Methodological Signatures in Early Ethology: The Problem of Animal Subjectivity

Abstract

What is the adequate terminology to talk about animal behaviour? Is terminology referring to mental or emotional states anthropomorphic and should therefore be prohibited or is it a necessary means to provide for an adequate description and should be encouraged? This question was vehemently discussed in the founding phase of Ethology as a scientific discipline and still is. This multi-layered problem can be grasped by using the concept of methodological signatures, developed by Köchy et al. (2016c). It is designed to analyse and systematically compare animal research approaches by examining their common parameters. By examining the works of Konrad Lorenz (1903-1989) and Nikolaas Tinbergen (1907-1988), this paper offers new insights both on a methodological and theoretical level. Methodologically, the application of the concept of methodological signatures is illustrated ; theoretically, the principles of Classic Ethology are analysed. My aim is to illustrate how the problem of scientific access to animal subjectivity was addressed in the history of Ethology by analysing statements about animal sentience. For this purpose, I will first outline the general discussion about animal subjectivity and the tension between anthro-pomorphism and empirical adequacy. I introduce my own theoretical and methodological framework before presenting an analysis of Lorenz' and Tinbergen's methodological signatures. Thereby, I show how the question of terminology is deeply embedded in a network of epistemological, methodological and ontological concepts and establish key characteristics in regard to ethological approaches to animal subjectivity. Finally, I shed light on the possibility of using this typology to examine current frameworks of animal welfare research.

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Vol.:(0123456789)
Journal for General Philosophy of Science (2021) 52:563–576
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-021-09556-4
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ARTICLE
Methodological Signatures inEarly Ethology: The Problem
ofAnimal Subjectivity
AnnaKlassen1
Accepted: 18 January 2021 / Published online: 24 June 2021
© The Author(s) 2021
Abstract
What is the adequate terminology to talk about animal behaviour? Is terminology refer-
ring to mental or emotional states anthropomorphic and should therefore be prohibited or
is it a necessary means to provide for an adequate description and should be encouraged?
This question was vehemently discussed in the founding phase of Ethology as a scientific
discipline and still is. This multi-layered problem can be grasped by using the concept of
methodological signatures, developed by Köchy etal. (2016c). It is designed to analyse and
systematically compare animal research approaches by examining their common param-
eters. By examining the works of Konrad Lorenz (1903–1989) and Nikolaas Tinbergen
(1907–1988), this paper offers new insights both on a methodological and theoretical level.
Methodologically, the application of the concept of methodological signatures is illus-
trated; theoretically, the principles of Classic Ethology are analysed. My aim is to illustrate
how the problem of scientific access to animal subjectivity was addressed in the history
of Ethology by analysing statements about animal sentience. For this purpose, I will first
outline the general discussion about animal subjectivity and the tension between anthro-
pomorphism and empirical adequacy. I introduce my own theoretical and methodological
framework before presenting an analysis of Lorenz’ and Tinbergen’s methodological signa-
tures. Thereby, I show how the question of terminology is deeply embedded in a network of
epistemological, methodological and ontological concepts and establish key characteristics
in regard to ethological approaches to animal subjectivity. Finally, I shed light on the pos-
sibility of using this typology to examine current frameworks of animal welfare research.
Keywords Konrad Lorenz· Nikolaas Tinbergen· Animal behaviour· Animal subjectivity
* Anna Klassen
anna.klassen@uni-jena.de
1 Lehrstuhl für Geschichte und Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften mit dem Schwerpunkt
Lebenswissenschaften, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Jena, Germany
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1 Introduction
Since its beginning, behavioural research has been confronted with the question of the
methodological, terminological and ontological problem of other minds1 in the investiga-
tion of non-human animals (hereafter referred to as animals) (Böhnert and Hilbert 2018,
4–7). The ability to have experiences that are directly accessible only to the experiencing
entity itself, e.g. emotions, intentions or thoughts, was discussed regarding either its sheer
existence, observability or in which way it could be adequately designated. These experi-
ences are hereinafter grouped together under the concept of animal subjectivity. An ongo-
ing discussion in the study of animal behaviour is about the question, whether subjective
states could be scientific research objects at all, if some could and other not.
