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CHAPTER 8
The European Council as a Key Driver
of EU–Turkey Relations: Central Functions,
Internal Dynamics, and Evolving Preferences
Ebru Turhan and Wolfgang Wessels
8.1 Introduction
With its central functions and wide-ranging activities within the political
system of the European Union (EU), the European Council has turned
into the key EU institution in framing and shaping EU–Turkey relations.
Since its establishment in 1974, it has been making the most fundamental
and far-reaching decisions on the EU–Turkey relationship. The influence
of the European Council in EU–Turkey relations is derived from its role
and status in EU decision-making. No institution other than the Euro-
pean Council has enjoyed so much ‘explicit political leadership in the EU
process’ (Wallace, 2010: 82), gradually expanded its functions beyond
E. Turhan (B)
Turkish-German University, Istanbul, Turkey
e-mail: turhan@tau.edu.tr
W. Wessels
Center for Turkey and European Union Studies (CETEUS),
University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany
e-mail: wessels@uni-koeln.de
© The Author(s) 2021
W. Reiners and E. Turhan (eds.), EU-Turkey Relations,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70890-0_8
185
186 E. TURHAN AND W. WESSELS
the legal provisions enshrined in treaties, and evolved into a ‘living insti-
tution’. As a ‘place of power […] where great European debate takes
place on a one-to-one basis’ (de Schoutheete, 2012a: 22), the Euro-
pean Council is composed of the Heads of State or Government1of the
member states, its President, and the President of the European Commis-
sion (Art. 15(2) Treaty on European Union, TEU). It sets the strategic
direction of the Union, amends EU treaties, and takes over key agenda-
setting and decision-making functions in enlargement policy and ‘new
areas of EU activity’ including economic governance and foreign affairs
(Fabbrini & Puetter, 2016: 482).
Since its creation, the European Council has reached agreements on
the most crucial and controversial aspects of Turkey’s EU accession
process. Yet, the functions and powers of the Heads of State or Govern-
ment in EU–Turkey relations are not exclusively limited to the accession
process. The European Council serves as a key ‘driver’ of manifold aspects
of EU–Turkey relations. Drivers are understood as ‘structural/agency-
related’ or ‘material/ideational elements’ that determine the direction and
scope of a relationship (Tocci, 2016: 4). Drawing on both written provi-
sions of the treaties and real-world patterns, this chapter identifies the
European Council’s roles as the EU’s ‘master of enlargement’ (Lippert,
2011: 254), ‘external voice and crisis manager’, and ‘agenda and direction
setter’ as its three central functions that drive the EU–Turkey relationship.
The central focus of this chapter is the evolution of the European Council
in framing relations with a candidate country—or what many now call a
‘strategic partner’—and the identification of the critical turning points
and shifts in the central functions, internal dynamics, and preferences of
this key institution.
The many faces of the European Council make it a core component
of the institutional machinery maintaining relations between the EU and
third countries, including Turkey. Nevertheless, theoretical and empirical
studies on the dialogue of the European Council with third countries
are rare. Such studies are outnumbered by existing empirical analyses of
the institutional evolution, internal dynamics, and influence of the Euro-
pean Council (Bulmer & Wessels, 1987;Wessels,2016;Werts,2008;
Tallberg, 2008; de Schoutheete, 2012b), its presidency (Alexandrova
1For the members of the European Council, this chapter uses the official term ‘Heads
of State or Government’ and, contingent on the context, ‘Union’s leaders’, and ‘member
states’ highest political representatives’.
8 THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AS A KEY DRIVER OF EU–TURKEY … 187
& Timmermans, 2013; Crum, 2009;Dinan,2013), and theoretical
considerations on the power of the European Council within the EU
system (Fabbrini & Puetter, 2016). A limited number of works touches
upon the European Council’s relevance for the EU’s relationship with
third countries while studying its role in crisis management, enlargement,
external action, or the area of freedom, security, and justice (Anghel et al.,
2016; Wessels, 2016;Nugent,2010). However, these studies do not
provide systematic and in-depth insight into the dialogue of the Union’s
leaders with third countries or examine country cases like Turkey.
This chapter first outlines the central functions and powers of the
European Council within the EU system that are of major relevance to
EU–Turkey relations and identifies the key tasks, mechanisms, and actors
related to each role. In the ensuing sections, it elaborates on the evolu-
tion of these a priori identified functions and their impact on EU–Turkey
affairs from 1987 to 2020 while also scrutinizing their limits and potential
to unfold EU–Turkey affairs. As far as the European Council’s role as the
master of enlargement is concerned, the chapter chronologically reviews
the European Council’s far-reaching conclusions on Turkey’s accession
process and examines the expanding impact of member states’ individual
preferences on the European Council’s role as a driver of Turkey’s acces-
sion process. The chapter then elaborates on EU–Turkey cooperation in
times of crisis by paying specific attention to the management of the
2015/16 refugee ‘crisis’ and discusses whether collaboration with Ankara
during external shocks is becoming an ever-growing role and a challenge
for the European Council. Of specific relevance for the last section is
the analysis of the empirical evidence offered by the conclusions of the
European Council, which frame different narratives for the doctrine on
Turkey and offer a systematic assessment of the evolution of the Euro-
pean Council’s role as an ‘agenda and direction setter’ in the EU–Turkey
relationship.
The main finding of this chapter is that the European Council has at
different times functioned as a positive driver of both Turkey’s EU acces-
sion process and of an interest-driven, transactional partnership between
the Union and Turkey. At the same time, the findings showcase a growing
trend toward a more conflictual, relatively hostile relationship between
the European Council and Turkey. Diverging geopolitical interests—espe-
cially in the Eastern Mediterranean—and normative considerations as well
as the expanding impact of bilateral issues and member states’ individual
188 E. TURHAN AND W. WESSELS
preferences shape the European Council’s role as a driver of EU–Turkey
relations.
8.2 EU–Turkey Relations: The Many
Faces of the European Council
As the constitutional architect, key decision-maker, strategic guide, and
external voice of the EU (Wessels, 2016), the European Council has many
functions as a driver of the EU–Turkey dialogue. Its roles as ‘master of
enlargement’, ‘external voice and crisis manager’, and ‘agenda and direc-
tion setter’ stand out in view of their relevance for the design of bilateral
affairs and their salience in political and public discourses.
