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MPIfG Discussion Paper
MPIfG Discussion Paper 21/3
Determinants of Wage (Dis-)Satisfaction
Trade Exposure, Export-Led Growth, and the Irrelevance
of Bargaining Structure
Lucio Baccaro and Erik Neimanns
Lucio Baccaro and Erik Neimanns
Determinants of Wage (Dis-)Satisfaction: Trade Exposure, Export-Led Growth, and the Irrelevance
of Bargaining Structure
MPIfG Discussion Paper 21/3
Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, Köln
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne
May 2021
MPIfG Discussion Paper
ISSN 0944-2073 (Print)
ISSN 1864-4325 (Internet)
© 2021 by the author(s)
About the author(s)
Lucio Baccaro is Director at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne, Germany.
Email: baccaro@mpifg.de
Erik Neimanns is a postdoctoral researcher at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne,
Germany.
Email: neimanns@mpifg.de
MPIfG Discussion Papers are refereed scholarly papers of the kind that are publishable in a peer-reviewed
disciplinary journal. Their objective is to contribute to the cumulative improvement of theoretical knowl-
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Baccaro, Neimanns: Determinants of Wage (Dis-)Satisfaction iii
Abstract
Although the determinants of wage militancy and moderation have been studied exten-
sively by comparative political economists, so far the literature has focused on the mac-
ro level of analysis. As a result, there has been no attempt to analyze the determinants of
individual-level attitudes towards wages. Based on two waves of the International Social
Survey Programme, in this paper we ll this gap. We examine to what extent workers inter-
nalize the imperatives of competitiveness, and whether wage bargaining institutions facili-
tate this internalization, as suggested by a large literature on neocorporatism. Surprisingly,
we nd that the structure of wage bargaining (more or less coordinated or centralized)
has no relationship with wage satisfaction or dissatisfaction at the individual level. Instead,
wage dissatisfaction decreases strongly when workers are individually exposed to trade and
countries rely heavily on export-led growth. Our results point to the need to rethink the
determinants of wage moderation.
Keywords: collective bargaining, export-led growth, trade exposure, wage moderation,
wage preferences
Zusammenfassung
In der Vergleichenden Politischen Ökonomie wurden die Bestimmungsfaktoren von Lohn-
zurückhaltung und Arbeitskämpfen für die Durchsetzung von Lohnforderungen umfas-
send untersucht. Diese Forschung bewegte sich jedoch bislang auf der Makroebene, sodass
es keine Versuche gab, Einstellungen zu Löhnen auf der individuellen Ebene zu untersu-
chen. Unter Verwendung von zwei Erhebungen des International Social Survey Program-
me adressieren wir in diesem Beitrag diese bestehende Forschungslücke. Wir untersuchen,
in welchem Maße Arbeitnehmende die Erfordernisse von internationaler Wettbewerbsfä-
higkeit internalisieren und ob, wie die umfassende neokorporatistische Forschung sugge-
riert, stärker koordinierte und zentralisierte Institutionen von Lohnverhandlungen diese
Internalisierung befördern. Überraschenderweise zeigen sich keine Zusammenhänge zwi-
schen der Struktur der Lohnverhandlungen und individueller Lohnzufriedenheit und -un-
zufriedenheit. Stattdessen zeigt sich jedoch eine geringe Unzufriedenheit mit dem eigenen
Lohn, wenn die eigene Beschäigung vom Außenhandel abhängt und wenn Exporte ein
starker Wachstumstreiber des jeweiligen Landes sind. Unsere Ergebnisse weisen auf die
Notwendigkeit hin, die Bestimmungsfaktoren von Lohnzurückhaltung neu zu überdenken.
Schlagwörter: exportgetriebenes Wachstum, internationaler Handel, kollektive Lohnver-
handlungen, Lohnpräferenzen, Lohnzurückhaltung
Baccaro, Neimanns: Determinants of Wage (Dis-)Satisfaction 1
Determinants of Wage (Dis-)Satisfaction: Trade Exposure,
Export-Led Growth, and the Irrelevance of Bargaining
Structure
1 Introduction
e determinants of “wage moderation,” or its opposite, “wage militancy” have been
extensively researched by comparative political economy. A large literature has studied
cross-country dierences in wage bargaining structures, trying to discern those that
are most (or least) conducive to wage restraint. Surprisingly, individual-level attitudes
towards wages have been neglected so far. Yet, it seems plausible that wage moderation
as an aggregate outcome is more likely to emerge when workers are satised with their
wages and thus less likely to mobilize to increase them.1
In this paper, we study the determinants of wage satisfaction and dissatisfaction at the
individual level by analyzing two waves of the International Social Survey Programme
(ISSP 1999; 2009), supplemented by macro-level data from various sources. Our goal
is to understand to what extent workers internalize two kinds of economic constraints:
the microeconomic risk of job loss for workers exposed to international trade, and the
macroeconomic requirement to keep wage growth in check if a country relies heavily
on export-led growth. Furthermore, we aim to ascertain whether the internalization of
constraints is facilitated by more coordinated or centralized wage bargaining structures,
as suggested by the vast literature on (neo-)corporatism.
We nd that the workers’ attitudes to wages are signicantly and substantially shaped
by the above-mentioned constraints. Wage dissatisfaction decreases with trade expo-
sure at the individual level and with reliance on export-led growth at the country level.
Interestingly, the wage-moderating eect of export-led growth applies not just to work-
ers who directly benet from increased cost competitiveness but also to other workers
as well. However, we do not nd any direct or moderating eect of wage bargaining
structure. is implies either that corporatist institutions aect aggregate wages without
modifying the wage preferences of workers, as suggested by a portion of the literature,
or that the corporatist literature has exaggerated the importance of bargaining structure.
Previous versions of this paper were presented at the virtual workshop “Working Class Politics in
the 21st Century” (University of Geneva, 2020), the virtual Conference of the Council for European
Studies (2020), and the Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics (New
York, 2019). We thank the participants, as well as Chris Howell, Georg Picot, Jonas Pontusson, and
Armin Schäfer for many helpful comments and suggestions.
1 In this paper, we use “wage moderation,” “wage restraint,” “wage satisfaction,” and their oppo-
sites, “wage militancy,” and “wage dissatisfaction,” interchangeably. We also use “wage prefer-
ences” and “wage attitudes” interchangeably.
