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Protecting the Vulnerable: Towards an Ecological Approach to Security

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Abstract

The Anthropocene is something of a ‘game-changer’ for the way we can and should view international relations. It suggests the need to step back and reconsider some of the core assumptions we have about the way the world works. In the context of the Anthropocene, this means that the environment is no longer a background to geopolitics, but rather a dynamic force that impacts global politics. This chapter makes the case that the Anthropocene compels us to view and approach security not through the lens of how we might protect human collectives or institutions, but how we might protect ecosystems themselves. Consequentially, this points to a defence of ecosystems, in particular their functionality in the face of ongoing change. For doing so, the chapter outlines the contours of an ecological security discourse, emphasising its focus on the resilience of ecosystems and the rights and needs of the most vulnerable.
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© e Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021
D. Chandler et al. (eds.), International Relations in the Anthropocene,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53014-3_11
11
Protecting theVulnerable: Towards
anEcological Approach toSecurity
MattMcDonald
Introduction
e Anthropocene is something of a ‘game-changer’ for the way we can and
should view international relations, in theory and practice. e idea that
humanity has become such a productive force on the planet as to push the
Earth into a new geological era, regardless of debates about when this era
began or how it is primarily characterised, tells us something about the pro-
found eect we as a species have had on the planet. And in the process, it
suggests the need to step back and reconsider some of the core assumptions
we have about the way the world works. In the context of the Anthropocene,
the environment is no longer a background to geopolitics or a site of interstate
contestation (see Dalby 2020 and Chap. 8). It is, rather, a dynamic force that
impacts profoundly—and indeed will increasingly serve to determine—key
dynamics of global politics. Clearly, this has important implications for the
way we view and approach key concepts like security, and the means used to
preserve or advance it in practice.
is chapter makes the case that the Anthropocene compels us to view and
approach security, not through the lens of how we might protect human col-
lectives or institutions, but rather how we might protect ecosystems
M. McDonald (*)
School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland,
Brisbane, QLD, Australia
e-mail: matt.mcdonald@uq.edu.au
192
themselves. If the Anthropocene means anything to us and the way we
approach security, then it should mean the need to reect upon—and ulti-
mately transition away from—the idea of a separation between nature and
humanity. In the process, it means orienting to a defence of ecosystems, in
particular their functionality in the face of ongoing change. is focus consti-
tutes the best means of advancing the rights and needs of the most vulnerable
in the face of dynamic and ongoing (ecological) change: marginalised and
impoverished human populations; other living beings; and future
generations.
In the process of making this case, the chapter focuses on the issue of cli-
mate change: perhaps the ultimate illustration of the arrival of the
Anthropocene era and the extent of humanity’s eects on earth systems func-
tionality. e chapter proceeds in four stages. e rst addresses why we
should engage with the Anthropocene—and in particular climate change—
through the lens of security at all, outlining the costs and benets of such
engagement. e second section points to the idea of dierent discourses of
climate security, noting what these discourses encourage and prioritise in
terms of the nature of the climate threat and appropriate responses to it. e
third section outlines the contours of an ecological security discourse, empha-
sising its focus on the resilience of ecosystems and the rights and needs of the
most vulnerable. e chapter concludes by briey reecting on the challenges
associated with advancing or realising this approach in practice.
Ultimately, the arrival of the Anthropocene—and the associated ecological
crisis—suggests the need for radical changes in the way in which we conceive
and approach security. Ecological security
represents such a change, but it is an approach that faces profound impedi-
ments to its embrace or institutionalisation.
Why Security?
When exploring the Anthropocene and the associated scale of ecological cri-
sis—especially climate change—we see increasing engagement with the idea
that we can approach these issues through the lens of security. is engage-
ment is evident in national security strategy statements (see Scott 2015), a raft
of think tank reports, and in discussions in the UN Security Council, for
example (see Maertens 2021). Yet while there’s growing consensus that we can
frame issues such as climate change as a security issue, there’s debate about
whether we should.
