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Original Research
Introduction
Many contextual aspects have affected the governance of
Latin American universities. Among other aspects, there has
been an exponential expansion of enrollment, the diversity
of institutions, and their methods and sources of funding
(Ferreyra et al., 2018; Rama, 2006). Enrollment fees for
Higher Education Institutions have doubled in Latin America
and the Caribbean in recent years, which has been shown in
studies surveying across 20 million students, 10,000 institu-
tions and 60,000 programs. From the year 2000 onward,
2,300 new Higher Education Institutions were created. From
this, not only have institutions diversified but so have the
expectations that students have for Higher Education—
explaining the growing demand for its’ services (Deming &
Figlio, 2016). This, in turn, creates substantial changes in
politics, the role of the State, and the funding of universities
(Garcia de Fanelli, 2018; Rama, 2006). Commodification
and transnational education have also recently developed in
some countries (Acosta, 2015; Rama, 2015).
As a consequence, there is a need to regulate the provision-
ing and quality of undergraduate and post-graduate programs.
The scenario, of course, is not identical in every Latin American
country, but it explains some of the wider tendencies related to
changes in governance regimes, mainly related to the emer-
gence of entrepreneurial universities in Latin America (Brunner,
2011). Therefore, universities are expected to face significant
challenges in their governances and the factors determining
them, and that eventually there will be differences between
countries and even within them, depending on the type of
Higher Education Institutions.
The concept of governance has acquired growing impor-
tance in attempts to understand the functioning of universities
(Ganga et al., 2014). In Latin America, increases in the com-
plexity of Higher Education Institutions has created the need
to incorporate all the multiple dimensions involved in the out-
come of their purposes through their governance (Ganga &
Abello, 2015; Rodríguez, 2017; Schmal & Cabrales, 2018).
The diversification of these purposes and their relation to
1023161SGOXXX10.1177/21582440211023161SAGE OpenAbello-Romero et al.
research-article20212021
1Universidad de Santiago de Chile, Santiago, Chile
2Universidad Tecnológica Metropolitana, Santiago, Chile
3Universidad de Tarapacá, Arica, Chile
4Universidad de Los Lagos, Osorno, Chile
Corresponding Author:
Juan Bautista Abello-Romero, Universidad de Santiago de Chile, Santiago
9170022, Chile.
Email: juan.abello@usach.cl
Perceptions on Regulation and
Asymmetry of Information as Critical
Factors in University Governance in
Latin America
Juan Bautista Abello-Romero1, Daniel López2,
Francisco Ganga3, and Claudio Mancilla4
Abstract
This article analyzes the results of an inquiry into Latin American university community members’ perceptions about regulatory
processes and asymmetries of information, as influential factors in the governance of Latin American universities. It does
so, by examining the national laws in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, and Mexico. Previous studies in this continent have
not considered these aspects and perspectives. Our research found significant differences between countries in terms of
the Board of Directors’ capacity to act and the control mechanisms they can employ—which can be interpreted as national
differences in the availability of their resources and their regulatory capacities. On the level of asymmetry of information,
there are differences between countries, which depend on the position of the university members in their institutions. Thus,
regulation and information are important factors when it comes to the governance of Latin American universities, and can
explain its’ diversity.
Keywords
university governance, higher education, Latin America, regulation, information asymmetry
2 SAGE Open
various stakeholders create different governance regimes
(Brunner, 2011). Regulation is a component of university gov-
ernance (Enders et al., 2013; Salto, 2017), revealed in norms
and controlling options. Furthermore, the quantity and quality
of information determine the decisions made over the manage-
ment and, therefore, asymmetry in its access and operation
between the different actors involved—and has essential con-
sequences in education and, eventually, in the governance of
universities (Ba & Duong, 2018; Ferreyra & Liang, 2012;
Ganga & Burotto, 2012).
