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Futures 131 (2021) 102761
Available online 15 May 2021
0016-3287/© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Five key dimensions of post-growth business: Putting the
pieces together
Jennifer Hinton
a
,
b
,
*
a
Stockholm Resilience Centre, Stockholm University, Kr¨
aftriket 2B, 10691, Stockholm, Sweden
b
Centre for Studies and Research in International Development, Université Clermont-Auvergne, 26 avenue L´
eon Blum, 63000, Clermont-Ferrand,
France
ARTICLE INFO
Keywords:
Post-growth economy
Degrowth
Post-growth business
Sustainable business
Not-for-prot business
ABSTRACT
As there has been no evidence of the kind of environmental decoupling necessary to allow for
green economic growth, academic and activist discussions alike have turned to exploring post-
growth pathways. Such a transformation entails a signicant shift in economic institutions, yet
post-growth analyses of what is problematic about businesses and how to resolve these issues are
piecemeal. This article offers an overview and synthesis of key ndings in the emerging post-
growth business literature. Using institutional analysis, it develops a framework that conceptu-
ally ties together ve dimensions of business that have been identied as most important for post-
growth transformations: relationship-to-prot, incorporation structure, governance structure,
strategy, and size and geographical scope. The intention of developing this ve-dimensions
framework is to offer a more coherent and concrete theoretical basis for ongoing discussions
about which types of business are compatible, or incompatible, with post-growth pathways.
1. Introduction
There has been no evidence that economic activity can be sufciently decoupled from environmental impacts to a degree that
would allow for sustainable economic growth (Haberl et al., 2020; Hickel & Kallis, 2020; Parrique et al., 2019; Vad´
en et al., 2020)
1
.
Thus, economies must be re-organized in ways that do not drive incessant growth, in order to avoid a collapse of the ecological
foundations upon which human societies depend (Daly, 1996; Parrique et al., 2019; Steffen, Broadgate, Deutch, Gaffney, & Ludwig,
2015). This shift has important implications for businesses, as key economic institutions (Jackson, 2017; Johanisova & Fraˇ
nkov´
a,
2017)
2
. What should businesses be like in post-growth economies? What kinds of features must they have (or not have) in order to be
socially and ecologically sustainable?
* Corresponding author at: Kr¨
aftriket 2B, 10691, Stockholm, Sweden.
E-mail address: jen@postgrowth.org.
1
Parrique et al. (2019) dene sufcient decoupling as: absolute, long-term, global, and applying to all critical environmental pressures. They
argue that, given the severity of the global environmental crises (e.g., climate change, biodiversity loss, soil degradation, etc.), decoupling is not
sufcient if it is: relative, temporary, based only on one environmental indicator (e.g., carbon emissions), or based on outsourcing environmental
impacts to another geographical location.
2
Businesses and markets do not necessarily have to be part of post-growth economies. However, because they are currently the main channel
through which production happens in most economies, post-growth models and visions of the future must address how businesses and markets
should be transformed or replaced by some other means of production in order to allow for sustainable provisioning.
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Futures
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/futures
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2021.102761
Received 27 May 2020; Received in revised form 9 May 2021; Accepted 13 May 2021
Futures 131 (2021) 102761
2
The post-growth
3
literature that deals with business tends to stay focused on the level of individual rms, leading to piecemeal
critiques of mainstream business and correspondingly piecemeal solutions (Cyron & Zoellick, 2018). For instance, in response to
globalization and inequality, post-growth scholars have critiqued governance and incorporation structures, proposing that shareholder
corporations should give way to cooperatives (Johanisova, Crabtree, & Fraˇ
nkov´
a, 2013) and non-growth-driven businesses (Gabriel,
Nazar, Zhu, & Kirkwood, 2019; Gebauer, 2018) that are rooted in place and time (Johanisova & Fraˇ
nkov´
a, 2017). In response to a
singular focus on prot-maximization, authors have proposed broadening rms’ strategic scope by using strongly sustainable business
models (Upward & Jones, 2016); ‘other-than-prot’ goals (Johanisova & Fraˇ
nkov´
a, 2017); a sufciency-based approach (Bocken &
Short, 2016); and for-benet production (Kostakis & Bauwens, 2014). Yet, there is a persistent concern that as long as rms are
prot-driven, this might keep them from being strongly sustainable, sufciency-based, or focused on social benet (e.g., Bocken &
Short, 2016; Johanisova et al., 2013). Indeed, much post-growth literature claims that the prot-driven way of organizing business
generates the macro-scale dynamics of economic growth, consumerism and inequality, as well as the associated environmental damage
(Magdoff & Foster, 2011; Jackson, 2017). In response to this concern, some authors claim that not-for-prot forms of business offer a
way of addressing these dynamics (Hinton & Maclurcan, 2017; Hinton, 2020; Lux, 2003).
How do all of these different aspects of rms t together and how do they relate to the post-growth compatibility of business?
Schmid (2018) and Johanisova and Fraˇ
nkov´
a (2017) highlight the need to articulate the hidden assumptions behind different con-
ceptualizations of post-growth business, as well as the need for discussions of how to conceptually organize the diversity of post-growth
business. consolidates many key principles of degrowth business found in the literature, yet it is not clear how they t together in actual
businesses. Furthermore, the important question remains of whether these aspects of business can be changed easily by willing
managers and employees, or whether there are deeper structural lock-ins and, if so, what those structural issues are. A framework that
puts these pieces together in a coherent way and identies the structural dimensions could provide the foundation for more effective
sustainability initiatives and help prevent the unnecessary confusion that arises from discussing business at cross-purposes.
