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China-Russia Collaboration in Shipping and Marine Engineering as One of the Key Factors of Secure Navigation Along the NSR
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Currently, about 80% of globally traded cargo is carried by maritime transport, including increasingly along the routes in the North, which have not been secured previously due to heavy ice conditions and extreme temperatures. In recent decades, however, climate change has been affecting the reduction of ice coverage in the Arctic Ocean and thus providing opportunities for the development of commercial navigation. Many countries are becoming increasingly interested in the exploration of opening maritime routes. With the incorporation of the Polar Silk Road into the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) network, China has rapidly emerged as the major non-Arctic actor in the region. Contributing to the development of commercial shipping in the North, China aims at the diversification of its trade routes and linking itself with Arctic countries by a network of maritime corridors. The implementation of the Polar Silk Road initiative requires first and foremost the improvement of the navigation safety and passability of Northern routes, primarily through the Northern Sea Route (NSR). The existing network of operable routes along the Russian coastline of the Arctic Ocean allows commercial shipping during summer and autumn only. Due to the prevailing shallow depths, the operation of icebreakers is limited. The extension of the secured navigation window is hindered by the lack of icebreaking and underdeveloped navigational infrastructure in Russia. In this paper, the authors discuss how China may collaborate with Russia to ensure the development of secure navigable routes by determining the areas suitable for the development of deep-water shipping and allowing the operation of large-tonnage tankers and icebreakers. The paper presents an analysis of water areas in the NSR suitable for the development of deep-water routes and operation of large-tonnage vessels with high categories of ice reinforcements. The authors provide an overview of the current condition of the shipbuilding industry in Russia in relation to the construction of vessels and marine equipment for the Arctic in such segments as icebreaking, transport, port, and dredging fleet. In the conclusion, the existing obstacles and opportunities for China and Russia are summarized in light of the establishment of more secure and stable navigation along the NSR
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... The mentioned legislative and political uncertainty about the arctic and the NSR has enticed a large number of researchers to discuss this situation in various forms (Peters, 1993, Hagen and Jones, 1996, Østreng, 2006, Borgerson, 2008, Brigham, 2008, Global, 2008, PAME, 2009, Lammer, 2010, Lárusson, 2010, Bunik and Mikhaylichenko, 2013, Huang et al., 2015, Chircop, 2017,Sørensen, 2017, Alexeeva and Lasserre, 2018, Sun, 2018, ABE and OTSUKA, 2019, Hossain et al., 2019, Gao and Erokhin, 2019. The main themes are the ownership of arctic waters beyond the 200-mile economic exclusive zone, the governance of one of the most pristine environments in general, and the (un)willingness of nations to cooperate in dealing with both these issues as well as the preparations required for the commercialisation of the arctic sea routes. ...
In this paper, the possibility of adding the North Sea Route (NSR) route to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is researched whereby the main aim is to determine if it is possible to set up a container service via the NSR route that could attract cargo from the existing maritime routes via Suez and the land route. In order to make the analysis, a model which is able to calculate the total generalised chain cost for a supply chain is used and updated.
This analysis shows that it is possible to set up such a competitive service compared to the land bridge and the Suez Canal Route (SCR) for cargo that has a high value of time. For these specific cargo types, it is possible to attract cargo for the NSR from the SCR at equal costs, but with an average time saving of 10%. Comparing the BRI or land bridge to the SCR, there is a cost increase of 20% and a time decrease of almost 65%. Considering the rather strict limitation in capacity, it should be noted that a single NSR service of eight 5,400 TEU vessels already offers around half the capacity of the land bridge. The uncertainty in arrival times, however, would remain an issue in the NSR service, but with ice diminishing, this risk will decrease as well.
With the emergence of economic globalization, the concept of the blue economy has evolved from fisheries to a broader context that comprised all kinds of biological and mineral resources, maritime trade, shipping, energy, and tourism. Intensive economic exploration of water areas is changing ecosystems, affecting biodiversity, and threatening sustainability. The transformations are felt globally in the form of climate change and environmental degradation, but the Arctic has appeared to be particularly vulnerable. Using the case of China, this chapter attempts to contribute to the convergence of economic benefits of exploring the Arctic with the urgent need to protect a fragile Arctic environment. The authors discuss how China’s involvement in Arctic-related activities can benefit the sustainable development of the blue economy in the region.
The Cold War was a conflict of incompatible ideologies between the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective allies. The global order during this time was marked by bipolarity between the two superpowers, and the peace was paradoxically maintained by balancing the power with a nuclear arms race. Thus, the realpolitik of the Cold War was shaped by deterrence. In the Nordic Arctic, however, the Cold War would pan out differently. The very real confrontation between the Kingdom of Norway and the Soviet Union was placated by a series of trust-building initiatives that led to the ad hoc creation of a zone of low tensions during the height of the Cold War between Norway – a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – and the Soviet Union, the founder of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). From culture and science agreements, joint management of fisheries, a moratorium for hydrocarbon extraction in contested waters, to perhaps most importantly, Norwegian self-imposed military restrictions, the initiatives were groundbreaking. These activities did not appear in a vacuum, as there were long historical ties between Norwegians and Russians. Especially in the north, the relationship was strong, with the nineteenth century Pomor trade, to the liberation of Finnmark County from German occupation in the Second World War. The relations were marked by neighborliness, and it is against this historical backdrop that during the Cold War, the iron curtain began to open with a culture agreement in 1956.