Denial of animal subjectivity has its roots in Cartesian subject philosophy (Kurth 2016,
18). Descartes’ mind–body-dualism and his thesis that animals (in contrast to humans) are
machines are regarded as central components of a narrative in animal research according to
which animals are mere corporeal beings without any sentience (Schmitz 2014, 34; Wild
2013, 44–53; Toepfer 2011, 494). Yet, this strong form of anthropological difference2 was
difficult to maintain in its original form due to the notion of phylogenetic kinship in the
theory of evolution. Today, the evolutionary continuity between non-human and human
animals is a widely recognized scientific fact that, on its own, has to be considered with
regard to definitions of anthropological difference (Wild 2013, 54–59).
The purpose of stressing the anthropological difference in behavioural research is the
avoidance of anthropomorphism, i.e. “the attribution of human characteristics (including
the projection of subjective states and feelings) to non-human entities” (Morton etal. 1990,
13). Thereby, the scientific nature of animal behavioural research is supposed to be secured
(Hilbert 2018, 141–142). Throughout Ethology’s history as a discipline, efforts were made
to distance it from other behavioural research that explicitly used employed subjective
states as explanations for animal behaviour, such as Animal Psychology (Toepfer 2011,
466–467) or Natural History (Wuketits 1995, 24).3 On the other hand, there are also voices
arguing for critical and reflective anthropomorphism (Wild 2013, 73; Böhnert and Hilbert
2018), or, by coining the counter-term “anthropodenial”, criticise the a priori rejection of
possible common characteristics of humans and animals (Waal 2006, 59–67). Especially
in animal welfare research there is an ongoing discussion about the possibility of assessing
animals’ subjective states (Wemelsfelder 1997; Lijmbach 1998; Proctor etal. 2013).
This paper portrays how the problem of scientific access to animal subjectivity was
addressed in the early history of Ethology by analysing selected research approaches in
which the (de)legitimisation for the use of subjective terminology is discussed. By exam-
ining the works of Konrad Lorenz (1903–1989) and Nikolaas Tinbergen (1907–1988),
this paper offers new insights both on a methodological and on a theoretical level. Meth-
odologically, the application of the concept of methodological signatures is illustrated;
2 “Anthropological difference” describes the characteristic(s) by which humans are essentially different
from all other animals (Wild 2013, 25–28).
3 The term “Ethology” stems from Oskar Heinroth, one of Lorenz’ mentors and is closely connected to
Lorenz’ research approach since the 1930s (Toepfer 2011, 462, 467). As the disciplinary boundaries were
still a matter of controversy in the historic period this paper covers (Meyer-Holzapfel 1984), the terms “Ani-
mal Psychology” or “Comparative Psychology” are also used by Lorenz and Tinbergen to refer to their field
of research.
1 I use a broad concept of “mind”, referring not only to cognitive, but also to emotional and intentional
states, and sentience.
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theoretically, the principles of Classic Ethology are analysed according to this concept.
Finally, the systematic usefulness of the historical analysis is presented. By application
of the key characteristics of Classical Ethology to a fairly new method in animal welfare
research called Qualitative Behaviour Assessment, I will show both the applicability of the
developed framework as well as shed light on possible modifications to animal behaviour
research in the 21st century.
1.1 Methodological Signatures
My approach based on the philosophical concept of methodological signatures. This pro-
grammatic concept of philosophy of science was developed in the interdisciplinary field
of human-animal-studies (Köchy etal. 2016c; 2016b, 81; 2016a, 359–360). In tradition
of a contextual approach in philosophy of science, as established in history and sociol-
ogy of science (e.g. Fleck 1981 or Latour 1987), a complex framework of foundational
assumptions can be generated (Böhnert 2020, 95). For this, the interaction of parameters of
a research approach is examined, i.e. “the specific combination of the explicit and implicit
key characteristics” (Böhnert and Hilbert 2018, 3). A none-exhaustive list of potential key
characteristics contains preferred reference animals, their primarily investigated abilities,
methodology, research locations, the underlying scientific ideal, the positioning in relation
to other research approaches and the philosophical background assumptions and implica-
tions (Köchy etal. 2016c, 14). In the case of historical research approaches, those key char-
acteristics are inferred from scientific texts which address a similar research problem. The
concept of methodological signatures is a tool for the analysis and comparison of different
scientific approaches in animal research (Böhnert 2020, 94), that do not have to be simi-
lar content-wise. On the contrary, it can be assumed that the basic presumptions are more
apparent in the case of controversies (Böhnert 2020, 16). This applies also to the present
case, since Lorenz and Tinbergen strive to set their research approach apart from both Ani-
mal Psychology and Behaviourism with emphasis on the question of animal subjectivity.
