Public policies against criminal assets in mexico: challenges and opportunities from the north border states

Abstract

Given its vast border with the United States, Mexico is a strategic trade and economic development region, which creates significant challenges in combating crime and violence. In recent years, Mexico´s federal and state governments have focused their efforts on the development of strategies to combat and weaken the criminal structures operating in the country by using legal instruments such as seizure, abandonment, and extinction of domain. This study seeks to identify the challenges faced by the states of Baja California, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, Sonora, and Tamaulipas in their efforts to combat crime through the collection of primary and secondary data and interviews with key actors. Mexico faces major challenges in the development of public policies to fortify the legal precepts of extinction of domain, in addition to fostering institutional links with the Financial and Patrimonial Intelligence Units of Mexico's northern Border States. There are few studies about subnational efforts for asset forfeiture as a policy instrument against criminal elements in developing countries. The Mexican case presents important subnational efforts to improve security strategies that may provide guidance for other subnational governments or regions that may be facing similar challenges or are pursuing parallel initiatives.

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https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-021-09960-3
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Public policies againstcriminal assets inmexico: challenges
andopportunities fromthenorth border states
PedroR.TorresEstrada1 · JuanC.MonteroBagatella1 ·
CarlosVázquezFerrel1 · SylviaC.GarcíaMariño1
Accepted: 29 March 2021
© The Author(s) 2021
Abstract
Given its vast border with the United States, Mexico is a strategic trade and eco-
nomic development region, which creates significant challenges in combating crime
and violence. In recent years, Mexico´s federal and state governments have focused
their efforts on the development of strategies to combat and weaken the criminal
structures operating in the country by using legal instruments such as seizure, aban-
donment, and extinction of domain. This study seeks to identify the challenges faced
by the states of Baja California, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, Sonora, and
Tamaulipas in their efforts to combat crime through the collection of primary and
secondary data and interviews with key actors. Mexico faces major challenges in the
development of public policies to fortify the legal precepts of extinction of domain,
in addition to fostering institutional links with the Financial and Patrimonial Intel-
ligence Units of Mexico’s northern Border States. There are few studies about sub-
national efforts for asset forfeiture as a policy instrument against criminal elements
in developing countries. The Mexican case presents important subnational efforts
to improve security strategies that may provide guidance for other subnational gov-
ernments or regions that may be facing similar challenges or are pursuing parallel
initiatives.
Introduction
The Latin American region has faced an unprecedented public security crisis. Vio-
lence has soared in Mexico, much of Central America, and some countries in South
America. This situation is made evident by the rise in homicides, victimizations,
and restriction of freedoms. Several initiatives to combat violence and criminality
have been implemented, including military and police deployment and peace and
* Pedro R. Torres Estrada
pedro.torres@tec.mx
1 Tecnologico de Monterrey, School ofGovernment andPublic Transformation, NuevoLeon,
Mexico
Published online: 2 June 2021
Crime, Law and Social Change (2021) 76:387–407
/
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1 3
development programs. However, crime has continued to worsen and prison popula-
tions have soared [1].
This is the context for the present research. This study focuses on an alternative
crime-fighting strategy in Mexico: tackling crime on the economic front through
asset forfeiture policies at the subnational government level. These strategies con-
stitute an effort to strengthen the government´s capabilities to financially undermine
criminal organizations. The research was conducted in Mexico, a country plagued
by criminal organizations that control several regions, which suffers from institu-
tional weakness, [2–5] and where violence reached record levels from 2017 to 2019
[6].The rule criminal organizations exert over different regions relies on the use of
violence, that is clearly visible, but especially political corruption, that cannot be
easily seen and can be confused with peace and stability [7, 8].
The link with political authorities allows criminal organizations to corrupt local,
state and federal authorities, allowing criminals to exert significant influence and
even control governments [9–11]. Such access, for example, facilitates the granting
of permits to open businesses that provide cover for money laundering—bars, casi-
nos, dance clubs, liquor stores, and so on. Protection of their drug trafficking routes
is another benefit purchased by political financing, allowing the criminal cartels to
move freely through vast territories through collusion with officials [11, 12]. One
consequence has been diversification of their activities into other types of crimes,
such as kidnapping and extortion [13, 14]. This strategy has generated fear in voters,
affecting democracy and electoral participation [15, 16], but has also allowed crimi-
nals to obtain greater territorial control and weaken public institutions [2].
Within this scenario, Mexico´s subnational governments have developed different
strategies to improve their institutional capabilities to fight crime while acknowl-
edging the need for collaboration from different government levels [17], innovative
measures, and cooperation within and outside subnational governments [18].
The cases presented in this paper reflect the efforts of the north border Mexi-
can states to implement asset forfeiture as a policy measure through the legal device
of “extinction of domain.” This policy instrument has been applied in other coun-
tries but is new to Mexico. This policy instrument is part of a strategy that treats
security as a multilevel governance issue where the federal, state, and local govern-
ments share legal responsibilities and capabilities. The national law was enacted in
2019, but state efforts had already been implemented several years before, present-
ing the subnational level as a space for policy innovation and experimentation. This
approach makes the cases presented in this paper a resource for policymakers in dif-
ferent subnational governments and regions for learning from the failures and suc-
cesses of the Mexican situation.
The security strategy in Mexico was designed by the National Public Security
System and implemented through the federal and state governments. The states play
a key role in the strategy to combat violence, but remain heavily dependent on the
actions and resources of the federal government to fight criminal organizations. The
states use federal armed forces [19] as well as financial institutions, such as the Intel-
ligence Financial Unit, to address the economic aspect of criminality [20] but have
not developed or improved their own police institutions [9], justice systems [21], or
their intelligence financial units [22].
