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Iranian Geopolitical Imaginations: A Critical Account
Abstract
After Chap. 1 outlined the theoretical framework specifying the need to explore geopolitical structures as well as cultures in the attempt to understand foreign policy, this chapter will explore Iran’s geopolitical imaginations, or geopolitical cultures, as predicated upon the country’s various political cultures, or politico-ideological formations, and their respective worldviews. Therefore, Part A will sketch out the historical roots of modern Iranian political culture, which was mainly shaped through the internal and external (mainly the encounter with colonialism) situation, in order to identify the most important politico-ideological formations (namely nationalism, Islamism and socialism). Then, the fate of these political cultures shall be briefly monitored throughout the initial years after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, where a process of Islamization took hold. Part B will provide an outline of the geopolitical imaginations (engâreh-e géopolitiques) that each of the afore-mentioned politico-ideological formations exhibit: namely nationalism, Islamism and Third-Worldism (Tiers-Mondisme). In doing so, the section highlights the geopolitical significance of an identity marker.
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I , K A Jordan warned about the emergence of an ideological Shiite crescent from Beirut to the Persian Gulf. Ever since then, the debate on Iran's intentions to create a Shiite crescent has been a significant topic of debate for the panels and conferences held on the region's issues. ree presumptions center on Iran's role and intentions. A Shiite crescent is seen by the Arab Sunni elites as an attempt by Iran firstly to engage the masses in the region 1 ; secondly, to build an ideological belt of sympathetic Shiite governments and political factions in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and the Persian Gulf region 2 ; and, thirdly, to expand its regional role and power. 3 ese explanations are inadequate and unrealistic; none of them are compatible with Iran's real aims and strategies. In this article, I aim to analyze this issue from an Iranian perspective. Is Iran trying to engage the Arab Shiite masses? Is Iran attempting to expand its regional influence by building an ideological Shiite crescent? What are Iran's aims in establishing friendly relations with the Shiite factions in the region? With the new political developments in post-invasion Iraq, one should not dispute that there is an ongoing conflict between the Shiites and the Sunnis in the region. Yet my argument is that this rivalry is a pure inter-Arab world power-sharing conflict rather than an ideological Iranian-Arab rivalry. To examine this idea, I argue firstly that, given Iran's political dynamics and the existing cultural-societal and historical distinctions between the Persian and Arab masses, the realization of an ideology-dominated Shiite crescent, is rather difficult, if not impossible. I then argue that Iran's attempt to create a coalition of Shiite friendly governments is based on a strategic rationale and is pragmatic and not ideological. Iran's regional policies have always been affected by its Barzegar.indd 87 10/31/08 8:28:10 PM
Iranian intellectual history
This article examines the role of corporate identity in Iran’s foreign policy making. Drawing on interviews with Iranian stakeholders and an analysis of Iran’s political developments, this article surveys the three key elements of Iranian nationalism that shape Iranian foreign policy: Iranism, Islam and Shi’ism. This article finds that each of these is crucial in explaining the apparent contradictions in the approaches of several significant Iranian leaders, especially in cases where Iranism collides with religious values. By highlighting how each component is at once unique but still intrinsically linked to the others, this article demonstrates how Iran’s foreign policy choices can be understood in relation to its corporate identity.
The tumultuous 2009 election in Iran demonstrated that Islam is not a homogenous religion, but rather it presents itself in different ways and is rooted within social classes. Indeed, the rupture within the ruling establishment between the populists and reformists shows that the Islamic Republic does not represent a 7th-century medieval ideology nor a radical regime with widespread support. How well the Islamic Republic will come out of this unscathed remains to be seen as the US-led sanctions increase economic and political pressure upon both the current ruling elites and the opposition.
Historically, the closure of a party is a common phenomenon in Turkish politics. While the recent case against the governing Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP) was reminiscent of this trend, the decision of the Constitutional Court demonstrated that there are changes in the dynamics of the Turkish political structure. Although the literature cites the so-called '28 February Process', the impact of EU accession, and the learning effects of democratization as explanations for the distinction of the AKP from its predecessors, this article argues that the AKP is different due to its extended business network and newly defined conservative base. The decision of the court in the recent closure case against the AKP reflects this structural political change within the foundation of Islamic parties in Turkey. While the court acknowledged the political legitimacy of the party by taking a decision against its closure, it has revealed the general discontent regarding AKP's non-adjusted conservative/pro-Islamic policies by cutting down its financial means.