The study of incidental factors in university governance
has been undertaken using various approaches (Ganga-
Contreras & Nuñez-Mascayano, 2018). One of them, is look-
ing at the perception of the parties involved in the execution
of national politics and institutional management, which
brings a subjective and first vision of reality, that is indepen-
dent to the theoretical approach (Centro Interuniversitario de
Desarrollo [CINDA], 2016a). The purpose of this study is to
establish the views of members of the university community
in Latin America on the regulatory capacities of the universi-
ties’ norms, and the existence of information asymmetries
between agent and principal; as well as the possible differ-
ences among countries and organizational levels—consider-
ing their influence in universities’ governance.
University Governance, Regulation, and
Information
Despite the growing importance given to governance to
explain the functioning and performance of universities (De
Boer & File, 2009; Kretek et al., 2013), the concept remains
diffuse and controversial (Ganga et al., 2014). In general
terms, it refers to how the landscape of collective control oper-
ates to achieve common goals. It is a process of direction and
management of the provisions that public and private actors
have to solve the problems of society; it also allows for taking
advantage of social opportunities, articulating interests for col-
lective goals, which means answering considerations relating
to what, when, and who decides in the organization (Aguilar,
2007; De Boer & File, 2009; Li et al., 2019). University gov-
ernance is understood as the processes and structures through
which decisions are made and executed, as consequences of
the interactions occurring between different stakeholders
(Capano, 2011; Sierra-Sanchez et al., 2020).
Models of University governance consider board compo-
sition (formal structure), power issues among key actors
(behavioral structure), board effectiveness, and the impact of
external factors on processes of boards (behavior of pro-
cesses; Carson, 2020; Erwin et al., 2019; Hambrick et al.,
2008; Li et al., 2019). Models of university governance can
be public or private; this distinction makes it possible to
identify the people who participate in the governance of uni-
versities. In public institutions, they will be the stakeholders
represented in the board of directors, which elect the uniper-
sonal authorities in various ways. While in private or
non-public institutions, these are governed by their owners
(shareholders, foundations, or religious orders) who delegate
governance to the authorities they designate (Sierra-Sanchez
et al., 2020).
Olsen (2007) classifies European universities in four
categories with regard to their organization and governance:
a university visualized as a community of scholars; as an
instrument for applying public policies; a representative
democracy; or, as a service company integrated into com-
petitive markets. De Boer and Maassen (2020) confirm the
evolution of European universities from an academic com-
munity with representative democracy, to a vision of the uni-
versity as a service company and as an instrumental entity
for achieving the economic objectives of the countries in
which they are located. Barnes (2020) reaffirms the same for
the Australian case; and this generates structural changes in
university governance, mainly in public universities, such as
going from collegiate methods of academic self-government
to more managerial modes of administration. In the manage-
ment model, authority is granted to a specialized managerial
level to the detriment of the academic staff’s participation.
Frequently, university governance has been associated
with internal variables (Blaschke et al., 2014; Bleiklie &
Kogan, 2007). However, essential factors operate beyond
that level (Ganga et al., 2018). Institutional organization, the
functioning of corporative governments, and internal and
external relations are influenced by situations such as reforms
and changes in national politics, processes of international-
ization, inclusion, public expectations on the role of univer-
sities, reputation, and fusion of universities (Bennetot &
Estermann, 2018; Capano & Regini, 2014; Christensen &
Gornitzka, 2017; De Boer & File, 2009; Flórez-Parra et al.,
2014; Safavi & Hakanson, 2018; Serger et al., 2015).
University governance can be measured through consider-
ing the following dimensions: context, transparency, auton-
omy, management orientation, and participation (Quyen,
2014; Rymarzak et al., 2020). In this work, we focus on
examining context and transparency. The context represents
the framework in which universities are managed, and encom-
passes the legal framework and the interaction between the
university and the state. The states generate regulatory frame-
works in the countries to protect the public interest of higher
education. Regulations influence governance by requiring
management accountability, establishing quality assurance
systems and standards that must be met (Krüger et al., 2019;
Mok & Jiang, 2020; Salto, 2017; Sukrismo, 2020; Thoenig &
Paradeise, 2014). As a consequence, institutions organize and
operate according to these regulatory demands (Weaver,
2014). Regulation can involve various costs associated not
only with non-compliance with the requirements, but also
with the incentives and measures needed to facilitate com-
pliance with them (De Jong & Kloeze, 2013; Nielsen &
Parker, 2012).
