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Middle Eastern Studies
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fmes20
Israel, Turkey, and the Turkish Jewish community
in light of Operation Protective Edge
Efrat Aviv
To cite this article: Efrat Aviv (2021): Israel, Turkey, and the Turkish Jewish community in light of
Operation Protective Edge, Middle Eastern Studies, DOI: 10.1080/00263206.2021.1937998
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2021.1937998
Published online: 23 Jun 2021.
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MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
Israel, Turkey, and the Turkish Jewish community
in light of Operation Protective Edge
Efrat Aviv
Department of General History, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel
The Turkish context proves challenging for the development of a minority discourse in ways
that differ from other countries due to challenges of, among other things, creating a substantive
form of equality. Although the Treaty of Lausanne provided non-Muslim minorities with a sub-
stantive right to ethno-cultural and religious diversity, as well as equality among citizens, the
remaining structures of the ‘millet system’, which should not be confused with the Ottoman
discourse on tolerance, can still be seen. The Ottoman background continued to affect policies
regarding minorities in Turkey during the transition from empire to a nation-state in two ways:
first, one’s creed continued to determine the criteria of inclusion and exclusion, and second,
the fifth column and/or secessionist acts of the latter resulted in a loss of confidence in minority
rights and minorities themselves. Inequality has also been manifested through the lack of rec-
ognition of ethno-cultural, ethno-linguistic, and cultural differences among Muslims in Turkey,
such as Kurds, Alevis, and other communities.
The discourse on minorities in Turkey has legally changed as over the years Turkish politics
and political culture have worked to establish a close linkage between citizenship and nation-
ality, which has led to the discussion of ‘who is a Turk?’ The answer to this question continues
to nurture the imagined unity of the Muslim millet, which remained intact through the posi-
tioning of non-Muslims as ‘others’. From the 1950s onwards, minorities began to be defined not
according to nationalist aspirations in internal politics, but by diplomatic crises that rocked
external relations. In this way, non-Muslim minorities frequently lost socio-political and economic
security whenever the Turkish government faced a diplomatic crisis. In this decade, the rela-
tionship between Turkey and the recently established State of Israel defined the position of
Turkish Jewry and raised questions regarding its national identity. Eventually, by the 1990s, the
intersection of these internal and external issues pushed Turkey to review its traditional concept
and treatment of minorities. This was followed by Turkey’s candidacy in joining the European
Union. Yet, in periods when relations between Israel and Turkey have deteriorated, restrictions
and discrimination vis-à-vis the Jewish minority that marked the Turkish policy of the 1950s
were implemented and justified through the prism of security, even if only in an unofficial
manner. Growing Islamization has further complicated this situation and, with the rise of the
AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi or Justice and Development Party, hereafter AKP), in 2002 and
the deterioration of bilateral relations with Israel starting from 2008, has severely affected the
government’s and then Turkish society’s attitude toward the Jewish community in the state.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Al-Aqsa Intifada between 2000 and 2005, the Mavi Marmara
flotilla incident in 2010, and the 2014 Gaza conflict were the main historical points where
Israeli-Turkish relations were tested. Operation Protective Edge is the recent military operation
that served as a test case for the relations between both countries and their relations’ impact
on the Jewish minority in Turkey.
© 2021 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
CONTACT Efrat Aviv efrat.aviv@biu.ac.il
https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2021.1937998
2 E. AVIV
Historical background of relations
The establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 was seen positively in Turkey, which increased
the local Jewish community’s prestige in the eyes of Turkish society. On the other hand, massive
Jewish immigration to Israel took place, and within a short time, the Jewish community in
Turkey was noticeably reduced.1 According to Avner Levy, mass immigration gradually made it
impossible to run independent institutions, which led to the integration of the Jews into general
Turkish society and culture as never before.2 Adina Weiss disagrees with Levi regarding the
impact of Israel’s establishment on Turkish Jewry. According to Weiss, from the establishment
of the State of Israel in 1948, an anti-Israel element was added, so the distinction between
antisemitic and anti-Israel sentiments in Turkey became blurred,3 a phenomenon that continued
until the twenty-first century. According to Mücahit Düzgün, Turkey remained neutral during
the Israeli-Arab War in 1948, but public opinion was mostly in favour of the Arabs. In 1950,
when the Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti) replaced the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet
Halk Partisi), which put an end to a long-lasting single-party regime, great hopes rose among
minority groups as well. The Democrat Party asserted that religious, linguistic, or cultural dis-
tinctions would no longer be subject to discrimination. However, in the mid-1950s, ethno-cultural
differences continued to be associated with socio-political and economic inequality. Non-Muslims
were still perceived as ‘unreliable’ and ‘undesirable’ in the eyes of the authorities as well as by
the public. However, according to Ahmet İçduygu and B. Ali Soner, and unlike in previous
decades, the position of minorities began to be defined not by nationalist aspirations relating
to internal politics, but by diplomatic crises of foreign relations. Füsun Türkmen and Emre Öktem
have different opinions. According to them, the continuity of the affinity between Turkish foreign
policy and its treatment of its non-Muslim minorities was mainly embodied in one of its neg-
ative aspects.4 Because non-Muslim minorities were considered agents of external forces, namely
enemies, they lost sociopolitical and economic security in Turkey whenever the latter faced
diplomatic disputes outside the country. This assumption can be exemplified by the treatment
of Jews.
Turkey adopted a hardline foreign policy against Greece as the conflict over Cyprus escalated
in 1954. The Greek minority living in Turkey was accused of siding with the Greek Cypriots.
Members of the Greek minority began to be treated as ‘foreign’ and even ‘hazardous’ to the
country. In addition, the house where Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was born was burned in Salonika.
As a result, on 6–7 September 1955, anti-Greek violence erupted in Istanbul and Izmir, and this
violence expanded to the burning of Jewish-owned businesses and threats to Jews and
Armenians. A mass riot in Istanbul and Izmir destroyed the cultural, religious, and economic
presence of minorities, not just the Greek minority. In 1955, in riots against Greeks, which
expanded to encompass other minorities, more than 5000 buildings, including churches, schools,
and shops belonging to minorities, including Jews, were damaged. The total cost of these events
was USD $300 million; probably fifteen people lost their lives.5 In 1964, twenty-four Jews who
held Greek citizenship were expelled from Turkey, along with other Greeks whose rights were
denied.6
Antisemitic incidents related to Israel that arose at the end of the 1960s and the beginning
of the 1970s were connected to the Arab population residing in Turkey, some of which may
have contained elements of Palestinian guerrilla organisations. From the 1960s onward, relations
toward the Jews of Turkey were dictated by Turkey’s approach toward the State of Israel. In
recent years, the number of antisemitic publications in Turkey has increased, and they have
become more aggressive, especially after the Six-Day War. These years (1960s–1970s) were char-
acterised by the dissemination of radical ideologies, crises of confidence in the regime, dissension
within political parties, the rise of violent groups, and increasing deterioration of the economic
situation, all of which opened the road to military interventions in 1971 and 1980. Under these
conditions and in light of Israel’s victory in the Six-Day War, propaganda against Jews was bound
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 3
to increase.7 The three main threats to Turkey in the eyes of antisemitic publishers were Zionism,
Communism, and Freemasonry.8 The Israeli Consul Efraim Elrom was murdered after being kid-
napped and held captive in 1971. During the trial against Elrom’s murderers, some Turks took
advantage of the delicate situation to commit antisemitic acts.9
Turkey-Israel relations reached a diplomatic low after the Israeli government’s declaration of
Jerusalem as Israel’s ‘eternal and indivisible capital’ on 30 July 1980. Ankara then decided to
lower its diplomatic representation in Israel to advisory status. Until the 1990s, relations between
Israel and Turkey were spearheaded by the United States and emanated from Turkey’s military
requirements; Israel was ready to modernise Turkish airplanes and share intelligence, even
though intelligence and other forms of cooperation existed throughout the low-contact years,
1950–1990. Relations were, to a large extent, predicated on the Cold War and Turkey’s position
as a key ally of the Western camp. Turkish-Israeli relations were influenced by the larger
Arab-Israeli conflict in the past.10
In the 1990s, Turkish-Israeli relations were not only becoming more open but deepening in
all spheres. There were warm feelings toward Israel, especially at the foreign ministry and in
the military. Relations were a function of strategic and political considerations, with the caveat
that public sympathies toward the Palestinians needed to be taken into consideration. An
example of the relationship and influence of Turkish Jewry is the ‘500 Yıl Vakfi’, known as the
Quincentennial Foundation. (500 Yıl Vakfı was formed in the 1980s to commemorate the 500-year
anniversary of the expulsion of Jews from Spain in 1492 and their arrival and settlement in the
Ottoman Empire.11) Despite the peak in political military relations between Israel and Turkey,
antisemitism was no longer manifested only through words. On 7 March 1992 Ehud Sadan, the
top Israeli security officer at the Israeli Embassy in Ankara, was killed by a powerful car bomb.
