Content uploaded by Hasan İlkbahar
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Hasan İlkbahar on Apr 01, 2021
Content may be subject to copyright.
V. ORTADOĞU’DA SİYASET VE TOPLUM KONGRESİ TAM METİN KİTAPÇIĞI
V. MIDDLE EAST CONGRESS ON POLITICS AND SOCIETY PROCEEDINGS BOOK
V. Ortadoğu’da Siyaset ve Toplum Kongresi
Sakarya, 14-16 Kasım 2020
V. Middle East Congress on Politics and Society
Sakarya, 14-16 November 2020
www.middleeastcongress.org
Editörler / Editors
Yıldırım TURAN
Bilal YILDIRIM
Ayşe Selcan ÖZDEMİRCİ CİNAL
Ahmet Arda ŞENSOY
Telif hakları yasası gereği izinsiz basılması ve çoğaltılması yasaktır.
ISBN: 978-605-2238-23-3
SAKARYA - 2020
KONGRE YÜRÜTME KURULU / CONGRESS ORGANİZATİON COMMİTTEE
Koordinatör / Coordinator
Yıldırım Turan
Yardımcı Koordinatörler / Coordination Team
Bilal Yıldırım
A. Selcan Özdemirci Cinal
Serra Can
Ahmet Arda Şensoy
Talha İsmail Duman
Organizasyon Ekibi / Organization Team
Tuncay Kardaş
Ali Balcı
Abdussamet Pulat
Ayşenur Hazar
Berkan Özgür
Fatma Zehra Toçoğlu
Furkan Halit Yolcu
Furkan Polat
Mustafa Caner
Mustafa Şeyhmus Küpeli
Recep Tayyip Gürler
Rumeysa Ayverdi
Rumeysa Köktaş
Zana Baykal
Bilim Kurulu/Advisory Board
Abdullah Al-Arian
Georgetown University – Doha
Abdullah Baabood
Qatar University
Ahmet Uysal
Istanbul University
Anoush Ehteshami
Durham University
Adrian Jones
La Trobe University
Burhanettin Duran
SETA, Ibn Khaldun University
Emad Shahin
Hamad Bin Khalifa University
Heba Raouf Ezzat
Ibn Khaldun University
Hilal Khashan
American University of Beirut
Homeira Moshirzadeh
University of Tehran
Katerina Dalacoura
London School of Economics and Political Science
Kemal İnat
Sakarya University
Mohamed El Moctar Shinqiti
Hamad Bin Khalifa University
İÇİNDEKİLER / CONTENTS
PARÇALI İTTİFAKLAR DÖNEMİNDE ABD’NİN GÜCÜNÜN ZAYIFLAMASI ............................................ 1
PEACEMAKING IN SYRIA: GLOBAL AND REGIONAL EFFORTS
TOWARDS ENDING THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR ............................................................................................ 11
STATIONING THE FIRST BRITISH CONSULATE IN JERUSALEM AS A REACTION TO RUSSIAN
THREAT AND THE ORIGINS OF THE RUSSIAN HISTORICAL CLAIM FOR THE REGION ................... 35
ZORUNLU ORTAKLIK TEMKİNLİ DOSTLUK: ÇİN’İN DIŞ POLİTİKASINDA İRAN ............................... 51
THE SINGLE ISSUE ALLIANCE IN THE EAST MEDITERRANEAN SEA SINCE 2010 ............................. 68
LEBANESE NATIONAL IDENTITY CRISIS: BASED ON “WEST BEIRUT” .............................................. 78
İRAN’DA SİYASET VE SİNEMA: HATEMİ DÖNEMİ SİYASAL AÇILIMLARININ
SİNEMAYA YANSIMASI .................................................................................................................................. 87
IS ANNEXATION EVITABLE IN THE LONG RUN? GULF STATES’ ‘SETTLEMENTS’ DILEMMA ..... 106
SUUDİ ARABİSTAN İLE İRAN ARASINDAKİ ASKERİ GÜÇ DENGESİ .................................................. 119
GRAND RENAISSANCE DAM AND ITS IMPACT ON THE ETHIOPIAN-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS ..... 135
İRAN TOPLUM YAPISINDA TÜRKLER ........................................................................................................ 156
POST-MODERNIST TRANSFORMATION IN POLITICAL RESISTANCE:
THE CASES OF IRAQ AND LEBANON ......................................................................................................... 168
CHANGING OF TURKEY’S SYRIAN STRATEGY:
FROM BANDWAGONING FOR PROFIT TO THREAT BALANCING ........................................................ 180
