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The EU in international environmental negotiations
... Компетенція ЄС щодо кліматичної політики зростає, зменшуючи можливості окремих держав-членів ветувати правові акти ЄС. Однак у деяких конкретних сферах, які мають особливе відношення до кліматичної політики, держави-члени наполягали на збереженні високого ступеня автономії -«субсидіарності» мовою ЄС, що означає, що вплив ЄС на основні державні повноваження, включаючи оподаткування, енергетику, постачання продовольства, а також питання планування землекористування, обмежені вимогою одностайності держав-членів щодо спільної політики [55]. Лісабонський договір 2007 р. розширив повноваження ЄС щодо енергетичної політики у сфері енергетичних ринків, безпеки та інфраструктури, але водночас підтвердив суверенітет держав-членів над використанням енергетичних ресурсів, вимагаючи, щоб рішення ЄС приймалися на основі одноголосного голосування [56,44]. ...
... However, in some specific areas that are particularly germane to climate policy, Member States have insisted on preserving a high degree of autonomy -'subsidiarity' in the language of the EU -meaning that the Commission's influence on core state powers, including taxation, energy supply, as well as land-use planning matters, is limited by the requirement for Member State unanimity on common policies (Delreux 2021). Lack of competence over land use planning aspects, for example, has been one reason why EU policy on adaptation has remained relatively incrementalist in nature (Rayner and Jordan 2010;Russel et al. 2020). ...
... environmental negotiations (Delreux 2011;van Schaik 2013). Other topics in the broad portfolio of EU external negotiations have received much less attention, despite their political relevance. ...
Since the 1980s, the European Union (EU) has negotiated fisheries agreements with numerous maritime countries. These agreements stipulate the conditions under which the European fishing industry gains access to foreign territorial waters. In the past two decades, the EU also wants to advance development objectives and promote environmental sustainability with these agreements. Not surprisingly, EU negotiators have found it hard to accommodate these often contradictory preferences. I argue that a mushrooming institutional structure of EU decision-making in the negotiation and ratification of fisheries agreements makes it increasingly hard for concentrated commercial interests to influence the outcome of the negotiations. As a result, diffuse interests representing a dominant normative discourse of social and ecological responsibility increasingly dominate the aggregation of preferences. I also find that the Commission (and its allies in the Council) benefit from the heterogeneity of diverse lobbies to pursue their geopolitical goals, again privileging the non-commercial dimensions of these agreements.
Environmental and climate diplomacies have become key external policy agendas for the European Union (EU). Climate change policy and governance are major fields where the EU seeks to broaden its external influence. EU climate diplomacy policy can be divided into three overlapping spheres: participation in global climate negotiations; promotion of ambitious domestic climate legislation and policies beyond the EU borders; and initiatives for climate cooperation and partnerships with third countries. As a framework for these actions, the EU has developed a solid climate diplomacy policy: a series of Council Conclusions on the theme have been adopted since 2008. Interestingly, energy diplomacy was coupled with climate diplomacy in the Council Conclusions in 2021, and the linkage was further strengthened in the new set of Council Conclusions in 2023. The, by now, rather well-established EU climate and energy diplomacy policy is part of the external dimension of the European Green Deal (EGD). It also underlines the inherent nexus thinking that is part and parcel of the EGD. The climate and energy diplomacy policy has called for a stronger mainstreaming of climate and energy diplomacy considerations in all areas of EU external action, including its foreign and security policy and development cooperation.
