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This project has received funding under the Horizon 2020 Framework Programme of the
European Union – Grant Agreement No. 861584
PROJECT DATA
Grant Agreement n
o
861584
Acronym ePIcenter
Project Title Enhanced Physical Internet-Compatible Earth-frieNdly freight Transportation
answER
H2020 Call Horizon 2020 - H2020 - EU.3.4
Start date 01/06/2020
Duration 42 months
DELIVERABLE
D
1.3. Arctic & New Trade Routes Challenges
Work Package WP 1
Deliverable due date 31/05/2021 Actual submission date 31/05/2021
Document reference D1.3
Document Type Report Dissemination level Public
Lead beneficiary AKER Revision no
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AUTHORS & EDITORS
Initials Name Organisation Project Role
CK
Christian Kinas
Panasonic
Business Support
Europe GmbH
Main Contact
in ePIcenter
CR Cayetana, Ruiz de Almiron Aker Arctic Main Contact in ePicenter
FL Frédéric Lasserre Laval University Main Contact in ePIcenter
KG Kate Gormley Heriot-Watt University Main Contact in ePIcenter
LM Lauren McWhinnie Victoria University Main Contact in ePIcenter
OP Oliver Philipp Panasonic Business Support
Europe GmbH Main Contact in ePIcenter
SS Sami Saarinen Aker Arctic Main Contact in ePIcenter
ZZ Zhihua Zhang Shandong University Main Contact in ePIcenter
REVISION HISTORY
Version Date Author Summary of Change
Draft 24/05/2021 Jakub
Piotrowicz Minor changes and edits to clarify the text.
Draft 31/05/2021 Irina Jackiva Minor changes and edits to clarify the text.
QUALITY CONTROL
Role Name (Partner short name) Approval date
Partner Jakub Piotrowicz (GMU) 24/05/2021
Partner Irina Jackiva (TSI) 31/05/2021
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DISCLAIMER
The content of the publication herein is the sole responsibility of the publishers and it does
not necessarily represent the views expressed by the European Commission or its services.
While the information contained in the documents is believed to be accurate, the authors(s) or any
other participant in the ePIcenter consortium make no warranty of any kind with regard to this material
including, but not limited to the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular
purpose.
Neither the ePIcenter Consortium nor any of its members, their officers, employees or agents shall be
responsible or liable in negligence or otherwise howsoever in respect of any inaccuracy or omission
herein.
Without derogating from the generality of the foregoing neither the ePIcenter Consortium nor any of
its members, their officers, employees or agents shall be liable for any direct or indirect or
consequential loss or damage caused by or arising from any information advice or inaccuracy or
omission herein.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Tables .............................................................................................................. 6
List of Figures ............................................................................................................. 7
List of Acronyms ......................................................................................................... 8
Executive Summary .................................................................................................... 9
1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 10
2 Arctic Shipping in General ................................................................................. 11
3 Part 1: Impacts of shipping to Arctic marine wildlife........................................... 19
3.1 Summary of Arctic Wildlife ........................................................................... 19
3.1.1 Marine Mammals .................................................................................. 19
3.1.2 Seabirds ................................................................................................ 21
3.1.3 Other Flora and Fauna and the Food Web ........................................... 24
3.1.4 Climate Change and Human Activities .................................................. 26
3.2 Arctic Shipping/Vessel Activities .................................................................. 26
3.3 Environmental Impacts of Shipping on Arctic Wildlife .................................. 28
3.3.1 Collisions/Ship Strikes .......................................................................... 30
3.3.2 Noise Disturbance ................................................................................. 34
3.3.3 Disruption to migratory patterns/abandonment of important habitats .... 40
3.3.4 Breaking sea ice ................................................................................... 41
3.3.5 Physical impacts from loss of ship or cargo and Invasive Species ....... 44
3.3.6 Atmospheric Emissions ......................................................................... 46
3.3.7 Discharge of Pollutants to Sea .............................................................. 49
3.4 Summary and Next Steps ............................................................................ 52
4 Part 2: Geo-economic & societal impacts of Arctic shipping (Laval Univ.,
Shandong Univ.) ....................................................................................................... 54
4.1 Contrasting Trends in Arctic Shipping (prepared by Frédéric Lasserre) ...... 54
4.1.1 A definite increase in Arctic shipping .................................................... 54
4.1.2 Transit traffic remains weak .................................................................. 58
4.1.3 Towards a new business model ............................................................ 61
4.2 China perspective ........................................................................................ 63
5 Part 3: Technical and economic challenges of Arctic Shipping ......................... 65
5.1 General ........................................................................................................ 65
5.2 Technical challenges and effects on costs .................................................. 65
5.2.1 Identification and understanding of ice conditions................................. 65
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5.2.2 Ice resistance ........................................................................................ 67
5.2.3 Ice loads and classification ................................................................... 69
5.2.4 Icebreaker assistance ........................................................................... 71
5.2.5 Ice associated accidents and uncontrolled ice events .......................... 74
5.2.6 Cold weather ......................................................................................... 77
5.2.7 Environmentally sensitive areas ............................................................ 78
5.3 China perspective ........................................................................................ 78
6 Conclusions ....................................................................................................... 80
7 References ........................................................................................................ 82
Annex 1 .................................................................................................................... 94
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List of Tables
Table 3-1. Endemic Arctic marine mammals, their status and distribution. ............... 21
Table 3-2. Example of Arctic distributed seabirds and their status. .......................... 23
Table 3-3. Direct and indirect Impacts from shipping on Arctic wildlife and the marine
environment. ............................................................................................................. 29
Table 3-4. Summary of global ship strike statistics (average numbers rounded up). 32
Table 3-5. Overview of Underwater Noise in the Arctic. ........................................... 36
Table 3-6. In-Arctic Shipping emissions estimates by vessel type for 2004 (metric ton
per year). .................................................................................................................. 47
Table 3-7. In-Arctic Shipping emissions estimates by vessel type for 2050 (metric ton
per year) under “business-as-usual" and “high growth” future scenario ................... 48
Table 4-1. Vessel movements in the Canadian Arctic, number of voyages,
NORDREG zone. ..................................................................................................... 55
Table 4-2. Voyages to and from Greenlandic waters. ............................................... 56
Table 4-3. Vessel movements in NSR waters. ......................................................... 57
Table 4-4. Transit traffic along the Northwest Passage, 2006-2019. ........................ 59
Table 4-5. Transit traffic along the NSR, 2006-2019. ............................................... 59
Table 4-6. Share of voyages carried out between June and October included, percent
of total. ...................................................................................................................... 61
Table 5-1. Ice conditions per ice class category according to Polar Class IMO ........ 70
Table 5-2. Ice conditions per ice class category according to RMRS ....................... 71
Table 5-3. Examples of assisting costs at the NSR .................................................. 73
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List of Figures
Figure 2-1. Main transit routes in the Arctic. ............................................................. 12
Figure 2-2. Trends in mean surface air temperature over the period 1960 to 2019. . 13
Figure 2-3. Yearly seasonal variation of Arctic sea ice extends. ............................... 14
Figure 2-4. Visualization of the route alternatives between South Korea and Central
Europe. ..................................................................................................................... 15
Figure 2-5. Development of shipping volumes at the NSR ....................................... 16
Figure 2-6. Grow of transit cargo in NSR during 2015 -2020. ................................... 16
Figure 2-7. Number of voyages per month along the NSR during 1/2016-5/2020. ... 17
Figure 2-8. Ice conditions in Central Arctic and Russian Arctic during the trip of
Christophe de Margerie. (AARI, 2021)...................................................................... 18
Figure 5-1. Illustration of importance of appropriate route selection in icy waters.
Utilization of open water leads (dark areas along yellow line) enable fuel and time
savings. The figure is illustrative and not based on real case. .................................. 66
Figure 5-2. Several vessels jammed in ice and waiting for the icebreaker assistance
in the Gulf of Finland in March 2011. (Source: Aker Arctic) ...................................... 68
Figure 5-3. Nuclear-powered icebreaker escorting a cargo ship through an ice pack in
the Kara Sea while heavy compression and ridging stop other vessels following in its
wake, in April 2015. (Source: Aker Arctic) ................................................................ 68
Figure 5-4. Icebreaker assisting two ships as a convoy............................................ 72
Figure 5-5. Close towing. The bow of a towed ship is fastened to the icebreaker stern
by a towing line ......................................................................................................... 73
Figure 5-6. Growler among waves. ........................................................................... 75
Figure 5-7. Ice damage to the bulb of a merchant vessel ......................................... 76
Figure 5-8. Damage caused by ice on the bilge keel of a merchant vessel .............. 76
Figure 5-9. Deck outfit icing ...................................................................................... 77
Figure 5-10. Maps of protected areas along the Canadian Arctic coastline .............. 78
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List of Acronyms
Abbreviation/acronym Description
AOAS Arctic Ocean and Adjacent Seas
BC Black Carbon
CAFF
Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna
CHNL
Center of High North Logistics
CO Carbon Monoxide
CO2Carbon Dioxide
DFO Department of Fisheries and Oceans (Canada)
ECA Emission Control Areas
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
GESAMP The Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Environmental
Protection (GESAMP) is an advisory body, established in 1969, that advises the
United Nations (UN) system on the scientific aspects of marine environmental
protection
HFO Heavy Fuel Oil
H&M Hull and Machinery
IACS International Association of Classification Societies
ICCT
International Council on Clean
Transportation
IMO
International Maritime Organi
z
ation
IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature
IWC International Whaling Commission
LNG Liquid Natural Gas
MARPOL The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL) is the main international convention covering prevention of pollution
of the marine environment by ships from operational or accidental causes.
NEP Northeast Passage
NM Nautical Miles
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (USA)
NOxNitrogen oxide
NPR North Pole Route
NSIDC National Snow and Ice Data Center
NSR Northern Sea Route
NSRA
Norther Sea Route Administration
NWP
Northwest Passage
OC
Organic Carbon
PAH Polyaromatic Hydrocarbon
PAME Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment
PC Polar Class
PCB Polychlorinated Biphenyl
PM Particulate Matter
POP Persistent Organic Pollutants
P&I Protection and Indemnity
RMRS Russian Maritime Register of Shipping
SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar
SO2Sulphur Dioxide
SOxSulphur Oxide
TEU Twenty-Foot Equivalent Unit (intermodal shipping container)
TPR Transpolar Route
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
WSC World Shipping Council
WWF World-Wide Fund for Nature
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Executive Summary
The Arctic is changing. Temperatures in the region are increasing causing a
range of physical and environmental changes. Arctic sea ice is thinning and
receding. As these changes expose potential opportunities and because the
Arctic Sea provides shorter routes for global shipping, the international interest
in the Arctic has increased. The growth of international interest towards
commercial utilization of Arctic Seas is inevitable.
The traffic in the Northern Sea Route is continuously growing. Gas related
mega-projects, located in the Russian Arctic, as well as governmental
cooperative actions of the Russia and China to build the “Ice Silk Road”, will
boost the near-future marine activities and shipping in the Northern Sea Route.
Commercial utilization of other trans-Arctic routes is still marginal, or practically
zero. For the Northwest Passage, several areas are considering project
proposals to build transhipment ports that might provide an as-yet
undeveloped shuttle service across Arctic passages, including the Transpolar
Route. Whether these schemes will go to fruition or not, remains to be seen.
Arctic shipping presents not only opportunities, but also challenges and
threats. Sea ice, even if it is thinning, still creates major challenges for
economically feasible shipping. Ice features, such as multi-year (icebergs, etc.)
and compressive ice, which generate threats and hampers shipping, may exist
in the encountered ice regime. The reasonable shipping season for non-
specialised ice strengthened ships is currently only few months long. Marine
(coastal) infrastructure, which is currently lacking, must be set up to enable
safe and efficient trans-Arctic navigation.
The Arctic environment is vulnerable. To enable utilization of Arctic routes in
an environmental-friendly manner it is important to consistently study the
effects of shipping on Arctic nature. An understanding of Arctic environment,
together with findings and learnings from anticipated future studies, can be
utilised to plan and execute shipping so that the environmental impacts are
minimized. In addition, these studies would improve the design of “greener
ships” and enables the development of the services for “greener navigation”
practices. Appropriate services, together with appropriate ships, ensure that
Arctic shipping practices are conducted in the most environmentally friendly
and sustainable manner in the future.
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1 Introduction
The challenges associated with Arctic shipping are considered in this report.
To provide context and background to these challenges, the status of the Arctic
shipping activities today, as well as its future prospects, are considered in
Section 2. Detailed consideration is then given to the challenges in Chapters
3-5. Conclusions, summarizing the key findings and learnings, are presented
at the end.
The challenges considered in this report are divided into three fundamental
parts. These parts and the respective key authors are listed below.
Part 1: Impacts of shipping to Arctic marine wildlife
This part is prepared by Dr. Lauren McWhinnie and Dr. Kate Gormley from
Heriot-Watt University (Scotland, UK).
Part 2: Geo-economic & societal impacts of Arctic shipping
This part is prepared by Prof. Frédéric Lasserre from Laval University
(Canada).
Part 3: Technical and economic challenges of Arctic Shipping
This part is prepared by Sami Saarinen, Rob Hindley and Cayetana Ruiz de
Almiron from Aker Arctic Technology Inc (Finland).
In addition, contribution to the report contents have been given by:
Professor Zhihua Zhang from Shandong University (China). His input is
incorporated to the contents of this report.
Christian Kinas and Doctor Oliver Philipp from Panasonic Business Support
Europe GmbH (Germany). Their input is in Appendix 1.
Acknowledgements to all authors.
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2 Arctic Shipping in General
In the recent years, interest in Arctic shipping has increased: exploitation of
Arctic oil and gas reservoirs, global warming resulting in an increase in the ice-
free navigable season on the shorter routes between North Pacific and North
Atlantic Oceans compared to southern latitudes, as well as technological
development of ice going vessels, are all contributing factors. As presented in
Figure 2-1, the routes between these Oceans can be divided to the Northeast
Passage (NEP), the Northwest Passage (NWP), and the Transpolar Route
(TPR). Today only the Northeast Passage, of which the Northern Sea Route
(NSR) forms part, is currently used for commercial transportation, whereas the
NWP and the TPR (also referred as “North Pole Route”) are predicted to be
utilized for commercial shipping later in the future. The decreasing trend of ice
extent and ice thickness, driven by global warming, increases the interests
towards utilization of these routes in shipping. However, even as the ice
conditions in the Arctic become more navigable for shipping at a general level,
difficult ice conditions persist and ice-caused challenges to shipping will be
encountered in the future. In addition, intra and inter-seasonal ice variability,
environmentally sensitive areas, political and jurisdictional disputes, lack of
modern infra (deep-water ports, search & rescue capabilities) all generate
additional challenges for Arctic Shipping. Analysis, storage, and distribution of
big data from diverse sources (e.g., meteorology/climate, ocean, remote
sensing, environment, economy, computer-based modelling) applied with
modern technology aids (like satellite technologies, etc.) and software
algorithms are needed to plan shipping activities arctic waters and exploit of
Arctic routes in shipping.
The Northeast Passage is a sea route connecting the Far East and Europe, by
travelling along Russia's and Norway's Arctic coasts through the Chukchi, East
Siberian, Laptev, Kara, Pechora and Barents Seas. Its total length is 3300 –
3700 NM (from Barents Sea to Bering Sea). The route is restricted to about
14,5 meters of depth. As described later in this section, the shipping activities
in this passage have increased remarkably during previous years. Several
large-size industrial projects have been established along coastal regions of
Northern Russia (mainly at the western segment of the route) during last 10
years. Locations of key existing oil and gas projects in Northern Russia are
presented in Figure 2-1 (yellow dots), together with main transit routes in the
Arctic.
The Northwest Passage is a term used for a collection of navigational routes
running along the northern coast of North America via waterways through the
Beaufort Sea, Canadian Arctic Archipelago, Baffin Bay and Davis Strait. The
representative length of the route is approximately 3200 - 3700 NM (from
Labrador Sea to Bering Sea). Traffic intensity in this route is relatively low.
Although the summer/autumn seasons in the Arctic are forecast to become
significantly more favourable for shipping, the probability of encountering ice
in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago is still significant during the short summer
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navigation period. The region often contains strong old or multi-year ice floes
which remain present throughout the summer.
The Transpolar Route (TPR) is not a passage as such but a theoretical route
of about 2800 NM (from Norwegian Sea to Bering Sea) long that connects the
Bering Sea and Norwegian Sea directly through the Fram Strait and across
the North Pole. Although the Transpolar Route is much shorter than the
Northeast and Northwest Passages, it is presently inaccessible due to the
presence of thick multiyear sea ice. However, some preliminary studies to
exam its commercial utilization in the future have lately been carried out.
Figure 2-1. Main transit routes in the Arctic.
Global warming and ice melting
Over the past 30 years, the Arctic has warmed at roughly twice the rate as the
entire globe, a phenomenon known as “Arctic amplification” (see Figure 2-2).
The projected 2-4 °C increase in the global mean temperature by the end of
the century will lead to a 2-9 °C increase in the Arctic region, which will result
in the rapid decline of the extent and thickness of sea ice in the Arctic. The
Arctic Ocean is predicted to be free of summer ice within the next 20-25 years.