This conceptual paper develops a framework to more clearly organize analyses and discussions about post-growth business. I begin
with a description of the institutional economics lens that I used to analyze the post-growth business literature, and which led me to
identify ve key dimensions of the rm that correspond to institutional elements of business. I then offer an overview of the relevant
literature, organizing the key themes and aspects of business according to these ve dimensions of the rm. I include a brief description
of real rms to illustrate how these different dimensions can take shape in a variety of different ways and combinations. I then present a
framework that brings the dimensions together, ordering them in terms of how they guide and constrain each other. This leads to the
insight that the legally-binding structural dimensions of the rm are critical for shaping economic actors’ behavior.
The dimensions framework presented in this paper claries how the different layers of a business’s organizational structure might
impact business behavior. This theoretical synthesis will inevitably be incomplete, but the main intention is to contribute more
structure and clarity to discussions around what kinds of business are compatible, or not, with post-growth pathways, as well as what
kinds of business could enable such transformations.
2. An institutional perspective on the post-growth business literature
Below I present an overview of the treatment of business in post-growth research, aiming to identify how key aspects of business are
discussed and to gain an understanding of how the different pieces t together. In this overview, I have focused on 30 relevant articles
and book chapters, which explicitly link business to the concepts of degrowth and post-growth economy, as well as the related concepts
of ecological economics, the steady state economy, and strong sustainability.
This body of literature identies a variety of aspects of business that are important to consider for post-growth economic trans-
formations. An institutional economics lens can be helpful in organizing these different aspects according to the institutional elements
of business on which they focus. Institutions are systems of embedded social rules that enable, guide, and constrain actors’ behavior
(Hodgson, 2018).
A key assumption of institutional approaches is that actors respond to their institutional contexts in a host of ways. They can
reproduce, accommodate, resist, or change those institutional contexts (Scott, 2014). Thus, an understanding of these contexts can give
insights into ranges of expected or acceptable behavior (Dugger, 1979). Although actors’ behavior is not determined by institutional
structures, it also cannot be understood outside of its institutional context (Dugger, 1979). By looking at the institutional elements that
guide and constrain businesses, we can get a better understanding of which institutions must change in which ways, in order to be
compatible with a post-growth understanding of sustainability.
Institutional economists tend to pay particular attention to legally-binding formal institutional elements (i.e., regulative in-
stitutions), such as property rights (Hodgson, 2018). Legally-binding institutions are typically more precisely articulated than other
types of social rules and there is a higher degree of obligation to comply with these types of rules because they are enforced by a legal
authority (Scott, 2014, p. 60). A related assumption of institutional economics is that the assignment of property rights creates in-
centives that shape the dynamics of the economy at large (Libecap, 1986). This coincides with much post-growth research, which also
highlights the importance of property rights and business ownership for the growth-orientation of the economy (Parrique, 2020).
Important to note is that regulative institutions have a corresponding logic and purpose - such as the logic of capitalism or the
purpose of increasing prot (Scott, 2014, p. 62). Thus, attention must be paid to the purpose embedded in institutions when discussing
3
I use ‘post-growth’ to refer to any growth-critical research.
J. Hinton
Futures 131 (2021) 102761
3
post-growth possibilities (G¨
opel, 2016). When regulative institutions are aligned with the social norms and belief systems in a given
context, they can be powerful in guiding and constraining actors’ behavior and are thus good indicators for anticipated ranges of
behavior (Scott, 2014). On the other hand, a lack of institutional alignment can lead to confusion and conict (Scott, 2014). Therefore,
the alignment of different institutional elements of business with post-growth aims is important for post-growth transformations.
3. Five dimensions framework for post-growth business
3.1. The ve dimensions
My reading and analysis of the post-growth business literature was shaped by a focus on these aspects of institutions: whether they
are legally-binding or not; their connection to property rights; and their connection to the purpose and goals of business. This led me to
identify ve key dimensions of business that are discussed in the post-growth literature:
•Size and geographical scope refers to how small versus large a business is, as well as how local versus global it is.
•Strategy refers to how a business uses its resources to achieve its purpose. This includes business management, business planning,
and business practices.
•Governance refers to the rules, protocols, and processes by which decisions are made in a business. This differs from strategy in
that it does not relate directly to which actions the business undertakes, but rather how and by whom those decisions are taken - and
who is excluded from decision-making.
•Incorporation structure (also known as corporate form or legal form) refers to the specic legal body in which a rm is incor-
porated or signed into legal existence.
•Relationship-to-prot (also known as legal form or organizational form) refers to the legal distinction between for-prot and not-
for-prot types of business.
Size and geographical scope of businesses are given a great deal of attention in the post-growth literature, and overall, scholars
have advocated for small, local companies that do not want or need to grow (e.g., Latouche, 2006; Dietz & O’Neill, 2013; Johanisova
et al., 2013; Liesen, Dietsche, & Gebauer, 2015; Johanisova & Fraˇ
nkov´
a, 2017; Gebauer, 2018; Gabriel et al., 2019; Nesterova, 2020).
Reichel and Seeberg (2011) discuss the idea of a ‘rightsize business’. There is also frequent mention of SMEs (small and medium sized
enterprises) (e.g., Kopnina, 2016) and (re)localizing production (Nesterova, 2020). This dimension is more of an attribute of business,
or an outcome of a business’s institutional conguration and wider context, rather than an institutional element itself. It is not
legally-binding, and it has no direct connection to the purpose or property rights of a company. The desire to grow or not, as a business
goal, can be seen as a normative or cultural institution that belongs in the dimension of strategy.
Strategy tends to be the area of greatest focus in the post-growth literature concerning business. This is a non-legally-binding
dimension that has no direct connection to the property rights of a rm, but does often connect to the rm’s purpose in terms of
goals and voluntary objectives. Thus, there are some informal institutional elements to be found in this dimension (such as norms and
beliefs), but the strategy dimension is more about agency than structure. This dimension encompasses how businesses respond to and
shape their institutional contexts. It spans a wide array of concerns, including supply chain management, ethical sourcing, production
techniques, third-party certication, sustainability-oriented accounting tools, voluntary objectives, non-market behaviors, and
everyday practices.
