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99
International security
Mariann Vecsey:
CHANGES IN THE MIGRATION TRENDS FROM
WEST AFRICA TO EUROPE
DOI: 10.35926/HDR. 2019.1-2.8
ORCID: 0000-0001-7134-3666
ABSTRACT: For a long time, the Central Mediterranean migration route was the most pop-
ular among those which went to the European Union from Africa. However, data from
2018 show that the trend is about to turn, and the Western Mediterranean route to Spain
is about to become the most popular. Changes in Italy, the entering point to Europe pre-
sumably means changes in the African internal routes as well. This article intends to track
the reasons which could affect the migratory pattern to the EU. The research focuses on
the condition changes along the Central Mediterranean route, from Italy, to Mali. The ar-
ticle aims to sum up both the political and security domains, including the CSDP missions
and operation from the southern border of the EU to the heart of West Africa.
KEYWORDS: international migration, Central Mediterranean route, Italy, Libya, Mali, Niger,
West African route
INTRODUCTION
In 2018 the whole European Union turned its eyes towards Italy. The reason: the parlia-
mentary elections. As in one of the biggest migration transit and receiving countries, inter-
nal political changes in Italy are expected to inuence the migration ows of the Central
Mediterranean route. The rising popularity of the League and the Five Star Movement
(M5S) foreshadowed radical changes in Italy’s migration policies. New approaches on the
European side are likely to inuence changes in the migration patterns in Africa as well.
The biggest North-African transit country, Libya is experiencing years-long ght for na-
tional power, which took another violent turn in April 2019. The events in Libya possibly
aect the migration ows, discouraging people to choose the Central Mediterranean route.
As a result of growing insecurity and jeopardy during the travel, migratory routes can
change to directions which are assessed to be cheaper or safer. Additionally, in 2017 the
former Italian government also managed to secure a deal with Libyan tribal leaders to seal
the borders, which also aected migration routes.1 The possible consequence is a change
in the migratory pattern between Africa and Europe.
1 “Italy brokers deal with Libyan tribes to curb migrant inux”. https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/
italy-brokers-deal-with-libyan-tribes-to-curb-migrant-inux/, Accessed on 12 May 2019.
100 HUNGARIAN DEFENCE REVIEW, Special Issue 2019, Vol. 147, Nr. 1–2
Map 1: Geographical overview
In addition to the changes in Italy and Libya, Mali is experiencing a further deterioration
in the country’s internal security. The ongoing conict in the Northern part of the country
and the escalation of ethnic tension in the Center, can also aect migration patterns. The
political and security changes could aect the migrants’ choice, on which route they prefer
to use, let it be intra- or inter-African. However, these changes do not necessarily result in
changing patterns. To assess what is behind the gures on the Central- and Western Mediter-
ranean route, I will examine both the developments in the political situation in Italy, and the
evolution of the security situation in Libya and Mali. I also used data analysis to examine if
the change of the gures in the Central and Western Mediterranean routes means a change
in the migration ow as well.
MEDITERRANEAN MAYHEM
In 2018, we could see signicant changes in the migration policies of the EU’s southern
ank. The result of the Italian elections predestined the changes. The far-right League and
the anti-establishment M5S parties formed the new government.2 The parties gained pop-
ularity because of the existing economic problems, the failed growth, and the long-lasting
pressure of irregular migration ows from Libya, and their dissatisfactory management. In
parallel, trust decreased towards the EU and its institutions. With this background, it was not
a surprise, that one of the main policy changes occurred in the eld of migration. The new,
more radical approach discontinued the practice of the former government in supporting the
presence of the NGO boats in the Mediterranean. Instead, it insisted on the closure of the
Italian ports to migrants.3 This step did not come unexpectedly, since earlier Italy heavily
criticised the NGO activity in the Mediterranean. NGO vessels could use Libyan coastal
2 Kirchgaessner, S. “Italy’s president invites populist coalition to form government”. The Guardian, 23 May 2018.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/23/italys-president-invites-populist-coalition-to-form-govern-
ment, Accessed on 4 May 2019.
3 Molnár, A. “Olaszország biztonsági kihívásai és stratégiai irányai” [Italian Security Challenges and Strategic
Directions]. Felderítő Szemle 17/3. 2018. 91-111. http://knbsz.gov.hu/hu/letoltes/fsz/2018-3.pdf, Accessed on 4
May 2019.