Due to the notion of research approaches as complex structures of explicit and implicit
methodology, epistemology and ontology, the (de)legitimisation of subjective terminology
is not only about terminology.
The aim of this paper is to show the network of epistemological, methodological, and
ontological assumptions in which such (de)legitimation strategies are embedded. This is
carried out by analysing statements about animal experience in the research of Konrad
Lorenz and Nikolaas Tinbergen who laid the methodological and conceptual groundwork
for Ethology as a discipline. In the first half of the twentieth century, Lorenz and Tinber-
gen presented themselves as scientists between two extremes of the spectrum of animal
behaviour research, namely Animal Psychology and Behaviourism.4 They demarcated their
research approach as the middle ground of those positions. Classical Ethology is presented
by Lorenz and Tinbergen as a scientific discipline that does not make the same mistakes
as its competitors, those mistakes being either anthropomorphism (Animal Psychology) or
reductionism (Behaviourism). They understood their own approach as capable of detailed
analysis due to two factors: Its conceptual foundation in evolutionary theory and its meth-
odology that prioritises being close to the phenomena in question.
4 These classifications are actors’ categories. Since I am interested in the arguments for demarcation
against the two other disciplines, I use these stereotypical categorisations.
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2 Lorenz’ andTinbergen’s Methodological Signatures
Before presenting Lorenz’ and Tinbergen’s respective methodological signatures it should
be pointed out that Tinbergen distinguishes more clearly between programmatic and
research writings than Lorenz. Lorenz, in turn, does theorize to a greater extent than Tin-
bergen. He is also the one who stages his life with animals in a sensational way parallel to
his research on animals (Meyer-Holzapfel 1984, 23–24; Tinbergen 1978, 139–140). Tin-
bergen, on the other hand, plays the role of the empirical researcher who always maintains
distance from his research objects (Burkhardt 2005, 188). Thus, Lorenz is seen, in the sci-
entific community as well as in the public, as the driving force behind the establishment of
Ethology, even by Tinbergen himself:
“[Lorenz] has made us apply ‘biological thinking’ to a phenomenon to which it had
hitherto not been as consistently applied as was desirable. […] I also submit that this is
an achievement of tremendous importance and that, if anything deserves the much-abused
name of ‘a major break-through’, Lorenz’ [sic] achievement does.” (Tinbergen 1963, 411).
2.1 Lorenz
The core of Lorenz’ theory is the concept of instinct. He defines instinct as an innate neuro-
physiological reaction (Lorenz 1965d, 346–350), and sharply distinguished it from learned
behaviour (Burkhardt 2005, 147). In this regard, Lorenz is also interested in the reconstruc-
tion of phylogenetic relationships on the basis of behavioural characteristics (Burkhardt
2005, 146). His initial goal was to integrate evolutionary explanation into the discipline
of Animal Psychology (Lorenz 1937). This orientation was the basis for the cooperation
between Lorenz and Tinbergen. Both agreed that Ethology should not deal with subjective
experiences of animals (Burkhardt 2005, 204).
The most prominent difference between Tinbergen and Lorenz is the uniformity of their
theories. In Lorenz’ post-war-writing, a departure from the strong claim to reject animal
subjectivity can be observed (Cranach and Lorenz 1992) (English translation: Lorenz and
Cranach 1996). Here, he attempts to unite the natural sciences and the humanities (Bur-
khardt 2005, 279). This is also associated with a new way of looking at animal subjectivity
(Lorenz 1966a) and the development of the concept of evolutionary epistemology.
Lorenz’ “Kumpan”-monograph is regarded as the elaboration of his fundamental etho-
logical concepts; above all the concept of instinct (Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1984, 67; Lorenz 1965b,
124) and Comparative Psychology of Perception (Burkhardt 2005, 164). Ontological
and methodological statements are mostly used in the context of justification of Lorenz’
instinct theory, for the demarcation against predominant Animal Psychology positions and
for the further development of Uexküll’s environmental theory. It is noteworthy to say that
the concepts of “Kumpan” (companion) and “Umwelt” (environment) used by Lorenz are
strongly influenced by Uexküll (Burkhardt 2005, 154–158), but Lorenz puts them in an
evolutionary context—in clear opposition to Uexküll.5
Lorenz emphasises the practice of “Comparative Psychology as a biological science
[translation AK]” (Lorenz 1965b, 124). By this he means the implementation of the idea
of the phylogenetic Bauplan (plan or blueprint, another term by Uexküll) to investigate the
instinctive behaviour of animals and to distinguish it from intelligent behaviour: “Without
5 However, Lorenz uses evolutionary terms such as species survival primarily to demonstrate that a causal
analysis can describe all aspects of behaviour.