M. McDonald
193
For some, there is an inherent danger that representing ecological change as
a security threat risks suggesting that central security agents (states and their
militaries) have a key role to play in addressing these challenges, in turn risk-
ing the militarisation of issues such as climate change (see Marzec 2015;
Deudney 1990). Do we really want or need militaries taking primary respon-
sibility for responding to the climate crisis, for example? For others, the logic
of security is a largely problematic one of exception. Specically, the concern
here is that if we dene an issue as a security issue, it will take it outside the
realm of ‘normal politics’ and into a space where it is dealt with through
urgent, secret and predominantly illiberal measures (see Wæver 1995;
Neocleous 2008). Security, in this schema, does things (see Chap. 9).
is is an important point. But while, for the above analysts, it counsels
against linking the Anthropocene, ecological change or climate change more
specically to security, viewed another way, it necessitates our engagement with
this relationship. Such an approach would suggest that if security constitutes
‘high politics’—if dening an issue as a security issue suggests priority, atten-
tion, urgency or even exceptional responses—then the choices made about
what constitutes a security threat are politically important (see Booth 2007;
Browning and McDonald 2013).
is is further underscored by the fact that the promise of providing secu-
rity underpins the political legitimacy of the key actors of international poli-
tics. For states, providing security is why they exist. At the heart of the social
contract—in which individuals give up some degree of freedom and auton-
omy to the institution of the state—is the idea that the state provides for the
protection of these individuals in an otherwise dangerous and anarchic envi-
ronment (see Williams 1998). It is no surprise, then, that states consistently
emphasise that their most important responsibility or obligation is to provide
for the security of their citizens. And, while this relationship between security
and political legitimacy is most evident in the context of states, the rst article
of the United Nations Charter also denes the UN’s primary responsibility as
the maintenance of international peace and security.
So, security matters. But when examining the implications of dening or
approaching an issue as a security issue, we should be wary of assuming that
‘securitization’ will have specic eects. My argument here—building on ear-
lier work (McDonald 2008, 2012, 2018)—is that what matters politically
isnt whether security is invoked, but how security is understood. If security is
understood and approached in terms of the nation-state and its preservation,
then that has very dierent implications (for addressing an issue like climate
change) than if security is understood in terms of international stability,
human welfare or ecosystem resilience, for example (see Chap. 10). Ultimately,
11 Protecting the Vulnerable: Towards an Ecological Approach…
194
a security framing might be dangerous but not necessarily. e big questions
then become how is that relationship understood and subsequently
approached, and what type of approach would best ensure actions oriented to
the most vulnerable and to addressing the ecological crisis eectively? To
make sense of this, and to explore the assumptions and implications of dier-
ent accounts of the relationship between climate change and security, I sug-
gest the need to approach this relationship through the lens of dierent—and
competing—discourses of security.
Discourses ofClimate Security
It is one thing to argue—or accept—that issues like climate change might
constitute a threat to security. But what exactly does this mean? Here, it is
useful to distinguish between dierent discourses of security: frameworks of
meaning with dierent conceptions of whose security matters; from what
threats; by what means it is to be protected or advanced; and by what agents
(McDonald 2018, 154). Recognising dierent discourses—as articulated or
enacted by policy-makers and as advanced by analysts or activists—is impor-
tant because the threat agenda looks dierent in each and they’re based on
dierent sets of assumptions and commitments. But more importantly, recog-
nising that there are dierent discourses is crucial because they ultimately
encourage dierent sets of responses to the challenges we see in the
Anthropocene.
A dominant discourse of security—regarding climate change and more
broadly in international relations thought and practice—is national security.
Here, an issue like climate change becomes a security issue to the extent that
it threatens the sovereignty or territorial integrity of the state. Ultimately, and
with the possible exception of states whose territory is directly threatened by
rising sea levels, the threat of climate change is an indirect one: it is a problem
if it makes conict, instability or large-scale population displacement more
likely. And in managing this threat, the state needs to be self-reliant (it cannot
rely on others to advance its security or protect its interests), and the responses
are largely adaptive (see Busby 2008). In other words, rather than commit to
cooperative mitigation action to prevent climate change from happening or
minimise its severity, states will look to insulate themselves from the eects of
these implications. An illustration of this discourse ‘in action’ is provided in
Box 11.1 below.
