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A Financial Frontier Model with Bankers’ Susceptibility under Uncertainty
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Abstract
This article aims to refine the Post Keynesian long run financial frontier models under an intermediate run called the ‘implementation period,’ the time horizon to finance and implement long run strategic plans. During this period, the availability of debt finance is crucial to bridge the time gap before future free cash flows validate the investment. Therefore, firms’ long run investment plans may be modified or suspended during this time horizon subject to bankers’ uncertainty perception and state of confidence, which constrain debt capacity and firms’ investment decisions. Uncertainty and the measures to enhance confidence, such as banking convention, mimetic behaviours, and bankers’ spontaneous optimism, are critical to determining the financial frontier because they affect the lending amount, tenor, and refinancing potential. The proposed model focusing on bankers’ convention and susceptibility explains the volatile nature of the financial frontier, investment instability, downward sloping effective loan supply and credit rationing under new perspectives.
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This paper conducts an empirical analysis of the financial instability hypothesis on Dutch data. The main literature on this topic has been reviewed, and various financial fragility indexes to determine whether Dutch firms are in a hedge, speculative, or Ponzi regime are discussed. To do empirical analysis, 340 publicly-listed private Dutch firms from various industries were selected, and these panel data include observations from 2005 to 2019. This period includes three cases of falling GDP of the Netherlands: 2008–2009, 2011, and 2014. We use for our empirical analysis three financial fragility indexes. After identifying the regime of firms according to these criteria, we chose an index developed by Nishi to make a logistic regression. We use the Nishi approach to determine what affects a firm’s probabilities of becoming a Ponzi and thereby confirm Minsky’s hypothesis on Dutch data. According to our analysis, significant factors of the probability that Dutch private non-financial companies will be a Ponzi firm are profitability, interest rate, industry output, and crisis. Both accumulation of financial fragility due to “destabilizing stability” and austerity policy were reasons for economic crises in the Netherlands in the last decades.
When it comes to investment expectations, entrepreneurs rely on their gut feelings, aka “animal spirits.” And yet, in most models, animal spirits are seen as “black box” irrationality that would cause random shocks. The purpose of this paper is to open this black box in order to comprehend how animal spirits work. First, we draw on Keynes’s texts and insights from psychology and neuroscience so as to elaborate a theoretical model of animal spirits. It seems they estimate prospective yields in an analogical and emotional fashion. Second, we implement a field study (presumably the first of its kind) in the context of a very realistic business game simulation in order to assess the animal spirits of would-be entrepreneurs and see whether they weigh more in investment expectations than the real factors so far outlined by the literature (profits, debt, the rate of capacity utilization, etc.). We find that emotions play a prominent role in investment decisions and that some of them enable entrepreneurs to cope with radical uncertainty.
Many philosophers argue that Keynes's concept of the "weight of arguments" is an important aspect of argument appraisal. The weight of an argument is the quantity of relevant evidence cited in the premises. However, this dimension of argumentation does not have a received method for formalisation. Kyburg has suggested a measure of weight that uses the degree of imprecision in his system of "Evidential Probability" to quantify weight. I develop and defend this approach to measuring weight. I illustrate the usefulness of this measure by employing it to develop an answer to Popper's Paradox of Ideal Evidence.
ABSTRACT Money is at the center of macroeconomics, which makes understanding the money supply central for macroeconomic theory. This paper presents the Post Keynesian theory of endogenous money supply and shows how it is fundamentally different from the conventional money supply theory. The conventional approach relies on the money multiplier and bank lending is invisible. Post Keynesian theory discards the money multiplier and focuses on bank lending which drives money creation. The paper emphasizes the structuralist version of Post Keynesian theory which retains Keynes’ liquidity preference theory of long term interest rates and also recognizes banks are subject to financial constraints that limit their lending activities. The paper then shows how to derive the LM schedule in an endogenous money economy, which is a necessary prelude to reconstructing the ISLM model.
