Populism and Borders: Tools for Building "the People" and Legitimising Exclusion

Abstract

This paper argues theoretically and illustrates empirically that the border and populism are mutually constitutive concepts. Borders are basic elements in the process of decontestation of "the people" and the construction of exclusion and inclusion narratives, which are at the centre of any successful populist strategy. Meanwhile different dimensions of populism, such as antagonism, morality, idealisation of society, popular sovereignty and personalistic leadership, can be found in the articulation and reproduction of bordering claims and practices. To show the interplay between populism and borders, the electoral manifestos of four radical right populist parties-Vox, Rassemblement National, UKIP and Brexit Party-are quantitatively and qualitatively analysed and compared. The interactions between borders and populism exposed in this paper illustrate that they can be considered not only as objects of analysis, but also as epistemic frameworks to understand each other. Further cross-fertilisation between these interdisciplinary areas of studies is desirable.

Full text

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Populism and Borders: Tools for Building “the People”
and Legitimising Exclusion
Abstract: This paper argues theoretically and illustrates empirically that the border and
populism are mutually constitutive concepts. Borders are basic elements in the process
of decontestation of “the people” and the construction of exclusion and inclusion
narratives, which are at the centre of any successful populist strategy. Meanwhile
different dimensions of populism, such as antagonism, morality, idealisation of society,
popular sovereignty and personalistic leadership, can be found in the articulation and
reproduction of bordering claims and practices. To show the interplay between populism
and borders, the electoral manifestos of four radical right populist parties —Vox,
Rassemblement National, UKIP and Brexit Party— are quantitatively and qualitatively
analysed and compared. The interactions between borders and populism exposed in this
paper illustrate that they can be considered not only as objects of analysis, but also as
epistemic frameworks to understand each other. Further cross-fertilisation between these
interdisciplinary areas of studies is desirable.
KEYWORDS: Populism, borders, radical right, exclusion, immigration
Introduction
This paper seeks to shed light on the interplay between borders and populism at both a
conceptual and an empirical level. It shows that bordering narratives and practices (e.g.
Newman 2003; Vaughan-Williams 2009; Kinnvall 2015) are based on and feed into
populist discourses and attitudes. Populism is often cited as one of the most prominent
challenges to western-style pluralist democracy (Kriesi et al. 2008; Müller 2014).
Migration flows, technological changes, and economic transformations linked to
globalisation have fuelled public discontent and facilitated the rise of populism (Rodrik
2018). Additionally, shifts in social and cultural values have produced a backlash against
governments and other democratic institutions which has been capitalised by populist
movements (Norris and Inglehart 2019).
Meanwhile, borders are linked to notions of sovereignty and citizenship, and part of
domestic and international power struggles. They evolve and overlap (Mezzara and
Nielson 2013). Borders are often interpreted as a territorialised manifestation of
“boundaries” a term that is used to capture not only political or territorial but also other
social and personal divides (Parker and Adler Nissen 2012: 775). By making cultural,

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linguistic or ethnic differences more explicit or formal populist leaders contribute to turn
those individual boundaries into something closer to a political border. These bordering
processes, therefore, help categorise people and create new, or strengthen existing,
distinct collective political identities.
These concepts have great scholarly and policy relevance nowadays but with a few
exceptions (e.g. De Genova 2018; Kallis 2018a; Lamour 2020) the interdisciplinary
literatures on populism and on borders have followed separate ways. This paper
problematises the relationship between the two areas of study and shows theoretical and
empirical synergies between them. It combines some of the key contributions in the
borders literature that can help to understand the populist phenomenon, with insights from
the populism literature that suggest the prominence of the concept of border into the
populist logic of articulation.
First, the article revisits the notion of border in populism theory and shows that
borders and bordering practices are central elements of the populist worldview and its
manifestations. Borders taken in a wider sense —not just as a political boundary between
two states— are intrinsic part of the logic of inclusion and exclusion that helps to define,
and decontest, “the people” as a clearly separate entity and in opposition to “the other”.
Populists dichotomise the social by creating internal frontiers and antagonistic
equivalential chains which bring together people with different, but comparable, fear,
concerns, resentments, and grievances (Laclau 2005a; 2005b: 40-44).
Second, this article argues that borders in practice are, not only constitutive of but,
also constituted by populism. Populist features usually underpin bordering discourses and
praxis. The article dissects populism into five dimensions —i.e. i) the antagonistic
depiction of the “other”, ii) the moralisation of the distinction “us” vs “them”, iii) the
idealisation of the past and identity to justify the reinforcement of protective boundaries,
iv) the utilisation of the concept of popular sovereignty and a majoritarian logic as means
to legitimise borders, and v) the reliance on a strong personalistic leader1— and shows
how each of these dimensions are used to justify, strengthen or instrumentalise borders in
(re)bordering narratives and claims.
Third, to illustrate empirically the interplay between border discourses and
dimensions of populism, this paper applies a content analysis methodology (Bauer 2000)
1 These five dimensions are based on those in Olivas Osuna (2020).

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to the manifestos of a set of European political parties which are often classified as
populist radical right parties (PRRPs) (Mudde 2007): the Spanish Vox, the French
Rassemblement National (RN), and the British UKIP and Brexit Party. The analysis of
coded segments in these texts indicates that, beyond the obvious differences between
these political parties and contexts, there are many common subjacent ideological,
discursive and performative elements. Populism theory can serve to explain several steps
and elements in the construction of insecurity, threat and fear narratives used to justify
policies of inclusion and exclusion by these parties. Bordering discourses are very salient
in all these manifestos and there are many intersections between the border and populist
references coded.
Finally, the analysis of these manifestos seems to indicate many similarities in how
these parties articulate their bordering discourses and construct fears and grievances
against the “other” as equivalent. In their discourses they establish not simply a fix binary
difference between “the people” and the “other” but they reflect a hierarchical approach
to “othering” based on a selective and ambiguous utilisation of borders and exclusion.
The populist “us” is sometimes extended and turned into a “meta-us” to incorporate other
Europeans which are suggested to share equivalent grievances or threats from same or
equivalent “others”.
Borders in Populism
Performing the Border: Identity, Exclusion and Populist Articulation
What is the role of the border in populist theory? The border, insofar as it is understood
as an instrument of power and site of struggle, can be used as a method to study other
social phenomena (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013: 14-19). Political and geographical
borders have been historically used as tools of exclusion and separation between “in-
groups” —those entitled to the privileges and responsibilities of citizenship or community
membership—and “out-groups” —those who belong to other communities and could be
potentially hostile and threaten the in-groups. The Great Wall of China is probably the
most iconic materialisation of the concept of border. In recent years migration and refugee
flows caused by military conflicts (e.g. Syria, Libya, Myanmar and South Sudan) and
deep economic crises (e.g. Venezuela) seem to have brought the border back to the centre
of the political arena (Schain 2019). Enormous walls have been built to keep out-groups
at bay for instance between the USA and Mexico, Spain and Morocco or Israel and Egypt.