Libya
Mali Niger
Italy
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International security
waters, while the EUNAVFOR MED ships could not, and were able to transport the stranded
directly to Italian or Maltese ports.4
Because of the growing migratory pressure, and the lack of burden sharing, the
South-European border countries, namely Malta and Italy closed their ports to NGO res-
cue ships. The most well-known case is the Aquarius, which was forced to detour to Spain
with rescued asylum seekers on board. Therefore, since 26th August 2018 the rescue ships,
which are operating in the Mediterranean have not had a clear guideline where to disem-
bark with the rescued migrants.5 The decision of Italy and Malta to keep their ports closed
to vessels which are carrying saved migrants on board also changed the attitude of cargo
ships. These vessels started to neglect their duty to save people in distress because of the
fear of economic loss.6
Italy’s rst attempt to gain more control over NGOs was made in 2017, when the
government passed a code of conduct for NGOs, who run migrant rescue ships in the
Mediterranean. The 12-point code includes limitations, such as banning NGO ships to
enter Libyan territorial waters and calls for closer cooperation with the police.7 The code
was presented to around nine NGOs which were threatened with being barred from Ital-
ian ports in case of refusal.8 It was, however, not the nal step by Italy in restricting
migration policies. On 24th September 2018, the Council of Ministers approved a decree
which restricts access to asylum, protection, and increases detention.9 The notorious law,
advocated by Interior Minister Matteo Salvini (League), was approved on 29th November
2018.10 The new legislation does now allow to give protection on humanitarian grounds.
This means that those who are not eligible to asylum, but had serious reasons of human-
itarian nature to ee their home countries are no longer entitled to get asylum status.11 It
also extended the time limitation for keeping migrants in detention centres. Besides this,
the withdrawal of the already granted protection became easier. A list of various crimes,
from thefts to violence to public ocials, was identied, for which asylum seekers can
be expelled from Italy. The new law also weakens the integration program, the Protection
System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees (SPRAR). This step will possibly lead to an
4 Molnár, A. “Az EUNAVFOR MED Sophia műveleti” [The EUNAVFO MED Operation Sophia]. In Molnár, A.
and Komlósi, O. (eds.) Az Európai Unió mediterrán térséggel összefüggő kapcsolata. Budapest: Dialóg Campus,
2019. 95-121. https://ak-dl.uni-nke.hu/pdf_kiadvanyok/Web_PDF_Az%20EU_mediterran_terseggel_osszef-
uggo_kapcsolata.pdf, Accessed on 4 May 2019.
5 Tondo, L. and McVeigh, K. “No NGO rescue boats currently in central Mediterranean, agencies warn”. The
Guardian, 12 September 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/12/migrant-rescue-ships-mediter-
ranean, Accessed on 4 May 2019.
6 Schmeer, L. “Migration in the Mediterranean: between Myth and Reality”. https://eyes-on-europe.eu/migra-
tion-mediterranean/, Accessed on 19 September 2019.
7 Zalan, E. “NGOs divided by Italy’s new rescue code”. https://euobserver.com/migration/138656, Accessed on 19
September 2019.
8 Balmer, C. “Italy drafts contested code of conduct for NGO migrant boats”. https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-europe-migrants-ngos/italy-drafts-contested-code-of-conduct-for-ngo-migrant-boats-idUSKBN19X2U1,
Accessed on 19. September 2019.
9 Sunderland, J. “New Low for Italian Migration Policies”. https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/09/26/new-low-ital-
ian-migration-policies, Accessed on 4 May 2019.
10 Scherer, S. “Italy’s Salvini gets win with new asylum and security rules”. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/ar-
ticle/us-italy-politics-immigration-security/italys-salvini-gets-win-with-new-asylum-and-security-rules-idUSK-
CN1NY1JN, Accessed on 11 May 2019.
11 Torrisi, C. “The Italian government has approved a new bill targeting migrants”. https://openmigration.org/en/
analyses/the-italian-government-has-approved-a-new-bill-targeting-migrants/, Accessed on 4 May 2019.
102 HUNGARIAN DEFENCE REVIEW, Special Issue 2019, Vol. 147, Nr. 1–2
increase in the number of those who are in an irregular situation. In parallel with this, the
legislation strengthens the police through increasing funds.12
Meanwhile Malta, with no EU agreement on search and rescue cooperation, follows the
migration policy, which has the widest support throughout the EU, namely the fortication
and externalisation of Europe’s border control. Besides this, Malta is an active participant
in training the Libyan Coast Guard, and views the North African country as a partner in the
EU’s external border management.13
However important, these Member State responses cannot inuence migration ows
in the Mediterranean in themselves. The EU has a mission and an operation under the
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in the Mediterranean. The mission is the
European Union Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM
Libya), which is a civilian mission. Its task is to “support the Libyan authorities in con-
tributing to eorts to disrupt organised criminal networks involved notably in smuggling
migrants, human tracking and terrorism.” It started in 2013, and “supports the Libyan
authorities in the areas of border management, law enforcement and criminal justice.”14
The EUBAM Libya has always had a diculty to conduct its tasks. The deterioration of
the security situation drove the mission out of the country in July 2014, and for the second
time in 2019. Mainly because of these negative circumstances the mission reduced its
activities in Libya.15
The operation, the EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia, is more interesting. The rst
phase of the operation was launched on 22nd June 2015, with a focus on “surveillance and
assessment of human smuggling and tracking networks in the Southern Central Med-
iterranean. The second stage of the operation provided search and, if necessary, seizure
of suspicious vessels.”16 In 2017 the Council extended the mandate of the operation with
two additional tasks, “with the training of the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy, and with the
contribution to the implementation of the UN arms embargo on the high seas o the coast
of Libya.”17
As the operation is part of the EU’s comprehensive approach to migration, and its head-
quarters is located in Rome, the expiration of its mandate on 31st December 2018, provided
Italy with an opportunity. Italy had enough of receiving migrants in the shape of letting
NGO vessels into its ports and having the EUNAVFOR MED ships rescuing the stranded
as well. Therefore, the newly elected government, pushed for changing the rules to be able
to redistribute rescued migrants in November 2018. Interior Minister Matteo Salvini even
threatened with closing up the operation, if there is no consensus on the proposed relocation
system, which would ease the pressure on Rome. Other options emerged, one of them to shut
12 Matamoros, C. A. “Italy’s new security decree clamps down on immigration”. https://www.euronews.
com/2018/11/29/italy-s-new-security-decree-clamps-down-on-immigration, Accessed on 4 May 2019.
