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ABSTRACT
Address Resolution protocol (ARP) is used to map logical addresses into its
corresponding physical addresses and is widely used protocol in TCP/IP network. ARP protocol
doesn’t provide any mechanism for authentication amongst hosts in the network. On other hand
it is a stateless protocol. These limitations make ARP protocol vulnerable to attacks. ARP
poisoning is a type of Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) in which attacker poisons the ARP cache of
two hosts and place itself between legitimate traffic. In this work we implemented ARP
poisoning using Ettercap and Cain and Abel tool. The work gives the systematic literature
reviews of techniques for mitigation of ARP poisoning and bitcoin based model is proposed.
The proposed model is based on the bitcoin networks and bitcoin cryptography. Our proposed
scheme can efficiently mitigate the ARP poisoning attack as authentication is achieved through
digital signature which can only be generated by legitimate host with their private key. Also,
other host in the same network can check whether the communication between two hosts is
authentic or not.
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Table of Contents
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................6
CHAPTER.2 ADDRESS RESOLUTION PROTOCOL ..............................................................7
2.1. ARP (ADDRESS RESOLUTION PROTOCOL) ..............................................................7
2.2. VIEWING ARP CACHE ENTRIES ............................................................................... 10
2.3. ANALYZING ARP PACKETS ...................................................................................... 12
2.4. ARP POISONING (MITM) ATTACK ........................................................................... 14
2.5. IMPLEMENTATION OF ARP POISONING USING ETTERCAP ............................... 16
2.6. IMPLEMETATION OF ARP POISONING USING CAIN AND ABEL ........................ 30
2.6. DETECTING AND PREVENTING ARP POISONING ................................................. 35
CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE REVIEW .................................................................................... 36
CHAPTER 4 PROPOSED WORK ............................................................................................ 39
4.1 BITCOIN BASED ADDRESS RESOLUTION PROTOCOL (BB-ARP) ............................ 41
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE SCOPE ............................................................. 44
REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................... 45
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure.1: ARP Request…………………………………………………………………………
Figure.2: ARP Reply…………………………………………………………………………
Figure.3: ARP Packet Structure………………………………………………………………
Figure.4: Using arp –a command…………………………………………………………….
Figure.5: Using arp –s command…………………………………………………………….
Figure.6: Using arp –d command…………………………………………………………….
Figure.7: Investigating ARP Request packet in wireshark………………………………….
Figure.8: Investigating ARP reply packet in wireshark………………………………………..
Figure.9: Legitimate traffic between Host A and Host B……………………………………
Figure.10: Traffic after ARP poisoning……………………………………………………..
Figure.11: ARP poisoning setup……………………………………………………………….
Figure.12: Promisc mode option……………………………………………………………….
Figure.13: Unified sniffing option……………………………………………………………..
Figure.14: Network interface selection…………………………………………………………
Figure.15: Selecting “Scan for host” option…………………………………………………..
Figure.16: Hosts scanned in the network……………………………………………………
Figure.17: Selecting “hosts list” option………………………………………………………..
Figure.18: Selecting target 1 for ARP poisoning………………………………………………
Figure.19: Selecting target 2 for ARP poisoning…………………………………………….
Figure.20: Selecting “Start sniffing” option in Ettercap……………………………………….
Figure.21: “ARP poisoning” option in Ettercap………………………………………………..
Figure.22: Sniff remote connections parameter option for MITM……………………………..
Figure.23: “Manage the plugins” option………………………………………………………..
Figure.24: Selecting “repoison_arp” parameter…………………………………………………
Figure.25: Selecting “remote_browser” parameter……………………………………………..
Figure.26: Viewing connections by selecting “Connections” option…………………………..
Figure.27: Active and idle connections………………………………………………..
Figure.28: Viewing connection details……………………………………………………….
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Figure.29: Double clicking on connection to split screen………………………………….
Figure.30: Character injection……………………………………………………………..
Figure.31: Selecting interface on wireshark………………………………………………
Figure.32: Capturing ARP protocol by using “arp” keyword in filter option…………………
Figure.33: Viewing ARP reply packet in wireshark………………………………………
Figure.34: Starting “sniffer” option in Cain and Abel……………………………………..
Figure.35: Scanning host in Cain and Abel……………………………………………….
Figure.36: Selecting “Add to list” option…………………………………………………
Figure.37: Selecting target IP address for ARP poisoning………………………………….
Figure.38: IP address selection for ARP poisoning………………………………………….