388 P. R. T. Estrada et al.
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National policies to tackle the economic aspects of criminality have been insti-
tuted through recently enacted laws. In 2009, during the Felipe Calderon administra-
tion (2006-2012), the federal government enacted the first legal reforms to bolster
the fight against money laundering [23]. In 2015, during the Enrique Peña adminis-
tration (2012-2018), the federal government promoted the National Anti-Corruption
System to promote intergovernmental cooperation to prevent, identify, prosecute,
and sanction corruption and strengthen accountability for public resources [24].
The states followed the federal example and developed their own “extinction of
domain” laws. However, not all states did so at the same time, understandably so
given the poor results from the first set of legal reforms [25]. As noted by the pros-
ecutor of the state of Tamaulipas in one interview, the previous legislation focused
on the creation of specialized units, staff training, and collaboration among different
governmental agencies, but lacked clear procedures for asset forfeiture. Thus, the
states began reforming their laws, as listed in the following table:
First enactment Reformed
Mexico City 2008
Chiapas, Nuevo Leon, San Luis Potosi,
Tabasco
2009
Chihuahua 2010
Guanajuato, Hidalgo, Mexico State, Puebla 2011
Baja California 2012
Coahuila, Oaxaca 2013 Nuevo Leon
Baja California Sur, Campeche, Colima,
Durango, Guerrero, Michoacan, Morelos,
Nayarit, Queretaro, Quintana Roo, Tlaxcala,
Veracruz
2014 San Luis Potosi
Aguascalientes, Jalisco, Sonora, Zacatecas 2015 Puebla, Oaxaca
Sinaloa, Tamaulipas 2016 Chihuahua, Guanajuato, Hidalgo, Mexico State
2017 Mexico City, Tabasco, Durango, Aguascalientes,
Sonora
2018 Baja California, Nayarit, Queretaro
2019 Coahuila, Yucatan
2020 Veracruz
Table1, Own elaboration based on each state laws.
The laws and reforms following 2013 can be seen as the basis for the federal and Con-
stitutional reform of 2019, which finally considered extinction of domain as a tool for
asset forfeiture. That same year, the National Law for Extinction of Domain was enacted
as a tool against organized crime, kidnapping, petroleum trafficking, drug trafficking,
human trafficking, public corruption, car theft, money laundering and extortion.
The legal instruments considered in the extinction of domain legislation have
been implemented, particularly in states such as Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon,
Sonora and Tamaulipas, where former governors face charges of political corruption
and unexplained wealth. These efforts by the states to tackle the economic aspect of
criminality are very recent and should be considered as an ongoing regional effort
389Public policies against criminal assets in mexico: challenges…
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Table 1 Relevant data regarding extinction of domain in the states. Own Elaboration with Microsoft Excel
The information requests were filed through Transparency Systems with folios 109,292,019, 00,916,819, 01,120,919, and 670,719 for the states of Chihuahua, Coahuila,
Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas respectively; they can all be consulted through the National Transparency Platform
State Number of extinction of domain
trials (last 5years)
Number of proceedings that ended with an
extinction of domain ruling
Assets declared in favor of the state as a
result of extinction of domain proceed-
ings
Baja California 0 0 0
Chihuahua 3 files 0 0
Coahuila 0 0 0
Nuevo Leon 0 0 0
Sonora 9 1 ½ Property
Tamaulipas 1 trial 1 proceeding 1 real property
390 P. R. T. Estrada et al.
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across Mexico. However, this study’s relevance rests on the analysis of the states and
regions as spaces for innovative policymaking, wherein observing and comparing
policy instruments, failures, results, and challenges with other regions and subna-
tional governments [17] can help provide guidance for stakeholders.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the efforts made by the north border
Mexican States and against criminal assets, especially through asset forfeiture. This
instrument is framed within the legal figures of “Transactions with Illicitly Obtained
Resources” and “extinction of domain.” The policy measures implemented by the
north border Mexican states against criminal assets are compared with similar ini-
tiatives taken in other countries, especially with civil and criminal asset forfeiture.
These policies involve the participation of multiple agents at the state level, such
as offices dealing with taxation and finances and state prosecutors are autonomous
from the governor´s office, as well as different federal entities for specific proce-
dures. The paper then examines the specific bodies created by the states to carry out
these policies, identifying their early results and existing problems and challenges.
The analysis of these cases demonstrates the capacity of subnational governments to
create their own policies for tackling the economic aspect of criminal operations—spe-
cifically criminal assets. This research contributes to identifying how regional and subna-
tional governments improve different public policies across the country, comparing their
specific results with other subnational governments and regions. Finally, the study also
reveals the complexity of developing and implementing asset forfeiture in a context where
different actors participate in different jurisdictions, requiring multilevel governance to be
enforced as a policy instrument against criminal assets.
Methodology
This research is based on case studies of the north border Mexican states, stressing
the legal particularities of “extinction of domain” as a policy instrument to fight the
economic side of criminality.