13 “Cherry-picking Europe: Migration and economic management in Malta”. European Council on Foreign Relations.
https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_cherry_picking_europe_migration_and_economic_management_in_
malta, Accessed on 12 May 2019.
14 “EU Integrated Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya)”. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/
les/20190319_eubam_libya_factsheet_march_2019_en.pdf, Accessed on 12 May 2019.
15 EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia Ocial. Personal interview. 17 June 2019.
16 “Council launches EU naval operation to disrupt human smugglers and trackers in the Mediterranean”. https://
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/06/22/fac-naval-operation/, Accessed on 04 May 2019.
17 “Story”. https://www.operationsophia.eu/about-us/#story, Accessed on 4 May 2019.
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International security
down Operation Sophia, and another is to launch a new mission in Tunisia, with the focus on
training the Libyan Coast Guard.18
Meanwhile it does not serve entirely the Italian interests to close Operation Sophia.
It is an operation led by Italy, with an HQ located in Rome, and it gives prestige to the coun-
try.19 It would also put more responsibility and nancial burden on Italy if Operation Sophia
ends. Rome would have to handle migration in the Central Mediterranean alone, if the mi-
gration ows from Libya increase.20 Not to mention Italian ties with Libya, which would
further erode with nishing up the operation. Keeping these in mind, Italian Prime Minister
Giuseppe Conte proposed a three months technical elongation to the operation. During this
timeframe Italy aimed to achieve its originally proposed conditions.21
The new timeframe was not enough for successful negotiations and reaching consensus in
the EU. Moreover, Italy’s decision to close its ports, and refuse to allow EUNAVFOR MED
ships to disembark rescued migrants can easily lead to further conicts within the EU. The rst
sign of it was when Germany decided to withdraw its naval units form Operation Sophia.22
Because of the lack of consensus, in March 2019, the Political Security Committee of
the EU agreed on a six-month-long elongation of the operation, with a rather interesting
solution. France proposed to temporarily suspend the deployment of naval assets of the EU-
NAVFOR MED, allowing only the air component to conduct surveillance tasks. In parallel
with this, the EU reinforced the support to the Libyan Coast Guard.23
The current Italian struggles to reduce the number of migrants arriving in the Central Med-
iterranean are, however, not the rst attempts to reduce migration ows. After the EU-Turkey
deal in 2016, the EU was keen to reach agreement with Libya as well, securing the communi-
ty’s southern borders. Thus, negotiations started in early 2017 between EU and North-African
representatives.24 Italy took the leading role in the negotiations soon. Then Interior Minister
Marco Minniti announced on 02nd April 2017, that after three days of negotiations behind
closed doors, 60 tribal leaders from Libya agreed to secure the country’s vast southern borders.
The deal included the deployment of a Libyan border patrol unit to the 5,000 kms long south-
ern border area. Besides this, various tribes agreed to monitor dierent sections of the border.
The deal not just aims to reduce migration ows, but also to reduce criminal activity in the
region: people, drugs, weapons smuggling. It also calls for job training programmes, in order
to provide young people with other options than joining criminal groups.25
18 Barigazzi, J. “EU diplomats tentatively agree to extend Operation Sophia”. https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-
rope-migration-refugees-diplomats-agree-to-extend-operation-sophia/, Accessed on 12 May 2019.
19 Taylor, P. “Salvini’s Sophia soapbox”. Politico, 12 March 2019. https://www.politico.eu/article/italy-matteo-sal-
vini-sophia-soapbox/, Accessed on 12 May 2019.
20 Barigazzi, J. “EU diplomats tentatively agree to extend Operation Sophia”. https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-
rope-migration-refugees-diplomats-agree-to-extend-operation-sophia/, Accessed on 12 May 2019.
21 “Italy extends Operation Sophia for three months”. https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/13824/italy-ex-
tends-operation-sophia-for-three-months, Accessed on 12 May 2019.
22 “German Navy drops out of Mediterranean Sea operation Sophia”. https://navaltoday.com/2019/01/23/ger-
man-navy-drops-out-of-mediterranean-sea-operation-sophia/, Accessed on 12 May 2019.
23 Barigazzi, J. “EU diplomats tentatively agree to extend Operation Sophia”. https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-
rope-migration-refugees-diplomats-agree-to-extend-operation-sophia/, Accessed on 12 May 2019.