ORTADOĞU’DA DEMOKRASİ VE DARBE DİKOTOMİSİNİN
TOPLUMSAL VE SOSYO-EKONOMİK TEMELLERİ: MISIR ÖRNEĞİ (2011-2020) ................................ 189
BİR İSLAMCI HAREKETİN İKTİDAR PRATİĞİ: “ENNAHDA ÖRNEĞİ” .................................................. 208
THE ROLE OF FAITH GROUPS IN THE BOYCOTT, DIVESTMENT AND SANCTIONS (BDS)
MOVEMENT AGAINST ISRAEL: THE CASE STUDY OF CHURCHES IN THE US AND tHE UK ......... 232
FİLİSTİN-İSRAİL POLİTİKASI ÖZELİNDE KUVEYT’İN ÖZGÜN DIŞ POLİTİKA YAKLAŞIMI ........... 248
V. Ortadoğu’da Siyaset ve Toplum Kongresi Tam Metin Kitapçığı – Sakarya, 14-16 Kasım 2020
135
GRAND RENAISSANCE DAM AND ITS IMPACT ON THE
ETHIOPIAN-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS
Hasan İLKBAHAR
Abstract
The Nile River consisting of two tributaries from Lake Tana in Ethiopia (Blue Nile) and Lake
Victoria in Uganda (White Nile), and unifying in Khartoum in Sudan is one of the longest rivers
in the world. Also, flowing from the south to the north, unlike the general conditions of other
rivers is another key feature of the Nile. Egypt as a downstream country in the basin has been
the most influential and dependent actor in terms of getting benefits from the river. For this
reason, Egypt and the Nile River have been used as the same meanings, and there has been a
phenomenon that “Egypt is the Nile”. However, the Ethiopian declaration on the construction
of the Great Renaissance Dam in 2011 over the Blue Nile shocked Egypt that this step can end
Egypt’s long-standing dominance on the river. This study mainly focuses on the possible
impacts of the Grand Renaissance Dam on Ethiopian-Egyptian relations. By doing this, first of
all, it briefly summarizes historical projects on the Nile done by Ethiopia. Secondly, it tries to
explain the reasons why Ethiopia started such a project on the Nile. Thirdly, the study focuses
on how Grand Renaissance Dam impacts the relations between Ethiopia and Egypt.
Keywords: The Nile River, Ethiopia, Egypt, Grand Renaissance Dam
Research Assistant, Duzce University, ilkbaharhasan42@gmail.com
V. Middle East Congress on Politics and Society Proceedings Book – Sakarya, 14-16 November 2020
136
Özet
Bir kolu Etiyopya’daki Tana Gölü’nden (Mavi Nil) diğer kolu ise Uganda’daki Viktorya
Gölü’nden (Beyaz Nil) meydana gelen ve bu iki ana kolun Sudan’ın başkenti Hartum’da
birleşmesiyle oluşan Nil Nehri dünyadaki en uzun nehirlerden biridir. Aynı zamanda dünyadaki
diğer nehirlerin aksini Nil’in güneyden kuzeye doğru akması ise Nil Nehri’nin bir başka önemli
özelliğidir. Havzadaki aşağı kıyıdaş ülke konumundaki Mısır, Nil sularından yararlanma
noktasında en etkili ve en bağımlı aktördür. Bu nedenle, Mısır ve Nil aynı anlama gelecek
şekilde kullanılmış ve ‘Mısır Nil’dir fenomeni ortaya çıkmıştır. Ancak 2011 yılında
Etiyopya’nın Mavi Nil üzerinde Büyük Rönesans Barajı’nın inşasına başlayacağını duyurması,
Mısır’ın Nil Nehri üzerinde yıllardır süregelen hâkimiyetini sona erdireceği ihtimalinden dolayı
Mısır’da şok etkisi yaratmıştır. Bu çalışma Büyük Rönesans Barajı’nın Etiyopya-Mısır ilişkileri
üzerindeki muhtemel etkilerine odaklanmaktadır. Bu bağlamda; çalışmada ilk olarak
Etiyopya’nın Nil Nehri üzerindeki projeleri özetlenecektir. İkinci olarak, çalışma Etiyopya’nın
Nil üzerinde neden böyle bir projeye başladığı açıklanacaktır. Son olarak, çalışma Büyük
Rönesans Barajı’nın Etiyopya-Mısır ilişkilerini nasıl etkilediği üzerinde duracaktır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Nil Nehri, Etiyopya, Mısır, Büyük Rönesans Barajı.