One of the dimensions of university governance is
transparency, which can be internal or external to the
Abello-Romero et al. 3
organization, and allows to legitimize the existence of the
organization in society. From the point of view of good
governance, this dimension can be considered both as a
condition or a strategy to increase institutional credibility
before internal and external stakeholders (Abello-Romero
et al., 2019a; Conesa-Carril et al., 2020; Sukrismo, 2020).
The promotion of transparency, and the development of
incentive mechanisms that encourage the agent to reveal
their hidden knowledge, allows information asymmetry to
be reduced (Bergh et al., 2019; Ghafoor et al., 2019).
When we mention information asymmetries, we refer to
when one of the parties, universities or stakeholders, has rel-
evant information that the other party does not have (Stiglitz,
2000). Asymmetry can be bilateral or unilateral; it is bilateral
when neither party is aware of the other’s information. For
example, in the university–student relationship, the univer-
sity may not be aware of the capabilities of the students, and
the student may have imperfect knowledge about the univer-
sity. Whereas if the information from the university is com-
mon knowledge, the asymmetry is unilateral as the institution
would not have the information from the students (Clarke,
2000; Flacher & Harari-Kermadec, 2013).
The levels of information asymmetry will be diverse depend-
ing on the interests and knowledge of the university’s stakehold-
ers (Mancilla et al., 2020). The information gap is assumed in
favor of an institution’s management team compared with inter-
nal stakeholders; this should translate into a higher perception of
information asymmetry by academics and students compared
with mid-level managers within the institution.
Latin American Context
According to CINDA (2016a, p. 81) in 2014, there were 4,081
universities in Latin America, of which 32.5% were public, and
only 25% carried out research. In the 2014–2018 five-year
period, 1,125 universities had at least one Scopus article. Also,
the Latin American countries with the highest scientific pro-
duction were Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Argentina, and Colombia—
Placing them in Group 1, they are those with the most of 60,000
publications in the 2014–2018 five-year period (De-Moya-
Anegón et al., 2020). Most of the universities that have scien-
tific production capacity are public; in some cases such as
Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina, 90% are public universities.
The ownership of the patrimony by the state locates them
within the public category, but the difference between public
and private institutions can be a little more complicated; for
example, the fact that a university is state-owned does not nec-
essarily imply that it behaves like a public entity. Therefore, in
Latin America, it is possible to find a university whose primary
source of income is exclusively student fees; however, its insti-
tutional governance is determined with the participation of aca-
demics and students.
Based on CINDA (2016b, 2016c, 2016d, 2016e, 2016f), it
is possible to provide a summary of the context in which
university governance is developed in the five leading coun-
tries previously mentioned, that group together to form the
largest number of universities in Latin America (Table 1). In
the first place, it is observed that public universities acquire
different names both between countries and within them.
Regarding corporate governments, it is possible to see that
while in Brazil, Chile, and Colombia, there is a uniform way
to identify them, in Argentina and Mexico, they are named in
different ways.
Regarding who elects the rector, in the public universities
of Brazil and Chile, they are appointed by a higher institution
such as the Ministry of Education, but ostensibly their appoint-
ment is based on an internal vote among the professors. In
Argentina, different groups within the university elect the
Table 1. University Governance: Context of Public Universities in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico.
Item Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia México
How public
university is
named
National Federal
State
Municipal
State-owned State-owned Federal
State-owned
Technological
Polytechnic
Intercultural
Name of corporate
governments
university
Assembly
Upper council
Board of Directors
University council Upper council University
upper
council
Governing board
General university
council
Who elects the
rector
Groups of the
university
community. By
indirect vote (most
of the cases), and
direct vote.