2 MPIfG Discussion Paper 21/3
e paper is organized as follows. We rst review the existing comparative political
economy research on wage moderation and workers’ preferences, and formulate hy-
potheses about how trade exposure, growth models, and wage bargaining institutions
aect individual attitudes to wages. en we present our empirical setup and empirical
tests. In the conclusion, we highlight the implications of our ndings for the literature
on wage bargaining and growth models.
2 Determinants of wage moderation
A rich literature in comparative political economy has examined the determinants of
“wage restraint.” e bulk of the literature has focused on wage bargaining institutions,
sometimes in interaction with the central bank’s behavior. In this literature, wage mod-
eration improves the trade-o between ination and unemployment (see Tarantelli
1986; Flanagan, Soskice, and Ulman 1983). If nominal wages are set by multiple wage
setters, and if none of them is suciently large to internalize the costs of wage militancy
(Olson 1965), each will have incentives to push for higher wages. Yet, because the same
reasoning applies to all actors, the ultimate outcome will be a tendency for nominal
wages to increase everywhere. Whether this tendency translates into higher ination or
higher unemployment will depend on the response of the central bank. If the central
bank accommodates, there will be higher ination. If the central bank does not accom-
modate, there will be higher unemployment (Hall and Franzese 1998; Iversen 1999).
However, if wage bargaining is centralized or coordinated, the wage setters will face
dierent incentives. In particular, unions will understand that a wage push is likely to
produce negative outcomes and will therefore exercise self-restraint. Empirical research
based on these theoretical premises has found that centralized or coordinated wage
bargaining is associated with lower ination and/or unemployment.2 Research has also
shown that wage growth is lower under centralized or coordinated bargaining (e. g.,
Baccaro and Simoni 2010).
A general feature of the existing literature is its focus on macro characteristics. is
focus makes it dicult to understand the mechanisms through which wage modera-
tion emerges (or fails to emerge) as an aggregate outcome. If bargaining coordination
2 See, in a very long list, Cameron 1984; Calmfors and Drill 1988; Soskice 1990; Scharpf 1991;
Garrett 1998; Hall and Franzese 1998; Iversen 1999; Soskice and Iversen 2000; Traxler, Blaschke,
and Kittel 2001; Franzese 2002; Kenworthy 2002; Mares 2006. is literature has also discussed
at length which type of bargaining structure is “optimal,” i. e., associated with lowest ination
and/or unemployment. Calmfors and Dril (1988) argued that both decentralized and cen-
tralized bargaining structures have good macroeconomic performances, while Soskice (1990)
argued that decentralized bargaining is inecient and found a monotonic relationship between
bargaining coordination and macroeconomic outcomes.
Baccaro, Neimanns: Determinants of Wage (Dis-)Satisfaction 3
leads to wage moderation, does this happen because bargaining coordination leads in-
dividual workers to develop more moderate wage preferences, or because union leaders
are able to suppress “deviant” preferences and impose moderate bargaining agendas?
In response to these questions, the literature on neocorporatism has oered interesting,
but so far largely untested conjectures. A portion of the literature has argued that corpo-
ratist institutions enable organizational leaders to eectively suppress or sideline “mili-
tant” worker preferences (Schmitter 1974; Streeck 1988, 1994; Pemberton 1988; Prze-
worski 1985). According to this literature, wage moderation does not emerge because
the wage preferences of workers become more moderate, but because the preferences
of interest group leaders prevail, enabling them to pursue policies that conict with the
preferences of a large portion or even the majority of the membership (Pizzorno 1978).
Another stream of literature has argued instead that union leaders in centralized unions
shape workers’ preferences and make them more moderate through the circulation of
information and persuasive argument (Baccaro 2003; Culpepper 2008).
In this paper, our focus is on workers’ individual attitudes towards wages. We start from
the assumption that wage attitudes depend on the perceived costs of wage militancy for
the worker, and that workers who are exposed to international trade are less likely to
express wage dissatisfaction. In formulating this hypothesis, we build on a portion of
the neocorporatist literature, which distinguishes between exposed and non-exposed
sectors. It argues that unions in sectors exposed to international competition are di-
rectly aected by the consequences of wage militancy, since the resulting cost increase
is likely to have negative consequences for rm competitiveness and lead to reduced
product and labor demand and lower employment. Firms in exposed sectors are for the
same reason more likely to resist unions’ wage militancy. Instead, unions in non-ex-
posed sectors face less stringent competitiveness constraints, and rms are more likely
to be able to accommodate higher costs by increasing prices. For public sector unions
in particular, employment may be entirely disconnected from market conditions. For
all these reasons, wage moderation is more likely to emerge in exposed sectors than in
non-exposed ones (Crouch 1988; Franzese 2001; Garrett and Way 1999; Hancké 2013;
Johnston and Regan 2016). e wage moderating eect of trade exposure is likely to
apply to the individual level as well, as suggested by the literature on the eects of trade
openness (e. g., Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Walter 2017; Busemeyer and Garritzmann
2019). According to this literature, individuals demand policies that reduce labor mar-
ket risks and the potential adverse economic consequences associated with trade open-
ness.3 Based on the above, we hypothesize that workers exposed to trade put their jobs
at risk if nominal wage growth is excessive. us, they internalize this constraint and are
more likely to suppress attitudes of wage dissatisfaction.
3 e literature on the eects of globalization on individual-level preferences has studied pref-
erences towards issues such as free trade (Mayda and Rodrik 2005) or social policies (Walter
2017; Busemeyer and Garritzmann 2019). To the best of our knowledge, to date no study has
examined how globalization aects individual preferences towards wages.
4 MPIfG Discussion Paper 21/3
Hypothesis 1: e more workers are exposed to international competition, the lower
their wage dissatisfaction.