The combination of melting Arctic ice and related economic drivers are
Varanday,
Prirazlomnoye
Yamal LNG,
Arctic LNG2
Novy Port
(Arctic Gate)
NWP
TPR
NEP,
NSR
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triggering and facilitating Arctic shipping by a longer navigation season (Wang
& Overland, 2012)
According to the National Snow & Ice Data Center (University of Colorado,
USA) the air temperature at high latitude has increased by almost 4 °C during
the last 50 years. WWF correspondingly reports that the average temperature
of the Arctic has increased 2.3°C since the 1970s (WWF, 2021).
The mean surface air temperature trend over the period from 1960 to 2019 is
illustrated in Figure 2-2 below (NSIDC, 2021).
Figure 2-2. Trends in mean surface air temperature over the period 1960 to 2019.
The variation of Arctic sea ice follows the same pattern every year. The ice
cover expands from late September until in reaches a maximum in March/April
after which melt begins. The minimum ice extent is reached around mid-
September. As can be seen in Figure 2-3, the ice extent has clearly shrunk
during last decades especially in the summer and autumn seasons. As of early
2020, the lowest extent in the satellite record occurred in September 2012.
September sea ice minima in 2007, 2016, and 2019 are all statistically tied for
second lowest (NSIDC, 2021).
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Figure 2-3. Yearly seasonal variation of Arctic sea ice extends.
The reduction in sea ice extent in the Arctic has stimulated shipping activities
along the Northeast Passed and along the Northern Sea Route in particular.
The navigational distance between Asia and Europe is 5000-7000 NM shorter
than the route via the Cape of Good Hope and 2000-4000 NM shorter than the
predominant route via the Suez Canal. The difference of routes between South
Korea and Central Europe via the Suez Canal and the NSR is illustrated in
Figure 2-4 ,where the blue track refers to the Northeast Passage and the red
track route through the Suez Canal (Wikipedia, 2021).
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Figure 2-4. Visualization of the route alternatives between South Korea and Central
Europe.
Figures presenting the growth of NSR transportation in previous years are
presented below. As can be seen in the Figure 2-5, most of the transportation
is associated with destinations or origins located within the NSR, while a minor
part of transportation is pure transit throughout the entire NSR (Aker Arctic
Technology, 2020). However, an increase of pure NSR transit cargo during
last few years can also be seen, as presented in Figure 2-6 (CHNL, 2021). The
chart indicates an increasing trend of cargo volumes during previous years
although these are still very low total volumes compared to cargoes shipped
via southern routes. Figure 2-7 (CHNL, 2021) correspondingly visualises the
seasonal variation of shipping utilizing the NSR. As can be seen, the traffic is
concentrated in the Summer-Autumn season when the ice cover extent is
minimum and ice conditions along NSR are relatively easy or the route is free
of ice.
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Figure 2-5. Development of shipping volumes at the NSR
Figure 2-6. Grow of transit cargo in NSR during 2015 -2020.
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Figure 2-7. Number of voyages per month along the NSR during 1/2016-5/2020.
In this context, it should be noted that for the first time in history, a large-
capacity cargo vessel, LNG Carrier “Christophe de Margerie”, completed a
transit passage along the eastern sector of the Northern Sea Route in February
2021. The lateness in the ice season for this voyage was unprecedented as
conditions have usually been unnavigable, even for ice strengthened ships
during later winter /spring. The journey started from Jiangsu (China) and ended
about 11,5 days later at the Sabetta LNG terminal (Ob Bay, Russia). From
Cape Dezhnev to Sabetta, the gas carrier was escorted by the “50 Let Pobedy”
icebreaker. The voyage covered a total distance of 2,500 nautical miles. The
most challenging part of the voyage involved passing through ice hummocks
in the Chukchi Sea and the East Siberian Sea (Sovcomflot, 2021). As shown
in Figure 2-8 the route was fully covered by ice including up to 2 m thick first
year ice during the trip. Sabetta is marked with yellow dot. Colour codes: Brown
= second-year or multi-year ice; Green = 0,3 – 2 m thick first year ice; Magenta
= 0,1 – 0,3m thick young ice; Dark Blue = very thin new ice (< 0,1 m), Light
blue = Open water.
Even though ice cover is continuously shrinking, the ice associated challenges
in the Arctic will be also met in the future. Therefore, ice conditions and
environment along the routes should be continuously monitored and studied.
Traffic management and infrastructure along the routes should be developed
simultaneously with increasing traffic to enable safe, efficient and greener
navigation routines in the Arctic. The first step in this development is to identify
the key challenges and threats associated with Arctic shipping today. Such
challenges, especially related to the environmental, geo-economic and social
impacts as well as technical issues, are introduced in the following chapters of
this paper.
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Figure 2-8. Ice conditions in Central Arctic and Russian Arctic during the trip of
Christophe de Margerie. (AARI, 2021)
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3 Part 1: Impacts of shipping to Arctic marine wildlife
3.1 Summary of Arctic Wildlife
As environmental conditions change and human activity continues to increase
in the Arctic marine environment, it becomes more important than ever to have
a clear understanding of the abundance and distribution of the many and
varied wildlife that are present (permanently or temporarily). This will ensure
that the impacts of human activities can be minimized; conservation measures
can be deployed and managed to protect the most vulnerable species and
habitats; human activities and industrial/economic developments occur
sustainably; and that indigenous communities and their way of life are
preserved, consulted, and supported now and in the future.
This section provides a high-level summary of the wildlife that is found in the
Arctic marine environment and some associated challenges and opportunities
that they face. More in-depth information on Arctic wildlife is available in the
Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) Arctic Biodiversity Assessment
2013 and the associated status reports (CAFF, 2013).
3.1.1 Marine Mammals
The Arctic is home to seven endemic marine mammals, which are dependent
or highly associated with sea ice for part of the year:
· Cetaceans
o narwhal (Monodon monoceros)
o beluga whale (Delphinapterus leucas)
o bowhead whale (Balaena mysticetus)
· Pinnipeds
o ringed seal (Pusa hispida)
o bearded seal (Erignathus barbatus)
o walrus (Odobenus rosmarus)
· Bear
o Polar bear (Ursus maritimus)
There are an additional four species of ice seals that depend on sea ice for
whelping in the southern Arctic in the spring but are generally pelagic or use
subarctic waters for the rest of the year: the spotted seal (Phoca largha), ribbon
seal (Phoca fasciata), harp seal (Pagophilus groenlandicus), and hooded seal
(Cystophora cristata). In addition to the 11 ice-dependent/ associated marine
mammals, there are approximately 24 other species of marine mammal that
use the Arctic seasonally, for foraging in the late spring and summer (Laidre &
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Regehr, 2018). These include spotted, ribbon, harp, hooded, northern Fur,
grey, harbor seals; Stellar sea lion; North Pacific right, North Atlantic right,
grey, blue, fin, sei, minke, humpback, sperm, Baird’s beaked, Stejneger’s
beaked, Cuvier’s beaked, northern bottlenose, killer, Long-finned pilot whales;
white-beaked, Atlantic white-sided dolphins; Dall’s, harbor porpoise; and sea
otter.
Table 3-1 provides a summary of the global population status and distribution
of the endemic Arctic marine mammals. The International Union for
Conservation (IUCN) Red List of Threatened Species provides a vulnerability
rating for species (as listed in Table 3-1) However, it should be noted that these
statuses are applied to the global population and does not consider the
vulnerability of sub-populations/sub-species. As shown in Table 3-1, all the
endemic Arctic species have multiple sub-populations. This is largely driven
by the nature of the sea ice in the Arctic, which historically has isolated these
populations. Although some species are listed globally as of ‘least concern’
by IUCN, several sub-populations in the Arctic may in fact be threatened or
critically endangered. [Table 3-1 Sources: (Laidre, et al., 2015); (IUCN, 2020);
(Laidre & Regehr, 2018), (CAFF, 2013)].
The known population trend and distribution for many Arctic marine mammals
is largely unknown, either through lack of research, lack of data, data is out of
date or due to their elusive behaviour. With reducing sea ice, there are several
opportunities and challenges for Arctic marine mammals. Sub-populations
may have the opportunity to begin mixing, therefore potentially reducing a sub-
population's vulnerability; allowing populations wider foraging/breeding areas;
access for research may improve, allowing for a better data gathering and
improved knowledge of population trends. Challenges of retreating sea ice
include loss of habitat (especially for hunting polar bears and breeding/nursing
seals, increased human activities (e.g., shipping) and increased predation, to
name a few (discussed in more detail in Section 3.3).
Arctic communities interact in some way with marine mammals, directly
through subsistence hunting (for food, clothes and secondary products) or
fishing, or indirectly via shipping and other activities that overlap with marine
mammal habitat (Hovelsrud, et al., 2008). Hunting activities, yields, methods
and target species vary between communities, but largely include the core
Arctic species listed above. (Hovelsrud, et al., 2008) also outlines the cultural,
social, and economic significance of certain marine mammals and that climate
change and increasing anthropogenic impacts may have serious
consequences on the needs of these communities.
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Table 3-1. Endemic Arctic marine mammals, their status and distribution.
Species Estimated
Global
Population
No. Known
Arctic
Subpopulations/
Subspecies/
Stocks
ICUN List Status (as of
2020) and Global Trend Distribution
Polar
Bear 20-25k 19 Vulnerable
Population Global Trend -
unknown
Throughout ice-covered
Arctic regions
Narwhal 100k 11 Least Concern
Population Global Trend -
unknown
Atlantic Arctic in the
eastern Canadian high
Arctic, waters around
Greenland, Svalbard,
and Franz Josef Land
Beluga
Whale 150k 19 Least Concern
Population Global Trend -
unknown
Circumpolar
Bowhead
Whale <20k 4 Least Concern
Population Global Trend -
unknown
(Svalbard-Barents
Sea/Spitsbergen subpop.
Critically Endangered)
Discontinuous
circumpolar
Ringed
Seal Low
millions 9 Least Concern
Population Global Trend -
unknown
Circumpolar
Bearded
Seal 500k 9 Least Concern
Population Global Trend -
unknown
Patchy circumpolar
Walrus:
Atlantic
Walrus
Pacific
Walrus
20k
129k
16 Vulnerable
Population Global Trend -
unknown
Discontinuous
circumpolar
3.1.2 Seabirds
The Arctic is seasonally populated by approximately 200 species of bird (of
which the majority are migratory). There are 64 species of seabirds (birds
which spend a proportion of their time at sea, primarily feeding); 44 species of
seabird and 59 species of shorebird (associated with coastal areas, but some
sea ducks, divers, geese and swans may spend some time at sea) that breed
(23 in the high Arctic and 41 exclusively in the low Arctic) in the Arctic. In both
polar regions, diving seabirds reach their maximum diversity in sub-polar
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latitudes, and the highest densities of breeding seabirds occurs in Arctic waters
(CAFF, 2013).
Seabird communities in general are well studied, particularly using seabirds as
an indicator for environmental change (primarily through their sensitivity to
prey availability), and the known spatial distribution of many Arctic seabirds
has improved over recent years. Like marine mammals, there are several
opportunities and challenges that face seabirds in the light of recent and future
environmental change. Retreating sea ice and coastal glaciers may see a
reduction in some ice associated species (such as the ivory gulls); however,
this reduced ice cover, will see an influx of other species (e.g., horned puffin
in the Beaufort Sea). Changes to prey species (e.g., zooplankton) as sea ice
cover changes will see seabird populations change (i.e., many seabirds have
specific diets, and if their prey is removed, it is possible that the birds will leave
an area, rather than adapt to the new prey available). Increased predation (due
to retreating sea ice) may also have an impact on Arctic seabird (CAFF, 2013).
It is not possible to give details on all Arctic seabirds here, but a summary of
status and distribution of some notable species (identified as breeding in the
Arctic and either vulnerable or near threatened on the IUCN Red List is listed
in Table 3-2 [source: (IUCN, 2020); (CAFF, 2013); (Strøm, et al., 2019);
(Birdlife International, 2020); (O’Hanlon, et al., 2020)].
Human activities have several impacts on seabirds (e.g., fisheries by-catch),
but the biggest threat to seabirds is from the potential for oil spills (primarily
related to shipping and oil and gas operations) and other pollution (e.g.,
microplastics). Seabirds spend time at sea – either resting on the water
surface or diving into the water for feeding. In the event of an oil spill, seabirds
are vulnerable to the oily surface (see Section 3.3.7 for more details).
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Table 3-2. Example of Arctic distributed seabirds and their status.
Species Estimated
Global
Population
ICUN List Status (as
of 2020) and Global
Trend
Distribution
Ivory gulls
(Pagophila
eburnea)
58,000-
78,000
Individuals
Near Threatened
Population Global
Trend - decreasing
Circumpolar
85% of global pop nest on the Svalbard,
Franz Josef Land and Severnaya Zemlya
archipelagos and associated islands
Davis Strait and northern Labrador Sea
is an internationally significant wintering
area for the species.
Arctic-wide metapopulation.
Yellow-billed
loon (Gavia
adamsii)
11000-21000
individuals Near Threatened
Population Global
Trend - decreasing
Breeds in the Arctic in Russia, Alaska
and Canada. Winters at sea mainly off
the coasts of Norway, western North
America, and the eastern coast of Asia,
including the coasts of Japan, North
Korea, South Korea, and China.
Spectacled
Eider
(Somateria
fischeri)
360,000-
400,000
individuals
Near Threatened
Population Global
Trend - decreasing
Breeds along the coasts of north-east
Siberia, Russia, east from the Yana
Delta to Cape Schmidt, Beaufort Sea
coast of Alaska's North Slope and the
Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta, Alaska, USA.
90% of the breeding population is
thought to inhabit the Russian range.
Common
Eider
(Somateria
mollissima
)
c. 3,300,000-
4,000,000
individuals
Near Threatened
Population Global
Trend - unknown
Holarctic distribution, being present in
both Eurasia and North America.
However, its distribution is not
continuous across the Holarctic
Long Tailed
Duck
(Clangula
hyemalis)
3,200,000 to
3,750,000
individuals
Vulnerable
Population Global
Trend - decreasing
This species has a circumpolar range,
breeding on the Arctic coasts of North
America (Canada, Alaska, U.S.A. and
Greenland), Europe (Iceland and
Norway), and Asia (Russia) - wintering at
sea further south.
Steller's Eider
(Polysticta
stelleri)
c.130,000-
150,000
individuals
Vulnerable
Population Global
Trend - decreasing
Breeding in Alaska and Russia. Summer
in Russia, northern Norway and adjacent
Russian waters, and south-west Alaska.
Winter in the Bering Sea, northern
Japan, north-east Atlantic Ocean and the
Baltic Sea.
Leach’s Storm
petrel
(Hydrobates
leucorhous
)
6,700,000-
8,300,000
individuals
Vulnerable
Population Global
Trend - decreasing
Wide breeding range, but Arctic wise in
Alaska, Canada, Iceland and Norway.
Velvet Scoter
(Melanitta
fusca)
141,000-
268,000
individuals
Vulnerable
Population Global
Trend - decreasing
Breeds in Scandinavia, from Norway and
Sweden, into Finland and Estonia, and
western Siberian Russia to the River
Yenisey, and winters mostly in the Baltic
Sea and along the coasts of Western
Europe.
Black-legged
Kittiwake
(Rissa
tridactyla)
14,600,000-
15,700,000
individuals
Vulnerable
Population Global
Trend - decreasing
Breeds in the North Atlantic, from
northern central Canada and north
eastern U.S.A. east through Greenland
to western and northern Europe, and on
to the Taymyr Peninsula and Severnaya
Zemlya (Russia).
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Atlantic Puffin
(Fratercula
arctica)
12,000,000-
14,000,000
individuals
Vulnerable
Population Global
Trend - decreasing
Population in Iceland and Norway,
account for 80% of the European
population.
Found throughout the North Atlantic
Ocean, from north-west Greenland (to
Denmark) to the coastline of
Newfoundland (Canada) and Maine
(USA) in the west, and north-west
Russia.
3.1.3 Other Flora and Fauna and the Food Web
3.1.3.1 Fish and Sharks
Of the 16,000 global fish species, 633 are known to occur in the Arctic Ocean,
with 15 species considered to be rare and endemic to the Arctic, with an
additional 63 considered to be true Arctic generalists. Overall, the status of
many Arctic marine fish is unknown and it is thought that about 95% have not
been evaluated for threat/vulnerability (CAFF, 2013). Fish species endemic to
the Arctic Ocean and adjacent seas (AOAS) are the ice cod (Arctogadus
glacialis) and polar cod (Boreogadus saida); 49 species of cartilaginous fishes
(21 shark species, 27 skate species and 1 rabbit fish species), spatial
distribution varies, with some sea areas devoid of these fish.
Fish in the Arctic Ocean are an important part of the ecosystem and food web.
Some species live within the water column (pelagic) and others live close to
the seafloor (demersal). Fish are important predators on plankton and bottom-
dwelling animals (benthos; (Norcross & Iken, 2016)). Fish are a key food
source/prey for marine mammals, seabirds and humans, particularly the Arctic
cod. Climate change is a specific concern for Arctic cod because its young life
stages depend on sea ice as a habitat, and this central species in the Arctic
food web may be severely impacted by the ongoing and projected sea ice loss
(Norcross & Iken, 2016).
Arctic fish may be sensitive to changing environmental conditions, particularly
the ones which prey on sea ice dependent plankton/algae or use sea ice for
breeding. Retreating sea ice may reduce the prey and breeding habitat
availability for these fish and increase predation. However, as before,
opportunities exist for other species, as the sea ice retreats, opening new
foraging habitats and increasing abundance of non-sea ice plankton and algae
species. Regarding human activities, fish are again vulnerable to impacts from
oil spills, leading to toxicity and contamination (particularly when considered
prey or subsistence catch); and some fish may also be sensitive to
anthropogenic noise.