Despite the comatose state of Turkey’s EU accession negotiations and
palpable challenges concerning their full-fledged revival, Turkey’s acces-
sion process still constitutes the political and institutional backbone of
EU–Turkey relations. The European Council’s role as the master of
enlargement has been a decisive factor in the formulation of EU–Turkey
relations, although the treaty provisions attribute only a marginal role to
the European Council in the widening process. Article 49 (TEU) requires
the Council to be mindful of the ‘conditions of eligibility agreed upon by
the European Council’ for the accession of third countries and charges the
member states with the signing and ratification of the accession treaties. In
June 1993, third countries’ eligibility for membership was tied to certain
conditions by the conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council. The
‘Copenhagen criteria’ require
[the] stability of institutions guaranteeing, democracy, the rule of law,
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of
a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with compet-
itive pressure and market forces within the Union’, and ‘candidate’s ability
to take on the obligations of membership’. (European Council, 1993: 13)
This qualitative accession conditionality serves as a ‘bargaining strategy
of reinforcement by reward’ (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004: 670),
making the major exogenous incentive—full membership in the Union
and progress toward it—conditional on Turkey’s and other candidates’
alignment with the EU’s norms (see also Lippert, Chapter 11).
The real-world patterns of accession management reveal the steering
influence of the European Council beyond the legal provisions. For the
8 THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AS A KEY DRIVER OF EU–TURKEY … 189
preparatory phase of the accession process, the Heads of State or Govern-
ment frame and adapt their enlargement doctrine in order to display the
EU’s narratives about the necessity for widening the Union (Lippert,
2011). They sign different types of association agreements with third
countries to foster alignment with EU norms and decide by unanimity
about the candidate status of a third country and the launch of acces-
sion negotiations. In the case of Turkey, these steps took place in 1963
(Association Agreement), in 1999 (candidacy), and in 2004 (decision to
start negotiations), respectively (see also Turhan & Reiners, Chapter 1).
Throughout the negotiation phase, the European Council carefully moni-
tors the talks; if necessary, adjusts their course with interim decisions
(e.g., calls for the suspension of talks with the request of one-third of its
members); and makes the political decision on accession. In the follow-up
phase, the Heads of State or Government individually steer the signing
and ratification of accession treaties according to their own domestic
political landscapes and, if necessary, re-negotiate the terms of accession in
the event of a request by prospective members (Wessels, 2016: 183–186;
Turhan, 2016: 465; Nugent, 2010: 175).
Secondly, the European Council’s duty as the external voice and crisis
manager of the Union has been a key driver of the EU–Turkey dialogue,
particularly since 2015. The written provisions assign the President of the
European Council the role of ‘external representation’ in matters relating
to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) based on a division
of labor with the High Representative (Art. 15(6) TEU). In its capacity
as the crisis manager, the European Council frequently issues statements
and declarations in the area of external action with the purpose of carving
a distinguishable profile in the international system and offsetting the
externalities of regional or international crises. Since the enactment of
the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has become vulnerable to a series of external
shocks. The lack or constrained presence of supranational competences
in crisis-relevant policy areas such as CFSP and Common Security and
Defense Policy coupled with the high degree of political salience carried
by crisis-related issues reinforces the European Council’s role as a crisis
manager (Fabbrini & Puetter, 2016: 488–489).
The Union’s leaders’ intensified efforts to offset crisis-induced nega-
tive externalities for the EU have increased their cooperation with key
third countries, including Turkey. The EU’s leading mechanisms of crisis
dialogue include joint declarations, statements, action plans as well as
190 E. TURHAN AND W. WESSELS
joint summits and bilateral meetings, where the Union is typically repre-
sented by the presidents of the European Council and the Commission.
As the EU’s sixth largest trading partner and ‘key strategic partner’
(European Council, 2015a), Turkey’s pivotal role in the containment of
regional crises was underlined by several European Council conclusions.
The announcement of the EU–Turkey refugee ‘deal’ subsequent to a joint
summit between the European Council and the Turkish government on
18 March 2016 elevated the Union’s leaders’ central role as a collaborator
with Turkey in negating external shocks.
Lastly, the European Council’s ‘most traditional function’ (de
Schoutheete, 2012b: 56) as an agenda and direction setter shapes the
scope and political direction of EU–Turkey relations. The Lisbon Treaty
charges the Heads of State or Government with providing ‘the Union
with the necessary impetus for its development’ (Art. 15(1) TEU). This
function empowers the European Council with the design of the overar-
ching guidelines, political direction, and priorities of the EU, including
those concerning the finalité of the European integration process. The
European Council conclusions are the decisive mechanism for the accom-
plishment of this duty. They are central documents in which issues are
initiated and framed, and the broad political parameters of future policy
are set to be operationalized by other institutions (Princen & Rhinard,
2006). For this purpose, the conclusions of the European Council
produce specific ‘narratives’ on certain issues or agents, which are ‘stories
told by actors to comprehend and frame the world in which they inter-
act’ (Wehner & Thies, 2014: 421). Narratives are helpful to legitimize
policy direction and actions as they characterize and label the agents or
issues involved in the stories and construct a causal relationship between
sequential events (Oppermann & Spencer, 2016). They are contingent
on critical turning points that generate ‘new stories to make sense of the
new events’ (Wehner & Thies, 2014: 421).
European Council conclusions on Turkey construct the strategic orien-
tation, policy objectives, and priorities of the EU and its institutions
regarding their dialogue with Turkey both within and outside the acces-
sion framework. They frame and design certain narratives concerning the
EU’s doctrine on Turkey, which comprise ‘interpretations […] of the
evolution, drivers and actors, as well as the goal (or finalité) of the EU-
Turkey relations’ and emerge ‘in response to key critical junctures and
milestones of the relationship’ (Hauge et al., 2019: 3–4). As casual stories
these narratives characterize Turkey by placing it in relation to the EU
8 THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AS A KEY DRIVER OF EU–TURKEY … 191
and its norms and preferences. They also legitimize the European Coun-
cil’s policy direction and enable—or constrain—opportunities for action
of other EU institutions involved in EU–Turkey affairs.
8.3 The European Council and Turkey’sEU
Accession Process: Far-Reaching Decisions,
Unilateral Vetoes, and Growing Doubts
While Turkey applied for full membership in the European Economic
Community in 1987, issues related to Turkey’s accession did not appear
in the European Council conclusions until 1992 (see Table 8.1). The
European Council’s initial reaction to the application appeared in its June
1992 conclusions, which discussed the applications submitted by Turkey,
Cyprus, and Malta, and underlined the need to assess each application
on its own merits (European Council, 1992). The considerably delayed
and vague response to the Turkish case signaled the unexpected timing of
the application and the lack of interest of the Heads of State or Govern-
ment to perceive Turkey as a serious candidate for full membership. In
the aftermath of the Copenhagen conclusions, the leaders’ agenda lacked
any reference to Turkey’s accession until 1997.