As part of an increasing international trend highlighting the 'singularity' of the subject of study and arguing that so-called universal theories of society and culture do not fit, communications have been increasingly conceptualised in terms like 'Asian', 'African' and 'Islamic'. Some researchers have been eager to play up difference between Eastern and Western value systems and experience. Wider considerations and contexts are usually brushed aside to pave the way for a singular 'culturalist' explanation of the media in the global South, and in particular the Middle East. By examining the Iranian media, and the interaction between state ideology and the logic of capital, this article suggests that there is no possibility of a particular theory of communication. The reappearance of the sacred has prompted a number of scholars to question the conventional sociological wisdom that 'Athens has nothing to do with Jerusalem'. This return does not indicate the passing of the world that Sociology wanted to understand. In Iran, as elsewhere, much of state's political legitimacy rests on its use of force as the ultimate sanction. The struggle over the monopoly of the means of symbolic violence, namely the attempted Islamicisation of the media, is increasingly important and cannot be separated from the former. States, as the case of Iran demonstrates, are seldom abstract or singular and have many contradictory institutions and units, and individual and institutional differences, policies and interests. The Iranian communication scene is peculiar in that liberalisation and privatisation are the order of the day, but the state is still reluctant to give up ideological control and is thus caught between the web of pragmatism and the imperative of the market, and the straightjacket of 'Islamism'.
This paper takes a stylized paradoxical fact of Iranian politics under the Islamic Republic of Iran as its starting point: the stark confusion between the position and a good portion of the opposition. Such a blurred frontier between 'position' and 'opposition' did not exist during the Shah's regime. Without the decisive support of non-Islamic organizations, secular intellectuals, and political forces on the ground, the creation of a theocratic regime in Iran and its consolidation could not be realized. Now in the thirtieth anniversary of the Islamic Republic, the open opposition of many influential clergies towards the way in which government is run under the present Supreme Leader and President Ahmadinejad, provides a new episode of 'opposition' within the theocrats' circles. To put this paradoxical fact differently, it should be emphasized that no regime in Iran's modern history has produced so much 'opposition' within its own ranks and enjoyed the loyalty of its 'oppositions' at the same time. How could this paradox be explained? Our paper tackles this issue by describing the peculiar type of social order under the Republic Islamic of Iran as ordered anarchy or "destructive coordination". Analysing the sources of this type of coordination, we proceed in two steps. The first is to question whether there has ever been a laic or secular movement in the recent Iranian history. The second consists in defining the institutional setup and recent dynamics of the Islamic Republic of Iran as a strange, if not unique, mutant of Huntington's Praetorian state, led by 'priests' and armed religious militants.
Purpose
International relations are involved in an undesirable order at the present time. It is emphatically necessary to propound firm principles to regulate the relationships among states and nations, and new laws and regulations are to be enacted at the international level. The purpose of this paper is to enumerate some of the main guide stones for development of Islamic thoughts in the fields of international humanities.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors enumerate the principles of Sufi foundations of international relations in Islam by introducing the theosophical standpoints of Islamic Sufism.
Findings
The paper introduces 95 principles in three categories of public international law, foreign policy, and diplomacy.
Research limitations/implications
As long as the essence of all religions has a unique root which is their spiritual paths and understandings based on their mystical views. To popularize and internationalize this proposition, comparative researches in other religions' Gnosticism will be essential.
Practical implications
Putting several principles forward, on the next phases, they can be used as the basis for many applied debates in the field and may be ended to a new international declaration/law.
Social implications
Delicateness, truthfulness, and righteousness of Islamic Sufism, which is the gist of thoughts of humankind's elites who are divine messengers/guardians during millenaries, may turn the attentions of scholars and researchers to this viewpoint, and consequently a new set of thoughts/doctrines for regulating international relations to be defined and codified.
Originality/value
International relations scholars have not touched the topic from a Sufi point of view. This paper brings this approach to a new challenging arena for those who are engaged in international relations related subjects of laws, politics, institutions, and organizations.