V. Ortadoğu’da Siyaset ve Toplum Kongresi Tam Metin Kitapçığı – Sakarya, 14-16 Kasım 2020
137
1. Introduction
The Nile River consisting of two main tributaries from Lake Tana in Ethiopia known as the
Blue Nile and Lake Victoria in Uganda known as White Nile is one of the longest rivers in the
world. Consisting of eleven countries in the basin and flowing from south to north when
compared to other rivers in the world makes Nile River quite different than others. In addition,
although upstream countries in the river basins in the world utilize and get much more benefit
from the rivers comparing to downstream countries, the Nile has another significant
characteristic: the downstream country, Egypt, and midstream country, Sudan, together has
much more benefited from the waters of the Nile. Ethiopia, on the other hand, as an upstream
country and contributing more than %80 of the central Nile waters has only benefited from the
river about 3%.
The emergence of this situation can be traced back to the colonial era in the region that the
agreements between colonial actors mainly disregarded Ethiopian rights and utilization of the
Nile waters. Also, the British Administration in the area tried to prevent Ethiopia to construct
irrigation projects through signing agreements. However, it doesn’t mean that Ethiopia did not
try to get benefit from the river waters, and Ethiopian governments also endeavored to begin
the construction of several projects on the Nile. However, most of these projects failed. When
it comes to the early 1990s, Ethiopia began to criticize the agreements in the colonial era, which
favored mostly Egypt and Sudan.
2011 became one of the critical milestones in the history of the region when the Ethiopian
government announced the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). It
is a massive project that threatened the water utilization of Egypt and Sudan. For this reason,
Egyptian, Ethiopian and Sudanese relations troubled for the GERD related questions. Although
there are several diplomatic steps for settling the problems, the high tension between Egypt and
Ethiopia continues to rise.
The main objective of this study is to explain the course of events in the Nile basin from a
chronological perspective, mostly related to Egyptian and Ethiopian relations. In doing so, this
study composes of four parts. To clarify why and how Egypt and Sudan have much more
utilized the Nile waters, the first part mainly analyzes the historical agreements related to
sharing and utilization of the Nile waters. The second part of the study discusses the Ethiopian
projects on the Nile River during the 20th century, and why they are failed. The third part of the
study analyzes the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and its importance for both
Ethiopia and other riparian countries in the region. Finally, the study focuses on the GERD’s
V. Middle East Congress on Politics and Society Proceedings Book – Sakarya, 14-16 November 2020
138
impacts on the Ethiopian-Egyptian relations and diplomatic activities among Ethiopia, Sudan,
and Egypt.
2. Historical Agreements over the Nile River
The Nile River occupied an essential place for the history of British colonialism. Therefore,
reading and writing the colonial history of the British Empire without emphasizing the Nile
River would be incomplete. During the British era in the region, the river was controlled by a
single sovereign power for the first time and some political events which affected the world as
a whole closely concerned with Britain’s Nile policy and strategies. The scramble for Africa,
the decline of the League of Nations system, the fall of the British Empire and the emergence
of Uganda, Kenya and, Sudan as the sovereign independent states in the region can be given as
examples of this.
1
For this reason, Britain was one of the most important and influential actors
among the other colonial powers concerning the agreements and treaties over the Nile River.
The British occupation of Egypt in 1882 is mostly related to the Suez Canal due to the British
concerns over the imperial road towards India. However, the British occupation of Uganda in
1894 and its annexation of Sudan between 1896 and 1898 constructed one of the crucial pillars
of the British imperial strategy towards the Nile River. There were two main political and
economic aims for Britain concerning the Nile River. The first aim was both related to
agricultural production and its position at Suez Canal. Providing security for the Nile waters,
Britain tried to increase the profitable cotton production in cultivated areas, and it also tried to
enrich Egypt under its sovereignty. Besides, controlling Egypt also provided its control over
the Suez Canal and imperial road. The second goal of the British imperial strategy towards the
Nile River was related to British occupation and its control in Egypt. British policymakers
thought that controlling the upstream water projects can be used as leverage against the
Egyptians in case they began to upraise.
2
However, Britain was not the single colonial actor in
the region that there were other actors such as France, Italy, Belgium and Germany that they
also influenced the British Nile policy and overall hydro-politics of the Nile River. For this
reason, Britain signed several agreements in order to sustain its dominant role over the Nile
River.
