The EU-Russia Strategic Partnership
... Western experts mainly explored the practical problems of the 'hierarchical structure' of institutional links and regulatory convergence and raised the issue of the transition from the PCAwith its emphasis on democratic governance and human rightsto a tailor-made association agreement, even debating the longerterm prospect of Russian membership of the EU along the lines of the accession of central European countries (Gowan 2001; see also Blockmans 2008;Gänzle 2008). They analysed and theorised 'how the EU has sought to lock Russia into a highly institutionalized, indeed postsovereign arrangements with a view of creating an essentially unipolar Europe based on the EU's liberal norms and values' (Haukkala 2015;25-26; see also Aalto 2006;Haukkala 2010). Hughes (2006) conceptualised these developments in terms of integration theory, whereby strong coordination of policy among states helps to erode national sovereignties through convergence. ...
... Cadier (2014) argues that, while it would be misguided to talk of a geopolitical contest between the EU and the emerging Russian-led economic bloc, the EU should de-emphasise the regional aspect of the ENP and analyse how the strategic, political and economic structures specific to the neighbourhood countries shape their regional order preferences. The EU's use of the same approach towards Russia as towards the rest of the eastern neighbourhood -'based on the EU's claim of normative hegemony in Europe, built on asymmetrically sovereignty-challenging approaches' (Haukkala 2010) is failing to ensure stability on its periphery. ...
... The EU promotes policy convergence on the basis of 'international and bilaterally developed rules', its main objective being the 'strengthening of the international order based on effective multilateralism' (Barbé et al. 2009), while Russia is 'very much a classic realist power that feels much more comfortable dealing with other "Great Powers". . . than the post-modern EU with its post-sovereignty agenda' (Haukkala 2010). ...
The Russia-Georgia conflict in August 2008 and Ukraine’s crisis have dramatic consequences for the security environment on the EU Eastern periphery and undermined ‘strategic partnership’ with Russia. The Western literature on security has been dominated since by Russia’s confrontation with Europe, the use of sanctions by the EU as an instrument of statecraft to ‘contain’ Russia, and the promotion by Moscow of ‘hybrid warfare’ tactics. The Russian literature has mainly concentrated on rivalry between Russia and the EU in the post-Soviet region, reciprocal sanctions and ‘Cold War 2.0’. In fact, much of the previous extensive literature reflected commonalities as well as divergences in Russian and European scholars’ perceptions of their security relationship. We identify the key conceptual and empirical concerns reflected in the scholarly literature: (1) legal-institutional issues; (2) EU–Russia bilateral cooperation in security governance; (3) EU–Russia cooperation at the international level to address common security problems and (4) EU–Russia relations in terms of ideational/identity issues. We have used these four themes as the basis of our analytical framework enabling us to compare approaches of Russian and European scholars. The conclusions focus on the commonalities and differences in European and Russian scholarship and identify epistemological and practical consequences.
... It is less clear that the variable of power can tell us much about what the actor actually chooses to do. For example, the weakness of Russia in terms of its capabilities in the 1990s was deliberately used by Moscow as a negotiating chip visà-vis the EU (Haukkala 2010). This could not be read off from the power structure. ...
... Indeed, many scholars have suggested, each in a slightly different way, that contrasting worldviews are the primary source of conflict in Russia-EU relations. While the EU is an actor who cherishes 'postmodern' integrationist values, Russia is committed to more traditional values emphasizing sovereignty and the role of the state (Prozorov 2006;Thorun 2009;Haukkala 2010;Makarychev 2014). These explanations have become quite popular. ...
This article looks at various theoretical approaches to Russia–EU relations and ways to explain the evolution and current rupture of the relationship. The article’s purpose is to assess the relevance of different explanatory factors and to what extent they are complementary rather than competitive. It is argued that the best way of assessing and organizing the various explanations is through a contrastive, counterfactual approach to causation. Moreover, the article suggests that pragmatic interests of knowledge should guide studies of Russia–EU relations and that scholars ought to strike a middle ground between parsimony and holism.
... However, strategic interaction has been fairly limited under the impression of the first Chechen War and the Russian debt crisis. Despite this, the EU's Common Strategy on Russia in June 1999 reaffirmed the importance of Russia and post-sovereign principles (Haukkala 2010). Russia's mid-term EU strategy 2000-2010 can be regarded as a direct answer to that, already opposing the mentioned principles emphasizing sovereignty and interest-based cooperation (freire and Kanet 2012). ...
... Moreover, the 2008 war in Georgia was a turning point for EU-Russian security relations (freire and Kanet 2012): both Russia and Georgia were blamed for having been the aggressor with the EU trying to mediate; at the same time, NATO enlargement was off the table with the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia as a freezing exercise (Haukkala 2010), having in mind the failed proposal of a New Security Treaty for Europe by Medvedev. Hence: "A cooperative security approach can only emerge when the EU and Russia would share a meaningful set of views and interests" (freire and Kanet 2012). ...
Current Ukrainian gender order was reflected in the modes of men’s and women’s participation in Euromaidan protests that took place in November 2013–February 2014. Despite presence of both men and women, gendered aspects of their participation have been visible in division of labor and functions performed by women and men during the protests. The modes of women engagement into the protests varied significantly during different stages of the protests—from peaceful demonstrations to violent clashes. Taking into account the existing controversy in the perception of women’s role into the protests, we will argue that there were different gender role scenarios of women’s participation into the protests according to functions they performed and the way they represented themselves.
... Constructivist analyses of the relationship point to diverging images and (mis-)perceptions as a reason for the conflictual relations between the EU and Russia (Casier et al. 2018;Gomart 2008). Rationalists conclude that the EU's attempts at increasing its influence in the post-Soviet space and the simultaneous alienation of Russia resulted in the deterioration of EU-Russia relations (Haukkala 2010;Maass 2017). Other authors examined the nature of this competition on the geopolitical, regulatory, and ideational levels and showed that conflict is most pronounced at the level of values and normative discourses (Moga and Alexeev 2013;Tumanov et al. 2011;Buzogány 2016;Noutcheva 2018;Raik 2019). ...
