No harm in being self-corrective: Self-criticism and reform intentions increase researchers’ epistemic trustworthiness and credibility in the eyes of the public

Abstract

Science should be self-correcting. However, researchers often hesitate to admit errors and to adopt reforms in their own work. In two studies (overall N = 702), we test whether scientific self-criticism and reform intentions expressed by researchers damage or rather improve their reputation in the eyes of the public (i.e. perceivers). Across both studies, such self-correction (compared to no self-correction) increases perceivers’ epistemic trustworthiness ascriptions, credibility perceptions, and willingness to further engage with science. Study 2 revealed that these effects were largely driven by the no self-criticism condition. In addition, researchers’ commitment to implementing reforms had positive effects and rejecting reforms had negative effects on perceptions, irrespective of the extent of these reforms. These findings suggest that researchers’ fear that self-criticism and expressing reform intentions may damage their reputation may be unfounded.

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https://doi.org/10.1177/09636625211022181
Public Understanding of Science
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P U S
No harm in being self-corrective:
Self-criticism and reform intentions
increase researchers’ epistemic
trustworthiness and credibility
in the eyes of the public
Marlene Sophie Altenmüller ,
Stephan Nuding and Mario Gollwitzer
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Germany
Abstract
Science should be self-correcting. However, researchers often hesitate to admit errors and to adopt
reforms in their own work. In two studies (overall N = 702), we test whether scientific self-criticism and
reform intentions expressed by researchers damage or rather improve their reputation in the eyes of the
public (i.e. perceivers). Across both studies, such self-correction (compared to no self-correction) increases
perceivers’ epistemic trustworthiness ascriptions, credibility perceptions, and willingness to further engage
with science. Study 2 revealed that these effects were largely driven by the no self-criticism condition. In
addition, researchers’ commitment to implementing reforms had positive effects and rejecting reforms had
negative effects on perceptions, irrespective of the extent of these reforms. These findings suggest that
researchers’ fear that self-criticism and expressing reform intentions may damage their reputation may be
unfounded.
Keywords
credibility, open science, reforms, self-criticism, trust
Humans fail and err all the time in their daily lives. Yet, admitting failures and errors is psychologi-
cally costly: doing so threatens one’s self-image and the desire to make a favorable impression
upon others. While there are certainly contexts in which people’s hesitation to admit potential
errors and to change their work routines is psychologically comprehensible, science is no such
context: here, a self-corrective mind-set (i.e. admitting flaws and intending to improve one’s rou-
tines) is crucial. The basic idea of scientific progress is that by constantly correcting previous work
and improving future work, researchers increase the likelihood of detecting the “truth” (or, at least,
Corresponding author:
Marlene Sophie Altenmüller, Department of Psychology, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Leopoldstrasse 13,
80802 Munich, Germany.
Email: marlene.altenmueller@psy.lmu.de
1022181PUS0010.1177/09636625211022181Public Understanding of ScienceAltenmüller et al.
research-article2021
Research article

2 Public Understanding of Science 00(0)
a robust phenomenon) and, thus, their own and other stakeholders’ confidence that their findings
are trustworthy and credible.
However, empirical findings suggest that the ever-doubtful and self-correcting scientist is an
ideal and that, when it comes to admitting flaws and failures, researchers behave just as “normal”
people do: they hesitate to do so for the sake of protecting their self-image and their reputation
(Bishop, 2018; Fetterman and Sassenberg, 2015; Rohrer et al., 2021; van der Bles et al., 2020).
Thus, the question is whether these concerns are justified. How does the general public react to
researchers who admit that their work may have been faulty and that they are willing to implement
reforms aimed at improving the quality of their future work? Would the public place more versus
less trust in researchers who admit such prior faults and/or who express reform intentions, and does
the extent of these intended reforms play a role here? The two studies presented here were designed
to find answers to these questions.
Trust in science can be conceptualized on different levels: trust in science as a whole and trust
in individual researchers and their work. Judging a scientist to be a reliable source of knowledge is
known as epistemic trust, which includes a cognitive aspect—expertise—and two affective
aspects—benevolence and integrity (Fiske and Dupree, 2014; Hendriks et al., 2015; McAllister,
1995; Mayer et al., 1995; Neal et al., 2012). Expertise means that one is perceived as able and
competent with regard to their (scientific) work; benevolence means that one is perceived as hav-
ing the best in mind for others/society; and, finally, integrity means that one is perceived as adher-
ing to prescriptive rules and principles. An additional element of trust in science, which is not
directly reflected by any of the three interpersonal facets mentioned above, is credibility—people’s
willingness to accept a scientific finding as true and integrating it in their own understanding of the
world. Both epistemic trustworthiness and credibility are relevant for maintaining general trust in
science on a societal level.
Previous findings suggest that self-criticism has positive as well as negative effects on people’s
trust in scientists. For instance, Hendriks et al. (2016) found that expertise ascribed to a science
blogger was lower when the blogger admitted (vs did not admit) an error in one of their blog
entries, while perceived integrity as well as benevolence were higher. Notably, the error that the
blogger admitted was not related to the research per se (i.e. the methodological quality of the
study), but rather to how they communicated about it (i.e. overgeneralization of results in a science
journalism piece). It is unclear, however, how admitting doubts about one’s own research might
influence the public’s trust in scientists. In addition, it is unclear whether such self-criticism also
affects credibility judgments. Here, effects are plausible in both ways: On one hand, admitting
doubts about past work might imply incompetence and, hence, decrease expertise and credibility
judgments. On the other hand, being self-critical and noticing and disclosing potential flaws in
one’s previous work might indicate a more attentive approach to future research projects, which
leads to more confidence that this work will produce sound scientific results. In addition, a self-
critical approach to one’s research demonstrates commitment to a certain scientific attitude of
constantly challenging and updating scientific knowledge, even at the cost of questioning oneself.
Regarding the effect of reform intentions on the public’s trust in science, previous studies
yielded an inconsistent pattern: recent studies support the idea that successful replications increase
laypeople’s trust in science (Hendriks et al., 2020; Wingen et al., 2020). However, learning about
specific reforms can have null or even backfiring effects. For instance, Wingen et al. (2020) found
that increasing transparency (e.g. by means of preregistrations, open data, and open materials) or
providing explanations for the “replicability crisis” in psychology had no effect on laypeople’s
trust in psychological science. Anvari and Lakens (2018) even found that participants expressed
less trust in psychological science after learning about suggested reforms. The authors discuss
three explanations for this backfiring effect: first, respondents may have been negatively surprised