External appointment
(Ministry of
Education), with a
proposal from the
university (via an
internal vote).
External appointment
(Ministry), with a
proposal from the
university (via an
internal vote of faculty).
Appointment
by the
Upper
Council
Different mechanisms:
(a) Students and faculty,
direct and indirect
vote. (b) Appointment
by the Governing
board.
Duration of the
rector in office
Minimum of 3 years. Four years in most
cases.
Four years, with the
possibility of one re-
election.
Three and 4
years.
Four years in most cases.
Source. Reworked according to Centro Interuniversitario de Desarrollo (2016b, 2016c, 2016d, 2016e, 2016f).
4 SAGE Open
rector, and it is mainly by direct vote; although there are cases
in which there are indirect votes. Public universities in Mexico
have different mechanisms according to the categories; how-
ever, they range from appointments made by the governing
board, to elections with direct and indirect voting, both for stu-
dents and teachers.
In the five countries analyzed, differences exist in the
capacities for regulation and its application to higher educa-
tion between countries, and the fact that these capacities
emerge from different resource availabilities and adequate
norms (Table 2). According to the 2016 report on higher edu-
cation in Ibero-America (CINDA, 2016a), there are one or
more public institutions that govern, conduct, or guide the
development of higher education in these countries. Chile is
the country with more weaknesses and limitations in regulat-
ing Higher Education, particularly in resources of a different
kind—in the capacity to conduct estate universities, and in
regulating private universities. Brazil, on the contrary, has
the resources, the use of information, the capacities, regula-
tory frameworks, and the politics to face regulatory pro-
cesses, independent of the type of institution of Higher
Education. Mexico only has very limited effective regulation
of private entities. Argentina also has limitations in this
aspect, in addition to limits in resources; while Colombia has
limitations in politics for the creation of universities and
regulatory frameworks on lucrative entities (Table 2).
Furthermore, there is confirmation of the differences in the
capacities for regulation and its application between
countries, and the fact that these capacities emerge from dif-
ferent resource availabilities and adequate norms.
Information disclosure is the tool by which universities
generate transparency that reduces information asymmetry
with their different stakeholders; society through the state
regulates the transparency of information. The regulation of
the transparency of information is reflected in the laws that
countries are given to safeguard the right to information
(RTI). Although, the above does not ensure transparency
because, in addition to the legal framework, it is necessary to
ensure the quality of the implementation. If a country has a
robust legal framework but is weak in implementation, its
legal framework will not guarantee openness if not imple-
mented correctly.
The Global Right to Information Rating (RTI Rating) is a
rating tool build by the Center For Law and Democracy
(2011), which is designed to assess the strength of the legal
frameworks of different countries to access information held
by public authorities (or the RTI). In the context of university
information disclosure, this regulatory context is important.
More specifically, the RTI Rating corresponds to 61 indica-
tors. All of these correspond to a wide range of international
standards on information law and comparative studies of
laws on the RTI worldwide. Abello-Romero et al. (2019b)
used the data from this indicator for the five countries
focused on in this study and proposed a model. They use the
regulation of information transparency as an explanatory
variable, to determine whether the differences in the
Table 2. The View From University Community Members Regarding Weaknesses and Resource Limitations, Information, Articulation,
and Regulatory Capacities of Government Institutions From Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico.
Item
Countries
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico
Resources
Human X X
Financial X
Technological
Monitoring X X
Supervision X X
Information and articulation
Supply and use of information X
Interlocution with the national governments X
Conduction and Regulatory capacities
State universities X
Private universities X X X
Politics for the creation of institutions
State X
Private X X
Legal framework and ownership politics
Lucrative universities X X X
Transnational universities X
Source. Reworked according to Centro Interuniversitario de Desarrollo (2016a, pp. 193–196).
Note. X = weakness or limitation.