1
Terje Tvedt, “About the Importance of Studying the Modern History of the Countries of the Nile Basin in a
Nile Perspective,” in The River Nile in the Post-Colonial Age, ed. Terje Tvedt (Bristol, UK: I.B. Tauris, 2010),
3.
2
Ibid., 3-4.
V. Ortadoğu’da Siyaset ve Toplum Kongresi Tam Metin Kitapçığı – Sakarya, 14-16 Kasım 2020
139
The agreements, treaties and protocols which were signed between downstream, midstream and
upstream countries, as well as colonial powers about the sharing and the utilization of the Nile
waters, can be categorized into three groups. The first categorization is the agreements between
1891 and 1925 in which colonial powers, especially Britain, were quite active. The second
categorization consists of two main agreements which were signed in 1929 and 1959; and which
also formed the current status quo in favor of the downstream country, Egypt, in the basin.
Finally, the agreements in the post-Cold War era can be the third categorization of the sharing
and utilizing of the Nile waters in which upstream countries mainly began to challenge the
dominant role of the midstream and downstream countries in the basin.
2.1. Agreements between 1891 and 1925
As it is stated above, the first categorization of the agreements, treaties and protocols were
between 1891 and 1925 in which the colonial powers mainly played a very active role. For
example; Britain and Italy signed a protocol in 1891 that both countries agreed on the issue of
their spheres of influence in Eastern Africa; and that they also agreed on the prevention of any
irrigation projects in Atbara where one of the tributaries of the Blue Nile is.
3
The second
agreement was signed between Britain and King Leopold II of Belgium on behalf of Congo.
According to this agreement, while Britain recognized the Congo as a private property of King
Leopold II, it also guaranteed its recognition of a dominant role on the Nile River.
4
In addition
to this agreement, there was also another agreement between Britain and Congo Free State in
1906 that both states decided to ban any construction on the Nile River; by doing this, Britain
guaranteed an uninterrupted flow of White Nile waters to Sudan.
5
Another significant agreement was signed between Ethiopia and Britain on behalf of Egypt and
Sudan in 1902 that Britain also guaranteed the uninterrupted flow of the Nile River from
Ethiopia to Sudan and then Egypt. According to this agreement, Ethiopia would not construct
any irrigation projects across the Nile River and tributaries of the river.
6
In addition to this
specific article of the agreement, it was also the last agreement that Ethiopia was accepted as a
part of the sharing and utilization of the Nile River until the end of the Cold War.
7
3
Ashok Swain, “Ethiopia, the Sudan, and Egypt: The Nile River Dispute,” The Journal of Modern African
Studies 35, no. 4 (December 1997): 676, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X97002577.
4
Cited in Muhammed Tandoğan and Osman Kağan Yücel, “Nil’in Paylaşılması Meselesi: Hidro-Diplomasi
Bağlamında Mısır, Sudan ve Etiyopya Rekabeti,” Dumlupınar Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, no. 53 (July
2017): 110.
5
Swain, “Ethiopia, the Sudan, and Egypt,” 676.
6
Ibid., 676.
7
Tandoğan and Yücel, “Nil’in Paylaşılması Meselesi: Hidro-Diplomasi Bağlamında Mısır, Sudan ve Etiyopya
Rekabeti,” 112.
V. Middle East Congress on Politics and Society Proceedings Book – Sakarya, 14-16 November 2020
140
Due to increasing concerns for the unity of the Nile River, Egypt continued to sign agreements
with other European colonial powers. For example; the tripartite agreement among France,
Britain and Italy in 1906 was signed; these colonizer powers agreed on the sharing of the Nile
waters in the sub-basins of Ethiopia.
8
Another agreement between European colonial powers
was between Britain and Italy in 1925. While Britain began to increase its dominance over the
sharing and utilization of the Nile waters, it also guaranteed the uninterrupted flow of the Nile
River by preventing any irrigation and other projects that would be done by Ethiopia.
9
When all these agreements, protocols and treaties are taken into consideration, it can be said
that Britain was the main determining and the most effective actor in the sharing and utilization
of the Nile River in the basin. Secondly, while Britain guaranteed the uninterrupted flow of the
Nile River by preventing any projects and constructions in the upstream regions in the basin,
most of these agreements among the colonial powers addressed Ethiopia, the only independent
state at that time, in case it began to construct any projects over the Nile River. Thirdly, reading
British colonial history without stressing the Nile River is missing that the Nile constituted one
of the most crucial dimensions of the British colonial rule in which British administration
benefited much more from the cotton production by providing uninterrupted flow for the Nile.