However, the egocentric eect of trade exposure does not exclude sociotropic consider-
ations. Here we build on the recent literature on growth models (Baccaro and Pontusson
2016; Stockhammer 2015; Lavoie and Stockhammer 2012). is literature casts doubt
on the notion that wage moderation is unconditionally conducive to higher growth. Es-
pecially for large economies, wages are an important determinant of aggregate demand,
and wage moderation may lead to excess savings and stagnation. However, in export-
led economies wage moderation leads to real exchange rate depreciation (provided the
exchange rate is not fully exible). If the economy is suciently open and the sensitivity
of exports to wage and price dierences suciently large, any negative eect of wage
moderation on domestic demand is more than compensated by the stimulation of ex-
ports (Bhaduri and Marglin 1990). In a recent analysis, Johnston (2021) nds that wage
moderation is associated with higher growth and lower unemployment only for coun-
tries pursuing export-led growth, but not for countries relying on domestic demand.
e growth model literature suggests that wage moderation is a prerequisite for export-
led growth (Baccaro and Pontusson 2016). We thus hypothesize that in countries rely-
ing on export-led growth, a generalized “wage consciousness” emerges, which leads
workers to internalize the need for wage moderation. e mechanisms may be multiple.
Workers may be inuenced by the dominant discourse in the country. e more a coun-
try relies on export-led growth, the more likely it is that the public discourse centers
around concerns for international competitiveness (Howarth and Rommerskirchen
2013, 2017; Meteling 2016; Ferrara et al. 2021). Most workers are unlikely to have a full
understanding of how changes in wages translate into macroeconomic outcomes such
as ination, levels of unemployment, or growth. In the absence of a full understand-
ing of such complex economic interrelationships, workers may react to cues provided
by political elites, transmitted via the media (e. g., Zaller 1992; Lenz 2009; Barnes and
Hicks 2018; O’Grady 2017). ey may also respond to persuasive communication by
union leaders. Considering all interrelations and spillovers, workers may think that
they are net beneciaries of wage moderation even when they are employed in sectors
in which wage moderation is not crucial for rm competitiveness. is implies that in
countries strongly dependent on export-led growth, a favorable attitude towards wage
moderation should also be manifest among workers who are not directly aected by the
benecial consequences of wage moderation, such as non-exposed workers.
Hypothesis 2: Individual wage dissatisfaction declines with greater country dependence
on export-led growth.
Hypothesis 3: Specically, for workers not exposed to international competition, wage
dissatisfaction declines with greater country dependence on export-led
growth.
Baccaro, Neimanns: Determinants of Wage (Dis-)Satisfaction 5
Finally, we explore the impact of bargaining structure. e corporatist literature reviewed
above suggests that a coordinated bargaining structure (Soskice 1990), or a centralized
bargaining or union structure (Golden, Wallerstein, and Lange 1999), reduces individual
wage dissatisfaction, leading workers to internalize the negative externalities of wage
militancy. is eect may apply to union members only or to all workers if bargaining
has spillover eects for non-union workers as well. Additionally, a more coordinated
or centralized bargaining structure may facilitate the internalization of competitiveness
concerns for workers exposed to trade (Crouch 1988; Franzese 2001; Garrett and Way
1999; Frieden and Rogowski 1996). Moreover, it may be hypothesized that faced with
low wage growth, workers may be less dissatised when wage bargaining is more coor-
dinated or centralized. is leads us to formulate the following additional hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4: Wage dissatisfaction is lower in coordinated/centralizated bargaining
structures.
Hypothesis 4a: e wage dissatisfaction of union members is lower in coordinated/
centralizated bargaining structures.
Hypothesis 4b: e wage dissatisfaction of workers exposed to international competition
is lower in coordinated/centralizated bargaining structures.
Hypothesis 4c: e wage dissatisfaction caused by low wage growth is lower in
coordinated/centralizated bargaining structures.
3 Data and models
Our data come from two waves of the ISSP Social Inequality module conducted in
1999 and 2009, which we complement with various country-level data. We focus on
advanced OECD countries included in at least one ISSP wave. In total, our sample in-
cludes 19 countries with 31 country-year observations and 14,945 individuals.4
Dependent variable
To operationalize our dependent variable we use the following survey question from the ISSP:
“Would you say that you earn: 1: Much less than [you] deserve; 2: Less than [you] deserve; 3:
What [you] deserve; 4: More than [you] deserve; 5: Much more than [you] deserve”
4 e countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium (Flanders only), Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
the United Kingdom, and the United States.
6 MPIfG Discussion Paper 21/3
We dichotomize responses to this item distinguishing between respondents who are
dissatised with their wage (categories 1 and 2) from those that are satised with their
wage (categories 3 to 5). Dichotomization of the dependent variable eases the presenta-
tion of the results. However, running multilevel ordered logistic regression models with
the original coding of the dependent variable does not alter the ndings (Table A.8 in
the online appendix). We include only employed individuals in the sample.
We consider our measure an acceptable proxy of attitudes towards wage satisfaction and
dissatisfaction. Research in economics has found that wage attitudes are largely shaped
by whether individuals consider their wages as being fair (for a review: see Fehr, Goette,
and Zehnder 2009). A perception of earning less than one deserves should thus be asso-
ciated with preferences for higher wages to address this perceived unfairness. Summary
statistics show that 57 percent of respondents in our sample state that they earn less
or much less than they deserve, which we interpret as wage dissatisfaction (see Table
A.1 in the online appendix). Below, we explain how we operationalize our independent
variables to take into account the fact that our dependent variable may be interpreted
as relative to a reference group. In the online appendix A.1 we also explain how we
cross-validated our measure against other measures of wage (dis-)satisfaction using the
WageIndicator Survey (Tijdens et al. 2010).
Main independent variables
Constructing a measure of occupational trade exposure
One of our key independent variables is individual-level exposure to trade. e ISSP
does not include information on the sector in which the worker is employed. us,
we combine the individual-level data on occupations in the ISSP with individual-level
data on occupation by sector of employment from the European Social Survey (ESS
2008), and with sector-by-country data on trade exposure from the OECD STAN da-
tabase (OECD 2019).5 Using ESS data, we calculate the probability for each occupation
(ISCO88, at the 4-digit level) of being located in a specic sector (NACE rev.1.1 at the
highest level of aggregation: een sectors). en we calculate the trade exposure of
each sector dened as: (Exports+Imports)/Output. We use 5-year averages of sectoral
trade exposure for the years preceding the elding of the ISSP (1994–1998 and 2004–
2008). In this way, we create a measure which attributes to each individual a probability
distribution of being employed in certain sectors based on the person’s occupation, and
5 We use the 2008 wave of the ESS as the wave closest to the ISSP 2009 wave. For the calculations
we include only those twelve countries that are also included in both ISSP waves in 1999 and
2009 (AT, BE, CH, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, NO, PT, SE, UK).