The idea of the Third World, which is usually traced to the late 1940s or early 1950s, was increasingly used to try and generate unity and support among an emergent group of nation-states whose governments were reluctant to take sides in the Cold War. These leaders and governments sought to displace the ‘East–West’ conflict with the ‘North–South’ conflict. The rise of Third Worldism in the 1950s and 1960s was closely connected to a range of national liberation projects and specific forms of regionalism in the erstwhile colonies of Asia and Africa, as well as the former mandates and new nation-states of the Middle East, and the ‘older’ nation-states of Latin America. Exponents of Third Worldism in this period linked it to national liberation and various forms of Pan-Asianism, Pan-Arabism, Pan-Africanism and Pan-Americanism. The weakening or demise of the first generation of Third Worldist regimes in the 1960s and 1970s coincided with or was followed by the emergence of a second generation of Third Worldist regimes that articulated a more radical, explicitly socialist, vision. A moderate form of Third Worldism also became significant at the United Nations in the 1970s: it was centred on the call for a New International Economic Order (nieo). By the 1980s, however, Third Worldism had entered into a period of dramatic decline. With the end of the Cold War, some movements, governments and commentators have sought to reorient and revitalise the idea of a Third World, while others have argued that it has lost its relevance. This introductory article provides a critical overview of the history of Third Worldism, while clarifying both its constraints and its appeal. As a world-historical movement, Third Worldism (in both its first and second generation modalities) emerged out of the activities and ideas of anti-colonial nationalists and their efforts to mesh highly romanticised interpretations of pre-colonial traditions and cultures with the utopianism embodied by Marxism and socialism specifically, and ‘Western’ visions of modernisation and development more generally. Apart from the problems associated with combining these different strands, Third Worldism also went into decline because of the contradictions inherent in the process of decolonisation and in the new international politico-economic order, in the context of the changing character, and eventual end, of the global political economy of the Cold War.
In recent years, analysts of world affairs have suggested that cultural interests—ethnicity, religion, and ideology—play a primary role in patterns of conflict and alliances, and that in the future the "clash of civilizations" will dominate international relations. The Limits of Culture explores the effect of culture on foreign policy, focusing on countries in the geopolitically important Caspian region and paying particular attention to those states that have identified themselves as Islamic republics—Iran, Taliban Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
The contributors to The Limits of Culture find that, contrary to the currently popular view, culture is rarely more important than other factors in shaping the foreign policies of countries in the Caspian region. They find that ruling regimes do not necessarily act according to their own rhetoric. Iran, for example, can conduct policies that contradict the official state ideology without suffering domestic retribution. Also, countries frequently align with one another when they do not share religious beliefs or cultural heritage. For example, Christian Armenia cooperates on trade and security with non-Christian Iran. Cultural identities, the contributors find, are flexible enough to enable states to pursue a wide range of policies that are consistent with their material interests. As the essays in The Limits of Culture make clear, the emerging foreign policies of the Caspian states present a significant challenge to the culturalist argument.
The first full-length study of Iranian nationalism in nearly five decades, this sophisticated and challenging book by the distinguished historian Ali M. Ansari explores the idea of nationalism in the creation of modern Iran. It does so by considering the broader developments in national ideologies that took place following the emergence of the European Enlightenment and showing how these ideas were adopted by a non-European state. Ansari charts a course through twentieth-century Iran, analysing the growth of nationalistic ideas and their impact on the state and demonstrating the connections between historiographical and political developments. In so doing, he shows how Iran's different regimes manipulated ideologies of nationalism and collective historical memory to suit their own ends. Drawing on hitherto untapped sources, the book concludes that it was the revolutionary developments and changes that occurred during the first half of the twentieth century that paved the way for later radicalisation.
The Tehran Bazaar has always been central to the Iranian economy and indeed, to the Iranian urban experience. Arang Keshavarzian's fascinating book compares the economics and politics of the marketplace under the Pahlavis, who sought to undermine it in the drive for modernisation and under the subsequent revolutionary regime, which came to power with a mandate to preserve the bazaar as an 'Islamic' institution. The outcomes of their respective policies were completely at odds with their intentions. Despite the Shah's hostile approach, the bazaar flourished under his rule and maintained its organisational autonomy to such an extent that it played an integral role in the Islamic revolution. Conversely, the Islamic Republic implemented policies that unwittingly transformed the ways in which the bazaar operated, thus undermining its capacity for political mobilisation. Arang Keshavarizian's book affords unusual insights into the politics, economics and society of Iran across four decades.
