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CHAPTER 4
Historical Institutionalism and EU–Turkey
Relations: Path Dependence and Critical
Junctures in the Accession Process
Gülay Icoz and Natalie Martin
4.1 Introduction
Historical institutionalism (HI) returned to the fore in the early 1990s as
part of the new institutionalism group of theories, which also includes
rational choice institutionalism (RCI) and sociological institutionalism
(SI) (Hall & Taylor, 1996). HI is distinguished by its emphasis on
processes over time, rather than examining snapshots, or moments in
time, and theorizes two main concepts: stasis and change. Stasis, or why
things stay the same, is attributed to ‘path dependence’, whereby what
comes after is dependent on previous events (Sewell, 1996). Change
is attributed to events of varying magnitude originating either within
the institution or outside of it. Accordingly, HI considers whether the
change process is one of ‘punctuated equilibrium’, implying a series
G. Icoz
University of London, London, UK
N. Martin (B)
University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK
e-mail: Natalie.Martin1@nottingham.ac.uk
© The Author(s) 2021
W. Reiners and E. Turhan (eds.), EU-Turkey Relations,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70890-0_4
83
84 G. ICOZ AND N. MARTIN
of smaller scale events (Krasner, 1984), or fewer, but more significant
‘critical junctures’, as the mechanism that may sway path dependence
off course (Cappoccia & Kelemen, 2007: 343–344). It is argued here
that the Turkish accession process is a prime candidate for using this
temporal approach—not least because EU–Turkey relations have existed
since 1959, and hence, there is a rich process to study that would benefit
from taking politics ‘[…] as a movie rather than a series of individual
snapshots’ (Pierson, 2004:1).
This chapter argues that HI is apposite to Turkey’s EU accession
process because it asks questions that cannot be answered by snapshot
theories.1The political landscapes of the EU and Turkey are complex
and diverse, and mere snapshots cannot encompass this complexity. It
argues that EU–Turkey relations exist—and have endured—for security
reasons. These reasons began as strategic issues, during the Cold War,
but have developed into a broader understanding of security since the
1990s to encompass human and energy security as well (among others)
(Buzan et al., 1998). Moreover, the relationship is highly path-dependent
for both material and ideational reasons: materially, the strategic secu-
rity value of Turkey has endured, and ideationally, the liberal democratic
reputation of the EU was staked upon it (Martin, 2015a: 109). The EU
felt obliged to honor its commitments, pacta sunt servanda, regarding
enlargement firstly from Eastern European states and then Turkey.
This chapter concentrates on the period from 2005, when Turkey’s
accession negotiations with the EU began, to 2020. It will identify the
path-dependent nature of the enduring relationship and the points at
which endogenous and exogenous changes have influenced events. These
points are characterized as ‘critical junctures’ (rather than punctuated
equilibrium) and fall into two categories: those which have hindered the
process and those which have expedited it. In the first category is the
succession of member states which vetoed the opening and closing of
the acquis communautaire chapters between 2006 and 2009, which led
to a stalemate in the accession process. In the second, we see how the
Arab Spring rejuvenated Turkey’s geostrategic value and its moribund
accession process. It prompted, at least partly, the May 2012 Positive
Agenda initiative to kick-start the accession process. The Arab Spring and
the subsequent civil war in Syria also contributed to the refugee crisis of
1For instance, other forms of institutionalism and theories such as Liberal Intergovern-
mentalism (see Moravcsik, 1999; Tsarouhas, Chapter 2).
4 HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM AND EU … 85
2015/16, which further expedited the process and led to the Ankara-
Brussels joint statements of November 2015 and March 2016 (the latter
also known as the EU–Turkey refugee ‘deal’). Both statements attempted
to breathe life into Turkey’s accession process to procure wider Turkish
goodwill and cooperation. However, any progress made was then negated
by the backlash to deteriorating human rights following the July 2016
attempted coup d’état (see also Turhan & Reiners, Chapter 1).
The net effect has been that neither attempts to sideline Turkish acces-
sion (through vetoes and opposition) nor kick-start it (from geostrategic
need) have been effective—the process has continued regardless of posi-
tive or negative influences displaying resilient path dependence. This
chapter will first outline the theory of historical institutionalism, placing
it in the context of wider theory and metatheory, and exploring its rele-
vance to Turkey and the EU. It will then analyze the nature of the critical
junctures identified and how they relate to the underlying path depen-
dence of Turkey’s accession process. Lastly, it will assess the explanatory
value of HI and suggest directions for future research.
4.2 Historical Institutionalism
4.2.1 The Role of Time in Political Science and International
Relations
Historical institutionalism has fallen between the disciplinary silos of polit-
ical science and International Relations (IR), which have very specific
and individual theoretical approaches. Moreover, it has also been caught
between metatheoretical debates in IR—positivism and post-positivism.
