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UNCORRECTED PROOF
Chapter 11
The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary
Commission: The Aftermath
Marco Odello
Contents
0
11.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......................................... 2661
11.2 TheFinalStagesoftheEEBC ................................................ 2672
11.3 Non-cooperation Between the Parties and the EEBC . . . . . . . . . .................... 2683
11.4 BadmeArea ............................................................... 2714
11.5 InternationalContext........................................................ 2725
11.6 EECC: Jus ad Bellum,BorderandConsistencyofDecisions ....................... 2746
11.7 Further Considerations on the Algiers Agreement and the EEBC Decision . . . . . . . . . . . 2797
11.8 Conclusions ............................................................... 2828
References ..................................................................... 2839
Abstract The border dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia never reached the final1
stage of physical demarcation of the border on the ground. The award decisions by2
the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission in 2002 and 2006 remained unimple-3
mented until today. The aim of this chapter is to revise the issues that surrounded4
the delimitation award in the context that followed that decision. In particular, this5
chapter considers some of the legal issues raised by the delimitation award and the6
border demarcation in relation to the decisions and processes that were adopted by7
the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission in the context of the 2000 Algiers Agree-8
ment. It also reflects on some issues that go beyond the strict legal analysis and that9
might explain the position of the parties to the dispute and their subsequent lack of10
cooperation in effectively concluding the process of delimitation and demarcation of11
the border, and therefore the related territorial dispute. Recent developments, partic-12
ularly in the last two years, may lead to some positive outcomes for the conclusion of13
this long-lasting situation of tension and disagreement between the two East African14
countries.15
The author is a Reader in Law at Aberystwyth University (UK).
M. Odello (B)
Department of Law and Criminology, Aberystwyth University, Penglais Campus, SY23 3FL
Aberystwyth, United Kingdom
e-mail: mmo@aber.ac.uk
© T.M.C. Asser Press and the authors 2021
A. de Guttry et al. (eds.), The 1998—2000 Eritrea-Ethiopia War and Its Aftermath in
International Legal Perspective,https://doi.org/10.1007/978- 94-6265- 439-6_11
265
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266 M. Odello
Keywords Algiers agreements ·Boundaries ·Boundary commission ·Claims16
commission ·Eritrea ·Ethiopia ·International law ·Demarcation ·Delimitation ·17
Maps ·Fragmentation18
11.1 Introduction19
The present chapter provides an updated review of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary20
Commission’s (EEBC) work and decision. It shall focus its analysis on the devel-21
opments that took place from 2007 until 2020. Therefore, relevant information and22
discussion of the work related to the EEBC before that date, which was discussed in23
the previous chapter,1shall be mentioned in a short way and references will be made24
to the relevant parts of that chapter, when necessary. In addition, there are several25
issues related to the 2018 Peace Agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia that are26
specifically discussed in another chapter2of this book; therefore, cross reference to27
that chapter will be made as well.28
The decision taken in 2002 by the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission in the29
form of an arbitration award3raised several issues in relation to the compliance by30
the two parties to the dispute, Eritrea and Ethiopia. Despite the fact that the two31
parties agreed, on 12 December 2000, in Algiers4(Algiers Agreement) that they32
would accept the Commission’s decision on the boundary delimitation as ‘final and33
binding’ (Article 4(15)), the issue of delimitation and demarcation of the boundary34
has led to subsequent disagreements between the two parties. A mixture of non-35
compliance, obstructionism and lack of collaboration from both Eritrea and Ethiopia36
led to a ‘period of no-war-no-peace’,5which ended formally in Asmara, the capital of37
Eritrea, on 9 July 2018, with the Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship between38
Eritrea and Ethiopia (2018 Joint Declaration of Peace).6This situation has therefore39
delayed the solution of the territorial dispute and the demarcation of the boundary40
between the two countries for another eighteen years.7
41
The aim of this chapter is to identify and discuss some of the relevant legal42
and surrounding issues that led to this delay. The chapter will consider events that43
surrounded and followed the EEBC decisions until 2020.44
1Kaikobad, Chap. 10.
2de Guttry, Chap. 32.
3See Kaikobad, Chap. 10, Sect. 10.5.1.
4On the Agreement, see Greppi and Poli, Chap. 4. The text of the Agreement is reproduced in
Appendix I to this volume.
5Müller 2019, p. 280.
6The text of the Joint Declaration is reproduced in Appendix I to this volume.
7Anebo 2017, pp. 257–295.
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11 The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission: The Aftermath 267
11.2 The Final Stages of the EEBC45
It should be stressed that the lack of cooperation by Eritrea and Ethiopia was clearly46
shown by the fact that neither of them attended the Commission’s meeting on 2047
November 2006 when also witnesses to the Algiers Agreement (United Nations48
Secretary-General, European Union, United States of America and Algeria) partic-49
ipated. Following this attitude by the parties to the dispute, the EEBC decided to50
complete the work of demarcation and ‘to interpret its procedures in a constructive51
manner directed towards achieving the objective the Parties are deemed to have had52
in mind’.8
53
The EEBC decided to fulfil its mandate by providing a list of boundary points54
identified by the EEBC itself using modern techniques of image processing and55
terrain modelling in conjunction with aerial photography. This work resulted in a56
list of geographical coordinates that was complemented by 45 maps illustrating the57
boundary points, which were attached to the Commission’s Statement.9The validity58
of this approach has been discussed extensively in the previous chapter,10 also in59
relation to the method of demarcation chosen by the EEBC. It is true that the demar-60
cation has been traditionally done on the ground, once the delimitation of the border61
is finalised,11 with the physical implantation of demarcation pillars or other markers62
on the ground that clearly and visibly define the border between countries.12 The63
two examples provided by the EEBC to support its method of demarcation by coor-64
dinates and maps, the Iraq/Kuwait case in the part concerning the maritime border65
delimitation and demarcation and the Beagle Channel award, might not be the best66
examples, because the reference is to maritime borders, where the implantation of67
pillars may not be a feasible option. However, the fact that both Eritrea and Ethiopia68
did not cooperate with the demarcation process did not leave many other options to69
the EEBC. It is difficult to disagree with the EEBC choice. Furthermore, by using70
analogy as a method of interpretation, it could be suggested that if the coordinates71
system is valid to demarcate a maritime border, as recognised also by UNCLOS,72
this method could work also on land borders. The fact that the demarcation has been73
usually carried on with the implantation of pillars on the ground also does not take74
into consideration further developments in scientific and cartographic tools. Satellite75
images, aerial photographs and Global Positioning System (GPS) can provide more76
precise images of the terrestrial surface. They could also support new and different77
ways to determine, in a sufficiently precise manner, the identification of points where78
the border between two or more countries can be demarcated.13 Therefore, it should79
not be difficult to accept the more innovative approach taken by the EEBC, also80
8EEBC, Statement by the Commission, 27 November 2006, PCA Case No. 2001-01, para 17.