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However, these are not the types of borders we more frequently encounter in our daily
lives, as Newman argues:
“Borders are not confined to the realm of inter-state divisions, nor do they have to
be physical and geographical constructs[…] They determine the extent to which we
are included, or excluded, from membership in groups […] the ‘us’ and the ‘here’
being located inside the border while the ‘other’ and the ‘there’ is everything
beyond the border” (Newman 2006: 172)
This paper also adopts an extensive conception of the term border including linguistic,
cultural and ethnic boundaries. It suggests that all borders, physical, legal-political or
socially constructed, can be used as instruments in the discursive nationalist and populist
toolkits. By alluding to borders politicians contribute to reify and reinforce differences
between individuals and groups, which they can strategically use for their electoral
advantage or to justify certain policies. Moreover, borders go beyond strategy and
discourse, they can be performed by take-for-granted everyday acts (Diener and Hagen
2017) and become expressions of banal nationalism (Billig 1985) and populist
performance or style (Ostiguy and Moffitt 2021).
Populism has a relational social, cultural and political component. It entails a process
of creation and recreations of identities, shaped by the relations between “the people” and
the leader, as well as their relationships of this dyad with the “nefarious other” (Moffitt
2016: 17-25; Ostiguy 2017: 17). Borders are part of this performative constitution of “the
people”. They shape individuals’ conception of the world and may be considered
ontologically prior to specific entities (Thompson 2007: 15). Borders play “a constitutive
role in the modes of production and organization of political subjectivity” (Mezzadra and
Neilson 2013: xi). For instance, territorialised social formations can be considered as the
root of identities as they are based on kinship and social adjacency (Agnew 2008: 178-
179). Borders help produce shared understandings of identity and a sense of inclusion, or
exclusion. The self-identities of members of a group are grounded in, and thus far
validated via, interactions with in-groups and out-groups (Parker & Adler Nissen 2012:
778). Borders are also central to the construction of “imagined communities”
underpinning nationhood claims (Anderson 1983) and the romanticised “heartlands” that
each populist movement tries to re-enact (Taggart 2002; 2004).

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Excluding the “other” is another way to reinforce the “self” and preserve identity.
Like nationalists, populists often rely on a post-modern logic of inclusion and exclusion,
according to which symbolic boundaries and belonging to the in-group are grounded on
specific notions of “national culture” which are socially constructed and reconstructed
(Lochocki 2018: 23). Borders are part of the logic of “cultural differentialism” and
preservation of a distinctive identity common among populist movements (Bornschier
2010: 422-423; Ritzer and Yagatich 2016: 112-113).
Denigration of out-groups is a psychological mechanism to maintain an image of self-
integrity (Steele et al. 1993: 885). In particular, the “othering” of migrants is used to
reinforce the self by numerous populist and nationalist groups (Wodak 2015; Fielder and
Catalano 2018). Individuals may selectively choose evidence that exacerbates intergroup
differences to portray the out-group as inferior (Hamilton and Trolier 1986) and
encourage in-group favouritism (Reed II and Aquino 2003: 1271). Similar processes
operate at a group level. Demonising, scapegoating, and even dehumanising the “other”
are practices rooted in religious morality often adopted by populist leaders (Berlet and
Lyons 2000: 7-8). Hence, populism can be considered moralistic rather than
programmatic (Wiles 1969: 167). As Mouffe argues, “[f]ar from having disappeared,
frontiers between us and them are constantly drawn, but nowadays they are drawn in
moral categories” (Mouffe 2005: 58).
Populists not only antagonise the morally inferior “others” but they also try to exclude
them altogether (Müller 2016: 4). Borders are tools that can be used to change the status
quo and reshape society and popular sovereignty. Populist often argue that the
underserving and corrupt minorities —“the elite”, “the caste”, “the colonisers”, “the
immigrants”—, do not really belong to the demos or the “heartland” and, therefore, the
“true” or “authentic” people must fight to achieve plenitude and “have their country back”
(Panizza 2005: 3-4, 2017: 409-411). The dissonance between the “empirical people”, and
the virtuous “ideal people”, where sovereignty “should” reside, pushes populists to create
boundaries and request the extraction of part of the people from within the people (Lefort
1988; Müller 2014). Thus, the populist logic leads sometimes to the dehumanisation of
the “other” and becomes a justification for authoritarianism in the process of extrication
of the ideal people from its empirical form, which implies the suppression of internal
enemies and out-groups (Laclau 2005a: 170; Arato 2013: 167).