'Imagined Communities' examines the creation & function of the 'imagined communities' of nationality & the way these communities were in part created by the growth of the nation-state, the interaction between capitalism & printing & the birth of vernacular languages in early modern Europe.
"The people want . . .": This first half of slogans chanted by millions of Arab protesters since 2011 revealed a long-repressed craving for democracy. But huge social and economic problems were also laid bare by the protestors' demands. Simplistic interpretations of the uprising that has been shaking the Arab world since a young street vendor set himself on fire in Central Tunisia, on 17 December 2010, seek to portray it as purely political, or explain it by culture, age, religion, if not conspiracy theories. Instead, Gilbert Achcar locates the deep roots of the upheaval in the specific economic features that hamper the region's development and lead to dramatic social consequences, including massive youth unemployment. Intertwined with despotism, nepotism, and corruption, these features, produced an explosive situation that was aggravated by post-9/11 U.S. policies. The sponsoring of the Muslim Brotherhood by the Emirate of Qatar and its influential satellite channel, Al Jazeera, contributed to shaping the prelude to the uprising. But the explosion's deep roots, asserts Achcar, mean that what happened until now is but the beginning of a revolutionary process likely to extend for many more years to come. The author identifies the actors and dynamics of the revolutionary process: the role of various social and political movements, the emergence of young actors making intensive use of new information and communication technologies, and the nature of power elites and existing state apparatuses that determine different conditions for regime overthrow in each case. Drawing a balance-sheet of the uprising in the countries that have been most affected by it until now, i.e. Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Libya and Syria, Achcar sheds special light on the nature and role of the movements that use Islam as a political banner. He scrutinizes attempts at co-opting the uprising by these movements and by the oil monarchies that sponsor them, as well as by the protector of these same monarchies: the U.S. government. Underlining the limitations of the "Islamic Tsunami" that some have used as a pretext to denigrate the whole uprising, Gilbert Achcar points to the requirements for a lasting solution to the social crisis and the contours of a progressive political alternative.
This interrogates the racist construction of Aria and Aryanism in an Iranian context, arguing that these concepts gave the Indo-European speaking Persian ethnic group an advantage over Iran’s non-Persian nationalities and communities.
This dissertation is a study of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906-11 which brought a constitution and a parliament to the country for the first time. Special attention is given to the grassroots councils, the anjumans, which became organs of direct democracy in the country, and the radical newspapers which were published during both the First and Second Constitutional Period. We will examine, in detail, the Tabriz Provincial Anjuman, the anjumans of peasants and craftsmen in Gilan as well as Azerbaijan, and the women's anjumans. We will also look at three significant social democratic tendencies which emerged in the course of the Constitutional Revolution: (1) The Firqih-yi Ijtima'iyyun Amiyyun, the organization of Iranian Social Democrats, was active during the First Constitutional Period of 1906-1908. The Iranian Social Democrats began their activities in 1905 in Baku. Branches of the organization, also known as the Anjumans of the Mujahidin, were particularly active in the Tabriz Provincial Anjuman, and in the province of Gilan. (2) The Tabriz Social Democrats, a mainly Armenian group, organized during the Period of Minor Autocracy in 1908-1909 and helped lead the resistance army in Tabriz against Royalist supporters of Muhammad Ali Shah. (3) The Democrat Party, which had a social democratic program, was founded during the Second Constitutional Period of 1909-1911 and participated in the government in 1910. Iran-Naw organ of the party, broke new ground because of its political analysis, literary achievement, and theoretic sophistication. Research for this dissertation was done at the Middle East Collection of the University of Chicago, the University of Michigan, the New York Public Library, the Library of Congress, and the Hoover Institute. Several librarians in Iran also provided me with important material. The dissertation draws on newspapers of the Constitutional Revolution, proceedings and reports of the First and Second Majlis (Parliament) 1906-1908; 1909-1911; British and Russian diplomatic records of 1906-11; the Times of London; memoirs and biographies of various participants in the revolution; documentary collections on the Constitutional Revolution in Persian; secondary literature on the Constitutional Revolution in Persian, English, and French, and German. Methodologically I have found the contribution of British Marxist historians Christopher Hill and E. P. Thompson most useful for this work. Their notion of a "history from below" and their breaking down of the compartmentalization of traditional historiography has influenced my work.