In the post-growth literature, there is an especially sharp emphasis on voluntary objectives like sufciency; societal needs and
wellbeing; consideration of non-human life; other-than-prot goals; and inclusive, collaborative, or shared value creation (e.g., Bocken
& Short, 2016; Cyron & Zoellick, 2018; Dietz & O’Neill, 2013; Hankammer & Kleer, 2017; Johanisova & Fraˇ
nkov´
a, 2017; Khmara &
Kronenberg, 2018; Nesterova, 2020; Reichel, 2017; Upward & Jones, 2016; Wells, 2016; 2018)
4
. Along those lines, there is a focus on
metrics and indicators (e.g., Dietz & O’Neill, 2013; Reichel & Seeberg, 2011). There is naturally also a concern about the kinds of
products and services a company chooses to sell, and in which sector(s) it chooses to operate (e.g., Nesterova, 2020; Wells, 2018).
Circular economy practices are prominent, such as: closed-loop processing; life-cycle analysis; material and energy efciency; sharing
resources; using renewable resources (and avoiding non-renewables); using natural processes; servicization (providing functionality
rather than ownership); encouraging sufciency; and making products that last and are repairable (e.g., Bocken, Short, Rana, & Evans,
2014; Kopnina, 2016; Khmara & Kronenberg, 2018; ; Reichel & Seeberg, 2011; Wells, 2018). There is also a focus on the use and
production of appropriate technology, as well as open-access and open-source technology (Kostakis & Bauwens, 2014; ; Wells, 2016).
Several authors identify increased cooperation between rms as important (e.g., Reichel, 2017; ; Schmid, 2018).
Schaefer, Corner, and Kearins (2015) also describe some prerequisites for sustainable business related to wider social norms and
value systems, that the rm should include: a caring view of human nature; a focus on social justice and equity; adoption of complex
systems thinking; identifying root causes of sustainability problems; critical reection on one’s own habits and patterns; seeing prot
as a means, rather than an end
5
; and respecting the planetary boundaries. Reichel (2017) refers to ‘(e)noughness, multiple values,
cross- sectoral market places, products and solutions for convivial lifestyles’ (p. 109). Along these lines, some authors write about the
4
Kostakis & Bauwens’ (2014) framing of ‘for-benet business’ also implies voluntary social benet objectives.
5
Seeing prot as a means rather than an end can be legally enshrined at the level of incorporation structure and relationship-to-prot; otherwise,
it is a voluntary objective (i.e., not legally enforceable).
J. Hinton
Futures 131 (2021) 102761
4
need for company managers and employees to behave in sustainable ways at work and in their personal lives (e.g., Khmara & Kro-
nenberg, 2018;). With regards to workers, includes in her framework: reduced working hours and a focus on meaningful work, as well
as developing human potential.
Governance structures also feature strongly. Much of the post-growth literature has advocated for democratic, inclusive,
collaborative, decentralized, networked, and adaptive companies (e.g., Cyron & Zoellick, 2018; Johanisova et al., 2013; Kostakis &
Bauwens, 2014; Khmara & Kronenberg, 2018; ; Reichel, 2017; Schmid, 2018). Johanisova et al. (2013) refer to the governance
structures built into many publicly-listed shareholder companies as being unsustainable (i.e., that shareholder votes depend on the
number of shares one owns). Similarly, one of Upward & Jones’ (2016) requisites of a sustainable business model is that it must
describe which stakeholders are to be involved in which conversations and advocate for processes of legitimation that are ‘determined
by the relative power of actors and stakeholders via governance arrangements’ (p. 109). Cyron and Zoellick (2018); Pay´
an-S´
anchez,
P´
erez-Valls, and Plaza-Úbeda (2019) and Reichel (2017) discuss bringing more stakeholders into management and decision-making.
‘Participative collaboration’ is one of Shaeffer et al.’s prerequisites for a sustainable business (2015). Some authors claim that dem-
ocratic or worker self-management are essential components of sustainable business (Johanisova & Fraˇ
nkov´
a, 2017; Johanisova &
Wolf, 2012; Latouche, 2006;). As will be discussed in more detail in section 3.3, some aspects of this dimension can be legally-binding,
while other aspects are not legally-binding. For instance, some types of companies are legally obliged to have a board in their
governance structure, but decision-making also happens in less formal ways, such as when a company forms a team to manage a
specic project and the team is then dissolved once the project is completed.
The incorporation structure is identied as important in the post-growth literature because it locks into place exactly who the
owners are and which legal rights, responsibilities, and obligations the company has in relation to the owners and other stakeholders
(Johanisova et al., 2013; Johanisova, Padilla, & Parry, 2015; Orsi, 2014; Orts, 2013). This is a legally-binding institutional element
that relates directly to both the purpose and property rights of a company. Although specic legal bodies vary from place to place, some
incorporation structures that are available in many parts of the world include the limited liability company (LLC); publicly-traded
shareholder corporation; joint stock company (not publicly-traded); partnership; sole proprietorship; cooperative; nonprot corpo-
ration; and association
6
.
The post-growth literature has mostly focused on a few incorporation structures. Scholars’ attention is largely focused on moving
away from the publicly-traded shareholder company, and towards cooperative structures (e.g., Dietz & O’Neill, 2013; Johanisova &
Wolf, 2012; Johanisova et al., 2013, 2015;). Traditional not-for-prot incorporation structures, such as the charity, foundation, and
association, are increasingly being used as legal bodies for carrying out business activities for social benet (Salamon, Sokolowski,
Haddock, & Tice, 2013) and are sometimes mentioned in post-growth literature (e.g., Hinton, 2020; Hinton & Maclurcan, 2017;
Johanisova et al., 2013; Johanisova & Fraˇ
nkov´
a, 2017; Schmid, 2018).