Finally, Ethiopia had been disregarded by the colonial actors except for the 1902 Agreement,
though it contributed to a high level of waters to the main Nile River. Also, Ethiopia’s being
disregarded from the agreements related to the Nile River continued in 1929 and 1959
agreements.
2.2. 1929 and 1959 Agreements
Egypt unilaterally declared its independence from the British Administration in 1922. As a
result of this declaration, Egypt began to influence the politics in the Nile River basin; however,
Great Britain still exerted to maintain its dominance over the Nile waters. The 1929 Nile Waters
Agreement between Egypt and Great Britain on behalf of Sudan and other colonized countries
was signed under these conditions.
10
The 1929 Nile Waters Agreement is the most crucial one in terms of leaving a legacy to the
present. Besides, the agreement is very controversial in terms of the utilization of the Nile
waters. There are two essential articles in the agreement that the first one is related to the sharing
8
Swain, “Ethiopia, the Sudan, and Egypt,” 676-7.
9
Cited in Tandoğan and Yücel, “Nil’in Paylaşılması Meselesi: Hidro-Diplomasi Bağlamında Mısır, Sudan ve
Etiyopya Rekabeti,” 113.
10
Ibid., 113.
V. Ortadoğu’da Siyaset ve Toplum Kongresi Tam Metin Kitapçığı – Sakarya, 14-16 Kasım 2020
141
amounts of the Nile waters, while the second one is related to Egypt’s veto rights. On the one
hand, based on the report of the Nile Waters Commission in 1925; the annual amount of Nile
waters was estimated at 84 billion cubic meters. While Egypt guaranteed 48 billion cubic meters
from this estimated amount by signing the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement in 1929, Sudan only
benefited 4 billion cubic meters from the amount. On the other hand, according to the
agreement, Egypt had also veto power that it had the legal right to veto any construction or
irrigation projects on the Nile River.
11
By considering this, it can be said that Egypt wanted to
protect the uninterrupted flow of the Nile River by having veto power on the constructions.
Another significant dimension of the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement is that Great Britain
recognized Egypt’s “natural and historic rights” on the Nile River. Although what are these
natural and historical rights were not clear on the agreement
12
, Egypt would claim its own
natural and historical rights for future agreements about the sharing and utilization of the Nile
waters.
After the 1929 Agreement was signed, Great Britain tried to convince Egypt for a more
equitable water-sharing agreement between Sudan and Egypt. However, Great Britain was
unsuccessful in terms of persuading Egypt
13
, and the 1929 Agreements have become the final
agreement that Great Britain was one of the parties on the issue of sharing and utilization of the
Nile waters.
14
One of the most important legacies of the colonial period for the Nile River Basin is that it
formed legally institutionalized water utilization in favor of Egypt and to some extent Sudan.
However, this situation continued in the post-colonial era that independent states such as Sudan
and Egypt continued to sign agreements without the will of the colonial powers. Regional,
international and their national dynamics contributed to this situation that it was necessary to
renew the 1929 Agreement for them. For this reason, another significant agreement related to
water sharing and utilization of the Nile River, known as “For the Full Utilization of the Nile
Waters”, was signed between Sudan and Egypt in 1959.
11
Mwangi S. Kimenyi and John Mukum Mbaku, “The Limits of the New ‘Nile Agreement,’” Brookings (blog),
November 30, 1AD, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2015/04/28/the-limits-of-the-new-nile-
agreement/.
12
Youssef M. Hamada, The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Its Impact on Egyptian Agriculture and the
Potential for Alleviating Water Scarcity, 1st ed. 2017 edition (Springer, 2017), 80-1.
13
Tvedt, “About the Importance of Studying the Modern History of the Countries of the Nile Basin in a Nile
Perspective,” 6.
14
Tandoğan and Yücel, “Nil’in Paylaşılması Meselesi: Hidro-Diplomasi Bağlamında Mısır, Sudan ve Etiyopya
Rekabeti,” 113.
V. Middle East Congress on Politics and Society Proceedings Book – Sakarya, 14-16 November 2020
142
From the perspective of Egypt, the reasons for the “For the Full Utilization of Nile Waters”
Agreement in 1959 are related to the military coup in 1952, Suez Crisis in 1956. After the coup,
Gamal Abdel Nasser sought ways for the development of Egyptian agriculture, and Egyptian
economy experts proposed the construction of the second dam at Aswan in the Nile River.