The result has been that HI remains a niche theoretical approach that
often gets lost within wider disciplinary disputes. However, this chapter
will argue that HI has a valuable contribution to make to European
studies, EU–Turkey studies and Turkish studies in explaining EU–Turkey
relations because of its emphasis on temporality. As Steinmo (2008)has
argued, what we now call HI is actually a form of historical description
and not a new phenomenon. Within IR it was undermined by the influ-
ence of behavioralism in the 1950s and the subsequent development of
positivist theories. It was the need to conform to the positivist norms
of statistical measurement which led to an overemphasis on ‘snapshot’
approaches rather than the processes over time, which are harder to
quantify because they retain context and explanatory power (Hay, 2002).
86 G. ICOZ AND N. MARTIN
4.2.2 New Institutionalism
HI came into the theoretical lexicon of political science and IR in the
early 1990s. It was coined by Steinmo et al. (1992),whodrewonthe
macro-historical approaches of comparative political economy (Skocpol,
1979) and placed HI as one of the three variants of new institutionalism.
Steinmo et al. applied the macro-historical emphasis to much shorter
timescales and focused on the processes of stasis and change within
institutions. As such, this approach still largely conformed to the contem-
porary positivist norms within IR and was couched within deductivist
terms, seeing ‘institutions’ as either dependent or independent variables
(Steinmo et al., 1992: 15).
It was further developed by Hall and Taylor (1996), who placed HI
alongside RCI and SI as ways of theorizing institutions in general. Each
strand of new institutionalism differed in its approach to the study of insti-
tutional policy and decision-making. RCI applied rational choice theory
to institutional settings to examine the role of institutions in tempering
the self-interested inclination of members (Steinmo et al., 1992). SI,
on the other hand, incorporated the then-nascent approach of social
constructivism to look at institutional decision-making from a cultural
perspective (Hall & Taylor, 1996), which also taps into the logics of
consequences and appropriateness (March & Olsen, 1984).
HI emphasized the importance of looking at more than snapshots of
time, as both RCI and SI were inclined to do. Around this time, it was
common for RCI to be characterized as a positivist approach and SI as
an interpretivist approach, with HI characterized as a hybrid or eclectic
approach (Hall & Taylor, 1996). However, it is argued that HI is a sui
generis approach rather than as a compromise to solve a metatheoretical
conundrum. As analyzed by Pierson and Skocpol, its defining charac-
teristic and explanatory value lie in its emphasis on taking a long-term
view:
Without the kind of attentiveness to temporally specified process […]
important outcomes may go unobserved, causal relationships may be
misunderstood and valuable hypotheses may never receive consideration.
(Pierson & Skocpol, 2002: 699)
Arguably, because of straddling disciplinary and metatheoretical divides,
the concept of HI is ‘woolly’ and ill-defined (Rixen & Viola, 2016).
Neither its definition nor its metatheory are consistent between advocates,
4 HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM AND EU … 87
and HI would benefit from ‘theoretical refinement’ (Pierson, 2004: 139–
142). However, the eclecticism of HI is a strength and is only problematic
if judged by positivist standards. Instead, we argue that HI can be both
deductive or inductive: hypotheses can relate to a time span, or evidence
can be assessed over a time span. Furthermore, HI can also address mate-
rial factors, for instance, written policies, or ideational factors, such as
norms and values. Accordingly, it can use an array of data sources—quan-
titative, qualitative, or both (although usually qualitative)—because its
defining feature within these broad parameters is time. As Pierson persua-
sively argues, although it has emerged as part of new institutionalism, HI
is as concerned with history as it is with institutions:
[HI] scholarship is historical because it recognizes that political devel-
opment must be understood as a process that unfolds over time. It is
institutionalist because it stresses that many of the contemporary implica-
tions of these temporal processes are embedded in institutions, whether
these be formal rules, policy structures, or social norms. (Pierson, 1994:
29)
HI scholars such as Pierson and Skocpol (2002) emphasize three key
elements of HI: big real-world puzzles, temporality, and context—and
this is HI’s uniqueness. However, this is not a zero-sum game but merely
an assertion that different theories ask different questions. Therefore,
which one is chosen will depend on the question being asked. With regard
to Turkey’s EU accession process, HI can illuminate processes over time
in a way in which RCI and SI cannot. HI is able to illuminate processes
of change—or non-change—and, hence, more recently has come to be
seen as a ‘useful tool’ in the study of institutions (Rixen & Viola, 2016:
4) and specifically the EU–Turkey accession process.
4.2.3 Stasis and Change
If the defining characteristic of HI is its attention to processes over time,
then the tools it uses are those that look at the processes of stasis and
change. Furthermore, HI examines the cause of the change in question,
whether it is incremental or sudden. The primary tool for examining
policy inertia, i.e., stasis, is ‘path dependence’, defined by Sewell as a
concept in which ‘[…] what happened at an earlier point in time will
affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later
88 G. ICOZ AND N. MARTIN
point in time’ (Sewell, 1996: 262–263). Similarly, Rixen and Viola (2016:
12) have characterized path dependence as ‘[…] a specific kind of process
that is set in motion by an initial choice, decision, or event, which
then becomes self-reinforcing’. Policy decisions become fixed because
funds may have been invested or reputations are staked on their success;
therefore, reversing the policy is more costly than continuing with it.