9Statement by the Commission 2006 (above n 8) paras 20–21.
10Kaikobad, Chap. 10, Sect. 10.8.3.
11ICJ, Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment, 3
February 1994, ICJ Rep 1994, p. 6, para 56.
12See African Union Border Programme (2013), Chap. 2.
13See Adler 2001.
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268 M. Odello
because of the obstructionist and un-cooperative attitude of the parties, who actu-81
ally should be considered responsible for not complying bona fide with the Algiers82
Agreement. It is actually quite surprising that the two States objected at the EEBC83
method of demarcation, when they did not comply with the obligations that they84
agreed upon and therefore were legally binding on them.85
11.3 Non-cooperation Between the Parties and the EEBC86
The previous chapter ended with the EEBC declaring itself functus officio for the87
purposes of the boundary demarcation.14 Probably, the frustration of the members of88
the EEBC facing the lack of collaboration by the two parties involved in the dispute,89
particularly in the period between 27 November 2006 and 30 November 2007, left no90
other choice than putting a unilateral end to its activities. The EEBC reiterated that91
its Delimitation Decision of 13 April 2002 and the Decision of 27 November 200692
were conclusive and binding on the parties.15 Despite the request by the Eritrean93
President to continue the EEBC mandate until the final demarcation of the border,94
Ethiopia replied to the letter, insisting that the method of demarcation by coordinates95
would not be a valid method under international law.16
96
From the content of the letters submitted by Eritrea and Ethiopia in 2007, it is97
clear that the two parties had quite different approaches. The two letters submitted by98
Eritrea’s President and by Lea Brilmayer, Legal Advisor to the President of Eritrea,99
despite several unclear statements regarding the acceptance of the EEBC decisions,100
show at least an interest in supporting the continuation of the work by the EEBC. The101
letter by Ethiopia had a different tone. It did not show any interest in the continuation102
of the EEBC work and, apart from refusing the use of coordinates as a method of103
demarcation of the border, it also refused to appoint a new EEBC Panel Member, to104
replace Sir Arthur Watts, who had died that same year.105
The end of the EEBC was probably welcomed by Ethiopia because the EEBC106
decision gave the city of Badme to Eritrea. This seems to be the main reason for107
Ethiopia, even if not clearly stated in the official documents, to disregard the EEBC108
decision and try to raise all possible objections to the decisions that were taken by109
the EEBC.110
The main question here is whether the EEBC could decide which method, as111
discussed before, was best suitable to define the delimitation of the boundary, as112
both parties agreed to accept the decision of the EEBC. At the same time, the EEBC113
declared that the decision on the border was based on existing international law114
standards and rules, according to the mandate provided by the Algiers Agreement.115
14UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, 23 January 2008, S/2008/40,
Annex II, Twenty-sixth report of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, para 11.
15Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea 2008 (above n 14) Annex II, para 10.
16Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea 2008 (above n 14) Attachments I, II and
III.
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11 The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission: The Aftermath 269
When establishing the creation of the EEBC, both Eritrea and Ethiopia agreed,116
under Article 4(12) of the 12 December 2000 Algiers Agreement,17 that the delim-117
itation of the border ‘should be completed within six months of the first meeting118
of the Commission’ and called upon the Commission to arrange for ‘expeditious119
demarcation’.18
120
Despite this strong interest of the parties to solve their territorial dispute, at least121
on paper, it is relevant to underline that the 27 November 2006 Statement19 by122
the EEBC mentioned the non-cooperation of the parties in the first footnote to that123
document.20 The EEBC document refers in particular to the Beagle Channel case21
124
and the position adopted by the International Court of Arbitration.22 In that case, the125
problem was raised by the Argentine Declaration of Nullity23 of the arbitral award.126
In the present case, the situation was quite different, as none of the parties explicitly127
declared the nullity of the decisions by the EEBC. The analogy with that case was128
based on the non-cooperation of the parties ‘in different ways and degrees’,24 and129
the analogy made by the EEBC with the Beagle Channel case was based on the a130
fortiori method of legal arguments and interpretation. However, this does not seem131
the correct way to apply the a fortiori method which requires a stronger and a132
weaker position in an Aristoteles syllogism logical deduction process. In reality, what133
happened in this case was that the parties did not reject the decisions (this would134
be the stronger position), but they were not collaborating enough with the EEBC.135
The a fortiori interpretation would work the other way round. If the parties do not136
cooperate, then a fortiori, if one or both reject the decision, the rule would apply.137
More than an a fortiori, this looks like as a minore ad maius way of interpretation. In138
fact, the Commission considered that the lower level of commitment by the parties139
would justify the ending of its services. This argument is less common in legal140
reasoning; however, there is little scope to delve into this interpretative discussion141
at this stage. Possibly, a more coherent way to address this situation, based on the142
agreement between the parties, under the Algiers Agreement’s obligations, and their143
subsequent performance, would have been for the EEBC to invoke the bona fide,or144
good faith, and the principle pacta sunt servanda, both well-established principles145
in international law. As the International Court of Justice affirmed:146
One of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal obligations ...147
is good faith. Trust and confidence are inherent in international cooperation, in particular in148
an age when this cooperation in many fields is becoming increasingly essential. Just as the149
17Algiers Agreement (above n 4).
18Algiers Agreement (above n 4) Article 4(13).
19Statement by the Commission 2006 (above n 8).
20Statement by the Commission 2006 (above n 8) Footnote 1.