In a reappraisal of Iran's modern history, Ervand Abrahamian traces its traumatic journey across the twentieth century, through the discovery of oil, imperial interventions, the rule of the Pahlavis and, in 1979, revolution and the birth of the Islamic Republic. In the intervening years, the country has experienced a bitter war with Iraq, the transformation of society under the clergy and, more recently, the expansion of the state and the struggle for power between the old elites, the intelligentsia and the commercial middle class. The author is a compassionate expositor. While he adroitly negotiates the twists and turns of the country's regional and international politics, at the heart of his book are the people of Iran. It is to them and their resilience that this book is dedicated, as Iran emerges at the beginning of the twenty-first century as one of the most powerful states in the Middle East.
Introduction This chapter is a more complicated task to write than would have been the case twenty or thirty years ago. In the age that we can perhaps now define as the ‘classic’ era in the historiography of the European twentieth century from the 1960s to the 1980s, the interconnection of revolutionary causes (of left and right) and violence seemed relatively uncomplicated. Revolutionary causes – perceived as secular, millenarian and intransigent – engaged in violence as a consequence of the radicalism of their rhetoric, dreams and ambitions and the intensity of the struggle that their actions generated for political power. Nowadays, however, matters no longer seem so straightforward. Much of the literature on revolutionary movements over the last twenty years has watered down the centrality of ideological dynamics within revolution and complicated such dynamics with a heightened recognition that much which might appear political in fact had other causes. Ethnic antipathies, the impact of imperialist projects both within and beyond Europe and what one might term the psycho-underground of masculinities and local community conflicts now seem at least as important, if not more so, as politico-ideological dynamics in explaining the surges of revolutionary violence that took place across Europe during the twentieth century. The purpose of this chapter is therefore to think afresh about the interconnectedness of violence and revolutionary movements (of the left and right) during Europe's long twentieth century. In doing so, three complexities immediately arise. First, there is the challenge of chronological scope.
This book is a radical piece of counter-intuitive rethinking of the clash of civilizations theory and global politics. In this richly detailed criticism of contemporary politics, Hamid Dabashi argues that after 9/11 we have not seen a new phase in a long running confrontation between Islam and the West, but that such categories have in fact collapsed and exhausted themselves. The West is no longer a unified actor and Islam is ideologically depleted in its confrontation with colonialism. Rather we are seeing the emergence of the US as a lone superpower, and a confrontation between a form of imperial globalized capital and the rising need for a new Islamic theodicy. The combination of political salience and theoretical force makes Islamic Liberation Theology a cornerstone of a whole new generation of thinking about political Islamism and a compelling read for anyone interested in contemporary Islam, current affairs and US foreign policy. Dabashi drives his well-supported and thoroughly documented points steadily forward in an earnest and highly readable style.
In this era of superheated rhetoric and vitriolic exchanges between the leaders of Iran and Israel, the threat of nuclear violence looms. But the real roots of the enmity between the two nations mystify Washington policymakers, and no promising pathways to peace have emerged. This book traces the shifting relations among Israel, Iran, and the United States from 1948 to the present, uncovering for the first time the details of secret alliances, treacherous acts, and unsavory political maneuverings that have undermined Middle Eastern stability and disrupted U.S. foreign policy initiatives in the region. Trita Parsi, a U.S. foreign policy expert with more than a decade of experience, is the only writer who has had access to senior American, Iranian, and Israeli decision makers. He dissects the complicated triangular relations of their countries, arguing that America's hope for stability in Iraq and for peace in Israel is futile without a correct understanding of the Israeli-Iranian rivalry. Parsi's behind-the-scenes revelations about Middle East events will surprise even the most knowledgeable readers: Iran's prime minister asks Israel to assassinate Khomeini, Israel reaches out to Saddam Hussein after the Gulf War, the United States foils Iran's plan to withdraw support from Hamas and Hezbollah, and more. This book not only revises our understanding of the Middle East's recent past, it also spells out a course for the future. In today's belligerent world, few topics, if any, could be more important.