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Borders and chains of equivalence
The discursive approach to populism, to a great extent based on the ideas originally
formulated by Ernesto Laclau and developed by the so-called Essex School of Discourse
theory (Townshend 2003), deserves special attention when analysing the role of borders
in populism. Unlike the proponents of the ideational or ideological approach who argue
that populism is a “thin” or “thin-centred” ideology (e.g. Mudde 2004, Stanley 2008),
Laclau suggests a displacement of conceptualisation from the contents to the form and
focus on how discourses are constructed (Laclau 2005a; 2005b: 44). “Discourse” in a
Laclauian sense is not restricted to words and ideas but represents all “systems of
meaningful practices that form the identities of subjects and objects’ through the
construction of antagonisms and the drawing of political frontiers” (Howarth and
Stavrakakis: 2002: 3-4). This implies considering leaders or parties as populist not
because they have a specific ideology, but because they show a particular “logic of
articulation” of social, political or ideological content, whatever those specific contents
are (Laclau 2005b: 33-34; De Cleen 2017:345-347).
“The people”, as understood by populists, do not encompass the entirety of the
population. Theirs is an idealisation of a people rather than an attempt to depict the
(empirical) people (MacRae cited by Berlin 1968: 172). Indeed, populist discourses aim
to construct and decontest a certain “people” through a process which entails two
intertwined conditions: i) the dichotomisation of the social space through the definition
of an internal frontier which separates individuals, and ii) and the creation of a chain of
equivalential demands (Laclau 2005a: 18-19, 74, 83; Laclau 2005b: 38). On the one hand,
this process requires application of a “logic of difference” with the discursive construction
of an enemy of the people who is placed on the other side of the frontier (Laclau 2005b:
39-40). On the other hand, populist discourses also follow a “logic of equivalence” and
unify “the people” by presenting their individual demands, fears and grievances against
the social “other” as similar. This is achieved by the discursive creation of “empty
signifiers”2, which do not have clearly defined “signifieds”. They are vague and malleable
symbols or conceptualisations of universal ideals, which have a homogenising function
in a highly heterogeneous reality.
2 Laclau also refers to the term “floating signifier” which is an expression of the ambiguity and certain
instability inherent to frontiers. This is a term which he considers to largely overlap with the concept of
“empty signifier” in practice but which analytically stands on its own (Laclau 2005b: 43).

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These “chains of equivalence” cut across different social sectors and particular
interests and help construct “the people” as the union of those who oppose the elites or
other type of social “other” and struggle against different, but equivalent, forms of
subordination or exploitation. (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: xviii-xix, Laclau 2005b: 38, 44-
46, Mouffe 2005: 69). These equivalential chains are tools of mutual recognition and
inclusion because they create links within the members of the group, “the people”. But at
the same time, they contribute to a process of “othering” and exclusion, through the
dichotomisation of the social around an internal frontier or boundary. Thus, “the people”
and the “other” become political constructs constituted through antagonistic chains of
equivalence (Figure 1). In other words, antagonism becomes a mode of identification
(Panizza 2005: 3)
Figure 1: Chains of Equivalence
Source: Author’s own elaboration
However, this is a complex and unstable dialectic. The internal borders on which
populism is grounded can be subverted by breaking the links of the chain of equivalent
demands or by disrupting the internal frontier through competing equivalential re-
articulations. The political dynamics of populism require these internal frontiers to be
constantly reproduced. Thus, populist strategies are often based on creating or re-drawing
political frontiers (Laclau 2005b: 41-46). Borders become to a great extent context
specific or ambiguous in populist argumentation (Biancalana and Mazzoleni 2020). The
border becomes a discursive resource for populist leaders who can pick and choose the
one that suits best their interests and agendas (Wodak 2015; Palonen 2016; Lamour and
Varga 2020).
In sum, borders are used in a multiplicity of populist discursive articulatory practices.
The academic literature attributes to borders an important role in underpinning several of

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the dimensions of the populist construct. They contribute to establish an antagonistic
distinction between “the people” and the “other”. These borders are usually turned into
moral divides by populists who seek to delegitimise and exclude certain groups. Borders
are also tools in the construction of an idealised society based on emotional and ahistorical
interpretations of the past that the populist projects aspire to revive. Consequently,
borders also impact their interpretation of who is part of the demos and where popular
sovereignty lies. Finally, borders are instrumentalised by populist leaders to gather
support and advance their political agendas.
Populism in Borders
Whereas the previous section showed the crucial role of borders in populism as key
elements in process of creation and re-creation of social, cultural and political identities,
this one shifts the attention to the opposite relationship; i.e. the salience of populist
attributes in the articulation and reproduction of bordering claims and practices. Many of
the current and historical justifications for the creation and reinforcement of borders are
grounded on populist logic. Each of the dimensions of the populism can be linked to
different bordering examples:
Firstly, the antagonistic Manichean interpretation of reality underpins the descriptions
of migrants as an existential threat and their labelling as exploitative “enemies”,
“invaders” or “parasites” in order to legitimise securitisation of borders (Hogan and
Haltinner 2015; Kinnval 2015; Schain 2019: 18). Populist arguments are not only used to
antagonise “internal outsiders” operating “within the polity” but also to “external
outsiders” such as the European Union, American Imperialism, the global capital, and of
course, political and economic refugees (Brubaker 2020: 54-58). Policies proposing new
borders and even walls by right-wing movements are based on the creation of scapegoats
and fear to legitimise exclusion (Wodak 2015: 2-6). Patrolling the external borders or
enforcing internal immigration control are presented as means to reinforce security and
shield citizens against them. Populist antagonism is also reflected in re-bordering claims
based in anti-establishment and anti-global-elite discourses which alert over alleged
institutional failure and threats to nations’ distinct identities (Kinnval 2015: 519; Mudde
2007). Eurosceptic discourses in Europe are examples of this.
Secondly, the moral interpretation of actors which is a key feature of populism
(Mudde 2004:543; Laclau 2005b: 4; Arato 2013: 156) and also central to bordering

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practices. There is often a moral dichotomisation of society between “honorable patriots”
who defend the border and the “traitors” or “internal enemies” who oppose bordering
policies (Kinnval 2015: 523). Migrants are also morally delegitimised and accused of ill-
intention or causing damage to society on purpose. This process of “moralisation of the
bordering” implies the application of a moral hierarchy and use narratives of
deservingness to justify and rationalise exclusion (Vollmer 2017: 4). The moral
distinction, which sometimes comes accompanied by a dehumanising rhetoric, helps
rationalise why some human beings in a society are excluded from the enjoyment of
certain public services and basic human rights (Rheindorf and Wodak 2017). Not only
the proponents of bordering see themselves in a higher moral ground, but they also
extablish moral distinctions between different groups of migrants. Moral judgments on
the degree of deservingness are often used to justify enforcement measures targeting
specific groups (Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas 2014: 426; Abt et al. 2021). The
consideration of “legal” and “illegal”, “deserving” and “undeserving” may impact the
allocation of resources and rights among them (Cowley 2005: 154).
Thirdly, the romanticised construction of society and its past grounded on
homogeneity and exclusion (Jagers & Walgrave 2007: 323) is another of the typical
attributes of populism which can be customarily observed in bordering arguments. Anti-
pluralist descriptions of “the people”, focusing on fixed collective identities and
nationhood, help reinforce discourses about cultural and economic threats by migrants.
Borders are often presented as “natural” or “irreversible” (Mostov 2008: 42).
Homogenising, differentiating, and classifying discourses are parts of the processes of
(re)drawing boundaries to separate some groups and unite others (Verdery 1993: 38). The
modification of political borders is usually preceded by changes in symbolic boundaries
within communities to recover or reconstruct an idealised past. Certain cultural markers
are promoted while others are eliminated. National mythologies and victimhood
narratives help strengthen antagonistic and moral superiority justifications of the
bordering. More worrisome is that the political subjects considered “illegitimate” are
excluded or expelled to fit a certain nationalist or populist conception of the society
(Mostov 2008: 41-42, 68).
Arguments about cultural compatibility and ethnic-based distinctions of superiority
and inferiority have been historically used as discriminatory criteria in border related
policies, such as national origins quota systems (Zolberg 1989: 411). Similarly, the