21Case concerning a dispute between Argentina and Chile concerning the Beagle Channel,18
February 1977, RIAA XXI (2006), part II, pp.53–264.
22For a full discussion on this point, see Kaikobad, Chap. 10, Sect. 10.5.2.
23Argentina to Chile, 25 January 1978, ILR 52:93, pp. 268–277.
24Statement by the Commission 2006 (above n 8) footnote 1.
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270 M. Odello
very rule of pacta sunt servanda in the law of treaties is based on good faith, so also is the
150
binding character of an international obligation.25
151
Furthermore, the ICJ considered that good faith implies a duty ‘to give effect to152
the Judgment of the Court’.26 This duty would imply meaningful compliance.27
153
The performance of the two parties, in different ways, showed that they were not154
offering enough support and cooperation to the work of the EEBC. In May 2002, after155
the publication of the award, Ethiopia tried to ask for a revision of the 2002 Delimita-156
tion Decision under the disguised request of interpretation of the decision;28 a request157
that was dismissed by the EEBC.29 Both parties decided not to take part in further158
discussion regarding an agreement on the emplacement of pillars for the demarcation159
on the ground of the border between 27 November 2006 and 30 November 2007. In160
addition, the official letters sent to the EEBC by both Governments at the end of the161
Commission’s work included unclear statements in relation to the acceptance of the162
decisions by the EEBC and displayed different forms of complaints and accusations163
between the two Governments. It is also worth mentioning that on 25 September164
2007 the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry issued a press statement accusing Eritrea of165
material breach of the 2000 Algiers Agreement, and that Ethiopia was entitled to166
consider its legal options including the suspension or termination of the Agreement167
either in whole or in part.30 No further actions followed in this direction, however,168
this type of message shows the context in which the two parties were dealing with169
the dispute.170
In the next two sections, the main area of concern and the possible main reasons171
behind the non-cooperation between the two parties will be discussed. Section 11.4172
shall consider in particular the Badme area, which was the main cause of disappoint-173
ment by Ethiopia. Section 11.5 shall look at the wider international context where174
the two States found themselves, until the most recent developments that occurred175
between 2018 and 2020.176
25ICJ, Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, 20 December 1974, ICJ Rep 1974, p. 253,
para 46.
26ICJ, Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), 25 September 1997, ICJ Rep 1997, p. 7,
paras 141–147.
27Paulson 11.2004, pp. 435–436, citing Chayes and Chayes (1995) The New Sovereignty: Compli-
ance with International Regulatory Agreements, Harvard UniversityPress, Cambridge MA, London,
pp. 17–22.
28Request for Interpretation, Correction and Consultation Submitted by the Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia, 13 May 2002; see also Kaikobad, Chap. 10, Sect. 10.8.1.
29UNSC, Progress Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, 30 August 2002,
S/2002/977, Annex I, Sixth Report of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, para 3.
30Blunt 2007, Ethiopia sends warning to Eritrea https://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/701352
9.stm. Accessed 5 June 2020.
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11 The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission: The Aftermath 271
11.4 Badme Area177
The main area of dispute in the whole border delimitation was certainly the so-called178
Western Sector31 of the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia, in particular in the Irob179
district and around the village of Badme.32 This was the main area where clashes,180
which started in May 1998, led to the war between the two countries.33
181
This particular aspect of the decision was immediately raised by Ethiopia soon182
after the award by the EEBC.34 In fact, Ethiopia rejected the EEBC 2002 decision183
to allocate the village of Badme to Eritrea, and expressed this view in a letter by the184
Prime Minister to the United Nations defining the decision by the Commission in this185
area as ‘totally illegal, unjust and irresponsible’.35 At the same time, Ethiopia did not186
allow access to that area for demarcation purposes, claiming security concerns. The187
reply by the President36 of the EEBC to Ethiopia’s criticism of the decision was that188
the delimitation process of the border was based on the relevant colonial treaties, as189
defined by the Algiers Agreement. The decision followed relevant international law,190
because the Algiers Agreement expressly requested the application of relevant rules191
of international law, and excluded the possible decision based on ex aequo et bono.37
192
It further supported this conclusion by citing a similar case decided by the ICJ in193
Cameroon v Nigeria where the Court said that: ‘it has no power to modify a delimited194
boundary line, even in a case where a village previously situated on one side of the195
boundary has spread beyond it. It is instead up to the parties to find a solution to196
any resultant problems, with a view to respecting the rights and interests of the local197
population’.38
198
This approach was also in line with Article 4(16) of the Algiers Agreement,199
which on this point specifically foresaw that ’the parties request the United Nations200
to facilitate resolution of problems which may arise due to the transfer of territorial201
control, including the consequences for individuals residing in previously disputed202
territory’. Therefore, the claim by one of the parties that a variation of the border203
would affect the local populations due to the change of jurisdiction was already204
envisaged as a possible consequence of the process of delimitation and subsequent205
demarcation.206
31See Kaikobad, Chap. 10, Sect. 10.4.
32Guazzini, Chap. 7, Sect. 7.8.
33See Bereketeab 2009, p. 110.
34Zane 2003, Ethiopia regrets Badme ruling https://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/2914559.stm.
Accessed 4 May 2020.
35UNSC, Progress report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, 19 December 2003,
S/2003/1186, Annex I, Eleventh report on the work of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission,
paras 4 and 10.
36Eleventh Report of the Commission (above n 35) Appendix I, para 10.
37Algiers Agreement (above n 4) Article 4(2); see also Kaikobad, Chap. 10, Sect. 10.5.1.
38ICJ, Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria),
Judgment, 10 October 2002, ICJ Rep 2002, p. 303, para 123. See also para 107.