8.3.1 The European Council’s Rise as a Positive Driver of Turkey’s
Accession Process
The European Council took up its function as the ‘master of enlargement’
at the Luxembourg Summit on 12–13 December 1997. It became an
active, key player in Turkey’s accession process when it rejected Turkish
demands to be included in the list of official candidates. At the same
time, the European Council also took over the role of ‘stabilizer’ of the
bilateral dialogue and sought to prevent Turkey’s alienation from the EU
by inviting it (alongside official candidates) to participate in the ‘Euro-
pean Conference’, which was planned to act as a forum for political
consultation (European Council, 1997).2As a result of Greek reserva-
tions, EU leaders affirmed that Turkey’s participation in the conference
was conditional upon the principle of ‘good neighborliness’. While initial
conceptualizations of this criterion appeared for the first time in the July
2However, this substitute arrangement never got off the ground.
192 E. TURHAN AND W. WESSELS
Table 8.1 The European Council conclusions on Turkey’s accession to the EU (1987–2020)
Date Place of meeting Main subjects/conclusions related to Turkey’s EU accession process
26–27 June 1992 Lisbon • Discussion on applications submitted by Turkey, Cyprus, and Malta
12–13 December 1997 Luxembourg • Turkey’s invitation to the European Conference
• Confirmation of Turkey’s eligibility for accession
• ‘European Strategy’ for Turkey
15–16 June 1998 Cardiff • Turkey’s inclusion in the list of countries to be evaluated by the Commission’s
progress reports
11–12 December 1998 Vienna • Further development of EU–Turkey relations based on the European Strategy
with the purpose of preparing Turkey for membership
10–11 December 1999 Helsinki • Confirmation of Turkey’s candidate status
• The need to fulfill the political criteria
• Candidacy based on the same criteria as applied to the other candidate states
19–20 June 2000 Santa Maria da Feira • Endorsement of Turkish efforts to meet the accession criteria
• Concerns about human rights, rule of law, and judiciary
• Invitation for the Commission to present proposals for the single financial
framework for assistance to Turkey and for the Accession Partnership
7–9 December 2000 Nice • Progress achieved in implementing the pre-accession strategy
• Importance of the Accession Partnership and the National Programme for the
Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA)
15–16 June 2001 Gothenburg • New prospects for Turkey’s European perspective after Helsinki (1999)
• Further emphasis on human rights in Turkey’s National Programme is needed
• Invitation for the Council to adopt the single financial framework for
pre-accession assistance
8 THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AS A KEY DRIVER OF EU–TURKEY … 193
Date Place of meeting Main subjects/conclusions related to Turkey’s EU accession process
14–15 December 2001 Laeken • Progress toward complying with the political criteria
• Prospect of opening accession negotiations
• Concerns about human rights
21–22 June 2002 Seville • Endorsement of recently adopted reforms in Turkey and emphasis on further
implementation
• Possibility of a new decision to be taken in the Copenhagen European Council
24–25 October 2002 Brussels • Turkey’s progress in fulfilling the economic criteria brings forward the opening
of accession negotiations
• Invitation for the Commission to prepare for the Copenhagen Summit and the
elements regarding the next stage of Turkey’s candidacy
• Candidacy based on the same criteria as applied to the other candidate states
12–13 December 2002 Copenhagen • Acknowledgment of steps taken by Turkey toward meeting the Copenhagen
criteria
• Remaining shortcomings in the field of political criteria
• The possibility of a decision by the December 2004 European Council to open
accession negotiations without delay
19–20 June 2003 Thessaloniki • Acknowledgment of the reform process in Turkey
• Revised Accession Partnership and increased pre-accession financial assistance
12–13 December 2003 Brussels • Significant progress in meeting the economic criteria and progress in meeting
the political criteria
• Concerns about judiciary, civil–military relations
• Settlement of Cyprus problem to facilitate membership
• Far-reaching decision to be taken by the December 2004 European Council
17–18 June 2004 Brussels • Acknowledgment of reforms in Turkey
• Far-reaching decision to be taken by the December 2004 European Council
• Invitation for Turkey to conclude talks with the Commission on the adaptation
of the Association Agreement
4–5 November 2004 Brussels • Presentation by the president of the Commission of a study on issues arising
from Turkey’s membership perspective
(continued)
194 E. TURHAN AND W. WESSELS
Table 8.1 (continued)
Date Place of meeting Main subjects/conclusions related to Turkey’s EU accession process
16–17 December 2004 Brussels • Far-reaching reform process in Turkey
• Welcoming of Turkey’s decision to sign the Additional Protocol to the
Association Agreement
• Turkey sufficiently fulfills the political criteria
• Opening of accession talks on 3 October 2005
15–16 June 2006 Brussels • Affirmation of commitment to support Turkey in its efforts to comply with
membership obligations
• Concerns about the fulfillment of Turkey’s obligations stemming from the
Additional Protocol
• Commissioning of the Council to assess Turkey’s progress regarding the
non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol vis-à-vis all
member states
14–15 December 2006 Brussels • Endorsement of the Council conclusions on Turkey adopted on 11 December
2006 regarding the suspension of talks on eight chapters of the acquis
9 December 2011 Brussels • Recalling of the Council conclusions of 5 December 2011 on enlargement
23–24 October 2014 Brussels • Recognition of all member states as a necessary component of the accession
process
• Stressing the need to respect Cyprus’ sovereignty
15 October 2015 Brussels • Declaring the need to re-energize Turkey’s accession process (under the
heading ‘Cooperating with third countries to stem the flows’)
20 June 2019 Brussels • Reaffirmation of previous Council conclusions (including the conclusions of 26
June 2018 and 18 June 2019, which forbade the opening or closing of any
further chapters)
Source Own compilation based on the official conclusions of the European Council on Turkey’s EU accession process
8 THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AS A KEY DRIVER OF EU–TURKEY … 195
1997 ‘Agenda 2000’ Communication of the Commission (Saatçio˘glu,
2009), its endorsement by the EU leaders and affiliation with Turkey took
place at the Luxembourg Summit. Accordingly, the European Council
added another qualitative component to the accession conditionality
outside of the Copenhagen framework.
In the immediate aftermath of the Luxembourg decision, the European
Council abruptly became a positive driver of Turkey’s accession process
with the far-reaching decisions it took in 1998 and 1999. While the
Cardiff European Council in June 1998 endorsed Turkey’s inclusion in
the list of countries to be annually reviewed by the Commission regarding
their progress toward accession (European Council, 1998: para. 64),
the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 confirmed Turkey’s
candidate status (European Council, 1999: para. 12). The Helsinki deci-
sion positioned Turkey within the institutionalized normative system of
the accession process. Yet, the change of heart of the Union’s leaders
was anything but normative. Security considerations of the EU after the
war in Kosovo accompanied by the replacement of Christian Democrat
Helmut Kohl with the Social Democrat Gerhard Schröder as German
chancellor primarily brought about Turkey’s candidacy (Turhan, 2012;
see also Schimmelfennig, Chapter 6). The normative consistency of the
Helsinki conclusions was further undermined by Cyprus’ exemption from
the ‘good neighborliness’ criterion (European Council, 1999: para. 8(b)).