24 “European, North Africa ministers seek to curb Libya migrant ows”. https://www.euractiv.com/section/jus-
tice-home-aairs/news/european-north-africa-ministers-seek-to-curb-libya-migrant-ows/, Accessed on 12
May 2019.
25 “Italy brokers deal with Libyan tribes to curb migrant inux”. https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/
italy-brokers-deal-with-libyan-tribes-to-curb-migrant-inux/, Accessed on 12 May 2019.
104 HUNGARIAN DEFENCE REVIEW, Special Issue 2019, Vol. 147, Nr. 1–2
The deal, agreed with the help of Italian Interior Minister Minniti, proved to be suc-
cessful in reducing the migration ows. By September 2017, the gures decreased dramat-
ically on the Central Mediterranean route. However, rumours started, that Italy induced
Libyan tribes and militias to end their illicit activities, especially people smuggling and
human tracking. Paired with the Libyan Coast Guard playing more active role in rescu-
ing migrants.26
Map 2: Influx of refugees and migrants to Europe
Source: https://erccportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/getdailymap/docId/2707, Accessed on 4 May 2019.
According to Map 2. the decline in the migratory gures started in mid-June 2017,
continued throughout 2018, and the decrease sustained steadily in 2019 as well, as it is clear
from Map 3. Translating it to numbers, around 24,000 migrants arrived in Italy in June 2017,
which dropped back to less than 5,000 monthly arrivals in 2018,27 and less than 300 in the
rst two months of 2019.28
26 Wintour, P. “Italian minister defends methods that led to 87% drop in migrants from Libya”. The Guardian, 7
September 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/07/italian-minister-migrants-libya-marco-minniti,
Accessed on 12 May 2019.
27 “Inux of refugees and migrants to Europe”. https://erccportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/getdailymap/docId/2707,
Accessed on 4 May 2019.
28 “Inux of refugees and migrants to Europe in 2019”. https://erccportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/getdailymap/docId/2839,
Accessed on 04 May 2019.
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International security
Map 3: Influx of refugees and migrants to Europe in 2019: map
Source: https://erccportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/getdailymap/docId/2955, Accessed on 18 July 2019.
However, the conict in Libya did not continue as peacefully as it was expected in
2019. To follow up the rather peaceful period of 2017-2018, when dierent armed groups
secured their territorial gains, in the end of 2018 General Khalifa Haftar started his southern
campaign with the Libyan National Army (LNA).29 His aim was to secure oil elds and ght
terrorist groups. The operation, which lasted for almost seven weeks, ended on 02nd March
2019.30 With this step, General Haftar gained control over the key oilelds in Libya. Besides
the oilelds, General Haftar went into a territory, which was involved in the EU’s external
border control, therefore the Italian deal, made in 2017, possibly fell victim of General
Haftar’s southern campaign. The Tobruk based LNA gained control just over the oil, but not
the revenues. The Libyan oil should be sold by the National Oil Corporation (NOC), and the
payments are received by the Central Bank of Libya. These institutions, besides they both
are headquartered in Tripoli, are declared as neutral. However, NOC condemned the LNA’s
militarisation of two facilities. The move resulted in the open support of LNA from the east-
ern NOC subsidiaries. Thus, General Haftar still needs to control Tripoli to inuence the rev-
enue allocation.31 Economic considerations, years-long intent to take Tripoli, and possibly
29 Marsai, V. “Elemző tanulmány a 2019. március 14. és 23. közötti Líbia migrációs kutatásához”. http://kozerthe-
totudas.hu/2019/04/11/marsai-viktor-elemzo-tanulmany-a-2019-marcius-14-es-23-kozotti-libiai-migracios-ku-
tatasahoz/, Accessed on 19 September 2019.
30 Binnie, J. “LNA advances across southwest Libya”. Jane’s Defence Weekly 56/11. 2019. 16.
31 Smith, R. and Pack, J. “Oil revenue access drives conict”. https://www.petroleum-economist.com/articles/pol-
itics-economics/middle-east/2019/oil-revenue-access-drives-conict, Accessed on 19 September 2019.
106 HUNGARIAN DEFENCE REVIEW, Special Issue 2019, Vol. 147, Nr. 1–2
some international suggestions led to General Haftar’s next step, the oensive against Trip-
oli. On 03rd April the LNA started its advancement towards the country’s capital.32 It became
obvious soon, that capturing Tripoli will not be an easy task for the LNA, and by the end
of April a house-to-house ght was unfolding.33 The protracted battle for Tripoli will soon
aect migration as well. When the ghts started there were approximately 140,000 migrants
in Tripoli, who were in need for protection.34 According to IOM, Libya has a migrant stock
of about 820,000 people, mainly from Syria and sub-Saharan Africa.35 The Libyan Ministry
of Interior, however, estimates the number of irregular migrants in the country around 1.5
million, but we have to take in consideration, that there is no reliable data from Cyrenaica
or Fezzan.36 The population in Tripoli, local and migrant, are both in a volatile situation,
and will likely seek the opportunity to ee Libya to safer countries if the situation does not
change in the short-term. With Libya becoming an unsafe country to reach, the protracted
situation can aect migration patterns in the mid-term from the sub-Saharan region, to adapt
to the new situation. The second part of the article investigates the possibility of Mali be-
coming a migration hub due to the changes in the situation in Libya and the Mediterranean.