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272 M. Odello
It would have been more appropriate to draft the mandate and the applicable207
legal rules in a more precise way, to avoid some interpretative problems that shall be208
discussed below.209
11.5 International Context210
Apart from the legal discussion on the EEBC decision and subsequent stalemate on211
the demarcation process, it is also relevant to understand some of the surrounding212
issues that led to the lack of cooperation between Eritrea and Ethiopia.213
The Framework Agreement and the Modalities for its Implementation of July214
199939 and the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities of June 2000 (with the support215
of the European Union and the United States of America)40 were both endorsed216
by the Organization of African Unity (OAU, later African Union – AU) and by the217
United Nations (UN).41
218
The 2000 Algiers Agreement was followed by the UN Mission in Ethiopia and219
Eritrea (UNMEE) that was established in 2000 by UN Security Council Resolu-220
tions 1312 and 1320.42 A Temporary Security Zone,43 foreseen by the 2000 Algiers221
Agreement, was established mainly in the 25-mile area within the Eritrean territory,222
as Eritrea lost the 1998–2000 war with Ethiopia. This area was created to facilitate223
the ceasefire and the deployment of the UN peacekeeping mission, which should224
have guaranteed the separation between the two parties, and later support the work225
of the EEBC in the delimitation and demarcation of the border.44
226
In August 2002, the UN Security Council revised the mandate of UNMEE ‘in227
order to assist the Boundary Commission in the expeditious and orderly implemen-228
tation of the Delimitation Decision’ and called upon the parties ‘to cooperate fully229
and promptly with the Boundary Commission, including by implementing without230
conditions its binding Demarcation Directions’.45
231
Parallel to that initiative, in December 2003, and following Ethiopia’s formal rejec-232
tion of the EEBC decision, the UN Secretary-General appointed Lloyd Axworthy as233
39OAU Framework Agreement and the Modalities, endorsed by the 35th Ordinary Session of the
Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Algiers, Algeria, 12-14 July 1999.
40Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities Between The Government of The Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia and The Government of The State of Eritrea, 18 June 2000. The text of the
Agreement is annexed to Letter dated 19 June 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Algeria
to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, 19 June 2000, S/2000/601.
41See the Preamble to the 2000 Algiers Agreement (above n 4).
42UNSC Res 1320 (2000), 15 September 2000, S/RES/1320; see also de Guttry, Chap. 5.
43See UNSC, Progress report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, 12 January 2001,
S/2001/45.
44Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities (above n 40) paras 3 and 14.
45UNSC Res 1430 (2002), 14 August 2002, S/RES/1430. The final and binding nature of the EEBC
decision was reaffirmed in UNSC Res 1434 (2002), 6 September 2002, S/RES/1434, and UNSC
Res 1507 (2003), 12 September 2003, S/RES/1507.
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11 The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission: The Aftermath 273
special envoy, with the task to support the implementation of the decision and coop-234
eration between the two countries. Eritrea interpreted this as conceding to Ethiopia’s235
demand for an alternative mechanism, and refused to meet the special envoy.46
236
At the same time, the Security Council explicitly referred to ‘Ethiopia’s ongoing237
rejection of significant parts of the Boundary Commission’s decision, and its current238
lack of cooperation with the Boundary Commission’.47 It also asked that ‘Ethiopia239
accept fully and without further delay the final and binding decision of the Eritrea-240
Ethiopia Boundary Commission and take immediately concrete steps to enable,241
without preconditions, the Commission to demarcate the border completely and242
promptly’.48
243
Two years later, the UN Security Council, in Resolution 1741 (2007), repeated its244
call for Ethiopia to accept ‘fully and without delay the final and binding decision of245
the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission and take immediately concrete steps to246
enable, without preconditions, the Commission to demarcate the border completely247
and promptly’ and for Eritrea to ‘immediately withdraw its troops and equipment248
from the Temporary Security Zone’.49
249
Eritrea tried to restrict UN activities in the Temporary Security Zone and asked for250
limitations on UNMEE such as ‘restrictions on road travel and a ban on helicopter251
flights, which directly impinged on UNMEE’s ability to fulfil its mission. It also252
affected evacuations by air of ill and injured UN personnel. Eritrea then demanded253
that all European and North American staff be withdrawn from UNMEE, leading to254
the hasty removal of around 180 members of staff’.50 It also occupied parts of the255
zone with armed personnel.51
256
The end of UNMEE in 200852 led to further tensions and sporadic skirmishes on257
the border, such as the Tsorona Incident in June 2016.53
258
46Healy and Plaut 2007,p.5.
47UNSC Res 1560 (2004), 14 September 2004, S/RES/1560.
48UNSC Res 1640 (2005), 23 November 2005, S/RES/1640. See also UNSC Res 1661 (2006), 14
March 2006, S/RES/1661, which demanded that the parties comply fully with Res 1640 (2005) and
extended for one month the mandate of UNMEE.
49UNSC Res 1741 (2007), 30 January 2007, S/RES/1741. The parties were also called upon to
cooperate fully with the Commission and to refrain from any threat or use of force against each
other. UNMEE mandate was extended for a further six months and its personnel reduced. See also
UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, 22 January 2007, S/2007/33; and
UNSC Res 1681 (2006), 31 May 2006, S/RES/1681, and UNSC Res 1710 (2006), 29 September
2006, S/RES/1710.
50Healy and Plaut 2007,p.5.
51UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, 18 July 2007, S/2007/440.
52UNSC Res 1827 (2008), 30 July 2008, S/RES/1827, by which the Council decides to terminate the
UNMEE mandate effective on 31 July 2008; UNSC Res 1798 (2008), 30 January 2008, S/RES/1798,
by which the Council, concerned about the tense security situation in the TSZ and adjacent areas,
extended the mandate of UNMEE for a period of six months, until 31 July 2008.
53BBC News (2016) Ethiopia and Eritrea blame each other for border clash https://www.bbc.co.
uk/news/world-africa-36515503. Accessed 1 June 2020.