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artificial selective emphasis on difference vis-à-vis certain out-groups and the
homogenisation of past social heritages among in-groups was a central element in the
formation of new states in post-colonial Asia, Africa and Latin America. These processes
were accompanied in some countries with the formation of certain internal “ethnic
hierarchies” which in many cases ended up in armed conflict and refugee crises (Zolberg
1989: 417-423). Irredentist, secessionist and nativist movements, still today, use populist
discourses to construct idealised heartlands and nations in order to rally support. The
violent dissolution of the former Yugoslavia provides a good example of how cultural,
religious and ethnic differences are instrumentalised in bordering practices with dramatic
consequences (Mostov 2008).
Fourthly, bordering policies come usually accompanied with references to popular
sovereignty and claims about the “will of the people” that are another important attribute
of populism (Mudde 2004: 543; Ivaldi and Mazzoleni 2020: 210). Borders are constantly
instrumentalised in “sovereignty games.” These “games” try to shape how power is
distributed between supranational, national and regional organisations and/or the scope
in which such power can be exercised (Gammeltoft-Hannsen and Adler Nissen 2008).
For instance, the resistance to the process of European integration is usually justified on
the ground of sovereignty and empowerment of the people. Moreover, border control is
presented as the essence of sovereignty (Hollifield 1992: 6-10). Policing the border finds
a strong normative justification in the defence of territorial sovereignty which underpins
liberal and democratic claims to popular rule (Agnew 2008: 186). Populist frames become
very handy to convey the appropriateness of reinforcing and policing borders. The
consideration of the “other” as a morally corrupt or inferior antagonist is used to
disseminate narratives about interest-based threats –i.e. security and economic threats–,
and identity-based threats –threats to culture, traditional lifestyles, democracy or to other
forms of domestic government (Hogan and Haltinner 2015: 528).
Furthermore, the redrawing of borders often seeks to match politico-administrative
and ethno-linguistic national boundaries (Kefale 2010). This is a process that involves the
renegotiation of identiy and reconstruction of demoi. Expansionist and secessionist
political claims challenge existing, and construct new, conceptions of “the people”
(Mostov 2008: 34). The dichotomous logic of inclusion-exclusion applied is often at odds
with the overlapping of identities and polities. Referendums and mass mobilisations,
which can be associated to a populist understanding of politics (Jacobs et al. 2018,

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Mohrenberg et al. 2019), are often key tools in the process of redrawing of borders. Self-
determination and minority rights arguments are used selectively (Mostov 2008: 11). The
conceptions of popular sovereignty used as justification for many bordering practices
presents majoritarian overtones which can clash with the principle of separation of
powers, lead to bypassing minority rights (Mudde and Rovira-Kaltwasser 2012: 18-22,
205-222) and to a potential tyranny of the majority (Stavrakakis 2005: 239).
Lastly, bordering practices are often proposed by political leaders who portray
themselves as guardians of the nation, or the people, and use inflammatory speeches to
exacerbate fears and sense of national pride (Mostov 2008: 10-11, 32). These are usually
charismatic and personalist leaders who use a populist style and claim to be able to discern
and articulate the “will of the people” (Kriesi 2014: 363; Müller 2016: 32-38, Moffit
2016). Competing ethno-nationalist leaders can simultaneously play the role of the
arrogant majority and an exploited minority, depending on the context of reference
(Mostov 2008: 68). These leaders may act as messianic and transcendental saviours of
the people and end up superseding the authority of the usual representative political
institutions (Finchelstein 2017: xxxvi, 183).
Data collection and methodology
Discourses are not mere ideas or words but systems of meaningful practices constitutive
of identities (Howarth and Stavrakakis: 2000: 3-4). The relation between political actors
and the world is mediated or constructed by language, in the form of talk and texts. To
illustrate the interaction between populism and borders, this paper applies classical
content analysis (Bauer 2000; Hawkins 2009) to a set of electoral manifestos of radical
right populist parties –i.e. Vox, Rassemblement National (“National Rally”)(RN), United
Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and Brexit Party (Table 1). These were the latest
manifestos available for these parties at the time the empirical analysis was launched, in
June 2020. This analysis is exploratory in nature and rather than providing a
comprehensive picture of the interaction of these two areas, it seeks to test the
methodology and identify certain hypothesis worth pursuing in future research.

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Table 1: Party manifestos analysed
Party
Document
Date
Word count
Vox
“100 medidas para la España Viva”
Nov 2019
3,504
Vox
“Programa electoral para las
elecciones europeas 2019”
May 2019
8,123
UKIP
“Manifesto for Brexit and Beyond”
Nov 2019
13,542
Brexit Party
“Contract with the People”
Nov 2019
1,966
Rassemblement
National, RN
“144 Engagements Présidentiels”
Apr 2017
5,563
This paper assumes that populism is a conceptual continuum between negative
(“populist”) and positive (“anti-populist”) poles (Goetz 2006: 27-35) (Figure 2). It records
populist and anti-populist features according to five dimensions: i) antagonistic depiction
of the polity, ii) morality, iii) idealised construction of society, iv) sovereignty, and v)
leadership (Table 2).3. In line with recent empirical studies on the supply (e.g. Storz and
Bernauer 2018; Bernhard and Kriesi 2019; Norris 2020; Meijers and Zaslove 2020) and
demand sides of populism (e.g. Akkerman et al. 2014; Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel
2018; Castanho Silva et al. 2018), this article shows populism is a matter of degree, not
simply a binary categorisation.4 It outlines how different parties display varying levels of
populism in their manifestos by comparing the density of populist references in each of
the abovementioned dimensions (number of references per thousand words).
3 These dimensions are justified theoretically in Olivas Osuna (2020). The identification and refinement
of dimensions combined a deductive process of examination of the most influential texts on populism,
with an inductive process based on a content analysis of political communications of several parties.
These dimensions are set primarily at the content plane and try to capture “what” is said or thought.
Alternative dimensions and angles to populism, such as demagoguery, opportunism, persuasiveness,
communication channels and articulation style (Kazin 1998; Ostiguy 2017) pertain to the expression
plane and focus on “how” populist content is conveyed, while others —e.g. mobilisation strategies, crisis
of trust and representation (Canovan 1999; Weyland 2001)— give analytical priority to socio-political
contexts and structural legacies.
4 Please note that there are also some influential studies that classify parties as either – populist or non-
populist (Rooduijn et al. 2019).