Abello-Romero et al. 5
legislative frameworks of Latin American countries affect
the information they disclose. The authors find evidence
favoring the thesis that the diversity of behavior in the dis-
closure of information in the countries is due to the differ-
ences in the regulations on information transparency.
Based on the literature’s antecedents, it seems pertinent to
investigate the perception of the universities’ internal stake-
holders (university community members), regarding the
regulations and laws on higher education; and to examine
whether these have affected the efficiency of university man-
agement. Another aspect to analyze is whether the corporate
governments of the universities see their role in monitoring
the university management team strengthened.
The availability of information is another crucial variable
in university governance, as well as the differences in its pro-
vision between institutions and the central level. This asym-
metry of information creates market failures, limitations on
accountability, problems regarding internal functioning,
among other things (Abello-Romero, 2015; Brunner &
Uribe, 2007; Ganga & Burotto, 2012). In this context, the
view of university community members is a valid and direct
way to establish the regulatory quality of norms and potential
asymmetries of information. This methodological approach
has been used to approach different themes, like exploring
organizational dynamics (Després, 2008) and student partici-
pation in governance (Planas et al., 2013).
Method
Regulation
A 49-question closed survey was applied to a diverse sample
of university community members (or university members),
such as professors and researchers with and without manage-
ment experience, directors from different hierarchical levels,
and professionals associated with university management. The
survey was designed under the execution of research project
n*1131134 of FONDECYT (National Fund for Scientific and
Technological Research of Chile), called Government Systems
In Iberoamerican Universities: An Analysis From Agency
Theory. This project covers various aspects of University
Governance. A panel of experts validated the applied ques-
tionnaire, items were adjusted, and it was submitted to statisti-
cal evaluation (Cronbach’s α = .85). The survey was applied
both on-site and online, with a response rate of 90%. With
regard to the on-site process, the survey was applied in differ-
ent research meetings and conferences. The survey was under-
taken between 2014 and 2016. A total of 766 responses were
received from 18 Latin American countries (Mexico,
Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru,
Paraguay, Costa Rica, Uruguay, Bolivia, Dominican Republic,
Cuba, Panama, Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua), of
which 77.4% are members of state universities, and 26.6%
from private universities. The total of answers was analyzed in
percentages to verify the general perception of the current
norms and laws in Higher Education in every country, using
four alternatives: very good, good, bad, very bad. The same
procedure was used to show if (a) the norms regulating univer-
sities’ functioning in their countries do not allow the Board of
Directors to monitor the work of the director appropriately;
and (b) control systems are efficient. For these two items, the
alternatives were “I strongly disagree,” “I disagree,” “I neither
agree nor disagree,” “I agree,” and “I strongly agree.” Data
were treated in groups, and every alternative was shown in
relative terms as percentages. Decimal percentage values were
estimated to the whole number greater than 0.5. For statistical
analysis, χ2 was applied using STATA 12 statistical package.
For comparative analysis between countries, 489 answers
from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico were
considered, to verify potential differences in the opinions of
university members or of every country about these two
items. It is necessary to mention that some answers were left
blank, so the tables’ total reported does not coincide with this
total; χ2 was also applied to verify statistical differences. In
addition, the general opinion of university members from
these five countries was verified, making groups for the
answers on each item. A relevant point of these five countries
is they account for 83% of all Latin American universities;
also, according to the Scimago Institutions Ranking
(De-Mora-Anegón et al., 2017), between 2012 and 2015,
they account for 89% of all publications in the region.
Asymmetry of Information
Using the same survey, opinions were solicited from Latin
American university members about the existence of asymme-
try of information in dichotomous terms (yes/no). At the same
time, for those in which the answers were positive, their opin-
ion about the asymmetry of information was considered in
terms of whether it was high, medium, or low; their opinion
about the existence of asymmetry of information and its possi-
ble levels varied according to the position of the surveyed. For
the sake of comparison, the answers were separated between
those from directorates, higher authorities, and medium author-
ities; and those from professorial and researcher roles. The
same procedure applied for regulation was then used in the
sample of university members from the five countries.