A militant Islamic group named the Islamic Revenge Organization said it was accountable for
the murder and referred to the assassination as revenge for Israel’s killing of Sheikh Abbas
Musawi, the head of the Hezbollah organisation in southern Lebanon, a month earlier.12 Islamist
terrorists targeted the car of the president of the Quincentennial Foundation, Jak Kamhi, in
1993. In 1995, the car of Professor Yuda Yürüm (head of the Jewish community in Ankara) was
bombed by Turkish Islamists, who received approval for this attack from Iran. Yürüm was only
injured, but no official governmental condemnation was expressed. Furthermore, the Turkish
Jewish community told Israeli diplomats of increasing antisemitism throughout the 1990s. For
example, on 2 December 1991 the president of B’nai Brith approached Uri Gordon, Israel’s
ambassador to Ankara (1990–1993), and asked for his intervention and opinion regarding
antisemitic publications by Adnan Oktar,13 and also informed the newly nominated American
ambassador to Turkey of these publications,14 although no clash between Israel and Turkey or
Palestine took place in that year.15 B’nai B’rith representatives eventually approached Süleyman
Demirel (the Turkish Prime Minister, 1991–1993) and complained about antisemitic expressions
by Oktar and others.16 As Türkay Salim Nefes shows in his research, the highest number of
remarks against Jews by Turkish Members of Parliament (MPs) in the past 25 years was between
and 1991–1995 (44 per cent), the years of strong ties between Turkey and Israel.17
The eruption of the Second Intifada in 2000 and subsequent clashes between Israelis and
Palestinians demonstrated an implicit correlation between progress on Palestinian-Israeli
peace-making and Turkish-Israeli relations.18
The AKP’s approach to Israel
Throughout the years, Zionism has been considered to have a secret Jewish agenda and has
frequently been invoked as a reason not to trust Jews. Rifat Bali notes that, at least between
1965 and 1980, the nationalist and Islamist press directly targeted Turkish-Jewish industrialists
and merchants in Istanbul. Later, many of the antisemitic statements in Turkey were not directed
at Turkish Jews per se but at all Jews, and one of the most distinctive features of these
4 E. AVIV
expressions was the attribution of Zionism.19 In other words, Zionism was used to demonise
Jews. In general, anti-Zionist Jews, such as Noam Chomsky, Norman Finkelstein, Neturei Karta
members, and others, are considered ‘good Jews’ in the eyes of the Turks, just as those who
condemn antisemitism or publicly support the Jewish leadership in Turkey are designated
‘Zionists’, ‘Israel lovers’, or ‘pro-Israelists’.20 Even if Jewish figures would like to distance themselves
from politics, they would be criticised for not criticising Israel.21 However, even when they
express no sympathy for Zionism, they still feel different. Turkey has always been sympathetic
to the Palestinian cause,22 and this sympathy was expressed not only by Islamists but also by
secular politicians, such as former President Ahmet Necdet Sezer (2000–2007) and former Prime
Minister Bülent Ecevit.23 Israeli diplomats are aware of this sympathy. Zvi Elpeleg, who served
as Israeli ambassador to Ankara from 1995 to 1997, characterised the Turks as extremely sen-
sitive to the plight of the Palestinians. Many Turks perceived the Palestinians as defending their
rights and were critical of Israelis who called them ‘terrorists’.24
However, it seems that under AKP rule, it was decided to take an active role in supporting
the Palestinians. As described by Israeli diplomats before the Justice and Development Party,
AKP ‘Turkey’s position toward the territories has been characterised by caution and moderation’.25
Political and strategic relations with Israel began deteriorating in 2008, after Turkey attempted
to mediate between Damascus and Jerusalem following the Second Lebanon War in the summer
of 2006 and after the triumph of resistance. This involvement yielded positive results, and Ehud
Olmert (Prime Minister of Israel from to 2006–2009) emphasised to the Turkish Prime Minister,
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, his willingness to return the Golan.26 Yet, as Operation Cast Lead
(December 2008–February 2009) took place right after Turkey’s attempt to mediate between
Israel and Syria, Erdoğan was outraged and blamed Israel for ruining Turkey’s peace efforts.
During this period, the rampant antisemitism pushed Silvyo Ovadya, the president of Turkey’s
Jewish community, to submit a request to President Gül to add a passage outlawing antisem-
itism to the Turkish Penal Code Article 216, which contains clear articles prohibiting incitement
or discrimination based on language, religion, or race. This attempt, which was rejected, encoun-
tered harsh criticism in the Turkish press. In fact, any attempt by the Jewish leadership to
confront Turkish society regarding antisemitism was likely to backfire and further intensify the
problem. On 29 January 2009 Erdoğan walked out of a panel at the World Economic Forum in
Davos after harshly criticising Israeli President Shimon Peres over the fighting in Gaza.
The Mavi Marmara incident,27 which occurred in May 2010, was basically political, but almost
immediately afterwards triggered a great campaign against Jews in general and Turkish Jews
in particular that marked a point of no return between Israel and Turkey. Türkmen and Öktem
claim that following the incident, Israel-Turkey relations had no impact on Turkish Jewry, even
though the incident was so serious that it had caused bloodshed for the first time in the history
of both countries’ long friendships. Prime Minister Erdoğan declared that the Jews of Turkey
had nothing to do with the Mavi Marmara incident, and he declared that he opposed the Israeli
government and not society, and that the Jews of Turkey, as well as other minorities, were and
are no longer affected by diplomatic rows.28 Unlike this perception, antisemitic rhetoric strength-
ened in Turkey during the incident and afterwards. The accusations during the Mavi Marmara
incident were directed toward Israel and Israel’s policies and Turkish Jews. For instance, indi-
viduals from the community were accused of collaborating with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
during the Mavi Marmara incident. The Turkish media demanded from the Jewish newspaper
in Turkey, Şalom, a statement on how Turkish Jews felt towards the Mavi Marmara incident. The
chief rabbinate responded mildly that Turkish Jews felt no difference from Turkish society in
general and expressed sorrow for the loss of Turkish citizens’ lives.29 Another example is the
Turkish media (mostly of the Islamist wing), who reported that Turkish Jews fought on the deck
of the Mavi Marmara arm-in-arm with IDF soldiers. Hüseyin Oruç, Deputy Chairman of IHH (İnsan
Hak ve Hürriyetleri İnsani Yardım Vakfı, Humanitarian Relief Foundation),30 whose activists fought
IDF soldiers on the ship, pressed the MIT (Turkish National Intelligent Organization, Millî İstihbarat
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 5
Teşkilatı) to investigate the Jewish community. The agency then gave personal information on
five Turkish Jews from Istanbul and Izmir who, dressed as IDF soldiers, took over the ship and
returned to Turkey to a court and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to investigate the participants.
Their origin was allegedly unveiled when they conversed in Turkish and even addressed one
of them by the name ‘Ömer’.31 Following this libel, Abraham Foxman, National Director of the
Anti-Defamation League (ADL) until 2015, stressed that the vague allegations being reported
would create a sense of alarm and intimidation among the Turkish-Jewish community. ‘Throughout
Jewish history, similar tactics have fomented antisemitism by publicly raising suspicions of
Jewish dual loyalty in the minds of fellow countrymen’, Foxman said. ‘If your government has
information about specific individuals under investigation, that should be disclosed immediately
in order to relieve any sense of uncertainty about the Turkish Jewish community in general. If
the news reports are unfounded or misleading, immediate and public clarification is needed’.32
In response, Turkey denied media reports that it had launched a probe into some of the coun-
try’s Jewish citizens on suspicions that they collaborated with Israel in the 2010 raid on the
Mavi Marmara. ‘There has never been antisemitism in any part of our history and there will
never be. Racism does not exist in the culture and tradition of the Turkish nation. Turkey has
repeatedly said that it considers antisemitism and racism crimes against humanity’, said the
Turkish Foreign Ministry spokesman, Selçuk Ünal. He stated that legal procedures were under
way to identify possible perpetrators of the Mavi Marmara incident and added that those legal
procedures had nothing to do with Turkey’s ‘Jewish community, who are equal citizens and an
integral part of our society. It is clear that these press reports, which have been picked up by
the foreign press, particularly in the US, have been exploited, leading to some misperceptions’,
the statement said.33
Operation Protective Edge and its impact on Turkish Jewry
In June 2014, Hamas and other militant organisations increased rocket fire in civilian-populated
areas in southern Israel. Sirens announcing an incoming rocket fire sounded in most Israeli
cities, including Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. A rocket even reached the city of Haifa in northern
Israel. Within three weeks, nearly 250 rockets were fired. Over the course of the operation, the
Iron Dome missile defence system intercepted hundreds of rockets.