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274 M. Odello
In 2009, the UN decided to adopt sanctions again Eritrea,54 which were lifted on259
14 November 2018,55 following the signature of a new pace agreement between the260
two States that shall be discussed below.261
At this stage, to understand the attitude of the two parties and their lack of coop-262
eration and collaboration, the parallel work of the ad hoc Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims263
Commission (EECC), foreseen under the Algiers Agreement,56 should be briefly264
discussed.265
11.6 EECC: Jus ad Bellum, Border and Consistency266
of Decisions267
The Algiers Agreement foresaw the creation of three bodies, but only two of them268
were actually established: the EEBC, already mentioned before, and the EECC that269
would investigate violations of International Humanitarian Law57 and determine270
the amount of damages during the 1998–2000 war. The EECC provided a series271
of awards and concluded its work with the final award in 2009.58 For the purpose272
of this analysis, the focus will be on the initial partial award on Jus ad Bellum59
273
because this award raises international legal issues related to the EEBC decision,274
and may have been an incentive for the parties not to comply, or not to engage, with275
the delimitation process. For this purpose, it is important to look at the main legal276
issues raised by the claims award, and then look at the possible implications of the277
decision, not only between the parties, but also in relation to the consistency, and the278
possible significance of coherence between two main decisions adopted by the two279
Commissions.280
The jurisdiction ratione materiae of the EECC was defined in Article 5 of the281
Algiers Agreement.60 The main problem in the mandate regards which acts and282
legal obligations should be considered by the EECC. The mandate was limited to283
claims related to violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) committed284
during the 1998–2000 armed conflict. This would mean, under the generally agreed285
meaning of IHL, to jus in bello. There was no explicit reference to issues related to286
54UNSC Res 1907 (2009), 23 December 2009, S/RES/1907; UNSC Res 2023 (2011), 5 December
2011, S/RES/2023; UNSC Res 2060 (2012), 25 July 2012, S/RES/2060; and UNSC Res 2111
(2013), 24 July 2013, S/RES/2111.
55UNSC Res 2444 (2018) 14 November 2018, S/RES/2444.
56Algiers Agreement (above n 4) Article 5(1).
57See Venturini, Chap. 15.
58Weeramantry 2010.
59Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Partial Award: Jus Ad Bellum, Ethiopia’s Claims 1–8,19
December 2005, PCA Case No. 2001-02. See also Weeramantry, Chap. 12, and Ponti, Chap. 14.
60For a full analysis of the legal issues related to the use of force and aggression, see Part IV of this
book.
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11 The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission: The Aftermath 275
the jus ad bellum, therefore to the assessment of the legality concerning the use of287
force by one of the parties.61
288
Furthermore, Article 3(1) and 3(2) of the Algiers Agreement unmistakably deter-289
mined that a third ad hoc body would be set up to investigate issues related to the290
violation of the jus ad bellum and the legality of the use of force between the two291
countries in 1998.292
It is also worth noting that the EECC affirmed, at the beginning of its work, that:293
Moreover, the Commission’s mandate under Article 5 must be construed so as to be in294
harmony with the overall institutional structure established by the Agreement. In this regard,295
the Parties gave two other institutions clear and expansive mandates regarding events that296
occurred before the outbreak of the armed conflict. It is difficult to see how this Commission297
could inquire into and pass judgment regarding events prior to 6 May 1998 without running298
afoul of the mandates of these other bodies.62
299
However, it is clear from the subsequent expansion of its mandate and from the300
awards’ decisions that the EECC did not follow its initial statement in a coherent301
way.302
The EECC defined its mandate in a broader sense, using different, but not very303
convincing arguments and reasons, such as:304
•The fact that the ad hoc body had not been established was a main justification
305
for the EECC to extend its jurisdiction on the determination of the aggressor;63
306
•That Article 5 and the parties in their claims64 referred to ‘other violations of307
international law’.308
It has been argued that the EECC was granted jurisdiction to determine ‘all claims309
… (a) related to the conflict … and (b) result from international humanitarian law310
… or other violations of international law’. Therefore, the violations of international311
law would include also the prohibition on the use of force, under Article 2(4) of the312
UN Charter. According to Weeramantry, ‘without clear evidence to the contrary …313
it is difficult to understand why a violation of the jus ad bellum would not fall within314
the scope of an “international law” violation’,65 because this exclusion should have315
been clearly stated at the end of Article 5(1). This approach is not fully convincing316
for the following reasons. The fact that the parties did not exclude does not automati-317
cally means that they agreed. In addition, the reference to Article 31(1) of the Vienna318
61Gray 2006, pp. 704–707.
62EECC, Decision Number 1: The Commission’s Mandate/Temporal Scope of Jurisdiction, August
2001, PCA Case No. 2001-02, para D.
63Jus Ad Bellum 2005 (above n 59).
64See, for instance, EECC, Final Award:Pensions,Eritrea’s Claims 15, 19 & 23, 19 December 2005,
PCA Case No. 2001-02; Partial Award: Diplomatic Claim,Eritrea’s Claim 20, 19 December 2005,
PCA Case No. 2001-02; and Partial Award: Diplomatic Claim, Ethiopia’s Claim 8, 19 December
2005, PCA Case No. 2001-02.
65Weeramantry, Chap. 12, Sect. 12.3.
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276 M. Odello
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT),66 concerning interpretation of interna-319
tional agreements, seems to be used in a selective way.67 Article 31(1) certainly refers320
to the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the terms used in the treaty. However, those terms used321
in the treaty should be interpreted in ‘their context and in the light of its object and322
purpose’. Therefore, the two parties agreed in Article 3(1) of the Algiers Agreement323
to establish a specific ad hoc independent and impartial body ‘In order to determine324
the origins of the conflict’. This body—not the EECC—was supposed to determine325
the jus ad bellum. Furthermore, the initial part of Article 5(1) of the Algiers Agree-326
ment refers to the ‘the negative socio-economic impact of the crisis’ between the two327
countries, and to ‘all claims for loss, damage or injury by one Government against328
the other, and by nationals (including both natural and juridical persons) of one party329
against the Government of the other party or entities owned or controlled by the other330
party’.331
This wording clearly refers to economic damages, and the claims related to viola-332
tions of IHL and other rules of international law that may have caused those economic333
damages. The same definition of ‘claim’ under international law is quite general. The334
ILC Articles on State Responsibility do not define the meaning of claim. They refer335
to claims by injured States in relation to violations of international obligations (Arti-336
cles 43, 44, 45, 48) and the term is used either as noun or as a verb. The term refers337
in general to some form of demand by virtue of a right; or a demand for some-338
thing as due; an assertion of a right or an alleged right. This term is often used in339
the context of State international responsibility, but is also generally used in human340
rights law, in general international law, as in this case, to raise alleged rights of one341
party against another, based on international obligations and to justify the existence342
of an international dispute68 in front of an international adjudicatory body. It is not343
the purpose here to discuss in details the nature and meaning of ‘claim’, but certainly344
the word has several meanings, and it is relevant to identify its real meaning in a345
specific international agreement by taking into consideration, as suggested before,346
the context and the purposes of the parties.347
A further issue that is worth mentioning is that the determination of the aggressor348
is not only a matter for international responsibility but also a matter for international349
criminal law,69 as there is a specific crime of aggression under international law.70
350
Determining the responsibility for an act of aggression has also possible further351
ramifications for the application of international criminal responsibility. This does352
not seem the original purpose of the EECC, but rather the function of a separate ad hoc353
66Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969.