Decimal percentage values were estimated to the whole
number greater than 0.5. For analysis, χ2 was also applied to
verify statistically significant differences in the variety of views
from the university members regarding the levels of asymme-
try of information, as well as the differences between countries
on their views according to the position of the surveyed.
Results
Regulations
The legislations regulating activities (Table 3) in Higher
Education were positively assessed by 54% of the surveyed
6 SAGE Open
university community members from 18 Latin American
countries (5% as very good, 49% as good); while 46% con-
sidered that they were inadequate (43% as bad, 3% as very
bad). Therefore, even though there is a more positive view of
the legislation, there exists important resistance to the mech-
anisms regulating universities. Of those who had a good or
very good view of legislations in Higher Education, 64%
pointed to having experienced proven positive effects on
the efficiency of universities’ management. Instead, among
those who viewed the legislations negatively, 85% pointed to
them having had adverse effects on management.
Considering only university members from the five Latin
American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Mexico), the balance between positive and negative views
on legislation regulating Higher Education was even tighter
(Table 3). Only 51% of university members has a positive
perception (4% as very good and 47% as good), while 49%
had a negative perception (46% as bad, 3% as very bad).
When analyzing the situation separately in every country,
the results reveal statistically significant differences (χ2 =
74.9; df = 12; p < .001; Table 3). However, different situa-
tions are verified in each case. In Argentina, 63% of the sur-
veyed expressed the opinion that legislations are good or
very good; in Brazil, the same opinion was held by 53% of
the surveyed university members, and 50% in Mexico. Chile
and Colombia are extreme cases. While in Colombia, 77%
viewed the legislations as good or very good, in Chile, the
same view is only held by 18%.
Concerning the roles of the Board of Directors and the
functioning of control mechanisms, almost half of the sur-
veyed disagreed or strongly disagreed, while only less than
one third agreed or strongly agreed with the opinion that cur-
rent norms allow monitoring the work of rectories (Table 4).
With regard to differences in perceptions between public and
non-public universities, Table 4 shows that perceptions were
stronger among members from public universities that the
legislations do not allow the Board of Directors to monitor
the work of the rectory, as compared with non-public univer-
sities (31% vs. 20%; p value = .01). However, there were no
significant differences in perceptions about control systems
between public and non-public universities; the general per-
ception is that 54% of members (agree 41% + strongly agree
13%) perceived the control systems as being inefficient.
However, there are statistically significant differences
between selected countries (χ2 = 40.9; df = 16; p < .001).
The least critical view was found in Colombia and, to a small
extent, in Brazil, while the most critical views came from
Chile and particularly Argentina (Table 5). In consequence,
the negative views regarding regulations in Higher Education
are important but differ between countries. The major prob-
lems are related to efficiency. Both in this aspect and the
authority of the Board of Directors, it is possible to find a
common pattern between countries. The most positive views
were ascertained from Colombia, while the least positive
came from Argentina and Chile.
Asymmetry of Information
Furthermore, university members from the five studied
countries estimated the existence of asymmetry of informa-
tion, which varies between countries (χ2 = 21.6; df = 4; p <
.001). Higher levels of perception of asymmetry of informa-
tion were reported for Brazil (82%) and Mexico (74%), the
lowest occurred for Colombia (53%) and Chile (56%); while
Argentina was situated in the middle ground (64%).
The level of asymmetry of information follows a different
pattern between the countries and the organizational level in
which the surveyed were situated; however, there were no
differences between different academic backgrounds. Even
though Brazil was the leading country in terms of negative
perceptions, those surveyed did not hold the perception that a
high level of asymmetry of information was present (Table 6).
Table 3. Relative Views (%) on the Operation of the Current Regulations and Laws on Higher Education.
How would you rate the current regulations and laws
on higher education in your country?