MALI MISFORTUNE
To be able to place Mali and assess its status on the West African migration route, the security
situation in the country must be analysed. In 2012, a Tuareg insurgency started in the northern
region of the country, aiming to liberate Azawad, a Tuareg state. Bamako could not handle the
situation in the north, and a coup d’état, led by military ocers, made the situation more com-
plex in the country. The coup de grâce came in April 2012, with the Islamist groups taking the
lead in the Tuareg insurgency. In 2013, an international intervention started in the country, and
in 2015 the insurgency was supposed to end when a peace agreement was signed between the
warring parties, namely the Mali government, the Platform, and the Coordination of Azawad
Movements (CMA).37 However, the conict de-escalated, it has not ceased but remained at
low-middle intensity.38 After the Peace Agreement was signed, despite the heavy international
presence in the country, the government was not able to consolidate the situation. Jihadist at-
tacks remained a problem throughout the years, not just in the northern region of Mali, but in
the whole country. The presence of multiple groups even threatens with the possibility of the re-
gionalisation of the conict, with a spill-over to Niger and Burkina Faso. Now, in 2019, besides
the radical Islamism, Bamako has to face escalating ethnic tensions in the central region of the
32
“Eastern Libyan commander orders forces to move on Tripoli”. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-se-
curity/eastern-libyan-commander-orders-forces-to-move-on-tripoli-idUSKCN1RG0RT, Accessed on 12 May 2019.
33 “Libyan forces push back against Haftar in house-to-house battles”. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-libya-security/libyan-forces-push-back-against-haftar-in-house-to-house-battles-idUSKCN1S40Q8, Access-
ed on 12 May 2019.
34 Peyton, N. “Migrant women, children denied shelter in Libya’s battleground”. Reuters. https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-libya-security-migrants/migrant-women-children-denied-shelter-in-libyas-battleground-idUSK-
CN1SG1PV, Accessed on 12 May 2019.
35 “Migration Data Portal”. IOM. https://migrationdataportal.org/?i=stock_abs_&t=2019&cm49=434, Accessed
on 19 September 2019.
36 Marsai. “Elemző tanulmány a 2019. március 14. és 23. közötti Líbia migrációs kutatásához”.
37 Vecsey, M. “Maliból jelentik” [Reported from Mali]. In Kaló, J. (ed.) Napjaink biztonsági kihívásai, veszélyei és
fenyegetései. Budapest, NKE Szolgáltató Nonprot Kft., 2016. 129-143.
38 “Conict Barometer 2016”. Heidelberg Institute for International Conict Research. 76. https://hiik.de/con-
ict-barometer/bisherige-ausgaben/?lang=en, Accessed on 1 October 2017.
107
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country. With such a background it is a rightful question to ask how Mali could possibly apply
for the position of a migration hub. The answer can lie in the local patterns. Mali is already the
part of a rather busy regional migration system, specically the West African one. Migration
within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) region is mainly labour
migration of various kinds: seasonal, temporary or permanent. Mali and Niger, the well-known
migration hub, are both countries of origin and destination in this complex. Mobility within the
ECOWAS is easy, since it is a visa-free movement area. Therefore, changes in the migration
routes would not demand further documentation, other than a passport. However, the use of
smugglers is common, especially when the aim is to exit the free movement area.39
In 2017, Mali hosted about 384,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees.40
The number changed during 2018. By the middle of the year only 238,000 IDPs and refugees
were ocially reported from Mali.41 In March 2019 this gure reached 372,000 again.42 As
these data show, the migration stock can change drastically in Mali during a couple of months’
time. But in a country marred with insurgencies, violent extremism, and ethnic tensions, mi-
gration stock and ows are rather uid, and changing rapidly, depending on the situation.
Map 4: Mali Regional Crisis
Source: https://erccportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/getdailymap/docId/2771, Accessed on 4 May 2019.
39 “World Migration Report 2018”. IOM. http://publications.iom.int/system/les/pdf/wmr_2018_en.pdf, Accessed
on 12 May 2019.
40 “International Migration Report 2017: Highlights”. 26. https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/mi-
gration/publications/migrationreport/docs/MigrationReport2017_Highlights.pdf, Accessed on 12 May 2019.
41 “Mid-Year Trends 2018”. UNHCR. 38. https://www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/5c52ea084/mid-year-
trends-2018.html, Accessed on 12 May 2019.
42
“Mali Humanitarian Crisis”. https://erccportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/getdailymap/docId/2918, Accessed on 13 May 2019.