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3.1.3.2 Seaweed and Plankton
There are 21 species of endemic seaweed species in the Arctic and
approximately 15-20% of zooplankton found in the Arctic is endemic (CAFF,
2013). The distribution of marine invertebrates in the Arctic is not only
associated with the open waters, but also with the sea ice, with some
specialized algae and invertebrates living exclusively on and under the sea
ice. The biodiversity of sea ice in terms of marine invertebrates is low, in
comparison to the surrounding water column (which is considered to have high
biodiversity when compared globally) due to low temperatures and high
salinity. Across the arctic the most common amphipod occurring under the
sea ice are Apherusa glacialis,Onisimus glacialis,O. nanseni and Gammarus
wilkitzkii, which are important prey species for fish, particularly the polar cod
(which in turn is an important food source for the ice seals). Climate change is
of particular concern to calciferous marine invertebrate (ones that form calcium
carbonate shells) as ocean acidification will reduce the amount of calcium
carbonate available in the water and increased acidification will lead to the
shells being dissolved.
Regarding marine invertebrates and plants, although too numerous to cover in
detail here, they are a fundamental part of the Arctic food web, and any
changes or impacts to these foundations, ultimately has an impact on the
higher organisms.
3.1.3.3 Food web
The Arctic food web is made up of primary producers (seaweeds, algae and
phytoplankton), consumers (primary consumers e.g., zooplankton, secondary
consumers, grazers and top consumers (e.g., apex predators etc.) and
decomposers (e.g., microorganisms that break down and recycle waste and
organic matter). The Arctic food web is most vulnerable to climate change
(see Section 3.1.4), although human activities may also cause significant
impact to the food web through over exploitation (which has been witnessed
through hunting of marine mammals for example and overfishing) and
pollution.
In many impact assessment situations, it is important to consider the
“cumulative impacts”, not necessarily from multiple stressors/activities, as we
define cumulative impacts in Section 3.3, but from a whole ecosystem
perspective (e.g., including the whole food web), therefore accounting for
impacts that may happen over different spatial and temporal scales. An impact,
particularly one arising from a catastrophic pollution event, may have
significant impacts in the food web, and ecosystem for many years (e.g.,Exxon
Valdez oil spill in Alaska, 1989, see Section 3.3.7; (Colegrove, et al., 2016)).
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3.1.4 Climate Change and Human Activities
Arctic amplification is a phenomenon where the rate of climate warming is
more rapid compared with the average rate of global climate warming. Over
the last 30 years, the Arctic has warmed at a rate roughly twice that of other
regions (NSIDC, 2020). In the marine environment in the Arctic, the concerns
include the melting sea ice, warming waters and ocean acidification.
The extent of sea ice in the Arctic has been recorded by the National Snow
and Ice Data Center (NSIDC) since the 1979, with the lowest extent of winter
sea ice being recorded in 2017. The 2020 sea ice extent represented the 11th
lowest recorded extent (since 1979) and reached its maximum on 5th March
2020. Entering the northern hemisphere winter in December 2020, sea ice
extent remained far below average, dominated by the lack of ice on both the
Pacific and Atlantic sides of the Arctic Ocean; the average October 2020 sea
ice extent was the lowest on record and the average November 2020 extent
was the second lowest (NSIDC, 2020). It is predicted that the Arctic sea could
lose its sea ice cover entirely by 2035 (Guarino, et al., 2020).
Given the rate of warming and loss of sea ice in the Arctic, the implications on
marine wildlife are many. There is evidence of north ward expansion of some
boreal marine invertebrate species (CAFF, 2013); fish are also likely to move
northward (some species are particularly sensitive to changes in temperature;
for example, some fish stocks in the Barents Sea are moving north at up to
160 kilometres per decade as a result of climate change (WWF, 2020); loss of
ice habitat for ice dependent (sympagic) flora and fauna (many of which are
unique to the Arctic and important food web species) ;and coastal erosion - a
particular threat to indigenous communities and wildlife that live on the coasts.
This erosion is accelerated due to the retreat and loss of land-fast ice
(Borunda, 2020).
The opening of the Arctic through the loss of sea ice also sees the likely
increase in invasive, non-native and opportunistic species – which often out-
compete their true Arctic counterparts, change predation rates (as seen by
increased presence, both in geographic range and time spent in Arctic waters
by killer whales for example, see Section 3.3.4 and altering the Arctic
ecosystem and biodiversity.
Finally, retreating sea ice brings with it the opportunity for people to expand
and diversify their activities and exploitation of the Arctic’s marine environment,
particularly shipping, extractive industries (oil and gas, aggregate, mining etc.)
and tourism (cruise ships etc.).
3.2 Arctic Shipping/Vessel Activities
Vessel activities that may have an impact on the marine environment in the
Arctic, include transportation of cargo; fishing vessel activities (commercial and
recreational/local); vessels related to oil and gas exploration and production
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(e.g. survey, supply, cargo vessels); military vessels; other offshore and
coastal developments or extractive industries (e.g., marine renewables,
aggregate extraction); tourism (e.g., cruise ships and wildlife watching); harbor
and coastal vessels (e.g., tugboats, coastguard); recreational vessels; and
indigenous community related vessels; all of which present several challenges
for the environment and Arctic wildlife.
Overall, when we consider shipping, we must also consider the potential
environmental impacts that may arise from the associated shipping
infrastructure, such as the construction of ports, harbours and marinas and the
long-term presence of these structures. These impacts may include the
temporary construction impacts (e.g., noise, debris, construction traffic,
suspended sediments/turbidity) and longer-term impacts (e.g., marine
biofouling, potential for invasive species, alteration to water movement and
persistent pollutants from heavy traffic use in the area).
The use of vessels for other activities in the Arctic also carry their own suite of
environmental impacts, such as, dredging and trawling for seafood from fishing
vessels, potential disturbance of wildlife on tourism/wildlife watching cruises (if
not conducted responsibly), disturbance of wildlife through survey activities
(e.g., shooting seismic, deep positioning thrusters, anchoring etc.) servicing of
offshore energy structures and platforms, mines, and removal of seabed
aggregate.
Shipping figures for the first ten months of 2020 suggest that shipping in the
Arctic increased, despite the coronavirus pandemic, with a total of 26.37 million
tons of goods being shipped on the Northern Sea route, an increase of 2.9
percent compared with the same period in 2019 (Staalesen, 2018a). In 2020,
the Northern Sea route opened in May and it is reported will be largely open
through December 2020 due to the warm Autumn, the longest open season to
date (Shiryaevskaya, et al., 2020). Reports in mid-January 2021 of Russian
tankers traversing the North Sea Route with no ice breaker escort, confirm
these predictions (Smith, 2020).
The development of the blue economy (WWF, 2016) in the Arctic is at a critical
stage, with the need to develop and enhance social and environmental
management strategies, that may allow for the sustainable development of the
marine environment and which will also adequately protect the important and
sensitive Arctic ecosystem.
In order to focus the scope of this report, it will concentrate on the
environmental impacts of shipping activities that only involve the vessel
moving from point A to point B (e.g., transportation /travelling /traversing
/transiting through the Arctic) and will not consider any other environmental
impacts that may be associated with the activities that occur onboard or from
a vessel (e.g., fishing, seismic, explosives etc.).
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3.3 Environmental Impacts of Shipping on Arctic Wildlife
Levels of human activities (e.g., shipping, fishing, oil and gas) in the Arctic
marine area are increasing, which will ultimately result in more frequent and
severe threats and impacts to Arctic marine wildlife (Reeves et al., 2014).
Environmental impacts of a project or activity can be grouped into three broad
categories: i) direct impacts – impacts that are a direct result of a project
activity or decision. These are usually predictable, based on planned
activities/routes and knowledge of the marine ecosystem and can to some
extent be managed or mitigated for; ii) indirect impacts - impacts that are less
predictable as they derive from interactions with multiple factors and
stakeholders; and could be described as a ‘by-product’ of an activity and these
tend to have a much larger spatial footprint (Biodiversity Consultancy, 2013);
and iii) cumulative impacts are “the incremental impact of an action when
added to another past, present and reasonably foreseeable action” (Piet, et
al., 2017), derived from European Commission guidelines, 1999) and therefore
this also includes impacts from multiple activities. Some impacts can be
considered both direct and indirect, depending on the environmental receptor
and stressor, and their temporal and spatial extent. Table 3-3 provides a
summary of potential direct and indirect impacts of shipping in the Arctic
marine environment.
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Table 3-3. Direct and indirect Impacts from shipping on Arctic wildlife and the marine
environment.
Impacts of Shipping in the Arctic Marine Environment
Direct Impacts
Collisions/ship strikes with
marine mammals
Direct hits to marine mammals (cetaceans and pinnipeds) by
vessels, resulting in injury or death and behavioural changes
(avoidance, increased dive times etc.)
Impacts can be at an individual or population level.
Noise disturbance to marine
mammals that use sound for
communication and navigation
(e.g., Cetaceans, pinnipeds,
some fish and crustaceans)
Excessive noise can result in physical injury, behavioural changes
and in severe cases death depending on level of exposure, noise
source and species sensitivity. Acoustic masking can also have
consequences for communication and maintenance of mother-
calf relations, foraging success and increase likelihood of predator
detection.
Impacts can be at an individual or population level.
Disruption to migratory patterns
or routes; and/or abandonment
of important areas/habitats
This may result from the introduction of noise which results in
behavioural or avoidance impacts; or through the physical
presence of vessels (especially in large quantities), or
contamination of water/habitat (e.g., due to a spill) which restricts
or does not allow for migratory passage. Species may temporarily
or permanently leave/abandon important areas/habitats if
significantly disturbed (e.g., by noise, physical presence or
contamination).
Breaking sea ice May result in the loss (habitat destruction or modification) of
calving, resting, feeding areas for marine mammals and other
marine wildlife e.g., seals/walrus, fish, seabirds. May contribute
to the loss of ice algae (food source and carbon sink).
Physical impacts from loss of
ship or cargo
Impacts seabed through potential loss or damage to seabed
habitats (e.g., coral reefs, sea pen communities). Potential for
ingestion of cargo by some marine wildlife, leading to injury or
death (particularly plastics).
Potential accidental
events/Spills/hazardous or toxic
substances/transportation of oil
(incidental, operational and
illegal discharges)
If an oil/chemical spill is encountered, this may result in injury or
death of animal. Behavioural changes may also occur (see
‘Disruption to migratory patterns or routes; and/or abandonment
of important areas/habitats’).
Indirect
Impacts
Breaking sea ice Impacts travel and hunting capabilities of indigenous communities
as they cannot travel over broken ice. This may lead to fractured
communities, loss of livelihoods, and loss of subsistence.
Changes to ice flows, making ice movement more erratic and less
predictable – this may lead to an increase in ice trapping incidents.
Collisions/ship strikes with
marine mammals
Significant incidents of death due to ship strikes, could ultimately
lead to a population’s decline or loss.
Atmospheric emissions (air
pollution through emissions and
particulate matter from engine
exhaust gases and cargo tanks)
Carbon Dioxide and Greenhouse gases: climate change, resulting
in loss of sea ice and associated knock-on impacts (e.g., see
‘breaking sea ice’), increased vessel traffic etc. Stormier
conditions during ice-free season.
Black carbon: contributes to climate change. On ice or snow black
carbon and particulate matter reduces the surface’s ability to
reflect sunlight and therefore accelerates melting.
These impacts ultimately have global consequences.
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Physical impacts from loss of
ship or cargo
If lost cargo is not recovered (not including hazardous
substances/cargo herein, see ‘release/discharge of substances’
below), then introduction of a hard substrate into an area of
previously only soft substrate, may lead to colonization by non-
native/invasive species, thereby potentially altering the local
ecosystem and potential ingestion of lost cargo/microplastics.
The potential loss of habitat (direct impact) may also result in the
loss of the associated habitat communities (e.g., fish) which are
important to the local and wider food web (including large
predators and communities).
Introduction of invasive species
(ship biofouling, ballast water
and associated sediment)
May lead to the rapid spread of the invasive species throughout
the region – potentially leading to the loss of native species, loss
of grazers or predators (if the invasive is not a suitable food
source), and loss of livelihoods (if invasive is not suitable for
hunting and therefore removes the community’s food source).
There is also the potential for the introduction of non-endemic
diseases/parasites etc., due to the Arctic’s relative isolation.
Noise disturbance to other
marine wildlife
Excessive noise may scare, injure or cause
behavioural/physiological changes to other marine animals, e.g.,
fish/cephalopods – which may in turn have a direct impact on for
example predators, if prey species are scared away.
Impacts can be at an individual or population level.
Discharge
of
pollutants
to Sea
Potential
accidental
events/Spills
/hazardous or toxic
substances/transp
ortation of oil
(incidental,
operational and
illegal discharges)
Any release of oil, chemicals or waste into the marine environment
could result in many potential impacts:
· Injury to and death of wildlife
· Contamination of prey (resulting in bioaccumulation up
the food chain)
· Ingestion of litter
· Physiological changes to wildlife (long term/chronic e.g.,
infertility)
· Loss of subsistence for local communities
· Damage to offshore and coastal habitats and
communities
Impacts can be at an individual or population level.
Discharge of
waste/oil/chemical
s (operational and
illegal discharge –
raw sewage, litter)
Release of toxic
chemicals (e.g.,
anti-fouling paints,
leaching heavy
metals from
anodes)
Disruption or loss to indigenous
community way of life Any number of impacts listed above may result in the loss or
disruption to indigenous communities, e.g., impacts to hunting
species, subsistence, travel, pollution of environment etc.
The following sections outlines these potential impacts in more detail and
primarily focuses on aquatic marine wildlife that have the potential to come into
direct contact with shipping activities (e.g., marine mammals and fish) and
seabirds that spend time at sea (surface or diving) in relation to oil spills.
3.3.1 Collisions/Ship Strikes
One of the most clearly defined and direct impacts of shipping on Arctic marine
wildlife, is the potential for vessel collisions/strikes. That is, when a vessel
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makes direct impact with an animal in the water, or while on ice. The resulting
impact from the collision may range from minor injury or behavioural change
to death.
(Schoeman, et al., 2020) reports that at least 75 marine species globally are
at risk of ship strikes including large and small whales, dolphins, porpoise,
dugongs, manatees, whale sharks, sharks, seals, sea otters, sea turtles,
penguins and fish. To date, most studies have focused on larger marine
mammals, particularly North Atlantic right whale (van der Hoop, et al., 2012),
fin whales (Carrillo & Ritter, 2010), blue whales (Szesciorka, et al., 209),
humpback whales (Hill, et al., 2017) and sperm whales (references in
(Schoeman, et al., 2020)). This disproportionate number of studies would
indicate that larger marine mammals are most prone to ship strikes, however,
smaller animals are still at risk, and the collision reports with smaller marine
animals although scarce, is likely due to a reporting bias rather than lack of
frequency (Schoeman, et al., 2020). In the Arctic, the potential risks to marine
mammals are widely acknowledged and the seven endemic Arctic marine
mammal species are presumed to be at most risk from increased vessel traffic
(Hauser, et al., 2018). A recent study on killer whales in the eastern Pacific
Ocean showed that deaths as a result of human interactions impacted all age
classes. Identification of vessel strike-related trauma demonstrates that
human interaction is a significant cause of morbidity or mortality in killer whales
and that ship strikes pose a significant threat to killer whale, especially
endangered populations (Raverty, et al., 2020).
The International Whaling Commission (IWC, 2011) states that the risk of
collision is defined as “the probability that a collision occurs, combined with the
probability that such a collision will lead to a serious outcome (i.e., major injury,
mortality or damage to vessel”. A collision risk analysis requires knowledge of
animal and vessel distribution patterns and specific vessel (e.g., size and
speed) and animal (e.g., time spent at or near surface, behavioural response
to vessels etc.) related factors (Schoeman, et al., 2020); and the probability of
a collision increases when areas of higher shipping activity overlap with higher
animal density.
Specific impacts of ships collisions with marine mammals include sharp and
blunt force injuries (which may be lethal immediately on impact or days-months
later); and longer-term consequences may include locomotive impairment and
reduced fitness, potentially preventing effective foraging and may ultimately
lead to starvation; open wounds and broken bones may lead to increased
energy expenditure (i.e., less energy available for growth and reproduction;
(Schoeman, et al., 2020)) and potential for infection and disease.
The Australian Marine Mammal Centre’s National Marine Mammals database
holds records of 84 individual marine mammals (all cetaceans), being struck
by vessels (during 74 incidents) between 1998-2012 (average 3/year). In the
UK, the UK Cetacean Stranding's Investigation Programme has confirmed 32
cetacean deaths as a result of ship strikes between 1990 and 2014
(representing 0.9% of investigated deaths - the most common cause being
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bycatch/entanglement; average 2/year). In the USA, 292 records of confirmed
or possible ship strikes involving large whales were recorded from 1975-2002
(average 11/year; of which 16.4% resulted in injury and 68% were fatal;
(Jensen & Silber, 2003)). A report in Alaskan waters reported 108 confirmed
and probable ship strikes to whales between 1978-2011 (average 3/year;
(Neilson, et al., 2012)); also, in Alaska, 13 whales between 1988 and 2007 (2-
3% of 459 bowheads landed as part of subsistence hunts) bore signs of
possible or confirmed ship strikes (Reeves, et al., 2012); 24 right whales (45
examined from 77 deaths between 1970 and 2007 on the east coast of the
USA, showed evidence of ship strike (Reeves, et al., 2012); and 30 cetacean-
vessel collisions were reported between 2004-2011 (average 4/year) in British
Columbian waters ( (Wild Whale, 2013); Table 3-4). It should be emphasized
that the number of whale strikes reported, and deaths registered as a result of
ship strikes, likely represent a very small percentage of the actual number of
animals that are struck. [Table 3-4 source: listed in Table; * confirmed or
possible.]