On 7 July the IDF carried out air attacks on Hamas arms caches, launch ramps, and terror
infrastructures. A week later, Hamas rockets injured two Israeli girls. On 15 July, the IDF sus-
pended its activity after ceasefire initiatives, but Hamas ignored the arrangement and fired
nearly 50 rockets on Israel. That evening, an Israeli civilian was killed by rocket fire near the
Erez Crossing, adjacent to the Gaza border. Hamas violated eight ceasefires during the course
of the conflict, while the IDF respected them.
On 17 July Hamas terrorists infiltrated Israel via underground tunnels to attack a kibbutz
near the border. That evening, the IDF launched the ground phase of the operation to destroy
the tunnel network in Gaza. Three days later, the IDF entered the Shuja’iyya district of Gaza
City; 13 Israeli soldiers were killed, and one of their bodies was taken.
On 23 July Hamas used the Al-Wafa Hospital in Gaza to fire rockets into Israel. After ensuring
that the hospital was evacuated, the IDF targeted terrorists hiding in the hospital. This was one
of many examples of Hamas’s use of public infrastructure to fire rockets on Israel: while the
IDF sought to protect Israeli citizens, Hamas used Gazans as human shields and fired rockets
on Israel from mosques, clinics, and United Nations (UN) schools.
According to the IDF, on 21 August, after a series of broken ceasefires, the IDF eliminated
three top Hamas terrorists in Gaza: Raed Attar, Mohammed Abu Shamlah, and Muhamad Barhum,
who were responsible for terrorist attacks and were involved in the abduction of the soldier
Gilad Shalit. The next day, a four-year-old Israeli child was killed by shelling. Three Israelis were
wounded later by rocket attacks on the Erez kibbutz, and another was killed by shelling in the
6 E. AVIV
Eshkol Regional Council. The IDF lost 68 soldiers in Operation Protective Edge.34 Toward the
end of August, a lasting ceasefire began.
Unlike the past, when antisemitism was mainly expressed by AKP members and supporters,
denunciations of Israel echoed throughout Turkish politics during Operation Protective Edge.
Members of the Kemalist opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk
Partisi, CHP) applied to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to dispatch a group of CHP
members in a convoy to Gaza in support of the Palestinian people. The Vice Chairperson of the
CHP, Veli Ağbaba, said on the television program Siyaset Vitrini (Window on Politics):
Our work is not done by explaining, and we want to present our help in an open and sincere way. This
is how we will express our solidarity with the Palestinian people who are under constant bombardment…
whatever the risk, we will go to Gaza, we will give the people of Gaza moral support, and we will visit
the injured in the hospitals. We will show the entire world our support.35
The CHP chairperson Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu also said that if the incidents in Gaza continued, Turkey
would be obligated to break off relations with Israel.36 AKP parliament members took part in
a virulent anti-Israel protest in front of the Israeli Embassy, as did CHP members.
On 19 July 2014 CHP Parliament member Muharrem İnce gave a long speech in the Turkish
Grand Assembly accusing the AKP of assisting Israel, for example, accusing the AKP of not
voting against Israel during the United Nations’ International Atomic Energy (IAEA) Organisation’s
session on Israel’s nuclear capacity; the Turkish delegation had abstained. He also criticised the
AKP for lifting the veto on Israel’s OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development) membership in 2010, and for enabling Israeli fighter jets to use Turkey to attack
Syria.37 Mehmet Akif Hamzaçebi, also from the CHP, said in the Turkish National Grand Assembly
on 15 July 2014:
I call on the whole world and the international community from here. This massacre of Israel in Gaza must
be ended immediately. For this, the entire international community, especially the United Nations, should
take the necessary steps.38
He never said what those steps should be.
Nefes analysed Turkish parliamentary debates between 1983 and 2016. According to speeches
after the operation, Turkish nationalists described the Jews as an enemy. For example, Ismet
Büyükataman from Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) quoted the well-known
ideologues of Turkish racism, Nihal Atsız (1905–1975), criticizing the AKP government’s attempts
to end the Kurdish question peacefully. Atsız warned: ‘If a Jew becomes the Minister of Finance,
he will fill his pocket … and make a grandson of a Kurdish separatist, Sheikh Sait, Prime
Minister’.39
Sheikh Sait is treated as a hero by the Kurdish people and a man who sacrificed his life for
the sake of his ideals. Sait led a Kurdish rebellion aimed at reviving the Islamic caliphate and
sultanate in Turkey in 1925 that used elements of Kurdish nationalism in recruitment.40 This
assertion demonstrates that Turkish politicians, especially right-wing political parties, justify their
negative impression of Jews by portraying them as Turkey’s enemy and agents of threats.41
Operation Protective Edge was unique in the expressions of antisemitism it provoked. This
was the first time in Turkish history that Turkey declared three days of national mourning for
the Palestinians. Not only were anti-Israel expressions circulated, but antisemitic rhetoric was
used by AKP members as well. For example, Şamil Tayyar, a former journalist of Star, and the
AKP’s representative of the Grand National Assembly from Gaziantep, posted the following
antisemitic tweet after the operation began on 18 July: ‘May your race be extinct and may you
never miss your Hitler [may you always have a Hitler].’42 Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan com-
pared Israel’s strategy in Gaza to the actions of Nazi Germany.43 On 19 July, during a presidential
campaign tour in Ordu, a city on the Black Sea, Erdoğan said: ‘Those who condemn Hitler day
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 7
and night have surpassed Hitler in barbarism.’44 The same declaration was tweeted on Erdoğan’s
Twitter account, including the following: ‘The terrorist state Israel struck and hit innocent chil-
dren who were playing on the beach. With these barbaric acts, they surpassed Hitler.’45
He went on to say:
When one explains the similarity between what Israel does and what Hitler and the Nazis did, it makes
some uncomfortable…. What is the difference between what the government of Israel does and what
Hitler and Nazis did? How can you explain what the State of Israel does in Gaza, in Palestine, if not holo-
caust? This is racism. This is fascism. This resurrects Hitler’s soul. Hitler said: ‘We can be unmerciful, but
when we save Germany, the world will be a merciful place.’ Hitler adhered to these perverted thoughts.
He caused the death of the millions. The State of Israel is doing the same as Hitler did…. When we speak
out, they immediately try to silence us by calling us anti-Semites.46
Despite Nefes’s claims that the search term ‘Hitler’ has been used online but not in a positive
way,47 Hitler has gained fame in Turkey and is also mentioned as someone whom Jews deserve.48
For example, one tweet on 7 June 2014 stated, ‘köpek yahudiler size bir Adolf Hitler lazim’ [Dog
Jews – an Adolf Hitler is needed for you],49 and another tweet on 15 July read ‘Cursed
child-murderer dog Jews. You are murderers, your destruction is near, God’s curse be upon
y o u ’, 50 and called for the Jews of Turkey to leave the country.51
There were clear calls for violence against Jews. Some tweets called for synagogues to be
burned and even mentioned the fact that the Jews of Istanbul live on the islands in the Marmara
Sea, the largest being Büyükada ‘the great island’, where many Jews spend their summer vaca-
tions. Tweets also called for the burning of all the factories owned by Jews. Disclosing the Jews’
location was significant, as it was virtually a call to attack them in their own protected residences.
The open calls to harm Jews were not disseminated solely through social networks;52 they
also appeared in newspapers. Faruk Köse’s call, published in Yeni Akit, clearly intimidated Jews
by saying: ‘“1955 Incidents” against the Jewish community in Turkey may result.’53 Köse also
suggested that Turkey’s Turkish-Jewish businessmen pay a special tax for the rehabilitation of
Gaza.54 Bülent Yıldırım, head of the IHH, the non-governmental organisation (NGO) behind the
Mavi Marmara flotilla, said, ‘The Turkish-Jewish community must immediately stop Israel’s rotten
behaviour; otherwise, the people who live here will witness unwanted outcomes.’55
Synagogues became targets of protests by Turkish mobs. Social media announced an ‘egg
attack’ protest, and attacks were carried out. The first ‘egg protest’ was conducted on 22 July.
One group carrying anti-Israel posters gathered in front of the Ortaköy Synagogue and then
threw eggs at the synagogue. They were dispersed by Turkish security forces. Attacks on syn-
agogues were only part of a broader phenomenon of attacks on Jews. The most shocking
manifestations of antisemitism in Turkey during the Israeli operation in Gaza was an antisemitic
rally in Istanbul, where participants chanted, ‘Jew, don’t forget, your turn will come’,56 resembling
Germany in the 1930s. This may have been the first rally of this kind to take place in Turkey
in the last decade.