Delineation and delimitation of extended continental shelves is an emerging issue in
international relations. Submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf (CLCS) triggered disputes among the coastal states with the overlapping claims.
However, some of them managed to reach non-objection agreements which allowed the
CLCS to proceed. The aim of this study is to identify the critical variable which
influenced the cooperation process on delineation. The methodology is based on
comparative study of two cases: the Arctic Ocean and the South China Sea. The original
hypothesis of this research was that the pre-existing international, much functional,
cooperation was the critical variable which influenced the adoption of non-objection
memoranda of understanding in the Arctic Ocean, and that it might have potential to
influence in the South China Sea. The main objectives of this study are to contribute
towards a better understanding of a legal nature of delineation and to demonstrate
interrelations between international law and geopolitics in regard to the delineation.
What dilemmas and challenges are Greenland facing in the light of the wish for future independence? This article reflects on central issues relating to the Greenlandic economy and business structure of today and the possibilities in a future secession from the Kingdom of Denmark. The article demonstrates that – besides the grants from Denmark and the EU which amounts to approximately 60 % of the income of the Greenland Government – the foundation for Greenland’s economy and business structure since the 1950s and 60s has been fishery which is still thriving. The article also shows that this is a single stranded and sensitive business structure that cannot alone meet the income needs for an independent Greenland. The article points out that the Greenlandic economy needs diversification and that the business environment should be developed. Particularly innovation and new product development in the marine industry, such as development in bio-economy, could be elaborated. There is also room for entrepreneurship within the cultural and creative industries. Developments of the tourism industry must be pursued and a comprehensive strategy for attracting foreign and direct investment to Greenland should be developed.
In the beginning of the article, the legal and political framework for Greenland's international and foreign affairs actions under the current self-government act and the Danish constitution are introduced. Although Denmark, pursuant to the constitution possesses the competences of foreign affairs politics within the Kingdom, it is also made clear that reality is a bit more complicated and Greenland is not without its competences, rights and democratic responsibility to the Greenlandic people within foreign affairs. Based on Greenland's previous colonial status under the UN and international law for colonies, as well as the aforementioned legislation, the possibilities for Greenland's development within foreign affairs are dealt with in an independence perspective. The possibilities under a possible federal model or a Free Association relationship with Denmark are highlighted as worth striving for. The article does not go into depth with individual cases, but focuses on frameworks and relevant subjects, such as security policy, membership of international organizations and practical aspects like capacity considerations.
China’s Arctic Ambitions and What They Mean for Canada is one of the first in-depth studies of China’s increasing interest in the Arctic. It offers a holistic approach to understanding Chinese motivations and the potential impacts of greater Chinese presence in the circumpolar region, exploring resource development, shipping, scientific research, governance, and security.
Drawing on extensive research in Chinese government documentation, business and media reports, and current academic literature, this timely volume eschews the traditional assumption that Chinese actions are unified and monolithic in their approach to Arctic affairs. Instead, it offers a careful analysis of the different, and often competing, interests and priorities of Chinese government and industry.
Analyzing Chinese interests and activities from a Canadian perspective, the book provides an unparalleled point of reference to discuss the implications for the Canadian and broader circumpolar North.
Most studies of Asian state involvement in Arctic affairs assume that shorter sea-lanes to Europe are a major driver of interest, so this article begins by examining the prominence of shipping concerns in Arctic policy statements made by major Asian states. Using a bottom-up approach, we consider the advantages of Arctic sea routes over the Suez and Panama alternatives in light of the political, bureaucratic and economic conditions surrounding shipping and shipbuilding in China, Japan and the Republic of Korea. Especially Japanese and Korean policy documents indicate soberness rather than optimism concerning Arctic sea routes, noting the remaining limitations and the need for in-depth feasibility studies. That policymakers show greater caution than analysts, links in with our second finding: in Japan and Korea, maritime-sector bureaucracies responsible for industries with Arctic experience have been closely involved in policy development, more so than in China. Thirdly, we find a clear tendency towards rising industry-level caution and restraint in all three countries, reflecting financial difficulties in several major companies as well as growing sensitivity to the economic and political risks associated with the Arctic routes. Finally, our examination of bilateral and multilateral Chinese, Japanese and Korean diplomatic activity concerning Arctic shipping exhibits a lower profile than indicated by earlier studies.
Responsible Editor: Øyvind Ravna, UiT The Arctic University of Norway, Tromsø, Norway