The cases were selected by the following criteria. First, in December 2018 the
research team conducted a workshop and research panel with Mexican and Ameri-
can academic experts and federal and state practitioners, identifying and discussing
relevant national and subnational issues with the assessment of the federal Financial
Intelligence Unit. Three key points were raised in this first exercise: (1) the iden-
tification of the heterogeneity development of the specialized state units for asset
forfeiture, called in some states Financial Intelligence Units (UIF) or Patrimonial
and Financial Intelligence Units (UIPE); (2) the case of Tamaulipas was considered
a good practice because of the results against former governors and important crimi-
nals; (3) there was not good communication between the state units and the fed-
eral authorities to support state investigations. This first meeting provided insight
into defining the pertinent cases for study, such as the crucial development of the
financial intelligence units in the northern states and the processes against former
governors and important criminals, as well as the relationship between the state and
federal financial units.
391Public policies against criminal assets in mexico: challenges…
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1 3
Second, in May 2019, the research team attended and participated in the National
Meeting of Patrimonial and Economical Units, conducting a questionnaire to all repre-
sentatives of the state units.1 From this exercise, the research team discovered that, save
for Baja California, Guanajuato, Hidalgo, Nayarit, Oaxaca, San Luis Potosi, and Yucatán,
almost all states had developed specialized units. However, there are several differences
in the government sector where the unit is located and its legal capabilities. From these
two exercises, the team identified the states of Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and
Tamaulipas as four relevant cases based on the stages of development of their units and
their early results. For the purpose of maintaining the study’s geographic integration and
also taking into account the shared economy, culture, and history with the United States
of America, it was decided to include the states of Sonora and Baja California.
Given that the legal initiatives by the states are quite recent, there is almost no
information regarding this topic. Consequently, semi-structured personal interviews
were conducted with attorney-generals, prosecutors, heads of the economic intel-
ligence units in the aforementioned states, the head of the Federal Financial Intel-
ligence Unit, and the Deputy Director for the Prevention of Transactions with Illicit
Proceeds Office of the National Banking Commission (CNBV). Document research
and information requests in the institutional transparency systems were also done.
This research arises from the following considerations. First, violence in Mexico is
strongly related with criminal organizations [4, 26], especially Drug Trafficking Organi-
zations (DTOs) [27]. The second consideration is that most criminal organizations seek
profits from trafficking illegal goods, so they require complex logistical chains that link
the production of goods with the markets where they are sold [7, 28]. They also have to
distribute and deliver their gains within the organizations and to their leaders, disguising
the unlawful origin of said resources to make them appear legal—i.e., money launder-
ing [29]. Third, criminal organizations in Mexico cannot be understood only as nation-
wide organizations or cartels. They are also the union of several organizations and gangs
that specialize in certain activities or control specific territories [30, 31]. Consequently, a
strategy against the criminal organizations responsible for most of the violence in Mexico
requires a complex response, based not only on the use of force, but also directed against
the assets of crime[32]. It must also be understood that the complex union of organiza-
tions allows for the states and even local governments to participate in this strategy by
identifying and neutralizing organizations that operate within their territories and jurisdic-
tions, through force and by attacking the assets of crime.
This study focuses on the institutional capabilities of Mexican state governments
against criminal assets. The main policy instruments for the states to utilize in the
strategy against criminal assets are those used to identify and sanction Transactions
with Illicitly Obtained Resources (ORPI), especially through extinction of domain
which can be understood as an asset forfeiture mechanism. These instruments,
according to the relevant legislation, focus on four high-impact crimes in Mexico2:
human trafficking, kidnapping, car theft, and drug trafficking.
1 The states of Baja California Sur, Campeche, Durango, Jalisco, Morelos, Sinaloa and Tlaxcala did not
attend the meeting and neither did answer the questionnaire.
2 The Public Security National System, defines “high impact crimes” as a those that due to their degree
of impact cause greater damage to citizens [70].
392 P. R. T. Estrada et al.
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1 3
The study focuses on Mexico´s northern Border States: Baja California, Sonora,
Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas, all strongly linked to the United
States of America through their economy, history, migration, and culture [33]. This
linkage is derived from a transport and communications network that incorporates
the four states into an interdependent economic dynamic. The region has common
characteristics such as dynamism and a concentration of added-value industrial
zones [34]. With 17.8% of the whole Mexican population [35], the region contrib-
utes 19.74% of the national GDP and represents one of the highest GDP per capita
rates in Mexico [36], along with a low poverty rate [37]. Mexican exports to the
United States represent 76.49% of all Mexican exports, and 61% of exports to the
USA are sent by land through these states. In terms of criminal activity, car thefts
have the highest incidence, followed by drug dealing, homicide, kidnapping, and
human trafficking, as shown in Fig.1.
The data show that the north region has had high crime rates for the past five
years. This is highly pertinent since this region represents one of Mexico’s most
important economic zones, given its industrial role and geographic situation as a
border with the United States.
The following section of the article describes and analyzes the legal instruments
to tackle the assets of crime in these four states. Next, based on the analysis and
interviews conducted with key players from the federal government, a policy pro-
posal is presented with the objective of promoting policy learning derived from the
early efforts by the four states.