67Weeramantry, Chap. 12, Sect. 12.3.
68A dispute was broadly defined by the Permanent Court of International Justice as ‘a disagreement
on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests between two persons’, PCIJ, Mavro-
mattis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. United Kingdom), Judgment (Preliminary Objections), 30
August 1924, PCIJ Rep Series A, No. 2, p. 11.
69See Dekker and Werner, Chap. 13.
70Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, Article 8 bis; ICC, Assembly of
State Parties, Resolution ICC-ASP/16/Res.5 on the activation of the jurisdiction of the Court over
the crime of aggression, 14 December 2017.
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11 The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission: The Aftermath 277
body, or in its absence, the UN Security Council or the International Criminal Court.354
However, under IHL States that are parties to the armed conflict are responsible for355
violations of IHL without the need to determine which party was also responsible for356
starting the armed conflict. The two issues should be considered independently from357
each other71 and should not influence the application of IHL rules72 when dealing358
with the breaches of those rules.73
359
To provide further support to this line of reasoning, it is worth noting that when360
looking at the composition of the EECC, ‘the main area of expertise of a majority of361
the arbitrators is in private international law and international commercial arbitration,362
rather than in the field of ius ad bellum’.74 This may say something to explain the363
original perception, and intentions, of the two States in relation to the type of claims364
that they were supposed to file and argue in front of the EECC.365
A much more convincing justification for the expanded powers of the EECC in366
taking a decision in relation to jus ad bellum is the subsequent behaviour of the367
parties. This is in conformity with Article 31(b) VCLT that, for the purposes of368
interpretation, takes into account ‘any subsequent practice in the application of the369
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation’. As370
Ethiopia and Eritrea engaged on the discussion of the jus ad bellum claims, it would371
result that they accepted the jurisdiction of the EECC on this specific set of claims.372
Once it is clarified the context where the decisions were taken, it is relevant373
to address the possible consequences that the decision taken by the EECC had on374
the aftermath of the EEBC. Christine Gray correctly pointed out the relevance and375
reciprocal influence of the two decisions, particularly in relation to the determinations376
concerning the use of force and the occupation of territories by the two parties.75
377
Those disputed territories were actually part of the border dispute under the EEBC378
mandate. The EEBC established Eritrea’s sovereignty on those disputed areas around379
Bame, and the EECC declared that Eritrea unlawfully attacked Ethiopia in those same380
areas.381
It is arguable that this inconsistency created the idea, between the two parties to382
the dispute, that there was some kind of contradiction between the two Commis-383
sions’ decisions, with possible negative consequences for the implementation of the384
EEBC decision related to the border delimitation. In fact, Eritrea, which was consid-385
ered responsible for the unlawful use of force, in breach of Article 2(4) of the UN386
Charter, under the EECC Jus ad Bellum Decision, would not possibly agree with that387
conclusion, as the area of Badme, according to the EEBC decision, would have been388
71For this debate see: American Society of International Law 2006; Weeramantry, Chap. 12;and
Gill, Chap. 19, Sect. 19.2.
72Articles 1 and 2 common to the Four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.
73Four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Article 50 of Convention I, Article 51 of Convention
II, Article 130 of Convention III, Article 147 of Convention IV, all defining the content of ‘grave
breaches’ of the Conventions.
74Gray 2006, p. 707.
75Gray 2006.
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278 M. Odello
within its original borders. Therefore, Eritrea would consider its use of force justi-389
fied by trying to regain an area that was illegally occupied by Ethiopia. On the other390
side, Ethiopia could consider that because the EECC decision determined that Eritrea391
started the war illegally, the area around Badme was actually under its control, and392
therefore its original claims were justified by the subsequent practice by the parties,393
and that Badme’s area was under its actual administration. This issue is not discussed394
here, as it is well analysed in other parts of this book.76
395
However, it is worth noting, as clearly expressed by Gray, that the EECC ‘showed396
little awareness of relevant decisions of the International Court of Justice or of397
doctrinal debates. Most seriously, it showed little respect for the award of the398
Boundary Commission’.77
399
Whatever the justification given by the EECC for delivering the Jus ad Bellum400
Decision, the issue raises a more general debate in relation to the coordination and401
consistency of international courts and tribunals. An issue that is often associated to402
the phenomenon of ‘fragmentation’78 of international law resulting from the prolif-403
eration of international agreements and jurisdictions. However, in this specific case,404
there should not be a case of fragmentation, as the two Commissions were estab-405
lished under the same Algiers Agreement. Therefore, more coordination, harmoni-406
sation and consistency would be expected, due to the fact that: ‘Treaty interpretation407
is diplomacy, and it is the business of diplomacy to avoid or mitigate conflict. This408
extends to adjudication as well’.79 A more coherent and harmonised approach by409
the EECC in interpreting its mandate would have probably followed more closely410
the real intention of the parties. This would imply, in a more general perspective,411
that when delivering its services in solving an international dispute, an adjudicating412
body’s award ‘must result in part from the wish of States parties to negotiate issues413
of apparent conflict between themselves and not to give the power to outsiders to414
decide on what may appear as coordinating difficulties that may have their roots415
already in the heterogeneous interests represented in national administrations. And416
negotiation is rarely about the “application” of conflict-rules rather than trying to417
find a pragmatic solution that could re-establish the disturbed harmony’.80
418
76See Weeramantry, Chap. 12, Sect. 12.3; and Gill, Chap. 19.
77Gray 2006, p. 707.
78See ILC, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and
Expansion of International Law: Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission,
13 April 2006, A/CN.4/L.682.
79Ibid., para 37.
80Ibid., para 41, citing Borgen (2005) Resolving Treaty Conflicts, George Washington International
Law Review 37:573–648, pp. 605–606.