Very bad
(%) Bad (%)
Good
(%)
Very
good (%)
Total survey
Rest of Latin American countries (n = 272) 3 36 54 7
5 selected countries (n = 477) 3 46 47 4
Total (n = 749) 3 43 49 5
χ2(3) = 8.6 p = .035
Selected Latin American countries
Argentina (n = 122) 1 36 58 5
Brazil (n = 70) 1 46 47 6
Chile (n = 92) 9 73 17 1
Colombia (n = 58) 3 19 72 5
México (n = 135) 1 49 47 3
Total (n = 477) 3 46 47 4
χ2(12) = 74.9 p < .001
Source. Own elaboration.
Abello-Romero et al. 7
In the cases of Mexico and Columbia, university members
who perceived the existence of an asymmetry of information
in their universities generally perceived this asymmetry to be
at a high level.
Another factor of variability in the responses of those sur-
veyed was the organizational level in which the surveyed
university members operate (p < .001); 35% of the higher
authorities stated high levels of asymmetry of information;
middle-ground authorities at 40%; and professors and
researchers, 68% (n = 388). Furthermore, the perceptions on
asymmetries of information were inversely related with the
organizational level.
Discussions and Conclusions
Governance has been recognized as a critical aspect in the
functioning of high-quality universities (Hax & Ugarte, 2014;
Salmi, 2009). Thus, there is a need to understand how the vari-
ables that determine university governance work. In Latin
America, the coverage and effectiveness of the norms in
Higher Education have achieved a primary role, because of the
regulatory requirements created by the expansion in the num-
ber of institutions—mainly as a result of the emergence of new
private universities (Rama, 2006). This is in addition to expan-
sion in the number of programs and students and changes in
both private and public funding. In effect, regulation has con-
ditioned the organization and the government in universities
(Brunner, 2011). In Chile, for instance, university governance
in state universities is no longer strictly academic, with the
incorporation of proxies from the national government into the
executive boards (Cox & Courad, 1990). Likewise, control
over universities in the use of public funds is different between
state and private universities. The establishment of new public
management and market relations have created new links and
Table 4. Relative Views (%) on the Operation of Regulatory Processes in Higher Education in Public and Non-Public Universities From
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico.
Item Category Public (%) Non-public (%) Total (%)
The legislations do not allow the Board of Directors to
monitor the work of the rectory.
χ2(4) = 13.3
p value = .01
Strongly disagree 12 18 14
Disagree 38 33 37
Neutral 18 29 21
Agree 23 17 21
Strongly agree 8 3 7
Total surveyed n = 124 n = 75 n = 482
The control systems in universities are inefficient.
χ2(4) = 3.9
p value = .425
Strongly disagree 6 7 6
Disagree 21 29 23
Neutral 16 16 16
Agree 42 37 41
Strongly agree 14 11 13
Total surveyed n = 356 n = 126 n = 482
Source. Own elaboration.
Table 5. Relative Views (%) on the Operation of Regulatory Processes in Higher Education in Five Latin American Countries.
Item Category
Countries
Argentina (%) Brazil (%) Chile (%) Colombia (%) Mexico (%) Total (%)
The legislations do not allow
the Board of Directors to
monitor the work of the
rectory.
χ2(16) = 40.9
p value = .001
Strongly disagree 14 12 8 26 13 14
Disagree 40 29 24 50 42 37
Neutral 18 25 26 17 19 21
Agree 22 25 30 7 19 21
Strongly agree 6 8 12 2 6 7
Total surveyed n = 124 n = 75 n = 91 n = 58 n = 134 n = 482
The control systems in
universities are inefficient.
χ2(16) = 42.6
p value < .001
Strongly disagree 5 5 2 7 10 6
Disagree 20 23 21 40 21 24
Neutral 23 17 10 22 11 16
Agree 38 45 41 22 48 41
Strongly agree 14 9 26 9 9 13
Total surveyed n = 124 n = 75 n = 90 n = 58 n = 135 n = 482
Source. Own elaboration.
8 SAGE Open
stakeholders (Brunner & Uribe, 2007), and the regulation
requirements are related to such situations. In the case of
Chilean universities, the role of the market has penetrated
more deeply than in other Latin American countries, creating
strong reactions from students (López & Prado, 2016).