Path dependence therefore can be defined as the process in which
what comes after depends on what went before. However, its simplicity
is deceptive, because there are various reasons why path dependence—
and therefore policy stasis—exists, and not all of them are present every
time. These reasons are sunk costs, the notion of ‘lock-in’ or institu-
tional inertia, and sequencing, which argues that some things may not
happen because of previous decisions in which things may have happened
if the previous event had not have happened (Cappoccia & Kelemen,
2007: 342). This contingent aspect of the concept of path dependence,
therefore, has contributed to the criticism of the theory’s ‘woolliness’.
As Mahoney has argued: ‘Discussions of path dependence have been
hampered by a basic problem; analysts often lack a clear understanding
of the meaning of path dependence’ (Mahoney, 2000: 535). The best
way to understand path dependence is to acknowledge the influence of
past decisions on what may follow and be aware that there may be several
reasons for this. The factors involved should be established case by case.
For this reason, process-tracing (George & Bennett 2005; see also Collier,
2011) is an oft-used methodology with this approach:
The aim has been to demonstrate the existence and effect of historical
legacies in the political processes and institutions of the present. […] For
them, (HIs) […] history matters; to understand the present is to under-
stand how it has evolved from the past and to trace the legacies of that
evolution. (Hay, 2002: 136)
Another recurrent criticism of HI is that its emphasis on path dependence
precludes explanations of change. In other words, ‘[…] although it is well
suited for explaining the persistence of policies, it is much less capable of
explaining change in those same policies’ (Peters et al., 2005: 1288). This
criticism is countered by the concept of ‘critical junctures’, first used by
Collier and Collier (1991).
Inevitably perhaps, the notion of a ‘critical juncture’ is also ‘woolly’:
it can be seen as the start of a path-dependent process or the result
4 HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM AND EU … 89
of exogenous factors that cause change to develop in a path-dependent
process. Alternatively, it can be viewed as a necessarily arbitrary point
or a convenient theoretical device to avoid going ever farther back into
history or ‘infinite explanatory regress into the past’. The critical juncture
is crucial to HI because ‘[…] after this […] major alternative development
trajectories are increasingly closed off’ (Mahoney, 2001:8).
Cappoccia and Kelemen urge ‘caution and clarity’ in the approach.
They define ‘critical’ through ‘probability jump’ and ‘temporal leverage’.
That is increased likelihood—but not proof—that choices made at the
given time will affect the outcome by triggering a path-dependent process
‘which constrains future choices’. Critical junctures must also be anchored
to a unit of analysis as they are relative to time and space rather than
absolute concepts. What is a critical juncture for one policy area may not
be for another—or it may be at another time. These junctures are also
relative to each other: ‘[…] the duration of the critical juncture must
be brief relative to the duration of the path dependent process that it
initiates’ (Cappoccia & Kelemen, 2007: 350).
4.2.4 Historical Institutionalism and Turkey’s EU Accession Process
What gives HI theoretical value is that it asks different questions than the
other ‘institutionalisms’ as well as provides different theoretical perspec-
tives due to its emphasis on temporality. When applying this to the case of
Turkey’s EU accession process, we can ask what periods of stasis or change
have occurred since accession negotiations were opened in 2005 and why
these may have occurred. Additionally, it is useful in discussing what the
sources of stability or change may be, and this may help with future
predictions about the process. These sources or triggers can be internal,
to the country or institution in question, or external (Cortell & Peterson,
1999: 185). External (global) triggers include war, pandemic, geopolit-
ical conflict, changing balance of power within institutions, technological
change, and macroeconomic change; internal triggers include revolution,
civil war, military coups, elections/changes of government, economic
growth rate, demographic change, and social movement/conflict (see also
Turhan & Reiners, Chapter 1). In this case, we will consider the strength
of the path dependency of the accession process and the nature of the
various critical junctures it has reached—namely, member states vetoing
90 G. ICOZ AND N. MARTIN
the opening and closing of the acquis communautaire chapters for Turkey
between 2006 and 2009, the consequences of the Arab Spring and the
illiberal nature of governance in Turkey.
Stasis and change can also be the result of individual action or agency
(Gourevitch, 1986: 236). At critical junctures, individuals have a greater
ability to influence policymaking. This has two consequences: (1) the
range of plausible choices open to powerful political actors expands
substantially, and (2) the consequences of their decisions on the outcome
are potentially much more momentous (Martin, 2019). We believe paying
attention to what politicians in Turkey and EU leaders do during these
critical junctures is also crucial in explaining what impact the critical
junctures have had on the accession process. For instance, emphasizing
how politicians, such as then Turkish EU minister, Ali Babacan, or EU
Enlargement Commissioner, Štefan Füle, present opportunities to enact
new plans and realize new ideas during the critical junctures (Gorges,
2001: 156), we can explore if any critical juncture in the accession process
has translated to opportunities for new ideas or new plans.