Recent scholarly work on the European Union (EU) in international environmental agreements has thus far lacked a focus on explaining variation in EU performance/effectiveness in different negotiation processes within one agreement, especially when it comes to less prominent issue areas such as biodiversity. To fill that gap, this article seeks to explain the EU’s effectiveness (goal achievement—GA) as a negotiator in the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in three key negotiation processes: (1) the negotiations on the coming into being of the CBD (1990–1992); (2) the negotiations towards a Cartagena Protocol on biosafety (1995–2000); and (3) the negotiations towards a Nagoya Protocol on the access to and benefit-sharing of genetic resources (2004–2010). For each case, the article measures EU effectiveness/GA by comparing the EU’s objectives for the international negotiations at the early stages of the process with the outcome of these negotiations. It tries to explain the degree of EU GA by considering EU diplomatic engagement and the EU’s position in the constellation of all negotiating parties in terms of issue-specific bargaining power and interests. It highlights the EU’s successful performance as a mediator and bridge builder in the negotiations on the Cartagena and Nagoya Protocols. This diplomatic engagement resulted in a high degree of EU GA as it was well adapted to the EU’s position in the constellation of all negotiating parties in terms of bargaining power and interests. This article emphasises the need to adapt EU diplomatic engagement to this position to boost EU GA.
In the early twenty-first century, environmental matters have become subject to high politics, tackled in complex global contexts. In such contexts, effectively dealing with environmental challenges requires a geopolitically informed environmental foreign policy strategy. This article examines whether, to what extent and for what reasons the European Union, with its highly developed internal environmental regime and its ambition to lead global environmental politics, possesses such a strategy. It argues that the EU has for a long time pursued a leadership-by-example approach, characterized by attributes of planning rather than a strategy, but that signs of change can nowadays be detected notably in the area of climate change. Drawing on insights from pragmatist reasoning, the article concludes by suggesting how the EU’s environmental foreign policy could develop further strategically.
The EU has been portrayed as a leader in international climate change negotiations. Its role in the development of the climate change regime, as well as the adoption of novel policy instruments such as the EU Emissions Trading Scheme in 2005, are frequently put forward as indicative of a determination to push the international climate agenda forward. However, there are numerous instances where the EU has failed to achieve its climate change objectives (e.g. the 2009 Copenhagen Conference of the Parties). It is therefore important to examine the reasons behind these failures.
This book explores in detail the involvement of the EU in international climate talks from the late 1980s to the present, focusing in particular on the negotiations leading up to Copenhagen. This conference witnessed the demise of the top-down approach in climate change policy and dealt a serious blow to the EU’s leadership ambitions. This book explores the extent to which negotiation theory could help with better comprehending the obstacles that prevented the EU from getting more out of the climate negotiation process. It is argued that looking at the role played by problematic strategic planning could prove highly instructive in light of the Paris Agreement.
This broad historical perspective of the EU’s negotiations in international climate policy is an important resource to scholars of environmental and European politics, policy, law and governance.
The Paris Agreement on climate change adopted in December 2015 reflects EU policy objectives to large extent. To find an explanation, we develop a general framework that incorporates both structural and actor-/process-related factors, paying particular attention to negotiation strategy and diplomacy. On this basis, we argue that the high level of EU goal achievement in Paris resulted from the interplay of (1) evolving international structures, (2) effective EU strategy fitting these structures and domestic politics, and (3) favourable situational circumstances. While the EU arguably pushed others to their limits, downscaled ambitions also meant that it accepted a Paris Agreement that is insufficient by itself and needs to be strengthened quickly. The application of our conceptual framework to the Paris Agreement demonstrates its added value and that it can build the basis of a fresh programme of work comparing the EU’s performance in international institutions/negotiations across time and policy fields.
We start with two puzzles: first, how to explain the European Union (EU)'s decline as a climate change leader at the Copenhagen summit? Second, how to understand the partial revival of its leadership position at the Durban climate summit? We advance a twofold explanation, focusing on changes in relative power relations among major powers but also on negotiation strategies and coalition building. In Copenhagen, the EU had a normative agenda and unrealistic expectations and thereby failed to forge any bridge-building coalitions. In Durban, it had moved towards a pragmatic strategy, attuned to the realities of changing power constellations. The EU approached developing countries that shared its desire for a legally binding regime covering all major emitters and probed compromises with veto players, such as China and the US. This bridge-building strategy was combined with a conditional pledge to agree to an extension of the Kyoto Protocol. In sum, the EU acted as a ‘leadiator’, a leader-cum-mediator.