However, the main problem was mainly related to the cost of construction, which was over 1
billion US dollars. After Nasser began to seek foreign aid for the construction, the World Bank
proposed a financial credit package that contained both the US and England. However, the US
government, later on, declared that it withdrew the offer, while Nasser thought whether to
accept the World Bank’s proposal.
15
As a result of the withdrawal of the US government from the credit package, Nasser
nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956, and he declared that all incomes of the canal would be
utilized for the development projects in Egypt. As a result of the nationalization process and
harsh statements by Nasser; England, France and Israel covertly organized an operation towards
Egypt. Since both the US and the USSR condemned this operation and the UN’s calls for the
ceasefire among the belligerents; Israeli, French and English armies had to be treated from
Egypt. As a result of the high tension in the region, the popularity of the USSR increased in the
Middle East, and Nasser found a way that he could get financial aid from the USSR for the
construction of the Aswan High Dam in the Nile River.
16
The only remaining part of this
construction for Nasser was its recognition and legitimization by the other riparian country,
Sudan, in the basin.
When it comes to Sudan, it got independence from British administration in 1956. As a result
of the independence, Sudan began to criticize the 1929 Agreement at the beginning of the
construction of Aswan High Dam, and Sudan also demanded a revision of the agreement based
on more equitable utilization of the water. Since the tension between the two countries increased
between 1956 and 1958, Egyptian military forces demonstrated their strength and force on the
Egyptian-Sudanese borders. After the 1958 military coup in Sudan, the tension decreased
between these two states and they signed an agreement called “For The Full Utilization of the
Nile Waters” in 1959.
17
When it comes to the terms and conditions of the agreement, it can be said that it is a softer
version of the 1929 Agreement between Britain and Egypt. For example, it was accepted in the
15
William L. Cleveland, Modern Ortadoğu Tarihi, trans. Mehmet Harmancı, 1.baskı (İstanbul: Agora, 2008),
345.
16
Ibid., 346-7.
17
Swain, “Ethiopia, the Sudan, and Egypt,” 679.
V. Ortadoğu’da Siyaset ve Toplum Kongresi Tam Metin Kitapçığı – Sakarya, 14-16 Kasım 2020
143
agreement that Aswan High dam will hold 84 billion cubic meters, and Egypt has the right to
use 55.5 billion cubic meters. In comparison, Sudan has the right to use 18.5 billion cubic meters
of the water held at Aswan. Another important condition of the agreement is concerned with
third parties. Both Egypt and Sudan agreed not to sign agreements with third parties
unilaterally.
18
By signing this agreement, Egypt guaranteed its water utilization in the Nile
River, and it also provided legitimacy for the construction of Aswan High Dam. Although
Ethiopia demanded participation in the agreement, it was accepted by neither Egypt nor
Sudan.
19
2.3. Agreements in the post-Cold War Era
Egypt and Sudan eliminated the other riparian countries in the Nile River Basin by signing the
For the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters agreement in 1959. Taking the provided advantage
of the colonial period, Egypt has become one of the most critical dominant and determining
countries in the basin. However, when it comes to the 1990s, the countries which got rid of the
negative impacts of the colonial period in the basin began to criticize the 1959 Agreement
between Sudan and Egypt by declaring it as an outdated agreement; and they also demanded
their rights on the Nile River in terms of utilization and sharing of the waters. Although Sudan
and Egypt were generally criticized, the other riparian countries began to benefit from the Nile
waters, and they also started to construct irrigation projects on the Nile River.
20
In order to sustain their dominance on the Nile River, Egypt and Sudan began to sign
agreements with the other riparian countries in the basin such as Ethiopia. For example; Sudan
and Ethiopia signed the Cooperation Framework Agreement in 1991, and Egypt and Ethiopia
also signed the Cooperation Framework Agreement in 1993. One of the most important aims
of these two similar agreements was to weaken the terms and conditions of the 1959 Agreement
between Sudan and Egypt. As a result of these agreements, neither the terms and conditions
weakened nor the tension between Ethiopia and Sudan and Egypt decreased.
21
Another critical step among the riparian countries is the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI). All riparian
countries established an inter-governmental partnership for the first time in the history of the
Nile River Basin in 1999. These countries are Burundi, Egypt, Democratic Republic of Congo,
18
Ibid., 679.