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
0.000%
5.000%
10.000%
15.000%
20.000%
25.000%
30.000%
35.000%
40.000%
45.000%
50.000%
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Number of Naonal High Impact Crimes
noigeRtsaehtroNehtnisemirCtcapmIhgiHfoegatnecreP
Kidnaping (N) Car The (N) Human trafficking (N)
Drug dealing (N) Homicide Kidnaping
Car The Human trafficking Drug dealing
Homicide (N)
Fig. 1 High impact crimes in Mexico´s northeastern region and at national level. [38] Own Elaboration
with Microsoft Excel
393Public policies against criminal assets in mexico: challenges…
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Policy instruments againstcriminal assets
As previously noted, most criminal organizations, regardless of their size, aim to
extract economic benefits from their illegal activities [39]. The impact of criminal
organizations, especially those involved in drug trafficking (DTOs), has led to these
groups being defined as a national security risk and aroused the necessity of the
federal government instituting measures to combat them. To achieve this, a regu-
latory framework has been developed for police institutions and the armed forces
to combat criminal organizations. Also, the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit
(SHCP) and the Attorney General’s Office (FGR) have been provided with tools
to take on the financial side of their operations. The Rules of the Federal Law for
the Prevention and Identification of Transactions with Illicit Proceeds (LFPIORPI)
are geared to destroy money laundering sources, re-classifies tax evasion to identify
unexplained wealth, and facilitates collaboration with criminal or corruption inves-
tigations and the National Law on Extinction of Domain (LNED) to directly attack
the assets of crime. The states share these instruments through their laws on fiscal
evasion, extinction of domain, and the prosecution of transactions with illicit pro-
ceeds [25], but only a few states have put these laws into practice.
One of the most common instruments implemented against the assets of crime
and money laundering is asset forfeiture3 [40, 41]. The legal concept developed in
Mexico is “extinction of domain,” which is very similar to “extinction of owner-
ship” as developed in countries like Spain, and “civil asset forfeiture,” as developed
in countries like Ireland, South Africa, and the United States. These are all legal
means for transferring property derived from criminal acts to the state [42] without
a conviction, arrest, or charges against a specific person [43]. However, in Mexico,
federal courts have ruled that the legal application of extinction of domain requires
the existence of an ongoing legal process for it to proceed in court. [44].
There are two common types of forfeiture, civil and criminal. Civil asset’s forfei-
ture (in rem) only requires that there is probable cause that the property is tainted,
without criminally convicting the owner [40, 45]. Regarding criminal forfeiture (in
personam), the government confiscates property as part of a criminal ruling [46].
Countries like the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States have a long his-
tory of implementing assets forfeiture to combat organized crime [47], and countries
like Ireland and Indonesia also target unexplained wealth [48, 49].
In Mexico, the legal instrument of extinction of domain was incorporated into
the constitutional reform of Article 22, as well as to the Federal Law on Extinc-
tion of Domain enacted in May, 2009 with the aim of hitting crime "where it hurts
the most—their money [50]. However, as mentioned in interviews with the prosecu-
tors in Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas, this law was very bureaucratic and not include
building specialized units and training staff for analyzing financial information and
using the proceeds as funding for prosecuting crime. As a consequence, the states
began reforming their laws and, in 2019, the National Law on Extinction of Domain
was approved with the objective of encompassing the actions of all the states.
3 Some countries in the European Union have a harmonization process to classify the crime of money launder-
ing [69]. The term money laundering has been used by the Organization of American States since 1991 [71].
394 P. R. T. Estrada et al.
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Extinction of domain has been implemented as a federal tool against DTOs [23,
51, 52], but has had few successes [65]. It is a legal hybrid between civil assets for-
feiture and criminal assets forfeiture, because it has been interpreted by the Federal
Courts as a civil procedure against an asset involved in a crime [53], but requires
a criminal proceeding against the owner. However, for the extinction of domain to
proceed, even when a legal proceeding against the owner is required, it is only nec-
essary to prove that the asset was linked to the crime. There is no onus to prove the
owner’s guilt or obtain a criminal sentence. Furthermore, the burden of proof rests
on the owner to demonstrate the legal status or “innocence” of the asset, as in the
case of Spain with the figure of “extinction of ownership” [54].
The complexity of the Extinction of Domain figure in Mexico remains in the
incorporation of the criminal, civil, and administrative laws [52]. These fields refer
to the establishment of property rights on certain assets before a judicial author-
ity for such rights to be allocated to the State without compensation to the affected
party. Several federal courts have ruled on this instrument identifying it as a civil
rather than a criminal matter [44, 55] and legally distinct from expropriation and
seizure [56]. Besides, the public ministry or the prosecutor’s office is responsible for
proving that the assets have been the instrument, object, or product of an illicit activ-
ity [57]. Accordingly, it is the persecutor’s responsibility to investigate extinction of
domain, but this requires the collaboration of the criminal, civil and administrative
areas.
In the United States, assets forfeiture has been used as a law enforcement policy
instrument designed to stymie the gains and profits of crime [47]. It has especially
incentivized anti-drug policies [41, 43], but some studies have shown that this meas-
ure has not had the expected outcomes because it created incentives to forfeit prop-
erty and money, but not prosecute the actual dealers [58] or the elements that make
drugs profitable [59–61].4 All states have their own forfeiture laws due to equitable
sharing programs with the federal government [62], incentivizing state seizures and
forfeitures to a level where the revenues from forfeitures often exceed the budget of
the law enforcement agencies [42]. This has fostered police abuse, leading to consti-
tutional disputes and several state law reforms across the country [63].
After the enactment of the federal law in Mexico, states also enacted their own
laws on extinction of domain; however, these laws have not been especially effective
[64] and have been viewed as a failure [25] due to the small number of cases that
have been filed and won [65].
Given the precepts of the Law on Extinction of Domain (LFED) in the north Bor-
der States, it follows that the extinction of domain precept is admissible in the com-
mission of kidnapping, human trafficking, car theft and drug dealing,5 regarding the
following assets:
4 This is an important issue to consider for the Mexican case because even when illicit drug trafficking
is a federal crime, the states have legal attributions on illicit drug distribution [72], so asset forfeiture
could become an incentive to target consumers instead of major distributors.