Analysing the European Union's (EU) role in the negotiations of the 2010 Nagoya Protocol on access and benefit sharing regarding genetic resources, this article argues for the integration of (1) the EU's policy objectives and (2) their achievement in the analysis of the EU's performance and leadership in international (environmental) negotiations. We first develop a conceptual and explanatory framework that highlights the inter-relationship between both aspects. We then establish that the EU pursued conservative policy objectives in the Nagoya process (becoming more moderate in 2006/2007) but was highly successful in achieving its goals. The explanatory analysis provides illustrative evidence of how the degree of ambition of the EU's policy objectives directly affects and indirectly frames goal achievement: while conservative objectives are easier to realize than ambitious ones, factors such as domestic legislation, internal interest homogeneity, universal norms and external policy making procedures may be especially important for achieving ambitious goals.
This contribution analyses the actorness, cohesiveness and effectiveness of the European Union (EU) in international environmental negotiations and examines the impact of the external context on the relationship between cohesiveness and effectiveness. Based on comparative data of nine international negotiations resulting in a multilateral environmental agreement, the paper shows that the EU's cohesiveness is higher in global negotiations than in regional ones. It argues that the relationship between cohesiveness and effectiveness is not straightforward, but is affected by the relative bargaining power and the relative position of the EU. When the EU's relative bargaining power is high, cohesiveness can be counterproductive for effectiveness, but a lack of cohesiveness is not a necessary condition for effectiveness. Furthermore, not having the most reformist position increases the likelihood of effectiveness for the EU; yet effectiveness can also be achieved with the most reformist position if the EU succeeds in making that position externally feasible.
When environmental issues emerged on the international agenda in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the United States was of one of the strongest and most consistent supporters of international environmental treaties and agreements. The member states of the European Union subsequently ratified all the international treaties created in this period, but U.S. leadership was crucial and European states were laggards in many cases. Since the 1990s, the political dynamics of international environmental policy have shifted, with the European Union emerging as a global environmental leader and the United States repeatedly opposing multilateral environmental agreements. The authors argue that a “regulatory politics” model that synthesizes the effects of domestic politics and international regulatory competition provides the most powerful explanation of why the United States and European Union have “traded places” with respect to their support for international environmental agreements.
Climate change has taken centre stage in European and international politics. Since the second half of the 1980s, the EU has established itself as an international leader on climate change and has considerably improved its leadership record. The Union has significantly enhanced both its external representation and its internal climate policies. However, implementation and policy coherence, coordination of EU environmental diplomacy, an evolving international agenda, EU enlargement, and a still precarious EU unity remain major challenges. Shifts in underlying driving forces and advances of EU domestic climate and energy policies nevertheless support the expectation that the EU will remain a progressive force in international climate policy for some time.
Abstract This article explores the EU’s efforts to ‘globalize’ EU environmentalregulation. EU leadership on global environmental governance emerged as the result of the combined effects of domestic ,politics and international regulatory competition. The growing power of environmental interests in Europe from the late 1980s, coupled with dynamics,of EU ,policy-making led the EU to ,be committed ,to ambitious environmental policies. Given this commitment, it was in the international competitive interests of the ,EU to support international agreements ,that would pressure other jurisdictions to adopt ,similar environmental ,regulations. Promoting treaties that spread EU environmental norms,internationally also served to legitimize EU rules and to shield them against legal challenges before world trade bodies. Keywords: European Union, Environmental Policy, Globalization, WTO ,3
Mainz Papers on International and European Politics, 01/2012. Mainz: Chair of International Relations, Johannes Gutenberg University.