This book critically examined the dichotomy in the literature regarding the differing influences of the EU and Russia in their shared neighbourhood. Through the development of a conceptual framework encompassing three ideal-typical mechanisms of hegemonic power (coercion, prescription, and co-optation) the study systematically compared EU and Russian neighbourhood policies in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. Empirical analysis of four cases (EU-Moldova, EU-Armenia, Russia-Moldova, and Russia-Armenia) highlighted the nuanced ways each power exerted influence, revealing both differences and similarities in their approaches. The study found that both the EU and Russia employed all three mechanisms, but with varying methods and effectiveness. Coercion by Russia was more unilateral and punitive, whereas the EU institutionalised its coercive measures within negotiated frameworks. In terms of prescription, the EU’s regulatory clarity contrasted with the complexity and incoherence of Russian standards within the EAEU. Co-optation efforts also differed, with Russia leveraging shared language, culture, and religion, while the EU focused on promoting European values. The analysis revealed that the legitimacy of these actions played a crucial role, with the EU generally perceived more positively than Russia, whose actions were often viewed as unpredictable and punitive. The findings also demonstrated a convergence in the hegemonic practices of the EU and Russia over time, especially post-2015, as both powers intensified their influence strategies. The study calls for future research to explore the interactive dynamics between regional hegemons and to examine how perceptions and local contexts shape power relations. It suggests extending the framework to other regions, such as Central Asia, South Asia, and Latin America, to understand the dynamics of regional hegemony in different geopolitical contexts. The insights from this research contribute to a deeper understanding of the complex interplay of hegemonic power in international relations, emphasising the importance of perceptions, legitimacy, and local contexts in shaping power dynamics.
... Серед європейських авторів варто згадати праці Хіскі Хаукалла (Haukkala, 2010), Штефана Майстера (Meister, 2022), Мартіна Рассела (Russell, 2018), Катрін Бьотгер (Böttger, 2015), Аркадія Мошеса (Moshes, 2020), Мікаеля Вігеля та Антто Віхми (Wigell, Vihma, 2016), Балажа Ярабіка (Jarábik, 2023), Яни Пуглірін (Puglierin, 2022) та ін. ...
У статті досліджено еволюцію відносин ЄС–Росія за останні тридцять років. Розглянуто основні етапи формування та їх характерні особливості. Доведено, що з кожною зміною установчих договорів Євросоюз як збільшував свою вагу та інституційні спроможності в регіоні, так і зміцнював співпрацю та взаємозалежність із сусідніми країнами, зокрема Росією. Важливою складовою впливу ЄС стала економічна інтеграція та захист європейських цінностей, що стали причиною розбіжностей з Кремлем. Поступове зростання ролі ЄС у Східній Європі Москва сприйняла як виклик російським інтересам на пострадянському просторі. Крім того, з 2000 р. в РФ відбувалося всебічне зміцнення режиму персональної влади Путіна, що дедалі більше суперечило європейським цінностям і ще глибше поглиблювало суперечності з Євросоюзом. Повномасштабне вторгнення Росії в Україну порушило європейський порядок безпеки, який склався після «холодної війни», і повністю змінило парадигму відносин ЄС–Росія. Після початку повномасштабної російської збройної агресії проти України Європейський Союз був змушений радикально переглянути своє партнерство з Москвою, що спричинило політичний та економічний розрив між сторонами. Зокрема, у червні 2024 р. Рада ЄС ухвалила вже 14-й пакет економічних обмежувальних заходів проти РФ, а також внесла додаткові 116 юридичних і фізичних осіб до санкційних списків. Нові заходи Брюсселя були спрямовані на важливі сектори російської економіки, такі як енергетика, фінанси та торгівля, а також покликані ускладнити обхід санкцій ЄС. Через постійний тиск санкцій з боку Євросоюзу та західних партнерів РФ втратила свої найбільш дохідні ринки природного газу та нафти в Європі. Більшість ключових російських банків були відключені від міжнародної системи SWIFT, також були заморожені активи російського Центрального банку та значна частина власності державних і приватних підприємств тощо. Попри те, що відносини ЄС–Росія продовжують деградувати, вони суттєво впливають на геополітику, економіку та безпеку об’єднаної Європи, частиною якої є й Україна. У подальшому вони залежатимуть від політичних результатів російської агресії в Україні. Тому дослідження цих відносин, спрямування їх динаміки та впливу на європейський і глобальний виміри є надзвичайно актуальними для вітчизняної політичної науки.
... Over the past two decades, Russian identity has grown apart from Europe (Casier 2013;Tsygankov 2012). This intersubjective gap, of which the Ukraine crisis may either be a symptom or an accelerator (Haukkala 2016), is striking with regards to notions of sovereignty (Haukkala 2010;Ziegler 2012). While sovereignty is limited and fluid for Europeans who view their Neighborhood Policy as a win-win partnership, it is absolute for the Russians, for whom sovereignty cannot be shared and influence is a zero-sum game (Haukkala 2009;Emerson 2011;DeBardeleben 2012). ...
... By building peace through economic interdependence (DeBardeleben 2018, 119), Brussels pursues a strategy of "circles of influence" made up of the EU as a core area, a close neighborhood, and a far zone of interest (Volovoj 2017). With the specific goal of creating a "ring of friends," it uses its economic and normative power (or "normative hegemony", Haukkala 2008Haukkala , 2010. EaP is guided by the principle of conditionality, which is "a vehicle for promoting democracy and market reform in line with EU values" (DeBardeleben 2018, 120). ...
This Special Issue examines the ways states, regions, de facto states and local actors situated in-between the EU and Russia cope with the competitive external pressure coming from the two regional powers. States, diverse groups and actors in this overlapping neighborhood navigate between varied economic and political integration projects and between different values, ideas and visions of society. This introductory article, first, contextualizes this “inside-out” perspective by presenting the nature of the current EU and Russian projects vis-à-vis the region, how they clash and how this puts regional actors in a state of “in-betweenness”. Then, it unpacks the concept of “navigation” by outlining the ways local actors at different levels of domestic governance studied in the contributions to this Special Issue respond to and manage areas of contestation relating to issues such as citizenship politics, minority rights, and political and trade strategies. The role of elite agency serves as a central thread running across the contributions. Caught “in-between” Russia and the EU, domestic actors, be it at national or sub-national level, navigate while adjusting to the external pressures, negotiating and appropriating external discourses. In the process, constraints are often turned into opportunities for the local actors to exploit.
... It has taken the form of development aid, a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), a Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), a Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership and a variety of legal interventions. A vital element in legitimising EU policies is the introduction of alternative notions of sovereignty in order to move towards a new post-Cold War international order (Haukkala, 2010). For better or worse, the idea of a European Neighbourhood has been presented as a prime example of the new "post-Westphalian" politics that aimed at turning the focus of international relations from military safeguarding of territorial integrity to mutual promotion of programmes of territorial cooperation (e.g. ...