Table 3-4. Summary of global ship strike statistics (average numbers rounded up).
Country
/Region No. of
Ship
strikes
*
Year
Range Average
No. Strikes
per year
Marine
Animal Reference
Australia 84 1998-2012 3 Cetaceans (Australian
Marine Mammal
Centre , 2020)
UK 32 1990-2014 2 Cetaceans (ZSL, 2014)
USA 292 1975-2002 11 Large
whales (Jensen &
Silber, 2003)
USA (Alaska) 108 1978-2011 3 Whales (Neilson, et al.,
2012)
Canada (British
Columbia) 30 2004-2011 4 Cetaceans (Wild Whale,
2013)
Arctic (Bering-
Chukchi-Beaufort
Sea)
20 1990-2012 1 Bowhead
whales (George, et al.,
2017)
USA (Alaska,
Barrow and
Kaktovik
subsistence hunt
landings)
13 1988-2007 1 Bowhead
whales (Reeves, et al.,
2012)
USA
(east coast) 24 1970-2007 1 Right
whales (Reeves, et al.,
2012)
USA/Canada
(west coast) 9 2004-2013 1 Killer
whales (Raverty, et al.,
2020)
As previously mentioned, studies on ship-strikes with other marine animals
(not just cetaceans) is limited. In the Arctic specifically, (Wilson, et al., 2019)
estimated that in the Caspian and White Sea, the potential collision risk with
seal pups in the path of ships transiting seal breeding ice were 9.6% and
approximately 1.4 to 1.9% respectively (% of pup population). They also
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reported that the median areas of danger for seals in water surrounding
vessels ranged from approximately 1500m2 to 7800m2, and in areas where
vessel speed was greater than 5 knots, seals in the water were prone to come
under the drawing forces of the vessels (Wilson, et al., 2019).
(Hauser, et al., 2018) undertook a comprehensive assessment of the
combined effects of vessel exposure (likelihood of encountering a vessel) and
sensitivity (to the vessel e.g., noise of ship strike) across all populations of
Arctic marine mammals under increasingly navigable Arctic sea routes during
open-water conditions. Their results (focusing on the North West Passage and
Northern Sea Route) showed that of the subpopulations that overlap with the
sea routes, the Eclipse Sound narwhal was most vulnerable to vessel traffic
(as a result of high exposure to the North West Passage and
biological/species-specific traits that increased vulnerability) and the Hudson
Bay-James Bay ringed seal was least vulnerable. In summary, the results
showed high vulnerability scores for narwhal, walrus, bowhead and beluga
subpopulations. Intermediate vulnerability for bearded seals and low
vulnerability for polar bears and ringed seals (Hauser, et al., 2018).
Arctic bowhead whale susceptibility to ship strikes can be demonstrated by
evidence of wounds and scarring consistent with vessel collisions, found on
about 2% of the whales taken by Alaskan Native subsistence hunters (Reeves,
et al., 2012). Indirect evidence that large vessels negatively impact bowheads
is derived from studies on their near relatives, North Atlantic right whales, with
vessel strikes being their most significant cause of mortality (Reeves, et al.,
2012). Endangered North Atlantic right whales are especially vulnerable to
vessel strikes as their habitat and migration routes are close to major ports and
often overlap with shipping lanes (NOAA, 2020)There is the potential that this
is the fate awaiting the Arctic bowheads (where the western Arctic populations
has been steadily recovering, post hunting depletion), as shipping increases,
if measures to protect them and reduce potential collisions are not
implemented effectively.
The IWC plan to mitigate ship strikes to cetacean populations: 2017-2020
report (IWC, 2017) identified a list of high-risk areas where ship strikes are
common. In the Arctic, these areas include the north-east coast of Sakhalin
Island (for western gray whale), Eastern Bering Sea (for North Pacific right
whale) and the general US and Russian Arctic (potential threats to bowhead
whale). The 2020-2022 ship strike workplan outlines plan (in collaboration with
relevant stakeholders) for developing proposals for ship strike reduction
measures in these high-risk areas.
Several knowledge gaps have been identified. Studies on the risk of ship
strikes to other (non-cetacean) marine animals are limited. Therefore, the
assumption that smaller animals (e.g., seals) and cetaceans (e.g., some
smaller whales, dolphins and porpoise) are more agile and faster moving, and
as a result are less likely to be struck, is largely unfounded. For example, the
Australian ship strike database reports that 25% of ships strikes occurred to
dolphins or porpoise (46% were whales and 29% were unidentified). Data
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presented by (Raverty, et al., 2020) demonstrates that even the agile killer
whales are still susceptible to ship strikes.
The under reporting of small cetacean or non-cetacean strikes may also be
related to vessel size. Some larger vessels may not be aware of striking an
animal, particularly if the strike does not result in damage to the vessel, and if
the animal is relatively small (e.g., in comparison to the larger whales). This
also includes a need to understand the risk to ice breeding seals and walrus
during their pupping season (Wilson, et al., 2019). Under reporting of large
whale strikes will also be an issue and therefore the true extent of ship strike
threat to marine mammals is not known.
Using the St Lawrence River Beluga whales as a proxy for other Arctic
cetacean species (particularly narwhal given their biological similarities) – the
impact of ship strikes has been significant. Following the ban on commercial
whaling, there has been no recorded recovery of the population (DFO, 2020).
The St Lawrence River has high levels of shipping activity (Reeves, et al.,
2014) that overlaps the population’s range. As a result, in 2016, this population
of Belugas was listed as endangered (Species at Risk public registry, Canada
and the Committee on the Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada).
The long-term physical and population level consequences of ship strikes is
also poorly understood and there are large data gaps on Arctic marine
mammal subpopulation status, trends and distribution, which contribute to the
uncertainty of risk and vulnerability assessments (Hauser, et al., 2018).
With adequate mitigation and management measures, which are well-informed
and based on solid scientific data and evidence, a number of these risks can
potentially be reduced or avoided. Ship strike reporting systems, stranding
databases and modelled risk analysis help identify populations for which ship
strikes may exceed population recruitment rates.
3.3.2 Noise Disturbance
Although this section focusses on direct and indirect impacts to wildlife, noise
should be considered as a direct, indirect, and cumulative impact. This is
because anthropogenic noise can be highly pervasive and there is no way to
‘remove’ other sources of underwater noise when examining the impacts of
one activity such as shipping. For example, (Nieukirk, et al., 2012) reported
that air gun sounds were recorded up to 4000km from seismic survey vessels
in the North Atlantic. This noise could ultimately impact all marine wildlife within
that range, to varying degrees, albeit temporarily; but when considered in
combination with all the other noise generating activities that happen within
that range, the level of noise a recipient is exposed to then has the potential to
dramatically increase. The nature of noise produced via ship propulsion (low-
mid frequency noise) means that it is more likely to propagate further and suffer
less attenuation than high frequency noise. Therefore, the potential area over
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which it will result in an impact or likely contribute to cumulative noise budgets
is significant.
Underwater noise can be categorized as: i) ‘acute’, noise generated through
activities such as military sonar, seismic activities, oil and gas exploration and
seabed construction; activities that are temporary, and the noise will stop when
the activity stops; and ii) ‘chronic,’ noise that is continuous, persistent and/or
spatially extensive such as the noise generated by shipping (Von Mirbach,
2019).
Ambient underwater noise levels in the Arctic are relatively low (compared to
the world’s other oceans), however the underwater marine environment in the
Arctic is undoubtably becoming noisier, due to the direct increase of human
activities and developments, the reduction of sea ice coverage and increasing
ocean acidification ( (Reeves, et al., 2014); (PAME, 2019)). However, it should
be noted that seasonal fluctuations to ambient noise may be attributed to ice
coverage extent. During the ice-covered season, ambient noise is
dampened/muffled by the ice. As the ice coverage reduces and anthropogenic
activities increase, the Arctic will become noisier (Insley, et al., 2017).
(Halliday, et al., 2020) have conducted a review of underwater noise and
marine mammals; and a recent state of knowledge report on underwater noise
(PAME, 2019) both give an extensive overview of issues and impacts
associated with underwater noise in the Arctic. These reports have been
reviewed and the highlights and impacts related specifically to vessel noise is
summarized in Table 3-5.
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Table 3-5. Overview of Underwater Noise in the Arctic.
Summary of Underwater Noise in the Arctic: A State of Knowledge Report (PAME, 2019);
Underwater noise and Arctic marine mammals: review and policy recommendations
(Halliday, et al., 2020); and references therein.
*root-mean-squared, ** median
Sound
propagation High frequency sound waves that hit sea ice attenuate by scattering (repeated
reflection). Near surface sounds waves will not propagate as far as waves
travelling in deeper or ice-free waters.
Layering of freshwater and temperatures (thermocline) refracts sound waves
up and down, creating the Arctic sound channel – with sound getting trapped
in certain layers of water (100-300m) – therefore propagating farther than if
they were not trapped. Propagation in the sound channel depends on noise
frequency. Ocean acidification can also reduce absorption of sound waves
(400-5000Hz) and allow sound to travel farther.
Ambient sound Ambient noise sources include physical processes (geophony; ice, wind,
earthquakes etc.), biological sounds (biophony; marine mammal
communication, fish grunts etc.) and anthropogenic sounds (anthrophony;
vessels etc.). Ambient sound varies throughout the year and elevated
ambient noise can be caused during marine mammal mating seasons (to
attract mates). For northern polar sea, on average, the Arctic Ocean has the
lowest levels of ambient noise, compared with that in the Greenland and
Beaufort Seas.
Shipping has a much larger overall impact on ambient sound levels than for
example seismic surveys (relative to the number of seismic surveys), adding
a median 3.5dB (40-315Hz) to ambient sound levels. The signal-to-noise ratio
is greater in the Arctic due to low ambient sound, which may elicit a greater
response from animals.
Vessel noise Typical vessel noise ranges have been reported to be between 159-178dBrms*
in non-polar regions (average 178dBrms*). Vessel noise in the Arctic is poorly
reported, and mostly focuses on icebreaking activity, which is greater than
other vessel noise – and can be louder than 200dBmed** (0.01 to 20 Hz). One
research vessel transiting in the Barents Sea reported 176dBrms* (0.063 to
20Hz). Noise levels will depend on vessel type and speed.
Marine mammals Marine mammals can be grouped as: 1) low frequency cetaceans (bowhead,
fin, grey and minke whales) range 7Hz-35kHz; 2) mid frequency cetaceans
(beluga and killer whales, narwhals) range 150Hz-160kHz; 3) high frequency
cetaceans (e.g., harbor porpoise) range 200hz-180kHz; and 4) Pinnipeds in
water (e.g., ringed seals) range 75Hz-75kHz (Walrus range 100Hz-
40kHz).
All Arctic pinnipeds (excluding walrus) are phocids (earless seals), therefore
their hearing is more acute underwater.
Bowhead whales (endemic): 50-1000Hz in summer; higher vocalization
>2000Hz in winter when they sing.
Beluga and Narwhal (endemic): 400-15,000Hz; echolocation clicks 10-12kHz.
Seals: species specific, but range100-10,000Hz (bearded seals produce
sound within this whole range; ringed seals <1000Hz)
Fish (only Arctic cod confirmed to make noise): grunts 100-200Hz.
Bowheads and bearded seals reported to elevate ambient noise during
breeding seasons.
Therefore, these different groups of marine mammals have varied sensitivity
to anthropogenic noise. Severity of the physical impact increases the closer
to the noise source and exposure to chronic/long term noise can both result
in behavioural change, physical injury (hearing damage, collision due to
avoidance) and death. Behavioural changes include, avoidance of an area,
increased vigilance, stress, decreased foraging (significant biological
implications), change in signal amplification and amplitude.
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Studies on vessel impacts reported Bowhead whales react to vessel noise by
avoidance and changing their diving behaviour. Limited studies on belugas
and narwhals, show both species are reported to be sensitive to intense
noises from icebreaking and shipping. Seals are reported to be more tolerant
to shipping noise than all three whale species.
Marine mammal
– species specific
responses to
shipping noise
Bowhead Whales: movement away from and changes in diving cycle in
response to vessels approaching. Show stronger reaction to noise whilst
migrating.
Belugas and Narwhal: beluga have strong reaction to ice breaking, with
avoidance responses within 50km of the ice breaker; while Narwhal may
respond to ice breaker noise with a “freeze” response, and avoidance for up
to 48hrs. Beluga vocalization may decrease due to decreased calling rates or
fleeing in response to vessel presence. Belugas may increase heart rate
(“acoustic startle response”) in response to noise disturbance.
Harp Seal: decreased vocalization in response to boat noise (potential
acoustic masking within 2km of seal)
Minke Whale: less sightings when vessel traffic and noise increases, so
avoidance inferred.
Note: species listed here are those covered by the two summarized reports
and is not necessarily representative of all species that need to be accounted
for when
considering future shipping impact assessments.
Fish Acoustic impacts have only been studied in two Arctic fish species: Arctic cod
and shorthorn sculpin. The impacts from vessels include altering their home
range size and movement patterns. Non-Arctic studies on other fish species
have shown that underwater noise may cause barotrauma (damage to swim
bladder; may cause injury or death), impaired hearing sensitivities, auditory
masking (when the ability to detect or recognize a sound is degraded by the
presence of another sound) and change in behaviour.
Invertebrates There have been no studies on the impacts of underwater noise on Arctic
marine invertebrates. However, other non-Arctic studies have shown that
vessel noise can impact the behaviour of lobsters, crabs and prawns, impact
on the biochemistry and physiology of crabs and prawns, change how
sediment dwelling invertebrates' function in their environment (e.g., nutrient
cycling) and low-frequency noise can damage the hearing in cephalopods.
Knowledge gaps
·
Limited geographic range of the studies (large areas of the Arctic
have no studies related to underwater noise).
· Limited number of Arctic species studied (7 of the 11 Arctic marine
mammals not studied for noise impacts; and only 2 of 633 fish species
studied); (need real-time studies)
· Limited studies on impacts of vessel noise on belugas and bowheads
(most studied species for other noise sources)
· Measurements of ambient underwater noise is not standardized
· Source levels not measured for many activities/vessel types/vessel
speeds etc.
· Measurements of source level not standardized
· No studies were found to have documented chronic/cumulative
impacts of noise on Arctic marine wildlife or cumulatively with other
stressors (majority of studies focus on acute responses)
· Very limited availability (if any) of data/evidence for hearing
sensitivities/tolerances for Arctic marine wildlife
· Lack of information on areas with the most vessel traffic (or future
traffic) - these areas need increased monitoring
Policy and
assessment
considerations
· Vessel traffic and shipping are not generally covered by
environmental impact assessments (only if considered within a
project specific EIA, e.g., oil and gas vessels)
· Other management measures needed, for example transportation
corridors or protected areas to reduce or limit extent of underwater
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noise from shipping, quieter technology, quiet zones, speed
reduction, seasonal protection, adaptive management etc.
Low-frequency noise from large ships (20–200 Hz) overlaps acoustic signals
used by baleen whales (e.g., Arctic endemic bowhead whales; (Ahonen, et al.,
2017)), and increased levels of underwater noise have been documented in
areas with high shipping traffic. This level of exposure may be associated with
chronic stress in baleen whale species (Rolland, et al., 2012). Studies of
humpback whales in Japan showed that their singing reduced in the presence
of vessel noise, vacating areas nearest to the shipping lanes, with most whales
not resuming their vocalizations until half an hour after the ship has passed
(Tsujii, et al., 2018). Other species have also been documented to change their
vocalization rate and/or the energy of their calls in response to the presence
of vessel noise both of which may have energetic or fitness consequences for
that individual or the wider population, if more than one animal adopts this
behaviour for a prolonged period (Weilgart, 2007).
For cetaceans, the importance of communication between animals during
periods such as the breeding season (bowheads; (Stafford, et al., 2012)) and
calving (beluga; (Vergara, et al., 2010)) is well recognized. For endemic
species in the Arctic these periods usually occur in the summer months and
temporally overlap with peak months for transmitting vessel traffic. It is also
known that introduction of ship noise has the potential to result in acoustic
masking of these types of vocalizations across a wide range of species and
can essentially reduce the space over which they are able to listen ( (Erbe, et
al., 2016); (Putland, et al., 2018)). Interference with vocalization that are linked
to communication can have a potential impact on breeding success and in
extreme cases separation of mothers and calves leading to mortalities ( (Parks,
et al., 2019); (van Parijs & Corkeron, 2001)). One study on humpback whales
also highlighted the introduction of vessel noise can result in mothers having
to increase the loudness or their call rate in order to maintain connection with
their offspring and that this could have wider implications for their fitness as
these normally discrete communications, if louder or more frequent will be
more likely to alert potential predators (i.e., killer whales to their presence;
(Videsen, et al., 2017)).