This chapter examines the European Union's external environmental policy, with particular emphasis on the challenge faced by the EU in exercising leadership in global environmental governance and in the development of the climate change regime. It first considers the international dimension of the EU environmental policy as well as the issue of sustainable development before discussing the EU's efforts to lead the negotiation of an international climate regime up until the 2015 Paris conference. It then explores how the different energy interests of the member states have been accommodated in order to sustain European credibility. It also looks at the question of climate and energy security in the EU and concludes with an assessment of the factors that determine the success or failure of the EU in climate diplomacy, including those that relate to coordination and competence problems peculiar to the EU as a climate negotiator.
In the negotiations of a follow-up agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’s (UNFCCC) Kyoto Protocol, the European Union (EU) was a vocal proponent of revisiting the ways in which the organizing principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR) was enshrined. The chapter analyzes the ways in which the EU promoted its distinct interpretation of CBDR and how other Parties to the UNFCCC contested the EU’s interpretation during the four-year climate negotiations that culminated in the adoption of the 2015 Paris Agreement. We performed a qualitative content analysis of the Earth Negotiations Bulletins (ENB) on the climate negotiation meetings between 2011 and 2015, thereby identifying not only the main contesters of the EU’s norm understanding but also the main themes of contestation over time. The analysis revealed that the EU pursued a firm, yet compromise-building approach to promote its own (re)interpretation of CBDR. Faced with hard contestation by developing countries, the EU engaged in a less hardline discourse than some of the other developed countries. This bridge-building positioning positively affected the EU’s perceived legitimacy in the global effort to combat climate change.
The European Union’s (EU) Delegations and Offices that represent the Union in 144 countries have evolved into important satellites, implementing EU external relations. Their activities are manifold and are implemented in various ways. Building on substantive interview data, this article provides the first expansive mapping of EU climate diplomacy practices of EU Delegations and explains the surprising variance therein. It shows that the intensity and quality of contacts between individual Delegations and individual (parts of the) Brussels-based institutions – most importantly DG Climate Action – in combination with individual Delegation staff members’ expertise and host country characteristics can explain the observed variation among EU Delegation activities. These factors can contribute to better understanding the nature of the EU as an international actor.
There is arguably no security crisis so great as the one that stems from climate change. For some time, the EU, rather than the US, has led the way in terms of far-ranging policies to reduce carbon emissions. But despite the fact that the EU has been able to bind itself to strong environmental norms internally, it has – up until COP21 – been a relatively weak norm entrepreneur externally when seeking to convince others, especially the US, to adopt stronger environmental policies. Why was the EU finally able to increase its influence in the lead up and at the 2015 UN summit in Paris? This article argues that while the EU’s climate diplomacy has underperformed in the past, it has been quick to adapt since the 2009 Copenhagen summit through effectively broadening its epistemic community of climate diplomats, and engaging in a process of political learning.
This book considers the environmental policies that the EU employs outside its borders. Using a systematic and coherent approach to cover a range of EU activities, environmental issues, and geographical areas, it charts the EU’s attempts to shape environmental governance beyond its borders. Key questions addressed include: What environmental norms, rules and policies does the EU seek to promote outside its territory? What types of activities does the EU engage in to pursue these objectives? How successful is the EU in achieving its external environmental policy objectives? What factors explain the degree to which the EU attains its goals? The book will be of interest to students and academics as well as practitioners in governments (both inside and outside of the EU), the EU institutions, think tanks, and research institutes.
In recent years climate change has emerged as an issue of central political importance while the EU has become a major player in international climate change politics. How can a ‘leaderless Europe’ offer leadership in international climate change politics - even in the wake of the UK’s Brexit decision? This book, which has been written by leading experts, offers a critical analysis of the EU leadership role in international climate change politics. It focuses on the main EU institutions, core EU member states and central societal actors (businesses and environmental NGOs). It also contains an external perspective of the EU’s climate change leadership role with chapters on China, India and the USA as well as Norway. Four core themes addressed in the book are: leadership, multilevel and polycentric governance, policy instruments, and the green and low carbon economy. Fundamentally, it asks why we have EU institutional actors, why certain member states and particular societal actors tried to take on a leadership role in climate change politics and how, if at all, have they managed to achieve this? This text will be of key interest to scholars, students and practitioners in EU studies and politics, international relations, comparative politics and environmental politics. © 2017 selection and editorial matter, Rüdiger K.W. Wurzel, James Connelly and Duncan Liefferink.