M. McDonald
195
Students of international relations will here note that this discourse largely
aligns with Realist approaches to international relations. We see the same pri-
mary concern with the threat and use of force, the imperative of self-help,
scepticism about eective multilateral cooperation and a moral universe that
extends to fellow citizens but not beyond. As theorists working in the critical
security studies tradition have long noted, this approach to world politics
gives us few (if any) resources for eectively addressing what are genuinely
global or transnational security challenges (e.g. Burke et al. 2014; Booth
2007). And the emphasis on insulating the nation-state from challenges that
pose immediate, direct or existential threats to the most vulnerable is dicult
Box 11.1 National Security and Climate-Induced Displacement
Some accounts suggest that framing an issue like climate change as a ‘security’
threat might be a way of building attention and concern about the impacts of
the issue among conservative audiences and those unmoved by concerns about
vulnerable outsiders (see Corner 2013). But while raising concerns, it doesn’t nec-
essarily follow that the practices we will see in response to these issues will be
effective in addressing climate change. At their worst, as the example of national
security responses to ‘climate refugees’ suggests (Baldwin etal. 2014), we may
see victims of climate change presented as threats to the security of the
nation-state.
In 2003, the US Pentagon commissioned a report on the national security
implications of abrupt climate scenarios (Schwartz and Randall 2003). While
focusing predominantly on the USA, the report made the claim that a range of
states that were less likely to be immediately affected by climate change might
seek to initiate stronger border control measures to prevent those displaced by
climate change manifestations (e.g. rising sea levels or natural disasters) from
entering the state. Here, national security in the face of climate change could
apparently be achieved by physically preventing those most affected by it from
reaching and penetrating the state.
Is this an unimaginable response to those displaced by the manifestations of
climate change? FormerUS President Donald Trump’s commitment to stronger
border control measures (in the form of a wall at the border with Mexico) sug-
gests not. And by some accounts, we already see climate barriers on the
Bangladesh-Indian border, with Indian authorities looking to prevent an influx
of Bangladeshi citizens displaced by rising sea levels (see Banerjee 2010;
Chaturvedi and Doyle 2015, 122–6). And in countries such as Australia, where
asylum-seekers arriving by boat are already viewed as security threats and held
in detention centres for prolonged periods, and where a range of neighbouring
Pacific island communities are on the frontlines of climate-induced displace-
ment, a hard-line, border-security oriented response is all too easy to imagine. By
contrast, there’s little evidence of genuine commitment to climate mitigation
action in Australia, or Australia moving to curtail coal production and export. In
this instance, a security framing seems more likely to encourage policies of inter-
ception and detention than strong action to reduce emissions.
11 Protecting the Vulnerable: Towards an Ecological Approach…
196
to justify. It certainly does little to address the nature of security challenges in
the Anthropocene. Indeed, for some, this way of viewing and approaching the
world has been a crucial driver of the ecological crisis we now face (see
Gardiner 2014).
An obvious corrective to this discourse is an international security discourse:
one that recognises the transnational—even global—nature of the threat
posed by climate change. Here, climate change is seen as a potential threat to
regional and international instability, creating conditions in which large-scale
population movements, government fragility or collapse and ultimately con-
ict become more likely. International organisations have, in this context,
linked conict in Darfur and Syria to climate change (e.g. UNEP 2007),
while the UN Security Council has discussed the (international) security
implications of climate change in 2007, 2011, 2018, 2019 and 2020
(Maertens 2021).
While this threat agenda (instability and conict) bears some similarity to
the national security discourse, the focus is ultimately how these dynamics
come to threaten the norms and rules of an international society, whether one
dened by order or justice (see Bull 1995). And crucially, the range of means
and agents widens here. While adaptation still plays a role in responding to
the eects of climate change, this discourse suggests a role for mitigation as a
preventive response to climate change. is is evident in attempts to apply the
Responsibility to Protect principle to climate change through the
‘Responsibility to Prepare’, a commitment developed by the Center for
Climate and Security in the USA (See Werrell etal. 2017). e Responsibility
to Prepare still focuses substantially on ‘climate proong’ existing communi-
ties and institutions, but the recent move to dene the principle as the
‘Responsibility to Prepare and Prevent’alsoendorses a focus on prevention
(i.e. signicant mitigation action) (see Werrell and Femia 2019). ere is
also a role in this discourse for actors beyond states in providing security,
including (as indicated above) international organisations.
But this conceptualisation or approach is still not without its limitations.
For one, the threat is still largely indirect—rather than climate change consti-
tuting a threat in and of itself, it is often presented as problematic if triggering
instability or fragility. And while recognising climate change as a problem
shared across states, there is limited recognition here of the particular threat
posed to vulnerable populations and in particular other living beings or future
generations. Finally, if it is a problem when contributing to large-scale disrup-
tion, then is there a danger that the everyday violence of climate change (that
creates signicant harm but doesnt unseat leaders or trigger conict) will not
M. McDonald
197
be identied as problematic when viewed through the international secu-
rity lens?