One of the main messages of this still new Millennium is that realist geopolitics is back with a vengeance. It is of course debatable whether “hard power” geopolitics actually ever disappeared from the scene, and its role is obviously key in any discussion about the darkening of optimistic visions of a post-Cold War order based on multilateralism and cooperation. Be this as it may, the multiple challenges facing global society appear to make thinking about international relations in realist terms unavoidable. It appears that the European Union (EU) itself, a champion of soft power, is now reconsidering its own positionality within the world system. As Commissioner Thierry Breton stated in a communication of 10 September 2020: “The era of a conciliatory or naïve Europe that solely relies on the virtue of its soft power is behind us. We are now seeing the dawn of a Europe that is determined to defend its strategic interests” (Breton, 2020). Breton also called for “a powerful and geopolitical Europe” that would be able to protect its economy, democracy and information space while avoiding debilitating geopolitical dependencies.
Possibly, Breton’s thoughts on EU international actorness reflect a certain “common sense” positionality given the present global disorder. However, the notion of a drastic change in international relations can hardly summarise post-Cold War experiences in all corners of Europe. From the perspective of the European North, there is, at this point, an obvious need to study in detail the outcomes of earlier policies and evaluate in what sense EU policies have offered adequate solutions and in what sense they are in need of renewal. Furthermore, common sense also requires that the increasing complexity of security and its inextricable links with issues such as social welfare, health, human rights, social justice and climate change be part of the conversation regarding EU actorness. Put simply, the EU’s goal has been – or at least is said to be – one of achieving a global governance that matters. As a step in this direction, cooperation and regional dialogue continue to be part of the EU’s (geo)political identity and its regional and global role. And yet, it is far from clear how and to what extent principles of multilateral and multilevel cooperation are to be upheld by “a powerful and geopolitical Europe”.
In the North, as well as within the whole of the EU, the security environment is dominated by a resurgence of competitive great-power relations that have clouded the prospects of a rule-based international order. The aggressive politics of the Russian Federation have hampered the search for a more productive EU-Russia relationship and complicated everyday economic and social interaction. Mechanisms targeted at greater local and regional-level cooperation between Russia and European partners have also been affected by sanctions, counter-sanctions and rhetoric of a return to confrontational Cold War type settings. Despite these realities, we suggest that regional responses to shifting security settings, regional cooperation initiatives, such as the so-called Northern Dimension, and the peculiarities of Finnish-Russian relations have much to tell us about the prospects for multilevel human security in Europe and beyond. Indeed, there is undoubtedly a need to balance the tension between geopolitical realism and pragmatic dialogue.
This contribution to the Borderlands Studies Series explores the nexus between security, regional cooperation and borders, whereby borders are understood here in political, social and cultural and, ultimately, discursive terms. The specific approach to European borderlands developed in this volume builds on the (geo)political salience of “non-core” cross-border relations – in this case, the Northern reaches of the EU-Russian “neighbourhood”. As elsewhere, in the European North geopolitics, borders and migration have coalesced in ways that exemplify complex “intermestic” security environments; domestic and international policy concerns are not only inextricably interlinked, they are co-constitutive of each other. This is evidenced strikingly by such issues as regional cooperation, border management as well as the humane treatment of refugees. Related to this, we will also provide a “northern” reflection on the multifaceted and networked nature of human security – security that encompasses much more than protection from physical harm or defence of national territoriality. The concept of human security as promulgated by the United Nations (2009) defines threats as both physical and perceptual – a threat can be an objective context of geopolitical risk but can also result from socio-economic, cultural, health-related and social tensions emerging from a lack of welfare and a diminished sense of social cohesion. Perceptual aspects also draw attention to links between security and information and heightened sensitivities to cybercrime, radicalisation processes promoted by social media and the manipulability of public sentiment through misinformation and false news.
... It has taken the form of development aid, a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), a Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), a Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership and a variety of legal interventions. A vital element in legitimising EU policies is the introduction of alternative notions of sovereignty in order to move towards a new post-Cold War international order (Haukkala, 2010). For better or worse, the idea of a European Neighbourhood has been presented as a prime example of the new "post-Westphalian" politics that aimed at turning the focus of international relations from military safeguarding of territorial integrity to mutual promotion of programmes of territorial cooperation (e.g. ...
This book critically analyses the changing EU-Russian security environment in the wake of the Ukraine crisis, with a particular focus on northern Europe where the EU and the Russian Federation share a common border.
Russian involvement in conflict situations in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood has drastically impacted the European security environment, leading to a resurgence of competitive great power relations. The book uses the EU-Russia interface at the borders of Finland and the European North as a prism through which interwoven external and internal security challenges can be explored. Security is considered in the broadest sense of the term, as the authors consider how the security environment is reflected politically, socially and culturally within European societies. The book analyses changing political language and concepts, institutional preparedness, border governance, human security, migration and wider challenges to societal resilience. Ultimately, the book investigates into Finland’s preparedness to address new global security challenges and to find solutions to them on an everyday level.
This book will be an important guide for researchers and upper-level students of security, border studies, Russian and European studies, as well as to policy makers looking to develop a wider, contextualized understanding of the challenges to stability and security in different parts of Europe.
... As noted above, a number of studies focusing on the dynamics of the EU's SP regarding specific countries have been published. Yet, this genre of literature is highly disparate, with a moderate number of studies covering only few target states, notably Brazil (Gratius 2018;Saraiva 2017;Santander 2016;Ferreira-Pereira 2016;Emerson and Flores 2013), China (Pan 2012;Michalski and Pan 2017;Smith 2016;Li 2016;Maher 2016), Russia (Chizhov 2012;Haukkala 2010;De Wilde and Pellon 2006) and India (Kavalski 2016;Bava 2010;Sachdeva 2009) besides relations with the United States which have been much more widely covered. A less extensive coverage is available for Canada, South Korea, Japan, Mexico and South Africa. ...
This chapter introduces strategic partnerships as a multidimensional and multipurpose instrument of the EU’s global diplomacy in a complex and contested world. It then explores the positioning and discussion of this topic within the field of European Foreign Policy. Finally, the chapter offers an overview of the focus and content of the volume.
... Over the past two decades, Russian identity has grown apart from Europe (Casier 2013;Tsygankov 2012). This intersubjective gap, of which the Ukraine crisis may either be a symptom or an accelerator (Haukkala 2016), is striking with regards to notions of sovereignty (Haukkala 2010;Ziegler 2012). While sovereignty is limited and fluid for Europeans who view their Neighborhood Policy as a win-win partnership, it is absolute for the Russians, for whom sovereignty cannot be shared and influence is a zero-sum game (Haukkala 2009;Emerson 2011;DeBardeleben 2012). ...