This contribution examines the role European Union (EU) leadership played in the outcome of the 2015 COP21 climate summit in Paris. The EU’s attempts to realise its bid for climate change leadership are scrutinised by investigating to what extent the EU is actually recognised as a leader by potential followers and to what extent the EU has succeeded in achieving its negotiation objectives. To address these issues we utilize survey data collected at eight UN climate summits from 2008 to 2015 and evaluate the results of the climate negotiations particularly with respect to the Union’s goal attainment in Copenhagen and Paris. Our findings, which reveal a fragmented leadership landscape in which the EU must adjust its leadership strategies in relation to other powerful actors, such as the United States and China, provide insights into leadership theory and the EU’s prospects for exerting influence as an external actor on the world stage.
On many issues in European Union (EU) foreign policy-making, political steering and operational action are provided by an informal, self-selected group of actors. Although this informal division of labour is an important phenomenon, it has largely escaped the radar of EU foreign policy scholars. This article aims to fill that gap. Applying an inductive approach, it presents empirical observations from the fields of crisis management and external climate policy, illustrating the occurrence of informal division of labour. It subsequently provides an analytical framework to map the key dimensions of its different manifestations: the enabling factors, starting point, subject, institutional embeddedness, exclusiveness and durability of informal division of labour. Four possible effects on EU foreign policy-making are then discussed: an increased internal and external effectiveness; and a strengthened internal and external legitimacy. The article concludes by presenting suggestions for further empirical research on this phenomenon, as well as for theorizing it.
The most important international initiatives to protect the global environment have been negotiated in the United Nations (UN) system. Despite the absence of environmental protection provisions in its Charter, the UN has brokered a number of multilateral agreements to address various international environmental concerns.2 The UN’s ability to advance an international environmental agenda has depended on support and pressure from many of its influential member states, not least, the members of the European Union (EU).
The EU’s strategic re-orientation to coalition and bridge building after the failed Copenhagen Climate Summit in 2009 paved the way for its success in securing the Paris Agreement on climate change in December 2015. This orientation will largely remain relevant in climate geopolitics characterized by multipolarity and a diversification of interests away from a North–South divide, both headed towards growing support for decarbonization. Various fora beyond the multilateral UN negotiations deserve systematic attention as climate governance has become “polycentric”, requiring careful prioritization as well as further enhanced coordination of climate diplomacy across the EU. The EU’s position in climate geopolitics will not least depend on the development of its internal climate and energy policy framework for 2030 and beyond. Advancing decarbonization and fostering low-carbon innovation towards the new climate economy in the EU will help enhance the EU’s power base and role in future climate geopolitics.