(Erbe, et al., 2019a)(and references therein) provides a summary of known
impacts and knowledge gaps on the impacts of shipping (and other sources
of) underwater noise on marine mammals in Antarctica. Studies summarized
included reporting increased stress levels in North Atlantic whale (or similar
species); effects on foraging, (e.g., lower descent rates and fewer side-roll
feeding events per dive) on humpback whales; and noise source avoidance
and predicted masking of communication sounds in killer whales. More
generally, (Erbe, et al., 2019b) review of the impact of ship noise on marine
mammals, gives an overview of species-specific responses as summarized
below:
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- Bowhead whales: avoidance, interruption of foraging, socializing, and
playing behaviour, less time spent at surface.
- Gray whales: increased vocalization rate.
- Humpback whales: increase amplitude of vocalization, less frequent
vocalization, cessation of singing in vessel presence, decrease in dive
time, avoidance, cessation of foraging activities, decrease in
communication range.
- North Atlantic right whales: lack of behavioural response (a possible
reason for high ship strike rates), increased stress levels (from
physiological examination), shift to vocalization frequency and duration,
“gunshot” call susceptible to masking by vessels.
- Fin and minke whales: decrease in communication range, masking
compensation (changes to vocalization range).
- Beluga whales: loss of pod integrity, commencement of rapid
movements, shallow dives, change to vocal behaviour, increasing
avoidance in heavy shipping areas (e.g., St Lawrence Estuary, Canada),
shift to higher frequencies.
- Narwhal: changed locomotion, fall silent.
- Sperm whale: fewer clicks during vessel passes, decreased surface time,
respiration interval and number of ventilations (avoidance, no response
and attraction depending on the context of the underwater noise).
- Killer whale: less foraging, increased surface-active behaviour, changes
to respiration, swim speed and direction, increased vocalization duration.
- Dolphins: displacement, changed site occupancy, altered movement
patterns, increase to time spent travelling (decreasing resting and
socializing), alterations to dive patterns, alteration to whistle
characteristics/frequency range, duration, increase in whistle production
rates.
Reported responses of whales to increased noise include habitat
displacement, behavioural changes and alterations in the intensity, frequency
and intervals of calls (Rolland, et al., 2012). Behavioural responses to
increased noise may include slower descent rates and fewer side-roll feeding
events per dive, which may ultimately reduce foraging success (as recorded in
humpback whales in the western North Atlantic; (Blair, et al., 2016)).
Results of a study on gray whales in the Gulf of California (Findley & Vidal,
2002) and other studies (references in (Findley & Vidal, 2002)) reported
behavioural changes (e.g., changes in vocalizations), preceded the
abandonment/avoidance of lagoons during underwater noise experiments and
in the presence of fishing vessels running at high speeds in the lagoons,
confirmed the disturbing effects of high-level underwater noise on these
whales.
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Evidence is emerging that when ship traffic is reduced, the levels of stress or
impact to marine mammals' species is also reduced. This was noted by
(Rolland, et al., 2012) following the events of 11th September 2001 (reduced
ship traffic in Bay of Fundy, Canada); and recent evidence suggests that
numbers of Indo-Pacific humpback dolphins in the Pearl River Estuary
between Hong Kong and Macau increased after ferry (approx. 200 ferries per
day) activity ceased in response to the Covid-19 pandemic (Davidson, 2020).
These examples suggest that background vessel noise is reducing the world
for these animals and robust management measures are needed to limit noise
impacts.
Impacts of noise on other marine species have also been documented. A
critical literature review by (Edmonds, et al., 2016) outlined that physiological
sensitivity to some underwater noise among Norway lobster (Nephrops
Norvegicus) and closely related crustacean species, although overall data is
lacking. A review by (Tidau & Briffa, 2016) also identified studies documenting
the impact of noise on crustacean species (freshwater and marine). Response
to noise included increase in some behaviours (e.g., locomotion) and stress,
reduced and slower antipredator behaviour, changes in foraging, suppressed
behaviours with an ecological function (bio irrigation), and changes to
intraspecific behaviour (e.g., agonistic encounters), although again suggesting
that knowledge was lacking.
Research on the impacts of anthropogenic noise on fish is also limited,
however the available studies suggest that fish may be subject to the same
range of impacts (although impacts and severity differ between species) e.g.,
behavioural responses furthest from the source, with an increasing likelihood
of physiological impacts, hearing damage, injury, and death with increasing
proximity as other taxonomic groups (Radford, et al., 2014); and prey fish may
be caught more readily when impacted by passing motorboats (Simpson, et
al., 2016).
3.3.3 Disruption to migratory patterns/abandonment of important habitats
The introduction of new and/or permanent shipping routes in the Arctic, could
be compared to the construction of a new road on land – it creates a new and
potentially very dangerous obstacle to animal movement (Pirotta et al., 2018)
and disturbance to habitats. Marine animals use both the water (cetaceans
and pinnipeds) and ice (polar bears) to seasonally migrate around the Arctic.
Migrations are in response to feeding, breeding and nursing/calving needs.
Arctic cetaceans are migratory, often following genetically based migration
routes and exhibiting site fidelity to productive regions with extensive summer
foraging opportunities (Hauser, et al., 2018).
The eleven endemic marine mammal species (3 cetacean, bowhead whales,
Beluga whales and narwhal, 7 pinnipeds and the polar bear) are also joined
by at least another five cetacean species (e.g., minke whale, fin whale, grey
whale, humpback whale, killer whale) that migrate into Arctic waters during the
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ice-free summer and autumn months, principally to feed (Moore & Reeves,
2018).
Pinnipeds rely on the sea ice to rest, breed and mate, and therefore migrate in
response to the seasonally changing sea ice conditions. It is likely therefore,
that as Arctic waters become ice free for longer, seal migration range will
probably decrease in response, with the seals needing to stay close to the ice-
covered areas.
There are geographic “bottle-necks” in/out of the Arctic (e.g., Bering Strait and
eastern Canadian Arctic), which are used by both seasonally migratory marine
mammals and vessels. The marine mammals that use these routes are two
to three times more vulnerable to the impacts of shipping (e.g., noise, strikes
etc.) as they represent potential high conflict areas (Hauser, et al., 2018) - the
more vessels using a migratory route, the more chance of coming into contact
and impacting migratory marine mammals.
Increased noise (see Section 3.3.2 for more details) from shipping and the
physical presence of more vessels may also lead marine mammals to abandon
or avoid migratory routes or preferred habitats (e.g., foraging or calving areas).
Cetaceans, and particularly those that have high site fidelity, are at risk of
significant population impacts, as seen in the gray whale population in the Gulf
of California, Mexico, reported by (Findley & Vidal, 2002). Their study
suggested that the increased presence of high-speed vessels (mainly fishing
vessels) and increased shipping traffic are likely responsible for the decrease
in gray whales using calving/nursery lagoons in the Gulf. This study was based
on gray whale observations from the 1950’s to 1995, and suggests that no gray
whales have returned to calve at these sites since the mid-1980's. This
movement of gray whales from these areas may lead to an increase in gray
whale populations elsewhere. This evidence suggests that there is the
potential for similar abandonment or avoidance of important areas in the Arctic,
as shipping levels increase.
3.3.4 Breaking sea ice
One of the most notable and well documented environmental
change/challenge in the Arctic marine environment over the last decade or
more, is the state of the sea ice (loss, summer break-up and sea-ice free
winters). Marine wildlife (considering primarily birds and marine mammals
here) in the Arctic area see the sea ice as either an opportunity (e.g., evolving
ways in which to exploit its presence - on ice hunting/foraging, breeding,
resting, migration etc.) or see it as a challenge/barrier, that needs to recede or
be broken in order to move into an area (e.g., breathing/feeding holes, in water
migration and feeding etc.; (Ainley, et al., 2003). Inevitably, there will be both
winners and losers in the event of the Arctic becoming ice-free. Moore, 2016
outlines that the ‘new normal’ (retreating sea ice and increased primary and
secondary production) conditions in the Pacific Arctic may provide endemic-
Arctic bowhead whales with optimal foraging opportunities, confirmed via
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observations of seasonal ecology in core-whale-use areas and improved body
whale condition.
In the Arctic, ringed seal, bearded seal, polar bear, bowhead whale, narwhal,
ivory gull and Ross’s gull are all classed as ice-obligate species (reliant on sea-
ice for hunting, breeding, resting etc.). Harp seal, hooded seal, walrus, minke
whale, beluga, thick-billed murre and black guillemot are ice-associated
(evolved specific adaptation to allow them to exploit sea ice habitat). For gray
whale, killer whale, northern fulmar, eider species, oldsquaw duck and
dovekie, ice is largely a barrier ( (Tynan, et al., 2010); (Moore & Huntington,
2008)).
Shipping may contribute to breaking sea ice via two routes. Firstly, and most
significantly, increased atmospheric pollution/emissions/particulate matter
from vessels, may lead to increased rates of global warming and accelerated
sea ice loss (see Section 3.3.6 for more details). Secondly, vessels (ice
breaking) travelling through areas of fragile/thin ice, may accelerate ice loss or
not allow ice to completely freeze (when it would have done so, if vessels
weren’t present). Although it is estimated that ice breaking vessels only
contribute a miniscule amount to summer sea ice loss (NSIDC, 2020); there is
the potential that the resulting impacts may be harmful for marine wildlife
(marine mammals, as summarized below). A 2017 WWF report (WWF, 2017)
provides a review of various literature on the impacts of shipping through Arctic
sea ice, and the highlights are summarized below.
-Ice Entrapment: although ice entrapment is a natural cause of death in
marine mammals, it has been speculated that ice breaking by vessels has
been responsible for a few ice entrapments events. The open water behind
the vessel confuses marine mammals and lead them to become trapped
then the water eventually refreezes. Ice breaking may also lead animals to
delay their winter migration, putting them at risk of entrapment. These
entrapments may become more frequent as shipping continues later into
the year.
-Habitat destruction and/or fragmentation: ice is used as resting, breeding
and nursery habitat by seals and walrus. Ringed seal pups are concealed
in lairs until they are about 6 weeks old. These lairs are vulnerable to
destruction by ice breaking activities as they are not highly visible (usually
a small ice hole or adult on the ice), therefore they are not easily avoidable.
Seal pups can also be flushed into the water by the vessel wakes, and their
survival is species dependent (e.g., some pups can tolerate the water from
about 4 days (larger hooded seal pups) while others may not be tolerant
before 6 weeks). Separation of mother and pup, displacement from natal
site and whelping site breakage may also occur. This causes stress to the
mother, may impact lactation and ultimately have impacts on pup survival.
Species with whelping site tenacity are more vulnerable to habitat
destruction than those species that only use the ice to haul-out. Navigation
back to the nursery sites for mothers following at sea feeding may also be
impeded by ice breakage.
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-Open passages: open areas of water left by ice breaking activities can lead
to the increased presence of non-endemic species (e.g., killer whale) or
introduction of new marine species (e.g., invasive/non-natives, see Section
3.3.5) to an area. This may be particularly pertinent when considering
predators, primarily killer whales. These open corridors may give these
predators greater access to wintering grounds (used by beluga, bowheads,
narwhal and seals/walrus) and for more of the year (Breed, et al., 2017).
-Noise: less sea ice leads to more noise, as the noise can travel further in
open water (see Section 3.3.2 for more details on noise impacts).
- Ship Strikes: less sea ice may lead to some animals (e.g., seals and walrus,
particularly pups and nursing mothers) spending more time in water which
will put them at increased risk from noise and ship strikes (see Section 3.3.1
for more details on ship strike impacts).
- Oil spills: an oil spill in an ice-covered area can be hard to detect and clean
up. In sea-ice, oiling of breathing holes puts the animals that use then at
particular risk, especially as they have no other alternative (see Section
3.3.7 for more details on oil spill impacts).
In addition, to the impacts outlined above, another impact to consider is the
potential fragmentation to polar bear hunting grounds. Polar bears’ main prey
are ringed and bearded seals, primarily those which are on ice (rather than in
the water). If the bears hunting grounds are destroyed through ice breakage,
then their hunting range is reduced, leading to increased competition between
bears, movement onto land (where food is scarce; and potential conflict with
communities) and possible starvation (Laidre, et al., 2020). Polar bears also
use the ice for seasonal movement, mating and in some areas maternal
denning. Reductions in optimal ice habitat result in reductions in body
condition, survival, reproduction, and abundance (Laidre, et al., 2020).
An opportunity also exists for other marine mammals that are not reliant on the
sea ice (e.g., non-endemic cetaceans) to move into the ice-free areas,
potentially increasing their range (e.g., subarctic species of baleen whales;
(Moore, 2016)). Increased primary and secondary production (as a result of
sea ice loss) opens new feeding opportunities for endemic and seasonally
migrant cetaceans (Moore & Reeves, 2018). This however is not without its
impacts – and may lead to intra-species competition for feeding/breeding
grounds; a change to the overall ecosystem due to the potential alteration to
the food web; exposure to more diverse human activities; and potential
changes to subsistence hunting ( (Reeves, et al., 2014); (Moore, 2016)).
Although not a specific impact of shipping, but an important impact to note
here; less sea ice also means that there is less ice for food-web foundation
organisms like krill, algae and plankton to live (sea ice algae contribute up to
50% of primary productivity in the central Arctic Ocean; (Gosselin, et al.,
1997)), which may have a knock-on effect throughout the whole food chain –
leading to less prey (e.g., fish) and less predators (e.g., seals) (NMLC, 2018).
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This has a massive impact on the whole marine ecosystem balance in the
Arctic and may lead to the loss of species and/or the introduction of non-
natives; or decreasing seal population, for example, may lead to an increase
in fish population (e.g., cod), which may ultimately lead to an increased fishing
industry.
3.3.5 Physical impacts from loss of ship or cargo and Invasive Species
Physical impacts to the marine environment may be as a result of a vessel
being lost to the seabed or grounding (physical presence, not spill of oil),
and/or the loss to the seabed of a vessels cargo. In 2020, the World Shipping
Council (WSC) reported an average of 1,382 containers were lost at sea each
year, between 2008-2019. This represents a significantly small amount (less
than one thousandth of 1%) of the approx. 226 million containers shipped each
year (WSC, 2020). In some cases, lost cargo can be recovered, in others, the
cargo is not recovered.
The resulting loss of cargo can have some unintended environmental
consequences. These include:
-Loss or damage to habitat: cargo or vessel may be lost over areas of
habitat/seabed that is of particular importance, either from a conservation
perspective (e.g., sea pen communities) or habitats that have significant
importance to the food web or support specific populations of species. Loss
or damage of this habitat could have a negative impact, particularly where
the habitat is important to a population of a species. For example, if a
habitat supports a large prey fish population, that ultimately supports a
particular marine mammal population; if the habitat is lost, and the fish
leave the area, the marine mammal is also forced to abandon their
“feeding” area too. The resulting loss may also impact on indigenous
communities (if they hunt the “lost” population); or move the predation
pressures elsewhere.
-Creation of habitat: hard substrate (e.g., cargo containers) may be added
to areas of previously soft substrate (e.g., sand or mud) - therefore creating
an unnatural substrate. Many marine flora (e.g., seaweeds) and fauna
(e.g., mussels, corals) require a hard substrate on which to attach and
grow. This potential impact can be both negative and/or positive. Over
time, as the newly attached organisms multiply to create new habitats (e.g.,
a coral reef), this may ultimately support higher organisms such as fish
(native or non-native) and potentially culminating in a positive impact on
the overall food web and contribute organic matter to the sediment
(potential to increase productivity), and on fishing communities, for
example. Inversely, a potential negative impact might be introduction of
invasive species (see below for more details).
-Ingestion of cargo: ingestion of marine litter/items lost at sea may be an
issue for larger marine animals depending on the type of lost item
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(considering larger items or foreign material/marine litter, >2.5cm, not
including “micro” here). It is widely documented that marine litter has
negative impacts on marine mammals, primarily due to ingestion and
entanglement and it is reported to be ingested by many species of marine
mammals, such as baleen whales, beaked whales, dolphins and porpoises,
and seals (Panti, et al., 2019).
-Creation of microplastics (and other non-biodegradables or heavy metals):
any non-biodegradables materials (particular focus on plastics; although
some “biodegradable” plastics are also contributors to the microplastic
problem) lost at sea, take a long time to degrade (100’s of years). Plastic
degradation over time, creates microscopic particles (e.g., microplastics; a
particularly important research topic at present; (Zantis, et al., 2021);
(Moore, et al., 2020)). These particles are ingested by marine animals at
all levels of the food web, causing a mechanical hazard if ingested (eaten,
uptake via cells/tissue or exposure through gills) and toxicity. The long-
term toxicity impacts of microplastics in-particular are currently not known
(GESAMP, 2015). Although impacts could include contamination of meat,
reduced fertility, impaired tissue/organ function and death, as seen with
long term heavy metal toxicity studies (e.g., (Das, et al., 2003); (Rosa, et
al., 2008)).
The overall risk of causing an impact to the environment as a result of lost
cargo or vessel is relatively low when considering single events (in relation to
the size of the Arctic ocean). However, when considered cumulatively, this
impact could become more significant, especially as the Arctic shipping are
restricted in area, areas become busier, and the potential for lost cargo
increases.
Of particular interest when considering this, is the potential for the creation of
“stepping-stone” habitats for invasive or non-native species (invasive species
being defined here as a species that may cause harm or out compete native
species; non-native species defined here as species that are not native to an
area, but do not cause harm or are perhaps beneficial). That is, the creation
of new hard substrate that could either be colonized by invasive or non-native
species, and which create a corridor for its wider spread through the region.
This has been reported for other marine structures such as marine renewable
devices (Adams, et al., 2014), decommissioned oil and gas structures (Olenin
& Minchin, 2019), wrecks and other marine infrastructure (ports, marinas etc.;
(Mineur, et al., 2012)).