Financialization is studied here from a microeconomic viewpoint. Following Stockhammer (2004a), the theory of the firm has been amended by introducing agency problems and class analysis between shareholders and managers. Further to that, I propose two alternative configurations for incorporation into the theory: the first views financialization as a constraint for the managerial firm, while the second discusses shareholders’ interests and integrates them as an end in itself for the finance-dominated firm. My conclusions focus on finance-oppressed accumulation, financial fragility, and potential macroeconomic instability.
JEL classification: D21, E12, G30
This paper examines Keynes's treatment of financial conventions, focusing on the stock exchange. It shows that Keynes's approach was unclear but insightful. Some elements are combined here to clarify his implicit concept, which incorporated features of a general concept (social sharing, conformity with the conformity of others, and arbitrariness) with specific characteristics in financial contexts. The paper identifies a peculiar sense in which the speculator is unconventional. It contrasts the potentially short duration of Keynes's financial convention with the widespread idea that informal institutions change very slowly. Finally, it discusses the relation between convention, self-interest, and decision-theoretic and social norms.
Typically, modern economics has steered away from the analysis of sociological and psychological factors and has focused on narrow behavioural assumptions in which expectations are formed on the basis of mathematical algorithms. Blending together ideas from the social and behavioural sciences, this paper argues that the behavioural approach adopted in most economic analysis, in its neglect of sociological and psychological forces and its simplistically dichotomous categorization of behaviour as either rational or not rational, is too narrow and stark. Behaviour may reflect an interaction of cognitive and emotional factors and this can be captured more effectively using an approach that focuses on the interplay of different decision-making systems. In understanding the mechanisms affecting economic and financial decision-making, an interdisciplinary approach is needed which incorporates ideas from a range of disciplines including sociology, economic psychology, evolutionary biology and neuroeconomics.
This paper explores the differences between the investment theories of Michal Kalecki and John Maynard Keynes. We argue that Kalecki's ideas (and empirical support for them) are necessary for Keynes's arguments regarding the determination of the level of effective demand. Kalecki's theory of the role of finance in investment also provides a fuller understanding of the importance of liquidity concerns for Keynesian theory and connects the theory of effective demand to the logic of capitalism.
The paper argues that, even in the absence of bureaucratic inertia, the transition from one convention to a superior one can be blocked. Because of the self-reinforcing mechanism generated by coordination effects, the economy can be locked-in to a Pareto-inferior convention. In the framework of evolutionary game theory, convention appears to be an evolutionary stable strategy. We show that the endogenous diffusion of a superior convention is possible but requires the presence of some social or cultural differentiation in order that coordination effects can be localized. The social or cultural links provide no information about the structure of the game, but help people to coordinate themselves by providing external points of reference. We construct a model where matching between agents respects a certain localization of interactions related to social or cultural similarity. These results are used to enlighten the surprising success of Japanese labor management in U.S. and U.K. transplants.
Over the past decades, the financial investment of non-financial businesses has been rising, and the accumulation of capital goods has been declining. The first part of the paper offers a novel theory to explain this phenomenon. Financialisation, the shareholder revolution and the development of a market for corporate control have shifted power to shareholders and thus changed management priorities, leading to a reduction in the desired growth rate. In the second part, the link between accumulation and financialisation is tested econometrically by means of a time series analysis of aggregate business investment for the USA, the UK, France and Germany. Extensive tests of robustness are performed. For the first three countries, evidence supporting the negative effect of financialisation on accumulation is found. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.
A Post Keynesian macromodel of capacity utilization and economic growth is developed in which the supply of credit-money by the banking system is endogenous, and firms' financial fragility is explicitly modeled. Both the influence of interest rate and indebtedness on capacity utilization and the rates of profit and economic growth, on the one hand, and the effect of the parameters of the saving and investment functions on firms' financial fragility, on the other hand, are carefully analyzed.
Shareholders have increased their ability to influence management decisions significantly over the past two decades. This paper proposes an extension of the Post Keynesian theory of the firm proposed by Lavoie (1992) to analyze the effects of this change in shareholder power on investment decisions. This microeconomic analysis is complemented by a Kaleckian macroeconomic model. Shareholder power is found to reduce investment and output, while increasing profits, which is consistent with the stylized facts of the neoliberal era.