Relationship-to-prot is a legally-binding institutional element that relates directly to both the purpose and property rights of a
company. Indeed, this dimension is mainly characterized by a difference in legal purpose and nancial rights (i.e., the right to receive
the prot and assets of a company (Palmiter, 2003)). The dening attribute of the for-prot type of business structure is the ability to
distribute prot to private owners (via private nancial rights) and to pursue nancial gain
7
as the business’s purpose (Hansmann,
1980; Reiser & Dean, 2017). Not-for-prot structures are characterized by the non-distribution constraint, which precludes a nancial
gain purpose and private nancial rights in order to ensure that resources (including prot) are used for a social benet purpose rather
than private enrichment (Hansmann, 1980; ICNL, 2013; Reiser & Dean, 2017). Not-for-prot businesses can also be distinguished from
traditional not-for-prot organizations in that they generate most or all of their revenue through the sale of goods and services, rather
than depending on grants and philanthropy (Hinton & Maclurcan, 2017). Not-for-prot businesses can be found all over the world in
nearly every sector of the economy, and have been the subject of social economy research for decades (e.g., Borzaga & Tortia, 2007;
Dees, Emerson, & Economy, 2001; James & Rose-Ackerman, 1986; Patten, 2017).
In the post-growth literature, Johanisova et al. (2013) are critical of prot being a business objective and they extend that criticism
to for-prot forms of business (pp. 7–8 and p. 11). Hinton and Maclurcan (2016, 2017); Hinton (2020) and Lux (2003) posit that the
dynamics of a not-for-prot market would allow for post-growth sustainability in ways that for-prot markets do not, due to the
requirement for not-for-prot forms of business to have a social benet purpose and the non-distribution constraint.
3.2. A brief exploration of existent businesses to illustrate the dimensions
These ve dimensions can be used as a kind of taxonomy to more clearly see how aligned (or not) a company is with global
sustainability concerns and post-growth aims. Table 1 shows how the dimensions can be used to understand and compare companies,
giving a brief illustrative description of some rms that have featured in sustainable business discussions: Unilever (Sim, King, & Price,
2016); Riversimple (Wells, 2018); Greyston Bakery (Van Wert, 2018); Mondragon (Johanisova et al., 2013); and BRAC (Seelos & Mair,
2009). The content of the table should not be seen as empirical evidence derived from case study research. These specic businesses
have been included here because they are diverse enough to illustrate and contrast the different dimensions and various combinations
of attributes. I will touch on these concrete examples as I elaborate the conceptual framework below. All information shown in the
6
It is worth noting that ‘social enterprise’ is not an incorporation structure, but is rather a category open to interpretation that can include both
types of relationship-to-prot, as well as many different kinds of incorporation and governance structures (Reiser & Dean, 2017). In other words, the
term ‘social enterprise’ provides limited usefulness for post-growth scholars and practitioners (Houtbeckers, 2018; Johanisova et al., 2015).
7
Also known as a pecuniary gain purpose.
J. Hinton
Futures 131 (2021) 102761
5
table is publicly available, and was obtained from the companies’ websites (BRAC, 2020; Greyston, 2019; Mondragon, 2019; Riv-
ersimple, 2019; and Unilever, 2020a), with the exception of Riversimple, for which some information was also obtained from the UK
national company register website (UK Companies House, 2019). Some of these businesses might seem clearly aligned with
post-growth aims, or at odds with them. The purpose of this exercise is to illustrate how taking all ve dimensions into consideration
can provoke a deeper discussion of why some businesses are more post-growth-compatible than others and in which ways, than if the
focus were on just one or two of the dimensions (which is commonly the case).
If only one or two of the ve dimensions are taken into account, there is a risk of missing information that has signicant impli-
cations for post-growth outcomes. For instance, B Corp certication and social enterprises are often highlighted in post-growth dis-
cussions (e.g., Johanisova & Wolf, 2012; Khmara & Kronenberg, 2018;). A focus only on this strategic aspect would highlight Greyston
Bakery, BRAC, and Unilever, which vary greatly in terms of all of the other dimensions. Large for-prot corporations like Unilever
might have sophisticated sustainability strategies, including a B Corp certication and life-cycle analysis, but the risk is high that their
nancial gain purpose, shareholder investment structure, and private distribution of prot undermine those strategies. Furthermore,
there is no legally-binding mechanism to hold them accountable for how well (or how) they carry out their particular sustainability
Table 1
A dimensional prole of diverse companies.