It is often assumed that Iran must necessarily submit to the forces of globalization and liberalize its economy, but the country’s ruling elites have continued throughout the post-revolutionary era to resist these pressures for neo-liberal economic reform, seeking to survive in the battlefield of today’s globalizing economy whilst remaining loyal to their own rules of engagement. This book analyzes the dynamics of economic reform in the Islamic Republic of Iran as they have played out in this post-revolutionary struggle for economic independence from 1979 up to the present day. It shows how, although some groups within the Iranian elite are in favor of opening up the economy to the inflow of foreign capital – believing that lasting independence requires economic growth powered in part by investment from abroad – others argue that such economic liberalization might endanger Iran’s national interests and put the survival of the post-revolutionary regime at risk.
Adib-Moghaddam examines the causes and consequences of conflict in one of the most important regions of the world. Bridging the gap between critical theories of international relations and the empirical study of the Gulf area, this book expands on the many ideologies, cultural inventions and ideational constructs that have affected relations in the past three decades. Key issues explored include: The rise and fall of Arab and Persian nationalism. The international repercussions of the Islamic revolution in Iran. The events surrounding the three Gulf Wars. The 'mindset' of terrorist networks such as al-Qaeda. Why US neo-conservatism is threatening regional order. Provocatively written, persuasively researched and conclusively argued, The International Politics of the Persian Gulf presents the first comprehensive analysis of international relations in the Gulf from an explicitly multidisciplinary perspective.
This chapter attempts to offer a more differentiated understanding of Iran's foreign policy discourse. Iran's foreign policy perspectives offer little doubt that Iranian Islamist leaders of all viewpoints strive for both security and a greater role in regional and global affairs. In addition, revolutionary-inspired Islamic nationalism in the face of what is deemed Western intransigence or bullying is effectively the thread that runs through almost all politically acceptable positions inside Iran. In this sense, revolutionary Islamic ideology envelops the understanding of regional and global geopolitics and Iran's aspirations. It also makes priorities of safeguarding Iran's territorial integrity, preserving the Islamic Republic's security and survival, countering its attempted isolation, and improving its standing in the region and, by implication, the world.
The victory of the Iranian nation in its historic revolution through popular uprising of bare-handed masses overcoming an armed to the teeth monarchy supported by all big world powers, caused the falsification of many theories in political science and international relations, and in particular on the pivotal concept of power. The political science as a discipline bound to power and power itself defined in terms of hard-ware elements -such as military force and economic power -suddenly crippled down and the slogan of "blood is victorious over the sword" practically objectified. After its establishment, the astonishing capability of the Islamic Republic of Iran to confront tremendous national, regional and international challenges such as coup d'état, local and regional rebellions, economic sanctions, military aggressions (such as Tabbas US operation) 1 , the imposed war of Saddam Hussein and etc, instead of weakening this new political system, all contributed to the promotion of its international standing. Hence, Iran now is being recognized as the paramount regional power by both friends and foes. However, the sources of its power have not stemmed from increase of hard power capabilities but from a new source of power called "Soft Power". This catchy concept was mainly signified following the victory Manouchehr Mohammadi is Professor of International Relations in Faculty of Law and Political Science, Tehran University. Currently he is the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Education and Research and Editor-in-Chief of IJIA.
Following the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran and the severance of ties between Iran and the United States, due to its geopolitical importance, Iran kept a decisive role in regional developments. On the other hand, neighboring 15 countries and its huge oil and gas reserves have enhanced Iran's importance manifold. Given Iran's political, security and geopolitical position, it is difficult if not impossible, to settle regional disputes without its partnership. At the same time, Iran should also pursue economic progress and development in order to economically compete with its neighbors. While examining the cultural identity of Iranian revolution, the following article largely focuses on the Shiite denomination of Iran's politics and its influence on Shiites in other countries, especially the neighboring states. It also analyzes the ideological and aspirational goals of the Islamic Revolution in Iran—as achievable alternatives to utopian objectives—which are the characteristic of all revolutions in the world.