Baccaro, Neimanns: Determinants of Wage (Dis-)Satisfaction 7
then weighs this probability distribution by the sectoral trade exposure.6 e formula
we use is the following:
where i indexes individuals, o occupations, s the n sectors, and is the probability of be-
ing employed in a particular occupation and sector. e measure captures the trade risk
of a particular occupation as opposed to the trade risk of the sector in which the indi-
vidual is currently employed. We think it is preferable to the latter because it takes into
account that individuals in particular occupations are employable in dierent sectors.
Online appendix Table A.2 shows that our measure of occupational trade exposure pro-
duces systematic variation in trade exposure across occupational categories (Table A.2
displays summary statistics at the ISCO88 1-digit level). Exposure varies between zero
for service workers and an average value of 0.33 for “plant and machine operators and
assemblers.” As a robustness check, we replicated the analysis using the “oshorability
index” developed by Blinder (2009). is index measures the potential for an occupa-
tion to be moved abroad based on its technological characteristics and was used, among
others, by Walter (2017) to assess the impact of globalization on individual preferences.
Using the oshorability index as an alternative measure produces similar ndings to the
main analysis (see Table A.4 in the online appendix). However, the risk associated with
trade exposure seems more general than the risk of oshoring. A worker may be aected
by foreign competition whether or not the job is oshorable. erefore, we consider our
measure of occupational trade exposure as more suitable for the context of this study.
We use two dierent versions of our measure of occupational trade exposure: one con-
tinuous, the other discrete. As our rst measure, we use a logarithmic transformation
(to reduce the inuence of outlying values) of the continuous occupational trade expo-
sure measure illustrated above, and control for the worker being employed in the public
sector using self-reported information from the ISSP survey. Our second measure com-
bines trade exposure and public sector employment into a categorical variable, which
distinguishes among sheltered public, sheltered private, and exposed workers. Due to
the probabilistic construction of our measure of occupational trade exposure only 13
percent of respondents have zero trade exposure, but many occupations have values of
exposure close to zero. For this reason, we code occupations with below-median expo-
sure as sheltered and with above-median exposure as exposed (this median value of ex-
posure is 0.0063). e large majority of public sector workers fall below this threshold.
We code the remaining public sector workers with above-median occupational trade
6 See Mayda and Rodrik (2005) for a similar but less precise approach. Mayda and Rodrik match
each occupational category to a specic sector based on information from secondary data. ey
then assign values of sectoral trade exposure to the corresponding occupations to construct a
measure of trade exposure at the occupational level. However, by assigning each occupation to a
specic sector, Mayda and Rodrik are unable to consider the probability distribution of occupa-
tions across sectors, which likely increases measurement error.
o, s s
8 MPIfG Discussion Paper 21/3
exposure as exposed workers. ese workers are likely to be employed in state-owned
enterprises, which are oen organized similarly to private sector companies, or to work
in public sector occupations which are in common with exposed sectors, and thus in
principle subject to similar labor market risks.
Constructing a measure of export-led growth
Another key predictor in our analysis is the country-level reliance on export-led growth.
A common approach to operationalizing export-led growth is to calculate the contribu-
tion of net exports (i. e., the dierence between exports and imports) to GDP growth
(e. g., Baccaro and Pontusson 2016). However, this approach underestimates the actual
growth contribution of exports because it subtracts the whole volume of imports from
exports. In reality, imports are mostly used for consumption and investment purposes,
and only a portion of imports is used for the production of exports. To obviate this
shortcoming we proceed as follows: In a rst step, we calculate the import-adjusted
volume of exports. is is the volume of exports minus the volume of imports used in
the production of exports. Data on exports comes from the AMECO database (AME-
CO 2019); data on the import-content of exports comes from the OECD Input-Output
Tables (OECD 2019). e import-adjusted contribution of exports to growth is then
calculated as the annual change of import-adjusted exports weighted by the share of
import-adjusted exports in GDP at t–1 (data on GDP from AMECO 2019). We then
calculate the share of import-adjusted growth contribution of exports in total growth.7
See the online appendix A.2 for a detailed exposition of the way this measure is calcu-
lated.8 e nal formula is the following:
Where Pe is the price of exports, P is the price of GDP, IE is import-adjusted exports,
and Y is GDP. To avoid an excessive inuence of year-to-year uctuations, we calculate
5-year averages for the periods preceding data collection in the ISSP (i. e., 1994–1998
and 2004–2008). Table A.1 in the online appendix lists the shares of (import-adjusted)
export-led growth by country. is is lowest in the US (with a value of 0.17) and be-
low average in the Anglo-Saxon and Southern European countries. Switzerland has the
highest contribution of exports to GDP growth (0.87), and export-led growth is above-
average in the Continental European and Scandinavian countries (see Figure 1 below).
7 e measure of GDP growth we use is based on current PPP, i. e., expresses cross-country values
in a common currency.
8 As a robustness check, we also use the absolute growth contribution of exports (without divid-
ing for total growth). is alternative model leads to very similar ndings (Table A.9 in the on-
line appendix). Moreover, results do not change if we divide the absolute growth contribution
of import-adjusted exports by a measure of GDP growth based on national currency as opposed
to PPP.
Baccaro, Neimanns: Determinants of Wage (Dis-)Satisfaction 9
Wage bargaining structure and controls
We operationalize bargaining structure by including several measures of wage bargain-
ing structure from the Visser (2019) database: coordination and centralization of wage
setting (coord and level), and centralization of union organization (cent).
We also control for union membership status using individual data from the ISSP since
some literature suggests that union members are more dissatised than non-members
(Bryson, Cappellari, and Lucifora 2004; Hadziabdic 2020).
Additionally, we control for a range of confounding factors at the individual and at the
country level. e coding of these variables is described in detail in online appendix
Table A.3. At the individual level, we include variables related to the demographic and
socio-economic situation of an individual to control for their potential association with
both trade exposure and wage preferences. We control for age, age-squared (to check
for a non-linear impact of age), gender, part-time versus full-time work, individual in-
come, and educational attainment.9 In robustness models, we include alternative ver-
sions of some individual-level control variables to account for the relative character
of our measure of wage preferences: Since the question about attitudes towards wages
may be interpreted by the respondent as relative to a reference group, we calculated a
relative education measure (indicating respondent’s over- or undereducation relative to
other respondents in the same occupation, at the ISCO 1-digit level), and a measure of
income dierence relative to respondents with a) the same educational attainment, and
b) the same occupation (at the ISCO 1-digit level). ese additional models lead to the
same ndings as the main analysis, which makes us more condent about using our
dependent variable being a valid proxy of wage (dis-)satisfaction.