Thus, with its conclusions in Helsinki, the European Council paradoxi-
cally acted as a positive driver of both Turkey’s EU perspective and the
Cyprus conflict.
The period from 2000 to 2004 marked the ‘golden era’ of the Union’s
leaders’ function as a positive driver of Turkey’s EU path. This was
reflected in the mentioning of issues related to Turkey’s accession in 12
of a total of 18 ordinary European Council conclusions, which essentially
acknowledged Turkey’s progress toward compliance with the political
and economic criteria (see Table 8.1). Accordingly, EU leaders sent a
strong political signal both to Turkey and other EU institutions regarding
their ‘position that Turkey will be judged on the basis of objective crite-
ria’ (Müftüler-Baç, 2008: 206). The EU leaders’ solid commitment to
the accession process accompanied by Ankara’s execution of an effec-
tive reform process brought about the historic decision of the European
Council in December 2004 to open accession negotiations with Turkey
on 3 October 2005.
196 E. TURHAN AND W. WESSELS
At the same time, the December 2004 conclusions laid a rocky founda-
tion for Turkey’s accession negotiations, which indicated the EU leaders’
perception of Turkey as a special candidate. They mentioned for the first
time in history the ‘open-ended’ feature of accession talks and included
an exit clause in the framework for negotiations:
While taking account of all Copenhagen criteria, if the Candidate State is
not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership it
must be ensured that the Candidate State concerned is fully anchored in
the European structures through the strongest possible bond. (European
Council, 2004a: para. 23)
The conclusions also underlined the possibility of long transition periods
and permanent safeguard clauses, and created a direct linkage between
Turkish membership and the EU’s absorption capacity by stating that,
[…] accession negotiations yet to be opened with candidates whose acces-
sion could have substantial financial consequences can only be concluded
after the establishment of the Financial Framework for the period from
2014 together with possible consequential financial reforms. (European
Council, 2004a: para. 23)3
8.3.2 The European Council’s Development from a Positive Driver
to a Brakeman in Turkey’s EU Path
After the launch of negotiations, two developments precipitated the
gradual evolution of the European Council from a positive driver to a
‘brakeman’ in Turkey’s accession process. The first development was indi-
vidual member states’ vetoes of the opening of talks in various chapters of
the acquis. The initial unilateral veto was adopted by then French Pres-
ident Nicolas Sarkozy in June 2007 against the opening of Chapter 17.
The French move had three major implications: first, the blocking of a
chapter on the grounds that it would bring Turkey closer to membership
(Bilefsky, 2007) de facto abolished the ‘open-ended’ feature of acces-
sion negotiations. Second, the French action served as a model for other
unilateral vetoes, such as the French veto on four chapters in December
3Absorption capacity, also known as ‘the Union’s capacity to absorb new members,
while maintaining the momentum of European integration’ is often called the ‘fourth’
Copenhagen criteria (European Council, 1993: 13).
8 THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AS A KEY DRIVER OF EU–TURKEY … 197
2007, the Cypriot blockage of six chapters in December 2009, and
the German veto on one chapter in June 2013 (Turhan, 2016). These
multiple vetoes demonstrated the expanding impact of bilateral issues
and member states’ individual preferences on the European Council’s
role as a driver of Turkey’s accession process (see also Müftüler-Baç &
Çiçek, 2017; Tsarouhas, Chapter 2). Third, the individual vetoes under-
mined the normative consistency of the EU’s acquis conditionality, since
Turkey’s ‘advanced’ or ‘moderately advanced’ level of alignment with
the acquis in various chapters had not been rewarded with the opening
of negotiation talks in those chapters.4This also impaired the Euro-
pean Council’s role as a credible and cogent player in Turkey’s accession
process.
The weakened interest of the Union’s leaders in Turkey’s full member-
ship emerged as the second major development in the negotiation phase.
From 2005 to 2020, only six of a total of 67 ordinary European
Council conclusions referenced Turkey’s accession process, which gener-
ally contained a negative tonality regarding the matter (see Table 8.1). In
December 2006, the European Council took a far-reaching decision and
adjusted the course of negotiations with its endorsement of the Council’s
conclusions on 11 December 2006. The conclusions suspended talks on
eight chapters of the acquis (Council of the EU, 2006) on the grounds of
Ankara’s non-implementation of the Additional Protocol of the Associa-
tion Agreement that foresees the opening of Turkish harbors and airports
to Cyprus as originally endorsed by the June 2004 European Council.
After December 2006, matters related to Turkey hardly appeared in the
conclusions of the European Council in the context of enlargement. This
represented a stark contrast to the European Council’s statements on the
Western Balkans, which repeatedly underlined palpable support for their
accession (e.g., European Council, 2008,2011,2019b).
There were two primary reasons behind the EU leaders’ vanishing
interest in acting as a positive driver of Turkey’s EU perspective. Firstly,
the diminishing appeal of EU norms as a reference point in the reform
processes in Turkey, what came to be known as ‘de-Europeanization’
(Aydın-Düzgit & Kaliber, 2016: 5–6; see also Alpan, Chapter 5; Kaya,
Chapter 14), weakened the plausibility of Turkey’s accession process. The
4According to the 2012 progress report, Turkey had achieved ‘advanced’ or ‘moderately
advanced’ level of alignment with the acquis in these four chapters blocked by member
states: Chapters 15, 17, 26 and 31 (European Commission, 2012).
198 E. TURHAN AND W. WESSELS
Heads of State or Government largely perceived the Turkish govern-
ment’s activities as not contributing to the goal of membership. Secondly,
the resurgence of far-right, Euroskeptic political parties in the EU echoed
the concerns of the European public about migration and cultural diver-
sity (Kaya, 2020). This brought into question the salience of Turkish
membership and constrained the policy options for mainstream governing
leaders.
The European Council’s function as a key driver of Turkey’s EU acces-
sion prospects was temporarily boosted during 2015 and 2016. Faced
with an unprecedented flow of Syrian refugees to Europe in late 2015
and the inability to find an EU-wide solution, the Heads of State or
Government declared the need to re-energize Turkey’s accession process
in their conclusions on 15 October 2015 (European Council, 2015b).
The strategic dependence of the Union’s leaders on cooperation with
Turkey concerning the management of irregular migration flows was
reflected in their realization of two bilateral summits with the Turkish
government, followed by the joint statements of 29 November 2015
and 18 March 2016 (the latter also known as the EU–Turkey refugee
‘deal’). The statements reaffirmed the European Council’s commitment
to restore Turkey’s accession process and its readiness to open Chap-
ters 17 and 33 (European Council, 2015c,2016a). The EU leaders’
interest-driven support for Turkey’s accession negotiations came at a time
when Turkey’s sustained non-compliance with the political criteria was
reiterated in various EU documents and created a ‘functional give-and-
take relationship’ (Saatçio˘glu, 2020: 7) with Ankara based on an illiberal
deal (Martin, 2019; see also Icoz & Martin, Chapter 4).