108 HUNGARIAN DEFENCE REVIEW, Special Issue 2019, Vol. 147, Nr. 1–2
The European Union deployed two missions to Mali, to help Bamako to consolidate the
situation in the country. The EUTM Mali started in 2013, with the aim to provide training to
the Malian Armed Forces (MAF), and to advice on “command and control, logistical chain,
and human resources” together with educating MAF on human rights, and protection of
civilians as well. The mission also got a task to conduct its tasks in close coordination with
other actors in the country, UN peacekeeping mission MINUSMA, and ECOWAS.43 The
original mandate only changed in 2016, when it had to add another coordinating partner, the
G5 Sahel.44 Supporting G5 Sahel Joint Task Force means that the EU is supporting a home-
grown African solution to the regional crisis in the Sahel.
The EUCAP Sahel Mali started in 2014. The main tasks of this civilian mission were to
help Malian authorities to “restore and maintain constitutional and democratic order and the
conditions for lasting peace, state authority and legitimacy in the territory of Mali.” Most
importantly, the mandate of the mission includes the obligation to establish contacts among
the EU missions from Mali to Libya.45 The following mandate extensions reinforced these
tasks and obligations. In this way, Mali served as an incubator of the use of the EU’s com-
prehensive and integrated approach in practice.
The EU missions in Mali are supporting the interests of the European community.
With the help of the EU to consolidate the situation in Mali, strengthen state legitimacy
and training the security forces, a stable democratic country can emerge. Stable countries
are generally not countries of origin of the migration process, so the stabilisation of the
country is in line with the EU’s Global Strategy to build resilient states in the south down
to Central Africa.46
However, the situation is not favourable to achieve these optimistic goals. As the situa-
tion in the northern region has remained practically the same since the summer of 2013, and
inter-ethnic tensions have escalated in central Mali, stability has remained a dream. Because
of this, migration ows can be expected to change. Instead of becoming a major transit coun-
try, Mali can be again a country of origin.
Data, collected in the rst half of 2019 testify, that outgoing ows were more signicant
than the incoming migration ows. Nearly half of the outgoing migration ows are Malians,
but Guineans, Ivoreans, Senegalese, Nigeriens, and Gambians were also observed to cross
Mali. The collected information also shows, that Spain is the most popular European target
country, followed by Italy and France. Since the second half of 2018, Spain has replaced
Italy as the most popular destination.47, 48, 49, This new popularity resulted in a steep increase
43 “Council Decision 2013/34/CFSP”. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32013D0034,
Accessed on 04 May 2019.
44 “Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/446”. https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/
f521b2e0-f18c-11e5-8529-01aa75ed71a1/language-en, Accessed on 04 May 2019.
45 “Council Decision 2014/219/CFSP”. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX-
:32014D0219&from=PT, Accessed on 04 May 2019.
46 “Shared Vision, Common Action: a Stronger Europe, a Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and
Security Policy”. 9. http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf, Accessed on 25
September 2017.
47 “Mali: Flow Monitoring Report 36: January 2019”. IOM. https://migration.iom.int/reports/ma-
li-%E2%80%94-ow-monitoring-report-36-january-2019, Accessed on 12 May 2019.
48 “Mali: Flow Monitoring Report 37: 1-28 February 2019”. IOM. https://migration.iom.int/reports/mali-
%E2%80%94-ow-monitoring-report-37-1-%E2%80%94-28-february-2019, Accessed on 12 May 2019.
49 “Mali: Flow Monitoring Report 38: 1-31 March 2019”. IOM. https://migration.iom.int/reports/mali-
%E2%80%94-ow-monitoring-report-38-1-%E2%80%94-31-march-2019, Accessed on 12 May 2019.
109
International security
in the migration ows towards Spain from Africa. However, this number did not exceed or
even reach the gures which have been observed in the Central Mediterranean route just
two years ago, in 2017.50 In the rst two months of 2017 roughly 14,000 migrants arrived in
Italy from Libya, and 5,000 in Spain.51 In the following year, the same reporting period Italy
received 5,200 migrants, while Spain 3,200. 2019 was the rst year which started with vis-
ible dierences in the favour of Spain. 11,138 people used the West-Mediterranean route to
get to Europe, while only 2,160 choose the Central Mediterranean.52 To assess if this change
in the gures means a shift in the migration pattern, I followed the method which had been
used in an earlier research on the shift of the migration patterns. According to this research,
the arrivals of those nationalities who used the Central Mediterranean route most commonly
must be analysed.53
I used data collected by FRONTEX on ‘illegal border-crossings statistics’ to show data
on the number of arrivals by nationality, using data from 2015 to May 201954 To reveal the
possible dierences between the gures of detected arrivals and asylum applicants I used
EUROSTAT data from 2017 to June 2019.