The analysis below concentrates on the accession process from the
opening of negotiations in 2005 until 2020. It considers the points
of change already outlined and the impact they may have had on the
accession process. It argues, the accession process remains in a state
of ‘managed containment’ (Martin, 2019) that has been constant since
2005. The points of change, or critical junctures, have been the result of
internal EU dynamics, in particular opposition to the Turkish case, and
external geopolitical factors, namely the Arab Spring. These have slowed
down or sped up the process at various points in time; but overall, very
little has changed due to Turkey’s poor record of liberal democracy.
4.3 Tu r k e y ’s EU Accession Process:
Stasis and Change Since 2005
The Turkish case is the longest standing accession process in the EU.
Ankara’s first approach to join, what was then the EEC, was in 1959 and
an Association Agreement was signed in 1963. The delay was the result
of the intervening coup d’état in Turkey in which the Prime Minister,
Adnan Menderes, and others, were executed by the Kemalist military. The
illiberality on display ruled out imminent membership for Turkey but the
Association Agreement enabled the member states to maintain Ankara’s
4 HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM AND EU … 91
goodwill within ‘Europe’ and, crucially, within NATO. Although very
separate institutions, Brussels had come under some pressure from the
USA not to alienate Ankara for these hard power geostrategic reasons
(Martin, 2015a:Chapter1). Even after the Cold War ended, Washington
used possible EU candidacy as an incentive for democratization in Turkey
because that was deemed to be in NATO’s interests. With the UK as
a proxy within the EU, the USA encouraged the EU–Turkey Customs
Union of 1995 and the candidacy offer made at the Helsinki European
Council in 1999. Once the offer had been made Turkey was then able to
‘sufficiently fulfill’ enough of the Copenhagen criteria, with some nudging
from the UK, for the EU to feel obliged, pacta sunt servanda, to honor its
commitment and open accession negotiations in 2005 (Martin, 2015b).
Hence, Turkey was admitted into the European sphere, as an aspi-
rant member, and subsequently a formal candidate, because of its security
value in different ways at different times. This security value became a
driver of the enduring path dependence and is still evident in Turkey’s
accession process. Since the beginning of the Cold War it has been too
valuable strategically to cast adrift from ‘Europe’ but not quite valuable
enough for this to override the liberal democratic criteria of the EU. This
‘ying’ and ‘yang’ dynamic, between security and liberal identity, is what
has maintained the process in stasis despite several junctures over time
where it may have changed by going forward—or ending altogether.
4.3.1 Vetoes
As agreed at the European Council meeting in December 2004, the
EU opened accession negotiations in 2005 by adopting the Negotia-
tion Framework (European Commission, 2005), which set out principles
governing the negotiations on the thirty-five chapters of the acquis
communautaire.2However, difficulties centered on Turkey’s reluctance
to recognize the sovereignty of Cyprus and the legitimacy of its shipping
flag soon emerged. Consequently, in December 2006 the Council agreed
to block the opening of eight chapters, covering policy areas relevant
to Turkey, as well as the closure of other chapters due to the problems
between Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus (Council of the European
Union, 2006). Relations with Cyprus were (and remain) highly sensitive
2For a comprehensive overview of the accession negotiations and the status of individual
chapters see also Lippert (Chapter 11).
92 G. ICOZ AND N. MARTIN
in Turkey, especially after the 2004 referendum (Hannay, 2005), and the
EU’s actions made Turkey’s EU accession dependent on the resolution
of the Cyprus issue, which was highly unlikely. The EU negotiator Ali
Babacan reacted by accusing the EU of discrimination:
[…] for Turkey we have found out that the opening of the chapters and
closing of the chapters could be influenced by reasons which are of a
very political nature. […] Now we cannot open eight chapters, we cannot
close any of the chapters until the Cyprus issue is resolved […]. (Parker &
Thornhill, 2007)
The incident also negatively impacted Turkish public opinion of the EU
as the Cyprus issue was seen as evidence of prejudice against Turkey as
a Muslim country. This loss of trust affected the future of the accession
process.
While the Turkish authorities were still absorbing the effects of the
December 2006 veto, French President Nicholas Sarkozy blocked the
opening of Chapter 17, ‘Economic & Monetary Policy’, in June 2007.
Furthermore, Sarkozy was highly undiplomatic when justifying this block,
stating, ‘I do not believe Turkey has a place in the European Union’
(Parker et al., 2007). Following this, France blocked another four in
December 2007 and a further six in December 2009 (Turhan, 2016:
469). However, regardless of the reaction to Sarkozy’s comments and the
subsequent Cypriot actions, the accession process remained intact, albeit
dormant. It is thus pertinent to ask why the accession process endured
these vetoes from 2006 to 2009. There are two interconnected points to
answer this question. The first is that while both the Council and Nicholas
Sarkozy vetoed the opening of negotiations on certain chapters, they did
not suggest calling off the accession process. Secondly, since the Turkish
authorities did not drastically react to the European Council’s veto posi-
tion, apart from an expression of disappointment, the course of action did
not change.