Altenmüller et al. 3
that the proposed reforms are not already common practice; second, their manipulation of reform
implementation might have been problematic (i.e. their “reform” vignette began by talking about
replication failures, while the other vignettes began by talking about the history of psychology,
which might have elicited a stronger negative response in the reform condition); third, participants
might have judged the reforms to be too weak. These inconclusive results call for more research on
the effect of reform intentions on epistemic trustworthiness and credibility judgments.
Expanding our main focus on trustworthiness and credibility,1 we will also investigate the effect
of self-criticism and reform intentions on participants’ willingness to engage with science.
Disclosure of uncertainties and doubts has been found to not only have a mixed impact on percep-
tions of trustworthiness and credibility (e.g. Hendriks et al., 2016; Jensen, 2008; van der Bles et al.,
2020) but also to increase the public’s interest in science and in new technologies (Retzbach and
Maier, 2015). Thus, self-correction in science—expressing self-criticism and reform intentions—
might also influence laypeople’s interest and make them want to engage more with science.
In this article, we report two preregistered studies investigating the effects of researchers’ self-
criticism and reform intentions on their epistemic trustworthiness, the credibility of their future
findings, and the public’s willingness to engage further with these researchers and their findings.
For both studies, we report how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions (if any), all
manipulations, and all measures (Simmons et al., 2012). All materials, the anonymized data, and
analyses are available online (https://osf.io/yhsbp/).
1. Study 1
In Study 1, we compare the effect of self-criticism (yes vs no) and reform intentions in varying degrees:
As previous studies regarding the perception of reforms focused on reforms in general (Anvari and
Lakens, 2018) or on specific reform approaches (Wingen et al., 2020), we manipulate the extent of
these reforms irrespective of their specific content (see “Methods” section; no, minor, or major
reforms). This way, we account for two issues related to previous research in this area: First, we inves-
tigate the effect of the extent to which a researcher promises to implement reforms in their research on
laypeople’s trust and credibility perceptions (Anvari and Lakens, 2018). Second, we try to get a more
generalizable picture of the effects of reform intentions (as the findings will not be specific to distinct
reforms, but rather get at the general willingness to implement reforms of differing degrees).
In Study 1, we also explore possible interaction effects of self-criticism and reform intentions on
epistemic trust, credibility judgments, and willingness to engage. First, it is possible that self-criti-
cism of previous work and reform intentions are perceived independently from each other, and, thus,
yield two main effects on trust, credibility, and willingness to engage. Second, it is also possible that
expressing doubts about one’s prior work makes reform intentions more reasonable and more cred-
ible, which would result in a synergetic interaction between self-criticism and reform intentions on
trust, credibility, and willingness to engage. Third and finally, self-criticism of past work might lead
to reform intentions for future work being perceived as a mandatory consequence; therefore, self-
criticism followed by a refusal to implement future reforms may be perceived as inconsistent, and
expressing reform intentions preceded by full-blown confidence in one’s prior results may be per-
ceived as “cheap talk” and, thus, lead to particularly low levels of trust, credibility, and willingness
to engage (i.e. an ordinal interaction between self-criticism and reform intentions).
Methods
Experimental manipulation. We conducted an online study using a 2 (self-criticism: yes/no) × 3 (reform
intentions: no/minor/major) full between-subject design. After obtaining informed consent, participants