The EU is a particular player in multilateral environmental negotiations. No other group of countries has achieved a comparable level of unity in external representation. This unity, together with the political and economic clout of the Member States, make the Union together with its members one of the most influential players in multilateral environmental affairs.The specific ways in which the Unions interest is developed and articulated at the multilateral stage builds on the institutional foundations of the EU. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty has significantly changed these foundations, particularly on matters central to the Unions engagement in multilateral affairs. Most importantly, the Lisbon Treaty
Multilateral environmental agreements are mixed agreements to which both the EU and its Member States are party, based on the respective competences that each has to enter into such agreements. This chapter will provide a practitioner’s view on the post-Lisbon arrangements for the external action of the EU and its Member States under MEAs and in other multilateral environmental processes. In particular, I would like to focus on how Member States might view the post-Lisbon arrangements and how the interests of both the Union and the Member States can be best served through appropriate roles and responsibilities when it comes to the crunch – that is, in the midst of rather frantic and politically charged international negotiations.This chapter will start by briefly outlining the arrangements for EU external representation in multilateral environmental fora before the Lisbon Treaty came into force, and will then offer an interpretation of the new provisions introduced by the Treaty, with particular emphasis on issues of legitimacy, transparency and accountability in an area of shared competence such as external environmental policy. In order to show the importance of continued collaboration between Member States and the European institutions representing the EU externally, the chapter will draw on a series of post-Lisbon case studies portraying a variety of practical approaches to the external representation of the EU and its Member States in multilateral environmental fora. The conclusions will identify the challenges posed by the new arrangements in the immediate aftermath of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.
This collection of essays comprehensively and systematically analyzes the various instruments and innovative approaches through which the EU is forging its external environmental policy, the legal implications of its multifaceted practice and interactions with international environmental law. It explains the legal and institutional framework for EU external action on environmental protection and sustainable development, identifying the changes introduced, and challenges posed, by the Lisbon Treaty. It explores key tools and trends in defining and implementing EU external policy across a broad range of environmental issues, as well as linkages with trade and human rights. It also assesses the reciprocal influences between the development and implementation of EU environmental law and of international environmental law.
The European Union (EU) is a central player in international economic diplomacy but how it goes about making decisions and negotiating is only poorly understood both inside and especially outside of the EU. The exact role of the EU is much debated. On some issues such as international environmental policy or trade - but not yet investment - policy the EU has aspirations of leadership. On other issues such as international financial and monetary policy including regulation of financial markets, the external policy of the EU is carried out by a combination of the European Central Bank with full legal competence for Euro monetary policy and the more or less coordinated actions by the Member States. In development policy the EU and its Member States taken together represent the largest donor community. In energy policy greater efforts to integrate the 'domestic' EU market go hand in hand with national policies on security of supply. The EU is thus clearly a complex actor in international economic relations. This book provides, in one volume, a comprehensive explanation of how the EU goes about decision making and negotiation in a number of topics central to international economic relations.
Delreux examines how the EU functions when it participates in international environmental negotiations. In particular, this book looks at the internal EU decision-making process with regard to international negotiations that lead to multilateral environmental agreements. By studying eight such decision-making processes, the book analyses how much negotiation autonomy (or 'discretion') the EU negotiator (the European Commission or the Council Presidency) enjoys vis-à-vis the member states it represents and how this particular degree of discretion can be explained. The book's empirical evidence is based on extensive literature review, primary and semi-confidential document research, as well as interviews with EU decision-makers. It is aimed at a readership interested in EU politics and decision-making, global/multilateral governance, environmental policy science and methodological development of Qualitative Comparative Analysis.
Contents: Introduction; The EU and mixed agreements; Member states as principals, EU negotiators as agents; The EU as negotiator in eight international environmental negotiations; Explaining the EU negotiator's discretion; Unravelling the EU decision-making process; Conclusions; Apendices; Bibliography; Index.
The article examines the informal division of labour in the European Union's (EU's) external environmental policy-making. It focuses on informal arrangements in the EU co-ordination and representation processes with regard to the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) and international climate negotiations. Whereas the rotating Presidency is formally in charge of leading the internal EU co-ordination and representing the EU externally, we see that in practice an informal system is used, in which member states and Commission officials informally ‘take the lead’. Based upon new-institutionalist insights, this article argues that four functional reasons explain the informality in the EU's external environmental policy-making: burden sharing; expertise pooling; involving member states; and guaranteeing continuity. Moreover, once the informal arrangement is in place, actors in the EU keep using it because they act path-dependently and because it is considered the most appropriate way to act in many international environmental negotiations.