An attempt to identify and respond to the direct threat of climate change
can be found in the human security discourse. Here, climate change is repre-
sented as an immediate and often existential threat to vulnerable human pop-
ulations, in terms of their lives and life prospects/livelihoods. eorists
pointing to the human security implications of climate change emphasise the
imperative of mitigation action as a means of responding to multiple sites and
experiences of vulnerability that cannot be eectively insulated from the
eects of climate change (see Matthew etal. eds2010; O’Brien 2006). In the
process, there is a suggestion here of a role for a wide range of actors not only
in reducing emissions but also in addressing the structural forces and inequali-
ties that dene vulnerability in the rst instance (i.e. poverty and
marginalisation).
is clearly constitutes a more progressive approach to the climate security
threat: one likely to identify climate change itself (not simply its ow-on
eects) as a problem, and likely to endorse strong mitigation action to address
the challenge at its source. is is an approach that has found increasing polit-
ical purchase, evident in UN Development Programme Reports (e.g. 2007)
and IPCC Assessments (e.g. 2014). Yet even here there are limitations, espe-
cially regarding the extent to which this approach suciently recognises the
particular vulnerability of other living beings and future generations. For
other living beings and future generations, their acute vulnerability is a prod-
uct not only of exposure to problems of climate change and limited capacity
to respond. It is also a product of an inability to directly inuence contempo-
rary decisions and actions that will have signicant implications for their life
prospects. At this fundamental level, a human security discourse still risks
endorsing a separation of human and nature that is precisely what needs to be
challenged in the context of the Anthropocene. Indeed, from the perspective
of the Anthropocene, the discourse of human security appears inherently
anthropocentric, while also concerned with a particularly narrow time frame
(focused on the present) in the context of a geological epoch.
In the above accounts of security in the context of climate change, then—
whether national, international or human security—we have core and crucial
limitations from the perspective of the Anthropocene. ese are limitations
that the Anthropocene concept simultaneously helps illuminate, while also
compelling us to respond to the problem of anthropocentrism and the prob-
lems of separation. e former, as Ra Youatt (2014, 210) has noted, neces-
sitates a ‘shift in human moral and political frameworks that orient our
relations with other species’, while the latter elides the reality of entanglement
11 Protecting the Vulnerable: Towards an Ecological Approach…
198
with and between these other living beings in the context of the Anthropocene
(see Hamilton 2017). Simply put, the Anthropocene points to the problem-
atic limitation of our moral universe to (currently living) humans alone, while
also illustrating the necessity of escaping the separation at the heart of the
traditional emphasis on protecting ourselves from (a violent and exter-
nal) nature.
Ecological Security: What Is It?
Recognising the limits of these discourses of security in the context of the
Anthropocene and the scale of the challenge posed by climate change in par-
ticular, I want to make a case here for ecological security. Ecological security
can be dened as a concern with the resilience of ecosystems themselves, espe-
cially in the face of ecological change (such as climate change). What consti-
tutes an ecosystem and what resilience means as an orientation and concern,
however, are both contestable and contested.
An ecosystem is understood here as a complex of organisms, their environ-
ment and their interactive relationship. It is composed of three elements:
1. e living beings in a given area that interact with each other;
2. e non-living parts of the physical environment (from atmosphere to
earth and water) that surround those beings; and
3. e relationships between these.
ese ecosystems have no denitive size and are overlapping: they can be as
large as a desert or as small as a pond. And a tree may be viewed as an ecosys-
tem in itself, or as part of a broader ecosystem (e.g. a forest). Ecosystem resil-
ience, meanwhile, refers to the capacity for ecosystems to continue to function
in the face of perturbation or change (see Adger et al. 2011). ‘Resilience’
here—as opposed to preservation or the maintenance of balance—involves
some degree of recognition of the inevitability of change. is is important in
the context of the Anthropocene and climate change in particular—dynamics
that point respectively to the force of ongoing human action on Earth systems
and to the reality of a changing climate, with some degree of climate change
now ‘locked in’ (see Christo 2013).