Business name Relationship-to-
prot
Incorporation
structure
Governance Strategy Size and scope
Unilever For-prot Publicly-listed
company
Head-quarters and boards in
different countries
(Netherlands, UK, and US);
Chief ofcer and executive
positions (23 people in top
leadership positions); Annual
General Meeting (for
shareholders)
Produces food &
refreshments, home care
products, beauty & personal
care products; CSR activities,
life cycle analysis, and
sustainability reporting; Some
subsidiaries are B Corp
certied; Sustainable Living
Plan (vision ‘to make
sustainable living
commonplace’)
Transnational; 161,000
employees;
€
51 billion
annual revenue; Owns more
than 400 different brands in
different sectors
Riversimple For-prot Private limited
company
One central ofce with six
people in leadership
positions;
Six Custodians (not-for-prot
entities to represent different
stakeholders)
Produces electric and
hydrogen fueled cars; Has
several sustainability
objectives; Aims for
circularity via product service
systems and distributed
manufacturing; Vision is ‘to
pursue, systematically, the
elimination of the
environmental impact of
personal transport’
Local (but unclear how
local); Based in Landrindod
Wells, UK; 21 employees;
Revenue is not publicly
available online
Greyston Bakery Not-for-prot
(for-prot
subsidiary fully-
owned by a not-
for-prot)
LLC owned by a
501(c)3
foundation
Four people in chief ofcer
and management positions;
Emphasis on community
engagement; ‘Dynamic
democracy’;
Produces baked goods; Uses
an Open Hiring Model (hires
people who cannot nd jobs);
B Corp certied; Moving into
vegan products with Whole
Planet Foundation; Buddhist
principles
Local (New York), but ships
nationally in the US; 65
employees; 2.3 million USD
annual revenue
Mondragon
Corporation
For-prot
a
Worker
cooperative
federation
Democratic representatives
and assemblies
Manufactures machines,
electrical appliances,
construction equipment,
technical assistance, legal
services, food; Democratic
vision; Strives to be
competitive and protable;
No ecological goals
National (Spain); 80,000
employees;
€
12 billion
annual revenue; Owns 266
companies and cooperatives
BRAC Not-for-prot Nonprot
corporation with
several
subsidiaries
Global board (5 members);
Governing body (9 members);
Executive body (with 27
people in managing and
director positions); Country
representatives
Runs businesses in clothing
and furniture retail,
agriculture, micro-nance,
and legal aid services, in order
to achieve social benet
missions of addressing:
extreme poverty; professional
development; climate change
and food; education; gender
equality; universal access to
healthcare; and human rights
outreach
International (Bangladesh,
Afghanistan, Liberia,
Myanmar, Nepal, Phillipines,
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South
Sudan, Tanzania, and
Uganda); 110,000
employees; 78 billion Taka
(circa
€
830 million) annual
revenue; Owns 5 social
enterprises
a
The worker cooperative incorporation structure involves private nancial rights for worker-owners (Pencavel & Craig, 1994).
J. Hinton
Futures 131 (2021) 102761
6
strategies or engage with societal wellbeing.
If the focus is on small and local companies, Greyston Bakery and Riversimple stand out. However, there are important differences
between these rms. Greyston has no private owners and uses all prot for the social benet mission of helping ‘unemployable’ people
nd jobs, as well as running early learning programs, community gardens, and housing programs in disadvantaged communities
(Greyston, 2019). They also publish their full annual nancial reports on their website. In contrast, Riversimple has taken private
equity-based investment (Seedrs, 2019), but does not clearly disclose on its website what its investment structure is; who the owners
are; how much revenue it generates; nor what happens to the prot. These are all arguably very important aspects of business when it
comes to sustainability and post-growth transformations. Furthermore, if large international companies are simply assumed to be
unsustainable, post-growth opportunities of the kind BRAC demonstrates might be missed. BRAC uses its prot to have a positive
impact on the lives of rural and poor people by creating more economic democracy in several different countries, through
locally-rooted branches (Ibrahim & Hulme, 2011, pp. 397–398).
Similarly, this taxonomy exposes the tensions between the dimensions that a company might have. For instance, a rm might have
a more democratic approach to governance, but does not address sustainability concerns in their strategy or they are locked into a for-
prot structure that encourages the pursuit of private nancial gain. Clearly, all ve of the dimensions are worthy of attention in post-
growth discussions.
3.3. Ordering the dimensions
All of these dimensions represent different aspects of business that are important for post-growth economies. The challenge is to t
these different dimensions together to form a more complete picture of what is required of rms for transformations to post-growth
economies.
Showing how the ve dimensions relate to each other can help scholars and practitioners identify the necessary and sufcient
conditions of business for post-growth economies. I have used changeability as a heuristic tool for ordering the dimensions. Drawing
upon the institutionalist perspective outlined above, the changeability of the dimension has to do with informal expectations versus
legal rights and responsibilities. For instance, to shift the incorporation structure or relationship-to-prot requires legal changes to the
basic structure of the business, including the assignment of its nancial rights. It is not as easy to change elements in these dimensions
as it is to change elements in the strategy dimension. Furthermore, the nancial rights of the business can be expected to have an
important impact on its strategy, but not vice versa. Changeability thus reveals which dimensions actively guide and constrain other
dimensions, and which dimensions are more guided and constrained by others.
Returning to our real-world examples, Mondragon can change its strategy tomorrow (and its broad production range indicates that
it has already done so several times), without impacting its democratic governance structure, but not vice versa. Reducing employee
involvement in its decision-making can be expected to have a signicant effect on the rm’s strategy. In the same vein, Unilever could
readily change its governance structure to be more democratic without getting rid of its shareholders. However, if Unilever’s incor-
poration structure were transformed from a publicly-traded shareholder corporation to a partnership, it would have major impacts on
the company’s governance – for instance, the corporate board would likely be dissolved. In most cases, changes to a company’s
incorporation structure does not have an impact on its relationship-to-prot. However, if the relationship-to-prot changes, there are
Fig. 1. The ve dimensions of business.
J. Hinton
Futures 131 (2021) 102761
7
usually major impacts on the incorporation structure. If Riversimple were to transition from being a private limited company to a
shareholder corporation, it would still be for-prot. But if Riversimple wanted to become not-for-prot, it would have to either change
its incorporation structure to a not-for-prot type or expand its incorporation structure by transferring all ownership to a not-for-prot
parent organization (as is the case with Greyston Bakery).
This analysis enables the ordering of the dimensions in relation to each other (as shown in Fig. 1). The dimensions at the bottom of
the pyramid (relationship-to-prot and incorporation structure) are legally-binding and structural in nature and, as such, they are not
easy to change. The dimensions at the top relate to purpose and goals, but are not legally-binding. Size, scope, and strategy are guided
and constrained by the other dimensions but do not have much of an impact on those lower dimensions. Governance can be seen as a
mediating dimension, which is guided and constrained by the lower dimensions, and also has a high degree of inuence on the upper
ones. Some structural aspects of governance are legally-binding, such as voting rights in cooperatives and shareholder corporations,
while others are not, such as decision-making protocols in the day-to-day management of the business’s resources.