When thinking about Euro-Russian relations, IR scholars focus on why conflict has replaced cooperation. The “geostrategic debate” excludes the possible coexistence of cooperation and conflict. In this Introduction to the special issue, we track the evolution of conflict and cooperation patterns in three zones of contact (Estonia, Kaliningrad, Moldova) between 1991 and 2016. Our findings show that, although the standard narrative remains compelling, in several cases patterns of cooperation/conflict are largely autonomous from the geostrategic level. This diversity justifies the elaboration of theoretical propositions distinguishing fluid, rigid, and disputed symbolic boundaries which are constructed in and through geopolitical fields.
... The relationship with Russia and post-Soviet states presented opportunities and challenges for the EU. Geography and historical legacies have ensured that the two sides would be destined to share common challenges but also be rivals for spreading influence and pursuing interests (Haukkala 2010). The immediate post-Soviet period in the 1990s saw the EU confident that it could build a "partnership" with Russia to address common concerns as well as promote its understanding of how it saw order in a wider European space and its role in it. ...
... Relations with Russia have been chosen as a litmus test for a shared European foreign policy discourse because they have proven to be one of the most dividing issues among European Union countries (Cadier 2014, Casier 2011, David and Romanova 2015, David et al., 2011, Gromyko 2015, Haukkala 2015and 2010a, Korosteleva 2016, Nitoiu 2016, Romanova 2016. In 2007, former EU trade commissioner Peter Mandelson stated that 'no other country reveals our differences as does Russia' (cited in Kagan 2008: 14). ...
This book examines the relationship between national identity construction and current foreign policy discourses on Russia in selected European Union member states in 2014–2018. It shows that divergent national discourses on Russia derive from the different ways in which the country was constructed in national identity. The book develops an interpretive theoretical framework and argues that policy makers’ agency can profoundly influence the contestation between different identity narratives. It includes case studies in policy areas that are of primary importance for EU–Russia relations, such as energy security (the Nord Stream 2 controversy), the Ukraine crisis and Russia’s military intervention in Syria. Focusing on EU member states that have traditionally taken different stances vis-à-vis Russia (Germany, Poland and Finland), it shows that at the peak of the Ukraine crisis national discourses converged towards a pragmatic, but critical narrative. As the Ukraine crisis subsided and new events took centre stage in foreign policy discussions (i.e. the Syrian civil war, international terrorism), long-standing and identity-based divergences partly re-emerged in the discourses of policy makers. This became particularly evident during the Nord Stream 2 controversy. Deep-rooted and different perceptions of the Russian Other in EU member states are still influential and lead to divergent national agendas for foreign policy towards Russia.
... It should be noted that scientists from different subject areas pay great attention to the study of aspects of cooperation between Russia and Germany, highlighting not only the project facts and event statistics, but also the results obtained on the basis of a scientific approach and the application of scientific knowledge methods in this area [1][2][3][4][5][6][7]. As a result, one can observe a diverse cooperation between the two sides, each playing its unique role in the intercultural dialogue [8]. ...
The launch of the Russian-Germany interstate project (the Russian-German Year of Scientific and Educational Cooperation 2018-2020) sets new requirements for the agenda formation for interstate cooperation in the field of education and science. The “Russian-German Roadmap for Cooperation in Education, Science, Research and Innovation” (the Roadmap) defines new opportunities for expanding cooperation between states in the educational and research fields, as well as developing economical innovations. The key directions of the cooperation are: “Large research infrastructure”, “Priorities”, “Young talents”, “Innovations, science and society”. The expansion of bilateral cooperation on a wide range of topics, the development of large research infrastructures and joint research projects in particular, will be carried out in the areas that are priority for both countries. By means of the Roadmap, young scientists should be supported, and the academic mobility of researchers, students and postgraduate students should be increased. It is also planned to enhance the transfer of research results to the real economy, as well as increase the advanced innovative business involvement in the partnership. One of the tasks that the organizers of the year face, is to create conditions for the public presentation of specialized events, as well as the dissemination of cooperation practices in the academic environment. For this purpose, a special website to gather the information from participants and organizers of events implemented in both countries, was launched (https://russia-germanycooperation.ru). The inclusion of innovative business in the year’s action field will create conditions for the formation of joint teams, both in the academic and professional environment, aimed at tackling new problems of states economies' innovative development.
... The relationship with Russia and post-Soviet states presented opportunities and challenges for the EU. Geography and historical legacies have ensured that the two sides would be destined to share common challenges but also be rivals for spreading influence and pursuing interests (Haukkala 2010). The immediate post-Soviet period in the 1990s saw the EU confident that it could build a "partnership" with Russia to address common concerns as well as promote its understanding of how it saw order in a wider European space and its role in it. ...
Russia’s intervention in the Ukraine, Donald Trump’s presidency and instability in the Middle East are just a few of the factors that have brought an end to the immediate post-Cold War belief that a new international order was emerging: one where fear and uncertainty gave way to a thick normative and institutional architecture that diminished the importance of material power. This has raised questions about the instruments we use to understand order in Europe and in international relations. The chapters in this book aim to assess whether foreign policy actors in Europe understand the international system and behave as realists. They ask what drives their behaviour, how they construct material capabilities and to what extent they see material power as the means to ensure survival. They contribute to a critical assessment of realism as a way to understand both Europe’s current predicament and the contemporary international system.
Roberto Belloni is professor of political science at the University of Trento, Italy.
Vincent Della Sala is associate professor of political science at the University of Trento, Italy.
Paul Viotti is professor at the University of Denver's Korbel School of International Studies and Executive Director of the Institute on Globalization and Security, USA.
... Since the early 2000s, the EU's international role conception has encompassed a vision of a rule-based international system founded on multilateralism, good governance, rule of law, human rights, and democracy, bolstered by the success of the Eastern enlargement and an increasingly confident international position (Ferrero-Waldner 2005;Solana 2009). It has enabled the EU to construct a postsovereign foreign policy based on an ambition to diffuse values, norms, and principles of global governance (Haukkala 2010;Pan 2012). The diffusion of European (liberal) norms became the basis for the EU's principle of international engagement with third countries, including "strategic partners," such as Russia and China; states in the EU's neighborhood, such as Ukraine; and countries further afield, such as the African, Caribbean, and Pacific states (Bengtsson and Elgström 2012). ...