For some, the focus on ecosystems might be seen as problematic because
they are particularly broad and amorphous as a referent object of security (see
Fagan 2016). e complexity of ecosystem functions also poses challenges:
when it comes to climate change, for example, we cant say for sure just if, how
M. McDonald
199
or when dierent ecosystems will be irrevocably compromised by changing
temperatures or rainfall, for example (see Palmer 2011). Ultimately, we have
to—as the precautionary principle suggests—err on the side of caution. is
means, in the context of climate change, signicantly limiting the production
of greenhouse gas emissions. I’ll return to this point in a moment.
e lack of precision or specicity is clearly, then, a challenge for making
sense of what constitutes ecological security. Yet what constitutes ‘interna-
tional society’ or ‘humanity’ in the context of international or human security
is not a great deal clearer. And whether at the national, international or human
security level, we are still confronted with clear challenges about whether and
how to interpret what constitutes a threat and how to respond to it. e
endorsement of resilience is also somewhat controversial and contested (see
Chap. 10). Yet while critics of resilience suggest that it implies that responsi-
bility for managing threats are to be borne by those exposed to them (Schick
2011; Schlosberg 2013), or that it can enable business as usual for existing
practices and institutions (see Chandler 2014; Buxton and Hayes 2015), it is
also a concept that allows us to identify a goal in the face of ongoing change.
is is partly why it has such a strong tradition in ecological thought (see
Bourbeau 2018; Boas and Rothe 2015).
Ultimately, ecological security is best viewed as an orientation or sensibility,
rather than as a denitive or objective condition. ere will always be contes-
tation over whether ecosystem functionality is threatened or compromised by
climate change, how severely and in what form. e appropriate response,
then, is to encourage us—whether researchers or policy-makers—to orient
towards viewing an issue such as climate change through the lens of ecosystem
resilience as a way of encouraging progressive and eective responses to it.
is clearly involves a signicant cognitive shift. So why is it necessary?
Most fundamentally, a focus on ecosystems in the face of ecological change
allows us to prioritise the rights and needs of the most vulnerable: not only
those marginalised and impoverished communities directly exposed to mani-
festations of climate change in developing states, but also to future genera-
tions and other living beings. As noted, vulnerability here is dened as a
product of exposure; adaptive capacity; and capacity to input into existing
decision-making and practices (see Adger 2006). By this account, future gen-
erations and other living beings are particularly vulnerable to the eects of
climate change, and a focus on ecosystem resilience is here viewed as the best
means of addressing this vulnerability. If ecosystems continue to function,
then the well-being of other living beings and future generations is ensured
through limiting the rst dimension of vulnerability noted above: exposure.
11 Protecting the Vulnerable: Towards an Ecological Approach…
200
In the ecological security discourse, the central threat posed by climate
change is a direct one: to the functionality of ecosystems themselves. Viewed
in this light, climate change is less a ‘threat multiplier’ (that might ultimately
trigger conict) than a threat in and of itself. is in turn necessitates a direct
response to it, one that addresses the issue of exposure to climate change
noted above. Ultimately, it suggests a central role for mitigation: action ori-
ented towards signicantly reducing greenhouse gas emissions to ensure the
degree and severity of climate change is minimised. e centrality of this
response to climate change in the ecological security discourse is discussed in
Box 11.2. It is important to note that adaptation and even potentially contro-
versial projects, such as geoengineering through carbon dioxide removal or
solar radiation management, may also be viewed as a means of providing
ecological security (see Dalby 2015; Symons 2019). is is particularly the
case given that global emissions continue to rise and some degree of climate
change is now inevitable. But these approaches—to managing the eects of
climate change or intervening through technological intervention to sever an
otherwise natural feedback loop—should remain secondary to addressing the
problem at its source.
Box 11.2 Mitigation and Ecological Security
It is hard to reject a role for adaptation to manifestations of climate change,
especially now some degree of climate change is already locked in. But from the
perspective of an ecological security discourse, it is imperative to focus on miti-
gation for two central reasons. First, the focus in this approach is on the threat
of climate change itself. This might seem circular: what else would the threat be?
But it is striking that in the national security discourse, climate change isn’t actu-
ally the central problem: it is the indirect and follow-on effects of climate change
that matter. Here, as noted, adaptive measures like border controls or military
preparedness might be the central means of ensuring (national) security in the
face of the indirect consequences of climate change. By contrast, when we focus
on the direct implications of climate change, we need to emphasise mitigation
as the central means of addressing the threat itself head-on. In this case, that
involves minimising the extent and severity of climate change by (significantly)
reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
The second consideration that encourages an overwhelming focus on mitiga-
tion is that the focus on ecosystems is viewed as the best means of addressing the
rights and needs of the most vulnerable. To reiterate, these are those beings
most directly exposed to the effects of climate change, least able to adapt to it,
and least able to input into decision-making that contributes to or addresses
climate change. When these beings are central to our consideration, the focus of
our response must shift to significantly minimising or at best avoiding any effect
of climate change, bearing in mind that these effects are most likely to directly
threaten the most vulnerable.