The European Council’s support for Turkey’s accession process quickly
deteriorated following the announcement of the March 2016 joint state-
ment. After the opening of talks in Chapters 17 and 33 in December
2015 and June 2016, respectively, the European Council conclusions did
not include any reference to the Union’s leaders’ interest in accelerating
Turkey’s accession negotiations. Contrarily, Turkey’s heightened bilateral
tensions with various member states, the deterioration of the EU–Turkey
dialogue in the aftermath of the attempted coup on 15 July 2016, and
diverging geopolitical preferences over Northern Syria, Libya, and the
drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean contributed to the rein-
forcement of the European Council’s role as a brakeman in Turkey’s
accession process.
8 THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AS A KEY DRIVER OF EU–TURKEY … 199
In October 2017, the European Council tasked the Commission
with evaluating whether to cut or reorient Turkey’s pre-accession funds
(European Council, 2017a), leading to a reduction of 105 million
EUR in Turkey’s pre-accession funds in 2018. More recently, in their
June 2019 conclusions, the Heads of State or Government adopted
the formulation of the Council, claiming: ‘Turkey has been moving
further away from the European Union’ (Council of the EU, 2018: para.
35). They also reaffirmed previous Council conclusions regarding the
suspension of key enlargement-related dialogue mechanisms, including
the opening or closing of any chapters in accession talks and the meet-
ings of the EU–Turkey Association Council (European Council, 2019a).
The expanding ‘bilateralization’ of European Council–Turkey relations
has further boosted the European Council’s growing role as brakeman in
Turkey’s accession process. Turkey has been increasingly confronted with
unilateral statements of member states (e.g., Austria, Germany, France)
suggesting ending the accession process or ruling out the opening and
closing of any chapter (see e.g., Reuters, 2016,2020;CDU,2018;
Hürriyet Daily News, 2018). Rising tensions in the Eastern Mediter-
ranean between Turkey and various member states including France,
Greece and Cyprus over drilling rights and territorial claims reinforced the
bilateralization of the European Council’s relationship with Turkey, and
further weakened the likelihood of a revitalization of Turkey’s accession
negotiations.
8.4 EU–Turkey Cooperation in Times
of Crisis: An Ever-Growing Role
or Challenge for the European Council?
Since the early stages of the bilateral dialogue, the Heads of State and
Government have acknowledged Turkey’s post-Cold War geopolitical
role in the EU’s immediate neighborhood as a ‘regional stabilizer’ and
‘arbiter’ (Öni¸s, 1995: 50–51). The European Council conclusions in
June 1992 attached the ‘greatest importance’ to ‘the Turkish role in
the [present] European political situation’ (European Council, 1992:5).
Numerous regional crises and security challenges including the Kosovo
war, September 11 attacks and the subsequent war in Iraq, the Arab
uprisings of early 2011, and the ongoing Syrian civil war brought recur-
ring attention to Turkey’s potential as a security-provider for the EU. In
200 E. TURHAN AND W. WESSELS
this context, the European Council conclusions underlined the impor-
tance of ‘Turkey’s regional initiatives with the neighbours of Iraq and
Egypt’ (European Council, 2003:2)oritsefforts‘tosecureprogresson
the Tehran Research Reactor agreement’ (European Council, 2010: 13)
amid the international community’s concerns over the Iranian nuclear
program. Successive presidents of the European Council and high level
political representatives of individual member states have repeatedly come
together with the Turkish prime minister and/or president during official
visits or on the sideline of multilateral summits in order to promote policy
coordination in times of severe foreign policy crises.
However, it was not until the transformation of the so-called Syrian
refugee crisis into a European crisis that the Heads of State or Govern-
ment put forth a substantial effort to systematize and institutionalize
EU–Turkey cooperation in crisis management and make regular reference
to Turkey in their summit conclusions as a collaborator in crisis situations.
The unprecedented scale of irregular migration flows to the EU in 2015
moved Turkey to the epicenter of the governance of the refugee crisis
alongside the European Council. The evolution of the roles of the Euro-
pean Council and Turkey in the management of the refugee crisis can be
divided into three distinct stages (see for a similar periodization Anghel
et al., 2016: 14).
The first stage (April–July 2015) commenced in the immediate after-
math of the 19 April 2015 boat disaster off the coast of the Italian island
of Lampedusa in which more than 600 refugees from Syria drowned
on their way to the EU. During this stage the European Council took
measures to prevent the loss of life in the Mediterranean Sea and ease
the disproportionate burden placed on the frontline member states with
‘temporary and exceptional relocation over two years from […] Italy
and Greece to other Member States’ (European Council, 2015d:2).
However, the Union’s leaders were unable to live up to their commit-
ments as a result of ‘lack of policy harmonization, low solidarity, and
absence of central institutions’ (Scipioni, 2018: 1361). Specifically, the
relocation of Syrian asylum seekers, a German-led initiative, was not
wholeheartedly embraced by the majority of the Union’s leaders, and the
transfer of Syrian asylum seekers from Italy and Greece to other member
states remained at remarkably low levels. This undermined the Euro-
pean Council’s capacity to effectively execute the internal dimension of
its response to the refugee crisis.
8 THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AS A KEY DRIVER OF EU–TURKEY … 201
The second phase (August 2015–March 2016) encompasses member
states’ unilateral reactions to the crisis and the European Council’s subse-
quent ‘externalization’ of EU border management to Turkey, which
involved a ‘redefinition of migration management beyond the territo-
rial borders of destination states [in the EU]’ (Üstübici, 2019:1).With
the purpose of encouraging other member states to relocate refugees
(Niemann & Zaun, 2018), in August 2015 Germany unilaterally declared
its temporary suspension of the Dublin Regulation, which affirms that the
country of first entry should process asylum claims in the EU. But, the
unprecedented number of refugees arriving in Germany did not result in
EU-wide responsibility-sharing. Rather, Germany’s declaration adversely
strengthened unilateralism in the European Council and brought about
a ‘domino effect’ of internal border controls in individual member states
(Scipioni, 2018: 1365). In view of these internal constraints, on the one
hand, and Turkey’s function as a key transit country for the refugees, on
the other, the European Council engaged with Ankara for the purpose
of reducing irregular migration flows from Turkey to the EU. On 23
September 2015, an informal meeting of the Heads of State or Govern-
ment underlined the need to ‘reinforce the dialogue with Turkey at
all levels’ (European Council, 2015e). Former European Council Pres-
ident Donald Tusk’s letter addressed to the Union’s leaders ahead of
the European Council summit on 15 October 2015 (Macdonald, 2015)
and the conclusions of the October summit (European Council, 2015b:
1) signaled the European Council’s readiness to incentivize Turkey in
exchange for cooperation on the management of migratory flows.