According to basic economics, if demand exceeds supply, prices will rise, thus decreasing demand or increasing supply until demand and supply are in equilibrium; thus if prices do their job, rationing will not exist. However, credit rationing does exist. This paper demonstrates that even in equilibrium, credit rationing will exist in a loan market. Credit rationing is defined as occurring either (a) among loan applicants who appear identical, and some do and do not receive loans, even though the rejected applicants would pay higher interest rates; or (b) there are groups who, with a given credit supply, cannot obtain loans at any rate, even though with larger credit supply they would. A model is developed to provide the first theoretical justification for true credit rationing. The amount of the loan and the amount of collateral demanded affect the behavior and distribution of borrowers. Consequently, faced with increased credit demand, it may not be profitable to raise interest rates or collateral; instead banks deny loans to borrowers who are observationally indistinguishable from those receiving loans. It is not argued that credit rationing always occurs, but that it occurs under plausible assumptions about lender and borrower behavior. In the model, interest rates serve as screening devices for evaluating risk. Interest rates change the behavior (serve as incentive mechanism) for the borrower, increasing the relative attractiveness of riskier projects; banks ration credit, rather than increase rates when there is excess demand. Banks are shown not to increase collateral as a means of allocating credit; although collateral may have incentivizing effects, it may have adverse selection effects. Equity, nonlinear payment schedules, and contingency contracts may be introduced and yet there still may be rationing. The law of supply and demand is thus a result generated by specific assumptions and is model specific; credit rationing does exist. (TNM)
This study presents an empirical analysis to detect Minsky’s financial fragility and its determinants in non-financial sectors in Japan, with particular attention on the differences between sectors and size. While post-Keynesian developed theoretical analyses of financial fragility for economic growth models, its empirical application is limited. Based on the financial fragility indices derived from a cash-flow accounting framework and Minsky’s margins of safety, I detect the overall configuration and evolution of financial fragility (hedge, speculative and Ponzi) in Japan. Then, I detect the factors that determine the probability of being Ponzi finance using a panel logistic regression. The results show that although speculative finance dominates many sector and size categories, the evolution of hedge and Ponzi finance is diversified and the determinants of financial fragility differ by category in Japan.
The high level of profits along with low levels of gross physical investment has been characterized as a puzzle in heterodox economics. One of the most extended answers at the firm level is that changes in corporate governance have altered the objectives of the firm toward profits, rather than growth. However, once it is acknowledged that investment becomes the basis upon which companies supply commodities as well as compete with other firms, an ever decreasing rate of investment should not be compatible with permanent high levels of profits. This is what we call the ‘supply-side’ face of the investment-profit puzzle. The article builds on the post-Keynesian theory of the firm and its investment decision and explores different answers already linked to the financialisation literature such as changes brought about by production outsourcing, increased market power, the attack on labor conditions and financial accumulation. Once these solutions are critically assessed, an extension to the theory is proposed in order to show that firm’s profitability has been detaching from its physical investment decisions.
One aspect in which non‐financial corporations (NFCs) are said to be financialized is that they have been increasingly engaged in financial accumulation from which they derive a growing proportion of financial income. This is what we call the financial turn of accumulation hypothesis. In this article, we show that the evidence used to sustain it, in the U.S. setting, has to be reconsidered. Our findings show that, contrary to the financial turn of accumulation hypothesis, financial income averages 2.5% of NFCs’ total income since the 1980s, oscillating since the beginnings of the 1990s until 2005 and then declining. In terms of assets, some of the alleged financial assets might actually reflect other activities in which NFCs have been increasingly engaged, such as tax avoidance, internationalization of production, activities refocusing and M&As.
In his General Theory, Keynes implicitly defines liquidity as stability of value with respect to changes in the state of long-term expectation. This contrasts with the usual conception of liquidity as convertibility and with leading Post-Keynesian interpretations. The proposed definition explains why Keynes places so much emphasis on liquidity, while assuming perfect markets for capital goods, and writes of the liquidity of land. It also sheds new light on the distinction Keynes makes between the liquidity of money and the 'liquidity' of organised investment markets. © The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Cambridge Political Economy Society. All rights reserved.