Figure.39: ARP poisoning process initiation…………………………………………………
Figure.40: ARP detection using Xarp…………………………………………………….
Figure.41: Bitcoin Ledger…………………………………………………………………..
Figure.42: ARP cache table……………………………………………………………….
Figure.43: Digital signature generation………………………………………………….
Figure.44: Signature verification process………………………………………………….
Figure.45: BB-ARP hosts in the network………………………………………………….
Figure.46: Communication via bitcoin based ARP……………………………………….
Figure.47: Broadcast of updated ledger………………………………………………….
LIST OF TABLES
Table.1:Search results and relevant papers……………………………………………………..
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ARP Address Resolution Protocol
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
S-ARP Secure-ARP
S-UARP Secure Unicast Address Resolution Protocol
TARP Ticket based Address Resolution Protocol
DAPS Dynamic ARP-spoof Protection & Surveillance
E-SDE Enhanced Spoof Detection System
GDPS Gratuitous decision Packet System
SDN Software Defined Network
PARP-S Secure Piggybacking based ARP
KARP Kerberos-ARP
BB-ARP Bitcoin Based-ARP
ES-ARP Efficient and Secure ARP
MR-ARP MITM Resistant-ARP
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
The network security is a prime concern for the companies in today’s scenario. Many companies
adopt strict security policies to ensure security within an organization. Attacks on an
organization can be inside attacks and outside attacks. The primary goal of the security policies
is to achieve CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity and Authenticity) model. Security mechanism is
implemented at every layer of the OSI reference model. However, security of the upper layer
protocols depends upon the security of the lower layer protocols. Therefore, hardening lower
layer protocol is essential for robust network as compromise of lower layer protocol leads to
serious inside attacks.
ARP protocol is used to map logical address into its corresponding physical address. The
purpose of ARP protocol is address resolution. ARP protocol is a stateless protocol. It doesn’t
provide any authentication amongst hosts in network thus making it susceptible to attacks. ARP
spoofing, or ARP poisoning is an attack in which an attacker poisons the ARP cache of the target
hosts and placed itself between legitimate traffic leading to attacks like MITM, sniffing,
connection hijacking, connection spoofing and DoS. Thus, makes it necessary to secure ARP
protocol.
In this work, we investigated the ARP packet using wireshark protocol analyzer. ARP poisoning
attack is implemented using Ettercap tool. The work gives the systematic literature review of
techniques that are proposed in the literature. Also, a bitcoin based model for mitigation of ARP
poisoning is proposed. The Proposed idea is based on the concept of bitcon network and bitcoin
cryptography.
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CHAPTER.2 ADDRESS RESOLUTION PROTOCOL
2.1. ARP (ADDRESS RESOLUTION PROTOCOL)
The packet in the computer networks passes through many physical networks and interconnected
devices before reaching its destination. In TCP/IP network, every host has two addresses
namely- logical addresses and physical addresses. The logical address is a 32-bit network layer
address well known as IP address. It is assigned by the DHCP or DNS server. The layer two
addresses are called physical address. It is imprinted in the hardware NIC. It is well known as
MAC address. The jurisdiction of the MAC address is local network and is unique locally.
Anytime the host sends the IP datagram to another host in the network, it has IP address of the
receiver at network layer. However, this IP address should be resolved so that it can be
encapsulated within the data link layer frame and pass the physical layer.
ARP protocol maps the IP address to its corresponding MAC address [1]. It is defined in RFC
826 [2]. The mapping can be done is two ways either statically or dynamically. In static
mapping, ARP cache table are static which is stored at every host’s machine in the network on
other hand dynamic mapping finds one of the two address with the use of address resolution.
Static mapping has various limitations as physical address can be changed in many ways. Also,
for resolving MAC address to its corresponding IP address RARP (Reverse Address Resolution
Protocol) is used. Whenever the host communicates with another host in the same network it
sends the broadcast request containing its IP address, MAC address and receiver’s IP address and
asks for receiver’s MAC address (Figure.1).
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Figure.1 ARP Request
Every host on the network receives the broadcast request but only intended receiver replies with
its MAC Address. Other host on the network discards this request. ARP request is broadcast and
reply is unicast (Figure.2).
Figure.2 ARP Reply
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In an order to minimize the broadcast requests within the network. ARP reply is cached and kept
in a cache memory for a while (20-30 minutes). Every host maintains its ARP cache table and
before sending the ARP broadcast request it first check its cache. Cache table is record of IP
addresses and their corresponding IP addresses [1].