4 Public Understanding of Science 00(0)
were asked to read an alleged online interview with Dr. Romberg,2 a psychological researcher, who
talks about a past study he conducted. At one point during the interview, Dr. Romberg stated (without
being asked) either that “. . . looking back on this study today, I admittedly doubt these findings. The
results are probably not quite right, because according to my current methodological knowledge this
study has some weaknesses” (self-criticism) or that “. . . looking back on this study today, I do not
doubt these findings. The results are probably right, because according to my current methodological
knowledge this study has no weaknesses” (no self-criticism).
Next, being asked explicitly about the on-going “open science” reform discussion in psycho-
logical science, Dr. Romberg describes some reforms in lay-terms (transparency through open data
and preregistrations) and explains how they should work (enhanced reproducibility and construc-
tive exchange, early detection of mistakes, higher reliability of findings). Then the interviewer asks
Dr. Romberg how he judges these reforms in regard to his own research, to which he either states:
“To be honest, I do not think these reforms are necessary for research on group processes. Therefore,
I won’t apply any of these currently discussed reforms in my future research” (no reform inten-
tions); “To be honest, I think these reforms are partly necessary for research on group processes.
Therefore, I will apply some of these currently discussed reforms in my future research” (minor
reform intentions); or “To be honest, I think these reforms are necessary for research on group
processes. Therefore, I will apply many of these currently discussed reforms in my future research”
(major reform intentions).
Dependent variables. After completing two attention check questions (“Which optimal group
sizes did Dr. Romberg’s study show?”; “Which topic does Dr. Romberg want to investigate
next?”), participants rated Dr. Romberg’s trustworthiness with the Muenster Epistemic Trustwor-
thiness Inventory (METI; Hendriks et al., 2015), consisting of 14 opposite adjective pairs measur-
ing expertise (e.g. competent–incompetent, Cronbach’s α = .94) and integrity and benevolence
(e.g. honest–dishonest, Cronbach’s α = .95)3 on 6-point bipolar scales. Next, they rated the per-
ceived credibility of Dr. Romberg’s future research on four items developed specifically for the
purpose of this study based on theoretical assumptions (e.g. Anvari and Lakens, 2018), including
cognitive as well as behavioral indicators of credibility (6-point Likert-type scale ranging from
1 = “not at all” to 6 = “absolutely”; for example, “I think, future research findings by Dr. Romberg
will be credible,” “I will try to consider future research findings by Dr. Romberg in my daily life”;
Cronbach’s α = .83). Finally, participants’ willingness to further engage with Dr. Romberg’s
research (“I intend to register for the free account to be able to read the rest of the article”), sup-
port for public funding (“Dr. Romberg’s future research deserves public funding”), and likeability
(“I like Dr. Romberg”) were assessed on 6-point Likert-type scales ranging from 1 = “not at all”
to 6 = “absolutely.”
Other measures. In the final section, participants completed two manipulation comprehension
check questions (“Did Dr. Romberg criticize his own previous study about group size?”; “Does Dr.
Romberg want to apply reforms for his future research?”) by selecting either “yes” or “no.” If
participants believed Dr. Romberg wanted to apply reforms, participants were asked about the
assumed extent of these reforms (response options were “some reforms,” “many reforms,” or
“don’t know”). To control for prior knowledge, we asked participants whether they had heard
about the “replication debate” in psychology before, and, if yes, how much they knew about it on
a 6-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 = “not much” to 6 = “a lot.” Furthermore, we measured
participants’ general public engagement with science (PES) using two scales that had been used in
previous research (BBVA Foundation, 2011): a five-item scale measuring engagement PES fre-
quency (e.g. “How often do you read news about science?,” 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from

Altenmüller et al. 5
0 = “never” to 5 = “almost daily,” Cronbach’s α = .71) and a multiple choice scale measuring 15
potential PES experiences during the last 12 months (e.g. “I know someone who does scientific
research,” “I visited a science museum”). Finally, demographics (age, gender, occupation, aca-
demic discipline) and a “use-me” item (“Should we use your data for our analyses?,” yes/no) were
assessed. Participants had the opportunity to participate in a lottery and sign up for more informa-
tion and were debriefed.
Sample. Participants were recruited via mailing lists (e.g. by the university, by the research unit) and
social networks (e.g. Facebook, science blogs). Inclusion criteria were very good German language
skills and a minimum age of 16. A total of 521 participants completed the study. Applying pre-regis-
tered exclusion criteria (see https://osf.io/qja78), 184 participants had to be excluded from the dataset:
45 participants stated not to use their data; 34 participants spent less than 60 seconds viewing the
manipulation; 105 participants failed the main manipulation comprehension checks.4 The final sample
consisted of N = 337 participants (68.0% female, 32.0% male); ages ranged between 16 and 74 years
(M = 43.33; SD = 14.73). Most participants were currently employed (59.6%; students: 20.2%; unem-
ployed: 20.2%). Participants who were currently studying at a university or already had a university
degree (61.4%) came from a variety of disciplines (law, economics, and social sciences: 33.2%;
humanities: 10.7%; mathematics and natural sciences: 7.1%; engineering: 6.5%; medicine and life
sciences: 3.3%). Although N = 337 is lower than the determined sample size specified in our pre-regis-
tration, the power is still large enough (i.e. 90%) to detect a small-to-medium interaction effect in our
2×3 analysis of variance (ANOVA; Φ2 = .195) on a 5% significance level (Faul et al., 2007).
Results
Supporting the effectiveness of our randomization, neither general PES (PES frequency: p = .27;
PES experiences: p = .61) nor prior knowledge about the replication debate (p = .12) differed
between the six cells of our design (mean difference tests via one-way ANOVAs). Across all condi-
tions, 19% of our participants had heard about the replication debate before; on average, they
judged their knowledge about the replication debate (M = 4.03, SD = 1.52) and questionable research
practices (QRPs; M = 3.34, SD = 1.61) to be moderate. Table 1 summarizes all means, standard
deviations, and correlations.
Next, we conducted a 2×3 multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) to test the effects of
self-criticism and reform intentions on the two epistemic trustworthiness dimensions (expertise
and integrity/benevolence), credibility, and willingness to further engage with the research.5 Both
self-criticism, F(4, 328) = 4.38, p < .01, Pillai-V = .05, ηp
2 = .05 (95% confidence interval
(CI95) = .01; .09), and reform intentions, F(8, 658) = 20.53, p < .001, Pillai-V = .40, ηp
2 = .20
(CI95 = .14; .24), had multivariate main effects, while the interaction effect was not significant, F(8,
658) = .96, p = .46, Pillai-V = .02, ηp
2 = .01 (CI95 = .00; .02). We followed up with univariate analy-
ses. Means and standard deviations, broken down by conditions, are reported in Table 2.
Epistemic trustworthiness. Univariate analyses show a significant main effect of self-criticism on
integrity/benevolence, F(1, 331) = 11.97, p < .001, ηp
2 = .03 (CI95 = .01; .08), but not on expertise,
F(1, 331) = 2.39, p = .12, ηp
2 = .01 (CI95 = .00; .04), as well as significant main effects of reform
intentions on both integrity/benevolence, F(2, 331) = 91.45, p < .001, ηp
2 = .36 (CI95 = .27; .42), and
expertise, F(2, 331) = 50.62, p < .001, ηp
2 = .23 (CI95 = .16; .30). The interaction effects were non-
significant on either dependent variable (DV; p = .44 for expertise; p = .71 for integrity/benevo-
lence). Looking at the reform intentions factor, follow-up pairwise comparisons (i.e. Tukey honest
significant difference (HSD) tests) suggest that both reform intention conditions differed from the