In this article, we investigate the European Union's (EU) role as a normative foreign policy actor and its troubled relations to Russia and China. We contend that the lack of preparedness of the EU to foresee the increasingly tense relations with these countries can be explained through a role theoretical perspective. We show that the attachment of the EU to its role as a normative international actor reduced its awareness of Russia's and China's growing refusal to accept the EU's ambition to diffuse liberal norms and principles. The EU's inability to read the changing role expectations of China and Russia hampered the shaping of an appropriate foreign policy leading up the diplomatic crises with these two countries in the late 2000s and early 2010s, respectively. Theoretically, the findings contribute with a novel understanding of role conceptions in terms of reducing an actor's preparedness to acknowledge changes to its international role position caused by challenges raised by antagonistic partners.
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... After the implementation of two action plans (2000-2003 and 2004-2006), the Northern Dimension policy framework retained its function as an umbrella for cross-regional partnerships (see Haglund-Morissey 2008;Haukkala 2010). However, the development of the EU's first macro-regional Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) pushed the Northern Dimension into oblivion. ...
The place of the oblast Kaliningrad in the EU-Russian relationship has shifted over the past twenty-five years. It has shifted between that of an international, high profile problem case to that of a neglected geographic space. The trajectory of the Kaliningrad oblast’s move into a state of relative neglect has surprised observers and dismayed many actors in the region that are directly affected by and concerned with the exclave’s future, prospects and potential. This contribution revisits the question of why Kaliningrad continues to receive very little political attention from Brussels and Moscow – and why not even the EU member states in the Baltic Sea region keep the Russian enclave on the domestic and regional agenda. It asks also what the prospects are for Kaliningrad in the EU-Russian relationship and how the oblast is affected by the conflict that has resulted from the Russian violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity since 2014.
... The relationship with Russia and post-Soviet states presented opportunities and challenges for the EU. Geography and historical legacies have ensured that the two sides would be destined to share common challenges but also be rivals for spreading influence and pursuing interests (Haukkala 2010). The immediate post-Soviet period in the 1990s saw the EU confident that it could build a "partnership" with Russia to address common concerns as well as promote its understanding of how it saw order in a wider European space and its role in it. ...
The aim of this chapter is not to trace the development of the EU’s foreign policy or to provide a comprehensive discussion of particular cases. Our objective is to examine some of the challenges that the EU faces in trying to act “strategically” in geopolitical spaces in close proximity and which have been traditionally sources of the types of conflict that led to the reasons for the creation of the Union in the 1950s. The global reach of the EU and its member states inevitably means that it takes on many different roles in its foreign policy and approaches to international relations. However, we will focus on two areas that are particularly useful to illustrate the challenges the EU faces in being a strategic actor as well as the continuing or growing nationalization of foreign policy: its actions in the Balkans and the EU’s relations with Russia. Our argument is that both areas present not only foreign policy challenges but also existential issues that point to the EU’s lack of ontological security. They highlight the tension in the growing need to make strategic choices in both cases while remaining consistent with its narrative of a benign, normative power.
... The relationship with Russia and post-Soviet states presented opportunities and challenges for the EU. Geography and historical legacies have ensured that the two sides would be destined to share common challenges but also be rivals for spreading influence and pursuing interests (Haukkala 2010). The immediate post-Soviet period in the 1990s saw the EU confident that it could build a "partnership" with Russia to address common concerns as well as promote its understanding of how it saw order in a wider European space and its role in it. ...
Dans une démarche de géopolitique critique, cet article montre comment l’Europe a été mobilisée en tant qu’objet géographique pour penser et mettre en pratique la conservation transnationale de l’environnement entre la Finlande, la Norvège et la Russie depuis le sortir de la guerre froide. Il est basé sur une recherche documentaire et quarante entretiens avec des acteurs locaux de l’initiative pour la Ceinture verte de Fennoscandie, qui vise à créer un réseau écologique le long de l’ancien rideau de fer qui se dressait entre l’Europe du Nord et l’Union soviétique. D’abord, il explique comment le développement de la ceinture verte s’est articulé avec l’idée de diffuser les valeurs du projet européen dans la Russie post-soviétique. Ensuite, il montre comment la conservation transnationale de l’environnement est organisée et opère en réalité au niveau local à travers des acteurs décentralisés. À l’heure où la théorie néoréaliste revient par la grande porte pour expliquer le caractère indépassable de l’affrontement entre les blocs européens et russes, ce travail appelle à nuancer cette perspective. Cet article illustre comment la relation entre l’Union européenne et la Russie n’est pas le fait de deux blocs monolithiques motivés par leur seul intérêt de puissance, mais qu’elle opère à travers des canaux divers et répond des subjectivités des acteurs qui la composent au niveau local.
Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has radically undone peace and security in Europe, broken its post-Cold War order and triggered a seismic shift in European geopolitics. Moscow’s lasting and ever-widening multilayered conflict against Ukraine, the EU, the US and NATO/West at large bears no end in sight. With the coming age of hostile coexistence with Russia, European countries grapple with how best to ensure a more robust and aggression-proof system post-war. Amidst multiple uncertainties, there is a certainty that the future European security architecture will not be complete without Ukraine, as well as there seems to be a political will to devise a security system that protects from Russia and aggression in the foreseeable future. Considering the past dynamics and the current impasse in Russia’s relationality to the European security order, this forum contribution examines the imperatives and modalities of organizing post-war European security in opposition to Russia.
This chapter frames the analysis that follows in this edited volume, discussing European Union international actorness in a context of increased contestation to the international liberal order. It introduces the contribution of this study to this discussion by engaging with the debates on global actorness and mapping new conceptual and theoretical avenues to better understand how agency and power are exerted at the global and regional levels. It also sets the roadmap for analysing how the EU has been repositioning itself in this contested international order, which is organised around three main lines: firstly, by looking at how the EU positions itself internationally in certain issue-areas; secondly by engaging, on the one hand, with the EU’s own perspective towards its regional contexts and, on the other hand, with the perspectives of regional actors on the EU; and, thirdly, by exploring non-European perspectives on EU actorness.KeywordsEuropean UnionActornessCapabilitiesRecognitionPerceptions
Based on a collective engagement that has lasted since 2001, this thesis looks at the role(s) of the EU Member States (MS) in the provision of security during the intervention in Afghanistan (2001-2014). It analyzes their national and collective contribution(s) to Afghanistan’s post-2001 national security and Security Sector Reform (SSR), from military and police training to peace keeping, war fighting and diplomatic initiatives. The dissertation shows the MS played an important role in security provision, but their collective impact was largely the result of synergies between national contributions that occurred outside of European dynamics or policy planning. US campaign leadership was an important enabler of this collective European role by default.The dissertation also advances a theoretical-conceptual argument: Far from being an impediment to a European role in security and defense, the absence of a European policy or project acted as an important enabler of behavioral convergence once a US lead could be relied upon. This behavioral convergence in security and defense occurred despite the great strategic cultural divergence between the MS. It consisted of, and was driven by, joined-up action on an opt-in/opt-out basis, while a collective European policy was not necessary.
