling for income, education, religion, historical plough use, gendered language, and country-time fixed effects. Our within country analysis allows us to isolate the impact of individualism from other confounding effects. Using historical rainfall variation as an instrument for individualism, we find that the exogenous portion of individualism reduces support for patriarchal attitudes and fertility, and it increases female employment and educational attainment. These effects are economically large. We address concerns over instrumental validity by controlling for a variety of factors, including historical plough use, religious affiliation, religiosity, social trust, average rainfall levels, distance from the equator, cool-water conditions, agricultural suitability, historical political and economic development, and the presence of large animals. This paper contributes to a mounting body of evidence suggesting a key role for highly persistent cultural norms and values in determining gender inequality, the gender division of labor, and economic and social outcomes for women.