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Figure 2: Five-dimensional framework with examples of dimensions and typical populist
and anti-populist features
Source: Olivas Osuna (2020)
Table 2: Description of populist and anti-populist features
Populist features
Anti-populist features
Depiction of
the polity
Dual and antagonistic description of polity:
“us” vs “them”,
‘the people’ vs ‘the elite’ or ‘the other’ (migrants, minorities,
intellectuals, etc.).
Rejection of political, legal and/or economic establishment.
Claims for radical change. Confrontational tone, militaristic
terms.
Complex and nuanced (non-antagonistic) depiction of
the polity. Endorsement or approval of political, legal
and economic establishment. Claims for gradual change.
References to working together with political opponents
and reaching agreements.
Morality
Moral interpretation of actors. Mora
l distinction and hierarchy
(superiority and inferiority). Claims against the legitimacy of
the other actors. Victimisation/blame discourses.
Ad
-hominem critiques and negative emotions. References to ill-
intentioned, unfair or immoral behaviour or political opponents.
Political actors are not classified according to their moral
standing. The legitimacy of political opponents and their
ideas is acknowledged.
Critiques not focused on the proponent’s personal
attributes or motives but on their actions or policy
proposals (usually backed on empirical evidence).
Construction
of society
Idealisation of society. Anti
-pluralist depiction of ‘the people’
focused on identity, nationhood and/or ahistorical ‘heartland’.
References to unity and singularity, hyperbolic descriptions.
Emphasis on difference with ‘the other’ and in
-group
homogeneity. Exclusionary claims. Emotional language.
Complex and nuanced depiction of society and history.
Pluralist portrayal of the people. References to diversity
of views and interests. Utilisation of empirical data to
back claims.
Emphasis on commonalities with ‘the other’ and in-
group heterogeneity. Recognition of a common space.
Inclusive claims
Sovereignty
Absence of limits to popular sovereignty. Majoritarian logic.
The ‘will of the people’ is expected to prevail over laws,
minority rights and institutions.
Preference for direct democracy tools. Praise of referendums,
public consultations and mass mobilisations.
Popular sovereignty limited by laws and formal rights.
Emphasis on representative democratic tools.
Complexity in decision-making is acknowledged.
R
eferences the protection of minority rights and interests
and to institutional and legal checks on the will of the
majority.
Leadership
Leaders voice ‘the will of the people’ and represent their
interests. Non
-mediated relation with the people. Leaders are
described as more important than political parties.
Focus on the actions, decisions and ideas of leaders.
Idealisation of their achievements. Charisma takes precedence
over expertise.
Leaders’ relations with people is mediated by
institutions. Politica
l parties represent people’s interests.
Parties and other institutions are expected to control and
be heard by political leaders.
Focus on the actions, decisions and ideas of political
parties and institutions, not simply those of individuals.
Source: Olivas Osuna (2020)

Manuscript under review - José Javier Olivas Osuna
14
In addition to the 10 codes associated to populism (5 for populist and 5 for anti-
populist features), 18 “borders” codes were created based on a preliminary analysis of the
literature and then refined inductively during the coding of these manifestos5: references
to immigration, establish / strengthen borders, migrants damage economy, migrants use /
abuse of public services, deportation, critiques to supranational authorities, country or
citizens first, economic protectionism, other portrayed as suspect, integration of the other,
externalised borders, barriers to citizenship or residence, exclusionary-discriminatory
policies, securitisation, language as inclusion-exclusion tool, protecting/recovering
sovereignty, culture/identity protection, and references to territorial integrity. Sentences
were recorded using MAXQDA software as indicators of populist, anti-populist and/or
borders features. Codes are not mutually exclusive so one sentence could be
simultaneously assigned to various populism and borders codes. In addition to counting
and comparing the relative density of each code and the intersections among them,
segments were also analysed qualitatively to better understand the role of populist tropes
in the construction of bordering arguments, and vice versa.6
Analysis
Given that the length of the documents varies significantly, rather than analysing the total
number of segments coded, this paper compares the density of codes –i.e. number of
segments coded per 1,000 words. The analysis of the party manifestos shows that the
relative levels of populism are higher in the manifestos of Brexit Party7 and RN than in
those of the UKIP and Vox (Figure 3). The density of anti-populist references is
comparatively extremely low. Aside for Vox EU elections manifesto, with 15 anti-
populist references (total anti-populist 1.84 references / 1,000 words) anti-populist
5 During the coding process certain codes were introduced and others merged. The set of codes presented
here can be subject of further refinement and adaptation to different specific contexts and research goal.
These codes are not mutually exclusive, and some can be considered, to certain extent, sub-categories of
other codes. The use of codes which could be placed in different rungs of the ladder of abstraction was
decided given the exploratory / inductive nature of this coding exercise. By recording a variety of codes,
from more general (e.g. immigration) to more specific (e.g. deportation) we increase the likelihood of
capturing meaningful interactions with populism codes.
6 The MAXQDA containing the documents analysed and the segments coded is already available publicly
at Harvard Dataverse. However for the sake of anonymity an alternative link to such file is included here:
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JjDvv7TwVcZ0eGhTlcGxKlbEwtqNVkD6/view?usp=sharing
7 The Brexit Party manifesto Contract with the People is significantly shorter than the others which may
contribute to the higher density of references.