Since the 1970s the European Union has made enormous strides in the global environmental arena and developed a considerable global standing. This article assesses the nature and scope of this new international leadership. It examines the EU institutional context and historical opportunities. The article presents an analytical overview that helps explain the dimensions of the EU role, as well as the conflicts within these roles. The article asks the following research question: how have the institutional and ideational complexities of the European policy-making structure defined both the scope and the impact of EU policy efforts? It offers some analytical propositions about how the EU shapes the global arena.
Studies of the European Union's role in international policy negotiations typically focus either on trade agreements, where the Community often enjoys exclusive competence in negotiations, or on military and security accords, where Member States take the diplomatic lead in international talks. Between these extremes are a number of issue negotiations in which Community officials and Member State representatives speak jointly on behalf of the EU. We analyse one such ‘mixed competence’ case - the negotiations for a global biosafety protocol - to understand more about the EU's behaviour and bargaining power in such settings. We aim for explanatory parsimony by applying an existing model designed to predict EU bargaining power in international trade negotiations (Meunier, 2000). The analysis reveals that the trade model has considerable explanatory power for some of the outcomes found in the biosafety protocol negotiations, but incorrectly predicts that the EU will have no bargaining power. We then explore the sources of discrepancy between the model's predictions and our empirical results, thereby identifying some of the general differences between exclusive and mixed competence negotiations. We conclude by making suggestions for future model-building and by reflecting on some recent proposed changes that may affect the EU's bargaining power on the global stage.
The performance of the European Union (EU) in international climate policy improved significantly over much of the 1990s and 2000s with respect to goal achievement (effectiveness) and relevance. However, the failure of the Copenhagen Summit in 2009 represented a major backlash for the EU. This article argues that internal factors – including in particular the development of internal climate policy – have mostly enhanced the EU’s performance conditions, but can hardly account for the Copenhagen backlash. In contrast, situational and structural changes in the international configuration of climate politics first supported and then significantly impeded a good EU performance in the 2000s. Overall, distinguishing systematically between EU internal factors that are under the direct control of the EU itself and external conditions on which EU influence is more limited allows us to identify the evolution of the external political ‘environment’ of international EU leadership on climate change, and the failure of the EU to adapt its strategy timely to this evolving environment, as major forces underlying the Copenhagen backlash.
This article examines the nexus between the EU's goal of being a leading actor on the world stage in devising a global solution to the threat of climate change and the performance of its Member States in meeting their climate change obligations. In doing so the article will discuss the concept of EU leadership, examine the modes of leadership the EU has employed in pursuing its climate protection objectives, scrutinize the extent to which EU Member States are actually living up to their Kyoto obligations and analyse how the EU's own performance, credibility and legitimacy in this area affects its aspirations to be a key norm-entrepreneur in the establishment of a post-2012 climate change agreement. The article concludes with a balance sheet of some of the Union's key successes and failures and closes by highlighting some potentially inconvenient truths that might frustrate the EU's climate protection aspirations. Copyright (c) 2010 The Author(s). Journal compilation (c) 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
For well over a decade, the European Union (EU) has proclaimed its leadership role in global environmental governance (GEG).
In this article, we examine both the nature of its leadership and the underlying conditions for ‘actorness’ upon which leadership
must depend. The EU’s record in the global conferences as well as its influence on the reform of the Commission on Sustainable
Development (CSD) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) are also investigated. We argue that the EU has frequently
sought to shape international environmental negotiations and promote sustainable development as an organising principle of
global governance. Despite its inadequate status at the UN and internal problems, it has had a significant effect on the global
agenda. However, due to persistent diplomatic opposition from other coalitions, its real, directly visible influence has been
more modest. For genuine directional leadership, which goes beyond the defence of self-interest, the Union will have to make
internal policy coherence a greater priority. Moreover, apart from relying solely on its weighty presence in the international
system or its potential capabilities, the EU needs to achieve a high level of credibility in order to enhance its powers of
persuasion.