4.3.2 The ‘Positive Agenda’
Hence, although the initial period of accession negotiations was turbulent
and little progress was made, the negotiation process continued despite
the vetoes. Subtracting the 2006 Council veto (eight chapters), then the
4 HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM AND EU … 93
French veto (five chapters), and finally Cyprus’ veto (six chapters), there
were only three chapters left to open.
In May 2012, Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neigh-
borhood Policy, Štefan Füle, and Turkish Minister for European Affairs
(and then Chief EU negotiator) Egemen Ba˘gı¸s, launched the ‘Positive
Agenda’ in Ankara. The aim of this process was to keep Turkey’s acces-
sion process alive and put it back on track after a period of, in their words,
‘stagnation’. The Positive Agenda was described as ‘[…] a new way of
looking at the accession negotiations. It is the new way we communicate
and interact with each other. It is the way how we look at each other as
two equal partners’ (European Commission, 2012). It was designed not
to replace but to complement the accession process and give it renewed
impetus (Paul, 2012). The initiative outlined policy areas in which Turkey
was expected to carry out reforms:
•Fundamental human rights
•Visa, mobility, and migration
•Trade
•Energy
•Counterterrorism
•Foreign affairs.
Working groups were established on eight chapters designed to accelerate
Turkey’s process of alignment with EU policies and standards in those
areas. The Positive Agenda, which was Füle’s personal initiative (Paul,
2012), increased the scope for dialogue between the EU and Turkey and
opened doors for further integration.
While the Positive Agenda was treated as an opportunity to restart
the process by both sides after the vetoes and years of stagnation, the
accession process soon returned to a stalemate due to the deteriora-
tion of human rights in Turkey including press freedom (Committee to
Protect Journalists, 2012). The accession process was further stymied
when Ankara suspended contact with the EU while Cyprus held the
rotating EU presidency from July to December 2012. Ankara had consis-
tently refused to recognize the sovereignty of Cyprus due to the sensitivity
of the reunification issue and had made its views clear regarding the legit-
imacy of Nicosia assuming the rotating presidency role for the EU. When
this transpired regardless, Ankara was implacable. Turkish Deputy Prime
94 G. ICOZ AND N. MARTIN
Minister, Be¸sir Atalay, said: ‘[…] we will freeze our relations with the EU.
We have made this announcement, as a government we have made this
decision. Our relations with the EU will come to a sudden halt’ (Dombey,
2011).
This freeze put the accession process back on hold, and the Positive
Agenda stalled. When Füle stepped down from being European Commis-
sioner for Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy in October
2014, the Positive Agenda fizzled out. Although the accession process
itself endured, the legacy of the Positive Agenda was not positive: Turkey
continued to believe the EU did not want Turkey as a member, and the
EU was concerned by the Turks’ implacability over Cyprus.
4.3.3 The Refugee Crisis
It took the refugee crisis of 2015–2016 to bring the accession process
back to life. The EU had actually begun discussing migration matters
with Turkey in 2013, and France subsequently removed its veto over
Chapter 22, ‘Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural Instru-
ments’. In December 2013, the European Commission and the Turkish
authorities had signed the EU–Turkey Readmission Agreement, which
initiated the EU–Turkey Visa Liberalization Dialogue (VLD) (European
Commission, 2014; see also Kaya, Chapter 14). This agreement aimed
to limit the influx of irregular migrants entering the EU through Turkey
and return any irregular migrant who is found to have entered the EU
through Turkey. In return for implementing this agreement, the EU
promised to begin an EU–Turkey VLD to progress toward eliminating
the visa obligation currently imposed on Turkish citizens travelling to the
Schengen area for short-term visits. The VLD had a positive impact on the
Turkish public opinion about the EU, which had been lukewarm previ-
ously. In 2013 only 45% believed membership would be a good thing,
while in 2014 this had risen to 53% (German Marshal Fund, 2014).
Since Turkish people had waited for a visa-free regime for several years,
they regarded the Readmission Agreement as part of the price to pay.
However, many Turkish officials still regarded Brussels with suspicion as
a result of the vetoes from 2006 to 2009.
So, while some progress had already been made in implementing the
Readmission Agreement, the migration issue in Spring/Summer 2015
brought the matter to a head following a sudden increase in the number
of people moving through Turkey into the Schengen area. This sentiment
4 HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM AND EU … 95
was particularly acute following the death of the two-year-old refugee,
Aylan Kurdi, in September 2015 and the heartbreaking photograph of
his body on a Turkish beach (Smith, 2015). The need to procure Turkish
cooperation to manage the refugee issue became acute and forced the
EU to offer incentives on accession. In the November 2015 EU–Turkey
Statement (European Council, 2015), which followed several weeks of
negotiation, the EU and Turkey agreed to initiate regular EU–Turkey
summits (see also Turhan & Wessels, Chapter 8), to ‘re-energize’ the
accession process and open Chapter 17 of the acquis communautaire.