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exact knowledge of an animal’s instinctive plan, one does not even know how difficult the
problem is for the animal [translation AK]” (Lorenz 1965b, 124). Instinct, according to
Lorenz, is analogous to an organ, not to mental activity and thus determined by the Bau-
plan (Lorenz 1965b, 274).
To distinguish instinct movements correctly from learned behaviour Lorenz formulates
methodological requirements for good scientific practice in Ethology. The methodologi-
cal theses of the pre-war works emphasize the value of long-term observation (Burkhardt
2005, 147) and experience based on scientific intuition: „In general, a somewhat experi-
enced animal keeper recognizes instinct behaviour of his fosterlings, as far as one recog-
nizes them at all, without any further thought completely emotionally as such [translation
AK]” (Lorenz 1965a, 89).
While the pre-war works served positioning himself in relation to a developing scientific
community, Lorenz’ writings from the war on are considered the “conception of a compar-
ative behavioural research […] in its essential theoretical components [translation AK].”
(Wunsch 2016, 278) Explicit ontological declarations and methodological theses can be
found here. One of them is the statement that “[t]he universe is governed by a hierarchical
framework of natural laws in which broader, simpler principles are always incorporated
into the narrower ranges of validity of special, more complex principles, because they [the
simple principles, AK] provide the foundations for them [the more complex principles,
AK]” (Lorenz and Cranach 1996, 40).
Lorenz’ concept of evolution fits the model of the hierarchical framework of natural
laws. He stresses the idea of the “history of the organic, determined by a unique and genu-
ine causal process, that let complex systems emerge from simpler ones. Simpler entities
have always been the cause of more complex entities and not vice versa. All living beings
are historical beings, and a real understanding of their being [So-Sein] is only possible on
the basis of a historical understanding of the unique process of evolution that led to their
development towards this and no other form [translation AK]” (Lorenz 1965c, 383).
Let me lead over to the question of terminology that is associated with the theoretical
assumptions of instinct, the methodological requirements and the strong emphasis on the
evolutionary framing of biological research.
Statements about animals’ inner life accumulate in the later writings of Lorenz. He
refers to animal subjectivity as a necessary premise to describe animal behaviour ade-
quately and comprehensively in certain species. There, Lorenz rejects Behaviourism’s
physical reductionism (Lorenz 1978, 17) and the Cartesian mind–body-dualism in favour
of what he describes as psychophysical parallelism (Cranach and Lorenz 1992, 157,
233–234), but would rather be more correctly defined as psychophysical monism.
“As inductively operating natural scientists, we must base our conclusions regarding the
relationship between mind and body in the undoubted, universally evident empirical fact
that spiritual [better: mental, AK] processes simply do not exist without parallel processes
operating [better: occuring, AK] in a living organism […]” (Lorenz and Cranach 1996,
158). According to Lorenz, subjective states are functions of living organisms (Cranach
and Lorenz 1992, 156). Thus, they must be regarded as products of evolution (Cranach and
Lorenz 1992, 153).
Starting from this understanding of evolution, Lorenz asks for the survival value of
subjective states. He finds it in experiencing pleasure and pain, since they are necessary
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preconditions for modifiable behaviour in the sense of learning. Thus, e.g. operant condi-
tioning of animals by “carrot and stick” is based on subjectivity, namely on the distinction
between pleasant and unpleasant stimuli (Cranach and Lorenz 1992, 242). The physiologi-
cal preconditions for this are complex sensory organs and a central nervous system (Cra-
nach and Lorenz 1992, 244), so this form of subjectivity can occur e.g. in mammals or
birds.
The possibility of inferring the existence of subjective states in animals from the sur-
vival value of pleasure and pain leads Lorenz to the proposition that, in higher animals,
instinct movement is linked with a subjective state, called Funktionslust (pleasure of
functioning (Lorenz 1966b, 337)). It is defined as the self-rewarding function of endog-
enous automatic movements that makes animals surge for the triggering stimulus for the
movement and thus serving the survival value of the instinct movement (Lorenz 1965c,
390–391).