M. McDonald
201
Of course, all the above raises questions about the agents of ecological secu-
rity: who provides security in this discourse? is is particularly important
here, given that ecosystems dont have a specic identity or form, and those
most exposed to the eects of ecological insecurity are almost by denition
those with the least capacity or resources to address the causes of that insecu-
rity. Here, and drawing on distributive justice concerns with equity (see Caney
2005; Shue 2014, 2017), responsibility for addressing the security implica-
tions of climate change for ecosystems is determined by capacity. is is
dened in two terms: the ability to knowingly contribute to climate harms,
and the ability to consciously engage in practices to address the problem itself.
e degree of responsibility, then, is determined ultimately by how much a
particular actor contributes to the problem of climate change and how able
they are to address it.
Clearly, even with recognition of varied levels of responsibility determined
by capacity, this is a broad denition of agency. It extends feasibly from our
individual choices and actions to a role for private companies (especially fossil
fuel companies), international organisations and states. All bear (some degree
of) responsibility for addressing the threat posed by climate change, in par-
ticular through pursuing urgent mitigation action. While there is much about
the ecological security discourse that is challenging for the way we think about
security, the absence of a clear constituency or agent is often identied as cen-
tral to the obstacles facing such a reorientation (see Barnett 2001). But if
ecological security encourages ethically defensible practices oriented towards
the rights and needs of the most vulnerable, then the question should argu-
ably be not how do we work with existing institutions, but rather how can we
create a constituency, institutions and practices to help advance or realise it in
practice? at’s the focus of the remainder of this chapter.
Towards Ecological Security: How Do
WeGet There?
If the key objection to ecological security as a framework through which we
might view and approach an issue like climate change in the Anthropocene is
that it resembles a Utopian enterprise, then it is important to be clear about
substantive possibilities for its articulation and even institutionalisation.
Under what circumstances, if any, is ecological security likely to nd purchase?
Clearly, there are profound obstacles. Among other things, we might point
to the institutional framework of the state system that militates against action
oriented towards global concerns; the limits of existing ethical frameworks
11 Protecting the Vulnerable: Towards an Ecological Approach…
202
that encourage us to focus on obligations to fellow citizens or even members
of our own family; modes of economic exchange/political economy that gen-
erally value extraction and exploitation for short-term gain; cultural practices
(eating red meat or driving large cars) that encourage destructive behaviour;
or the challenges of genuinely knowing either the needs or interests of the
most vulnerable or the precise points at which ecosystem functionality is (irre-
vocably) compromised (on these points, see Gardiner 2011). And from the
perspective of ‘security’, the dominant discourse of security we usually work
with—the orientation towards the territorial preservation of the nation-state
from (usually external) military threat—is wholly inconsistent with an
approach to security emphasising the extension of ethical responsibility across
space (marginalised and impoverished populations in the developing world),
time (future generations) and species (other living beings).
Yet we see principles consistent with this already articulated and endorsed in
existing normative frameworks and even evident in existing forms of practice.
Critical theorists refer to these as ‘immanent’ possibilities: possibilities for prog-
ress that exist within a particular order (see Linklater 1998). e precautionary
principle, for example—part of the ‘Rio Declaration’ at the 1992 Earth Summit
(UNCED)—endorses the idea that ‘lack of full scientic certainty shall not be
used as a reason for postponing cost-eective measures to prevent environmen-
tal degradation’. e concept of ‘common but dierentiated responsibility’, also
endorsed at UNCED as part of the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), recognises universal obligation to act but indicates that
states have dierent obligations that should be calculated ‘on the basis of equity
and in accordance with their common but dierentiated responsibilities and
respective capabilities’. And the concept of the Anthropocene itself has emerged
as a compelling reason to revisit the notion of a separation between humanity
and nature, in the process encouraging us to orient towards recognising our
embeddedness in the natural world. In dierent ways, these dierent norms,
principles and concepts all endorse key elements of the ecological security dis-
course: the imperative to act in the face of uncertainty; the idea of responsibility
based on capability; and the imperative of moving beyond a separation between
nature and humanity. ese are principles that can potentially be built upon.