Additionally, there was the promise of visa liberalization, 3 billion euro of
humanitarian aid and the Joint Action Plan on ‘migration management’
to curtail the number of people reaching Greece from Turkey (Turhan,
2016). The Commission also delayed the 2015 progress report, which
highlighted a negative trend in respect for the rule of law and fundamental
rights, until after the November general election in Turkey.
A further EU–Turkey Statement was agreed in March 2016 under
which there would be an ‘acceleration’ of visa liberalization and irreg-
ular migrants would be returned to Turkey in exchange for migrants in
Turkey to go to the EU. An additional 3 billion euro was agreed for
humanitarian aid and work to ‘upgrade’ the Customs Union was ‘wel-
comed’ by both sides (European Council, 2016). Moreover, the accession
process would be re-energized, again, with the opening of Chapter 333
and preparatory work on other chapters would ‘continue at an acceler-
ated pace’ (European Commission, 2016). The opinion in Brussels and
other member state capitals was that these measures would not have
been agreed without the imperative of the migration situation. The two
joint statements (of November 2015 and March 2016) and the March
2016 deal were achieved despite Turkey’s deteriorating human rights
record (Esen & Gümü¸sçü, 2018), which was the reason for considerable
cynicism.
The March 2016 refugee ‘deal’ was criticized both for its inherent illib-
erality and its reliance on the illiberal human rights regime in Turkey.4On
the second point, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
and Amnesty International opposed the plan to return migrants back to
3Chapter 33 of the acquis communautaire refers to financial and budgetary provisions.
4It was also criticised on the grounds that it relied on an unlikely solution to the
Cyprus problem to make it work (see Martin, 2019).
96 G. ICOZ AND N. MARTIN
Turkey because of its human rights record and the fairness of its asylum
system (Pitel, 2016). Amnesty International was also scathing of the
EU, claiming it was ‘shirking its responsibility to people fleeing war and
persecution’ by using Turkey as a ‘border guard’ (Amnesty International,
2016). After the first joint statement, in November 2015, Marc Pierini,
the former EU Ambassador to Ankara, had said the EU’s willingness to
reach such agreements with Turkey in spite of Ankara’s human rights
record was ‘EU Realpolitik at its worst’. Pierini attributed it to ‘political
panic’ and said the EU had gone to Erdo˘gan ‘on our knees’ and ‘now he
is playing us’ (Pitel & Beesley, 2015). A senior EU diplomat said Erdo˘gan
had gone from being ‘untouchable’ in the EU in the summer of 2015, to
being the ‘dinner companion of choice’ of the EU’s three presidents (of
the Parliament, Commission, and the European Council) as well as that
of German Chancellor Angela Merkel in the autumn (Barker, 2015). The
migration issue should therefore be seen as an exogenous shock to the
EU–Turkey relations which kick-started the accession process temporarily
but undermined the liberal credentials of the EU (Martin, 2018).
4.3.4 Authoritarian Drift
Hence the accession process slumped after the vetoes and was revived,
but only temporarily, by the Positive Agenda. It took the geopolitical
imperative of the refugee crisis to bring both sides back to the table
primarily because the EU felt it had no other option at that time.
However, once the refugee situation stabilized, the accession process
returned to stasis, this time because human rights in Turkey deteriorated
even further following the July 2016 coup d’état attempt. Moreover, the
mainstay of the March 2016 deal, visa liberalization, had not been forth-
coming because Turkey had failed to meet the condition of liberalizing
its counterterrorism legislation.
Whilst Turkey had been ‘drifting’ toward authoritarianism prior to
2016, the scale of detentions, many on spurious grounds of ‘terror-
ism’ (Martin, 2018), after the attempted coup d’état, provoked hostility
within the EU despite the need to maintain the refugee ‘deal’. Dimitris
Avramopoulos, the EU’s Migration Commissioner, said: ‘We have always
been clear with our Turkish partners on visa liberalization—if Turkey
wants visa liberalization, all conditions must be met’ (Pitel & Brunsden,
2016). The European Council President at that time, Donald Tusk,
said the decline of liberal democracy in Turkey jeopardized its accession
4 HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM AND EU … 97
prospects: ‘We want to keep the doors open to Ankara, but the current
reality in Turkey is making this difficult’ (Barker et al., 2017). Austria,
a longstanding critic of Turkey’s accession, called for membership talks
to be frozen (Beesley, 2016), and Germany also voiced misgivings about
human rights in Turkey (Wagstyl & Chazan, 2017). Erdo˘gan’s response
was to call the EU member states’ bluff: he accused them of discrimi-
nating against Turkey and dared them to ‘do the necessary thing’ if they
could no longer tolerate working with his country (Pitel, 2017).