6 Public Understanding of Science 00(0)
no reform condition (all p < .001); yet, the extent of these reforms (i.e. minor vs major) did not
affect the DVs (p = .35 for expertise; p = .37 for integrity/benevolence).
Credibility. On credibility, the main effect of self-criticism was not significant, F(1, 331) = .15,
p = .70, ηp
2 < .001 (CI95 = .00; .02), while the main effect of reform intentions was significant, F(2,
331) = 78.72, p < .001, ηp
2 = .32 (CI95 = .24; .39). Again, there was no interaction effect, F(2,
331) = .28, p = .76, ηp
2 < .01 (CI95 = .00; .02). As before, the reform conditions significantly differed
from the no reform condition (both p < .001); but the extent of reforms did not make a difference
(p = .87).
Willingness to engage. On participants’ willingness to further engage with the research, we found no
significant main effect of self-criticism, F(1, 331) = .14, p = .71, ηp
2 < .001 (CI95 = .00; .02), but a
significant main effect of reform intentions, F(2, 331) = 6.85, p < .01, ηp
2 = .04 (CI95 = .01; .08).
Once again, there was no significant interaction effect, F(2, 331) = 2.31, p = .10, ηp
2 = .01 (CI95 = .00;
.04). Follow-up analyses reveal a slightly more complex pattern than before (see Table 2). Post hoc
tests only revealed a significant difference between the no reform and the major reforms conditions
on this DV (p < .001); all other comparisons were non-significant (no vs minor: p = .07; minor vs
major: p = .35).
We also conducted explorative analyses to investigate the effects of self-criticism and reform
intentions on public funding support as well as on likeability ratings. The results closely mirror the
findings for credibility. These findings are not the focus of this article and are provided in a sup-
plemental file (https://osf.io/yhsbp/). To scrutinize whether the effects reported here merely reflect
an unspecific “halo” effect, we re-ran our analyses with likeability as a covariate (see supplemental
file). Importantly, the main effect of self-criticism on integrity/benevolence remained significant,
and the main effect of reform intentions on expertise, integrity/benevolence, and credibility
remained significant, too. The main effect of reform intentions on willingness to engage, however,
became non-significant. We will come back to this in the “General discussion” section.
Table 1. Means, standard deviations, and correlations between measured variables.
Variable M SD Correlations
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 Expertise 4.79 0.95 .94
2 Integrity/benevolence 4.47 1.00 .78** .95
3 Credibility 3.79 1.14 .73** .75** .83
4Willingness to engage 2.53 1.64 .29** .27** .36** —
5Public funding support 4.00 1.33 .59** .66** .68** .35** —
6 Likeability 3.69 1.31 .66** .73** .71** .32** .68** —
7Replication debate
knowledge
4.03 1.52 −.13 −.01 −.13 −.04 −.09 −.08 —
8 QRPs knowledge 3.34 1.61 −.18 −.08 −.12 .02 −.16 −.16 .76** —
9 PES frequency 3.16 0.63 −.03 −.06 −.09 .16** .01 −.07 −.09 −.07 .71
10 PES experiences 5.09 2.96 −.15** −.15** −.13 .09 –.05 –.07 .24 .25* .51**
SD: standard deviation; QRP: questionable research practice; PES: public engagement with science.
N = 337; for variables 7 and 8: N = 64.
*p < .05; **p < .01. Cronbach’s α for each scale are reported in the diagonal (in italics).

Altenmüller et al. 7
Discussion
These findings suggest that there are no detrimental effects of self-criticism and reform intentions
on laypeople’s trustworthiness ascriptions and credibility perceptions. Expressing self-criticism
(vs no self-criticism) led to higher benevolence and integrity perceptions—the affective dimen-
sions of trustworthiness. Announcing reform intentions (compared to no reform intentions) had
positive effects on epistemic trustworthiness and credibility, as well as on participants’ willingness
to engage further with the expert’s research.
This pattern is in line with previous findings (Hendriks et al., 2016). Contradictorily, however,
we found that self-criticism did not negatively affect expertise (Hendriks et al., 2016). This might
be due to how self-criticism was particularly framed in our study: The self-critical researcher’s
statement implied a more advanced methodological knowledge by the time he was interviewed
compared to when the study was conducted (“according to my current methodological knowl-
edge”), which actually suggests increased expertise that participants might have picked up upon.
In Hendriks et al.’s (2016) study, however, the researcher revised his previous overgeneralizing
statement in a blog entry, which might not have been perceived as improved knowledge but rather
as correcting a careless mistake that could happen again.
Self-criticism only impacted affective dimensions of epistemic trustworthiness, but had no
effect on expertise or on credibility. One reason for this could be that self-criticism regarding a
particular study conducted in the past does not tell us much about the credibility of future research.
A second reason could be that, in our study, reform intentions were mentioned at length at the end
of the alleged interview, immediately before the DVs were measured. This might have overshad-
owed any effect of our self-criticism manipulation, which was mentioned earlier in the interview.
Announcing reforms had consistent and large effects on all of our DVs. Contrary to previous
studies (Anvari and Lakens, 2018; Wingen et al., 2020), expressing even minor reform intentions
led to higher ratings of epistemic trustworthiness and credibility compared to a no-reform intention
control condition. Interestingly, the extent of such reforms did not have any effects. This suggests
that it might be sufficient to signal at least some willingness to improve one’s scientific practices.
It should be noted that, in Study 1, self-criticism and reform intention statements were con-
trasted with conditions in which the researcher explicitly expressed no self-criticism regarding
prior findings and/or refused implementing reforms. Thus, it is unclear whether our results display
an increase in trust and credibility due to expressing self-criticism and/or reform intentions, a
decrease of the same due to being overconfident, or both.
Table 2. Means and standard deviations, broken down by conditions.
Variable Self-
criticism
Reform intentions
None Minor Major
Expertise No 4.00 (1.07)a5.01 (0.84)b5.14 (0.79)b
Yes 4.30 (0.84)a5.05 (0.72)b5.22 (0.70)b
Integrity/
benevolence
No 3.44 (0.94)a4.65 (0.71)b4.84 (0.83)b
Yes 3.83 (0.85)a4.95 (0.76)b5.06 (0.67)b
Credibility No 2.83 (1.15)a4.26 (0.85)b4.22 (0.87)b
Yes 2.92 (0.96)a4.18 (0.82)b4.32 (0.94)b
Willingness to
engage
No 2.12 (1.59) 2.91 (1.68) 2.67 (1.72)
Yes 2.09 (1.53)a2.35 (1.60) 3.05 (1.57)b
N = 337. Means (standard deviations in brackets). In each line, different letters in the superscript indicate significant
pairwise differences (i.e. p < .05; Tukey honest significant difference (HSD) test).