Manuscript under review - José Javier Olivas Osuna
15
references in the other documents are anecdotal –RN: 0.9 anti-populist 1.84 references /
1,000 words; Vox Spanish Elections: 0.86; Brexit Party: 0.5; UKIP: 0.3).
Figure 3: Total populist references per 1,000 words
A more fine-grained analysis of the composition of these populist features shows a
significant variation in the relative salience each of the populist dimensions across
manifestos. The reliance on a personalist leader is almost completely absent in all of them,
which is not surprising in this type of formal political communications which are
supposed to reflect the party position on policies. Antagonism is the more salient populist
attribute in the Brexit Party manifesto. The populist idealisation of society is the most
prominent attribute found in RN and Vox documents, whereas morality references are
more common in the UKIP one (Figure 4).
Figure 4: Populist references per dimension (references per 1,000 words)
Regarding references to borders, the manifestos of Vox and RN show a significant
higher density than those of the UKIP and Brexit Party, which are usually considered
8,99 8,56 7,63 7,83
15,26
11,86
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Populism references
Average Vox Nov 2019 Vox May 2019
UKIP Nov 2019 Brexit Party Nov 2019 RN April 2017
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Antagonism - Pop Morality - Pop Society - Pop Sovereignty - Pop Leadership - Pop
Vox Nov 2019 Vox May 2019 UKIP Nov 2019 Brexit Party Nov 2019 RN April 2017

Manuscript under review - José Javier Olivas Osuna
16
issue parties with a central bordering strategy, i.e. getting the UK leave the EU (Figure
4). References to immigration are the most frequent in all manifestos, which is not
unexpected as some of the other codes are usually associated to specific discourses on
migrants. In the bordering discourse of RN references to exclusionary/discriminatory
policies and to economic protectionism are very salient. The Brexit Party document
emphasises the idea of protecting and recovering Britain’s sovereignty and the need of
prioritising national interests over those of the EU. Exclusionary policies and protection
of British sovereignty are the most common references in the UKIP manifesto. Finally,
whereas the Vox EU elections manifesto gives more salience to securitisation, protecting
sovereignty and the critique of supranational institutions, the Vox Spanish elections
manifesto emphasises identity and culture protection as well as some discriminatory
policies (Table 3).
Figure 5: Total populist references per 1,000 words
Table 3: Distribution of borders codes in each of the Manifestos analysed.
All
manifestos
Vox Nov
2019
Vox May
2019
UKIP
Brexit
Party
RN
Immigration
23%
23%
22%
28%
21%
16%
Exclusionary-discriminatory
policies
13%
15%
6%
18%
8%
15%
Protecting or recovering
sovereignty
10%
5%
12%
8%
21%
9%
Culture/identity protection
8%
16%
10%
6%
0%
4%
Critique of supranational
authorities
7%
4%
11%
7%
13%
4%
Securitisation
7%
7%
13%
2%
13%
3%
Economic protectionism
5%
3%
2%
2%
8%
15%
Country or citizens first
5%
3%
0%
8%
17%
6%
15,02
21,12
18,34
10,71 12,21
17,80
0
5
10
15
20
25
Borders references
Average Vox Nov 2019 Vox May 2019
UKIP Nov 2019 Brexit Party Nov 2019 RN April 2017

Manuscript under review - José Javier Olivas Osuna
17
Barriers to citizenship-residence
4%
4%
1%
6%
0%
7%
Deportation
3%
3%
5%
1%
0%
5%
Territorial integrity
3%
3%
9%
0%
0%
2%
Other portrayed as suspect
3%
3%
2%
3%
0%
6%
Language as inclusion-
exclusion
3%
7%
2%
2%
0%
4%
Use or abuse of public services
2%
0%
0%
6%
0%
0%
Integration issues
1%
1%
1%
1%
0%
1%
Establish / strengthen borders
1%
3%
1%
0%
0%
1%
Externalised borders
1%
1%
3%
0%
0%
0%
Migrants damage economy
1%
0%
0%
2%
0%
1%
Borders references total
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
Next, having mapped the relative intensity of each of the populist dimensions and
different border arguments, this paper shows both types of codes appear intertwined. A
myriad of intersections between populist and borders were found: 97 between the Society-
pop codes and borders codes, 60 in the case Antagonism-pop codes, 38 for Morality-pop
and 8 between Sovereignty-pop borders references (Table 4). Figure 6 presents a
visualisation of the populism and borders codes and shows that broadly three clusters of
codes emerge from these manifestos. Antagonism and morality appear associated to each
other and closely connected to references to supranational authorities. Society-pop
appears closely connected to immigration and references to discriminatory or
exclusionary measures, as well as to mentions to culture and identity protection.
Sovereignty-pop is connected to the recovering or protecting sovereignty code.
Table 4: Most frequent code intersections (5 or more intersections)
Populist references
References to borders
Number of
intersections
Society - Pop
Immigration
26
Society - Pop
Exclusionary-discriminatory policies
21
Antagonism - Pop
Critique of supranational authorities
17
Society - Pop
Culture/identity protection
13
Morality - Pop
Critique of supranational authorities
10
Antagonism - Pop
Protecting or recovering sovereignty
10
Morality - Pop
Immigration
7
Antagonism - Pop
Immigration
7
Sovereignty - Pop
Protecting or recovering sovereignty
6
Society - Pop
Deportation
5
Antagonism - Pop
Securitisation
5
Antagonism - Pop
Exclusionary-discriminatory policies
5
Society - Pop
Other portrayed as suspect
5
Antagonism - Pop
Other portrayed as suspect
5
Society - Pop
Country or citizens first
5

Manuscript under review - José Javier Olivas Osuna
18
Figure 6: Map of code intersections. In parenthesis the total number of codes. Lines
capture intersections with a minimal frequency of 5
A qualitative analysis of the segments coded for both populist and borders references
serves to illustrate some common constructions across radical right parties in their
articulation of border and populist claims:
The populist idealised conception of a somewhat homogeneous society that these
parties try to convey is underpinned by policy proposals which aim to exclude or
discriminate individuals either based on political or cultural boundaries. Nationality and
religion are used to define the ideal society in these “othering” discourses. For instance,
Vox proposes the “deportation of illegal immigrants” and of migrants who are lawfully
in the territory but have committed serious crimes or repeated minor offences. RN
proposes barriers naturalisation of foreigners and the eliminate double nationality treaties
with non-European countries. They also recommend the automatic deportation of
migrants who have committed crimes or are connected to Islamic fundamentalism. Both
parties propose the ban and closure of mosques associated to fundamentalist
interpretations of Islam. UKIP suggests to “re-institute the British nationality
requirement” for all civil servants and other obstacles to the obtention of British