In 2019, the European Parliament (EP) voted to suspend accession
talks with Turkey (European Parliament, 2019) due to concerns about
human rights and civil liberties, political pressure on the judiciary, and
the unresolved territorial disputes with Cyprus and other neighboring
countries, which were also stressed in the 2019 country report of the
Commission (European Commission, 2019). Although EU governments
have the final say in any suspension, the EP’s decision was a serious
setback for accession negotiations. The Turkish government dismissed the
vote as ‘worthless, invalid and disreputable’ (Reilhac, 2019) but further
problems emerged in Summer 2019 over Cyprus. In July, Turkish Foreign
Minister Mevlüt Çavu¸so˘glu said that his government was suspending the
Readmission Agreement with the EU due to the stalemate over visa liber-
alization following the 2016 refugee ‘deal’ (Candau, 2019). There has
also been controversy over the sovereignty of gas reserves found in the
Eastern Mediterranean and Turkish drilling activities (Pitel, 2019), which
resurrected Turkey’s issues with Cyprus and led to several sanctions by
the Council, inter alia, the suspension of the Association Council and
further meetings of the EU–Turkey high level dialogues for the time
being (Council of the European Union, 2019). So, in summary, the
refugee crisis was an opportunity to progress the accession process, but
this did not materialize because of the authoritarian drift in Turkey which
worsened further following the attempted coup in July 2016. Since then,
the situation has continued to flounder and has been complicated further
by a dispute over gas reserves with Cyprus.
4.4 The Accession Process Goes on (and on?)
Turkey’s EU accession process began as a result of a security imperative
during the Cold War and has demonstrated ongoing path dependence
for related reasons. Even after the Cold War ended, Turkey retained
geostrategic significance for the EU and NATO, including during the
98 G. ICOZ AND N. MARTIN
Balkan wars, the Iraq war, and more recently, the Syrian civil war and the
parallel migration crisis. It is argued here that since accession negotiations
were opened in 2005, the accession process has been tested and thrown
off course at various times by different events; however, the process has
also shown remarkable resilience, as a result of path dependence. HI illu-
minates this temporal process, unlike comparable theories such as RCI,
SI, or liberal intergovernmentalism. While RCI, SI, and liberal intergov-
ernmentalism may have valid points to make about, say, the December
2004 European Council or the EU–Turkey Statements in 2015 and 2016,
they consider these events as snapshots rather than as part of a long-term
process. They simply do not ask these questions; they ask other types, of
equally valid questions, but not questions of temporality.
Since 2005, there have been several points of change, both pushing
and constraining accession, which we have identified as critical junctures.
The accession process has been influenced by the changing constellation
of state leaders within the EU and their views on Turkey as well as the
consistent hostility of member states such as Austria and Cyprus to the
Turkish case. However, the EU’s need to placate Turkey over security
issues and maintain wider cooperation has boosted Turkey’s accession
progress. While vetoes have acted as a deterrent to accession, security
issues have been an incentive for Turkey’s accession. However, neither
has sustainably impacted the actual accession process.
Various actors’ vetoes on opening and closing chapters between 2006
and 2009 deterred the Turkish government from continuing with liber-
alizing reforms as it lost confidence in the EU’s sincerity about accession.
It should be noted that, at this time, Turkey’s withering accession process
was convenient for several member states which had not been whole-
hearted supporters of opening negotiations in 2005 but had felt cornered
into agreeing to it because of the pacta sunt servanda effect. However, as
has been outlined, whilst the accession process was moribund after 2006,
the process itself continued as a bureaucratic entity. Conversely, the Posi-
tive Agenda was hailed as a ‘new beginning’ for EU–Turkey relations but
never overcame the twin problems of Turkey’s declining human rights
record and the legacy of its Cyprus relationship. It failed to kick-start the
process, and no tangible progress was made, but accession continued as
before within the EU bureaucracy for the same reason: security. Turkey’s
covert involvement in the Syrian civil war was an open secret even then.
Turkey’s overt relevance to both the future of the Assad regime and the
Kurdish issue was obvious, and this was enough to maintain relations.
4 HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM AND EU … 99
The refugee crisis in 2015 was another factor which kick-started acces-
sion process in spite of the EU’s liberal credentials. While the 2016
refugee ‘deal’ was signed before the further deterioration of human rights
following the attempted coup in July of that year, it was nevertheless
signed amidst the ongoing persecution of journalists and academics as well
as serious human rights issues in eastern, Kurdish areas of Turkey such as
Cizre and Nusaybin (United Nations, 2017). The EU sealed the deal
despite challenges to its liberal principles in the face of rising populism
and opposition to immigration in some member states. However, the
further deterioration of human rights provided cover for various member
states to backtrack on the visa aspect, and yet, like before, the accession
process itself remained intact. Overall, accession has been strongly path-
dependent, based on a security imperative that has endured, but has failed
to advance because of human rights concerns.