5 Article 7 of Chihuahua’s Extinction of Domain Law; Article 20, Section II of the Political Constitution
of the Free and Sovereign State of Nuevo Leon and Article 10, Clause 1 of Tamaulipas’s Extinction of
Domain Law. Additionally, Coahuila added the crime of Criminal Facilitation, Article 9, Section V of the
Extinction of Domain Law.
395Public policies against criminal assets in mexico: challenges…
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1 3
I Assets that have been an instrument, object or product of a crime,
II Assets that have been used to hide or mix assets product of a crime;
III Assets used by a third party to commit a crime, provided that the owner is
aware of said purpose;
IV Assets registered under the name of a third party, where there’s sufficient
evidence to prove that they are the proceeds of a crime and the party accused
of committing the crime appears as the owner of said assets.6
As previously noted, in the United States assets forfeiture has been subject to
abuse in some states because law enforcement agencies receive most of the gains
from these forfeitures. In the case of Mexico, however, the gains are distributed
between different agencies and the enforcement agencies only receive a portion.7
Therefore, state law enforcement agencies in Mexico lack an economic incentive to
enforce assets forfeiture. However, one relevant issue on the analyzed states is that,
as mentioned in an interview by Nuevo Leon´s State Prosecutor, American states
provide information to the Mexican Federal and State governments to improve both
Mexican and American operations against criminal organizations.
Extinction of domain is a complex legal device that creates significant collaboration
problems between the different agencies. For example, prosecutors, public ministries, and
judges are all involved in the preparation, filing, information-gathering, and resolution of
legal proceedings. Similarly, government agencies that oversee the state’s public finances
need to collaborate among themselves. Finally, there is a need for intergovernmental col-
laboration between the prosecutor’s offices of the federal entities with both the Attorney
General’s Office (FGR) and the Financial Intelligence Unit of the SHCP, in addition to
working together with state and federal judges. This process is not functional because,
as the chairwoman of the National Banking Commission responsible for prevention of
operation with resources from illicit proceeds explained, the states have not developed
the resources to analyze financial information, lack technology and human resources, and
spend years analyzing information provided by the federal authorities.
The complexity of the extinction of domain proceeding reduces the chances of
it being employed as part of a government strategy. In this regard, the public safety
strategies of the states were reviewed for the period starting from the enactment of
the extinction of domain acts mentioned in Chart1.8 The governor’s annual reports
were also examined for references or results related to extinction of domain as a pol-
icy instrument. Information requests were also sent to the judicial powers and public
prosecutors’ offices of the referred states to obtain data on the number of extinction
7 According to the National Extinction of Domain Act, gains from forfeited assets have to be equally dis-
tributed among the judicial power, the General Attorney´s Office and a special victims’ fund. Every state
defines in its own laws the specific rules to distribute the gains from forfeited assets.
8 The research first considered government´s plans to identify if the current governor considered extinc-
tion of domain as a policy instrument for the security or anti-corruption strategies. This process consid-
ered the administrations 2013–2019 and 2019–2021 for Baja California, 2010–2016 and 2016–2021 for
Chihuahua, 2015–2021 for Sonora, 2011–2017 and 2017–2023 for Coahuila, 2009–2015 and 2015–2021
for Nuevo Leon, 2011–2016 and 2016–2022 for Tamaulipas.
6 Article 8 of Chihuahua’s Extinction of Domain Act, Article 10 of Coahuila’s Extinction of Domain Act, Arti-
cle 8 of Nuevo Leon’s Extinction of Domain Act and Article 10 of Tamaulipas’s Extinction of Domain Act.
396 P. R. T. Estrada et al.
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1 3
of domain proceedings filed and resolved. Finally, the prosecutors in Nuevo Leon
and Tamaulipas responsible for said matters were interviewed to get their experience
and views on the government’s capacities to combat the assets of crime.
According to the development plans and annual reports of these federal entities,
combating illegal transactions or tackling the assets of crime has not been part of the
security strategy. The issue is not mentioned, no objectives or proceedings are pro-
posed, and no results are reported. In the government´s plans, none of the governors’
reports mentioned combating transactions with illicit proceeds, extinction of domain,
or any other measures aimed at criminal assets as part of their security or anti-corrup-
tion strategies. Every state included different strategies to strengthen its police insti-
tutions, intelligence capabilities, and infrastructure, but there is no mention of com-
bating the finances of criminal organizations or implementing extinction of domain
as a public policy instrument. Along the same lines, governors’ annual reports do
not emphasize dealing with the economic aspects of crime, although they do refer to
extinction of domain as part of their legislative agenda. The only references related to
the implementation of extinction of domain were found in the annual reports of Chi-
huahua, where the governor announced the first two successful procedures by the gov-
ernment [66], and Sonora in 2018, where the governor noted the creation of a special-
ized unit to implement asset forfeiture and, again in 2019, revealed that this unit was
prosecuting 78 different cases, especially targeting drug trafficking, and had won one
case [67]. This is an important lacuna because it shows that attacking criminal assets
is not part of the public security strategy in the states and such initiatives therefore will
not have resources and support from the state government.