Manuscript under review - José Javier Olivas Osuna
19
citizenship. Vox also proposes incentives to companies that hire Spanish workers, while
RN wants to prioritise employment for French people.
Similarly, culture/identity protection references are a common method to define who
belongs, and who does not, to their ideal (populist) community. These parties portray a
model of society founded on traditional, often Christian, values. Some of the arguments
they use are not directly related to borders, such as the claims by RN, Vox and UKIP in
defence of traditional families and fertility policies, and the explicit opposition of UKIP
and Vox to abortion, gender reassignment and what they call “gender ideology”.
However, these parties also show their ideal society threatened by out-groups with
explicit and implicit references to Islam and Islamism, which is associated in these
manifestos to radicalism, violence and low respect for some democratic rights. For
instance, Vox proposes “promotion of European values, uniquely embodied in Christian
civilisation”, the “exclusion of Islam education from public schools” and to follow
Hungary footsteps and create a government agency for the protection of “endangered
Christian minorities”. They also want to stop the existing policies for the promotion of
ethnic and linguistic minorities. UKIP claims to repeal the 2010 Equality Act which
protects Black and Asian minorities and they consider discriminating against white
people. Moreover, UKIP declare that they “will promote a unifying British culture” and
Christian schools in the UK. Meanwhile, RN declare that they will “defend the national
identity, values and traditions of the French civilisation”. These claims and policy
proposals are grounded on (and fuel) existing prejudices and promote a sense of threat
and grievance that can be instrumentalise in unifying and “othering” processes.
Antagonism against supranational and international organisations also emerges as a
recurrent theme in these manifestos. For instance, Vox promises to abandon any
supranational and international organisation with interests conflicting to those of Spain,
and criticises a “Europe that asphyxiate political freedom and cultural wealth of its
member-states”; meanwhile UKIP claims that they will abolish “all of the EU-inspired
legislation that binds us to EU legal institutions”; Brexit Party promises that there will be
“no more years of wrangling with Brussels, no further entanglement with the EU’s
controlling political institutions”. This antagonism is sometimes also combined with a
moral delegitimisation of supranational institutions. Brexit party accuses the EU of being
undemocratic and Vox of abusing its competences. RN does not explicitly accuse
international organisations but suggests that the EU has undermined freedom and

Manuscript under review - José Javier Olivas Osuna
20
sovereignty. The critique to supranational authorities can be interpreted as an attempt to
enhance national borders.
Moreover, references to sovereignty are rarely made from a pluralist interpretation
of the term. These parties do not seem to recognise the logic of shared sovereignty in the
EU. They suggest that their countries need to recover a lost sovereignty and regain control
over their futures, which they claim to be now in the hands of global elites who do not
care about the real interest of the people. For example, UKIP claims that they will “fully
restore the UK’s former status as an independent, self-governing, sovereign state”, Brexit
Party requests a “Clean-Break Brexit” take control of “laws, borders, money, fishing and
defence”; and RN proposes a referendum for EU membership “to regain our freedom and
control over our destiny by restoring their sovereignty to the French people”.
Morality is also used to justify exclusion and prejudices against “the other”, who
could be either migrants or the elites that defend migration. For instance, UKIP warns
against the “systematic and industrialised sexual abuse of under-age and vulnerable
young girls by majority-Pakistani grooming and rape gangs”, and Vox insinuates that
there are NGOs that collaborate with “illegal immigration mafias”. RN suggests that those
who defend globalisation want to destroy the great economic and social balances, by
abolishing economic and physical borders to increase immigration and reduce cohesion
among the French people. The Brexit Party accuses the political establishment of
conspiring “to frustrate democracy over Brexit”.
There are some disparities across these manifestos that can be linked either to
programmatic differences –e.g. economic protectionism and interventionism is much
more prominent in RN than in UKIP, which seems to favour a more liberal economic
stance– or to the specific country context –e.g. Brexit Party’s manifesto is very short and
focuses almost exclusively on the EU exit, while the manifestos of Vox puts great
emphasis in territorial integrity due to the secessionist challenge in Catalonia. However,
a common logic of articulation of populist and bordering practices can be elicited from
the analysis of these party manifestos which helps as illustration of several of the
arguments made in the earlier theory sections.
This exploratory analysis resonates with the findings of previous studies highlighting
the similarities in othering discourses across populist radical right parties (e.g. Wodak
2015; Sakki and Pettersson 2016; Kallis 2018b). In the texts analysed, borders play a

Manuscript under review - José Javier Olivas Osuna
21
prominent role in constructing antagonistic relationships against some corrupt or ill-
intentioned “others” which can be either international elites, (mainly poor) migrants, or
“deviant in-groups” who support out-groups in eroding political, economic or cultural
boundaries. In their attempt to re-enact their ideal heartland and recover a purportedly
lost popular sovereignty, these parties suggest to (re)establish political borders between
states as well as to reinforce internal legal, economic, or cultural frontiers. They propose
securitisation and policing supposedly to reduce migration flows. They also recommend
laws to discriminate or exclude foreigners from becoming citizens, residents or from
using public services based on negative moral considerations and on the assumption that
some migrants are suspect of damaging the traditional ways of life and upsetting societal
balances. Moreover, these parties want to reduce or stop altogether the participation in
cross-border initiatives, treaties and supranational organisations, that they interpret as
hindering national sovereignty.
Finally, the similarities found in the bordering policy proposals of these parties, are
relevant and could be framed within a wider process of discursive alignment between
radical right populist parties in Europe. The manifestos of Vox allude to proposals from
Hungary and the Visegrád group. This potential convergence both at the level of populist
articulation and bordering is a hypothesis which deserves further scholarly attention. It is
worth noting that although these three European countries have been historically rivals,
and they still maintain some ongoing border disputes –e.g. Gibraltar, Calais, fishery
rights– these radical right parties do not give a high priority in their othering discourses
to the citizens of each other. They construct supranational elites, Muslims and non-
western European migrants and refugees as their main out-groups they antagonise.8 To a
large extent these parties recognise each other and the people they represent as subject to
an equivalent sort of exploitation and external threats.
Although these parties claim a partial or total withdrawal from Europe, they do not
portray their European neighbours as an enemy or a full-fledge “other”. They seem to
8 The Brexit Party manifesto does not refer to Islam or Islamists, however, several of its high-profile
members have been accused of making anti-Islam comments
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/20/leader-of-pro-brexit-party-catherine-blaiklock-resigns-
over-anti-islam-messages . These groups often also portray left-wing as internal enemies or traitors for
enabling immigration or radical Islam. For instance in France RN brought to the fore the term islamo-
gauchism (“Islamo-leftism”): https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2012/4/6/french-right-focuses-on-
radical-muslims