We can also see evidence of ecological security in practice. A range of
NGOs and civil society groups actively endorse principles of ecological secu-
rity, including most recently the Extinction Rebellion movement, discussed in
Box 11.3. In negotiations for the most recent climate agreement in Paris in
2015, meanwhile, recognition of particular vulnerabilities of—and obliga-
tions to—communities of developing countries at the front line of climate
change was prominently invoked in the push to limit warming to 1.5°C, and
in recognition of ‘loss and damage’, for example (see Falkner 2016).
M. McDonald
203
Of course, all this might not take us far enough. If a genuine orientation
towards ecosystem resilience and the rights and needs of the most vulnerable
is to be realised, with an associated urgency in response to the ecological crisis
we are facing, then we arguably need to do more than locate possibilities
within the existing order and within new institutions. Indeed, Eva Lövbrand
and colleagues (Lövbrand etal. 2015, 214) refer to this tendency as a ‘post-
political ontology of the Anthropocene’; one in which we try to locate solu-
tions to unprecedented ecological challenges within existing institutions and
sites of policy. For them, we might need to move beyond a discussion of how
we might build on existing norms or ‘green’ the state (see Eckersley 2004): we
might need to imagine radically alternative institutional arrangements and
practices that arent presently evident in existing sites of policy. is was argu-
ably at the heart too of Burke etal.’s (2016) ‘Planet Politics Manifesto’, which
inverted the conversation about the way institutions of international relations
might manage the ecological crisis to one which began with the ecological
crisis and asked which institutions and practices were needed to address it.
is is—in practical terms—more of a challenge for advocates of an ecologi-
cal security discourse. But rather than attempt to outline what institutional
frameworks or practices should look like specically, the suggestion here is
that approaching the Anthropocene era and the issue of climate change
through the lens of ecological security will provide a sensibility that will in
turn inform the types of institutional arrangements and practices that are
needed. Here, I suggest the need to begin with rst principles—tempered
with a commitment to reexivity, humility and dialogue (see McDonald
2018)—and allow these to guide shifts in existing institutions and practice.
Box 11.3 Extinction Rebellion and Ecological Security
Of a range of movements and organisations that endorse principles consistent
with ecological security, the Extinction Rebellion movement is one that has done
so perhaps most explicitly and directly. Emerging in the UK in 2018, its members
called originally for recognition of an ‘ecological emergency’, urgent actions to
‘halt biodiversity loss’, and outlined a vision of change focused on ‘creating a
world that is fit for generations to come’ (BBC 2019; Extinction Rebellion 2019).
Since then, it has rapidly grown into an international movement, with major
protests not only in the UK in 2018 and 2019 but also in the USA, Germany,
Australia, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain and Switzerland. While it remains a
small movement in international terms, and one concentrated in developed
states, its rapid growth in members and international scope suggests it speaks to
growing global concerns consistent with the sentiments of ecological security.
11 Protecting the Vulnerable: Towards an Ecological Approach…
204
Conclusion
e apparent arrival of the Anthropocene era clearly raises profound and chal-
lenging questions, not least around the nature of humanity’s relationship with
the natural world. So often separated—in modern thought, in policy and in
practice—we need to nd ways to recognise our embeddedness within the
natural world rather than continue to work with problematic assumptions of
the possibility of distinction from it. is will be at the heart of a progressive
politics of the Anthropocene, as Lövbrand etal. (2015) note.
When it comes to security, as noted at the outset, it is not only possible to
include questions of security in a discussion of responses to the Anthropocene
or the ecological crisis. It is also essential because the promise of providing
security is central to the political legitimacy of key actors in the international
system—most notably states—and the ‘high politics’ space security consider-
ations command needs to extend to urgent and global challenges that cannot
be addressed through unilateral action alone. e case for ecological security
noted here was presented as a means of addressing these challenges, and in the
process extending our ethical register beyond fellow citizens and towards the
most vulnerable over time, space and species. While facing signicant chal-
lenges to its embrace and institutionalisation as a framework for viewing secu-
rity in the Anthropocene era, ideas consistent with this approach can already
be discerned in existing principles, concepts, institutions and practices. And
perhaps more importantly, we cannot allow dominant conceptions and prac-
tices of IR to determine the limits of how we respond to a genuine existen-
tial crisis.