The laws and reforms in the field of extinction of domain have not led to specific
proceedings or results, demonstrating that the reforms promoted in the states have
sought only to harmonize state and federal regulations but not actually use them to
seize criminal assets or halt related transactions. To this end, information requirements
were submitted to the judicial powers and the states’ prosecutors’ offices, regarding
the number of extinctions of domain proceedings filed and resolved.9 The response
revealed that the judicial authorities of the state of Chihuahua received and resolved
eight extinction of domain proceedings, ruling in favor of the attorney general in only
two cases; however, no file numbers, dates, or amounts involved were included. The
chairwoman of the National Banking Commission, which is responsible for prevent-
ing operations with resources from illicit proceeds, considered Chihuahua had one of
better state records, having developed a specialized unit with technological and human
capabilities for analyzing financial information provided by the federal government.
In the states of Coahuila and Nuevo Leon, by contrast, the prosecutor’s office and the
judicial powers had not filed or resolved any extinction of domain case. In Tamaulipas,
the public prosecutor’s office reported that it filed and obtained a favorable extinction
of domain resolution for a property valued at 800,000 Mexican pesos.
The lack of criminal proceedings in the field of extinction of domain presumes
the existence of other factors that may influence this failure. To explore this issue,
9 The transparency requests were presented with folios 00,986,920 for the case of Baja California,
076,102,019 for Chihuahua; 00,677,819 for Coahuila; 00,828,119 and 00,828,019 for Nuevo Leon;
and 01,045,120 for Sonora, and 00,457,019 and 00,456,919 for Tamaulipas. They can all be consulted
through the National Transparency Platform.
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1 3
the prosecutors responsible for combating the assets of crime in the states of Nuevo
Leon and Tamaulipas were interviewed. They noted that the entities specializing
in combating the assets of crime were just two years in existence and did not have
expert personnel in this area. They also noted the lack of collaboration within the
government’s structures, with no substantive and ongoing communication between
the sectors responsible for public safety or with the treasury, which prevents them
from filing proceedings based on the identification of suspicious transactions.
Finally, the prosecutors acknowledged that they lack specialized staff capable of
simultaneously addressing the criminal, fiscal, administrative, and civil rights sur-
rounding crime assets seizure. Moreover, there are no judges who specialize in this
area so, even if proceedings are filed, the outcomes are uncertain.
The interviewees also pointed out that the procedure to file an extinction of domain
case is not straightforward. Uncertainty exists about how files should be integrated, caus-
ing prosecutors to rely on other legal precepts.10 This works well for property obtained
from special transactions, particularly vehicles, weapons, and cash, but are ineffectual in
cases involving houses, bank accounts, and other assets associated with DTOs.
When addressing the issue of intra-governmental collaboration, prosecutors
acknowledged the support of the treasuries or units responsible for the treasury in
their states. However, they admitted that interaction with the Financial Intelligence
Unit of the Finance Ministry and other federal entities were problematic. In the same
vein, the chairwoman of the National Banking Commission noted that collaboration
with the states is weak because of the lack of technological and human resources to
conduct financial analysis and apply the information to criminal procedures. Conse-
quently, the states and the federal government do not rely on each other for financial
investigations and do not collaborate. The chairs of both the Financial Intelligence
Unit and the National Banking Commission admitted that this is partly because the
states have to request banking and financial information. Prosecutors responsible for
specific cases do not have the authority to freeze bank accounts but must apply to
the federal offices, making the process slow and bureaucratic. Also, state prosecu-
tors are typically rotated, which makes it virtually impossible to follow up on cases.
Only Chihuahua had built a strong relationship between their prosecutor’s office and
the National Banking Commission and the Financial Intelligence Unit.
Finally, prosecutors noted the lack of incentives to file extinction of domain cases.
Before the prosecutors’ offices became autonomous, the resources obtained from
criminal investigations were integrated into victims’ funds or used for compensation
but, under the new dispensation, it is unclear how the resources are managed. As a
result, there are no incentives for prosecutors to specialize on extinction of domain,
file these appeals, and integrate the files.
In sum, combating Transactions with Illicit Proceeds and extinction of domain
are not part of the government’s strategies, prosecutors’ offices have no incentives to
file extinction of domain cases and the required human resources and intergovern-
mental collaboration are lacking. However, it should be acknowledged that, within
10 When an asset is declared as abandoned, an administrative proceeding is executed for the state to
assume its control, safeguarding the right of the possible owner to claim it, but given that the asset is
associated with a criminal act, it is generally not claimed and it is transferred to the State’s control.
398 P. R. T. Estrada et al.
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1 3
the past few years, the prosecutors’ offices have started developing specialized struc-
tures to pursue these legal strategies.
The following section presents a proposal to reinforce the policy against criminal
assets in Mexico’s states. The recommendations are informed by the challenges faced by
the units of the states under study and interviews of state prosecutors, the head of the
Intelligence Financial Unit, and the chairwoman of the National Banking Commission.
Developing public policies tocombat assets ofcrime insubnational
governments
Criminal policy is ideally shaped by cogent reasons for prioritizing certain types of
crime over others and applying limited human and technical resources accordingly.
States must initially evaluate which crimes they have to combat in the context of their
particular situation. Thus, each state must determine the priority they must give to dis-
mantling the financial structures of criminal organizations as part of their policy on
Transactions with Illicit Proceeds and extinction of domain of criminal assets [68].
Some subnational governments will be more interested in investigating cases of
political corruption (which usually have a greater media impact) and, as a strategic
move, other states will start with high-impact crimes that have more dire effects on
their communities. The Mexican case, with the assessment of the federal agencies
and the cases studied, emphasized the importance of targeting Transactions with
Illicit Proceeds.