8 Public Understanding of Science 00(0)
Our design allowed us to investigate whether self-criticism and reform intentions interact with
each other. Regarding such an interaction, both amplifying effects (e.g. self-criticism makes reform
intentions seem more reasonable) as well as alleviating effects (e.g. self-criticism alleviates the
effect of reform intentions as they seem imperative) would have been plausible. However, we did
not find any interaction effects on any of our measured variables, which suggests that self-criticism
and reform intentions are independent of (and not contingent on) each other.
2. Study 2
Study 2 aimed to replicate and clarify the effects of self-criticism and reform intentions. For this
purpose, we made some changes compared to Study 1. First, we manipulated each of the two inde-
pendent variables, separately, because (a) we did not find evidence of an interaction between the
two, and (b) doing so reduced the danger of any artificial “overshadowing” effects between the two
manipulations. Second, to scrutinize which condition might drive the effects obtained in Study 1,
we added neutral (“control”) conditions for both self-criticism and reform intentions (see “Methods”
section). Third, we refined the operationalization of self-criticism as expression of a self-corrective
attitude toward science: The researcher’s self-criticism was based on viewing his prior findings as
preliminary and fragile (indicating high self-criticism) versus as fixed and definite (indicating lack-
ing self-criticism). Fourth, we no longer differentiate between minor and major reform intentions,
since Study 1 suggested no differences between these two conditions.
Methods
Experimental manipulation. In Study 2, we again used a full between-subject design. However, we
split the study in two parts (presented in randomized order): (2A) self-criticism (yes vs no vs no
information) and (2B) reform intentions (yes vs no vs undecided). Participants read two alleged
interviews with researchers, Dr Kugler and Dr Ecker, in which they talked about their own research
on group processes (full materials are provided here: https://osf.io/yhsbp/).
In interview A, we manipulated self-criticism, defined as the expression of a self-critical atti-
tude toward prior findings. When asked about a prior study, the researcher, Dr Kugler, described
the results and then expressed either no self-criticism (“Still today, I actually do not have doubts
about these findings. I see no reason why the results from back then shouldn’t also apply today and
would view them as definite”), self-criticism (“However, today, I do have some doubts about these
findings. Viewed scientifically, there might be reasons why the results from back then do not apply
today and, thus, I would view them as preliminary”), or nothing of that kind (no information con-
trol condition).
In interview B, we manipulated reform intentions: After describing some general reform ideas
in psychology and the ongoing debate, the interviewed researcher, Dr Ecker, either stated that he
would not implement any reforms in his research (no reform intentions), that he would implement
such reforms (reform intentions), or that he was still undecided whether to implement reforms
(undecided).
Dependent variables. After each interview, we measured the same variables as in Study 1: First,
they answered two respective attention checks (2A: “What was the optimal group size in Dr.
Kugler’s earlier study?,” “Which topic would Dr. Kugler like to research next?;” 2B: “What is the
goal of the discussed reforms according to Dr. Ecker?,” “Which topic would Dr. Ecker like to
research next?”). Next, trustworthiness and credibility (as well as likeability and support for public
funding) were measured exactly as in Study 1. In addition, we measured participants’ willingness