A call to revoke the citizenship of Turkish Jews who had served in the IDF represents another
aspect of the worsening situation for Turkish Jews. It established a seemingly irrefutable con-
nection between Turkish Jews and Zionism, at least from the perspective of Turkish society. The
staunchly pro-government daily, Milat, targeted Turkish nationals from the Jewish community
who also held Israeli passports, arguing that since Israeli citizens are required to serve in the
IDF, they have blood on their hands and are responsible for killing Gazan civilians during an
Israeli offensive that led to more than 2000 deaths since July 2014. Milat, which uses political
Islamist rhetoric, employed English in its headline, stating ‘Go Home Killers’ about Turkish Jews
who allegedly serve in the Israeli army. The article stated that after Israel announced its recent
military campaign, Turkish Jews holding dual citizenship rushed ‘to massacre’ Palestinians. Milat
based its report on a social media campaign launched by journalists and activists with the
hashtag #israilaskeriistemiyoruz (we do not want Israeli soldiers).
8 E. AVIV
Bülent Yıldırım said in a televised interview on TVNET (a television station belonging to
pro-government Albayrak Media Group) on 17 July that there is one vulnerable point that may
be exploited to force Israel to stop its self-indulgent behaviour: the Turkish-Jewish community.
According to him, most of Israel’s money comes from Turkish Jews. Turkish Jews have contin-
uously paid taxes to Mossad. Soldiers are constantly going to Israel. The Turkish Jewish com-
munity must act to immediately stop Israel’s putative self-indulgence. Otherwise, people living
here would experience unwanted consequences.57
These heightened displays of antisemitism resulting from Operation Protective Edge were
accompanied by the ‘usual’ feelings of intimidation expressed during previous military operations
as well, including considerations of making Aliya [the immigration of Jews from the diaspora
to Israel] in larger numbers. One Jewish Istanbul resident who requested to remain anonymous
said, ‘It gets worse from day to day, in the press, on the streets, and in general. I do not reveal
the fact that I am a Jew, and I would deny it if asked. It is a spine-chilling thing.’58 When Israeli
journalists tried to converse with officials from one of the synagogues in Turkey, they were
warned that ‘we are not allowed to discuss this topic. It is dangerous and very dangerous.’59
Jewish community representatives responded to the situation by saying that the community
was ‘in a panic’ and that:
Turkey has become a haven for the most strained society in the world. There is no war in our country,
but we are stressed as if we are at war. We are fearful. There is a wave of xenophobia, beyond which
antisemitism is rife. It is very stifling for those who live under this continuous problem.60
The Jewish writer and lawyer Rita Ender reported that, ‘Turks come in front of our synagogues,
shouting in a threatening way. They hang around the neighbourhood where we live, staring
straight into the eyes of the Jewish children in a threatening way, wearing T-shirts printed with
a picture of Hitler and swastikas.’61 Again, as in the past, shops posted signs on their front
windows announcing that ‘Jew dogs’ are banned from entering. A mobile phone accessory shop
located in Tahtakale in Istanbul, an area where many Jewish businesses are situated, posted a
sign in its front window in August 2014 banning ‘dog Jews’ from entering.62 The same happened
in a bazaar in Konya, where many shops put up a sign saying: ‘Jewish goods are not sold here’.
This sign was hung after the operation and as a protest against Israel’s attacks in Gaza, espe-
cially what the owner called ‘the murder of the innocent Palestinian children playing on the
beach’. The blurring of ‘Israeli goods’ and ‘Jewish goods’ should be carefully noted.63
On 22 August 2014 Burak Bekdil from Hürriyet Daily News mentioned examples of troubled
Jewish life in Turkey. His bottom line was the reason for the serious concern. According to
Bekdil, the Jews of Turkey should leave Turkey as soon as possible, or in his own words, ‘Leave
while you can before the second Holocaust happens.’64
Responses from the community
There are several characteristic responses to antisemitism from the Jewish side in general, and
specifically during the operation. The most common one is the Kayadez: the historical response
of Turkish Jewry is known by the Ladino word Kayadez, which means maintaining silence. This
is less a viewpoint than a way of life. Kayadez means that Jews should maintain a low profile.
It stems from a primaeval fear that often led to the custom of maintaining a low profile and
even the need to be ‘hidden’ from the public, to be made invisible. İvo Molinas, chief editor of
Şalom newspaper, uses the famous Ladino saying that expresses the kayadez differently: ‘no
mos kareshtreamos en los echos del hukumet’ (We do not intervene in the government’s mat-
ters). This phrase means that Jews must not create any problems with the government and
must always be good citizens.65 This also involved self-censorship as a mode of self-protection
from social discrimination and physical harm. Thus, Jews have found ways to discuss sensitive
topics in public. Turkish Jews will never say ‘Israel’ in public. Instead, they prefer to employ the
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 9
Hebrew word for ‘the state’, hamedinah. Similarly, while speaking of their origin, they avoid the
word ‘Jew’ [Yahudi/Musevi in Turkish], preferring the Ladino term Judio or Cudio.66 A Jewish
editor once revealed her secret for publishing stories in a way that only intimates recognise.
She mentions neighbourhood names instead of cities. As antisemitic journals rely on Jewish
newspaper publications to allege their Jewish pseudo-conspiracies, the editor must publish
stories in which both their topic and writing style will not endanger the Jewish community.67
The Kayadez is not only a way to avoid protest; it is also partly related to the distinction
that Turkish Jews attempted to create between themselves and the State of Israel. Jerusalem
Post reporter Sam Sokol described his own experience with the Kayadez policy of the Jewish
community in Turkey, saying that after he visited an Istanbul synagogue in 2013 and published
an article on the local community’s preparations to celebrate Israel’s Independence Day, the
community requested through an intermediary that the article be taken offline, in an apparent
bid to avoid being linked to Israel in the media. ‘The Turkish-Jewish community would prefer
to keep their mouths shut, because of their public safety, and they are right to do this’, one
émigré said to the Post afterwards.68 There were many earlier examples, as Israeli diplomats had
described Turkish Jews on many occasions as reluctant to take an active role in combatting
antisemitism and as avoiding ties with Israel.69
Bali differentiates between the community’s formal representatives and its public figures,
who often represent the Jewish community in the eyes of the average Turk. In his opinion,
until a certain period, both types of leader preferred to express their concerns regarding
antisemitism privately to Ankara in a sort of quiet diplomacy, while concurrently expressing
their gratitude to Turkey for its allegedly tolerant attitude toward its minorities, instead of going
public and demanding that the plethora of antisemitic publications in Turkey be abolished.
When they began to go public, says Bali, it was too late. Not only was the request not met
with encouragement from the media, which had been expected to offer support, but it was
met with harsh responses from the Islamist and nationalist sectors in Turkey. This made the
Jewish leadership retreat to their communal invisibility and quiet diplomacy.70 In other words,
the Jewish community’s official publication follows Kayadez in several respects.
In contrast to the Kayadez, several Jews have followed an Active Response: Lina Filiba, exec-
utive vice president of the Turkish Jewish community (2001–2011), argued that the community
has not been passive or submissive in quietly defending Jewish interests, but has diplomatic
cards of its own that occasionally have been played, most importantly its relations with American
Jews, whose political clout successive Turkish governments have needed to counter the influence
of Greek and Armenian lobbies on obvious issues.71 Indeed, the Turkish government sought the
help of Jewish lobby groups in the US on different occasions.72
Some Turkish Jews believe that as nothing will change public opinion, Turkish Jews have
two options: either they should leave Turkey and settle somewhere else or fight within the
framework of the law to the extent that this is possible. ‘It was a mistake not to inform the
authorities’, said D. ‘It should not be forgotten that Kayadez hasn’t been and still isn’t helpful.’
A similar response called for an immediate call to a district attorney. Even if complaining is not
effective, there is still a need to complain, others say. When the famous Turkish singer Yıldız
Tilbe tweeted an antisemitic message on 10 July 2014, opening with ‘God bless Hitler’, the
Jewish community’s reaction was very harsh and prompt. Along with extensive media coverage,
it initiated a petition calling for Tilbe to apologise.73
For some Jews, an active response might take the form of a cultural reply. As a museum
director said in a 2007 interview, ‘The Jews here have been very careful in showing their culture
in public. We want to show ourselves in public, not to be hidden anymore, we like sharing our
culture.’74 Being seen in cultural venues seems like a decent response that contributes to the
visibility of the Jewish community through some of its members. Leyla Navaro, a Turkish-Jewish
academic from Istanbul, expressed her concern not only with regard to antisemitism in Turkey
but also for the future of Turkey itself in Radikal,75 shortly after Operation Cast Lead ended
10 E. AVIV
(2009): ‘I feel worried, sad, and scared for myself and for my country’s future, which is leaning
toward racism.’76 In her article, Navaro finds it difficult to understand why Jews are seen as
different when they share the same values, culture, and history as Muslim Turks. She concludes
by saying, ‘If there is no conscious and responsible end, I am afraid that Turkey will be doomed
to isolation. Dark isolation.’77 Other Jews respond to antisemitic incidents by increasing their
feelings of distrust of the authorities, followed by desperation. An example to illustrate this is
‘F’ who says:
I used to think that there was nothing to fear, but I no longer think so, because security guards are
constantly exposed to daily antisemitic propaganda and I am not certain that they will not act on it. I
don’t remember exactly, but in the synagogue in Caddebostan (the Asian side of Istanbul), I heard a
policeman who was on duty, standing at the entrance to the synagogue saying: ‘In order to enable them
to pray, we cannot commit our Namaz [the Islamic daily prayer]’ …we must already see the facts in Turkey.