Data on detected border-crossing show that the main counties of origin changed over
time regarding the Central Mediterranean route (Table 1) on a larger scale than on the West-
ern Mediterranean route (Table 3). In 2015, Eritrea, Gambia, Nigeria, Somalia and Sudan
were the top 5 source countries of the Central Mediterranean route, while by 2019, seven
more countries had been added to the list at least temporarily. In the rst months of 2019, the
main nationalities who used the Central Mediterranean route, were mainly from the Middle
East and North-Africa (MENA) region, however, Eritrea and Nigeria remained among the
top sending countries over the examined period. Besides the changes in the main national-
ities, data show a sharp decrease in the use of this route, from 90,570 people in 2015 from
the top 5 sending nations to 1,209 in the rst 5 months of 2019. In parallel with the detected
arrivals, EUROSTAT collects data which show how many people want to legalise their sit-
uation in the host countries. Table 2 shows the main nationalities who applied for asylum in
Italy from 2017 to June 2019.55 The data comparison of the two tables shows gaps both in
the number of applicants and their nationalities. Most of the countries present here as main
senders appear in the FRONTEX dataset as well. Bangladesh, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Mali
and Nigeria are present in both tables. Senegal and Morocco, however, are not considered as
main countries of origin, according to FRONTEX data. It is also visible that some nationals
are not keen to legalise their situations in Italy. Among them we can nd Eritreans and Guin-
eans. I assume, that the dierence between the gures can be interpreted as a delay between
the time of the detected arrival and the actual time of the application, which possibly means
months-long delays.
50 “Europe Monthly Report”. UNHCR. March 2019. 1-2. https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/68983,
Accessed on 04 May 2019.
51 “Inux of refugees and migrants to Europe”.
52 “Inux of refugees and migrants to Europe in 2019”.
53 Brenner, Y., Forin, R. and Frouws, B. “The ‘Shift’ to the Western Mediterranean Migration Route: Myth or Reali-
ty?”. http://www.mixedmigration.org/articles/shift-to-the-western-mediterranean-migration-route/, Accessed on
04 May 2019.
54 “Detections of illegal border-crossings statistics download: updated monthly”. https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/
Migratory_routes/Detections_of_IBC_2019_07_05.xlsx, Accessed on 30 July 2019.
55 “Asylum and rst-time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex, monthly data (rounded)”. https://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/eurostat/data/database, Accessed on 14 May 2019.
110 HUNGARIAN DEFENCE REVIEW, Special Issue 2019, Vol. 147, Nr. 1–2
Table 1: Detected arrivals on the Central Mediterranean route by nationality
(Data collected from FRONTEX)
Detected arrivals on the Central Mediterranean route by nationality
Year 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
Eritrea 38,791 20,721 3,529
Nigeria 21,914 37,554 18,163 1,262
Somalia 12,430
Sudan 8,916 2,037 229
Gambia 8,519 11,929
Guinea 13,550 9,714
Côte d’Ivoire 12,399 9,509
Bangladesh 9,009 193
Mali 7,119
Tunisia 5,182 347
Pakistan 1,513 232
Algeria 208
* Data collected until M05
Table 2: Asylum and first-time asylum applicants by citizenship in Italy (rounded)
(Data collected from EUROSTAT)
Asylum and first-time asylum applicants by citizenship in Italy (rounded)
Year 2017 2018 2019
Nigeria 25,500 6,970 1,180
Bangladesh 12,445 5,410 1,060
Gambia 8,875 2,270 320
Senegal 8,455 3,060 595
Côte d’Ivoire 8,440
Mali 2,465
Morocco 510
* Data collected until M06
Table 3: Detected arrivals on the Western Mediterranean route by nationality (Data collected from
FRONTEX)
Detected arrivals on the Western Mediterranean route by nationality
Year 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
Guinea 1,946 2,184 3,283 12,233 191
Algeria 1,193 1,698 4,293 4,349 324
Cameroon 843
Morocco 684 722 4,704 11,881 1,970
Côte d’Ivoire 609 1,646 3,517 4,045
111
International security
Detected arrivals on the Western Mediterranean route by nationality
Year 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
Gambia 899 2,660
Mali 10,747 191
Senegal 117
* Data collected until M05
The main senders regarding the Western Mediterranean route changed less over time.
Here North-African and West African countries dominate among the top 5 countries of ori-
gin from 2015 to May 2019. On this route it is visible, that in 2018 the gures rose to 39,210
detected arrivals from 5,275 in 2015 regarding the top 5 senders. Therefore, we can state that
this route became the more popular, but the examination of these data is not enough to verify
if the migration pattern changes or not because it just shows how the top 5 senders varied
over the examined timeframe. Thus, I created a list of West African countries, collecting
them from the main countries of origin over time on the Central Mediterranean route, to ex-
amine the detected arrivals of their nationals from 2015 to 2018. The selected countries are
Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali and Nigeria. To get a wider picture, I added 4 more West African
countries, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Niger and Senegal to the examination. Senegal was added
because it appeared as a main country of origin on the West African route, and I assumed
that this country’s nationals use traditionally the West African route. The other 3 countries
were chosen, because, however they are not main sending countries, they can provide further
context on the intra-African patterns.
The rst result, which is visible is, of course, the signicant decrease in the gures since
2018. The further examination showed, that Senegalese, whom I expected to prefer the
Western route, used mainly the Central Mediterranean between 2015 and 2017, and chang-
es occurred only in 2018. Table 4 shows, that the selected country nationals preferred the
Central Mediterranean route from 2015 to 2017. In 2018, the pattern changed signicantly
regarding the examined nationals. The Western Mediterranean route was preferred during
2018 in a large extent for almost all nationalities, save Nigerians. Even such nations as Ni-
ger, for whom the Central Mediterranean route is geographically closer, started to use the
Western route on a greater scale.