As the sea ice retreats and the Arctic ocean warms, these potential stepping-
stones may become more relevant for the introduction of invasive and non-
natives (climate migration) into the Arctic region. The specific impact of this in
the Arctic is currently a knowledge gap and therefore recommendations on
policy, management and mitigation of this impact is further required.
Invasive and non-native species may be introduced into the Arctic marine area
via several routes, e.g., biofouling on ship hulls, ballast water and climate
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migration. The introduction of invasives as a result of biofouling and ballast
water are well known and studied, with several international and national
measures in place, to minimize this route of introduction (e.g., amendments to
Ballast Water Management Convention entered into force on 13 October
2019); (Seebens, et al., 2013). Climate migration in the Arctic may also allow
for the introduction of new species (see Section 3.1.4 for more detail).
3.3.6 Atmospheric Emissions
Shipping is known to contribute significantly to global warming/climate change
and health impacts through emission of many pollutants (e.g., carbon dioxide,
methane, nitrogen oxides, Sulphur oxides carbon monoxides and particulate
matter including organic carbon and black carbon). Although shipping in the
Arctic at present only contributes a relatively small proportion to global
atmospheric pollution, that is likely to increase (Schröder, et al., 2017) and
local/regional impacts in the Arctic may be more significant due to the unique
and sensitive environment.
However, shipping is statistically the least environmentally damaging mode of
transportation, when its productive value is considered (accounting for the
movement of 90% of global trade, (IMO, 2020)). The International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) 73/78 Annex VI
Regulations for preventing air pollution from ships includes a global Sulphur
limit of 4.5% for heavy fuel oil burned by ships and has established special
areas (Emission Control Areas; ECAs) where certain Sulphur oxide (SOx) and
nitrogen oxides (NOx) emission are further regulated (IMO, 2020). At present,
there are no ECAs in the Arctic ocean (the closest being the Baltic Sea),
however, that may change as shipping in the Arctic increases. A global
shipping inventory for 2015 emissions is shown in Table 3-6.
(Corbett, et al., 2010) outline a baseline emissions inventory for shipping in the
Arctic for 2004 by vessel type (Table 3-6). This is compared with the 2015
global emissions inventory for all ships (Global emissions were not available
for 2004). Emissions data is also presented in the “Prevalence of heavy fuel
oil and black carbon in Arctic shipping, 2015 to 2025” report (ICCT, 2017).
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Table 3-6. In-Arctic Shipping emissions estimates by vessel type for 2004 (metric ton
per year).
Vessel
Category
2004 Emissions Inventory (mt/y)
Source: (Corbett, et al., 2010); (Arctic marine Shipping Assessment Database,
2009); (Johansson, et al., 2017).
CO2 BC OC SOx NOx PM CO
Container
ship 2400000 260 790 10000 58000 3900 5500
General
cargo ship 2000000 220 670 34000 49000 3300 4600
Bulk ships 1200000 130 410 21000 30000 2000 2800
Passenger
vessels 1100000 120 380 19000 27000 1900 2600
Tanker 900000 100 300 15000 22000 1500 2100
Governme
nt vessels 380000 40 130 6000 9000 630 880
Tug and
barge 40000 4 12 600 863 59 82
Offshore
service
vessel 10000 1 4 183 263 18 25
2004
Transit
Total 8030000 875 2696 105783 196126 13307 18587
Fishing
3200000
350
1080
10000
58000
1100
7500
In
-
Arctic
Total 33630000 3675 11336 185783 660126 22107 78587
2015
Global
Total (All
ships)
831300000 - - 9690000 20880000 1490000 1350000
% of 2015
global
shipping
emissions
inventory
4 - - 2 3 1 6
(Corbett, et al., 2010) reported that by 2050 (under their two future scenarios,
Business as Usual and High Growth) container shipping will account for
between 50-61% of all shipping in the Arctic. From the figures presented in
Corbett et al. (2010), on the percentage of shipping and future scenario
emissions projections for 2050, the emissions per vessel category have been
further calculated and presented in Table 3-7.
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Table 3-7. In-Arctic Shipping emissions estimates by vessel type for 2050 (metric ton
per year) under “business-as-usual" and “high growth” future scenario
Future Emissions (mt/y)
Source: extrapolated and calculated from figures presented in (Corbett, et al., 2010).
Note: Tugs and offshore vessels not included as numbers were 0% as per (Corbett, et al., 2010)
.
Vessel
Category CO2BC OC SOxNOxPM CO
2050 "Business
-
as
-
Usual" Scenario
Container
ship 12000000 1350 1500 23000 214500 5000 28000
General
cargo ship 2160000 243 270 4140 38610 900 5040
Bulk ships 2400000 270 300 4600 42900 1000 5600
Passenger
vessels 1440000 162 180 2760 25740 600 3360
Tanker 2640000 297 330 5060 47190 1100 6160
Governme
nt vessels 480000 54 60 920 8580 200 1120
Fishing 2880000 324 360 5520 51480 1200 6720
Total
24000000
2700
3000
46000
429000
10000
56000
2050 “High Growth” Scenario Emissions
Container
ship 26230000 2867 3172 81130 458720 10980 60390
General
cargo ship 3440000 376 416 10640 60160 1440 7920
Bulk ships 3440000 376 416 10640 60160 1440 7920
Passenger
vessels 2150000 235 260 6650 37600 900 4950
Tanker 3870000 423 468 11970 67680 1620 8910
Governme
nt vessels 430000 47 52 1330 7520 180 990
Fishing 3440000 376 416 10640 60160 1440 7920
Total
43000000
4700
5200
133000
752000
18000
99000
Heavy fuel oil (HFO) is the most used marine fuel in the Arctic (60% of fuel
consumed in the geographic Arctic (at or above 58.95oN as defined by (ICCT,
2017)), the combustion of which is highly polluting, resulting in high levels of
Sulphur dioxide (SO2), heavy metals, volatile organic compounds and black
carbon particles (Zhang, et al., 2019). Although black carbon is a relatively
small proportion of emissions (Table 3-7), it has unique properties that can
significantly influence snow and ice albedo (reflectivity of sunlight) and further
accelerate Arctic sea ice melt (Zhang, et al., 2019). If black carbon is
deposited on ice or snow, sunlight is absorbed by the darker material (rather
than being reflected into the atmosphere; (Stephenson, et al., 2018)). The
absorption of solar radiation leads to warming, and results in ice/snow melt -
the more solar radiation that is absorbed, the faster the melt. Per unit of mass,
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black carbon may have a climate warming impact that is 460-1500 times
stronger than CO2 (Climate and Clean Air Coalition, 2015).
As of the 1st of January 2020, new IMO regulations state that the allowable
amount of Sulphur content in fuel is reduced to 0.5% m/m, however there are
knowledge gaps around the behaviour of these alternative low-Sulphur fuels
in the cold Arctic waters (PAME, 2020). However, in the limited time that these
regulations have been implemented, a study has found that use of these very
low Sulphur fuels, may increase black carbon emissions by 10 to 85% (IMO,
2019). More research is therefore needed to properly examine and quantify
these impacts.
Reporting of global shipping emissions is limited; with shipping being the least
regulated transportation modes in terms of emissions, which consequently
makes access to quality spatial and temporal data difficult (ICCT, 2017). Better
data is needed to be collected in order to make more informed decisions
regarding fuel use and to implement effect mitigation and management
strategies for shipping in the Arctic. There also needs to be improved global
co-operation regarding shipping emissions, as more non-Arctic countries are
predicted to participate in Arctic shipping (Zhang, et al., 2019).
Our understanding of how atmospheric emissions directly impact marine
wildlife is lacking, with no studies to suggest bioaccumulation of contaminants
from atmospheric emissions in marine mammals. However, one study
demonstrates that killer whale population (near whale watching vessels) may
be inhaling concentrations of air pollutants that have the potential to cause
serious adverse health effects (Lachmuth, et al., 2011).
3.3.7 Discharge of Pollutants to Sea
Pollutants from shipping discharged to sea can include operational discharges
(e.g., ballast, cleaning and sanitary waters, litter), accidental spills and
discharges (e.g., oil or chemical spills) and other hazardous substances
(heavy metal leaching from anodes, leaching of anti-fouling paints); and
pollutants released to sea come in many forms including, for example,
Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs), Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs),
Polyaromatic Hydrocarbons (PAHs) and heavy metals.
The presence of POP contaminants (chronic pollution) in the tissues of marine
mammals and their potential impacts on populations has been documented
over the years (see references in (Simmonds, 2017)), with particular interest
in the Arctic on the beluga whales of the St Lawrence River. Specific impacts
may include issues with reproductive health (infertility, abortion, fetal
abnormalities, calf mortality) and even cancers (as in the case of the belugas;
(Simmonds, 2017)). The persistence and bioaccumulation/biomagnification of
pollutants in the food chain is well established, and marine mammals feeding
in more polluted waters are more vulnerable, with toothed whales, killer
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whales, sharks, bears (and humans) at the top of the food chain being most at
risk (Simmonds, 2017).
It is also possible for pollutants to enter the marine environment via the ship-
air-sea-interface as described by (Endres, et al., 2018). Exhaust gas cleaning
systems (aka “Srubbers”). In short, wet scrubbers use seawater as a cleaning
media for SOx producing sulfurous acid, sulfuric acid, and calcium sulfate. The
SO2 dissolves and is removed from the exhaust gas. The resulting wash water
is acidic (pH 3), hot and contains several contaminants (e.g., PAHs, heavy
metals and nitrate). The need to remove SOx from shipping emissions in this
manner is a cost-effective response to the low-Sulphur fuel requirements (see
Section 3.3.6).
One of the most significant threats to Arctic marine wildlife is from an oil spills
(generalized to include fuel and chemical spills here too), with initial impacts
being classed as acute and long-term exposure/bioaccumulation classed as
chronic. Although major oil spills are not necessarily a regular occurrence in
the Arctic (65 shipping related spills in the Arctic between 1970 and 2011; <1
per year; (PAME, 2016); the most famous of which is likely the Exxon Valdez
oil spill in Alaska, 1989, which had long-term impacts on the environment (
(Peterson, et al., 2003); (Matkin, et al., 2008)), this may increase as
anthropogenic activities like shipping and oil exploration increase; their impact
can be catastrophic – with the unique environmental conditions in the Arctic
impeding response and clean-up efforts and making the oil-environment
interactions unpredictable or significantly damaging. Impacts may also extend
to indigenous communities’ food security and livelihoods (PAME, 2019).
Depending on the type of substance spilled, the environmental conditions in
the Arctic can lead to a slow rate of degradation due to the low temperatures,
limited evaporation (typically less than 10%) and limited dispersion in the water
column (PAME, 2019). Increased turbidity and wave action can also lead to
the creation of oil-in-water emulsions, which are not only harder to remediate,
but which also increase the “volume” of the oil spilled (Fingas & Fieldhouse,
2006). In addition, oil and other substances spilled in ice covered areas can
lead to trapped oil under the ice surface and the potential for wider spatial
distribution if the ice breaks off and drifts, complicating spill tracking and clean-
up operations (Aune, et al., 2018). Small spills may rely on natural attenuation
to remove the spill from the environment whereas larger spills require human
intervention via a variety of clean-up methods, the use of which depends on
location, type and size/volume of spill and proximity to the shoreline (Aune, et
al., 2018). The behaviour of oil spilled under ice will vary, depending on the
local ice conditions, in particular under-ice roughness (Fingas & Hollebone,
2013).
However, knowledge on the true extent of the impacts of oil spills in Arctic
waters is limited, due the lack of field and experimental data and lack of data
on species’ vulnerability/sensitivity to and probability of encountering a spill. In
addition, extrapolating general oil spill impacts from a single Arctic spill is
problematic (Nevalainen, et al., 2018) due to the vast and varying nature of the
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Arctic marine environment and the sea ice. The risk of oil spills to marine
wildlife differs between species, spatial locations and seasons. In addition,
although risks of heavy fuel oil spills are considered more impactful, lighter fuel
oils still pose significant risks as these oils can pollute larger areas compared
with heavy fuels (Helle, et al., 2020).
Seabirds are particularly vulnerable to oil spills as spills on the water’s surface
may cause direct toxicity through ingestion and hypothermia as a result of the
birds’ inability to waterproof their feathers, which may ultimately lead to their
death. Seabirds are also indirectly impacted by oil spills, through displacement
from foraging habitats and reduced food availability where prey species are
affected (O’Hanlon, et al., 2020).
Marine mammals are impacted by oil spills in varying ways. Polar bears are at
risks from oil spills as they are reliant on their fur to protect them from the
extreme Arctic temperatures. Oil significantly reduces the insulating value of
the fur, and if not removed it is unlikely that the bear would survive. Polar
bears are also likely to ingest oil via grooming or foraging oil contaminated
seals (Helm, et al., 2015). Seals spend time at sea foraging and may come
into contact surface oil at these times, although data of impacts is limited (or
sample sizes very small). As seals and walrus use blubber for insultation, it is
thought that external oiling is unlikely to have a significant impact, although
contact via the eyes and ears, for example, may cause significant damage. As
with seals, data and evidence of impacts for cetaceans is again limited, but
their blubber will protect them for significant external damage. The most
significant impact for cetaceans and seals, will be the at the surface when they
need to breathe, and they may inhale oil and toxic vapours. In addition, marine
mammals with high site fidelity will be most vulnerable if a spill occurs within
their habitats, or those Arctic marine mammals that use sea ice breathing holes
(Helm, et al., 2015).
Impacts of ballast water are largely linked with the potential for the introduction
of invasive or non-native species (see Section 3.3.5), however, ballast water
can still contain quantities of fuel and other substances (although this should
be well managed), that may cause significant impacts in areas of high activity
and where ballast water release sites overlap with areas used by marine
mammals and seabirds.
The level of impact of an oil spill in the Arctic will be influenced by both spatial
and temporal variables. Many marine animals (fish, seabirds and mammals)
are present in the water throughout the year, however, during migrations and
open water seasons, the number of individuals and variety of species will
increase. Therefore, if an oil spill was to occur during these times, there will
be more animals effected, and in the case of migratory seasons, whole
populations. In addition, seals, during the pupping season will be onshore,
where an oil spill will have a huge impact if it washes ashore. Seal pups are
vulnerable at this stage as they rely on fur to keep warm and feeding from their
mother, who if oiled, will lead to oil ingestion. In addition, oil spills that occur
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during the Spring phytoplankton bloom will also have an impact on foraging
animals, either through ingestion of the oil, or starvation.
Large parts of the arctic region are not adequately prepared for large accidents
and spills, and Arctic oil spill response and preparedness for worst-case
scenarios remains a weakness (Atkisson, et al., 2018).However, emergency
response in the Arctic has improved slightly in the last decade through the
addition of available vessels and helicopters, but response times may be too
long and the capacity limited if major incidents occur (Marchenko, et al., 2018).
The remoteness and challenging environmental conditions in the Arctic make
response to certain areas difficult often hindered by harsh weather conditions
and seasonal periods of darkness (PAME, 2019), however, as shipping
increases and waters become ice free, accessibility and speed of response
may be improved; and management and mitigation (e.g., oil spill response
plans) for oil spills will hopefully improve via the responsibility of the shipping
industry.
3.4 Summary and Next Steps
The Arctic marine ecosystem is sensitive to environmental change and
particularly vulnerable to anthropogenic impacts as a results of climate change
and rapid development. Levels of human activity are increasing in the Arctic
marine area, which will ultimately result in more frequent and severe threats to
the Arctic’s marine wildlife. The level of impact from shipping will vary, based
on the receptor or receiving environment, and the type of impact (direct,
indirect or cumulative) and its severity/exposure.
Some of the impacts on marine wildlife, associated with shipping (not
necessarily just in the Arctic), are relatively well understood, with some being
considered temporary or short-term e.g., behavioural disturbance. However,
knowledge on the long-term or permanent (both chronic e.g., ship strikes and
acute e.g., noise exposure) impacts of shipping are lacking (e.g., the impact at
population and/or individual level, there is limited knowledge about the many
populations that make up different marine mammal stocks). This is particularly
apparent in the Arctic, as extensive shipping has been limited through the
region until more recently, and more research is therefore needed to truly
understand these impacts and threats.
Looking to the future, there is the need to consider what effective management
measures could be put in place to minimize the impact of shipping on the Arctic
wildlife. Whilst ensuring that developments and increasing anthropogenic
activities are managed sustainably and with greater consideration of the
environment.
The next steps are to consider what mitigation, management and conservation
measures are currently utilized within the Arctic in relation to marine wildlife,
shipping and associated impacts (e.g., Marine Protected Areas, exclusion
zones, speed restriction zones, other management tools etc.); gain an
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understanding for the appropriateness and applicability of such measures in
an Arctic setting (considering such issues as transboundary management and
physical limitations due to sea ice) and their potential adaptability; explore
different spatial management scenarios (e.g., identifying area of ecological
significance, assessing areas for shipping/wildlife intensity etc.); what
recommendations could be made to enhance these measures (e.g., industry
guidelines); and outline opportunities for future management options (e.g.,
stakeholder engagement, mechanisms for introducing policy/management
frameworks, Marine Spatial Planning).
Assessing the impacts of shipping on the marine environment is a global issue,
and as such, several management and mitigation measures have been
explored and implemented in the seas around the world. Those developing
and working in the Arctic have an opportunity to use lessons learned from
around the world to proactively manage the environment and ensure that
future Arctic shipping is conducted in a manner that has minimal impact on
marine wildlife.