In my opinion, this is not the first incident, and will not be the last.78
This sort of response is often accompanied by the expression of despair in Turkey. It leads
either to remaining in Turkey without any expectations from Turkish authorities or to making
Aliya. ‘B’ says, ‘I know many of you don’t like to hear it but making Aliya is the only solution.’79
Others simply deny the fact that Antisemitism exists in Turkey. In fact, the academic liter-
ature on the Turkish perception of Jews can be divided into two main perspectives. One
strand presents a tolerant, multicultural atmosphere. These authors conceptualise antisemitic
events as exceptions which are likely to originate from marginal groups.80 The second strand
challenges this view, arguing that antisemitism is a mainstream phenomenon in Turkey and
that Turkish Jews are seen as a foreign group.81 This approach aligns with Jeffery C. Dixon’s
research, which found that Turkish people are less tolerant of minorities than people in the
EU member states and candidate states.82 The third strand of the existing literature on antisem-
itism contends that there is no difference between Jews and other minorities. In other words,
the assumption is that Jewish hatred is part of an overall xenophobia in Turkey and not a
unique phenomenon.83 The alleged non-existence of antisemitism or the denial of antisemitism
as a unique discourse in the overall discourse on minorities in Turkey has also infiltrated the
community itself: some Jews as well deny the fact that there is antisemitism in Turkey. Marc
David Baer describes this attitude by giving Jack Kamhi as an example. In the eyes of Kamhi,
Turks cannot be antisemitic, but only tolerant; if they are intolerant, they are not real Turks.84
The denial of antisemitism has sometimes been developed into self-accusation by the Jews
themselves; if the Turks cannot be antisemites but if they act this way despite that, it is clear
then that the fault is that of the Jews themselves: N, a 65-year-old Jewish businessman living
in Istanbul, referred to antisemitism as ‘our fault’, saying, ‘antisemitism is also our fault because
we like to be seen, we like to flaunt our wealth unnecessarily … there is a stereotype in
Turkey that the Jews are noisy so sometimes when one of us is shouting we tell him “do not
behave like a Jew”.’85 Some claim that antisemitism exists everywhere and that Turkey is no
exception.
Other Jews have been taking a pro-government or pro-Muslim stance. This response includes
two sub-responses. First, the expression of ideological support for the Turkish regime or criticism
of Israel (and sometimes even an anti-Israel viewpoint). Following Operation Protective Edge, a
group of Turkish-Jewish intellectuals condemned being targeted over Israel’s recent operations
in Gaza, describing attempts to hold them responsible for Israel’s policies as racist. Prominent
figures such as scholar and columnist Soli Özel, leftist writer Roni Margulies, economist Cem
Behar, and former radio host and activist Avi Haligua stressed their opposition to Israel’s actions
in a letter published on 29 August 2014. However, they also added that no one should expect
uniformity of opinion in a community of 20,000 people and stated that they did not want their
opinion to be interpreted based on their identity.86 The full letter reads:
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 11
Israel’s latest attack on Gaza led, once again, to cries of ‘Why does the Jewish community remain silent?’ A
campaign was launched that claimed that the Jews of Turkey bear responsibility for what Israel does in Gaza.
No citizen of this country is under any obligation to account for, interpret, or comment on any event that
takes place elsewhere in the world, and in which he/she has no involvement. There is no onus on the Jewish
community of Turkey, therefore, to declare an opinion on any matter at all…. In the same way as the people
of Turkey cannot be held responsible for the barbarity of what ISIS does because a number of Turks are
among its fighters, the Jewish community of Turkey cannot be held responsible for what the State of Israel
does. It is racism to hold a whole person responsible for the actions of a state, and we wish to declare that
we are opposed to this. We, the undersigned, are children of Jewish families in Turkey. It is incumbent upon
us to express an opinion on the attack on Gaza precisely to the same degree that it is on any other citizen
of Turkey, no less, and certainly no more. Nonetheless, we wish to declare that we are opposed to the Israeli
state’s policies on Gaza, not because we are of Jewish origin, but because we are human.87
Erol Aron Bünyel, a Turkish-Jewish actor, said he agrees with this perception because:
Turkey is a Muslim country, and it is clear that people like those who are close to them. I do not expect
the Turks to understand or support Israel, and of course this has nothing to do with my Jewishness….
When political discussions of this type arise on the set, I always tell my fellow actors that I have nothing
to do with Israel, as my family and I have been living here for more than 500 years and Jews have been
living here even before some Muslims.88
However, the pragmatic view is not disregarded amongst the Jewish community’s reactions
to antisemitism. One community leader argued that ‘quiet diplomacy, not contestation’, has
worked to the community’s advantage compared to the treatment of other minorities who did
not adopt this strategy. In this way, according to the leader, the Jewish community has received
permission to construct new synagogues and other benefits.89 This is the case with Erdoğan’s
Courage Award, presented to him in 2004 by the American Jewish Congress (AJC) for Turkey’s
protection of the Jewish community against all forms of malice. The AJC demanded that Erdoğan
return this award following his harsh criticism of Israel during Operation Protective Edge in 2014.
The Turkish-Jewish community condemned the AJC for sending an open letter to Erdoğan
demanding that he return the award and asked the president of AJC, Jack Rosen, to re-evaluate
his decision.90 Yet, according to one prominent figure of the Jewish community, the letter was
dictated to them: ‘We do not want Israel to believe that we initiated it.’91 Rabbi Yitzchak Haleva,
Chief Rabbi of Turkey, expressed this viewpoint in an interview on the Israeli website NRG on 4
January 2015. According to Haleva, there is no ‘governmental anti-Semitism’ in Turkey. On the
contrary, Haleva claimed he had warm relations with the Turkish Prime Minister and President
and that he and Erdoğan are ‘good friends’ and that Erdoğan even calls him ‘Haleva’. For Haleva,
politics ‘destroys everything’. Haleva quoted Erdoğan’s ‘constant sayings’ that the Jews of Turkey
are under his protection. If politics are ignored, Turkish Jews live in peace in Turkey. The war is
between Israel and Palestine, and this war is equivalent to a war between England and France.
It does not affect the relationship between Judaism and Islam. Israelis and Palestinians can live
peacefully when politics are not involved. Furthermore, Haleva said, ‘I mention and mention
again that we have no political affinity to the State of Israel. There is a joint religion and love
of course, but a political relationship does not exist. Israel is Israel, and Turkey is Turkey’. Haleva
also said that, unlike the aforementioned belief, he is not afraid of anyone, and thus it is ridic-
ulous to think that no one has imposed this supportive viewpoint of the Turkish regime: ‘Everyone
who visits Turkey can see that there are no problems. Some people like to fish in troubled
waters.’ Haleva said that although antisemitism exists in Turkey, it is like everywhere in Europe.
‘This was not the case in the past. The Turks love us, but with all the unrest, they started loving
Muslims.’92 Shay Cohen, Consul General of Israel in Istanbul (2014–2017), explains this position:
The legislation system in Turkey is very different from the ones in Europe and the US, and it is prohibited in
Turkey to officially establish any organisation such as B’nai Brith, the Bund, or even AIPAC, which are affiliated
with a country other than Turkey. According to the law, there is no open, transparent community life regarding
12 E. AVIV
Israel. This is why the Rabbinate and the community’s chairpersons are afraid of identifying with Israel. They
are afraid that this identification will affect the authorities’ positive attitudes toward the Jewish community.93
Shay Cohen says that Jews’ responses are driven less by fear and more by efforts to protect
their interests: ‘Full cooperation exists between minorities and the state. The government has
also returned millions of dollars’ worth of property to minorities in Turkey. The Jewish commu-
nity is afraid to lose all of this, and that is why they remain quiet. They tell me, “You [Israeli
diplomats] come and go, but we stay here, and we must take care of our interests.”’94
Conclusion
The phenomena surrounding Operation Protective Edge represent the height of attitudes critical
of Jews in Turkey thus far, as they involve actions and statements of antisemitism.95 Comparing
Israel to Nazi Germany has become one of Erdoğan’s most common rhetorical strategies, but
during Operation Protective Edge, Erdoğan said that Israel was worse than the Nazis. The
anti-Israel sentiments expressed by other parties’ members in the past were less resentful than
this time and included the enthusiastic participation of members of the CHP, a secular
modernist-nationalist party that is not usually associated with antisemitism. The chain reaction
following the prime minister’s accusatory statements was also harmful to Jews. Boycotting Israel
was easily equated with boycotting Jewish products or products sold at Jewish businesses. The
dangerous part of the most recent wave of antisemitism in Turkey is that it manifested in acts
against Jews and was also led by Erdoğan, and thus acquired perceived legitimacy in Turkish
society. Thus, even if a Jew turns his back on Israel and Zionism and sees himself as a full Turk,
he will never be accepted as one. Every time Israel skirmishes with Palestine, he will be reminded
of his Jewishness. Jews who see themselves as Turkish and Jewish will have to face this duality
of national identification, which is forced on them by their surroundings.