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11 The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission: The Aftermath 279
11.7 Further Considerations on the Algiers Agreement419
and the EEBC Decision420
The lack of cooperation by the two States cannot be limited to mere legal interpre-421
tation, and is the result of a variety of issues that require some considerations and422
discussion.81 In particular, whether the Algiers Agreement’s terms and the mandate423
of the EEBC might have been framed differently, so that the parties might have been424
willing to implement the decision more effectively. The different positions of the425
two countries in relation to the relevance and application of international law to their426
border dispute is a non-secondary element, as clearly discussed by Clapham,82 that427
should be taken into consideration when looking at the overall picture of the dispute.428
It has been pointed out that because Ethiopia won the 1998-2000 war, it was also429
expecting that the area of Badme would fall within its territory as a kind of ‘reward’.83
430
However, this option was difficult to be included in the EEBC decision due to the431
clear reference, under the Algiers Agreement, to delimit the border on the basis of432
pre-existing colonial treaties (1900, 1902 and 1908), limiting the EEBC margin of433
manoeuvre in taking decisions that would consider human and geographical factors.84
434
The mandate in the Algiers Agreement might have been more carefully worded.435
First, there were pre-existing border treaties, but they were drafted during the colonial436
time, a time when agreements were often based on unequal positions and treatment437
between the Powers and territories involved in the negotiations. Those treaties were438
based on the interests of the European colonial powers, and certainly not on the439
interests of the existing local governments, and definitely without any consideration440
of the local population affected by the new boundaries.85
441
It is also a fact that the general rule in international law regarding borders and new442
States’ boundaries is based on the uti possidetis principle.86 Therefore, borders of new443
independent States should follow the lines and maps drafted prior to independence,444
often defined during colonial times. This approach creates a tension between the two445
international law principles of self-determination and territorial integrity, as well446
discussed in Guazzini’s chapter in this book. The principle was recognised in 1964447
by the OAU87 and it was invoked in African territorial disputes.88 The principle was448
81See Pratt 2006.
82Clapham, Chap. 9.
83Bereketeab 2009, p. 111. See also Zondi and Rejouis 2006; Healy and Plaut 2007;Plaut2005.
84Pratt 2006, pp. 333–335.
85See Guazzini, Chap. 7, Sect. 7.2.
86See Kohen and Hébié 2018, pp. 206–215.
87OAU, Resolution AHG/Res. 16(I), adopted at the first session of the Conference of African Heads
of State and Government, Cairo, Egypt, 7–21 July 1964; and later included in Article 4(b) of the
Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU).
88See ICJ, Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Mali), Judgment, 22 December 1986, ICJ Rep 1986,
p. 554, paras 20–26; Frontier Dispute (Benin/Niger), Judgment, 12 July 2005, ICJ Rep 2005, p. 90,
paras 24–28 and 45; Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Niger), Judgment, 16 April 2013, ICJ Rep
2013, p. 44, para 63.
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280 M. Odello
acknowledged in the Algiers Agreement, as Article 4(1) declares that ‘the parties449
reaffirm the principle of respect for the borders existing at independence as stated450
in resolution AHG/Res. 16(1) adopted by the OAU Summit in Cairo in 1964’. This451
condition, jointly with the subsequent Article 4(2) narrowing the decision of the452
EEBC to existing colonial treaties and rules of international law, de facto and de jure453
limited the possibility for the EECB to substantially revise the border in its decision.454
However, the uti possidetis principle, despite being widely invoked and used in455
international territorial disputes, is not a jus cogens norm. The parties to the dispute456
may still negotiate and define new borders, or invoke different criteria. It may seem457
awkward that two States, both victims of colonialism, decided to keep their border458
along the lines that were decided during their colonial times. Considering the fact that459
several armed conflicts, international and non-international, in Africa find their origin460
from colonially drafted borders,89 it would have been wiser to include some other461
rules concerning, for instance, the consideration of local populations affected by the462
boundary dispute, mentioning, for example, international human rights provisions.463
However, the colonial times and experience may be perceived and interpreted in464
quite different ways by different countries. In particular, for Eritrea, and the area465
of Tigray on the border with Ethiopia, the colonial and post-colonial times were a466
way to assert its identity as a new country, resulting from the decolonisation and467
independence processes.90
468
It is also relevant to take into account that, in 2000, Eritrea and Ethiopia were469
coming out of an armed conflict, so it was probably difficult to enter in complex470
diplomatic negotiations on a new border. Therefore, the EEBC was perhaps consid-471
ered to be a more neutral institution to facilitate an expedite solution to the ongoing472
dispute.473
A second issue should also be considered. That is the request for a very rapid474
decision by the EEBC.91 The Algiers Agreement set very short deadlines for the475
starting of the work and delivery of the decision regarding the delimitation and476
demarcation of the border. These requirements, with hindsight, were probably too477
tight, as they did not give the parties enough time to discuss and revise their position478
on the disputed areas. This view was also expressed by the former President of479
the EEBC, Sir Lauterpacht, in an interview including his views on the work of the480
EEBC.92 Furthermore, it seems that there was some confusion regarding the title481
over Badme, in the initial circulation of information regarding the EEBC decision.93
482
All these elements created a situation of uncertainty in relation to the implementation483
89See Boyd 1979; Kornprobst 2002; Nguendi 2012.
90Bereketeab 2010, pp. 20–29.
91Pratt 2006, pp. 335–336.
92See Conversations with Professor Sir Elihu Lauterpacht. Fifth Interview: The Nineties and new
Millennium, 28 March 2008. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1810/197070/
Eli%20Lauterpacht%20interview%205%20transcript%20-%2028%20March%202008.pdf?seq
uence=3. Accessed 2 May 2020.
93See Healy and Plaut 2007,p.4.