(Figure. 3) depict the format of the ARP header and the fields are as follows [3]: -
Hardware Type- This 16-bit field defines the type of network on which ARP is running.
Protocol Type- A 16-bit field defining protocol.
Hardware Address Length- A 8-bit field defines length of physical address in bytes or
octets. For Ethernet the length is 6.
Protocol Address Length- It defines the length of the logical address in bytes or octets.
Operation- It’s a function of ARP packet- 1 for request and 2 for reply.
Sender Hardware Address- It’s a Sender’s hardware address.
Sender Protocol Address- It’s an Address of sender’s upper layer protocol.
Target Hardware Address- The recipient hardware address. Always zero in request.
Target Protocol Address- It’s an Address of receiver’s upper layer protocol.
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Figure.3 ARP Packet Structure [3]
2.2. VIEWING ARP CACHE ENTRIES
Static and dynamic ARP cache entries can be easily viewed on windows operating system by
command prompt. The steps are as follows: -
1. Open the Command Prompt.
2. ARP cache can easily be viewed by arp – a command in command prompt (Figure.4).
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Figure.4 Using arp –a command
3. Addition in cache entries can be done manually by arp – s command (Figure.5)
Figure.5 Using arp –s command
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4. Also to delete the ARP cache manually arp –d command is used (Figure.6)
Figure.6 Using arp –d command
2.3. ANALYZING ARP PACKETS
ARP packets can be analyzed using wireshark network protocol analyzer. We analyzed the two
packets used by the ARP protocol for dynamic mapping for IP address and MAC address
namely- ARP request packet and ARP reply Packet.
1. ARP request- The first packet is ARP request packet which is a broadcast request
containing source’s IP address, MAC address and target’s IP address (Figure.7). As
shown in Figure. The receiver MAC address is 00:00:00: 00:00:00 as it is marked zero in
ARP request. Opcode (1) depict it’s an ARP request packet. The hardware address for
Ethernet is 6.
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Figure.7 Investigating ARP Request packet in wireshark
2. ARP reply: On response of the broadcast request the receiver sends it MAC address. The
receiver sends its MAC address. The Opcode here is (2) depict it’s a ARP reply request
as shown in (Figure.8).
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Figure.8 Investigating ARP reply packet in wireshark
2.4. ARP POISONING (MITM) ATTACK
ARP protocol is a stateless protocol, it doesn’t keep track of request coming and going out. Also
ARP protocol doesn’t guarantee any authentication amongst host in the network. These factors
make ARP protocol susceptible to attacks [4].
ARP cache poisoning, ARP spoofing, or ARP poison routing is the Man-In-The-Middle attack in
which attacker placed itself in between two legitimate hosts and poison their ARP cache table [6]
(Figure.10). This is done by forge IP addresses, sending fake ARP replies, sending fake IP
address and so on [4].
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Figure.9 Legitimate traffic between Host A and Host B
(Figure.9) shows the legitimate traffic between Host A and Host B. After the successful ARP
poisoning attack, attacker place itself between the traffic (Figure.10). The attacker can now
intercept and view the information. The objective of ARP poisoning is to take over the session.
ARP poisoning attack can cause sniffing, connection hijacking, connection spoofing and DoS
[5].
Figure.10 Traffic after ARP poisoning
Consider the scenario where three Hosts are connected via Ethernet. Host A wants to
communicate with Host B. Attacker can implement the ARP poison and poison the cache
through various ways [4]: -
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Figure.11 ARP poisoning setup
Scenario one: Broadcast request
Host A sends the broadcast ARP request. This ARP request is received by every host connected
via Ethernet. Attacker in this scenario uses the IP address of the Host A and sends the ARP
broadcast request. This results in the two hosts with same IP address. This request is stored by
the Host B’s ARP cache table resulting in the ARP cache poisoning [4].
Scenario two: Multiple responses
In this scenario, Host A receives the response from the attacker and Host C. There exists a race
condition that attacker’s response is received first by the Host A [4].
Scenario three: Unsolicit ed response
Since ARP protocol is a stateless protocol. It doesn’t keep track of requests going out. Therefore,
an unsolicited response sometimes causes ARP cache poisoning [4].
2.5. IMPLEMENTATION OF ARP POISONING USING ETTERCAP
There are various tools available in the market through which ARP cache poisoning can be
implemented such as Ettercap, Subterfuge, Arpoison, Arpspoof, ARP-FILLUP-v0.1, Arp-sk-
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v0.3.2, arping, Cain and Abel, SwitchSniffer and many more. The implementation is done on
windows operating system. Ettercap tool was used to launch ARP poisoning.