4.5 Conclusions
HI’s raison d’être is to highlight the existence and significance of
processes over time. Analyzing Turkey’s accession process through this
approach, it has been argued that the path-dependent nature of Turkey’s
EU accession process has endured for broadly defined security reasons.
Turkey became an applicant and a candidate because of security consid-
erations and the process has continued for broadly similar reasons in a
broadly similar way meaning the status of Turkish accession in 2020 is not
that different to 2005. Overall, the positive influence of security concerns
in forwarding the process has been balanced by the negative influence of
Turkey’s poor human rights record. Hence, the accession progress has
been driven by its security value, but this has never been strong enough
to overcome the residual misgivings (and hostility) from the EU side to
translate into real accession progress. Turkey has progressed more when
its perceived security value was higher—and the converse is also true—
but the net effect, over time, is managed containment. Overall, it has
retained its place as a potential candidate of the EU, for security reasons,
but has never maintained sustained and meaningful progress. The secu-
rity reasons have not been enough to override the underlying hostility of
several member states who have been able to fall back on ‘human rights’
to put the brakes on. The significance for HI is that it is these patterns, of
100 G. ICOZ AND N. MARTIN
stasis and change, over time which would not be revealed by other theo-
ries within political science or IR because they do not ask such temporal
questions.
Nevertheless, the value of HI could also be viewed as a weakness as
it does not address the details of the other institutionalisms and liberal
intergovernmentalism, among others. It has neither the forensic rigor
of RCI, nor the ideational freedom offered by the interpretivism of SI.
In taking such a long-term view, HI inevitably has to make generaliza-
tions, leaving it susceptible to accusations of ‘woolliness’. In addition,
HI does not address the minutiae of wider issues inherent within the
argument presented here. For example, the locus of this path dependence
argument is the ‘security imperative’: this is not part of HI theory per
se but is incorporated into it instrumentally when it helps explain the
concept of path dependence. A similar logic applies to the notion of
liberal democracy which is acting as a counterweight to security in this
path-dependent process. HI uses these concepts to explain the temporal
processes but does not speak to them directly and does not address the
issues of metatheoretical commensurability.
However, what HI does do is identify patterns over time. The future
for HI is to streamline the metatheory and extricate HI from the metathe-
oretical no-mans-land so it can develop on its own terms and incorporate
the ‘thick description’ and context that was stripped out by the domi-
nance of positivism. It is suggested that the development of HI within a
critical realist metatheory would be a productive way forward (Bhaskar,
1989; Wight, 2006). Tighter definitions of the change mechanisms would
also help it lose its ‘woolliness’. As Rixen and Viola (2016)argue,HI
has much to offer to the study of institutions in general and EU–Turkey
relations in particular.
Lastly, it is likely that the path dependence of Turkey’s EU acces-
sion process will survive the authoritarianism of the ruling Justice and
Development Party (AKP) and the Erdo˘gan government because of the
ongoing security imperative. This has underpinned the path-dependent
nature of the relationship since the beginning, and it has been further
galvanized by sunk costs and institutional inertia. If illiberality in Turkey
were tempered, it is possible that the accession progress could resume.
However, what cannot be predicted are the critical junctures yet to
happen. These could be endogenous—as a result of the political or
economic collapse of the EU itself or a collapse resulting from pandemic.
Alternatively, these could be exogenous factors concerning regional
4 HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM AND EU … 101
geopolitics (see also Reiners & Turhan, Chapter 16). The accession
process could restart if Turkey liberalized, but what we do not yet know
is the severity of the events which could blow it off course once more.
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Gülay Icoz is an independent researcher who received her Ph.D. from Royal
Holloway, University of London. Her work encompasses the Turkey–EU rela-
tionship as well as British politics and issues of the rule of law in Poland and
Hungary. Icoz blogs at ideasoneurope.eu and has published on Turkey’s rela-
tionship with the EU in the Journal of Contemporary European Studies in 2016
and 2011. She also co-edited a special issue for the same journal in 2016 enti-
tled ‘Opportunities Missed: Turkey-EU Accession since 2005’. Icoz was a local
councillor in the UK between 2006 and 2014.
Natalie Martin is assistant professor at the University of Nottingham in the UK.
She was a BBC journalist before returning to academia to do a Ph.D. on Turkey’s
EU accession process and received her Ph.D. from Loughborough University
in 2012. She has since published widely on the issue of Turkey and the EU—
and more recently has examined the role of liberal democracy and the media in
both Turkey and the UK. She is part of the organizing council of the British
106 G. ICOZ AND N. MARTIN
Association for Turkish Area Studies (BATAS) and a trustee of the British Insti-
tute at Ankara (BIAA). Her most recent book is The Securitisation of News in
Turkey: Journalists as Terrorists? (2020) which is part of the international political
communication series of Palgrave Macmillan.
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