Key Points
1. In the context of the Anthropocene and the scale of the ecological crisis, it
is hard to defend an approach to security that focuses on the preservation
of self-contained political communities, and that separates humanity
from nature.
2. ere is signicant debate over the desirability of a ‘security’ framing, but
it is possible to view the politics of security (the question of what security
does) as being contingent on the way security itself is understood.
3. If we are interested in fundamentally addressing the origins of the ecologi-
cal crisis, then we need to focus on what renders ecosystems them-
selves insecure.
M. McDonald
205
4. A focus on the resilience of ecosystems provides the best means of address-
ing the rights and needs of the most vulnerable: impoverished and mar-
ginal human populations; other living beings; and future generations.
5. Realising and advancing ecological security in practice is challenging for a
range of reasons, but we can identify principles and practices associated
with this approach in a range of contemporary contexts.
Key Questions
1. Why should we approach the Anthropocene through the lens of ‘security’?
Is it helpful? Is it politically important?
2. Can ‘security’ feasibly be dened in terms of the resilience of ecosystems?
3. Would conceiving and approaching security as ecological security be a
good thing? Would it encourage environmental stewardship or the milita-
risation of the environment?
4. How optimistic are you that security might come to be viewed and
approached through the lens of ecosystem resilience? What are the key
impediments and possibilities?
5. Are those concerned about issues like climate change better served focus-
ing on the threat posed to currently existing (and vulnerable) human
communities?
Further Reading
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Dalby, S. 2020. Anthropocene Geopolitics. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press.
Eroukhmano, C. and Harker, M. (eds) 2017. Reections on the Posthuman in
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Harrington, C. and Shearing, C. 2017. Security in the Anthropocene. Bielefeld:
Transcript.
McDonald, M. 2018. Climate Change and Security: Towards an Ecological Security
Discourse?International eory10(2): 153–80.
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M. McDonald
Preprint
By comprehensively analyzing the discourse of UNSC open debates from 2007 to 2023, the study delves into the complexities of arriving at a unified Global South front on climate security. Two key questions are addressed here: to what extent do states acknowledge climate change as a security concern and how willing are states to support the UNSC’s mandate regarding the same. The article is arranged into five sections: first, a literature review on the Global North-South dichotomy; second, a conceptualization of the term ‘Global South’; third, a description of the methodology using Maarten Hajer’s argumentative discourse analysis and a new and broader definition to the idea of the ‘Global South’, fourth, primary findings with regard to the evolving stance of Global South nations, and fifth, a conclusion summarizing the implications for global climate governance.
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Since 2007, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has debated the security implications of climate change on several occasions. This article addresses these debates by exploring two interrelated questions: What drives the continuous efforts to place climate change on the UNSC’s agenda and to what extent do the UNSC’s debates illustrate an ongoing process of climatization? To answer these, the article draws on the concept of climatization, which captures the process through which domains of international politics are framed through a climate lens and transformed as a result of this translation. It suggests that climate change has become a dominant framing and an inescapable topic of international relations and that the UNSC debates follow a logic of expansion of climate politics by securing a steady climate agenda, attributing responsibility to the Council in the climate crisis, involving climate actors and advocating for climate-oriented policies to maintain international security.
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Climate change is increasingly characterized as a security issue. Yet we see nothing approaching consensus about the nature of the climate change–security relationship. Indeed existing depictions in policy statements and academic debate illustrate radically different conceptions of the nature of the threat posed, to whom and what constitute appropriate policy responses. These different climate security discourses encourage practices as varied as national adaptation and globally oriented mitigation action. Given the increasing prominence of climate security representations and the different implications of these discourses, it is important to consider whether we can identify progressive discourses of climate security: approaches to this relationship underpinned by defensible ethical assumptions and encouraging effective responses to climate change. Here I make a case for an ecological security discourse. Such a discourse orients towards ecosystem resilience and the rights and needs of the most vulnerable across space (populations of developing worlds), time (future generations), and species (other living beings). This paper points to the limits of existing accounts of climate security before outlining the contours of an ‘ecological security discourse’ regarding climate change. It concludes by reflecting on the challenges and opportunities for such discourse in genuinely informing how political communities approach the climate change–security relationship.
Book
Cambridge Core - Political Sociology - On Resilience - by Philippe Bourbeau