It should be noted that implementation is done in a controlled environment and three laptops was
connected to the LAN. Host A IP address is 192.168.0.107, Attacker IP address is 192.168.0.106
and Host C IP address is 192.168.0.104. Host A and Host C ran on windows operating system.
Attacker ran on Kali Linux and used Ettercap to implement ARP poisoning attack. The steps for
attack are as follows-
1. Start the Ettercap on attacker machine and configure it for “Promisc Mode” via options
drop down menu (Figure.12).
Figure.12 Promisc mode option
2. Start the “Unified Sniffing” through sniff drop down menu (Figure.13).
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Figure.13 Unified sniffing option
3. Select the interface (wlan0) as Hosts are connected on the LAN (Figure.14).
Figure.14 Network interface selection
4. Click on the “Hosts” drop down menu and select “Scan for hosts” option for scanning the
hosts that are connected to the LAN (Figure.15). Once the scanning is completed, the list
of hosts was viewed (Figure.16) by selecting Host list option in Hosts drop down menu
(Figure.17).
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Figure.15 Selecting “Scan for host” option
Figure.16 Hosts scanned in the network
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Figure.17 Selecting“hosts list” option
5. From the list of hosts connected on the LAN, Attacker selects the two targets for MITM
attack (Figure.18) (Figure.19).
Figure.18 Selecting target 1 for ARP poisoning
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Figure.19 Selecting target 2 for ARP poisoning
6. After selecting the two targets, click on the “Start” drop down menu and select “Start
sniffing” (Figure.20).
Figure.20Selecting “Start sniffing” option in ettercap
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7. Once the sniffing started, select the “Arp poisoning” option in the “Mitm” drop down
menu and select “Sniff remote connection” (Figure.21) (Figure.22).
Figure.21“ARP poisoning” option in ettercap
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Figure.22 Sniff remote connections parameter option for MITM
8. Under the “Plugins” drop down menu select “Manage the plugins” option (Figure.23).
Select “repoison_arp” and “remote_browser” parameters. The “remote_browser”
parameter allow attacker’s web browser to display the web pages of the victims
(Figure.24) (Figure.25).
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Figure.23“Manage the plugins” option
Figure.24 Selecting “repoison_arp” parameter
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Figure.25 Selecting “remote_browser” parameter
9. After selecting the parameters, go to “View” drop down menu and select “Connections”.
This shows the active and idle connection with source IP address and destination IP
address (Figure.26) (Figure.27).
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Figure.26 viewing connections by selecting “Connections” option
Figure.27 Active and idle connections
10. Now Attacker can easily view the connection detail by right clicking the mouse and
choosing “View details” option (Figure.28). This will reveal the protocol, bytes
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transferred, source IP address and MAC address. Also destination IP address and MAC
address. By double clicking on the connection, screen is spiltted into two parts. Attacker
can choose the targets and can inject characters (Figure.29) (Figure.30).
Figure.28 Viewing connection details
Figure.29 double clicking on connection to split screen
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Figure.30 Character injection
The Attack can easily be investigated in the network by wireshark protocol analyzer. Selecting
“wlan0” as an interface and click on the “Start” option (Figure.31). After starting the capturing,
the protocol, apply “arp” to the filter and apply (Figure.32). The poisoned ARP packet is easily
rectified (Figure.33).
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Figure.31 Selecting interface on wireshark
Figure.32 Capturing ARP protocol by using “arp” keyword in filter option
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Figure.33 Viewing ARP reply packet in wireshark
2.6. IMPLEMETATION OF ARP POISONING USING CAIN AND ABEL
Cain and Abel is a password recovery tool for windows operating system. This is done by
sniffing the network. However, ARP poisoning can be done using Cain and Abel by following
the below steps: -
1. Start the Cain and Abel and click on the Start/Stop sniffer button (Figure.34)
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Figure.34 Starting “sniffer” option in Cain and Abel.
2. Choose the “Sniffer” option and click on the Add (+) button to scan all hosts in the
subnet (Figure.35).
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Figure.35 Scanning host in Cain and Abel
3. Start “APR” option and select the target for ARP poisoning by Add (+), this will add the
hosts in the list. After selecting the two target if the status is not idle passwords and
HTTP packets can be easily recovered. (Figure.36) (Figure.37) (Figure.38) (Figure.39).