This paper examines the transformation of the European Union from a laggard to a leader in the international politics of biotechnology regulation. The emergence of EU leadership in global environmental politics during the 1990s seems to support recent arguments about the distinctive nature of the EU as a 'normative power' in international relations. However, as this paper argues, this perspective lacks historical depth and fails to capture tensions between competing principles and conflict among domestic interest groups in Europe. The paper calls for a more critical reading of the normative power argument and identifies shifts in the domestic political economy of agricultural biotechnology as the key factors behind the EU's support for a precautionary international regime on trade in genetically modified organisms.
The European Union is now an important actor in the arena of global environmental politics. It is a signatory to important global treaties and a significant participant in global negotiations. Surprisingly, however, its role has been given very little scholarly attention. This paper explores how the Community constructed over time an international presence in the environmental field. It argues that the Community, while not a ‘state’ in the international arena, has undergone an institution-building process since 1973 which has garnered international recognition. CITES, the Vienna Convention, and UNCED are briefly discussed.
In this article we examine the relationship between the institutional set-up of the EU foreign policy-making process and the international actorness of the EU in two particular cases: the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol. Whereas in both cases policy-making is organized along intergovernmental lines, the EU has shown a relatively high degree of international actorness. We argue that this is the combined result of the considerable congruence of EU Member States' initial preferences and the social interactions between EU Member States, third countries and non-state actors, through which preferences converged even further over time. Copyright (c) 2007 The Author(s); Journal compilation (c) 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
The question approached in this article is whether the almost unanimous picture, drawn by both academic observers and EU representatives, of the EU as a major power and leading actor in global trade negotiations, is also shared by 'outsiders'. I describe and analyse how representatives of non-EU Member States picture and evaluate the EU's role in the WTO and the strategies it uses to achieve its goals. Special attention is given to perceived constraints on EU leadership. In brief, my results demonstrate that the EU is indeed seen as a key actor in the WTO but that it is not necessarily seen as a leader. Its leadership potential is diminished by perceived incoherence across issue areas, by a lack of perceived legitimacy and, to a lesser extent, by an excessive focus on internal co-ordination. Copyright (c) 2007 The Author(s); Journal compilation (c) 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Studies on the international identity of the EU have stressed the normative feature of European foreign policy. At the same time, scholars have pointed out that the inconsistency between the EU's rhetoric and behaviour and the lack of reflexivity undermines its credibility. How does reflexivity affect collective identity? To what extent does the EU's utopian rhetoric affect its credibility as a normative power? In order to address these questions, we investigate the self-representation of the EU as an international actor, the extent to which this self-representation provides a basis for reflexivity and, finally, the impact of the EU's identity narratives on its credibility. We focus on the normative power of the EU in the institutionalization of the International Criminal Court and in the elaboration and ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. Copyright (c) 2007 The Author(s); Journal compilation (c) 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
The EU's international role in the Paris and post-Paris era is discussed by Oberthür (2016) and Oberthür and Groen
- Afionis
Afionis (2017). The EU's international role in the Paris and post-Paris era is discussed by
Oberthür (2016) and Oberthür and Groen (2018).
EU external engagement in areas with long-standing internal policies: single market, competition policy and environmental policy
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Damro, C. and Ibáñez E. (2018) 'EU external engagement in areas with long-standing internal
policies: single market, competition policy and environmental policy' in C. Damro, S.
Gstöhl and S. Schunz (eds), The European Union's Evolving External Engagement.
Towards New Sectoral Diplomacies?, Routledge, London.
Multilateral environmental agreements to which the EU is a contracting party or a signatory
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Beyond Leadership by Example: Toward a Flexible European Union Foreign Climate Policy
- S Schunz
Schunz, S. (2011) Beyond Leadership by Example: Toward a Flexible European Union
Foreign Climate Policy, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin.
European Union External Environmental Policy. Rules, Regulation and Governance Beyond Borders
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