To be able to identify the eect of export-led growth on wage preferences, we need to
hold constant a range of confounding factors at the country level. Bivariate correla-
tions reveal a tight negative association between average real wages at the country level
and wage dissatisfaction (r = –0.63; p = 0.004) meaning that wage dissatisfaction is lower
where the average real wage is higher. We thus include average real wage levels, as well
as their change in the years preceding the surveys, as control variables. Wage dissatis-
faction might also be stronger if incomes are distributed more unequally, since income
inequality violates fairness norms (Fehr, Goette, and Zehnder 2009). us, we control
for inequality in market and disposable incomes. Furthermore, wage expectations can
be associated with the country’s economic situation. Wage dissatisfaction should be
more widespread if the country experiences strong economic growth, if high ination
threatens the purchasing power of wages, and if national or education-specic unem-
9 In additional models, we also controlled for whether a respondent has supervisory responsi-
bilities since this might also aect their wage preferences. ese additional models do not alter
our main ndings. Because the variable on supervisory responsibilities is not available for all
countries, we do not include it in the nal analysis.
10 MPIfG Discussion Paper 21/3
ployment is low, implying a more favorable labor market situation for workers. Euro-
zone membership could be expected to reduce wage demands because it eliminates the
option of currency devaluation to compensate for adverse consequences of high wage
settlements on competitiveness. e euro was in the process of introduction during the
rst ISSP wave in 1999 but the exchange rate parities had been xed the year before. We
control for all of these potential confounding variables in separate models.
Estimating equation and estimators used
We run multilevel logistic regression models to account for the nested structure of our
data. Because individuals are nested in country-years, which are nested in countries, we
include country and country-year random intercepts.10 We include macro-level variables
as country-average values over the two periods and as deviation from these values in the
specic period of observation (Bell and Jones 2015; Fairbrother 2014). is specica-
tion has several advantages. Compared to standard random eects models it avoids the
assumption that cross-sectional and longitudinal relationships are the same. Including
country-averages of the macro-level variables controls for possible correlation between
time-invariant covariates and country random intercepts. At the same time, this speci-
cation is more exible than the country xed eects model specications because it is not
limited to longitudinal relationships only. By distinguishing country averages and period-
specic deviations, we can thus distinguish between long-term eects of macro variables
(captured by the variables in levels) and short-term eects (captured by changes). Finally,
we include a year dummy to control for time eects that are common across countries.
4 Results
We begin by examining the individual predictors of wage dissatisfaction. We then move
to the impact of export-led growth at the country level, including the cross-level in-
teraction between export-led growth and occupational trade vulnerability. Finally, we
analyze the eects of various dimensions of bargaining structure, including cross-level
interactions with union membership and occupational trade vulnerability, respectively.
e multilevel logistic regression results in Table 1 provide robust support for the hy-
pothesis that working in an occupation exposed to international trade is associated with
lower wage dissatisfaction (hypothesis 1). is nding applies to both the continuous
10 e results hold if we add the lower level components of our cross-level interaction terms, oc-
cupational trade exposure and union membership, as random slopes (cf. Heisig and Schaeer,
2019).
Baccaro, Neimanns: Determinants of Wage (Dis-)Satisfaction 11
and the categorical operationalizations of occupational trade exposure (see Models 1
and 2). Average marginal eect estimates based on Model 1 suggest that compared to
workers without any trade exposure, the probability of wage dissatisfaction for individ-
Table 1 Multilevel logistic random intercept regressions: Determinants of wage
dissatisfaction; maximum likelihood estimates
M1 M2 M3 M4
Dependent variable: Wage dissatisfaction
Occupational trade exposure (log) –0.034***
(0.006)
Public sector 0.050
(0.043)
Occupational exposure: Public sheltered
(Reference group: Exposed)
0.292***
(0.047)
0.292***
(0.047)
0.445***
(0.124)
Private sheltered 0.102*
(0.045)
0.100*
(0.045)
–0.078
(0.110)
Union member 0.200***
(0.043)
0.196***
(0.043)
0.196***
(0.042)
0.194***
(0.043)
Age 0.064***
(0.010)
0.064***
(0.010)
0.064***
(0.010)
0.064***
(0.010)
Age squared –0.001***
(0.000)
–0.001***
(0.000)
–0.001***
(0.000)
–0.001***
(0.000)
Female 0.083*
(0.039)
0.101**
(0.039)
0.102**
(0.039)
0.100*
(0.039)
Individual income –0.250***
(0.010)
–0.250***
(0.010)
–0.249***
(0.010)
–0.248***
(0.010)
Employed part-time –0.624***
(0.053)
–0.619***
(0.053)
–0.617***
(0.053)
–0.613***
(0.053)
Education: Upper secondary
(Reference group: Below upper sec.)
–0.192***
(0.053)
–0.182***
(0.053)
–0.191***
(0.053)
–0.188***
(0.053)
Above upper secondary –0.078
(0.057)
–0.059
(0.057)
–0.070
(0.057)
–0.068
(0.057)
Tertiary –0.103
(0.055)
–0.082
(0.054)
–0.093
(0.054)
–0.092
(0.054)
Year = 2009
(Reference: 1999)
0.223
(0.146)
0.223
(0.147)
0.297*
(0.132)
0.292*
(0.132)
Export-led growth (mean) –1.348***
(0.359)
–1.390***
(0.369)
Export-led growth (delta) –0.174
(0.646)
–0.174
(0.649)
Public sheltered * Export-led growth (mean) –0.349
(0.259)
Private sheltered * Export-led growth (mean) 0.412
(0.232)
Constant 0.507*
(0.236)
0.212
(0.234)
0.772**
(0.267)
0.790**
(0.270)
Random intercept variance (country) 0.033
(0.058)
0.032
(0.060)
0.007
(0.032)
0.006
(0.032)
Random intercept variance (country-year) 0.136*
(0.062)
0.139*
(0.063)
0.106*
(0.042)
0.107*
(0.043)
N 14,945 14,945 14,945 14,945
N countries 19 19 19 19
N country-years 31 31 31 31
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.