19
Tandoğan and Yücel, “Nil’in Paylaşılması Meselesi: Hidro-Diplomasi Bağlamında Mısır, Sudan ve Etiyopya
Rekabeti,” 115.
20
Terje Tvedt, “About the Importance of Studying the Modern History of the Countries of the Nile Basin in a
Nile Perspective,” 8-10.
21
Swain, “Ethiopia, the Sudan, and Egypt,” 692.
V. Middle East Congress on Politics and Society Proceedings Book – Sakarya, 14-16 November 2020
144
Kenya, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania, Sudan and South Sudan. There are five objectives
of NBI. The first one is mainly related to the development of the water resources of the basin
more equitably and sustainably to guarantee prosperity, security and peace for all people. The
second one is mainly concerned with efficient water management and the optimal utilization of
the resources in the basin. The third objective stresses the importance of collective action among
the riparian countries in the basin that NBI promotes win-win gains. The fourth objective of
NBI is related to poverty and in the basin that NBI promotes economic integration among the
riparian countries. Finally, NBI emphasizes the importance of action rather than planning.
22
Although there are harsh criticisms towards Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) due to the lack of results
and giving the impression as if there is cooperation in itself, there are also notable developments
since the establishment of the NBI in 1999. For example; the NBI had provided more trust
among the riparian countries when it compared to the past; the NBI has also provided a
framework in terms of the basin-wide development and planning by containing all countries in
the basin; it is easier for the Nile Basin countries to get financial aid thanks to the NBI; it
provides a platform so that countries in the basin can discuss and mediate the disputes among
each other; it can be said that it is a declaration of the unsustainable status quo in the basin and
that calls for a new regime in which all countries efficiently and optimally benefit from the Nile
waters.
23
The last significant achievement in the Nile River basin is the Cooperative Framework
Agreement that can be traced back to early 2000. Although only four countries, Ethiopia,
Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda, signed this agreement in 2010, later on, Kenya in 2010 and
Burundi in 2013 signed it. Besides, South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo also
expressed their intent to sign the agreement.
24
One of the most important goals of the agreement,
as it is stated in itself, is to “promote integrated management, sustainable development, and
harmonious utilization of the water resources of the Basin, as well as their conservation and
protection for the benefit of present and future generations”.
25
On the other hand, the CFA does
not focus on the quantification of the water utilization in the basin while implying the
22
“Who We Are | Nile Basin Intitative (NBI),” accessed November 22, 2020, https://nilebasin.org/nbi/who-we-
are.
23
Terje Tvedt, “Some Conceptual Issues Regarding the Study of Inter-State Relationships in River Basins,” in
The Nile River in the Post-Colonial Age, ed. Terje Tvedt (Bristol, UK: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 246.
24
“South Sudan Set to Sign New Nile Agreement,” Al Jazeera, accessed November 22, 2020,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/6/20/south-sudan-set-to-sign-new-nile-agreement.
25
“CFA Nile Basin Intitative (NBI),” accessed November 22, 2020, https://nilebasin.org/nbi/cooperative-
framework-agreement.
V. Ortadoğu’da Siyaset ve Toplum Kongresi Tam Metin Kitapçığı – Sakarya, 14-16 Kasım 2020
145
importance of the collective action in the basin.
26
It can be said that the CFA tries to replace the
1929 and 1959 Agreements which favored the downstream and midstream countries, Egypt and
Sudan respectively.
As a result of this agreement in the basin, Egypt and Sudan harshly criticized it because of the
fear that their water utilization would be decreased in case upstream countries begin to construct
irrigation and hydropower projects on the Nile River.
27
In addition to Egypt’s rejection of the
CFA, the Ethiopian government declared the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance
Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile in 2011, the bilateral relations between Ethiopia and Egypt have
multiplied in terms of water utilization, reservoir capacity and leaving amount from the dam.
28
3. Ethiopia’s Projects on the Nile River
As it is understood from the last part of the study, Ethiopia had been disregarded in the
agreements concerning the utilization and sharing of the Nile waters until the early 1990s.
Although Ethiopia has contributed to %86 of the Nile waters through its western rivers such as
the Abbay (Blue Nile), Baro-Akobo (Sobat) and Tezeke (Atbara), it has only utilized 3% of this
amount. In contrast, the neighbour countries have benefited a significant margin of the total
amount.
29
For this reason, the Ethiopian government enacted a national water resources
management policy for the first time in the history of the country in 1999. In this policy paper,
it is clear that the Ethiopian government determined hydropower development strategy, water
supply and sanitation strategy and irrigation development strategy.