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11 The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission: The Aftermath 281
of the Algiers Agreement, with subsequent distancing and tensions between the two484
countries.485
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the two countries signed two documents in486
2018. The first document was signed in Asmara in July 2018, in the form of a Joint487
Declaration,94 and later a second document, the Agreement on Peace of 16 September488
2018 in Jeddah (2018 Agreement)95 that is fully discussed in Chap. 32. This new step489
in the relations between the two countries should end almost 20 years of what has490
been called ‘no war, no peace’ or ‘frozen war’ period between Ethiopia and Eritrea.491
Here, it is worth mentioning a specific section of the 2018 Agreement, in particular492
Article 4 that plainly says ‘The two countries will implement the Eritrea-Ethiopia493
Boundary Commission decision’.494
The text does not clarify how and which body or institution would be in charge495
of implementing this task. This still leaves a certain amount of uncertainty on the496
future border demarcation. Article 7 of the 2018 Agreement foresees the creation497
of ‘a High-Level Joint Committee, as well as Sub-committees as required, to guide498
and oversee the implementation of this Agreement’. The creation of a technical499
sub-committee would be an option. However, the parties may still decide and agree500
to give this task to another body or institution, involving other States, independent501
experts or a suitable international organisation,96 such as the UN or the AU or a sub-502
regional organisation like the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, which503
includes States from the Horn of Africa region.97 This approach would follow the504
recommendations adopted by the AU in 2007, in relation to border disputes.98
505
So far (June 2020), there are no further developments on the establishment of the506
High-Level Joint Commission and the demarcation process. Several options have507
been suggested in relation to the demarcation process, based on similar situations.508
For instance, the Libya and Chad border demarcation process, based on the ICJ509
decision,99 was delegated to a committee of experts from the two countries100 and510
observed by the UN. This seems the best option, due to the nature of the demar-511
cation process, which includes the physical identification of points on the ground512
and the building of pillars, markers and monuments that identify where the border is513
actually located. Clearly, this type of task would be more appropriate for engineers,514
94Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship 2018 (above n 6).
95Agreement on Peace, Friendship and Comprehensive Cooperation between the Federal Demo-
cratic Republic of Ethiopia and the State of Eritrea, Jeddah, 16 September 2018. The text is
reproduced in Appendix I to this volume.
96See Zaghlami 2019, p. 24 ff; Gichuru 2019,p.32ff;andKibrik2019.
97IGAD Member States are Djibouti, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Sudan, Somalia, South Sudan;
Eritrea was a member of the organisation, but it withdrew in 2007, and was readmitted in 2011.
98AU, Declaration on the African Union Border Programme and its implementation modalities as
adopted by the conference of African ministers in charge of Border Issues held in Addis Ababa
(Ethiopia), 7 June 2007. https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/border-issues.pdf. Accessed 2 June 2020.
99Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad 1994 (above n 11).
100Article 6 of the Agreement between the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and
the Republic of Chad concerning the practical modalities for the implementation of the Judgment
delivered by the International Court of Justice on 3 February 1994, ILM 33:619–621.
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282 M. Odello
geographers, cartographers and surveyors,101 rather than for lawyers, politicians or515
diplomats. Actually, the same composition of the EEBC has been criticised, as it516
did not include, as an official member of the Panel, a cartographer, who could have517
helped in determining and interpreting the delimitation lines on existing maps.102
518
The UN Cartographer was appointed as Secretary to the EEBC, but it seems that his519
team had quite limited technical functions, such as providing accurate maps, carto-520
graphic mapping and satellite images of the border area. Meanwhile, a ‘geographer521
would have been able to offer a different perspective on the issues under discussion,522
provide map-interpretation skills during deliberations, and advise the legal experts523
on the many complex geographical aspects of the delimitation’103 process.524
11.8 Conclusions525
The previous analysis leads to some final considerations on the problems of and526
solutions to the border dispute.527
First, the two States should have better clarified in the Algiers Agreement the528
legal rules that would be applied by the different bodies that they established. Had529
the mandate of the EECC be framed more clearly a further misunderstanding would530
have avoided between the parties in relation to the nature and powers of that body.531
This issue of indeterminacy seems present again in the recent 2018 Agreement, as532
this document does not clarify which type of body, including its composition, is going533
to work on the demarcation of the border and whether that body is going to apply534
the EEBC decisions. A clear statement on this point would have helped in speeding535
any future delimitation activities.536
Second, the EEBC should have been asked to decide exclusively on the border537
delimitation. The physical demarcation should have been delegated to a different538
body mainly comprised of technical experts. There is now an opportunity, under539
the 2018 Agreement, to establish such a technical team of experts, which would be540
able to follow the demarcation lines based on geographical coordinates, that were541
attached to the EEBC decision.542
Third, other States in the region, and African organisations, like the AU and sub-543
regional organisations, could play an important role in supporting the process by544
providing both political and technical assistance.545
Fourth, the vagueness of the power ratione materiae by the EECC concerning the546
decision on the application of jus ad bellum probably created a climate of insatis-547
faction which contributed to an even more obtructionist attitude by both parties. It548
would be desirable, in future cases, that different bodies—in particular when they are549
foreseen by the same agreement, or interrelated agreements, or when dealing with the550
101Adler 2001,p.1.
102Pratt 2006, pp. 336–337.
103Pratt 2006, p. 337.
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11 The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission: The Aftermath 283
same matter—would apply a more cautious approach in defining their powers, partic-551
ularly when they are not clearly identified by the parties to the dispute. Adopting a552
too liberal approach, when the parties to the dispute were not expressly intending so,553
may lead to fragmented and possibly contradictory decisions which may undermine554
a spirit of cooperation, and would ignite possible appeals, counter-claims and other555
forms of obstructionism.556
Finally, the strict deadlines for the border delimitation and demarcation entrusted557
to the EEBC were probably too unrealistic and led to renewed tension and disagree-558
ment among the parties. As pointed out by Rushworth, ‘agreed settlement of frontiers559
only occurs when relations between the states concerned are reasonably good and560
usually lags a considerable time behind any conflict’.104
561
The new political and diplomatic context, materialised in the 2018 Peace Agree-562
ment, and more relaxed bilateral relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia seem to offer563
some hope for a future peaceful conclusion of this longstanding border dispute.
AQ1 564
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Author Queries
Chapter 11
Query Refs. Details Required Author’s response
AQ1 References ’Chayes and Chayes (1995), Zane (2003), Borgen
(2005), Rushworth (1993)’ are cited in the text but not provided
in the reference list. Please provide the respective references in
the list or delete these citations.