It is important to note that contrary to Nefes’s claims that antisemitism is not a prevalent
political and cultural phenomenon in Turkey, Turkish Jews are outsiders in Turkish society. In
Nefes’s opinion, Jews in Turkey are treated as a non-local resident community that needs to
prove its loyalty on a constant basis. In his opinion, antisemitic currents are not strong in con-
temporary Turkey, but Turkish Jewry does not live in a tolerant society. However, this research
proves that the problem is deeper than intolerance or perceiving Jews as ‘strangers’.96 Antisemitism
exists in Turkey, and it is intensely aggravated by events in Israel, but it is also a daily occur-
rence and has no connection to Israel.
Negative remarks or depictions of Jews in Turkey are historically rooted elements of Turkish
right-wing and Islamist politics, but external events – mostly the Israel-Palestine conflict – and
military actions in particular, contribute to this negative impression and increase visible antisemitism
in Turkey by left-wing politicians as well. The strongest expression of this so far until maybe 2021
was the outpouring of antisemitic commentary and actions after the Protective Edge operation.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Professor Dinçşahin for his assistance with this article.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. On the Aliya from Turkey and the settlement of Jews in Israel see İ. Hepkaner, ‘Jews from Turkey in Israel
and Cultural Diplomacy (1996–2006)’, in H. Papuççular and D. Kuru (eds), A Transnational Account of Turkish
Foreign Policy (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), pp.195–223; Ş. Toktaş, ‘Turkey’s Jews and their Immigration
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 13
to Israel’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.42(3) (2006), pp.505–19; A. Mills, Streets of Memory: Landscape, Tolerance,
and National Identity in Istanbul (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2010); W.F. Weiker, The Unseen Israelis:
The Jews from Turkey in Israel (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988); R.N. Bali, Cumhuriyet
Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri: Aliya: bir toplu göçün öyküsü, 1946–1949 [The Jews of Turkey during the
Republican years: Aliyah: the story of a mass migration] (Istanbul: İletisim Yayincilik, 2003).
2. A. Levi, ‘Yahas HaShiltonot ve HaChevra HaTurkim Klapey HaYehudim Agav Parashat Aliza Niego’, [The at-
titude of the Turkish authorities and society toward Jews in the aftermath of the Aliza Niego Incident], in
Avraham Hayim (ed.), Chevra VeKehilla: MiDivrey Hakongress HaBenleumi HaSheni LeCheker Moreshet Yahadut
Sfarad ve HaMizrach 1985 [Society and Community: Proceedings of the 1985 Second (International) Congress
on Sephardi and Oriental Jewish Heritage] (Jerusalem: Misgav Yerushalayim, 1991), pp.237–46 [Hebrew],
p.239.
3. Although calls for Jews (as ‘illegal citizens of Turkey’) to leave Turkey, ‘maybe to Palestine’, were made long
before the State of Israel was established. See Avigdor Levi, History of the Jews in the Republic of Turkey,
p.46. Adina Weiss, ‘Yehudey Turkia: Misgeret Datit BeMishtar Stagrani’ [The Jews of Turkey: religious frame-
work in closed regime], Tfutzot Israel [Israel diaspora], 12, Choveret [booklet] Bet (March–April 1974), p.105
[Hebrew].
4. F. Türkmen and E. Öktem, ‘Foreign Policy as a Determinant in the Fate of Turkey’s Non-Muslim Minorities:
A Dialectical Analysis’, Turkish Studies, Vol.14(3) (2013) pp.463–82. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ref/10.1
080/14683849.2013.831257#.UkFHNtIwopo (retrieved 7 September 2013), p.2.
5. A. İçduygu and B.A. Soner, ‘ Turkish Minority Rights Regime: Between Difference and Equality’, Middle Eastern
Studies, Vol.42(3) (2006), p.460.
6. A. Weiss, ‘Yehudey Turkia: Misgeret Datit BeMishtar Stagrani [The Jews of Turkey: religious framework in a
closed regime]’, Tfutzot Israel [Israel diaspora], 12, Choveret [booklet] Bet (March–April 1974), p.106;
F. Türkmen and E. Öktem, ‘Foreign Policy as a Determinant’, p.7.
7. E. Aviv, Antisemitism and Anti-Zionism in Turkey: From Ottoman Rule to AKP (New York and Oxford: Routledge,
2017), pp.48–9.
8. Ibid., p.54.
9. On Efraim Elrom’s murder see E. Aviv, ‘Turkey and Elrom Affair: A Unique Affair or a Link in a Chain of
Terrorist Events in 1970s Turkey?’, Hamizrah Hehadash – The New East, Vol. 52 (2013), pp.286–308 (Hebrew);
E. Aviv, ‘The Efraim Elrom Affair and Israel-Turkey Relations’, Middle Eastern Studies Vol.49(5) (2013), pp.750–
769; R.N. Bali, İsrail Başkonsolosu Ephraim Elrom’un İnfazı – ‘Çok Cesur Bir Adamdı. Sonuna Kadar Direndi’ [ T he
Execution of Ephraim Elrom, Consul General of Israel – ‘He Was A Very Brave Man. Resisted Until the End’]
(Istanbul: Libra Kitap, 2016); G. Özcan, Türkiye – İsrail İlişkilerinde Dönüşüm: Güvenliğin Ötesi [Transformation
in Turkey – Israel Relations: Beyond Security] Dış Politika Analiz Serisi 1, pp.30–1. http://www.fes-tuerkei.org/
media/pdf/Publikationen%20Archiv/Ortak%20Yay%C4%B1nlar/2005/2005%20Turkiye-%C4%B0srail%20
%C4%B0li%C5%9Fkilerinde%20D%C3%B6n%C3%BC%C5%9F%C3%BCm_11_2005.pdf (retrieved 19 November
2020).
10. U. Uzer, ‘Turkish-Israeli Relations: Their Rise and Fall’, Middle East Policy, Vol.20, 1 (2013), p.98.
11. Brink-Danan mentions the Quincentennial Foundation organization as ‘responsible’ for building represen-
tations of the Turkish Jews as ‘the good minority’. The QF claims that Turkey’s national spirit infused with
a cosmopolitan regard for the ‘other’ set the agenda for a public awareness campaign to improve Turkey’s
international image. Even from the Jewish side, the campaign was built around the notion of Jewish
‘gratitude’ for Ottoman and Turkish hospitality and emphasized the warm relations between Turkey and
Israel and the United States. Bali also claims that what stands behind the will of Turkish Jews to keep
discussions on antisemitism away from the public eye is an unwillingness to damage Turkey’s image in
the eyes of the world. See M. Brink-Danan, Jewish Life in 21st Century Turkey: The Other Side of Tolerance
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012), pp.34, 36; R.N. Bali, Antisemitism and Conspiracy Theories in
Turkey (Istanbul: Libra Kitap, 2013), p.226.
12. https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/emniyet-celiski-yok-39156012 (accessed 12 November 2020).
13. In the 1990s, a prominent religious leader named Adnan Oktar published numerous antisemitic books,
as well as an antisemitic journal, Rönesans (Renaissance), which was published between 1991 and
1992, and an antisemitic newspaper Son Mesaj (Last Message), under the pseudonym Harun Yahya
(‘Harun’ refers to the biblical Aaron and ‘Yahya’ refers to the New Testament John the Baptist). First,
by acquiring a following as the leader of a small religious group at Istanbul University in the 1980s,
Oktar sought to attract wealthy and influential Istanbul youths with a materially fulfilling brand of
Islam. He made a name for himself penning antisemitic, anti-Freemasonry, anti-Communist,
conspiracy-theory-laden tracts, which culminated in his 1987 book, Yahudilik ve Masonluk (Judaism and
Freemasonry).
14. Israel State Archive (hereafter ISA) RG MFA to Middle East 1 from Ankara ISA-PMO-Government
Secretary-0010d1s, 7 February 1992.
15. 15 To Middle East 1 from Ankara ISA-PMO-Government Secretary-0010d1s, 6 December 1991.