The European Council held two joint summits with Turkey on 29
November 2015 and 18 March 2016 to determine the scope and condi-
tions of EU–Turkey cooperation and the reward mechanism to be offered
to Turkey. The EU–Turkey joint statement issued following the summit
on 18 March 2016 framed the final agreement between both parties.
It endorsed Turkey’s readmission of all irregular migrants crossing from
Turkey to the Greek islands as of 20 March 2016 and the EU’s resettle-
ment of one Syrian from Turkey to the member states for every Syrian
returned to Turkey from the member states. Turkey was offered a wide
range of incentives, ranging from a total of six billion EUR of financial
aid for hosting refugees to the acceleration of Turkey’s Visa Liberaliza-
tion Dialogue and accession negotiations (European Council, 2016a;see
also Turhan, 2016). The European Council’s joint summits made Turkey
‘the only candidate country with which the EU holds bilateral summits’
202 E. TURHAN AND W. WESSELS
(Müftüler-Baç, 2016: 100) and fortified Ankara’s function as a key partner
of the EU in crisis situations by institutionalizing policy externalization
and bilateral cooperation in migration matters.
The third phase (April 2016–ongoing) spans from the implementation
of the EU–Turkey ‘deal’, including discussions regarding its sustainability
as well as the evolving conflictual dynamics of EU–Turkey cooperation,
until the present. The European Council conclusions and statements of
key member states largely portray the ‘deal’ as a success story accen-
tuating the decline in irregular crossings from Turkey to Europe (e.g.,
European Council, 2016b: 1). However, various studies question its
unequivocal impact on refugee arrivals in the EU, referring to other
factors like the closing of the Balkan route (Adam, 2017; Walter-Franke,
2018). Return and resettlement numbers related to the ‘one in, one out’
mechanism have remained remarkably low, which has raised doubts over
the Heads of State or Government’s commitment to burden sharing.
While the disbursement of EU financial aid carries on with some delays,
other key components of the reward mechanism (e.g., the acceleration
of Turkey’s accession process and Visa Liberalization Dialogue, joint
summits between the European Council and Turkey, and the upgrading
of the Customs Union (CU)) remain to be fulfilled as a result of technical
benchmarks or heightened political tensions between the EU and Turkey.
Ankara’s periodic unilateral statements indicating the possibility of the
suspension of the refugee ‘deal’ amid political tensions with Brussels or
individual member states (e.g., Deutsche Welle, 2017,2019) have cast
doubt on the sustainability of the deal. Turkey’s temporary de facto with-
drawal from the deal in late February 2020 with the opening of its
Western borders amidst the emergence of a new humanitarian crisis in
the Syrian province of Idlib and the ensuing prospect of a new refugee
wave indicates the fragility of the deal and the changing dynamics in EU–
Turkey cooperation. In response to Ankara’s appeal for a new ‘deal’, the
EU and Turkey agreed in early March 2020 to enter ‘a process to take
stock of the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement’ (European
Commission, 2020:3–4).
Thus, we observe a paradox: issue-specific interdependence in favor of
Turkey accompanied by weak or absent incentives for policy compliance
(Turhan & Yıldız, forthcoming) and growing tensions between the EU
and Turkey over diverging geopolitical and normative preferences make
EU–Turkey cooperation in crisis management both imperative and chal-
lenging for the Heads of State or Government. The European Council
conclusions of 1 October 2020 also illustrated the perplexing co-existence
8 THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AS A KEY DRIVER OF EU–TURKEY … 203
of issue-specific interdependencies in favor of Turkey and the growing
estrangement between the EU and Turkey. The conclusions framed a
‘dual strategy’ by offering the conditional launch of a positive agenda
with Turkey, on the one hand, and by threatening to impose restrictive
measures and possible sanctions, on the other (European Council, 2020).
8.5 The European Council as the ‘Agenda
and Direction Setter’in EU–Tu r k e y
Relations: Competing Narratives on Turkey5
The conclusions of the European Council over the last four decades
frame the Union’s narratives on Turkey, which are ‘legitimizing stories for
specific policy actions’ (Ceccorulli & Lucarelli, 2017: 84). These casual
stories couple lessons from the past with the future when proposing issue-
specific policies (Radaelli, 1999). The European Council’s narratives on
Turkey construct specific characterizations and labels of the country at
different points in time and under distinct circumstances. They show-
case the Union’s leaders’ prevailing perception of Turkey and the present
and future of EU–Turkey relations. The way the European Council
discursively characterizes Turkey justifies the agendas of member states’
highest political representatives concerning EU–Turkey relations and the
policy actions endorsed by the European Council conclusions. Influen-
tial narratives are particularly those that are capable of telling a more
convincing story than the competing narratives, and which are reiter-
ated on a more regular basis over time (Tonra, 2011). The study of the
European Council conclusions from the early 1980s to 2020 reveals both
shifts and continuities in the Union’s leaders’ narratives on Turkey. Four
(master)narratives—the normative, the accession, the transactional part-
nership, and the conflict narratives—stand out in view of their repeated
iteration by the European Council, their distinct readings of past and
present events, and their influence on the direction of the EU–Turkey
partnership.
5This section partially builds on Wessels (2020).
204 E. TURHAN AND W. WESSELS
8.5.1 The Normative Narrative
From the early 1980s to the start of Turkey’s accession negotiations, the
European Council’s ‘normative narrative’ has often remained at the core
of the Union’s leaders’ readings of Turkey and EU–Turkey relations. The
normative narrative refers to the liberal democratic values of the Union
(Art. 2 TEU and Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU) as the
focal point for the further progression of the EU–Turkey relationship, in
general, and Turkey’s EU accession process, in particular. Notably, respect
for human rights, democracy, rule of law, fundamental freedoms, and
independent and efficient judiciary, which are at the crux of the European
Council’s Copenhagen political criteria and of Chapter 23 of the acquis,
have recurrently provided the Heads of State or Government with legiti-
mate ground for the improvements and setbacks in EU–Turkey relations.
Following its confirmation of Turkey’s candidacy, the European Council
repeatedly acknowledged in its conclusions from 2000 to 2004 Ankara’s
progress in complying with the political criteria while also demanding
further alignment in various issue areas as a condition for commencing
accession negotiations (see Table 8.1). In doing so, it provided Turkey’s
accession process with further normative impetus for its advancement.