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Figure.36 Selecting “Add to list” option
Figure.37. Selecting target IP address for ARP poisoning
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Figure.38 IP address selection for ARP poisoning
Figure.39 ARP poisoning process initiation
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2.6. DETECTING AND PREVENTING ARP POISONING
The ARP poisoning can be detected in the network by using the IDS (Intrusion Detection
System) and use of Firewalls. There are many tools available which can be used to rectify ARP
poisoning within an organization. Some of them are Snort, Colasoft, Arpalert, Arpwatch, anti-
spoof, Antidote, Xarp etc. These are GUI based tools which is easy to use and deploy. We have
used Xarp for detecting the ARP poisoning within the network. (Figure.40).
Figure.40 ARP detection using Xarp
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CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE REVIEW
The extensive literature review was carried as per the guidelines proposed by Kitchenham [7].
The objective of carrying literature review was to gain deeper understanding of mitigation
techniques that exists in literature and to find gap in the study. The literature has been carried out
in following journals: -
1. Springer
2. ACM digital library
3. Wiley online library
4. Science Direct
5. IEEE Xplore
The search term was “ARP poisoning” in the search field. The papers in journals and conference
proceedings were taken into consideration for the literature survey. The result of the search is
shown in (Table.1).
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Table.1 Search results and relevant papers
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Total 22 relevant papers were selected for review. The papers in journals and conferences are
taken into consideration.
One of the earliest paper in literature was published by Tripunitra and Dutta in 1999 [8],
proposes a middleware approach that utilizes design constraints. The implementation was done
on stream based networking subsystem. ARP poisoning can be detected and prevented but
limitation was compatibility of existing network architecture with proposed one.
The paper by Bruschi. Ornaghi and Rosti in 2003 [9] presents S-ARP in which public and private
key are distributed to every hosts in the network by Central Server that act as a Certificate
Authority. PKI based authentication mechanism is used. S-ARP has a limitation of single point
of failure as if the Central Server fails; the whole network will not work. Also the cost of manual
configuration to give keys to new hosts.
In 2005, Isaac and Mohammed [10] proposed S-UARP that uses ARP unicast request mechanism
rather than broadcast request to Central Server. Thus, minimizes the broadcast requests within
the network. As technique depends on Central Server it has a limitation of single point of failure.
In 2007, two papers were published. The work by Trabelsi and El-Hajj [11] introduced a
technique that uses ARP stateful cache instead of traditional ARP stateless cache via Fuzzy
Logic Controller. The paper by Lootah et al [12] proposes a TARP where tickets and IP/MAC
mapping are centrally distributed to the hosts by DHCP server. Since it is a centralize approach,
it has a limitation of single point of failure.
In 2009, three paperswere published. Ortega et al [13] introduced a scheme that uses SOHOs by
using low end networking equipment running on the OpenWrt firmware. The paper by
Hammouda and trabelsi [14], proposes scheme where modification of switch is done to act as a
“Trusted Authority” and authenticate hosts while communication. The scheme has dependability
on switch configuration. The work done by Puangpronpitag and Masusas [15] presents dynamic
ARP spoof protection and surveillance (DAPS) for mitigation of ARP poisoning.
In 2010, Nam et al [16] invented the voting based resolution mechanism MR-ARP, where
concept of voting is done by the hosts in an order to prevent ARP poisoning. It has some
limitations like it is not valid in 802.11 networks.
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In 2011, Dangol et al [17] proposes GARP. In this protocol the ARP reply is broadcast not
unicast and Central Authority monitors ARP table.
In 2012, four papers were published. Kumar and Tapaswi [18] present a centralize mechanism
where every host check and validates their ARP entries through ARP Central Server (ACS).
ACS corrects and detects ARP poisoning. It is susceptible to single point of failure. Again, Nam
et al [19] published a paper that improves voting based mechanism of MR-ARP [16] through
puzzle based computational method. In an order to gain fair voting RSA algorithm is used. Salim
et al [20] introduced GDPS that detects the doubtful packets and legitimate host can be
recognized by sending modified request of gratuitous packets. Ataullah and Chauhan [21]
launched ES-ARP that is a stateful protocol and cache is updated after each communication.
In 2013, three papers were published. The paper by Tripathi and Mehtre [22], suggested an
approach where ICMP based secondary cache is maintained by every host in the network.
According to ICMP responses, the cache is updated. It has an advantage as there is no single
point of failure. Nam et al [23] in their paper proposes a scheme to enhance the voting amongst
host by adding some parameters like filtering, key parameters and early response. Pandey [24]
presents E-SDE in which ICMP and ARP packets are used as a probe packets and algorithm for
this is introduced.