Manuscript under review - José Javier Olivas Osuna
22
recognise as equivalent the grievances denounced by other radical right parties in Europe
and construct a sort second level “us” or “the people”. This is particularly evident in the
case of European Elections manifesto of Vox that seems to extend the “us”, the “in-group”
to the rest of Europe and construct an idealised “European Civilisation” grounded in
traditional Christian values, which is threatened by some common external (and internal)
enemies. RN clearly establish a distinction between other European and non-European,
for instance when proposing to eliminate double nationality agreement with non-
European countries. When referring to expelling “illegal immigrants” or excluding them
from certain services these parties are also implicitly acknowledging a difference between
migrants according to their origin, given that EU citizens’ legal right to stay in EU
countries.
Therefore, this suggests that populist parties may adopt a flexible strategy and can
emphasise or underplay state and supra-state borders creating a sort of hierarchical
othering and a “meta-us” based on an equivalential logic and the selective blurring of
differences with some foreign groups (Figure 7).9 This is in line with Lamour’s (2020)
argument on the existence of a “meta-populism” in the Italian-Swiss border based on
chains of equivalence to reduce regional and national disparities, and construct an
antagonism between a transregional people (“us”) and common distant enemies
(“clandestine workers and Muslims”)(Lamour 2020: 3). The variable, selective or
context-specific utilisation of borders and grievances by populist leaders and parties may
also be construed as part of the strategy of “calculated ambivalence” typical of right-wing
populism (Wodak 2015: 46-47). In this case, ambiguity about certain borders serve as
unifying discourse and a means to establish an additional “us” that encompasses allied
right-wing movements across state borders (Biancalana and Mazzoleni 2020). The
construction of this “meta-us” may help normalising exclusionary policies and provide
legitimacy for these movements.
9 It is worth noting that Donald Trump former advisor, Steve Bannon founded an organisation in Brussels
to try to organise radical right parties in Europe
https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_bannon_sets_his_eyes_on_spain/

Manuscript under review - José Javier Olivas Osuna
23
Figure 7: Ambiguity and selective use and blurring of borders in othering processes.
Although further research is needed to confirm the hypotheses above, the exploratory
analysis in this paper suggests that the usually assumed binary or dichotomous
interpretation of the polity between “us”, (“the people”) and “them” (“the corrupt other”)
central to populism (Mudde 2004: 543; Laclau 2005b: 39) may require to be reconsidered
as a more complex hierarchical distinction or relationship. In addition to create or enhance
borders, populist leaders can blur existing ones as means to strategically create new
narratives of equivalence and layers of identity and otherness.

Manuscript under review - José Javier Olivas Osuna
24
Conclusions
This paper has tried to show theoretically and empirically that borders are constituted by
and constitutive of populist discourses. Borders play a prominent role in the populist logic
of articulations. Populism has an important relational component as it implies a process
of (re)creation of political identities via an established antagonism between “the virtuous
people” and “the nefarious other”. Borders shape shared understandings of the self and
the community and are central elements in this performative constitution of the people.
Borders are tools of exclusion and used to categorise individuals along territory,
linguistic, religious or biological traits. Identities are generated and validated via
interactions with in-groups and out-groups which are separated by political, physical or
socio-cultural borders.
Borders are particularly relevant in the discursive interpretation of populism. As
Laclau argued, the dichotomisation of the social space through the definition of an
internal frontier which separates individuals, and the creation of chains of equivalential
demands or grievances are the bases of populist articulation. Populists seek to bring
equivalential homogeneity to a heterogenous reality. A shared antagonism across a border
becomes the unifying feature that serves to decontest a certain notion of “the people.”
Borders not only contribute to establish an antagonistic and moral distinction between
“the people” and the “other” and but also become tools in the construction of populist
heartlands, and in (re)interpretations of the sovereign demos.
But the relationship between borders and populism is bidirectional, so after showing
the salience of the border in populism theory, this paper has argued that populism
underpins the articulation and reproduction of bordering practices and claims. It has
shown that different dimensions or attributes of populism –i.e. antagonism, morality,
idealised construction of society, popular sovereignty and personalistic leadership– are
customarily used to justify (re)bordering policies. Populist tropes and rhetoric become
common tools for those who seek to create new, or modify and strengthen existing,
borders.
Finally, the exploratory comparative quantitative and qualitative analysis of the
political manifestos of four European radical right populist parties: Vox, UKIP, Brexit
Party and RN, has served to confirm how populist and borders allusion are interwoven.
Borders are key instruments in the construction of antagonistic relationships against

Manuscript under review - José Javier Olivas Osuna
25
(poor) migrants, international elites and “deviant” in-groups. Although they reflect some
discrepancies in terms of policy priorities and relative intensity of populist dimensions,
all these parties propose to reinforce political and cultural frontiers and a series of
discriminatory and exclusionary policies against those who do not belong to their
somewhat homogeneous conception of ideal society.
These populist parties seem to establish a hierarchy in their othering discourses and
to mutually recognise as each other as subjects of similar fears and grievances. The
selective blurring of boundaries depending on the context, allows them to recreate a sort
of “meta-us” and establish a common front with other groups in different countries that
share equivalent perceived threats. This ambiguity can be considered part of a calculated
strategy to normalise and legitimise their bordering exclusionary policies against other
out-groups or in-groups.
In sum, this paper justifies theoretically and illustrates empirically the complex
interdependence relationship between borders and populism. At the same time, it suggests
important synergies between these two interdisciplinary fields of study worth exploring
further in future research. The border can be used as a method to study populism and vice
versa.
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