The ve dimensions are more dynamic and interrelated than they are depicted in Fig. 1. They should not be thought of as silos,
separate from one another. Nor do processes ow linearly upward from the bottom dimensions to the top. Instead, the dimensions are
better thought of as different interacting aspects of one dynamic system. This is similar to an ecosystem, where the soil and climate are
less changeable and have a large inuence on how the ecosystem functions, but the microbes, plants, and animals still play a vital role
in shaping the ecosystem’s dynamics.
Another useful metaphor for interpreting the order of these dimensions is that of an iceberg. The upper dimensions are more visible
and currently receive more attention in the academic literature, whereas the lower dimensions are less visible. Perhaps the reason they
receive less attention is because they are legal in nature, making them technically complex, more difcult to get information about, and
harder for interdisciplinary researchers to integrate. For instance, it is very easy to gather information about the strategy, size and
scope of all of the companies in Table 1 from their websites, while it takes more digging to uncover their governance structure,
corporate form, and relationship-to-prot. Yet, it is exactly because of their legally-binding nature – the cementing of rights, re-
sponsibilities, and expectations – that the deeper layers have signicant impacts on the other dimensions and are important for social
and ecological sustainability.
3.3.1. A closer look at how each of the dimensions affects the others
The upper dimensions of strategy, size and scope, can be characterized as being more changeable, diverse, and context-dependent.
The size and geographical scope of a business can be seen mostly as an outcome of strategy. A company can choose to stay small and local,
like Greyston, or to grow large and become transnational as a part of its strategy (Penrose & Pitelis, 2009). The size and geographical
scope can also be a byproduct of certain strategies. A company seeking to control more of its supply chain might do so by acquiring
other companies in the supply chain, thus becoming larger and more international. As such, the size and scope of a business are fairly
changeable traits, that are quite heavily inuenced by strategy directly.
Size and geographical scope can also be impacted by the incorporation structure and relationship-to-prot of the company, through
strategy. For example, equity-based investment from venture capitalists might put pressure on managers to pursue a growth-driven
strategy.
The size and scope of a business can also guide and constrain strategy and governance structures, in terms of what is feasible and
desirable. For instance, if a company has thousands of employees, like Unilever or BRAC, it might be more logistically challenging to
switch to more democratic governance structures than for smaller companies to do so.
The strategy of a business guides and constrains the size and geographical scope of a business. However, strategy is mostly inu-
enced by other dimensions. For instance, governance determines who can participate in making decisions and in shaping the voluntary
objectives of the rm. Likewise, a company’s strategy is guided and constrained by its incorporation structure and relationship-to-
prot, in terms of setting priorities as well as choosing ways of pursuing those priorities. The for-prot structure means that there
are likely investors who expect a dividend, so there is pressure on the manager to deliver this (Bapuji, Husted, Lu, & Mir, 2018).
Managers of for-prot social enterprises are expected to nd a way to balance nancial gain for owners with benets for the wider
community (Reiser & Dean, 2017). A not-for-prot social enterprise is expected to focus its strategy on generating enough revenue to
pursue the social benet mission (James & Rose-Ackerman, 1986). This means that in order to radically change strategy (e.g., to
decrease the size of its output), a company might require corresponding shifts in the governance, incorporation structure, and
relationship-to-prot dimensions.
Governance structures are somewhat exible and somewhat steadfast in nature. Some aspects of governance structures are legally-
binding, while other aspects can be changed overnight by managers. In many companies, a CEO can decide to make a project manager
more independent in terms of her decision-making and her control over the company’s resources, for instance requiring less oversight
of how she uses the budget. This change in governance protocols can often be made without any need to amend legal documents.
However, incorporation documents can determine some aspects of governance in legally-binding ways. For example, the cooper-
ative is an incorporation structure that requires democratic decision-making (ICA, 2018). Likewise, publicly-traded corporations,
nonprot foundations, and associations are incorporation structures that require a board to be engaged in major decisions (ICNL, 2013;
Orts, 2013). In a sense, the governance of a business bridges the incorporation structure with the strategy dimension. Decisions are
connected to the legal responsibilities and obligations of the business through its decision-making protocols, which include and
exclude certain stakeholders according to the incorporation structure. As a shareholder corporation, Unilever’s structure means that
members of the board can have a direct inuence on the strategy and that investors with voting-right shares can also inuence it once a
year at the shareholder’s meeting (Unilever, 2020b).
Finally, relationship-to-prot guides and constrains the dimensions of incorporation structure, governance, and strategy. As such, it
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8
can also have an indirect inuence on size and scope. The non-distribution constraint, which is the essence of the not-for-prot
organizational type, means that only certain kinds of incorporation structures can be considered not-for-prot. For instance, a com-
pany with private shareholders (whether through private equity or publicly-traded shares) can only be for-prot. The focus on social
benet often guides or requires the company to have a board in its governance structure, in order to hold the rm accountable for using
its resources for this purpose (Orsi, 2014). Likewise, relationship-to-purpose guides and constrains the company’s strategy to focus on
the pursuit of its legal purpose (ICNL, 2013; Orsi, 2014).
3.4. Overlapping but different: relationship-to-prot and incorporation structure
Relationship-to-prot and incorporation structure are closely linked, in terms of ownership and investment. It might not be
necessary to consider the distinctions between them at all in post-growth discussions, if it were not for three main issues:
•the widespread lack of awareness of not-for-prot forms of business and the common assumption that business is naturally for-
prot;
•the lack of clarity about nancial rights in some incorporation structures; and
•the wide ranges of acceptable business behavior among different incorporation types.