Russian norm diffusion has been studied mainly as the mirror image of the EU’s, but deserves to be studied in its own right and complexity. Three core categories of political norms are explored: sovereign choice, regime and conservative ideas. It is argued that Russia does not promote a coherent political model, by lack of one, but rather diffuses a disparate set of conservative ideas and non-democratic practices. Russia’s normative positioning is equivocal. It champions established international norms like sovereignty, placing itself within the dominant normative community, but contesting the application by the West. When it comes to certain liberal political norms (often reduced to a strawman version), it questions their validity and rejects them, placing itself outside the dominant normative community, but claiming to defend “genuine” European values. This makes Russia an ambiguous norm contester, rather than the perfect normative rival of the EU. The complexity of its norm contestation follows from exogenous motives: it is predominantly an anti-hegemonic reaction against what it perceives as the Western imposition of norms, harming vital Russian interests.
Many observers were casting doubts about the existence of a strategic partnership between Russia and the European Union long before the annexation of Crimea and the subsequent strained relations between the two blocs. Nevertheless, the main challenge of this article is to prove that there was indeed a positive effect regarding the strategic partnership on bilateral trading – together with such factors as the growth of the Russian and EU GDPs per capita, the devaluation of the Russian currency and the oil price increase – by applying the Gravity Model. Based on this model, it was also confirmed that there was a negative effect of the geographical distance and sanctions between parties on the EU–Russia trade flow. Moreover, we tried to predict by means of the Error Correction Models how EU–Russia bilateral trade would have changed according to a scenario wherein the parties continued being strategic partners, and had the sanctions not been imposed. As such, and by the method described, not only was it empirically confirmed that the major partners would have received the most benefit from the strategic partnership with Russia but even Russia’s smaller trading partners are incurring significant welfare losses from sanctions, along with Russia itself.
Today the relationship between Russia and the today EU-28 (today EU-27) members of the European Union is essential and very strategically important; this issue is bound to become more urgent as the two draws closer together over the next decades. In this paper, we discuss this and the Russian Federation’s role in the Ukraine conflict that has seriously affected EU-Russia relations. The EU and Russia have a long record of cooperation on issues of bilateral and international concern in several fields, from climate change to drug and human trafficking, but also the organized crime, terrorism, and non-proliferation. In particular, Europe, the “old traditional Europe”, acquires special weight for Russia in the context of the cooling down of relations between Russia and the United States. We will discuss gas, oil, and energy, but we can see that the solution can be only economic, and the oil and agriculture sectors could help do just that. “Business is business”.
This chapter discusses the origins, evolution and erosion of the ‘strategic partnership’ between the EU and Russia. It develops an analytical narrative that examines and discusses the genesis and the practice of the strategic partnership between the EU and Russia over the 15 years it was in place (1999–2014). It will do so by, firstly, analysing the EU’s initial objectives and comparing them with those put forward by Russia while analysing the key milestones in the relationship with a view of teasing out the gradual increase in tensions between the partners. This is followed by sections that delve into how the internal dynamics and third parties have affected the relations. Finally, the chapter concludes by drawing these strands together by looking at the outcomes of the EU’s SP with Russia in light of the Ukraine conflict with a view of probing the current and future potential of relations.
This chapter assesses Eurasian integration against these dimensions of EU’s external policy. The analysis starts with a discussion of the status quo of EU’s relations with the Eurasian region and the tensions already observed before exploring the institutional nature and practice of the Eurasian Economic Union. On balance, it arrives at a sceptical conclusion about the prospects for a change in EU’s current approach beyond the likelihood of ceasefire in Ukraine.
Millaista on suomalainen maahanmuuttokeskustelu? Julkisuudessa puhutaan ”pakolaisaalloista” ja ”tulvista” ja näytetään karttoja Eurooppaan ”hyökyvistä siirtolaisvirroista”. Todellisuudessa valtaosa pakolaisista on lähellä kriisialueita, muualla kuin Euroopassa.
Miten puhetavat ruokkivat ennakkoluuloja ja ääriliikkeitä? Miten poliittinen ilmapiiri on muototutunut uudenlaisen mediaympäristön aikana? Entä miten Suomessa on historian saatossa keskusteltu esimerkiksi romaneista?
Muuttoliike murroksessa selvittää, miten muuttoliikkeeseen ja turvapaikanhakijoihin liittyviä mielikuvia luodaan. Kirja purkaa vakiintuneita puhetapoja, retorisia ja metaforisia kehystyksiä ja yhteiskunnallista polarisaatiota ja ennakkoluuloja ruokkivia merkityksenannon tapoja.
This article situates the interdependence debate in IR theories within contemporary world politics and reconsiders the concept of complex interdependence against current deglobalizing dynamics. A notion of fragile interdependence is developed to explore the reversibility of interdependent relationships, an issue which has become increasingly important. Russia-EU relations, during and in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis, serve as the core case study to illustrate the implications of the theoretical debate. The focus is placed on two dimensions of their interdependent relationship: (non-energy) trade and gas. Although both dimensions have been reversed during this geopolitical crisis, there has been a contrasting pattern. In a comparative manner, the case study illustrates the ramifications of the theoretical debate, and, more importantly, the extent to which complex or fragile interdependence is relevant. This article argues that fragile interdependence would better capture the reversals, although, at the same time, complex interdependence may still be relevant to account for the rebound in resilient interdependent relationships.
Ever since 2007/2008, the European Union (EU) and its various institutional actors have been developing a dedicated EU Arctic policy, setting common positions, stressing the EU’s Arctic credentials and prominently expressing its own “Arcticness”. These Arctic steps have been thoroughly scrutinised over the past decade. Yet, research has almost ignored one particular pillar of the EU’s Arctic endeavour: the “Arctic exception” in EU–Russia relations and the related lack of a distinct Russian dimension in the EU’s Arctic policy. Similarly, little is known of how the Russian side views the EU’s Arctic policy steps taken since 2008. The extensive transdisciplinary literature on EU–Russia relations has basically ignored how the EU has been represented in Russia ever since 1991. This article examines EU and Russian Arctic policies and their relations in the European North. In attempting to explore how the EU’s “Arcticness” has been presented, narrated and perceived in Russian media between 2008 and 2018, we draw upon an analysis of articles published on various Russian media platforms during that period. The study identified four core narratives of the EU’s engagement in the Arctic: the EU as player , as seeker , as prohibitor and as partner . These narratives provide evidence of the “Arctic exception” in EU–Russia relations, as well as offering some related explanations.