Examining Lorenz’ methodological signature on the basis of his notion of animal sub-
jectivity leads to the conclusion that his concept of animal subjectivity is broad. It ranges
from the simple difference of pain and pleasure to the ability for informed decision making
(Lorenz 1965b, 131),6 so from what may be called very basic emotional states to high men-
tal performances. But not only animal subjectivity is a benchmark in Lorenz’ methodologi-
cal signature, human subjectivity is important as well. It plays a role in Lorenz’ biologised
epistemology to that extent that long-term observation, expertise and emotional commit-
ment in combination with physiological, physio-chemical approaches lead to scientifically
valuable results.
2.2 Tinbergen
Tinbergen’s approach of defining Ethology through the questions it asks is fundamental to
the identity of this scientific discipline (Burkhardt 2005, 12) and is still taught today (e.g.
(Kappeler 2017, 4–5; Naguib 2006, 8). In his 1963 article “On aims and methods of Ethol-
ogy” he states that Ethology should be able to answer the questions concerning causation,
survival value, evolution and ontogeny of behaviour. Causation and ontogeny have to be
investigated at the level of the individual animal, evolution and survival value at the level
of the population.
There theoretical demands are based on Tinbergen’s methodology that insists on a cer-
tain concept of objective research (Wuketits 1995, 77), proximity to natural phenomena
(Tinbergen 1963, 411) and a consistent, self-restrained methodology (Tinbergen 1942, 93).
According to Tinbergen, “Comparative Ethology consciously returns to a sounder mode
of approach [than Behaviourism, AK], in which the problem again is primary, the method
secondary.” (Tinbergen 1942, 42) The basis for this kind of research are observation data
collected over many years by experienced field workers. Good ethologists are “good natu-
ralists” (Tinbergen 1963, 427) who, through experience with the observed animals, per-
ceive more behavioural details and also have knowledge of the biological value of behav-
iour in relation to the environment. Although the animal is the clear focus of Ethology, it
should not be treated as an isolated object.
6 Since Lorenz is not interested in researching animal intelligence, he only mentions it as a possible capac-
ity of higher animals such as parrots or chimpanzees.
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Tinbergen also takes in consideration the relation of observation and theory building.
He makes three methodological claims:
1. “First, there is a need for ever increasing detailedness.” (Tinbergen 1942, 43) Accord-
ing to Tinbergen, it is necessary to get a complete overview of how many and which
elements one kind of behaviour consists of, since it can consist of different individual
movements. Tinbergen contrasts this approach with that of Animal Psychology, whose
aim it is to investigate animal emotions and therefore only deals with movements that
are considered to be the expressions of emotions (Tinbergen 1942, 44). According to
Tinbergen, however, subjective factors as emotions cannot be objectively understood,
which is why, as causal factors, they must not play any role in objectivistic research
(Tinbergen 1966, 4–5).
2. “Secondly, consideration of the whole behaviour pattern of a species is necessary”
(Tinbergen 1942, 43). Even in one species the comparison between different kinds of
behaviour can lead to meaningful and exhaustive insights. “Knowledge of the whole
behaviour-pattern of a species saves us from seeing a controversy in what is actually
differentiation” (Tinbergen 1942, 45).
3. “Thirdly, comparison of behaviour patterns of a species is necessary” (Tinbergen 1942,
43). Tinbergen seeks to avoid monolithic explanations and instead points out the require-
ment of an accurate overview of the causal factors of behaviour (Tinbergen 1942, 46).
For this reason, the research method must always be adjusted to the examined spe-
cies—otherwise there is a risk of erroneous analogy under the pretence of an overall,
non-species-specific generalisation (Tinbergen 1966, 14). This implicates a discontinu-
ous understanding of evolution – the premise is that each species’ behaviour should be
foremost recognised in regard to its current inner and outer conditions, in contrast to a
historical comparative analysis of behaviour.
Tinbergen’s objective is to address the inconsistency of contemporary Ethology by clar-
ifying its questions. According to him, the foundation of all ethological thinking should
be based in the understanding Ethology as “the biological study of behaviour” (Tinbergen
1963, 411). The question that precedes all ethological research is: “Why do these animals
behave as they do?” (Tinbergen 1963, 411). This question is synonymous to: “What are
the causes of [their] movements?” (Tinbergen 1942, 49–50). The goal of Ethology is to
uncover the individual causal factors and to explain their origin. The system of causal fac-
tors is built on the basis of the “major biological problem”, which are the problems of (1)
causation, (2) survival value, (3) ontogenesis and (4) evolution (Tinbergen 1963, 411).