12 MPIfG Discussion Paper 21/3
uals at the 90th percentile of exposure is 7.47 percentage points lower.11 e magnitude
of this eect is comparable to an upward shi of individual income of approximately 1.5
income deciles. Average marginal eect estimates based on Model 2 suggest that com-
pared to individuals in sheltered private sector occupations, the likelihood of individu-
als working in exposed occupations to express dissatisfaction with their wage decreases
by 2.25 percentage points. Compared to sheltered public sector workers, the dierence
is 6.37 percentage points. It seems that working in the sheltered public sector is associ-
ated with a higher likelihood of being dissatised with one’s wage.
Several of the individual-level control variables in Table 1 are also signicantly related
to wage preferences. Being a trade union member is associated with a higher likeli-
hood of being dissatised with one’s wage. Age has a curvilinear relationship: Both la-
bor market entrants and workers close to retirement age are more likely to be satised
with their wages compared to middle-aged workers. Women are more dissatised with
their wages than men. is nding is surprising because women have been found to
be willing to accept lower wage oers than men (Säve-Söderbergh 2007; Bowles and
Babcock 2012). e wage dissatisfaction of women may be a reaction to discriminatory
wage practices. In contrast, part-time work, which is more common among women, is
associated with lower dissatisfaction. If working part-time is dropped from the model,
being female becomes insignicant.12 Furthermore, wage dissatisfaction is lower for in-
dividuals with higher income. e eect of educational attainment is non-linear, with
individuals below upper secondary education having the highest level of dissatisfaction
and individuals with upper secondary education being most satised.
In the next step, we evaluate the impact of export-led growth (hypothesis 2), starting
with a graphic representation of the bivariate relationship at the country level. Figure 1
displays a clear negative association between export-led growth and wage dissatisfac-
tion. e bivariate correlation coecient is –0.71 (p = 0.001). Dissatisfaction is highest
in Portugal, a country with below-average export-led growth with more than 70 percent
of workers being dissatised with their wages, and is lowest in Switzerland, a country
with a strong export contribution to growth and less than 40 percent of workers being
dissatised.
Models 3 and 4 in Table 1 add our macro-level measure of export-led growth to the lo-
gistic regression models. e core nding is that a higher reliance on export-led growth
is associated with more moderate wage preferences (Model 3). What matters is cross-
national variation in export-led growth, which is highly statistically signicant, while
variation in export-led growth over time is also negatively signed but does not reach
11 is and the following references to eect sizes are based on average marginal eect estimates
of the multilevel logistic regression results.
12 Vice versa, if being female is dropped from the model, part-time work remains signicantly
negatively related to wage dissatisfaction.
Baccaro, Neimanns: Determinants of Wage (Dis-)Satisfaction 13
conventional levels of statistical signicance. e eect of export-led growth is substan-
tial in size. e simulated dierence in the predicted probability of wage dissatisfaction
between countries with a very low (the US) and a very high level of export-led growth
(Switzerland) amounts up to 20.83 percentage points. It seems that the more exports
contribute to GDP growth, the more satised individuals are with their wages, control-
ling for other individual determinants of wage (dis-)satisfaction.
In additional models, we tested for the inuence of country outliers. We replicated
Model 3 dropping one country at a time. e eect of export-led growth remains robust
at least at the 99 percent level of signicance and the simulated dierence in the pre-
dicted probability of wage dissatisfaction between the countries with the lowest and the
highest levels of export-led growth varies between 17.73 and 24.23. ese results sug-
gest that the negative eect of export-led growth on wage dissatisfaction is not driven
by particular country outliers.13
13 When using the operationalization of export-led growth based on GDP growth measured in
national currency as opposed to PPP, Japan becomes a country outlier with exceptionally high
levels of export-led growth. e eect of export-led growth holds in these alternative models,
but becomes stronger when Japan is excluded (Table A.9 in the online appendix).
Note: Survey weights used.
Figure 1 Export-led growth and country-average levels of wage dissatisfaction
Average levels of wage dissatisfaction
Export-led growth
US
UK
DK
IT
PT
JP
FR
SE
IS KR
AT
BE
CH
DE
ES
FI
AU NZ
NO
.2 .4 .6 .8
1
.8
.7
.6
.5
.4
.3
14 MPIfG Discussion Paper 21/3
To evaluate the claim that competitiveness concerns are internalized also by individuals
in sheltered sector occupations (hypothesis 3), we introduce a cross-level interaction be-
tween occupational trade exposure and export-led growth (Model 4). Wage dissatisfac-
tion declines with greater export-led growth orientation not only for exposed workers
but also for public sector and private non-exposed workers. In fact, the insignicance of
the interaction terms suggests there is no dierence in the impact of export-led growth
for these three types of workers. In other words, reliance on export-led growth and oc-
cupational exposure operate additively on wage attitudes. Figure 2 plots predicted prob-
abilities of wage dissatisfaction by export orientation and occupational exposure (based
on Model 4 in Table 1). It shows that our hypothesis 3 is corroborated: wage preferences
are more moderate in countries that rely more extensively on export-led growth also for
workers not exposed to international competition.
Models 1 to 9 in Table 2 test whether the negative eect of export-led growth holds
when controlling for various macro variables: real average wage levels, changes in real
average wages, GDP growth, (education-specic) unemployment, ination, eurozone
membership, and disposable and market income inequality (the full results are reported
Figure 2 Predicted probabilities of wage dissatisfaction, by export-led growth
and occupational trade exposure
Predicted probability of wage dissatisfaction
Distribution of countries
.8
.7
.6
.5
.4
.3
0 .25 .5 .75 1
Public sheltered
Private sheltered
Exposed
Number of countries
20
15
10
5
0
Export-led growth (mean)
Note: Predicted probabilities and 95 percent confidence intervals based on
Model 4 in Table 1. Predicted probabilities are shown for export-led growth at
the following levels: minimum value, 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th percentile, and
maximum value.