Altenmüller et al. 9
to engage further with the researcher and his findings (one item used in Study 1 plus three addi-
tional items; for example, “I would like to learn more about Dr. Kugler’s/Dr. Ecker’s research;”
assessed on a 6-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 = “strongly disagree” to 6 = “strongly
agree”).
Other measures. After each interview, we applied a comprehension check similar to Study 1 (2A:
“Did Dr. Kugler express doubts about his prior findings?,” 2B: “What did Dr. Ecker say about his
own intentions to implement reforms?”). In addition, after the interview concerning reforms in
psychology (2B), we again asked whether participants had heard about the replication debate and,
if yes, how extensive they judged their knowledge about the replication debate and QRP to be.
Then, and similar to Study 1, we assessed participants’ general engagement with science (PES
frequency and PES experiences; BBVA Foundation, 2011), demographics (age, gender, occupa-
tion, academic discipline), and a “use-me” item (“Do you think we should use your data for our
analyses in this study?” yes/no). Finally, participants were fully debriefed and informed about their
reimbursement.
Sample. As in Study 1, participants were recruited via mailing lists and social networks and could
participate when they were older than 16 years, had very good German language skills, and had not
previously participated in Study 1. We collected data from 400 participants as prescribed by our
preregistered a priori power analyses for each study part based on our findings in Study 1 (see
https://osf.io/9szde/). Applying our preregistered exclusion criteria, 35 participants had to be gen-
erally excluded:6 11 participants denied the “use-me” question; 5 participants fell below the mini-
mum threshold of 30 seconds for viewing the manipulation texts; 4 participants completed the
questionnaire in less than 5 minutes; 15 participants failed the comprehension check in both parts.
The final sample consisted of N = 365 participants; ages ranged between 16 and 77 years (M = 30.60;
SD = 13.95; 81.10% female, 18.63% male, 0.27% other). A majority was currently enrolled in a
higher education program (64.1%; employed: 26.8%; unemployed: 9.0%). Participants who were
studying at a university or already had a university degree (90.1%) came from a variety of disci-
plines (law, economics, and social sciences: 58.2%; humanities: 9.2%; mathematics and natural
sciences: 9.7%; engineering: 3.3%; medicine and life sciences: 6.7%). Thus, compared to Study 1,
the sample in this study was younger, more female, and more highly educated.
Results
Supporting the effectiveness of our randomization, neither general PES (PES frequency: pa = .58
and pb = .63; PES experiences: pa = .94 and pb = .70) nor prior knowledge about the replication
debate (pa = .81 and pb = .76; overall, 34% had heard of it before) differed between experimental
conditions in any of the two study parts (mean differences tested via one-way ANOVAs).
Descriptive statistics and correlations between measured variables are reported in Tables 3 (for
Study 2A) and 4 (for Study 2B).
Self-criticism (Study 2A). Using a MANOVA, we tested the effects of self-criticism on the two epis-
temic trustworthiness dimensions (expertise and integrity/benevolence), credibility, and willing-
ness to engage: The multivariate main effect of self-criticism was, again, significant, and slightly
larger than in Study 1, F(8, 566) = 6.38, p < .001, Pillai-V = .17, ηp
2 = .08 (CI95 = .03; .12). We fol-
lowed up with univariate analyses. Self-criticism had a significant effect on all our DVs: integrity/
benevolence, F(2, 285) = 24.96, p < .001, ηp
2 = .15 (CI95 = .08; .22), expertise, F(2, 285) = 15.24,
p < .001, ηp
2 = .10 (CI95 = .04; .16), credibility F(2, 285) = 14.76, p < .001, ηp
2 = .09 (CI95 = .04; .16),

10 Public Understanding of Science 00(0)
and willingness to engage, F(2, 285) = 6.04, p < .01, ηp
2 = .04 (CI95 = .01; .09). Follow-up pairwise
comparisons (i.e. Tukey HSD tests) show that expressing no self-criticism compared to self-
criticism or no information led to significantly lower mean values on all DVs. There were no sig-
nificant differences, however, between expressing self-criticism versus giving no information (i.e.
the control condition). Means and standard deviations, broken down by conditions, and results for
follow-up tests are reported in Table 5 (upper part).
Reform intentions (Study 2B). Again, using a MANOVA, we tested the effects of reform intentions
on epistemic trustworthiness (expertise and integrity/benevolence), credibility, and willingness to
engage. The multivariate main effect of reform intentions was, again, significant, yet slightly
smaller than in Study 1, F(8, 634) = 9.87, p < .001, Pillai-V = .22, ηp
2 = .11 (CI95 = .06; .15). We fol-
lowed up with univariate analyses. Reform intentions had a significant effect on all our DVs:
integrity/benevolence, F(2, 319) = 33.42, p < .001, ηp
2 = .17 (CI95 = .10; .24), expertise, F(2,
319) = 7.90, p < .001, ηp
2 = .05 (CI95 = .01; .10), credibility, F(2, 319) = 25.05, p < .001, ηp
2 = .14
(CI95 = .07; .20), and willingness to engage, F(2, 319) = 4.85, p < .01, ηp
2 = .03 (CI95 = .00; .07).
Follow-up tests showed that for all DVs, reform intentions compared to no reform intentions led to
significantly higher mean values. Reform intentions compared to being undecided led to signifi-
cantly higher mean values on all variables except for willingness to engage. And being undecided
compared to no reform intentions led to significantly higher mean values on all variables except for
expertise and, again, willingness to engage. Means and standard deviations, broken down by con-
ditions, and results for follow-up tests are reported in Table 5 (lower part).
Again, explorative analyses of the effects of self-criticism and reform intentions on public fund-
ing support as well as likeability indicate a very similar pattern of results as described above for our
DVs (see https://osf.io/yhsbp/). When controlling for likeability in our analyses to scrutinize a
possible halo-effect, self-criticism only had a significant effect on integrity/benevolence, and
reform intentions only had significant effects on integrity/benevolence and credibility. We will
come back to this in the “General discussion” section.
Table 3. Means, standard deviations, and correlations between measured variables for study 2A (self-
criticism).
Variable M SD Correlations
123456789
1 Expertise 4.93 0.87 .93
2 Integrity/benevolence 4.68 0.88 .73** .95
3 Credibility 4.05 0.98 .64** .63** .77
4 Willingness to engage 3.74 1.14 .51** .48** .47** .77
5 Public funding support 4.44 1.11 .59** .61** .56** .51** —
6 Likeability 4.24 1.24 .66** .77** .58** .54** .64** —
7 Replication debate
knowledge
3.61 1.50 .11 .12 .07 .04 .03 .07 —
8 QRPs knowledge 3.06 1.66 .04 .08 .07 −.01 .04 .01 .83** —
9 PES frequency 3.10 0.68 −.01 −.03 −.04 .05 .07 −.06 .15 .17 .73
10 PES experiences 6.15 2.75 −.06 −.09 −.10 .01 .03 −.10 .12 .09 .45**
SD: standard deviation; QRP: questionable research practice; PES: public engagement with science.
N = 288; for variables 7 and 8: N = 193.
**p < .01. Cronbach’s α for each scale are reported in the diagonal (in italics).