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4 Part 2: Geo-economic & societal impacts of Arctic shipping
(Laval Univ., Shandong Univ.)
4.1 Contrasting Trends in Arctic Shipping (prepared by Frédéric Lasserre)
Ever since the impact of climate change on Arctic sea ice began to be
discussed in international forums at the turn of the century, several comments
were published to the effect that diminishing sea ice would quickly translate
into the development of massive transit routes across the Northwest Passage
(NWP), the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the Arctic Bridge linking Churchill
on the shores of Hudson Bay and Murmansk. Twenty years later, Arctic
shipping did indeed expand significantly, but the actual picture is significantly
different from what analysts projected. Destinational traffic appears to be the
driver of Arctic shipping expansion, while transit traffic remains marginal. What
are the main features of Arctic shipping presently, and how did the industry
adapt, depending on the area? Results show contrasting evolutions along the
NSR, in the Canadian Arctic, and in Greenlandic waters.
This chapter is based on the analysis of figures from three different sources,
which implies methodological issues since the data does not display the same
elements ( (Lasserre & Alexeeva, 2015); (Lasserre, 2019)). In the Russian
Arctic, data about vessel movements and characteristics were gathered from
the Northern Sea Route Administration1 and from the Center for High North
Logistics.2 For the Canadian Arctic, the Ministry of Transportation agency for
the Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulations provided the
author with annual detailed ship movements. For Greenlandic waters, data
was provided by the Danish Joint Arctic Command based in Nuuk.3
4.1.1 A definite increase in Arctic shipping
Figures below indicate that vessel movements are definitely increasing
substantially in the Arctic. From 2009 to 2019, traffic was multiplied by 1.92 in
the Canadian Arctic; by 1.97 in Greenlandic waters; and by 1.58 between 2016
and 2019 in waters of the Northern Sea Route.4
1 NSRA, nsra.ru
2 CHNL, www.arctic-lio.com
3 Joint Rescue Coordination Center/JAC, Nuuk,
https://www2.forsvaret.dk/eng/Organisation/ArcticCommand/Pages/ArcticCommand.aspx
4 The Northern Sea Route comprises Russian Arctic waters between the Kara Gate and the Bering Strait. Thus,
traffic in the Barents Sea is not included in NSR figures, nor traffic in Russia’s Arctic Pacific waters.
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Table 4-1. Vessel movements in the Canadian Arctic, number of voyages, NORDREG
zone.
Vessel movements in the Canadian Arctic, number of voyages, NORDREG zone.
Source: figures compiled by the author from data submitted by NORDREG, Iqaluit.
2009 2011 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Vessels cumulated
dwt, million metric
tons 1.02 1.28 1.39 1.43 1.8 2.79 3.54 4.38 5.16
Voyages 225 319 348 302 315 347 416 408 431
Of which:
Fishing boats 65 136 137 119 129 131 138 139 137
Cargo or barges 109 126 127 108 120 147 188 197 223
Of which:
General cargo 23 38 35 32 34 36 50 48 59
Tanker 23 30 28 25 27 23 24 29 28
Dry bulk 27 23 27 33 36 53 72 89 106
Tugs and barges 36 33 36 18 23 35 42 31 30
Pleasure crafts 12 15 32 30 23 22 32 17 19
Cruise/passenger 11 11 17 11 18 20 19 21 24
Government
vessels
(icebreakers, navy) 21 20 17 23 16 20 22 18 20
Research vessels 7 11 20 10 9 6 13 13 8
Others 3 3 6 3
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Table 4-2. Voyages to and from Greenlandic waters.
Voyages to and from Greenlandic waters.
Source: Joint Arctic Command, Nuuk
2009 2011 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Container,
general cargo 159 184 141 155 135 150 151 113 146
Passenger,
cruise 96 113 130 122 105 222 249 372 241
Bulk 12 0 02188 132 155 188
Tankers 57 60 24 29 22 20 31 36 40
Fishing vessels 54 145 124 120 123 144 142 168 149
Research
vessels 62 44 20 31 24 32 33 20 10
Other ships 59 73 48 88 122 131 143 209 228
Offshore 0 61 6 0 0 0 0 0 4
Government
vessels 12 17 12 13 13 13 19 5 3
Total
511 697 507 559 564 800 900 1078 1009
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Table 4-3. Vessel movements in NSR waters.
Vessel movements in NSR waters, number of voyages.
Source: CHNL
2016 2017 2018 2019
Volume transported,
million metric tons 7.265 10.713 20.18 31.53
Voyages in NSR waters 1 705 1 908 2 022 2 694
Of which:
Tanker 477 653 686 799
LNG tanker 13 225 507
General Cargo 519 515 422 546
Container 169 156 150 171
Icebreaker 58 101 232 231
Supply 57 104 169
Research 91 87 85 93
Within the general and substantial increase in vessel traffic in these three
areas, contrasting trends can be observed from these figures.
In the Canadian Arctic, growth in traffic was mainly driven by fishing vessels
(+106.2 percent between 2009 and 2019) and cargo ships (+122 percent), of
which dry bulk experienced the fastest expansion (+288.9 percent), driven by
mining activities, and general cargo (+156.5 percent), driven by community
supply.
Bulk traffic has benefited from the exploitation of Arctic or subarctic mines such
as Voisey’s Bay (Labrador), Raglan (Quebec), and Mary River (Baffin Island,
Nunavut); this traffic has largely made up for the drying up of traffic to and from
Churchill since the port closed down in 2016 before reopening up in 2019. For
instance, Baffinland Iron Mines shipped 920,000 tons of ore from its mine in
Mary River through its port of Milne Inlet the first year of activity in 2015, then
4.1 million tons in 2017 (Maritime Magazine, 2018) and 5.1 million tons in 2018
(Debicki, 2019). The company eventually intends to reach an annual volume
of 12 million tons.
In Greenland, cruise traffic (+151 percent), fishing (+176 percent) and bulk
traffic (+1,467 percent) largely drove traffic expansion, whereas container and
general cargo stagnated. Research vessel traffic decreased 83.9 percent and
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offshore vessel traffic decreased 93.4 percent from 2011 to 2019, anticipating
a decline in interest for offshore oil and gas development.
In Russia, tanker traffic increased 67.5 percent between 2016 and 2019. LNG
tanker went from nil to 507 voyages, and icebreaker voyages increased 238
percent. Tanker traffic experienced a sustained growth with the oil and gas
developments in the Kara Sea (Prirazlomoye and Varandey oil terminals)
(Agarcov, et al., 2020) and on the Yamal peninsula and Ob Bay, with Sabetta
and Novy Port main terminals and the impending opening up of Arctic LNG 2
terminal ( (Staalesen, 2018b); (Katysheva, 2020)). With the programmed
opening of coal and lead and zinc mines, bulk traffic should experience a fast
growth in the Russian Arctic as well,5 whereas fishing, concentrated in the
Barents and Bering Seas, does not appear in these statistics.
It is apparent that the main driver for the expansion of shipping in the three
areas is natural resources exploitation, including mining, oil and gas, and
fishing. Community resupply in Canadian waters and cruise ship traffic in
Greenland also experienced sustained growth.
However, contrary to popular belief and widespread expectations, transit traffic
remains very limited along Arctic passages in Canada and Russia.
4.1.2 Transit traffic remains weak
Despite the ongoing melting of sea ice, transit traffic remains rather limited
along the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route, here again with
differentiated pictures.6
5 Nickel ore is shipped in containers from the port of Dudinka, thus the apparently high container traffic that in
fact largely reflects shipments of mineral and metallurgical semi-transformed products, besides limited reefer
shipments of fish from Kamchatka to Arkhangelsk and St-Petersburg.
6 A methodologic note is necessary here. The term transit is interpreted differently by the various administrations
that collect and publish figures describing transit along Arctic passages. In Canada, figures are collected by the
Canadian Coast Guard section responsible for the enforcement of the Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services
Zone Regulations (NORDREG). The definition used by NORDREG for transit is a movement between Baffin Bay to
the Beaufort Sea. Robert Headland and his team at the Scott Polar Research Institute use a definition whereby
transits are counted between the Labrador Sea and Bering Strait. This difference does impact figures since a vessel
servicing the community of Inuvik from Montreal will be counted as a transit by NORDREG but not by the Scott
Polar Research Institute. This is why the SPRI counts 32 transits in 2017 (33 for NORDREG), and 3 in 2018 (5 for
NORDREG) for instance. In Russia, figures are collected by the Northern Sea Route Administration, then formatted
and published by the Center for High North Logistics (CHNL), a private association and therefore not an official
Russian administration. CHNL bases its figures on the NSRA definition of transit, which is a voyage between the
Bering Strait and the Kara Gate. Thus, a ship from Kamchatka to Murmansk will be counted a transit by CHNL
despite the fact the ship is still in Russian Arctic waters. Other voyages, like those carried in 2009 by heavy lift
vessels Beluga Foresight and Beluga Fraternity in 2009, are counted as transits by CHNL from South Korea
despite the fact they unloaded their cargo at Yamburg before proceeding to Germany, thus making their voyages
a destinational voyage. On these methodological issues, see (Lasserre & Alexeeva, 2015), (Lasserre, et al., 2019).
For this paper, it was decided to work with official NORDREG figures and semi-official CHNL figures.
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Table 4-4. Transit traffic along the Northwest Passage, 2006-2019.
Transit traffic along the Northwest Passage, 2006-2019.
Source: figures compiled by the author from data submitted by NORDREG, Iqaluit
Vessel
type 2006 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2016 2017 2018 2019
Icebreak
er 21222243221
Cruise 2 2 4 2 2 4 2 3 3 0 5
Pleasure
boat 0 7 12 13 22 14 10 15 22 2 13
Tug10102000311
Cargo
ship 01011111205
Research 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 0 0
Total 6 12 19 18 30 22 17 23 33 5 25
Table 4-5. Transit traffic along the NSR, 2006-2019.
Transit traffic along the NSR, 2006-2019.
Source: CHNL data compiled by author.
Vessel type 2006 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Icebreaker 0 0 0 2 3 2 2 1 2 0 1 0
Government ship 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 3 1 0 0 0
Cruise 0 0 1 1 0 1 3 1 1 0 0 0
Tug, supply vessel 0 1 4 4 5 1 1 4 4 1 2 0
Commercial 0 2 6 31 38 64 24 15 11 24 23 32
Research 0 2 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2
Fishing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 3
Total official transit 0 3 13 41 46 71 31 18 19 27 27 37
Volume transported,
million metric tons 0 na 0.11 0.82 1.26 1.18 0.27 0.04 0.21 0.19 0.49 0.70
Total volume handled
in the NSR, million
metric tons na 2.2 2.1 3.2 3.7 3.9 4.0 5.4 7.3 10.7 20.2 31.5
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In both cases, there is a definite trend towards an expansion but with
differentiated details. Transit numbers across the Northwest Passage were
higher at the beginning of the period, experienced growth until 2012, witnessed
a moderate decline, expanded again until 2017, then collapsed in 2018, only
to recover in 2019. Figures show that both in terms of voyages and tonnage,
transit represents a very small share of total traffic along the NSR, despite the
recent increase in tonnage in 2018 and 2019. Transit traffic was initially very
moderate, then expanded up to a high of 71 voyages in 2012, then collapsed
to 18 in 2014 to recovery gradually to 37 in 2019. This decline, and later
stagnation at low levels in transit traffic along the Northern Sea Route, is clearly
out of step with media forecasts announcing the advent of heavy traffic along
Arctic routes. This is due to several factors ( (Balmasov, 2016); (Doyon, et al.,
2017)):
- The decline in oil and fuel prices, which makes the search for possible
reductions in transit costs less attractive for shipping companies.
- The decline in commodity prices, which makes Arctic resources less
attractive, both for exploitation and for initial investment for transport with
specialized vessels. The impact of this element may decrease as new oil,
gas, and mining sites open along Siberia’s Arctic shore.
- The continuing global decline in both bulk and container freight rates, which
discourages shipping companies facing overcapacity from investing in new
ice-bound vessels.
- The priority deployment of Russian icebreakers to infrastructure projects,
notably the terminals linked to the oil and gas project on the Yamal
Peninsula or Ob delta. The lower availability of icebreakers has dissuaded
some carriers from hiring their vessels for lack of guaranteed escort.
- A confusing tariff schedule for the services of the Northern Sea Route,
sometimes considered opaque by maritime carriers.
The composition of this traffic also differs by region. Commercial cargo ships
represent the largest share of transit traffic along the NSR, whereas transit
along the NWP is largely composed of pleasure boats, with commercial
vessels comprising between zero and two units (except for five in 2019).
Among the elements that explain this very weak interest for transit traffic along
the NWP, let us mention a higher ice concentration in summer (NSIDC, 2019),
the absence of promotion of the NWP as opposed to a very proactive stance
in Russia, and a higher level of equipment and infrastructure along the NSR,
including ports that can harbor ships in cause of damage. Icebreaker support
also varies greatly, with Canada having only nine Arctic-capable icebreakers
as opposed to Russia’s five nuclear and 37 diesel icebreakers.
This comparison between total and transit traffic underlines the fact that
destinational traffic (ships going to the Arctic, stopping there to perform an
economic task and then sailing back) remains the driving force in Arctic
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shipping. This destinational traffic is fuelled by the servicing of local
communities, the exploration for natural resources and their exploitation,
including mining, oil and gas, and fishing.
Another feature of Arctic traffic is the recurrent seasonality. Most traffic takes
place between June and October, inclusive.
Table 4-6. Share of voyages carried out between June and October included, percent
of total.
Share of voyages carried out between June and October included, percent of total.
Source: compiled by author from NORDREG, CHNL and JAC data.
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
NSR na na na 69.8 68.7 64.1 61.2
Canadian Arctic 86.5 88.7 86.7 87.1 88.5 89.2 88.2
Greenland 77.7 77.5 80.7 84.5 71.5 86.6 87.5
The seasonality is less pronounced and is declining along the NSR, in large
part because several oil and gas projects included investments in high ice-
class vessels for year-round shipments, especially from Varandey oil terminal
as well as Sabetta port. In 2019, 1,245 out of 2,694 of transits (46.2 percent)
were carried out by ships with an ice class Arc 6 or greater (Polar Class 5), of
which 1,032 were carried out by commercial ships and 214 by icebreakers
(CHNL, 2020); among these voyages, 866 were carried out by tankers or LNG
tankers. This clearly underlines the business model resting on year-round
shipping developed by the oil and gas industry with regard to Arctic
hydrocarbon development. However, for now other segments of the shipping
industry have not really developed year-round activity in NSR waters and thus
maintain a seasonal approach, as is very obviously the case in Greenland and
Canadian Arctic waters.
4.1.3 Towards a new business model
The literature abounds with cost analyses that pledge Arctic commercial transit
shipping is profitable, although several other articles state the contrary
(Theocharis, et al., 2018); (Theocharis, 2019); (Lasserre, 2019). There is an
increasing discrepancy between academic research, with an emphasis placed
on transit shipping, and the reality where destinational shipping is on the rise
but transit shipping remains very weak. This has led some authors to suggest
that shipping companies analyse the market more broadly, and not merely on
a single-trip cost basis. This should come as no surprise since it is a basic
principle in business management that strategic analysis does not rest
exclusively on a cost-based approach ( (Porter, 1991); (Lorange, 2009);
(Stopford, 2009)). Authors ( (Buixadé Farré, et al., 2014); (Lee & Kim, 2015);
(Lasserre, 2019); (Lasserre & Pelletier, 2011), (Lasserre, et al., 2016);
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(Sarrabezoles, et al., 2016)) have underlined that shipping companies also
take into account strategic business elements such as:
- The high financial risk for bulk carriers, working on a tramp basis, stemming
from the difficulty to secure long-term contracts to make up for higher ice-
class construction and exploitation costs.
- The high commercial risk for liner shipping (container, general cargo) to
develop seasonal and ice-prone routes given their major just-in-time
business constraint.
- The non-tariff barriers to entry imposed by insurance companies regarding
ship equipment, ice class, crew experience, now enshrined in the Polar
Code.
A way to circumvent these business constraints would be to build transhipment
hubs at both entry points of Arctic passages, where cargo could be loaded onto
regular ships, while enabling shipping companies exploiting Arctic routes to
consider investing in ice-class vessels with greater capabilities, so as to
develop year-long service. Indeed, a technical constraint for Arctic shipping is
that high ice-class vessels are more expensive to build and operate, but are
also often less seaworthy in open, rough waters (Baudu, 2019), thus making
their exploitation in non-Arctic waters less attractive. The implementation of
this transhipment system would, according to its promoters, eliminate these
technical and business impediments to the growth of Arctic commercial
shipping.
Several ports have thus been considered for the development of transhipment
hubs, with various advantages and capacities. For the NSR, Murmansk is
already acting as such a hub on the western entrance; the Norwegian port of
Kirkenes is dreaming about such a possibility, especially if the Kirkenes-
Helsinki railway is eventually built (Lasserre & Têtu, 2020). On the eastern
entrance, Zarubino in Primorie Province or the more northern port of
Petropavlovsk are options. These two NSR possibilities are the most serious
since they are actively supported by the shipping companies involved in oil and
gas development in the Yamal area and by the Russian government with its
Northern Sea Transport Corridor scheme (Staalesen, 2020).