This article argues that socioeconomic changes within Islamist constituencies are critical parts of understanding of how moderate Islamists emerge and succeed. The diverging paths of economic reform in Turkey and Egypt have generated different effects on the Islamist constituencies in these two countries. Economic liberalization has played both a constitutive and a causal role in transformation of political Islam in Turkey by facilitating the growth of a strong devout bourgeoisie with vested interests in liberalism and democracy. With the growing support of this rising devout bourgeoisie, the moderate Islamists managed to transform Islamism into a democratic conservative party. In Egypt, in contrast, the way the state implemented economic reform prevented the formation of as strong and independent a devout bourgeoisie that could be assertive in political Islam. Instead, the lower-middle-class professionals, losers of reform, populated the Islamist constituency and entrenched Islamism in ideological positions rather than pragmatism. This ultimately led to the marginalization of the moderates in Egypt.
A comparison of trade unions and NGOs in Iran demonstrates the diverse nature of their activities. Over the last 90 years, trade unions have played important roles in changing the political system in that country. However, unions are largely male-dominated organisations, which explains why some women have begun to organise women's trade unions. This article focuses, however, on the activities of women's NGOs, which are engaged in improving the socio-economic conditions of the most marginalised sectors of society. Their activities are limited and they are not engaged in structural change. However, they are challenging gender-specific access and influence over institutional power, matters that are crucial to the process of democratisation. It is argued that, since many trade unions and NGOs in Iran are strengthening community-based institutions in different ways, their collaboration would have a mutually transformational impact which would turn these organisations into more powerful forces in the process of democratisation.
Purpose
Governing principles of the world countries' current foreign policies are based on nationalism and in the realization of this aspiration, human rights in other countries are less considered and demands of national interests on other issues are surpassed. Islam, in principle, is opposite to this approach. However, national interests are important in Islam, but Islam does not try to achieve this target at the price of destruction of other countries and rights violations of their peoples. The interests of Islam's government are based on expediency of humankind as a whole and in its foreign policy should be arranged in a way to fulfil this target. In this regards this paper aims to introduce the basic principles of foreign policy in Islam based on the Sufi standpoint.
Design/methodology/approach
Islam aims to improve humanities based on moralities and spiritualities. Some principles for reaching this goal based on Islamic Sufism standpoints are provided.
Findings
The paper reveals 32 principles.
Research limitations/implications
Comparative research in other religions' Gnosticism will be helpful.
Practical implications
These principles can be used for applied debates in the field and ended with new international regulations.
Social implications
Delicateness, truthfulness, and righteousness of Islamic Sufism may turn the attentions of scholars and researchers to this viewpoint, and a new set of regulations to be codified.
Originality/value
Political scientists have not touched the topic from a Sufi point of view. This paper brings this approach to a new challenging arena for those who are engaged in it.
Purpose
Many laws have been derived from the religions' legislations and lots of them have not the capability of uniqueness and publicity, due to variety of reasons, especially at the level of countries. But the spirit of legislations is the same and unique in all religions and it is the Tariqah (Sufi path), Sufism, mysticism and ethical beliefs that have been stable and unchangeable for millennia, and wisdom has accepted and accepts them in all times and locations. Thus, if the international public law to be defined and designed upon the base of the unique religions' spirit, we will reach to a unique law with most publicity. The purpose of this paper is to survey the subjects of Islamic public international law, and extend Islamic jurisprudence decisions from a theosophical point of view over the field of international law.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper explores the foundation of public international law from the theosophy approach of Islamic Sufism and mysticism.
Findings
By raising 38 principles, the author proposes basic principles of important public international law subjects to prepare a backbone for recompilation of new law in this subject matter.
Research limitations/implications
Comparative researches in other religions' gnosticism will be helpful.
Social implications
Delicateness, truthfulness, and righteousness of Islamic Sufism, may turn the attentions of scholars and researchers to this viewpoint, and a new set of laws to be codified.
Originality/value
Public international law scholars have not touched the topic from a Sufi viewpoint. This paper opens new challenging arena.
The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is widely misunderstood. On the one hand many experts regard the Iranian foreign policy as being essentially ideology driven while on the other hand a significant body of opinion believes that ideology is a convenient smokescreen for Iran's pursuit of its national interests. This paper examines the role of ideological, political and institutional actors in the context of the Islamic Republic's quest for consensus and cohesion. The purpose is to delve into the relationship between these factors with a view to understanding how this complex interaction impacts on foreign policy formulation and implementation. It is proposed that any improvement to the current system requires a more transparent strategic direction.