Altenmüller et al. 11
Discussion
Study 2 replicates and further qualifies the results from Study 1. Again, our findings indicate no
harm in being self-corrective. Actually, Study 2 suggests that there is harm in not being self-correc-
tive: While researchers’ expression of a self-critical attitude toward their previous findings (com-
pared to no such expression) did not affect trustworthiness (expertise and benevolence/integrity),
perceived credibility, or willingness to further engage with this research, researchers who expressed
no self-criticism and presented their findings as fixed and definite were perceived as less trustwor-
thy and less credible, and participants were less willing to engage with this research (compared to a
neutral control condition). Whereas in Study 1, the researcher in the self-criticism condition
expressed doubts about his prior finding as a “second thought” regarding his methodology, Study 2
operationalized self-criticism as being mindful of the fragility and preliminary nature of (his)
research, in general. Researchers who deny this fragility and tentativeness of science might not only
be perceived as less benevolent and integer, but also as less competent (as this attitude contradicts
the basic idea of science as being self-corrective), which, in turn, questions the quality of their future
research and makes them seem less of exemplary researchers.
Regarding reform intentions, our findings indicate a benefit of being self-corrective: Announcing
reform intentions (compared to being undecided and/or intending no reforms) increased perceived
trustworthiness (expertise and benevolence/integrity) and credibility of their future research, and
led participants to report a higher willingness to further engage with this research. Nevertheless,
we also find that dismissing reforms can harm the public’s trust in science: When the researcher
announced not to implement reforms, integrity/benevolence and credibility ratings were consider-
ably lower. Although the effects of reform intentions in Study 2 were smaller than in Study 1, our
findings support the same conclusion: Researchers’ expressed positions on reform intentions have
the potential of enhancing (as well as impairing) the public’s trust and interest to engage with
science.
Table 4. Means, standard deviations, and correlations between measured variables for study 2B.
Variable M SD Correlations
123456789
1 Expertise 4.98 0.82 .93
2 Integrity/benevolence 4.47 0.96 .71** .95
3 Credibility 3.85 0.97 .54** .69** .76
4 Willingness to engage 3.51 1.18 .31** .37** .41** .81
5 Public funding support 4.23 1.21 .58** .66** .65** .40** —
6 Likeability 3.94 1.23 .56** .67** .60** .52** .69** —
7 Replication debate
knowledge
3.69 1.45 −.10 −.23* −.23* −.12 −.20* −.20* —
8 QRPs knowledge 3.07 1.66 −.16 −.26** −.27** −.09 −.21* −.21* .80** —
9 PES frequency 3.15 0.67 .00 .02 −.07 .05 −.02 −.06 .14 .11 .73
10 PES experiences 6.37 2.75 .01 −.02 −.09 .06 .02 −.06 .15 .10 .46**
SD: standard deviation; QRP: questionable research practice; PES: public engagement with science.
N = 322; for variables 7 and 8: N = 203. *p < .05; **p < .01. Cronbach’s α for each scale are reported in the diagonal (in italics).

12 Public Understanding of Science 00(0)
3. General discussion
In two studies, we demonstrate the effects of two ways of being self-corrective in science: express-
ing self-criticism and intending to implement reforms. Our findings suggest that there is no harm
in expressing criticism toward one’s own research or in announcing one will implement reforms.
In fact, such self-corrective behavior was superior to non-corrective behavior in terms of laypeo-
ple’s perceptions of researchers’ epistemic trustworthiness (expertise and integrity/benevolence)
and the perceived credibility of their research, and led to a higher willingness to further engage
with researchers and their findings.
Researchers’ self-criticism (i.e. reflecting critically upon prior studies and regarding scientific
findings as preliminary and fragile) did not have negative effects. However, explicitly expressing
a lack of doubts impaired trustworthiness (especially integrity and benevolence), credibility, and
even participants’ willingness to further engage with such research. Thus, in the eyes of the public,
self-criticism does not harm, while a lack of self-criticism does. This has important implications for
researchers communicating their findings: Openly expressing uncertainties and acknowledging the
inherent preliminary nature of new scientific findings seems unproblematic for researchers’ reputa-
tion. However, on the contrary, appearing overconfident might have considerable reputational
costs.
Across both studies, researchers’ reform intentions (i.e. planning to implement currently dis-
cussed reforms in future research) consistently led to more trust in and willingness to engage with
science. Interestingly, these effects were driven both by the intention to implement reforms and, in
the reverse direction, by an explicit dismissal of such reforms. In addition, Study 1 suggests that
the extent to which researchers are willing to implement reforms (i.e. minor vs major reforms) does
not play a decisive role for their public perception. These findings cast a new light on psychologi-
cal research on the public perception of reforms in psychology: contrary to previous studies (Anvari
and Lakens, 2018; Wingen et al., 2020), participants reacted quite positively to the idea of imple-
menting reforms in science. Our studies extend this prior research in two important ways: First,
Table 5. Means and standard deviations, broken down by conditions for study A (self-criticism) and Study
B (reform intentions).
Variable Self-criticism (Study 2A)
No self-criticism No information Self-criticism
Expertise 4.56 (0.96)a5.10 (0.72)b5.14 (0.77)b
Integrity/benevolence 4.23 (0.98)a4.79 (0.75)b5.00 (0.69)b
Credibility 3.63 (1.05)a4.24 (0.78)b4.28 (0.93)b
Willingness to engage 3.42 (1.09)a3.90 (1.17)b3.92 (1.11)b
Reform intentions (Study 2B)
No reform intentions Undecided Reform intentions
Expertise 4.83 (0.94)a4.86 (0.77)a5.22 (0.68)b
Integrity/benevolence 4.03 (1.04)a4.38 (0.84)b4.98 (0.71)c
Credibility 3.46 (1.04)a3.76 (0.93)b4.31 (0.73)c
Willingness to engage 3.24 (1.23)a3.61 (1.13) 3.70 (1.14)b
Study 2A: N = 288; Study 2B: N = 322. Means (standard deviations in brackets). In each line, different letters in the super-
script indicate significant pairwise differences (i.e. p < .05; Tukey honest significant difference (HSD) test).