This article paper aims to investigate the EU’s strategic partners using both theoretical and empirical analysis. Applying the technique of cluster analysis has allowed us, first, to demonstrate that not all of the EU’s ‘special ten’ are strategically sound for the EU; second, to investigate which regional organizations represent the best interest of the EU from a strategic standpoint; third, to find out the true potential of the EU’s strategic partners; and, finally, to prove empirically that the EU’s strategic partners are so heterogeneous as to represent a collective response to multilateralism and that a bilateral approach should be applied instead, taking into consideration the specific character of every strategic partner.
Over the last decade(s), the European Union (EU) has established itself as geopolitical actor seeking to actively engage in the spatial ordering of its neighbourhoods. In order to better understand the existing geopolitical nature of the EU, this article addresses the question of the EU’s decade-long endeavour to construct legitimacy in its Northern Neighbourhood; an area often neglected in discussions about the EU’s geopolitical role. By examining its Arctic involvement between 2008 and 2018, this article enquires into the EU’s broader role as an international actor with an evolving geopolitical identity. Over the last decades, the EU has exhibited geopolitical ambitions alongside its own conceptualisation of world order, rule of law and good governance. This article establishes a clearer picture on how the EU as an amalgamation of its various institutions has tried to impose these geopolitical ambitions on a neighbouring region that itself experiences a manifold change in the early twentieth-first century. It gets to the conceptual bottom of what exactly fashioned the European Union with geopolitical agency in the Arctic region – internally and externally. The article is based on a decade of research on the EU as an emerging Arctic actor.
The article provides a typology and a comparative analysis of academic studies on EU-Russian economic cooperation since its formal inception in the early 1990s. The authors strive to present a contextual analysis, explaining how the bilateral trends have been perceived in the respective academic environments. On this basis, the paper accentuates problems of academic dialogue between EU and Russian researchers, like constraints of mutual internalization, language-determination, and different research agendas. Four European discourses on the role of economic relations in EU-Russian relations are identified: Normative one (economic and non-economic interlinkages are inseparable and structurally determined), ‘Business case’ discourse (economic relations constitute an inherent system), ‘Neo-Ostpolitik’ discourse (establish reliable and trustful relations between the EU and Russia) and ‘Economic statecraft’ discourse (maximizing EU power and disciplining Russia). Russian publications are usually more policy-oriented compared to Western studies. We trace four periods: Illusions of Euro optimism during Russian market transformation (1992–1999); Adaptation to the EU enlargement and Putin’s attempts to establish a partnership with leading EU member states (1999–2008); Crisis in EU-Russian relations (2008–2015) and New Cold War (since 2015).
KEYWORDS: EU-Russian economic cooperation, EU-Russian energy dialogue, investment climate, foreign direct investment (FDI)
This article investigates Germany’s role in the European Union’s (EU) foreign policy towards Russia. It argues that Germany has been a leader in EU relations with Russia since the late 2000s, most notably through attempts to upload its long-standing policy of dialogue and cooperation with Moscow – known as Ostpolitik – to the EU level. During the Ukraine crisis, German leadership in this field became hegemonic. Economic and institutional power, the consent of its European and transatlantic allies and supportive domestic politics allowed Germany to profile itself as the main EU negotiating partner for Moscow. By highlighting the long-term German quest for leadership in the EU’s relations with Russia, the article makes the argument that Germany is not a ‘reluctant’, but rather an assertive hegemon in this policy area. Furthermore, the article highlights how the Ostpolitik tradition and its self-conception as a civilian power enabled Germany to lead Western diplomacy in the Ukraine crisis. At the same time, Germany’s hegemonic leadership in EU-Russia relations faces several challenges and limitations, which relate to the nature of Germany’s power, the consent of its allies and evolving domestic politics.
This article addresses the changing security environment in the Baltic Sea region and reviews the patterns of cooperation and conflict since the end of the Cold War. The exploration starts from the concerns voiced by analysts since 2014 that the Baltic Sea could become the scene for a military confrontation with Russia. The article reviews the scholarly debates and examines the insights gained from past developments in the region. It underlines the utility of cooperation to address emerging security challenges and highlights the drivers of insecurity and threat perceptions, revealing the importance of changes in the sense of identity and belonging across the region. The article situates the contributions to the Forum: The Return of Geopolitics to the Baltic Sea Region in the context of the lessons that can be drawn from the shifts and changes that have taken place in the region in the last three decades.
As the European Union (EU) grapples with multiple challenges, Manasi Singh argues that its presence as a more coherent and visible foreign policy actor needs renewed attention. Interestingly, the EU Global Strategy 2016 talks about a fully fledged role in Asia for the EU, emphasising economic diplomacy, inter-regionalism and scaling-up Europe’s security role in the region. Although the EU has been caught up with security issues in its neighbourhood, it is keen to ‘pivot’ towards Asia, given its high economic stakes and maritime interests in the region. The chapter discusses the EU’s normative aspirations in reinforcing and expanding a rules-based global order while simultaneously balancing its strategic interests in terms of regional powers in Asia.
Examining Russia-EU relations in terms of the forms and types of power tools they use, this book argues that the deteriorating relations between Russia and the EU lie in the deep differences in their preferences for the international status quo. These different approaches, combined with economic interdependence and geographic proximity, means both parties experience significant difficulties in shaping strategy and formulating agendas with regards to each other. The Russian leadership is well aware of the EU’s “authority orientation” but fails to reliably predict foreign policy at the EU level, whilst the EU realizes Russia’s “coercive orientation” in general, but cannot predict when and where coercive tools will be used next. Russia is gradually realizing the importance of authority, while the EU sees the necessity of coercion tools for coping with certain challenges. The learning process is ongoing but the basic distinction remains unchanged and so their approaches cannot be reconciled as long as both actors exist in their current form. Using a theoretical framework and case studies including Belarus, Georgia and Ukraine, Busygina examines the possibilities and constraints that arise when the “power of authority” and the “power of coercion” interact with each other, and how this interaction affects third parties.