Baccaro, Neimanns: Determinants of Wage (Dis-)Satisfaction 15
Table 2 Multilevel logistic random intercept regressions: Determinants of wage dissatisfaction; effects of macro-level covariates;
maximum likelihood estimates
Export-led growth
(mean)
Export-led growth
(delta)
Macro-level control
(mean)
Macro-level control
(delta)
N countries N country-
years
M1 Real average wage levels –1.073*** (0.309) 0.123 (0.685) –0.000** (0.000) –0.000 (0.000) 19 31
M2 Changes in real average wages –1.334*** (0.362) –0.155 (0.628) 0.312 (1.960) 2.588 (2.592) 19 31
M3 GDP growth –1.589*** (0.384) 0.069 (0.588) –0.068 (0.074) 0.243 (0.139) 19 31
M4 Unemployment rate –1.228*** (0.337) 0.033 (0.617) 0.027 (0.022) –0.071 (0.045) 19 31
M5 Inflation –1.441*** (0.370) –0.488 (0.649) –0.041 (0.078) 0.158 (0.131) 19 31
M6 EMU membership –1.470*** (0.359) –0.219 (0.640) 0.170 (0.132) 19 31
M7 Education-specific
unemployment rate
–1.201** (0.400) –0.034 (0.694) 0.026 (0.016) –0.032 (0.029) 16 26
M8 Disposable income inequality –1.341*** (0.407) –0.295 (0.673) 0.058 (0.094) 0.003 (0.018) 19 31
M9 Market income inequality –1.187*** (0.353) –0.426 (0.675) 0.077 (0.079) 0.025 (0.016) 19 31
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.
Note: Regression models include the same individual-level variables as Table 1, Model 2. For full regression results, see Table A.5 in the online appendix.
16 MPIfG Discussion Paper 21/3
in Table A.5 in the online appendix). Across model specications, the eect of export-
led growth is robust and strongly statistically signicant. Compared to the strong and
persistent eects of export-led growth, the remaining macro-level variables matter little
in inuencing wage preferences and the eect estimates are insignicant for most vari-
ables. e only signicant eect appears for long-term wage levels, with higher average
wage levels reducing wage dissatisfaction.
Finally, we assess the inuence of wage bargaining structure (hypotheses 4 to 4c). e
models in Table 3 keep the individual-level predictors from the previous models and
add the macro-level measure of wage bargaining coordination (Model 1), its interaction
with union membership (Model 2), with occupational trade exposure (Model 3), and
with country-level wage change (Model 4). Results for the additional indicators of wage
bargaining structures, wage bargaining centralization, and union centralization, are in-
cluded in the online appendix (Table A.6). We do not nd support for hypotheses 4 to
4c. Contrary to hypothesis 4, the eect estimates of wage bargaining coordination are
statistically insignicant. Contrary to hypothesis 4a, there is no evidence that the wage
dissatisfaction of union members is lower in countries with more coordinated wage
bargaining. In fact, the interaction between bargaining coordination and union mem-
bership is insignicant and even positively signed. Contrary to hypothesis 4b, the wage
dissatisfaction of exposed workers (the reference category) is not signicantly lower
in countries with more coordinated wage bargaining. Post-estimation Wald tests show
that dierences in wage dissatisfaction of exposed workers are statistically insignicant
across levels of bargaining coordination. Model 3 in Table 3 even suggests that public
sector workers are more dissatised in countries with higher bargaining coordination.
Contrary to hypothesis 4c, there is no evidence that the wage dissatisfaction caused by
low wage growth at the country level is contained at higher levels of bargaining coordi-
nation. Again, Wald tests show no signicant eects. In a similar vein, we do not nd
support for hypotheses 4 to 4c by using the alternative indicators of wage bargaining
structures (Table A.6 in the online appendix).14
In light of our ndings for export-led growth and non-ndings for wage bargaining
structures, export-led growth seems to be the decisive country-level factor shaping in-
dividual attitudes towards wages. In additional models, we include both sets of variables
simultaneously to further evaluate their relative importance.15 Table A.7 in the online
appendix reinforces the above ndings. Holding wage bargaining structures constant,
the eect estimates of export-led growth remain signicant and hardly change in size.
14 e interaction between wage growth and union centralization is statistically signicant in
Table A.6, Model 8. However, graphical inspection suggests that this result is driven by Austria
with its exceptionally high level of union centralization. If Austria is dropped from the models,
the interaction becomes insignicant.
15 However, wage bargaining coordination and export dependence are positively correlated (r = 0.53,
p = 0.02) and this makes it more dicult to disentangle their respective eects on wage (dis-)sat-
isfaction. We also tested the interaction between export-led growth and bargaining coordination
and found that it is not statistically signicant (Table A.7, Model 4, see online appendix).
Baccaro, Neimanns: Determinants of Wage (Dis-)Satisfaction 17
Table 3 Multilevel logistic random intercept regressions: Determinants of wage
dissatisfaction; effects of wage bargaining coordination; maximum
likelihood estimates
M1 M2 M3 M4
Dependent variable: Wage dissatisfaction
Occupational exposure: Public sheltered
(Reference group: Exposed)
Private sheltered
0.292***
(0.047)
0.295***
(0.047)
0.069
(0.088)
0.291***
(0.047)
0.102*
(0.045)
0.102*
(0.045)
0.045
(0.080)
0.104*
(0.045)
Union member 0.198***
(0.043)
0.078
(0.079)
0.204***
(0.043)
0.197***
(0.043)
Age 0.064***
(0.010)
0.064***
(0.010)
0.064***
(0.010)
0.064***
(0.010)
Age squared –0.001***
(0.000)
–0.001***
(0.000)
–0.001***
(0.000)
–0.001***
(0.000)
Female 0.101**
(0.039)
0.100*
(0.039)
0.099*
(0.039)
0.101**
(0.039)
Individual income –0.250***
(0.010)
–0.249***
(0.010)
–0.249***
(0.010)
–0.250***
(0.010)
Employed part-time –0.620***
(0.053)
–0.618***
(0.053)
–0.618***
(0.053)
–0.619***
(0.053)
Education: Upper secondary
(Reference group: Below upper sec.)