An expanding literature analyses the implications of the post‐1980 expansion of finance in advanced economies – a process summarized as ‘financialization’ – for capital accumulation. This paper surveys the empirical literature on financialization and investment to take stock of where we are and to identify questions for further research. Because ‘financialization’ is widely recognized to be ambiguously defined, I first introduce empirical indicators of financialization in this literature. This categorization elucidates three approaches to measuring financialization in the context of investment. The first two approaches emphasize rising income flows between nonfinancial corporations (NFCs) and finance: first, growth in NFCs’ financial incomes and, second, growth in NFCs’ payments to creditors and shareholders. Rising financial profits are, notably, widely used to suggest financial assets and incomes ‘crowd out’ physical investment. I contend that these flow‐based indicators of financialization capture important relationships between changes in firm financial behaviour and investment, but also raise questions about determinants underlying NFCs’ changing portfolio and financing decisions. The third approach to defining financialization emphasizes the best‐developed behavioural explanation linking financialization to reduced investment: shareholder value orientation. In future research, scope remains for further attention to behavioural drivers of the empirical trends summarizing financialization.
Preface - Abbreviations - Introduction - PART 1 KEYNES'S PHILOSOPHY - Some Philosophical Background - Theoretical Reason and Logic - Types of Probability and their Measurement - The Concept of the Weight of Argument - Epistemology - Practical Reason and Ethics - Philosophy after 1921 - PART 2 KEYNES'S ECONOMICS AND POLITICS - Philosophy and Economics: Some General Connections - Mathematics and Economics - Epistemology and Economics - The General Theory I: The Dye of Expectations - The General Theory II: Behaviour and Rationality - Political Philosophy 1 - Political Philosophy II - A Middle Way - Conclusion - Bibliography - Index
The book is a considerably extended and fully revamped edition of the highly successful and frequently cited Foundations of Post-Keynesian Economic Analysis, published in 1992. It provides an exhaustive account of post-Keynesian economics and of the developments that have occurred in post-Keynesian theory and in the world economy over the last twenty years. Topics covered include open-economy issues, the methodological foundations of heterodox economics, consumer theory, firms and pricing, money and credit, effective demand and employment, inflation theory, and growth theories.
The main conclusion of Myron Gordon's essay is that all five of the core propositions of neoclassical investment theory he identifies are "false," a conclusion that raises a fascinating question: How can an economic theory based on universally false propositions dominate the economics profession? The simplest and most compelling answer is ideological in character. Neoclassical theory is the concrete theoretical embodiment of a powerful, overarching "pre-analytic Vision" (to use Schumpeter's tenn) of capitalism as an economic way of life-a metatheoretical, intuitive grasp of the essential properties of an unregulated capitalist system that is overwhelmingly supportive of it. As such, it must be a theory of how markets efficiently coordinate the decisions of atomized agents, creating coherence and optimality where chaos might otherwise have been. Neoclassical investment theory has adopted the particular assumptions Gordon criticized because they are necessary for the construction of a theory of investment that can sustain the systemwide stability and optimality properties that are the hallmark of the neoclassical worldview.1 In the remainder of this essay I discuss the relation between three core neoclassical assumptions and the Vision-sustaining properties of neo
This paper develops a microlevel model of the banking firm rooted in Keynes's insights as a microfoundation for post Keynesian theory. This model substantiates Keynes's claims that banks' functions of liquidity supply and credit creation are interdependent and that the banking system is a crucial determinant of the level of economic activity. The essential feature of this model is the explicit incorporation of "real time." By contrast, in a standard bank model which ignores real time, the bank's functions are independent, and bank behavior is not a determinant of the level of economic activity. A number of post Keynesian theorists have given considerable attention to the macroeconomic aspects of banking; however, analysis of microlevel bank behavior has been relegated to intuitive comments. A case in point is Minsky's work on the financial fragility hypothesis
In this paper the differences between the principle of effective demand of Keynes and Kalecki are analyzed, focusing on Kalecki's less well known version. The paper considers, in the first place, the theory of prices and the theory of distribution. Then it deals with the theory of investment, and finally it studies money and finance in the principle of effective demand. The author concludes that it would be difficult to disregard the importance of Kalecki's theory of the profit share based on the pricing policy of firms, and of the profit level based on capitalist expenditure. A host of empirical research showing that investment is determined by past profits and is conditionally stable has also, in the authors' opinion, vindicated Kalecki's theory of investment. But, on the other hand, the study of the financial aspects of capitalism is an area where Kalecki's theory needs to be completed and updated.