This chapter explores Dirk Nabers’ notion of “disruptive processes” in the EU Eastern Partnership countries to scrutinize contested patterns of belonging amid continued talk of a “new Cold War” in light of the Ukraine Crisis. The arguments brought forward are that the crisis in Ukraine: (1) pointed to a case of ontological insecurity where the (narrated) existence and autobiography of Ukraine are challenged and reconfigured; (2) reflected a situation where, through mutual constitutions of othering/belonging, not only Ukraine was rendered ontologically insecure, but in particular Georgia as well; (3) led to a substantial refortification of already existing images of Self(s) and Other(s); and (4) showed that balancing images of (the) significant other(s) is a discursive strategy of rendering one ontologically secure again.
The Eurasian Economic Union is an institution formalized in January 2015 for the purpose of regional economic integration; it includes five countries: Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan, and may include Mongolia and Tajikistan in the future. With a GDP of 1.3 trillion in 2014, and population of almost 200 million as of 2016, the EEAU could represent a geopolitical success that supports both Putin's ambitious political agenda and the Union's economic prospects. Although the efforts of this Union are ongoing and long-term success is not certain, the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union can be considered a hybrid half-economics and half-political “Ianus Bifrons” that serves as a powerful illustration of what Putin envisions for the post-Soviet space. Despite promising steps so far, more should be done toward the achievement of economic development and balanced opportunity for all Eurasian countries. Russia's longstanding role within the Union, as well as its power and political motivations, are all considerations that must be accounted for.
The role of geopolitics in European Union (EU) foreign policy has been the focus of much media, political, and scholarly commentary. This literature has interrogated the topic from a number of perspectives, critically exploring, for example, the construction and embodiment of EU foreign policy, the geopolitics of regional cooperation within the EU, and the role of geopolitical imaginations in the creation of the EU. Far less literature, by contrast, has explored how the EU is viewed as a geopolitical actor by other entities. This paper begins to do this, by exploring how ideas of the EU have become an enduring geopolitical conception in post-Soviet Russia. It traces their evolution from the early 2000s, when Russia sought to emulate EU norms and values as part of a broader Westernising tendency in its foreign policy. Narratives about the EU were reworked in the context of the so-called ‘colour revolutions’ between 2003 and 2005, and have subsequently been revitalised since Vladimir Putin returned to the presidency in 2012. In these contexts, this paper critically scrutinises the evolution of the EU’s role within Russian practical geopolitical discourse and this role’s relations to other claims and visions of what it means for Russia to be a great power.
This article analyzes Russia’s retaliatory food embargo, explaining why the Russian government banned some imports from the West but refrained from banning a range of equally plausible others. I argue that Moscow was following a strategy of differentiated retaliation when selecting which imports to embargo. The countersanctions were not designed to mete out equal punishment on all members of the sanctioning coalition. Rather, Russia purposefully crafted the policy to inflict greater economic damage on some states than others. Utilizing an original data-set on all agricultural and food products that Russia imports, I demonstrate that, ceteris paribus, imports of sizeable commercial value to countries the Kremlin has long viewed as the mainstays of anti-Russian policies were far more likely to have been banned. In contrast, the evidence shows that Moscow stayed its hand in dealing with Europe’s major powers. This analysis both illuminates the policy objectives being pursued by a leading actor in world politics, as well as lays the groundwork for theoretically understanding the geostrategic, political, and economic drivers of countersanctions.
The article analyses the conflict between the EU and Russia over Ukraine and other countries in the common neighbourhood as a collision between two visions of European order: the liberal norms-based order, as perceived and represented by the EU, and Russia’s pursuit of a multipolar international order where major powers are entitled to a privileged role in their adjacent regions. It makes an analytical distinction between three dimensions of the conflict: first, the norms and values of political order; second, economic order, in other words the norms regulating economic activity; and third, European security order and, more broadly, the norms of international security. There are profound disagreements between the EU and Russia along each dimension. It is misleading to call the conflict ‘geopolitical’, if geopolitics is understood in the realist spirit as a zero-sum battle over who controls the region. What is at the core of the conflict is the norms and values of European order which define inter alia Ukraine’s place in Europe.
Conceptualizing the EU as a postmodern cooperative power that “transcends realism” provides ideological scaffolding for an exclusive conception of “Europe” and veils a zero-sum geopolitical project as “European integration”. Neoclassical realism considers assigning morally opposite political identities to the EU and Russia to be “rational” to the extent it strengthens internal cohesion and mobilizes resources to enhance security in accordance with the balance of power logic. Yet, the artificial binary construction can also produce a Manichean Trap when compromises required to enhance security are depicted as a betrayal of indispensable virtues and “Europe”. The ability to harmonize competing security interests diminishes as the conceptual space for comparing the EU and Russia is de-constructed. Competition is framed in uncompromising terms as “European integration” versus Russian “spheres of influence” and democracy versus authoritarianism.
Contrary to the popular narrative of ‘return’, the spheres of influence that have destabilized Ukraine are not a throwback to the nineteenth century. They are something new. What makes them new is explained here in a story of a failed experiment to escape geopolitics in a region between the borders of an enlarged European Union (EU) and Russia. This project created a ‘grey zone’ of overlapping authority, jurisdiction and allegiance out of which new spheres of influence emerged. Ukraine’s geopolitical misfortune was to be included into this ‘grey zone’. The logic of this new narrative of the Ukraine crisis is worked out with reference to the literature on neo-medievalism – a political theory that develops a critique of supranational projects like European integration.
This chapter examines the European Union’s (EU’s) role in the Ukraine crisis by putting it in the transatlantic context. It begins by analyzing the main contours of the EU’s policy vis-à-vis its eastern neighborhood. It then discusses the EU’s response to the rapidly unfolding crisis and eventual conflict in Ukraine and examines those efforts in a triangular context. The chapter concludes by assessing the EU’s overall performance in the crisis and makes a prognosis concerning the possible evolution of the EU’s role. The conclusion is that the EU policy line in the Ukraine crisis is not derivative of the US policy. It seems that the Ukraine crisis has, to a degree at least, helped the EU to come of age as an international actor.
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the conflict in eastern Ukraine represent the greatest security threat to western Europe since the end of the Cold War and a profound challenge to international norms. This volume is explicitly comparative, considering how the European Union and the United States responded to the same crisis. It also employs a ‘360-degree’ perspective, considering how the US and EU each regard the other in its dealings with Russia, and how Russia and Ukraine perceive them. This chapter sets the stage analytically for the other contributions by making the case for studying the EU’s foreign policy from a comparative perspective and setting out the triangular diplomacy framework. It concludes by introducing the other contributions to the volume.
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