14 E. AVIV
16. ISA RG MFA to Middle East 1 from the Israeli Embassy, Washington ISA-PMO-Government Secretary-0010d1s,
12 February 1992.
17. T.S. Nefes, ‘Negative Perceptions of Jews in Turkish Politics: An Analysis of Parliamentary Debates, 1983–2016’,
South European Society and Politics, Vol. 24(3) (2019), p.407.
18. Aviv, p.58.
19. Bali, Antisemitism and Conspiracy Theories, p.53.
20. Ibid., pp.229, 289.
21. Ersoy Dede, İsrail Malları [Israeli goods], Yeni Akit, 25 July 2014; http://www.yeniakit.com.tr/yazarlar/
ersoy-dede/israil-mallari-6994.html (retrieved 26 July 2014).
22. İ. Aytürk, ‘Between Crises and Cooperation: The Future of Turkish-Israeli Relations’, Insight Turkey, Vol.11(2)
(2009), p.61.
23. Ecevit overtly accused Israel of ‘applying genocide on Palestinians’ after Israeli soldiers besieged Palestinian
President Yasser Arafat’s headquarters in May 2002. See No author, ‘İsrail soykırım yapıyor’ [Israel commits
genocide], Radikal, 5 April 2002; http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=33996 (last accessed 12
November 2012).
24. Uzer, ‘Turkish-Israeli Relations’, p.98.
25. ISA RG MFA to New York, Washington, Ankara. From the Office, Tel Aviv, ISA-mfa-mfa-000xcsu, 28 March
1988.
26. R. Nahmias, ‘Assad Confirms: Olmert said willing to cede Golan’, Ynet News, 24 April 2008; http://www.
ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3535361,00.html (retrieved 18 September 2012).
27. The Mavi Marmara incident is the name given to an Israeli military raid on a Turkish-led aid flotilla to Gaza
that resulted in the death of nine Turks and the shattering of the once-close ties between Ankara and
Jerusalem.
28. Türkmen and Öktem, ‘Foreign Policy as a Determinant’, p.14.
29. A.-C. Hoff, ‘Normalizing Antisemitism in Turkey’, The Journal for the Study Antisemitism Vol.5(1) (2013), pp.185,
191.
30. Oruç is known for his antisemitic rhetoric, http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/Data/articles/
Art_20456/H_273_12_784420210.pdf (retrieved 10 April 2013).
31. A. Cihat, ‘Mavi Marmara katilleri aramızda’ [Mavi Marmara murderers are amongst us], Yeni Şafak, 13
December 2012, http://yenisafak.com.tr/gundem-haber/mavi-marmara-katilleri-aramizda-14.12.2012-435777;
in this source the IHH chairperson is not mentioned as the source for the information on Turkish Jews’
participation in the Mavi Marmara incident, http://m.haber5.com/haber/224182 (retrieved 28 August 2013).
32. http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/163344#.UhpnmvBBRjo (retrieved 28 August 2013).
33. E. Aviv, p.111.
34. https://www.idf.il/en/minisites/wars-and-operations/operation-protective-edge/ (last retrieved 12 July 2019).
35. M. Pelit, ‘CHP’den Gazze’ye Gitme Kararı’ [CHP’s decision to go to Gaza], Hürriyet, 20 July 2014. Available
at http://www.Hürriyet.com.tr/gundem/26850899.asp (last accessed 22 July 2014).
36. A.G.A.M. Güngör, ‘İsrail’le İlişkilerimizi Askıya Almak Zorundayız’ [We Must Suspend Our Relations with
Israel], Anadolu Ajansı, 23 July 2014. Available at http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/haberler/363539–israille-iliskilerimiz
i-askiya-almak-zorundayiz (last accessed 24 July 2014).
37. Publications of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/genel_kurul.
cl_getir?pEid=32956 (accessed 10 October 2020).
38. https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/genel_kurul.cl_getir?pEid=32665.
39. Nefes, ‘Negative Perceptions of Jews’, p.410.
40. On Atsız see U. Uzer, ‘Racism in Turkey: The Case of Nihal Atsız’, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 22, 1
(2002), pp.119–30; J.M. Landau, Exploring Ottoman and Turkish History (London: C. Hurst, 2004), pp.58–61.
41. Nefes, ‘Negative Perceptions of Jews’, p.413.
42. Available at https://twitter.com/samiltayyar27/status/489904703963406336 (last accessed 30 July 2014).
43. All titles referred to the presidential elections in June 2014.
44. M.A. Berber, ‘Barbarlıkta Hitler’i Geçtiler’ [They bypassed Hitler’s Barbarism], Sabah, 20 July 2014. Available
at http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2014/07/20/barbarlikta-hitleri-gectiler (last accessed 21 July 2014).
45. Available at https://twitter.com/RT_Erdoğan/status/490532074173243393 (last accessed 22 July 2014).
46. H. Yılma and C. Coşar, ‘Erdoğan Van’da Halka Hitabetti’ [Erdoğan Addressed the People in Van], Hursedahaber,
31 July 2014. Available at http://hurseda.net/Haber/121918-Erdoğan-Vanda-Halka-Hitabetti.html (last accessed
2 August 2014).
47. T.S. Nefes, Online Anti-Semitism in Turkey (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p.52.
48. It can also be added that Mein Kampf, which is the ‘handbook’ for the ultranationalists of Turkey, was
translated into Turkish and published about 45 times between 1940 and 2005. In early 2005, a Turkish
translation of Mein Kampf was published by several small publishers and sold at discount prices at news-
stands, supermarkets, and bookstores in Turkey. Aviv, Antisemitism and Anti-Zionism, p.146
49. https://twitter.com/search?q=kopek%20yahudiler&src=recent_search_click (retrieved 20 August 2019).
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 15
50. https://twitter.com/fatihalpoz/status/488810435718967296 (retrieved 20 August 2019).
51. https://twitter.com/mehm34/status/489162887030931456 (retrieved 20 August 2019).
52. On antisemitism in social networks see T.S. Nefes, Online Anti-Semitism in Turkey (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2015).
53. F. Köse, ‘Hahambaşı’na çağrı’ [A call upon the chief rabbi], Yeni Akit, 15 July 2014. Available at http://www.
habervaktim.com/yazar/65969/hahambasina-cagri.html (last accessed 17 July 2014).
54. Ibid.
55. No author, ‘İHH Başkanından Türk Yahudileri’ne Tehdit’ [A threat to Turkish Jews from IHH chairperson], OdaTV,
18 July 2014. Available at http://www.odatv.com/n.php?n=ihh-baskanindan-turk-yahudilerine-tehdit-1807141200
(last accessed 20 July 2014).
56. No author, ‘Türkiye’deki Yahudiler’e Tehdit’ [A threat to the Jews in Turkey], OdaTV, 30 July 2014. Available
at http://www.odatv.com/n.php?n=turkiyedeki-yahudilere-tehdit-3007141200. The rally can be seen at: http://
www.odatv.com/vid_video.php?id=8D315 (last accessed 20 July 2019).
57. M.S. Korucu, ‘Ortaköy Sinagogu’na Yumurtalı Saldırı’ [Egg Attack on Ortaköy Synagogue], CNN Türk, 24 July
2014. Available at http://www.CNNTürk.com/haber/turkiye/ortakoy-sinagoguna-yumurtali-saldiri, http://
yenisafak.com.tr/video-galeri/ihh-baskani-bulent-yildirim-israil-dunyaya-rezil-olacak/18751 (last accessed 24
July 2020).
58. No author, ‘First Samples: Erdoğan Won the Presidential Elections’, Globes, 10 August 2014. Available at
http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1000962044 (last accessed 10 August 2020 (Hebrew)).
59. Ibid.
60. No author, ‘Hitler Tişortü Kişiler Sinagogların Önünde Dolaşıp İşyerlerini Tehdit Ediyor’ [People wearing Hitler
T-shirts Walk in Front of Synagogues Threatening Workplaces], T24, 8 August 2014. Available at http://t24.
com.tr/haber/hitler-tisortu-kisiler-sinagoglarin-onunde-dolasip-isyerlerini-tehdit-ediyor,266978 (last accessed
9 August 2019).
61. R. Ender, ‘Farz Edelim Ki Biz Yahudiler Türkiye’den Gittik!’ [Let’s suppose that we, Jews, left Turkey], Bianet,
2 August 2014. Available at http://www.bianet.org/biamag/toplum/157482-farz-edelim-
ki-biz-yahudiler-turkiye-den-gittik (last accessed 6 August 2019).
62. No author, ‘Eminönü Tahtakale’de Yahudi düşmanlığı’ [Antisemitism in Tahtakale, Eminönü], Şalom, 4 September
2014. Available at http://www.salom.com.tr/haber-92271-eminonu_tahtakalede_yahudi_dusmanligi.html?rev=1
(last accessed 1 September 2020).