Over the past fifty years interest rate spreads have widened substantially, both between longer and shorter maturity loans and between loans to riskier and less risky borrowers. In much of economic theory, the determination of interest rate spreads is analytically distinct from the determination of the overall level of interest rates. But from a Keynesian perspective that regards interest as fundamentally the price of liquidity, there is no conceptual basis for picking out the difference in yield between money and a short-term government bond as "the" interest rate; there are many other pairs of asset yields the difference between which is determined on the same principles, and may have equivalent economic significance. In this article, we argue that this Keynesian perspective is particularly useful in explaining the secular rise in interest rate spreads since the 1980s, and that both conventional expectations and stronger liquidity preference appear to have played a role. The rise in the term and credit premiums is important for policy, because they mean that the low policy rates in recent periods of expansionary policy have not been reliably translated into low rates for private borrowers.
We review recent attempts to integrate 'financialisation' processes into Post-Keynesian distri-bution and growth models and distinguish three principal channels of influence: 1. objectives and finance restrictions of firms, 2. new opportunities for households' wealth-based and debt-financed consumption, and 3. distribution between capital and labour, on the one hand, and between management and workers on the other hand. Starting from a re-interpretation of the Post-Keynesian theory of the firm we bridge the gap between micro-and macro-analysis of 'financialisation' and we trace the main characteristics and effects of 'financialisation' from the micro to the macro level taking into account stock-flow interactions. Our review of the theoretical literature on 'financialisation' shows that expansive effects may arise under certain conditions, in particular when there are strong wealth effects in firms' investment decisions (via Tobin's q) and in households' consumption decisions. However, our review also suggests that even an expansive finance-led economy may build up major financial imbalances, i.e. increasing debt-capital or debt-income ratios, which make such economies prone to financial instability.
We develop a model of portfolio choice to nest the views of Keynes, who advocates concentration in a few familiar assets, and Markowitz, who advocates diversification. We use the concepts of ambiguity and ambiguity aversion to formalize the idea of an investor's “familiarity” toward assets. The model shows that for any given level of expected returns, the optimal portfolio depends on two quantities: relative ambiguity across assets and the standard deviation of the expected return estimate for each asset. If both quantities are low, then the optimal portfolio consists of a mix of familiar and unfamiliar assets; moreover, an increase in correlation between assets causes an investor to increase concentration in familiar assets (flight to familiarity). Alternatively, if both quantities are high, then the optimal portfolio contains only the familiar asset(s), as Keynes would have advocated. In the extreme case in which both quantities are very high, no risky asset is held (nonparticipation).
This paper was accepted by Brad Barber, Teck Ho, and Terrance Odean, special issue editors.
Abstract This paper addresses the problem of the conceptualization of social structure and its relationship to human agency in economic sociology. The background is provided by John Maynard Keynes's writings on uncertainty and conventional behavior on the stock market, and the analysis consists of a comparison of the social ontologies of the French Intersubjectivist School and the Economics as Social Theory Project in the light of these observations. The theoretical argument is illustrated with concrete examples from a prominent study of the stock market boom of the 1990s.
Starting from potential Harrodian instability in the Kaleckian distribution and growth model we survey Kaleckian reactions put forward to avoid or to cope with this instability. We show that, contrary to the position taken by the critics of the Kaleckian model, this model is capable of maintaining an endogenous rate of capacity utilization, the paradox of thrift and the paradox of costs in the long run, even if the problem of Harrodian instability arises. We conclude that Kaleckian models are more flexible than their Harrodian and Marxian critics suppose when attacking the simple textbook version.