Throughout the negotiation phase, the normative content of the Euro-
pean Council conclusions has been largely reduced to concerns over
Turkey’s commitment to good neighborly relations and international law,
while the EU’s criticism of a broad range of Turkey’s normative failings
has rather been left to other institutions like the European Parliament
and the European Commission (see also Bürgin, Chapter 9; Kaeding &
Schenuit, Chapter 10). More recently, in its June 2019 conclusions the
European Council endorsed previous Council conclusions that justified
setbacks in the deepening of EU–Turkey relations, including preventing
the modernization of the CU, according to Turkey’s diminished commit-
ment to good neighborly relations and peaceful settlement of disputes
(European Council, 2019a). Key documents of individual member states
like the German coalition agreement in 2018 also ruled out any reform
of the CU until the situation of rule of law, democracy, and human rights
is improved in Turkey (CDU, 2018). Overall, as Turkey’s membership
prospects started to deteriorate, the European Council’s normative narra-
tive was largely replaced by utility-maximizing calculations, according to
the interest of the Heads of State or Government ‘in the development of
8 THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AS A KEY DRIVER OF EU–TURKEY … 205
a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Turkey’ (European
Council, 2020: para. 15).
8.5.2 The Accession Narrative
The ‘accession narrative’ underpins Turkey’s labeling by the European
Council as an accession candidate with a functioning and promising acces-
sion process. This narrative was high on the agenda of the Heads of
State or Government between 1997 and 2006. Throughout this period
almost all European Council formulations on Turkey appeared under
the section ‘enlargement’ in the summit conclusions and communicated
both the positive developments and remaining shortcomings regarding
Turkey’s transformation on its path toward accession. Based on the eval-
uation of past developments and experiences, the EU leaders narrated
policy actions about the future direction of Turkey’s accession process.
Those ranged from inviting the Commission to prepare ‘proposals for
the single financial framework for assistance to Turkey as well as for the
Accession Partnership’ (European Council, 2000: para. 17) to demanding
‘full and timely implementation of reforms at all levels of administra-
tion and throughout the country’ (European Council, 2004b: para. 27).
While the European Council confirmed the launch of Turkey’s acces-
sion negotiations in December 2004, the possibility of long transition
periods and permanent safeguard clauses led to Turkey’s labeling as
a ‘special candidate’. In this context, the December 2004 conclusions
confirmed the EU leaders’ openness to alternative forms of partnership
outside the accession framework. That the European Council conclu-
sions have increasingly dealt with matters related to Turkey under other
sections and that they have not included any precise formulation about
Turkey’s accession negotiations since October 2015 suggest the tran-
sience of the accession narrative and confirm the European Council’s
increasing interest in ‘thinking outside of the accession box’ (Turhan,
2017) in regard to the future design of EU–Turkey relations.
8.5.3 The Transactional Partnership Narrative
With the gradual evaporation of the accession narrative, the European
Council’s ‘transactional partnership narrative’ has gained importance.
The underlying logic of this narrative is its characterization of Turkey
206 E. TURHAN AND W. WESSELS
and its relationship with the EU largely independent from the acces-
sion process and its accompanying norms-based conditionality through
locating an interest-driven, functional partnership in areas of common
interest to the center of bilateral affairs. The transactional partnership
narrative partly draws on the logic of ‘external differentiated integration’,
which refers to forms of cooperation/policy harmonization between
the EU and non-member states ranging from ‘narrow, bilateral, static’
to ‘broad, multilateral, dynamic models’ (Gstöhl, 2015: 855; see also
Tekin, Chapter 7). Former European Council President Tusk’s labeling
of Turkey as a ‘key partner’ of the EU ‘in areas of common interest for
EU-Turkey relations such as security, migration and energy’ (Delegation
of the EU to Turkey, 2018) indicates the broad spectrum of policy fields
concerning this narrative. At the same time, of particular relevance for the
transactional partnership narrative has been the vast number of European
Council conclusions on EU–Turkey cooperation on the management of
the migration influx to Europe. In their October 2009 conclusions, the
Heads of State or Government had already welcomed ‘the beginning of
the reinforced dialogue on migration with Turkey’ (European Council,
2009: para. 38). However, the exacerbation of the Syrian refugee crisis in
2015 and the resulting EU–Turkey ‘deal’ of March 2016 primarily evoked
an interest-driven functional partnership between the EU and Turkey
and induced the recurrent use of the transactional partnership narrative
by the Heads of State or Government. The March 2016 agreement did
not incorporate any normative conditionality that fell back on the EU’s
political criteria. On the contrary, it offered Ankara material rewards and
an upgrade of its institutional dialogue with the EU outside the acces-
sion framework based on frequent joint summits and thematic high level
dialogues. These mechanisms mimic the dialogue procedures the EU
utilizes in handling its official strategic partnerships that are largely of a
transactional and sectoral nature (Turhan, 2017). Following the making
of the EU–Turkey ‘deal’, a large number of European Council formula-
tions on Turkey popped up under the heading ‘migration’ in the summit
conclusions, underpinning the Union’s leaders’ perception of Turkey as
a key partner rather than a promising candidate for accession. During
2016–2017 the European Council reiterated in its conclusions its ‘com-
mitment to the EU-Turkey Statement’ (e.g., European Council, 2016c:
para. 1) and repeatedly demanded the ‘implementation of the EU-Turkey
Statement in all its aspects’ (e.g., European Council, 2017b: para. 20).
The transactional partnership narrative came once again into prominence
8 THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AS A KEY DRIVER OF EU–TURKEY … 207
in 2020 when in their 1 October 2020 conclusions, the Heads of State
or Government endorsed the conditional ‘launch a positive political EU-
Turkey agenda with a specific emphasis on the modernisation of the
Customs Union and trade facilitation, people to people contacts, High
level dialogues, continued cooperation on migration issues’ (European
Council, 2020: para. 19).
8.5.4 The Conflict Narrative
The conflict narrative primarily draws on Turkey’s portrayal by the
European Council as a difficult cooperation partner and a problematic
neighbor. Growing disagreements with Ankara over geostrategic priori-
ties and regional threat perceptions as well as Turkey’s strained bilateral
dialogue with several member states have lately evoked the emergence
of this narrative. The conflict narrative pinpoints the gradual shift of
EU–Turkey relations from a primarily cooperative to a progressively
uncooperative and conflictual one, thereby generating cautiousness about
the reinforcement of the institutional dialogue between the EU and
Turkey even for transactional purposes. In recent years, several develop-
ments have served as enablers of the conflictual dynamics in the bilateral
relationship and promoted the conflict narrative. In view of mounting
tensions between the EU/Cyprus and Turkey over drilling activities in the
Eastern Mediterranean, in October 2014 the European Council initially
expressed its ‘serious concern about the renewed tensions in the Eastern
Mediterranean and urged Turkey to show restraint and to respect Cyprus’
sovereignty over its territorial sea’ (European Council, 2014: para. 24).