63. K. Kızılkaya, ‘Burada Yahudi Malı Satılmaz’ [No Jewish goods are sold here], Anadolu Bugün, 21 August 2014.
Available at http://www.anadoludabugun.com.tr/burada-yahudi-mali-satilmaz-51490h.htm (last accessed 20
August 2019).
64. Quoted in B. Bekdil, To All Jews in Turkey: There is an Enormous Red Dragon Coming After You. Leave while
you can before the second Holocaust happens, Shoebat Foundation, 7 September 2014. Available at http://
shoebat.com/2014/09/07/Jews-Turkey-red-dragon-two-horns-leave-now/ (last accessed 11 September 2014).
65. F.G. Diler, ‘No moz karışayamoz a la eços del hükümet’ [We do not intervene in the government’s matters],
Agos, 2 February 2015. Available at http://www.agos.com.tr/tr/yazi/10577/no-moz-karisayamoz-a-la-eco
s-del-hukumet (last accessed 28 February 2019).
66. There is no difference in the meaning of the two terms Musevi or Yahudi. In the past there was little
use of the latter, as Yahudi went together with derogatory names such as korkak Yahudi (coward Jew)
or pis yahudi (dirty Jew). The term Musevi derives from the prophet Moses – Musa – and thus cannot
be used while cursing. In recent years, though, Jews themselves started using Yahudi, so the negative
connotation was removed, although when Jews are cursed today, they are always cursed as Yahudi, and
not Musevi.
67. Brink-Danan, Jewish Life, p.159.
68. S. Sokol, ‘Study: Antisemitism most common prejudice in Turkish media’, Jerusalem Post, 6 January 2015.
Available at https://www.jpost.com/Diaspora/Study-Antisemitism-most-common-prejudice-in-
Turkish-media-386882 (last accessed 10 January 2020).
69. For example, in March 1988, an anti-Israeli and antisemitic campaign took place in Turkey in reaction to
Israel’s acts in the Territories during what is now known as the ‘First Intifada’. In one of the protests in
Istanbul, a PLO representative harshly criticized Israel and used antisemitic expressions. Other complaints
were about threats against Turkish Jews in several cases. The antisemitic campaign caused deep concern
among the Turkish Jewish community. The delegate in Istanbul reported of these incidents that ‘official
sources in the community attempt to deny or to underestimate them’. The diplomats had planned a
meeting with the community’s leaders to suggest acts against this campaign, but said, ‘By knowing the
parties involved, I doubt anything real is going to come out if it. As I know the people involved, I doubt
that any practical result will be expressed’. ISA RG MFA to Mazatim (Middle East) from Istanbul,
ISA-mfa-mfa-000xcsu. 3 March 1988. ISA RG MFA to the Office, from Ankara/Hadas, ISA-mfa-mfa-000xcsu
21 March 1988. Another occasion was when the Jewish-themed musical Fiddler on the Roof, performed by
the Turkish national theatre company, was removed from theatres in 1988, probably as a gesture by Turkey
16 E. AVIV
toward Arab countries. ISA RG MFA to Dr. Yehoyada Hayim, MAZATIM (Middle East), from the person in
charge, Ankara, ISA-mfa-mfa-000xcsu, 3 March 1988.
70. Bali, Antisemitism and Conspiracy Theories in Turkey, pp.44–45.
71. F.H. Adler, ‘Jews in Contemporary Turkey’, Macalester International, Vol.15(1) (2005), pp.127–34, cf. 132.
72. Hepkaner, ‘Jews from Turkey’, p.201. Turks in the US decided to cooperate with the Jewish lobby against
what they called ‘the hostile powers’ which have intensified their anti-Turkish campaigns with the plan to
open an Armenian Genocide Museum in Washington and with the anti-Turkish schoolbook debate in
California. The California State Board of Education published a classroom guide for teachers on human
rights and the Armenian Genocide in 1988: https://www.armenian-genocide.org/Education.45/current_cat-
egory.117/resourceguide_detail.html (retrieved 2 November 2020). Other examples of such cooperation
between Turkey and American-Turkish Jewry appear throughout the correspondence of Israeli diplomats.
See ISA RG MFA to the Middle Eastern from Ankara/Hadas ISA-mfa-mfa-000xcsu, 10 August 1987, and ISA
RG MFA to vice general manager from Milo, Ankara, 11 August 1987, ISA-mfa-mfa-000xcsu.
73. No author, ‘Yıldız Tilbe’nin ‘ırkçı’ mesajları tepki çekti’ [Yıldız Tilbe’s ‘racist’ messages drew reaction], Hürriyet,
11 July 2014. Available at http://www.Hürriyet.com.tr/kelebek/paparazzi/26783541.asp (last retrieved 11 July
2019).
74. Brink-Danan, Jewish Life in 21st Century Turkey, p.60.
75. Radikal (Radical) was established in 1996 by Aydın Doğan’s Doğan Media Group. Liberal centre-left in its
orientation, it was shut down in 2016.
76. L. Navaro, ‘Kendim ve ülkemin geleceği için tedirginim, üzülüyorum, ürküyorum’ [I am worried, sad and
scared for myself and the future of my country], Radikal, 1 January 2009. Available at http://www.radikal.
com.tr/yorum/kendim_ve_ulkemin_gelecegi_icin_tedirginim_uzuluyorum_urkuyorum-918064 (last retrieved
10 July 2013).
77. Ibid.
78. Leshem Shamayim, a closed online group of Orthodox Jews that mainly provides religious information.
79. Both citations appeared in Leshem Shamayim.
80. For example, A. Levy, The Jews of the Ottoman Empire (Pennington, NJ: Darwin Press, 1994); S.J. Shaw, The
Jews of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991); Ş. Toktaş, ‘Perceptions
of Anti-Semitism among Turkish Jews’, Turkish Studies, Vol.7(2) (2006), pp.203–23.
81. For example, R. Bali, Musa’nin Evlatlari Cumhuriyet’in Vatandaslari [The Sons/Daughters of Moses and the
Citizens of the Republic] (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001); Brink-Danan, Jewish Life in 21st Century Turkey;
Aviv, Antisemitism and Anti-Zionism.
82. Cited in Nefes, ‘Negative Perceptions of Jews in Turkish Politics’, pp.400–1.
83. For example, A. İçduygu, Ş. Toktas and A. Soner, ‘The Politics of Population in a Nation-Building Process:
Emigration of Non-Muslims from Turkey’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol.31(2) (2008), pp.358–89.
84. M.D. Baer, Sultanic Saviors and Tolerant Turks: Writing Ottoman Jewish History, Denying the Armenian Genocide.
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2020), pp.269–70.
85. Interview in Istanbul, 25 February 2014.
86. No author, ‘Türkiyeli Yahudilerden sert açıklama’, Cumhuriyet, 29 August 2014. Available at http://www.
cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/112363/Turkiyeli_Yahudilerden_sert_aciklama.html (last accessed 30 August
2019).
87. No author, ‘Turkey’s Jewish intellectuals denounce being targeted over Israel’s Gaza assault’, Hürriyet Daily
News, 30 August 2014. Available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/Turkeys-jewish-intellectua
ls-denounce-being-targeted-over-israels-gaza-assault.aspx?PageID=238&NID=71095&NewsCatID=341 (last
accessed 30 August 2014).
88. Aviv, Antisemitism and anti-Zionism, p.184.
89. Brink-Danan, Jewish Life in 21st Century Turkey, pp.58–9.
90. No author, ‘Turkey Replies to American Jewish Congress for Demanded Award’, Daily Sabah, 29 July 2014.
Available at http://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2014/07/29/Turkey-replies-to-america
n-Jewish-congress-for-demanded-award (last accessed 2 September 2014).
91. B. Bismuth, ‘Turkiya ze HaBayit’ [Turkey is home], Israel Hayom, 29 August 2014. Available at http://news.
walla.co.il/?w=//2780662 (last accessed 2 September 2020) [Hebrew].
92. Z. Klein, ‘Rabah shel Turkiye: en lanu kesher politi im Israel’ [Turkey’s chief Rabbi: ‘We have no political
relation with Israel’], NRG, 4 January 2015. Available at http://www.nrg.co.il/online/11/ART2/667/548.html
(last accessed 10 January 2014) [Hebrew].
93. Interview with Shay Cohen, Israeli Consul General in Turkey, Istanbul, 26 February 2015.
94. Interview with Shay Cohen, 26 February 2015.
95. According to the Hrant Dink Foundation’s annual report, in 2014 the Jews were the group that mostly
suffered from hate speech in the Turkish media, showing a great increase from the previous year: https://
hrantdink.org/attachments/article/91/EylulAralik2014raporuson.pdf (accessed 17 February 2020).
96. Nefes, Online Anti-Semitism, pp.54–6.