The federal and subnational experience in Mexico underlines the importance of
developing specialized units within the responsible dependencies for enforcing asset
forfeiture. Initially, states will be required to review the information they have at
their disposal. The construction of these databases is often challenging. Databases
provide the raw material required for intelligence analysis. According to the chair-
woman of the National Banking Commission, the relevant state units do not have
the resources or personnel needed to analyze the information provided by her office.
This highlights the need to train prosecutors and keep them in their positions, given
that typical rotation of personnel adds to the difficulty of building strong relations
between the states and the Commission. As previously mentioned, asset forfei-
ture requires collaboration between different financial, civil and criminal depart-
ments, which sharing databases crucial. The challenges lies in creating data-sharing
agreements with other units and agencies to be able to use intelligence products
as evidence in judicial proceedings, given that, if there is no existing agreement to
exchange information, the findings will not be admissible in court.
Similarly, tools designed to store and cross-reference information require training
for analysts. The prosecutors of Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas both noted the lack
of support from decision-makers to strengthen the units. The chairwoman of the
CNB also admitted that they could not build strong relations with the states because
of constant changes in the unit´s staff, making it almost impossible to follow the
investigation process for specific cases. For this reason, recruitment is an important
part of the consolidation process of this Public Policy, since analysts are the ones
who develop the final product that will be provided to prosecutors for the judicial
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1 3
process. In contrast, the chairwoman of the CNB noted that the lack of human and
technological resources in the states weakened collaboration and trust with federal
agencies. In this sense, the challenge is to break the existing resistance and mistrust
about sharing information between agencies and governments, especially regarding
financial, patrimonial, and economic issues.
There is an ongoing debate about where the specialized units should be located—
whether in the finance ministries, the autonomous public prosecutors’ offices, or the
law enforcement units. There is no set model in Mexico, neither in the federal or
subnational governments. However, from the interviews with the Intelligence Finan-
cial Unit and the cases studied, the most effective case-building capacity is found
in those units integrated to the prosecutors’ offices in charge of prosecuting what
they identify as crimes, or those derived from complaints remanded by finance or
municipal units.
Prosecutors responsible for cases related to ORPIs will have to specialize in this
type of crime, hence the suggestion that the same prosecutor should be responsi-
ble for the investigation files. Changing prosecutors exacerbated the following prob-
lems: deficient case follow-up; weakness in the judicial processes; corruption; and
failure of the public policy. Additionally, prosecutors are not well versed in the legal
precept of Transactions with Illicit Proceeds and Extinction of Domain and judges
do not have the required knowledge to interpret the intelligence products to attack
the assets’ structures because they do not have specialized training. The research
and interviews revealed that very few cases are reviewed by judges. This becomes
a vicious cycle characterized by the judge’s lack of training regarding Transactions
with Illicit Proceeds, given the low or no referral of cases of this type.
The usefulness of the intelligence products for decision-making is crucial to legit-
imize the unit. Ultimately, units become service suppliers for diverse areas within
the prosecutors’ offices and finance ministries. Their legitimacy and strength within
the institutional framework will be determined by their usefulness to the actors
responsible for decision-making or integrating judicial files.
The ultimate aim is to generate intelligence products that strengthen investiga-
tion files, with the aim of increasing the likelihood of their prosecution and getting
judicial decisions that undermine the finances of criminal organizations. This type
of institution must work hand-in-hand with the prosecutors responsible for bringing
the cases before the judges, so the prosecutor’s affiliation with the working model
will be decisive. In this regard, the challenge is not only to create units and train
prosecutors, but also to train and guide judges. It should be noted that the National
Extinction of Domain Law required the Federal Judiciary Council to create courts
dedicated to extinction of domain cases within six months after enactment.11 This
situation must be taken into consideration by the states under study.
Regarding the issue of increasing prosecutions and convictions, it is a good
practice to monitor the proceedings from the initial investigation to the final rul-
ing to identify good and bad practice, strengthen human resources’ training, and
11 Refer to article 9 of the Decree’s transitional that gives effect to the National Extinction of Domain
Act.
400 P. R. T. Estrada et al.
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1 3
generate proceedings protocols that can be updated with new legal and operational
developments.
The high expectations for the specialized units often elide the complexities
involved for successful prosecutions or even case-building. Interviews conducted
with state prosecutors and representatives from the federal government revealed
that, when a unit of this type is formed, results are expected within a short period,
which in turn stymies thorough training. One of the most important challenges of
the states’ prosecutors will be to increase the court caseload and conviction rates
of Transactions with Illicit Proceeds cases. Insufficient cases were identified in the
states under study to statistically perform this exercise on a representative basis
since they remain confidential due to ongoing legal processes. In the Mexican legal
process, the prosecutors first prepare the case, then present it to a judge who rules
on suitability for trial. In consequence, not all cases even reach the courts and the
number of trials does not reflect the work done by prosecutors. Moreover, only the
number of trials is public, but the number of cases being prosecuted are not. At pre-
sent, there are very few registered extinctions of domain trials or rulings in the states
under study.12
Taking the above into consideration, it is necessary to rethink the public policy
strategies being used to attack criminal financial structures. However, the purpose of
this study is to identify the early work, challenges, and opportunities for these efforts
to be strengthened, promoting policy learning, and making clear their importance
toward contributing to the strategy against criminality.13
Conclusions
Countries like Mexico confront the most worrying challenge for security because of
organized crime. Through violence and corruption, crime has gained control over
territories, undermined institutions, and even threatened democracy [9, 15]. The
common strategy has been to fight crime through the police institutions and armed
forces, but minimal effort has been made to tackle the financial side of criminality.