Subjective terminology in the sense of assumptions about purposiveness of behaviour
is a precarious issue for Tinbergen in so far as there is a danger of a false attribution of
intentionality, in the sense of: The animal is aware of the function of behaviour and wants
to bring about its purpose intentionally. The possibility of fallacy is also embedded in Tin-
bergen’s notion of intertwined causalities: Inferring from I know from myself a behaviour
pattern with the goal X to If an animal reaches X with the motion sequence ABC, then it
ABC is X behaviour does not take into consideration that B may not contribute to X at all,
but may be a factor whose effect is Y or which even has no function at all.
So, the use of subjective terminology is, according to Tinbergen, an obstacle in the pre-
cise study of the relationship of the various causal factors of behaviour.
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3 Key Characteristics inRegard toEthological Approaches toAnimal
Subjectivity
Having identified the demands Lorenz and Tinbergen make on ethological research, I will
now present the key characteristics of their respective methodological signatures. The key
characteristics are phrased as problems the methodological signatures address in their spe-
cific way.
Lorenz and Tinbergen, distancing themselves from both Animal Psychology and Behav-
iourism, which stand for the two poles of approaches to animal subjectivity in Ethology:
Tinbergen demands a strict rejection of subjective concepts in an objective scientific
research approach, Lorenz provides the context-related acceptance of subjective terms in
the service of a systematic, species-specific and uniform description of some abilities in
some animals in particular in his post-war writings.
Both approaches share the orientation towards evolution and natural science. However,
Lorenz adds the orientation towards a broader philosophical framework. Separating him-
self from Animal Psychology, he justifies subjective terminology methodologically and
modifies his philosophical background assumptions in the direction of an epistemologi-
cal programme. Tinbergen strictly rejects subjective terminology on the basis of methodo-
logical and epistemological claims. In this case, too, an evolutionary theoretical framework
is invested, largely abstaining from ontological assumptions, but the underlying scientific
ideal restricts explanations to causal references and material factors.
On the basis of the approaches to the problem of animal subjectivity, three key charac-
teristics can be identified as constitutive for Lorenz’ and Tinbergen’s methodological signa-
tures: The concept of phylogenetic kinship, temporal and spatial requirements of research
and the semantic content of the concept of subjective terminology. They are characterised
as follows:
1. The concept of phylogenetic kinship: Both Lorenz and Tinbergen emphasise the neces-
sity to base Ethology on the concept of evolution. Lorenz understands evolution as
a continuum of increasingly complex beings in regard to quantitatively measurable
characteristics, but also accentuates the qualitative differences between the species that
emerge from the quantitative differences. According to Lorenz, subjectivity can only be
assumed on a certain level of materiality, i.e. organisms with a central nervous system
and a sophisticated sensory apparatus. The use of subjective terms is therefore only
legitimate for certain animal species.
Tinbergen’s notion of evolution emphasizes discontinuity and focuses on individual
present species. Therefore, it is inadmissible, to explain behaviour of one species by
transferring theories that are the result of research on another species.
In addition, the notion of phylogenetic kinship is closely connected to the concept of
anthropological difference (Taylor 2011, 267–268): understanding evolution as a con-
tinuum is the condition of the possibility of inferring the knowledge about subjective
states in humans to other species, if there is no contradictory biological evidence. In
contrast, if evolution is understood as discontinuous, one is not allowed to draw conclu-
sions from one species’ behavioural patterns to another’s.
2. Methodological and spatial requirements: Both Lorenz and Tinbergen stress the impor-
tance of long-term observation in the field. Its value lies in the fact that behaviour should
be investigated in relation to its function for the individual animal and the species as an
outcome of evolution. Both the relationship of the individual behavioural elements to
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each other and the relationship between behaviour and the environment are accessible
in this observational situation. Especially Lorenz emphasises the value of research on
wild animals and not on domesticated ones, since the latter tend to show dysfunctional
behaviour. Additionally, observational expertise, i.e. familiarity with the target species,
can only develop in an adequately long observational time. Thus, behavioural research
should be carried out long-term.