For the Northwest Passage, several areas are considering project proposals
to build transhipment ports that might provide an as-yet undeveloped shuttle
service across Arctic passages, including the Transpolar Route: Nome in
Alaska is promoting its hub vision; Halifax, Nova Scotia; St-Pierre on the
eponymous French island; and Portland, Maine have all been considered.
Whether these schemes will go to fruition or not remains to be seen.
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4.2 China perspective
Compared with the Suez route, the navigation shortcuts via the Arctic waters
can cut traditional transit times between East Asia and Europe by about 10
days and reduce navigational distance by 3000-4000 miles. Moreover, the
economic benefits will become greater for the mega vessels that are unable to
pass through the Suez Canals and must navigate around the Cape of Good
Hope. At the same time, to prevent the mean global temperatures from rising
more than 2° C, global transportation must reduce its carbon emission
footprints by 2.6% per year during 2020-2050. Compared with traditional
southern routes, maritime transportation via Arctic Northeast passage could
reduce carbon emissions by 49%-78%.
Currently, due to unpredictability, seasonality and nonregularity of navigation,
Arctic sea routes are possibly more economical for bulk cargo vessels than for
container vessels, since the later depend more on precise schedules for
loading, shipping, and unloading to keep costs down. When the transit time in
the Arctic is not a key impact factor affecting benefits, because the fuel
consumption and related carbon emissions of vessels at low speed is much
less than that at high speed, the operators may select lower than the standard
speeds. This approach to achieve reduction in fuel consumption may be higher
than the decreased costs due to the reduction in navigational distances. So,
for shipping low-value raw materials, it is prudent to use reduced speed instead
of shorter transit times, which will also help to mitigate global warming.
Unlike via the Suez or via the Panama Canal, there are no similar canal fees
for Arctic navigation routes. The main costs for Arctic maritime transportation
consist of fuel costs, icebreaking costs, operating costs, and vessel
depreciation costs. Fuel costs depend mainly on sea ice conditions and
navigational distance/speed. The trans-Arctic transportation may avoid
passing through politically unstable and piracy affected regions and reduce
transit times significantly, but lack of intermediate markets along Arctic
passages may restrict seriously shipping via these routes. At the same time, it
is important to note that the exploitation of trans-Arctic transportation may be
seriously conflicted with some ambitious climate change mitigation strategies
which will reverse the decreasing trend of Arctic sea ice cover, and then
prevent future exploitation of trans-Arctic maritime transportation.
With the recent increases in international trade of goods between Europe and
China, the related transportation section consumes huge amounts of fuels and
contributes substantial quantities of global carbon dioxide emissions. Arctic
maritime transportation not only can reduce transit times and costs but can
also help to achieve the objective of reducing carbon emissions from shipping
transportation in China. Although China is not a littoral Arctic country, as the
largest international trader, trans-Arctic maritime transportation has
considerable impacts on China and will play an increasing role for green and
sustainable development of China. Recently, China is incorporating trans-
Arctic maritime transportation into “the Belt and Road Initiative” which will boost
trade by massive investments in roads, ports and other infrastructure between
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Asia and Europe. In July 2017, the Chinese government and the Russian
government announced plans to cooperate on Arctic passages and to build
the “Ice Silk Route”. Both governments would cooperate to improve
infrastructure construction and to explore oil/gas resources and eco-tourism
resources along Arctic coastline, which could partially solve the dilemma of the
lack of intermediate markets along Arctic Northeast Passage.
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5 Part 3: Technical and economic challenges of Arctic Shipping
5.1 General
The key challenge, when addressing in practice all technical and operational
challenges of Arctic shipping, is associated with cost. This is due to multiple
reasons which are elaborated on in this section. For example, the fuel cost
during ice navigation is higher than in open water navigation because ice
causes additional resistance to the ship’s hull, requiring the use of higher
engine power. The impact of ice on the ship’s hull and propulsion system
(through the propeller) causes loads that exceed those when operating in a
seaway, the ships thus require extra strengthening leading to the increased
weight and size (and/or reduced cargo capacity) and increasing the
newbuilding cost. Variability of ice conditions during the voyage, risks of
uncontrolled interaction events with ice as well as possible environmentally
sensitive areas on the route (requiring rerouting) tend to increase cost as well.
Together, this result in higher building and operational costs of an ice going
vessel compared to an equivalent vessel designed for operation in ice free
water.
Technical, operational, and economic challenges regarding Arctic shipping are
introduced in this chapter. All of these are very case-specific, strongly
interconnected and controlled by multiple regulations and standards. The costs
associated with Arctic shipping are heavily affected by ship itself and actual ice
conditions which in turn varies depending on the season, severity of the winter
and location. Therefore, the challenges presented in following sections, should
be considered as representative, based on existing operational practices.
5.2 Technical challenges and effects on costs
5.2.1 Identification and understanding of ice conditions
Sea ice is the greatest obstacle affecting Arctic maritime transportation. Ice
conditions offshore are dynamic, varying and reforming continuously. The
main factors affecting navigation include the ice extent, ice concentration, ice
thickness, ice type (e.g. level ice, ridged ice, brash ice, first-year ice, multi-year
ice, etc.), partial concentration of each ice type and floe size. Identification and
prediction of such conditions along the planned ship route in advance is
difficult. On the other hand, in most of the cases waypoint navigation (directly
between point A and point B) is not efficient. Difficult ice conditions (e.g.
compressive ice areas, compacted and ridged ice, etc.) should be avoided
because they may significantly slow down the navigation speed and
sometimes the vessel may even get totally jammed in ice (see Figure 5-2).
Correspondingly, easier ice conditions, even it means increased navigation
distance, are preferred. This is termed tactical ice navigation and it is illustrated
in Figure 5-1.
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Figure 5-1. Illustration of importance of appropriate route selection in icy waters.
Utilization of open water leads (dark areas along yellow line) enable fuel and time
savings. The figure is illustrative and not based on real case.
Due to harsh climatic conditions and poor infrastructure, in consideration of
sparse and inefficient ground observation sites, state-of-the-art satellite based
remote sensing techniques have become the most efficient and accurate
approach to monitor large-scale variability of Arctic sea ice conditions. Utilizing
a combination of multiple active and passive microwave, visible, and infrared
satellite data sources currently provides the only efficient means to obtain
information on the expected ice conditions on the route ahead.
Due to the restricted spatial resolution, icebergs and multi-year ice floes, which
can cause serious damages to vessels, are difficult to be detected and
monitored by satellites with passive microwave radiometers. Satellites with
Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) have high spatial resolution (30-100m), which
can be used to track icebergs and large-size multi-year ice floes. However,
due to the narrow swath width of SAR, which leads to low temporal resolution,
it is very difficult to make near real-time monitoring. Therefore, it is essential,
to combine all active/passive microwave remote sensing data and other kinds
of observational data to track sea ice motion. In the longer-term, more satellites
should be launched so that at any time, every region along the Arctic routes
can be covered. In general, latest developments associated to satellite image
availability and quality provides new possibilities to significantly improve real-
time recognition of ice conditions and ice conditions prediction. These
possibilities could be utilized in planning of arctic shipping activities and real-
time routing in ice covered waters.
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AN additional challenge connected to the utilization of satellite images is
related to the significantly limited communication possibility with ships
navigating in remote Arctic waters. The file size of satellite images is typically
large thus sending such images to the ships through limited communication
channel requires a lot of time. Expenses related to this transmission may also
be significant.
Thus, lack of services related to the detection and planning of most efficient
routes through ice, even the appropriate technology exists already, exist today.
This leads to inconveniences in estimating transit times, fuel consumptions
during the voyage, arrival times and overall logistical chain in general. For
shippers, unreliable transit times and therefore unreliable lead time reliability
can cause issues on supply planning. This will not only cause cost for carriers,
but also for shipper. Those cost could come up through express services
necessary at on-carriage from port to customers and through potential
penalties due to delayed arrival of goods.
5.2.2 Ice resistance
Ice generates extra resistance on the ship’s hull as it moves through ice. The
magnitude of this resistance depends mainly on the ice thickness, ice strength
and ship hull geometry and ship speed. In principle, the ship speed in ice may
be remarkably lower than in open water even when all available propulsion
power is utilised. The vessel’s speed may occasionally drop close to zero and
the vessel may get totally stuck in ice. Figure 5-2 shows an example of a
situation where multiple vessels are jammed and unable to proceed in ice.
Another example difficult ice event is presented in Figure 5-3.
Due to ice resistance the time required for voyages increases, thus increasing
the fuel costs and other time related expenses per voyage. To achieve and
maintain an appropriate speed in ice, the machinery power of an ice going
vessel is typically higher than the power of a similar sized vessel designed for
operation in ice free waters (an “open water vessel”). This naturally increases
the ship price compared to such an open water vessel due to increased engine
size and overall ship lightweight.
The magnitude of the challenges described above are highly dependent on the
ship design itself and the additional costs connected to Arctic navigation can
be significantly decreased with the appropriate design of such ice going
vessels. However, such specialised designs are typically optimised for certain
ice conditions and/or specific routes which can make them inefficient in open
water and thus uncompetitive against ships designed for open water. The
balance of designing for reduced ice resistance whilst still retaining close to
parity of efficiency with “open water ships” is one technical challenge that has
a significant impact on the economic case for a ship owner: if the ship can be
operated efficiently in ice, but the ship cannot be utilised throughout the year
in ice then for the rest of the year that ship is inefficient, costly to run and
difficult to find work for.
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Figure 5-2. Several vessels jammed in ice and waiting for the icebreaker assistance
in the Gulf of Finland in March 2011. (Source: Aker Arctic)
Figure 5-3. Nuclear-powered icebreaker escorting a cargo ship through an ice pack
in the Kara Sea while heavy compression and ridging stop other vessels following in
its wake, in April 2015. (Source: Aker Arctic)
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5.2.3 Ice loads and classification
Ice generates additional loads on the ship hull and propulsion machinery which
typically exceed the loads generated from waves when operating in a seaway.
Consequently, a vessel operating in icy waters needs to be reinforced. This is
done by defining the anticipated ice loads on the different areas of the ship’s
hull and on the propulsion components (principally the propeller, with the loads
then transferred along the propeller shaft) with respect to the ice conditions
(thickness, strength) that the vessel will operate in and how the ship is
expected to operate. The reinforcement of these areas and components is
then done according to the defined loads. Hull strengthening is most often
done by increasing the hull plate thicknesses and the thickness and density of
the supporting frames behind the shell plate. Correspondingly, the propeller
strength (thickness) is increased and the rest of the propulsion components
reinforced at a higher level, forming a pyramid of strength of the various shaft
line components from the propeller to the prime mover. All these reinforcement
measures require additional material increasing the lightship weight and the
newbuilding price of the ship. In turn increased lightship weight means reduced
deadweight (cargo carrying capacity) for a ship of a certain size. For ships
designed for heavy ice conditions (higher ice loads), it is often necessary to
utilise special steels with higher strength properties than those used on “open
water” ships, to limit the impact on the lightship weight. These materials are
however more expensive and thus a balance between utilisation of special
steels and loss of deadweight is a challenge.
The scientific understanding of the loads imposed on ships due to interaction
with ice is still incomplete. In particular, the ice failure mechanics at the point
of contact between ice and the ship is not fully understood. Furthermore, the
natural variability of ice, the orientation of the ice when in contact, etc. means
that ice loads are stochastic in nature. Although some engineering models
exist for predicting the ice load magnitude on a ship operating in certain ice
conditions these are semiempirical in nature, relying on a relatively limited set
of full-scale measurement data for validation.
To address this issue, standards have been developed by various national and
international organisations which specify a certain strength level for operation
in specific sea areas, during specific seasons, based on semi-empirical data
and experience of damage. These standards usually adopt nominal
descriptions of the ice conditions that the ship is intended to operate in. The
standards often divide the strength level required by arbitrary steps, which are
called ice categories or ice classes. Consequently, often a ship is strengthened
to a certain ice class or ice category which is selected by the ship owner (or
designer) based on their understanding of the expected ice conditions, and
national regulations which may stipulate a certain ice class. Higher ice classes
typically provide increased independency (need for the icebreaker assistance
decreases), wider time and geographical ranges to navigate in the Arctic
waters.
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Under UNCLOS Article 234 coastal states have the right to regulate ships
operating in ice covered waters within the EEZ to ensure ship safety and
environmental protection. Often the approach to regulation is for the coastal
state to divide their sea areas into zones, categorized by the historic prevailing
ice conditions, and regulate access to these zones or areas by requiring a
certain ice class for ships to enter, dependent on the season.
The relevant categories of Russian ice class rules and international Polar
Class Rules, which are often applied for the commercial Arctic shipping, are
presented below. The nominal descriptions of ice conditions associated to the
presented categories are given in Table 5-1 (IMO, 2010) and Table 5-2
(RMRS, 2020). The categories between considered ice classes are roughly
comparable. However, since some of the underlying engineering assumptions
behind these rules are partially different, the categories should be considered
only “referentially” comparable, but not completely equivalent.
Table 5-1. Ice conditions per ice class category according to Polar Class IMO
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Table 5-2. Ice conditions per ice class category according to RMRS
The effect of an ice classification on the newbuilding costs depends on several
factors thus simple and generally applicable rule for it cannot be given. For
example, ice class upgrade often requires, in addition to hull and propulsion
reinforcement, also propulsion power upgrade to ensure that the vessel can
navigate with reasonable speed in intended ice conditions. The percentual
increase of the newbuilding also depends on the vessel type. Using 170k LNG
Carrier designed for open water operation (no ice class) as a reference, an
approximate increase in shipbuilding price for an Arc 4 LNG Carrier would be
10%; and for a Arc7 LNG Carrier 70%.
5.2.4 Icebreaker assistance
Arctic shipping is often assisted by icebreakers. In principle this means that an
icebreaker navigates in front of the assisted vessel (or vessels which proceed
in “convoy”, Figure 5-4) and breaks ice in advance so that it is easier for the
assisted vessel(s) to follow icebreaker and proceed in ice. Icebreaker
assistance can be arranged on a regular/seasonal basis as a part of a shipping
scenario where the vessels are not designed for independent navigation in all
anticipated ice conditions along the route. It may also be needed occasionally
if the vessel (even it is designed for independent ice navigation) gets jammed
in unexpectedly difficult ice conditions or if the vessel’s speed drops
unreasonably low.
Icebreaker assistance may take time (waiting for the icebreaker, waiting other
vessels to join to convoy, etc.) and it is charged by the operator of icebreakers
thus increasing the costs. On the other hand, sometimes assisted navigation
may save fuel of the assisted vessel, because the power needed during
assistance may be much lower than without assistance. The net impact of
assistance to the costs is very case specific.
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Icebreaker assistance also includes an increased risk of collisions. This is
because sometimes, depending on the type of assistance, the distance
between the icebreaker (or icebreaking tug at the port area) and assisted
vessel may be small, and if the icebreaker rapidly decelerates due to a change
in ice conditions, the assisted vessel may not be able to stop in time to avoid
collision with the icebreaker’s stern. The same applies also to ships proceeding
in convoy. Examples of different icebreaker assistance types are presented in
the Figure 5-4 and Figure 5-5 (ARCOP, 2006). Accidents and ship collisions
are further considered in Section 5.2.5.
Figure 5-4. Icebreaker assisting two ships as a convoy
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Figure 5-5. Close towing. The bow of a towed ship is fastened to the icebreaker stern
by a towing line
Representative cost estimates for icebreaker assistance on the NSR are
presented below. The costs are estimated for an Arc5 container ship of about
10 000 TEU and an Arc7 container ship of the same size. The assisted routes,
seasons and ice classes are considered representative examples of assisting
events thus giving an overall insight into the variation of NSR assisting costs.
The estimations are calculated according to NSRA information and apply to
the assisting services of the Russian state icebreaking company “FSUE
Atomflot” (NSRA, 2020).
Table 5-3. Examples of assisting costs at the NSR
Class Period Assisted area/route Cost
Arc5 Summer-Autumn East-Siberian and Laptev Seas 230 000 EUR
Arc5 Summer-Autumn Throughout NSR(1 290 000 EUR
Arc7 Summer-Autumn Laptev Sea 190 000 EUR
Arc7 Winter-Spring Throughout NSR(1 790 000 EUR
1) Bering Strait – Barents Sea
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5.2.5 Ice associated accidents and uncontrolled ice events
Many Arctic areas include multi-year ice and glacial ice obstacles (e.g.
icebergs, bergy bits, growlers, thick floes) which are sometimes difficult detect
in advance and which are much stronger than first-year ice. High speed
collisions with such objects may cause substantial damage to ships, even
those with ice class. An example of a growler is presented in Figure 5-6 . These
small glacial ice features are especially challenging to be identified in advance
because they are small, and they may be hidden between the waves.
Examples of ice damages are presented in Figure 5-7 (Canadian Coast Guard,
2012) and Figure 5-8 (TRAFI, 2018).
It is worthy of mention in this connection that the hazardous ice features
mentioned above may also exist in regions where no regular ice cover exists
(like “Iceberg Alley” located in south Labrador Sea offshore Newfoundland and
north-western Atlantic Ocean). In any case, notwithstanding if there is ice cover
or not, navigating with high speed in the regions where multi-year ice or glacial
ice may exist increases the risk of damage.
Vessels may also get jammed in ice (ref. Figure 5-2) especially if ice conditions
in the area around the vessel are compressive. The compression may cause
dents to the ship hull or in the first case, even damage the ship hull
dangerously.
Jamming in ice may also lead to the dangerous situation if the ice cover moves.
Then the vessel which is jammed in moving ice and thus unable to control her