Altenmüller et al. 13
previous studies focused on transparency as the main aspect of science reforms, but did not explain
in detail how this connects to more reliable and credible research. One could argue that the connec-
tion is obvious; yet, explaining the link between transparency and higher reliability in more detail
(and simpler words) to participants may have contributed to the positive effects of reform inten-
tions on trustworthiness and credibility that we found in our studies. This also has important impli-
cations for communicating science reforms to the public: focusing on the superordinate goal these
reforms aim to achieve (instead of merely portraying these reforms to be good for their own sake)
might help lay audiences understand what they are about and why they are relevant. That said, it
should be noted that we did not really measure participants’ understanding of the consequences of
science reforms for science as a whole; instead, we focused on participants’ epistemic trustworthi-
ness in one particular scientist. Thus, future research should look at how such individualized trust-
worthiness perceptions may generalize onto trust in science and the perceived credibility of science
as a whole.
As scientific progress is not a solitary endeavor but a collaborative effort, researchers might also
worry about their colleagues’ perceptions of them. Future research should investigate how other
researchers perceive their self-corrective peers. In fact, first evidence suggests that researchers
receive wrongness admission of their colleagues positively (Fetterman and Sassenberg, 2015) and
that, following (self-)correction, they indeed update their scientific beliefs in light of such new
evidence (yet, not as much as they should; McDiarmid et al., 2021).
Our findings suggest that researchers are perceived as more trustworthy and their research as
more credible when they express self-criticism and reform intentions. One might argue that this
pattern reflects nothing more than a positive acknowledgment of other people’s humility (Chancellor
and Lyubomirsky, 2013; Powers and Zuroff, 1988). However, it should be noted that many of our
findings persisted after controlling for general likeability of the target person (i.e. the researcher in
Studies 1 and 2), even though likeability ratings were highly correlated with trustworthiness (see
Tables 1, 3, and 4): integrity/benevolence ascriptions at least can, thus, not be explained by such a
“halo” effect. However, likeability strongly predicted participants’ willingness to engage with the
research and also suppressed the significant main effects of self-criticism and reform intentions on
this DV in both studies. This suggests that the extent to which laypeople are motivated to learn
more about science is contingent on their overall impression of a scientist. Importantly, however,
laypeople’s ascriptions of integrity and benevolence—the “affective” dimensions of epistemic
trustworthiness (Hendriks et al., 2015; McAllister, 1995)—are specifically affected by expressions
of self-criticism and reform intentions, irrespective of more general likeability ratings.
4. Conclusion
Our findings suggest that researchers’ hesitation toward self-correction (e.g. Fetterman and
Sassenberg, 2015; Frewer et al., 2003; Rohrer et al., 2021; van der Bles et al., 2020) seems unwar-
ranted: there is no harm in openly admitting doubts and regarding one’s findings as preliminary or
in intending to reform one’s work routines. On the contrary, researchers who portray their findings
as fixed and definite and who are unwilling to implement reforms are perceived as less trustworthy
and less credible by laypeople. In this regard, the current discussion of self-criticism and reforms
(e.g. the open science movement) might prove to be an attention-drawing door opener for greater
lay engagement with science; a chance for science to improve not only its methodological rigor,
but also its relationship with the public.

14 Public Understanding of Science 00(0)
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
ORCID iDs
Marlene Sophie Altenmüller https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1714-3601
Stephan Nuding https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8997-2230
Mario Gollwitzer https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4310-4793
Notes
1. Willingness to engage was explored in Study 1 and preregistered only in Study 2.
2. We made “Dr. Romberg” (Study 1), as well as “Dr. Kugler” and “Dr. Ecker” (Study 2) male research-
ers because of linguistic simplicity in the German language, yet, we assume the manipulations would
work just as well with female researchers. We avoided overemphasizing gender by using the neutral “Dr.
Romberg/Kugler/Ecker” more that “he/his/him.”
3. Contrary to the proposed three-factor solution by Hendriks et al. (2015), factor analyses conducted with
the present data suggest a two-factor solution with expertise (factor 1) and integrity/benevolence (factor
2), corresponding to the idea of a cognitive and an affective dimension of trustworthiness. Deviating
from our pre-registration in Study 1, epistemic trustworthiness will be analyzed on these two dimensions
instead of three.
4. Furthermore, 83 participants could not correctly remember the extent of the reform intention but, in line
with the preregistration, were not excluded. Excluding them did not change the results on our depend-
ent variables (DVs). Deviating from the preregistration, we did not exclude 56 participants with same
answers on every single item on a questionnaire page or choosing only extreme response options (regard-
ing epistemic trustworthiness and credibility). Excluding them did not change our results on our DVs.
Furthermore, one could argue that these are, in fact, plausible answers. Because of this and additional
power concerns, we decided not to exclude these participants.
5. Because of the very high intercorrelations, we deviated from the preregistered analyses by adding all
DVs to the MANOVA. The results did not differ significantly from the originally planned analyses.
6. We describe the sample with a general dataset including participants who fulfilled the criteria for at least
one part of the study. For specific analyses in each part of the study, we only used data from participants
who fulfilled the criteria for the respective part of the study (N2A = 288; N2B = 322).
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Author biographies
Marlene Sophie Altenmüller is a doctoral student and research assistant at the social psychology chair at
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München. Her research focuses on science communication, social justice,
and art reception.
Stephan Nuding is a psychology student at Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München. His research interest
focuses on open science and science communication.
Mario Gollwitzer is a professor and a chair of social psychology at Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München.
His research focuses on social justice, science communication, meta science, and evaluation.