In this vein, several countries have developed asset forfeiture as a policy instru-
ment against criminal assets and today are discussing the aim of this instrument
because in some cases it may allow abusive powers from the police [61]. How-
ever, in Mexico this instrument has been recently enacted under the legal figure of
12 The absence of state cases contrasts with the amount of federal cases. In the federal level, since the
enactment of the Extinction of Domain Law promoted several cases but, according to the interviews with
the Head Chair of the Financial Intelligence Unit, this legal instrument wasn´t considered as an important
policy instrument for the public security strategy until recent years under the current administration of
President Andrés Manuel López Obrador.
13 The absence of state cases contrasts with the amount of federal cases. In the federal level, since the
enactment of the Extinction of Domain Law promoted several cases but, according to the interviews with
the Head Chair of the Financial Intelligence Unit, this legal instrument wasn´t considered as an important
policy instrument for the public security strategy until recent years under the current administration of
President Andrés Manuel López Obrador.
401Public policies against criminal assets in mexico: challenges…
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1 3
“extinction of domain”. The first try to develop “extinction of domain” as a policy
instrument for asset forfeiture was in 2009 but its complexity did not allow it to be
enforced had to be reformed. Nowadays, under the reforms almost all states in Mex-
ico have developed specialized units to prosecute crime and enforce asset forfeiture
as an instrument against the assets of crime.
This paper identified the existing institutional weaknesses in the northern states
of Mexico in terms of asset forfeiture, making it an attractive area to launder money
from drug trafficking and other criminal activities. This is a very worrisome issue,
given the volume of money and commercial transactions carried out in this region.
However the states face several challenges addressed in international experiences
such as collaboration with different agencies, from each state, across states and with
the federal government [60, 61, 69].
The institutional weakness of Mexican states has been used by organized crime
to control several regions across the country. However, asset forfeiture is a policy
instrument which may improve the strategy against crime and violence, but its
enforcement also requires collaboration across different agencies and developing
specialized units to carry on with the investigations to build the cases and take them
to trial. These units require their own legal framework, technology, but mainly need
trained staff who can analyze information, collaborate with different agencies of dif-
ferent governments, and generate the required materials to build a case and take it
to trial. As mentioned in the interviews, collaboration and trust is weak because the
specialized units are very recent, do not have support from prosecutors and gov-
ernors. However, in opposite cases, where these units have support, they profes-
sionalize their staff and improve on their capabilities, conducting strong investiga-
tions against criminals and corrupt politicians as shown for the cases of Sonora and
Tamaulipas.
In recent years, the federal and state governments have created intelligence units
to attack crime assets through the legal precept of extinction of domain. Although
a powerful legal tool, this legislation has not been effectively utilized and requires
administrative strengthening by improving intra- and inter-institutional communica-
tion and collaboration between the agencies, and the training of judges, prosecutors,
and other actors in legal precepts to attack the assets of criminal organizations and
procedures. It is also vital for these units to link with decision-makers to include
asset forfeiture as a policy instrument to attack the financial gains of criminality
[59].
The Mexican border with the United States is a geostrategic region, decisive for
understanding drug trafficking, the exchange of money, and smuggling of weap-
ons [20]. In the last ten years, the region experiences a large part of the violence
that Mexico has experienced. Organized crime even control some territories, influ-
ence and have even captured local governments [9, 15]. However, local and fed-
eral governments are only recently considering changes in the approach to address
the issues by enacting and reforming their extinction of domain laws to carry out
asset forfeiture and have begun to strengthen their institutions to deal with money
laundering. These are ongoing processes that may contribute to improve similar
efforts in other regions of the world, with similar or lower risk characteristics [69].
402 P. R. T. Estrada et al.
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1 3
Acknowledging the fact that crime, and specially organized crime is an important
risk for several countries, the subnational Mexican experience brings lessons to
improve the efforts against the economic side of criminality [20].
Finally, the interviews with key actors and the literature review allow us to identify
that it is necessary for the states of the studied region establish as a priority in their
government plans the fight against money laundering, the implementation of strate-
gies aimed at controlling this problem and the effective use of the figure of asset for-
feiture. On the other hand, it is recommended that state governments strengthen the
legal framework for the operation of their intelligence units, emphasizing their func-
tions, obligations, scope, and collaboration with other actors (judges, analysts, pub-
lic ministries, etc.). It is recommended to give priority to topics such as: training of
human resources in the legal figure of asset forfeiture, structuring of their databases
and monitoring of cases involving the figure of asset forfeiture in the states.
It is important to continue studying Mexico’s northern border region and all sub-
national experience because the phenomenon of assets’ forfeiture has an impact in
both countries on issues such as security and regional growth. It is necessary to con-
duct more studies to promote policy learning about the states’ capabilities to attack
criminal assets in Mexico and contribute to the public security strategy.
This article has presented the results of research conducted in Mexico, showing the
efforts of subnational governments to attack the financial side of criminal organizations.
Many countries face similar challenges, but this case raises the importance of subna-
tional governments and their role in dealing with complex issues like organized crime.
Funding Not mentioned for not making any reference to authorship.
Data availability Data available on request from the authors.
Declarations
Conflicts of interest The author(s) did not have any conflict of interest during the research and the elabora-
tion of this article.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License,
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Com-
mons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article
are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the
material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is
not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission
directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http:// creat iveco mmons. org/ licen
ses/ by/4. 0/.
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