With regards to the rst issue, most scholars and practitioners assume that business must be for-prot (Hinton, 2020) or even that
maximizing owners’ wealth must be a prime concern of all businesses (Bapuji et al., 2018). As such, some authors have pondered how
to make companies prioritize social benet over private prot. For instance, Johanisova et al. (2013) express a common concern,
‘Another difcult issue which needs to be discussed in relation to a potential social enterprise future is the tendency of successful
alternative economic structures to revert to a mainstream model… How do explicit social and environmental objectives get written
into the objects of an enterprise, and take long-term precedence over simple prot maximisation?’ (pp. 14–15). Bocken and Short
(2016) express a similar concern. The not-for-prot structure prohibits private distribution of prot, which offers clarity, account-
ability, and enforceability to the prioritization of social benet. Therefore, it is important to highlight that the for-prot structure is a
matter of choice and social norms, rather than a natural aspect of business.
Regarding the second issue, with so many different kinds of incorporation structures it is hard to keep track of the types of nancial
rights and legal purpose associated with each structure. Incorporation structures are complex, diverse, context-dependent, and
constantly evolving, so it is not an ideal dimension to guide international, interdisciplinary discussions and visions for post-growth
organizing. Relationship-to-prot has only two types, which are found around the world, and it relates directly to legal purpose
and nancial rights. Therefore, relationship-to-prot offers a useful shorthand for this important information. For example, the non-
distribution constraint of not-for-prot structures means that dual-purpose incorporation structures, which seek to deliver social
benet and private nancial gain to owners (like the benet corporation in the US), are for-prot in legal terms (Reiser & Dean, 2017).
This is a point that is commonly misunderstood in the literature in instances where authors describe dual-purpose businesses as not
really being for-prot or not-for-prot (e.g., Dietz & O’Neill, 2013, p. 149). This point of confusion between incorporation structure
and relationship-to-prot is part of the reason why the latter needs to be a separate dimension. In Fig. 2, I have traced how
Fig. 2. Relationship-to-prot and incorporation structure.
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9
relationship-to-prot and incorporation structure are connected in order to highlight how the former is a more straightforward
indication of purpose and nancial rights than the latter.
Incorporation structure is often (but not always) tied to one type of relationship-to-prot (as depicted in Fig. 2). For instance, a
publicly-traded shareholder corporation can only be for-prot, and a state-owned enterprise can only be not-for-prot (due to the
preclusion of private nancial rights). However, some incorporation structures can be either for-prot or not-for-prot, such as co-
operatives and many types of social enterprise. Consumer cooperatives can be considered not-for-prot
8
, whereas worker cooperatives
are for-prot, as they entail private nancial rights (Pencavel & Craig, 1994). Community Interest Companies in the UK are another
example, as there are two available forms: limited by shares and limited by guarantee (Ofce of the Regulator of Community Interest
Companies, 2013). The former is for-prot, as it allows for the private distribution of prot (albeit capped). The latter does not, so it is
not-for-prot. This difference is not immediately clear and has, thus, led to confusion in the literature. Dietz and O’Neill (2013) for
instance, describe all Community Interest Companies as having private nancial rights (p. 149). If business ownership is as important
for post-growth organizing as many authors claim (e.g., Lange, 2018), then this information about different types of business needs to
be easily accessible and decipherable.
Adding complication to the situation, a company that is incorporated as a for-prot structure, like a limited liability company, can
be owned by a not-for-prot entity (as is the case with Greyston Bakery). Despite its complex incorporation arrangement, Greyston
meets the legal denition of NFP, because it is wholly-owned by an NFP entity, precluding private nancial rights. These intricate
aspects of incorporation structures reveal why relationship-to-prot needs to be its own dimension. Even in less straight-forward
incorporation structures, asking the question of whether a business is for-prot or not-for-prot prompts questions (and answers)
about two of the most important aspects of business for post-growth organizing – the nancial rights and legal purpose (as shown in
Fig. 2).
Lastly, the relationship-to-prot and incorporation structure of a company can encourage, allow for, or inhibit the pursuit of certain
Fig. 3. Relationship-to-prot and incorporation structure guide and constrain the range of business behavior.
8
The only way members can capture the value of the cooperative’s activities is by buying its goods and services (Ruiz-Mier & van Ginneken,
2006). It can be argued that consumer cooperatives and credit unions meet the legal denition of not-for-prot, because the prot distributed to
consumers will never be more than a fraction of what the consumers have spent into the company via purchases (Hinton & Maclurcan, 2016). The
‘dividends’ from consumer cooperatives are best thought of as refunds, rather than actual dividends for private nancial gain.
J. Hinton
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business objectives, such as private nancial gain or social benet. This leads to a range of possible strategic behaviors, as concep-
tualized in Fig. 3. Equity-based investment can compel for-prot companies to pursue prot as an ultimate end, because equity-holders
are expecting returns on investment. Some for-prot incorporation structures, such as the publicly-traded shareholder corporation,
have more structural pressure to deliver private prot than others (Bapuji et al., 2018; Johanisova et al., 2013). The partnership, LLC,
worker cooperative, and producer cooperative structures allow for the pursuit of social benet or for a sole focus on private nancial
gain, depending on the motivation of the owners – but there is no legal requirement for a focus on either type of objective. If a producer
cooperative’s members are for-prot companies, the cooperative can be very focused on delivering private prot to its members’
owners (Gall & Schroder, 2006). Dual-purpose incorporation structures are expected to deliver nancial gain to owners, but often have
caps on how much prot and assets can be privately distributed, so that the business can focus on social benet as well (as in the case of
Community Interest Companies limited by shares, mentioned above).
Note that all for-prot structures allow for the pursuit of private nancial gain, whereas not-for-prot structures do not. If a not-for-
prot company does pursue private nancial gain, it is breaking the law and can be held legally accountable (James & Rose-Ackerman,
1986; ICNL (International Center for Not-for-Prot Law), 2013; Orsi, 2014). As Fig. 3 illustrates, not all not-for-prot businesses will
act sustainably and not all for-prot businesses are slaves to the prot-maximization mandate; rather not-for-prot business frame-
works naturally encourage a focus on social benet, while for-prot business frameworks risk encouraging a focus on private nancial
gain and driving problematic dynamics like consumerism, environmental degradation, inequality, and market concentration (Hinton,
2020).