Situations of this kind likely explain the negative perceptions
of Chilean university members regarding the effectiveness of
the legislation. For example, the cost of universities is the
highest in the world, measured as a percentage of GDP (Gross
Domestic Product) per capita. It also has the world’s highest in
terms of the relation between the educational debt of profes-
sionals and their annual revenue (Meller, 2011). Even though
the weight of the market in Higher Education exhibits differ-
ences between the five studied countries, in every case, the
perception of university members revealed reservations
toward the effectiveness of the legislation.
The results show difficulties that crop up in the role of the
Board of Directors with regard to their relationship with the
directories. The case of executive boards in Chile provides
an example that having corporative representation of differ-
ent stakeholders in the political decisions in universities
alone does not ensure effectiveness (Rojas & Bernasconi,
2009). The complexity of the tasks demands information,
time, and the professionalization of management. From this
point of view, the functionality of the highest instance of the
internal organization as Board of Directors must necessarily
consider the dependence of directories as a problem that has
to be solved; as much as the need to evince accountability
processes that go beyond the managerial accomplishment of
a public account from the directories. The processes of
accountability must be evident in day-to-day practices under-
taken by the whole government of the university.
These limitations explain why two thirds of Chilean
university members agree on the ineffectiveness of control
systems. Here, national studies taken by CINDA (2016a)
allow for interpreting the differences between countries in
the results. In addition, considering the opinions of experts,
in Chile available resources were judged as insufficient
(except technological resources), as well as the interlocution
with the national government and the conduction and regula-
tion capacities of private and state universities; this con-
trasted with responses from Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil.
Another variable that facilitates university governance is
the distribution and application of information on the differ-
ent organizational levels. This has an impact on the deci-
sions, participation, and the coordination of organizational
levels. The view from university members revealed that there
are strong asymmetries of information, verifying the differ-
ences between countries and according to the organizational
positions of university members. These results indicate that
there is a need to establish mechanisms that may help over-
come this situation. The regulatory processes associated with
ensuring institutional quality in Chile have encouraged the
emergence of internal unities of institutional analysis follow-
ing the North American model (Middaugh, 2010), made to
provide appropriate and reliable information to internal and
external actors—as well as a national system providing
information about Higher Education (www.sies.cl). The per-
sistence of the perception of asymmetries in information is
likely linked with the flow of information, the abilities to
process it, and the limitations in internal organization.
In summary, the results from this research highlight the need
to make changes to regulatory processes, as well as in access to
and use of information by stakeholders and general society.
Acknowledgments
This work corresponds to an investigation framed in the project
CONICYT / Fondecyt-Regular 1161353, for which the support
and financing of the National Commission of Scientific and
Technological Research of Chile is thanked.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect
to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research and/or
authorship of this article.
Table 6. Relative Perception (%) of Asymmetries of Information,
According to Countries and Organizational Position of University
Community Members.
Level of asymmetry of
information (%)
Variables High Medium Low
Country
Argentina (n = 72) 44 53 3
Brazil (n = 57) 53 45 2
Chile (n = 47) 30 59 11
Colombia (n = 28) 64 29 7
Mexico (n = 88) 82 17 1
Total (n = 292)
χ2(8) = 48.9, p < .001
57 39 4
Organizational level
Higher authorities (n = 23) 35 48 17
Middle-ground authorities
(n = 83)
40 55 5
Professors and researchers
(n = 180)
68 30 2
Total (n = 286)
χ2(4) = 29.4, p < .001
57 39 4
Academic background
Doctor (n = 126) 64 33 3
Master (n = 63) 51 43 6
Bachelor or none (n = 101) 50 46 4
Total (n = 290)
χ2(4) = 6.355, p = .174
57 39 4
Source. Own elaboration.
Abello-Romero et al. 9
ORCID iD
Juan Bautista Abello-Romero https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3064-
3456
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