–0.182***
(0.053)
–0.180***
(0.053)
–0.182***
(0.053)
–0.181***
(0.053)
Above upper secondary –0.059
(0.057)
–0.056
(0.057)
–0.061
(0.057)
–0.058
(0.057)
Tertiary –0.082
(0.054)
–0.080
(0.054)
–0.080
(0.054)
–0.082
(0.054)
Year = 2009
(Reference: 1999)
0.213
(0.143)
0.213
(0.143)
0.218
(0.141)
0.275
(0.158)
Wage bargaining coordination (mean) –0.261
(0.277)
–0.357
(0.282)
–0.400
(0.283)
–1.174
(0.838)
Wage bargaining coordination (delta) 1.020
(0.884)
0.996
(0.887)
1.008
(0.878)
0.698
(0.951)
Union member * Bargaining coordination (mean) 0.253
(0.139)
Public sheltered * Bargaining coordination (mean) 0.454**
(0.152)
Private sheltered * Bargaining coordination (mean) 0.117
(0.146)
Changes in real average wages (mean) –10.793
(11.213)
Changes in real average wages (delta) 2.538
(3.105)
Wage bargaining coordination (mean) *
Changes in real average wages (mean)
18.197
(16.044)
Constant 0.355
(0.261)
0.385
(0.262)
0.410
(0.262)
0.851
(0.603)
Random intercept variance (country) 0.041
(0.062)
0.040
(0.062)
0.042
(0.061)
0.025
(0.063)
Random intercept variance (country-year) 0.119*
(0.059)
0.119*
(0.059)
0.117*
(0.058)
0.122
(0.064)
N 14,945 14,945 14,945 14,945
N countries 19 19 19 19
N country-years 31 31 31 31
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.
18 MPIfG Discussion Paper 21/3
In contrast, bargaining coordination, bargaining centralization, and union centraliza-
tion are not signicantly related to wage dissatisfaction.
5 Concluding discussion
is paper has shed light on the determinants of individual attitudes of wage satisfac-
tion and dissatisfaction. In so doing, it has contributed to two literatures: the literature
on the institutional determinants of wage moderation, by exploring the so far neglected
dimension of individual preferences, and the new literature on growth models, by in-
vestigating their relationship with workers’ wage preferences.
Our main intent was to assess the extent to which workers internalize the systemic
constraint of competitiveness, both at the individual and at the country level. For this
reason, rather than only considering the impact of bargaining structure as in the previ-
ous macro-level literature, we also examined the impact of occupational exposure to
trade and country reliance on export-led growth.
Our results indicate that workers employed in occupations exposed to international
trade are less likely to express wage dissatisfaction. In other words, wage satisfaction
is enhanced by a heightened risk of job loss if the requirements of competitiveness are
violated.
Wage preferences are also inuenced by sociotropic concerns about the drivers of growth
in the country as a whole. If a country relies heavily on export-led growth, workers are
less likely to express wage dissatisfaction, even when they do not benet directly from
the competitiveness-enhancing eects of wage moderation. We conclude that export-
led growth comes with a generalized “wage moderation consciousness.” Workers seem
to internalize the systemic importance of wage restraint for the country’s growth. is
nding suggests that export-led growth creates its own supporting attitudes, which fa-
cilitate its reproduction as a growth regime.
Surprisingly, wage bargaining institutions are not associated with wage dissatisfaction
according to our analysis. One would expect, based on the previous literature, that wage
preferences would be more moderate when wage bargaining is coordinated or central-
ized or union structure centralized. However, we do not nd any evidence either of a
direct eect of wage bargaining structure on wage preferences or of a moderating eect
on the attitudes of union members or workers exposed to trade competition.
ere are two possible explanations for this null nding: First, the eect of bargaining
institutions may have been exaggerated by the previous literature because previous re-
search did not control for export-led growth, which seems to be the decisive factor and
Baccaro, Neimanns: Determinants of Wage (Dis-)Satisfaction 19
is positively correlated with wage coordination. Second, bargaining institutions may
aect wage moderation without modifying worker preference, as suggested by the early
literature on corporatism, which argued that corporatist institutions allow union lead-
ers to ignore or suppress the preferences of workers (Schmitter 1974). Obviously, the
absence of a general cross-country eect of wage bargaining does not exclude possible
localized eects in specic sectors or regions or countries.
Our ndings invite further research in several directions: First, we should explore
through which mechanisms reliance on export-led growth moderates workers’ wage
expectations. One may hypothesize that the eect is linked to the dominant discourse
diused by the media, or to political party cues that workers follow. Second, future
research should return to the macro analyses of the determinants of wage moderation,
and test whether the eect of bargaining institutions on average wage moderation at the
country level holds when the average wage preferences of workers are controlled for. If
bargaining institutions remain a signicant predictor controlling for average wage pref-
erences of workers, this would indicate that bargaining institutions aect wage mod-
eration without inducing a change in individual preferences, for example by moderat-
ing the bargaining policies of unions. Furthermore, it would be interesting to examine
in future research whether there are patterns to workers’ wage (dis-)satisfaction, e. g.,
whether it is broadly distributed in some countries vs. polarized in others, and whether
such patterns are related to dierent growth models.
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Das Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung
ist eine Einrichtung der Spitzenforschung in den
Sozialwissenschaften. Es betreibt anwendungsoffene
Grundlagenforschung mit dem Ziel einer empirisch
fundierten Theorie der sozialen und politischen Grund -
lagen moderner Wirtschaftsordnungen. Im Mittelpunkt
steht die Untersuchung der Zu sammen hänge zwischen
ökonomischem, sozialem und politischem Handeln. Mit
einem vornehmlich institutionellen Ansatz wird erforscht,
wie Märkte und Wirtschaftsorganisationen in historische,
politische und kulturelle Zusammenhänge eingebettet
sind, wie sie entstehen und wie sich ihre gesellschaftlichen
Kontexte verändern. Das Institut schlägt eine Brücke
zwischen Theorie und Politik und leistet einen Beitrag
zur politischen Diskussion über zentrale Fragen
moderner Gesellschaften.
e Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
conducts advanced basic research on the governance
of modern societies. It aims to develop an empirically
based theory of the social and political foundations
of modern economies by investigating the interrelation
between economic, social and political action. Using
primarily an institutional approach, it examines how
markets and business organizations are embedded
in historical, political and cultural frameworks, how
they develop, and how their social contexts change
over time. e Institute seeks to build a bridge between
theory and policy and to contribute to political debate
on major challenges facing modern societies.