Figures also show, that the number of detected arrivals by nationality on the West-
ern Mediterranean route exceeds the gures in the Central Mediterranean route on such a
scale, which means the change of the preferred routes. For example, in 2017, 68 Ghanaians
and 624 Malians used the Western route, while 3,909 of Ghanaians and 7,119 Malians the
Central. However, these numbers changed to 461 Ghanaians and 10,747 Malians using the
Western route in 2018, while only 218 Ghanaians and 915 Malians reached Europe via the
Central Mediterranean route.
According to the scale of the dierence on the gures, it is visible, that the Western
Mediterranean route replaced the Central route in 2018. There are nationalities, which still
prefer to use the Central Mediterranean route despite the emerged diculties along it. To
assess its causes, another research is needed on the available migrant stock of those nation-
alities in the main African transit countries.
112 HUNGARIAN DEFENCE REVIEW, Special Issue 2019, Vol. 147, Nr. 1–2
Table 4: Detected arrivals by nationality (data collected from FRONTEX)
2015 2016 2017 2018
BURKINA FASO
2015 2016 2017 2018
GHANA
2015 2016 2017 2018
COˆTE D’IVOIRE
2015 2016 2017 2018
GUINEA
Western route Central route
2015 2016 2017 2018
MALI
2015 2016 2017 2018
NIGER
2015 2016 2017 2018
NIGERIA
2015 2016 2017 2018
SENEGAL
Detected arrivals by nationality
466315
418
331
456
609
1646
3517
4045
24
68
461
1946
2184
3283
12 233
97
125
624
10 747
35
10
78
77
56
28
30
185
20
19
90
1891
52
1055
656
54
3756
12 399
9509
1194
4357
5629
3909
218
2716
13 550
9714
840
5756
10 008
7119
915
151
694
432
16
21 914
37 554
18 163
1262
5821
10 329
6000
437
113
International security
SUMMARY
The reported numbers and visible patterns of migration ows in the Mediterranean can sug-
gest that now we are experiencing a change in the migration routes to the European Union.
Based on the results of the research it can be stated that the changes in the migration pattern
are not necessarily visible if the research focuses only on the biggest sending country nation-
als. With including multiple countries from West Africa in the data analysis, the changes in
the pattern can be detected. Although some countries, like Nigeria and Eritrea still prefer the
Central Mediterranean route, most of the West African nationals have preferred to use the
Western Mediterranean route since 2018. The general gures show a signicant decrease of
the migration ow to Italy, which is expected to continue during 2019.
The decreasing numbers of crossings on the Central Mediterranean route are originating
from the agreement between Italy and the Southern-Libyan tribes, to control sub-Saharan
African migration ows. Additionally, Italian political changes made the Southern Europe-
an country less appealing to migrants from Africa. In 2018 Italy also restricted its asylum
policy, which possibly had a further discouraging eect on migrants. Besides this, suspend-
ing the activities of naval assets of EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia made the journey
particularly dangerous. General Haftar’s oensive against Tripoli, which proved to be a
protracted situation, displaced Libya from its previous position of the biggest transit country
of the North-African region. Mali also experienced the escalation of ethnic tensions in its
central region, while radical groups are still present and active in the whole country.
It is also important to note, that in spite of the relatively large number of migrants, who
reaches the EU, it is now visible, that most of the African migrants remain on the African
continent. Additionally, there is a growing tendency among young Africans to choose Asia
over Europe when deciding about the destination. An increasing number of people choose
China, whose Africa policy is far more welcoming than that of the EU.56
The use of information technology, which helped to organise the events of the Arab
Spring in 2011, now supports those sub-Saharan Africans, who are planning to leave their
countries of nationality. Therefore, the news on unfavourable policy changes, developing
anti-immigrant attitude are getting to those, who want to reach the EU. It might be also
discouraging, that the EU has still not nished the reform of the Dublin system. Potential
migrants can also gather information on the rapidly changing security situation in transit
countries. Thanks to the internet, all this earlier mentioned information can reach the people
on the move relatively fast to discourage them to start a perilous journey to the European
Union, which is ever more dicult to reach through countries which have a rather hostile
environment.
The change of the migration patterns is the result of complex, interconnected events.
Policy changes in one country cannot realistically inuence the directions of entire mi-
gration routes, but a series of events along a formerly popular migration route can be an
eect multiplier. On the Central Mediterranean route multiple changes took place, in-
cluding both policy, and security changes, which was apparently enough to encourage
migrants from sub-Saharan African countries to choose routes dierent from that of their
predecessors.
56 Tarrósy, I. “‘Kik és hányan kopogtatnak ajtóinkon onnan Délről?’: az afrikai migráció valóságának sok szí nű-
ségéről”. Magyar Tudomány 180/1. 2019. 79-89. DOI: 10.1556/2065.180.2019.1.7
114 HUNGARIAN DEFENCE REVIEW, Special Issue 2019, Vol. 147, Nr. 1–2
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