4. A brief discussion of the theoretical and the practical
Theoretical approaches to business often describe how a rm operates after it has already been started. However, contextual factors
such as culture, market pressures, and regulatory environment, can inuence how entrepreneurs decide to start their business in the
rst place.
When starting a business, entrepreneurs have to contend with many things all at once. They must think about where they can nd
sources of investment, and on which conditions. Different kinds of investment have different kinds of expectations when it comes to a
return on investment. They must grapple with the types of incorporation structure that are available and which is best for their business
plan. They must think about what kind of ownership structure they prefer. If they nd easier access or better terms with certain streams
of investment, then that might guide the way they structure the business. Likewise, the desired incorporation structure may shape
decisions about relationship-to-prot (e.g., a worker-cooperative or partnership). A lack of knowledge about the different options that
are available may also shape decisions (Schmid, 2018).
For traditional rms that have nancial gain as a core aim, the question of relationship-to-prot might never even appear as a
decision that needs to be made; for-prot legal structures will be taken for granted in investment and ownership decisions, leaving
explicit decisions to be made only about the incorporation structure (i.e., which specic legal vehicle to use), governance, strategy, size
and scope. If an entrepreneur desires to have a core social benet purpose, relationship-to-prot becomes more prominent in the
decision-tree. In fact, entrepreneurs that choose the not-for-prot organizational type often do so in order to minimize the possibility of
the business drifting away from its social benet mission (Reiser & Dean, 2017).
These practical issues of how aware and familiar entrepreneurs are with the existing range of ways to organize a business have
implications for transformation. If certain forms of business are deemed necessary for post-growth transitions, then awareness may
need to be raised about those types of business. For instance, it is difcult to imagine how the economy could transition from for-prot
to not-for-prot types of business without a larger social movement that raises awareness about this possibility
9
. However, these
concerns should not inuence how we conceptualize the necessary and sufcient conditions for post-growth business. There are
important differences between identifying and describing the most post-growth compatible businesses that currently exist, on the one
hand, and conceptualizing the necessary and sufcient conditions for all businesses in a post-growth economy, on the other. The ve
dimensions framework offers a concrete basis for both types of discussions.
5. Conclusion
This article has organized and grounded various specic insights about business and post-growth economies in one coherent
framework. The ve dimensions framework offers a clearer conceptual foundation for assessing how and why different types of
business might be compatible (or not) with post-growth transformations. As such, it can facilitate the theoretical and practical
development of post-growth-compatible rms, and can also be used to probe existing businesses for post-growth-compatibility.
Scholars have so far largely focused on aspects of the governance, strategy, size and geographical scope of rms, but have largely
overlooked the deeper legally-binding structures that guide and constrain those more changeable processes. Considering all ve di-
mensions in the framework above might help researchers, policy-makers, and practitioners nd better ways of aligning economic
activity with social and ecological sustainability. As it offers a concrete, well-dened set of terms and categories, it might also help
scholars and practitioners avoid unnecessary misunderstandings in discussions about sustainable business. The debate is not about
whether not-for-prot structures, democratic decision-making, or environmentally-regenerative strategies are required for post-
9
Hinton and Maclurcan (2016) offers such a transformation scenario from the for-prot economy to a not-for-prot economy (pp. 215–246).
J. Hinton
Futures 131 (2021) 102761
11
growth transformations, but rather how attributes in all ve dimensions might be aligned. The discussion should center on which kinds
of changes are important in all of these dimensions, and why. The specic attributes given by post-growth authors for each dimension
10
(covered in section 3.1) offer clear guidance for holistic sustainability analysis and organizing.
The ve dimensions framing also helps reveal the amount of existing diversity of business structures that can suit a post-growth
economy, rather than just social enterprises or cooperatives. This can help readers nd those building blocks in their own commu-
nities rather than trying to create something new or reinvent the wheel.
Another contribution of this framework is that it can help to categorize types of business as: growth-driving; potentially compatible
with post-growth transition pathways; or ideal for post-growth economies. This connects to questions about what the necessary and
sufcient conditions of business are for a post-growth economy and gives guidance for avenues for future research. Which attributes in
each of these dimensions are not compatible with post-growth aspirations, which are compatible, and which traits might be necessary?
The extent to which the deeper layers guide and constrain the other layers, due to their legally-binding nature, hints that they are
where the necessary conditions for a post-growth economy might reside. Should the sustainability of the economy be left to the visions
and voluntary objectives of enlightened owners and managers, or is a transition in the legally-binding institutions of business also
necessary?
Of course, there are also many external factors that inuence whether a rm behaves sustainably. All rms operate in a larger
economic and societal context, and experience various sources of pressure, resistance, encouragement, and constraint from contextual
factors as well. This means there are important differences when contrasting how for-prot businesses might act in a predominately
for-prot market; how not-for-prot companies might act in a for-prot market; and how not-for-prot businesses might act in a
predominately not-for-prot market. To this end, and because relationship-to-prot plays such an important role in guiding and
constraining other dimensions of the rm, there is a need to collect data on not-for-prot business as a distinct category, separate from
for-prot businesses and charity-dependent nonprots, in order to better understand the ranges of sustainability outcomes associated
with this type of business and the extent to which their behavior is inuenced by larger for-prot dynamics.
Funding
Funding is acknowledged from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklo-
dowska Curie Fellowship Action in Excellent Research (grant agreement no. 675153).
Declaration of Competing Interest
I have no competing interests to disclose.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful for feedback on drafts of this article from Sarah Cornell, Arnaud Diemer, Anselm Schneider, Timoth´
ee Parrique, María
Mancilla García, Wijnand Boonstra, Ola Persson, and two anonymous reviewers.
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