3. The semantic content of the concept of subjective terminology: Lorenz’ methodological
signature is characterised by a differentiation in subjective terminology. He discrimi-
nates general from specific and emotional from cognitive terms. He rejects specific and
cognitive terms, whereas he advocates for the use of general emotional terminology, that
is to say the distinction between positive and negative subjective states. On the other
hand, Tinbergen regards all propositions about animals’ inner life as unscientific. This
ranges from emotions to intentionality.
Regarding the application of this key characteristics to research approaches, the seman-
tic content of the concept of subjective terminology must be considered in terms of differ-
entiation and range: Is subjectivity characterised broadly as experience or does it refer to
emotion, cognition or even specific experiences like boredom or surprise? And, if subjec-
tive terminology is rejected, does this mean all kinds of terms or just a subset?
4 Outlook onCurrent Frameworks ofEthological Research inAnimal
Welfare
In recent years, animal subjectivity and associated questions about meta-theoretical basic
assumptions and methodological principles have emerged in philosophy and other disci-
plines in the context of human–animal-studies. Applied ethology, a discipline that is tradi-
tionally concerned with animal welfare, is central in this debate.7 From a philosophy of sci-
ence perspective, the consideration of recently developed methodologies to adequate grasp
animal sentience seem promising (Rault and Doyle 2016, 114–116).
The example chosen for this paper is Qualitative Behaviour Assessment (QBA), because
of its already widespread application (Lawrence 2016, 134) and its explicitly programmatic
statements. The aim of this section is to apply the developed key characteristics of research
approaches that are explicitly concerned with questions regarding animal subjectivity.
QBA was developed by Françoise Wemelsfelder and her collegues in the early 1990s
(Lawrence 2016, 139), and is now applied to farm animals (Wemelsfelder et al. 2000;
Fleming etal. 2013; Rutherford etal. 2012; Grosso et al. 2016; Minero etal. 2016), but
also to zoo animals and pets (Arena etal. 2017), and which has been incorporated into the
EU Welfare Quality® project (ISAE Creativity Award 2017).
The aim of QBA is to create an “overt, quantifiable measure for behavioural expression”
(Fleming etal. 2013, 87), which involves the use of subjective terms. To legitimise this ter-
minology, the approach applies statistical schematisation techniques (Free Choice Profiling
and Geneteal Procrustes Analysis (Wemelsfelder etal. 2001, 211–213)) to terms that are
supposed to describe the “expressive state” (Wemelsfelder etal. 2001, 210) of an animal.
7 Another discipline is Cognitive Ethology which is examined thoroughly in (Böhnert 2020).
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The terms themselves are generated by experienced animal-handlers like farmers or vet-
erinarians who are shown video-recordings of pigs and tasked with describing the “‘body
language’ apparent in the entire demeanour of an animal” (Wemelsfelder etal. 2012, 3654).
In her programmatic writings, Wemelsfelder refers to philosophical notions by e.g.
rejecting “models of animal behaviour and welfare […] based on dualistic principles, as
conceived by the seventeenth century French philosopher Descartes” (Wemelsfelder 1997,
76). She argues against a soley mechanistic, chemo-physical approach, i.e. considering ani-
mals only as “purely physical systems as we understand physical systems today” (Wemels-
felder 2001, 129). Wemelsfelder instead bases her research in philosophical assumptions
about the categorical comprehensibility of other minds adapted from Wittgenstein’s private
language argument (Wemelsfelder etal. 2001, 219).
The application of key characteristics of Classic Ethology to QBA enables philosophers
of science to identify and systematise basic assumptions of animal research approaches
that are concerned with animal subjectivity. Additionally, in comparison to historical
approaches, distinctive features of today’s research concerning animal subjectivity can
become more visible.
I will outline the possibilities by applying the three key characteristics from the analysis
of Lorenz’ and Tinbergen’s methodological signatures:
1. The concept of phylogenetic kinship: Because of the explicit use of subjective termi-
nology, QBA researchers feel compelled to distance themselves from allegations of
anthropomorphism. As shown above, the suspicion of anthropomorphism can only be
connected with the use of subjective terminology only if a categorical anthropologi-
cal difference is assumed. Wemelsfelder tackles possible suspicions by upholding the
notion of the evolutionary continuum: “Careful observation of an animal’s behavioural
expression (is it nervous, is it relaxed?) should decrease, not increase, the risk of pro-
jecting human fears and preferences. The description of animal expressive repertoires
throughout the evolutionary continuum could generate information about the evolution
of emotion, and help prevent the postulation of arbitrary ‘cut-off points’” (Wemelsfelder
2001, 135). The assessment of animal subjectivity is presented not only as a means to
determine factors relevant for animal welfare in the disciplinary framework of Applied
Ethology, but also as a prerequisite for research in evolutionary biology.