This paper is concerned with drawing on both psychology and economics in order to amplify the psychological content of Minskys account of the behaviour which leads up to financial turmoil, and market responses to it. In exploring recent developments in behavioural finance, the author finds that a crucial element is given inadequate attention: the motivation for action under uncertainty. Yet earlier traditions in economic thought (notably the Scottish Enlightenment thought) incorporated the role of psychological motivation under uncertainty. One can see this emerging again in Keyness analysis of financial behaviour, and again in Minskys financial instability hypothesis. The methodological features of their economic analysis are explored which allow this crucial psychological input to be present, focusing in particular on the role and meaning of rationality.
This article argues that the problem of uncertainty represents the central limitation of efficiency-based approaches to the explanation and prediction of economic outcomes. The problem of uncertainty reintroduces the Hobbesian problem of order into economics and makes it possible to connect questions of economic decision-making with social theory. The emphasis lies not, as in the behavioral theories of the Carnegie School, in the influence of uncertainty on the actual decision process, but in those social devices that actors rely on in decision-making, i.e., that structure the situation for the agents. If agents cannot anticipate the benefits of an investment, optimizing decisions become impossible, and the question opens up how intentionally rational actors reach decisions under this condition of uncertainty. This provides a systematic starting point for economic sociology. Studies in economic sociology that argue from different theoretical perspectives point to the significance of uncertainty and goal ambiguity. This contribution reflects theoretically why economic sociology can develop a promising approach by building upon these insights. It becomes understandable why culture, power, institutions, social structures, and cognitive processes are important in modern market economies. But it should be equally emphasized that the maximizing paradigm in economics will not be dethroned without a causal theory of the relationship of intentional rationality and social rigidities.
The present essay has focused on specularity as a type of intersubjectivitywithin self-referential systems. We have stressed the self-organizationaldimension of specular processes, which lead to the emergenceof collective objects around which the group structures itself. Rationalbubbles, sunspots, and conventions provided us with examples of thiskind of self-organization within self-referential groups. It seems thatwe have here a theoretical schema that can account for numeroussocial institutions. Such is the case with money, which the overlappinggenerations model shows to belong to the same problematic. We haveobserved that individual and collective representations play an essentialrole in the definition of specular dynamics. In fact, giving thecollectivity a means of interpreting and understanding the natural andsocial environment is a crucial function of these representations. Inspite of its great importance, this cognitive dimension of collectiverepresentations has hardly been explored in previous theorizing. Wehave given priority to a specific form of specularity, namely, mimetism,which is in our view at the very heart of financial processes. Far frombeing the aberration that traditional approaches deem it to be, imita-tion is one of the most important types of rationality in situations ofuncertain and in situations where the agents' outcomes are highlyinterdependent. Our central hypothesis amounts to considering thatthe emergence of speculative bubbles on various kinds of markets canbe explained in terms of mimetic dynamics. Should this hypothesis beconfirmed, it would be possible to account for a phenomenon that isoften observed, namely, the link between bubbles and a decrease inthe diversity of opinion on the market. In our approach, conventionsare taken to be the outcome of a mimetic process. Conventions are thesocial objects created by a unanimous mimetic polarization.
Keynes argued that profit expectations, and the degree of confidence or weight that managers place in their profit forecasts, determine investment. Previous attempts to test Keynes' theory have been plagued by the absence of any clear measure of entrepreneurs' expectations of future profits. The Conference Board collected managers' self-reported data on expectation of future profits. The Conference Board data also allowed the construction of a measure of the weight assigned by managers to their profit forecasts. With this data, it is concluded that in most industries, investment rises both when managers are more optimistic and when they exhibit greater confidence in their forecast.
Implications of financialisation for sustainability. Financialisation
- G Gabbi
- E Ticci
Gabbi, G., & Ticci, E. (2014). Implications of financialisation for sustainability. Financialisation,
Economy, Society and Sustainable Development (FESSUD) Working Paper Series No. 47.
Economics of Control: Principles of Welfare Economics
- A P Lerner
Lerner, A. P. (1944). Economics of Control: Principles of Welfare Economics. The Macmillan Company.