In 2015, five papers were published. Masoud et al [25] make use of SDN ( Software Defined
Network) for mitigating ARP poisoning. Tian [26] et al introduces arpsec, a secure ARP/RARP
that utilizes TPM commodity as attestation base, verify the identity of the tar-get machine and
doesn’t require protocol modification. Saputro and Akkaya [27], presents PARP-S but it is suited
for 802.11s based smart grid networks. Bakhache and Rostom [28], launched a method that use
Kerberos protocol for authentication. This technique was named KARP. It is low cost but has a
limitation of single point of failure. The paper by Arote and Arya [29] detects and prevent ARP
poisoning by voting among host and modified ICMP.
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CHAPTER 4 PROPOSED WORK
This work proposed a Bitcoin network based approach for the mitigation of ARP poisoning
attacks. Bitcoin is a transaction system where every host in the network maintains a digital file
called as Ledger [30]. The various host on the network exchange money by exchanging ledger.
Bitcoin starts with the creation of bitcoin account which contains the account number, public key
and the private key of the host. Unlike ARP cache table, bitcoin ledger table contains the host’s
name and its balance (Figure.41) (Figure.42).
Figure.41 Bitcoin Ledger Figure.42 ARP cache table
Bitcoin is based on decentralized network. There is no centralizing authority in bitcoin
transaction like bank. Suppose Host A wants to send 5$ to Host B, Host A sends the broadcast
request containing digital signature and transaction message. Host B receives the request update
its balance with plus 5$ resulting in balance of Host A minus 5%. Now this updated ledger is
broadcasted to the network so that everyone updates their ledger. In bitcoin, everyone can see
everyone else balances and transactions [30]. Now the following questions arise: -
Who maintains the ledger?
Every host in the network maintains its own copy of ledger there is no centralize authority which
owns the ledger (Figure.45).
How authentication is done?
The authentication in bitcoin is done by digital signature by make use of host’s private key
(Figure.43).
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Figure.43 Digital signature generation
How other Hosts make verify that request is legitimate?
The broadcast requests are easily verified by the other hosts in the network as another function is
created and it allows other people to check whether the transaction is legitimate or not
(Figure.44).
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Figure.44. Signature verification process
In bitcoin transactions, the cryptographic functions and mathematics is used to achieve
authentication amongst the host. However, the concept if used in ARP protocol can enhance its
security and makes it less susceptible to attacks. The processing of broadcast request is more in
bitcoin as compare to ARP protocol, but if the security is the prime concern. It can be used with
ARP protocol. In this work we propose a Bitcoin Based ARP (BB-ARP).
4.1 BITCOIN BASED ADDRESS RESOLUTION PROTOCOL (BB-ARP)
In bitcoin based ARP protocol every host maintains the ledger containing host’s account number,
public key and private key. Also the list of corresponding MAC addresses and its IP addresses.At
the administrator level each host on the network will be assigned a pair of public key and private
key. Public key will have distributed in such a way that every host in the network will have
everyone’s public key. Now if host want to resolve its IP address into its corresponding MAC
address it broadcast the message encrypted with the public key of destined host so that it can
only decrypted by it.
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Figure.45 BB-ARP hosts in the network
When Host A communicates with Host B in the network. Host A sends the broadcast request
containing digital signature of host and a transaction message (Figure 46). Host B encrypt the
message by using Host A’s public key and its private key. Other Hosts on network can verify
whether the transaction between Host A and Host B is legitimate or not (Figure 44). After the
successful communication or transaction Host A and Host B broadcast the updated transaction
message containing IP address and MAC address mapping. Therefore, other host on the network
updates their ledger containing updated information. In BB-ARP every host maintains its copy of
ledger and mechanism is decentralized (Figure.47) (Figure.45).
Figure.46 Communication via bitcoin based ARP
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Figure.47 Broadcast of updated ledger
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE SCOPE
The systematic literature review has been carried out in an order to find techniques that were
proposed for mitigation of ARP poisoning. There are various techniques that exists in literature
but has limitations and constraints. Therefore, need for proposing new technique arises.In this
work the bitcoin based model is proposed for the mitigation of ARP poisoning. The
authentication is done by the digital signature and other hosts can verify whether the
communication between two host are legitimate or not. Since the approach is decentralized it is
not prone to single point of failure problem. The proposed scheme has a limitation of cost of
manual configuration as public key and private key is distributed to the new host manually every
time. Apart from this, it provides robust security and strong authentication.
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