2. Methodological and spatial requirements: Tough QBA explicitly assesses domesticated
animals living in man-made environments, its methodology is similar to Lorenz’ and
Tinbergen’s in regard to the question of expertise. Even contemporary critics of subject-
related approaches in applied Ethology stress the importance of experience and practice
in observing animal behaviour (Tuyttens etal. 2014, 278).
In QBA, video recordings replace the observers’ presence, thus render the observation
of the same behaviour possible for everyone who is given access to the recordings. This
research situation shows characteristics of laboratory research (continuous presence of
the object of research, miniaturization of the natural phenomenon by technical means,
phenomenal time sequences are replaced by social ones (Knorr-Cetina 2002, 47)) as
well as of field research (observation of complex and variable phenomena (Kohler
2002)). Hence, QBA turns out to be an overlap of opposing scientific cultural terrains
(Köchy 2010, 167), especially when considering the fact, that the observed entities are
products of nature as well as of human culture. It is worth taking a closer look at the
anthropogenic aspects of animal behaviour in Applied Ethology and the interpretation
of domesticated animals in contrast to wild ones.
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In regard to observational methodology, QBA is much more reliant on both tech-
nological means and statistics than Lorenz or Tinbergen. QBA uses a combination of
statistical teqchniques to both quantify qualitative descriptions of animal behaviour
(Wemelsfelder etal. 2001, 210–213) and also to test their reliability and validity. The
statistically proven quantifiability of qualitative terminology is supposed to legitimise
the use of this terminology. Examining the quantification of qualitative research can be
linked to the discussion about mechanism in biological research in general (e.g. Kaiser
and Craver 2013).
3. The semantic content of the concept of subjective terminology: At this point, QBA
does not have a fixed set of terms or a unified methodology of creating them. Usually,
emotional terms are used (Des Boyer Roches etal. 2018; Minero etal. 2018), but there
is also research regarding temperament (Parham etal. 2019), or terminology based on
human mental medical conditions like depression (Harvey etal. 2019). The processes
by which sets of terms are compiled also differ: The terminology is either defined in the
process of the actual behaviour assessment (Patel etal. 2019) or based on a “pre-fixed
list of descriptors” (Grosso etal. 2016, 52), selected from existing ethological literature
and revised by experts. QBA today is a method on the level of journal science, “bear[ing]
the imprint of the provisional and personal” (Fleck 1981, 118). For future research, it
would be interesting to investigate processes of standardisation and unification of QBA
in regard to particular species.
5 Concluding Remarks
The aim of this paper was to use the analysis of historical positions to determine key char-
acteristics of Classic Ethology by applying the tool of methodological signatures. The basic
question in animal behaviour research is the adequate destruction and analysis of animal
behaviour. By analysing Lorenz’ and Tinbergen’s research approaches I showed the episte-
mological, methodological and ontological basic assumptions that constitute the (de)legiti-
misation of subjective terminology. Those basic assumptions were used to define three key
characteristics of ethological research concerned with animal subjectivity: The concept of
phylogenetic kinship, temporal and spatial requirements of research and the semantic con-
tent of the concept of subjective terminology.
The fruitfulness of applying the tool of methodological signatures to examine current
animal behaviour research was shown by the example of QBA. The transfer of the key
characteristics highlights the distinctive features of QBA’s research approach, e.g. the
opportunities of audio-visual technology, while still being connected to a broader frame-
work of ontological assumptions like the evolutionary continuum or the necessity of expe-
rienced observers. An extension of the scope of investigation to other ethological research
approaches, their stance towards animal subjectivity and the associated basic assumptions
seems productive for future studies in the history and philosophy of biology.
Acknowledgements The author would like to thank the research group Integrative Biophilosophie at the
University of Kassel, especially Kristian Köchy, Robert Meunier and Martin Böhnert for their valuable
advice on previous work on this topic, the colloquium under David Löwenstein at the Friedrich-Schiller-
Universität Jena for constructive criticism of an early draft of this paper, and the anonymous referees for
their helpful comments.
Funding Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL.
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as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Com-
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