Since 2018 the conflict narrative has increasingly replaced the transac-
tional partnership narrative in the conclusions of the European Council,
which have recurrently characterized Turkey as a destabilizing actor and
a major source of conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean and Northern
Syria. The conclusions reiterated the Union’s leaders’ ‘full solidarity
with Cyprus’ (European Council, 2018: para. 12) and underlined ‘the
serious immediate negative impact that such illegal actions have across
the range of EU-Turkey relations’ (European Council, 2019a: para. 17).
They characterized Turkey’s Syria policy as a critical threat to European
security (European Council, 2019b: para. 7) and deemed the memo-
randum signed between Turkey and Libya on Mediterranean maritime
sovereignty in November 2019 as incompatible with international law
(European Council, 2019c: para. 19). More recently, in their 1 October
208 E. TURHAN AND W. WESSELS
2020 conclusions, member states’ highest political representatives indi-
cated the possibility of imposing sanctions and restrictive measures in the
event of renewed unilateral attempts by Turkey (European Council, 2020:
para. 20). Such formulations signal a turn toward a narrative that ques-
tions Turkey’s credibility as a reliable partner and stabilizing actor in the
EU’s immediate neighborhood and challenges the further deepening of
EU–Turkey relations even on a primarily transactional and sector-specific
basis.
8.6 Conclusion and Outlook: A Key Institution’s
Ever-Evolving Role in a Conflictual Partnership
The European Council serves as a key driver of EU–Turkey relations.
This chapter has illustrated that the powers of the European Council
are derived from the three functions it performs in the ever-evolving EU
system.
First, as the master of enlargement, the European Council remained a
positive driver of Turkey’s EU accession process from the late 1990s to
2005. The interest and influence of the Heads of State or Government
in Turkey’s EU aspirations were manifested in the far-reaching decisions
they took in 1999 and 2004, and the high number of detailed conclu-
sions they formulated on Turkey’s accession. Throughout the negotiation
phase, the European Council gradually developed from a positive driver
to a brakeman in Turkey’s accession process as a result of the unilateral
vetoes of individual member states, increasing bilateralization of European
Council–Turkey relations, and evolving normative conditions in Turkey.
Second, in their capacity as the external voice and crisis manager of
the EU, the Heads of State or Government systematized EU–Turkey
cooperation in crisis management and placed Turkey at the epicenter of
the governance of the refugee crisis with the EU–Turkey Statement in
March 2016. The commitment of member states’ highest political repre-
sentatives to a reinforced partnership with Ankara based on an extensive
reward package, which even foresaw the acceleration of Turkey’s accession
negotiations at a time of greater normative uncertainty, was an instance
in which the strategic interests of the Heads of State or Government
trumped normative concerns. This demoted the normative consistency of
the EU’s conditionality strategy, placing EU–Turkey relations primarily
along a transactional axis outside the accession framework. At the same
8 THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AS A KEY DRIVER OF EU–TURKEY … 209
time, Turkey’s temporary de facto withdrawal from the refugee ‘deal’ put
the sustainability of a functional relationship between two parties with
increasingly diverging geostrategic and normative preferences into ques-
tion, turning EU–Turkey cooperation in times of crisis into a growing
challenge for the European Council.
Third, over the last four decades, the conclusions of the European
Council have framed diverse narratives on Turkey that have shaped
the overarching agenda and course of EU–Turkey relations. The disap-
pearance or, at times, coexistence of some (master)narratives since the
early 1980s highlights the complexity and layered nature of the Union’s
leaders’ mental maps of a moving target. The findings of this chapter
indicate a clear shift from the use of the ‘accession narrative’ and ‘nor-
mative narrative’ to formulations based on the ‘transactional partnership
narrative’ in the European Council’s characterization of Turkey following
the launch of the accession negotiations. However, contrary to the
Parliament’s actions, the Heads of State or Government have refrained
from officially closing ‘the accession door for Turkey’ (see Kaeding &
Schenuit, Chapter 10) and remained interested in acting as a central
‘stabilizer’ of EU–Turkey relations based on their self-interested, utility-
maximizing calculations. At the same time, the latest statements of the
European Council from 2018, 2019, and 2020 emphasize a turn toward
the ‘conflict narrative’, which portrays Turkey as a dissonant partner and
problematic neighbor. The increased use of the conflict narrative by the
Union’s leaders challenges the reconfiguration of EU–Turkey relations
even on a primarily transactional and sector-specific basis.
Growing divergences between the Heads of State or Government and
Turkey over geopolitical interests and normative principles suggest a long-
lasting role for the European Council as a brakeman in Turkey’s accession
process. This brings the European Council to an important crossroads in
its function as a driver of EU–Turkey relations. On the one hand, the
recent turn toward more conflictual and uncooperative relations between
the European Council and Turkey makes the search for an innovative
partnership model for EU–Turkey relations outside the accession scheme
tricky. On the other hand, in view of the ever-evolving political contexts
and issue-specific interdependencies between the EU and Turkey, the
future trajectory of the bilateral relationship is likely to rest on an insti-
tutionalized alternative path. This could force the European Council to
develop a strategy for a special partnership and frame a respective narra-
tive based on geopolitical arguments. The findings of this chapter provide
210 E. TURHAN AND W. WESSELS
plentiful evidence that with their powers and central functions in the
making of the EU–Turkey dialogue, the Heads of State or Government
will remain a key driver in the design of an institutionalized alternative
path for EU–Turkey relations.
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Ebru Turhan is assistant professor at the Department of Political Science
and International Relations, Turkish-German University (TDU), Istanbul. She
also serves as a senior research fellow at the Institute for European Politics
(IEP) in Berlin. Turhan was the academic coordinator of the Jean Monnet
Module ‘INSITER-Inside the Turkey-EU Relations’ (2016–2019), co-financed
by the European Commission. Before joining the Turkish-German University in
September 2015, she was a Mercator-IPC fellow and post-doctoral researcher
at the Istanbul Policy Center (IPC) of the Sabancı University. Her current
research interests include EU-Turkey relations, external differentiated integra-
tion, EU enlargement policy, German-Turkish relations, and decolonizing and
degendering knowledge. Turhan holds an M.A. in Contemporary European
Studies from the University of Bath and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the
University of Cologne.
Wolfgang Wessels is the director of the Center for Turkey and European
Union Studies (CETEUS) and holder of an ad personam Jean Monnet Chair
8 THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AS A KEY DRIVER OF EU–TURKEY … 217
at the University of Cologne, Germany. He is the vice president of the German
consortium for the foundation of the Turkish-German University, Istanbul and
visiting professor at the College of Europe. He is the chairperson of the Exec-
utive Board of the Institute for European Politics (IEP, Berlin) and was chair-
person of the Executive Board of the Trans European Policy Studies Association
(TEPSA, Brussels) until 2016. He is involved in several EU-funded research and
teaching networks on EU-Turkey relations, such as INSITER, VIADUCT, and
FEUTURE.
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