30
However, there were also
several failed projects of Ethiopian governments in the 20th century, and this national water
resources management policy was the outcome of the failure. For this reason, in this part of the
study, which projects that Ethiopia tried to implement on the Nile River and why they were
failed will be discussed.
26
“CFA Nile Basin Intitative (NBI),” accessed November 22, 2020, https://nilebasin.org/nbi/cooperative-
framework-agreement.
27
“Disputed Nile Agreement Signed,” Al Jazeera, accessed November 22, 2020,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2010/5/14/disputed-nile-agreement-signed.
28
These will be further detailed in the last section of the study.
29
Yacob Arsano, “Institutional Development and Water Management in the Ethiopian Nile Basin,” in The River
Nile in the Post-Colonial Age, ed. Terje Tvedt (Bristol, UK: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 161.
30
The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Ministry of Water Resources, “Ethiopian Water Sector
Strategy,” 14-18.
V. Middle East Congress on Politics and Society Proceedings Book – Sakarya, 14-16 November 2020
146
3.1. The Lake Tana Project
The Lake Tana Project was carried out between 1929 and 1934. As a result of the British-Italian
Agreement in 1925
31
, the project was seen as leverage in case the colonial powers encroach the
Ethiopian territorial integrity. For this reason, it aimed at producing water through a constructed
barrage over Lake Tana and selling this water for the irrigation of cotton fields in Sudan and
Egypt. Although an American company, G.J. White Engineering Corporation of New York,
was interested in the project, the British government intervened with the US Company while
the Italian government was preparing itself for the invasion of Ethiopia. For this reason, the
project could not be implemented.
32
3.2. The Abbay Master Plan Study
The Abbay Master Plan study was carried out between 1958 and 1964. The Ethiopian
government had three significant aims through this project that were compiling a complete
inventory of the water resources; forming a framework for the other basin studies in the country;
and developing the human resource capacity for the water sector. As in the case of the Lake
Tana Project between 1929 and 1934, the US was again interested in this project that the Bureau
of Reclamation of the US Department of Interior joint the project, and it made field research
for the hydrology, water quality, sedimentation, etc. As a result of the research of the basins in
Ethiopia, the Bureau proposed four dams in Ethiopia. Due to the lack of financial capacity of
Ethiopia for these great projects and also foreign financial assistance, the project was never
implemented.
33
There are some significant notes from this project. For example, taking the USSR’s financial
assistance for Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Aswan High Dam project in Egypt into consideration, it
can be said that the Abbay Master Plan Study and the US’s being interested in the project also
demonstrates to us how the Cold War affected the Nile River Basin countries. Secondly,
although this project and the proposed four dams
34
by the Bureau of Reclamation of the US
Department of Interior were not completed at that time, it is clear that the Ethiopian government
continues to depend on the US’ proposed sites for future projects.
35
31
Through this agreement, British government had the right to construct dam on the Lake Tana while Italy had
the right to build railway between Ethiopia and Eritrea and Somalia.
32
Arsano, “Institutional Development and Water Management in the Ethiopian Nile Basin,” 166-167.
33
Ibid., 167.
34
The sites of these proposed four dams at Karadobi, Mabil, Border and Mendia regions in Ethiopia.
35
See Table 2.
V. Ortadoğu’da Siyaset ve Toplum Kongresi Tam Metin Kitapçığı – Sakarya, 14-16 Kasım 2020
147
3.3. The GilgayAbbay Project
The Gilgay Abbay project was another project of Ethiopian governments that was never
completed during the 1960s. Different from the other two projects, German engineering groups
made the field researches and found that great potential for the production of oilseeds pulses
and fodder in terms of commercial. Due to the Ethiopian governments rested on the Abbay
Master Plan Study, the Gilgay Abbay Project was included in the Abbay Master Plan Study.
36
3.4. The Tana-Beles development project
The Tana-Beles development project was carried out in the middle of the 1980s. In this regard,
it was designed over the previous projects and studies of Ethiopia. In order to re-settle the
people who affected by droughts and famine during1984 and 1985, the Ethiopian Relief and
Rehabilitation Commission and the Italian government cooperated. As a result of this
cooperation, infrastructural services such as airports and roads were constructed. However, this
project, like the others, was also failed due to the lack of strong management for the resettlement
and anti-government forces in the region.
37
3.5. Why Ethiopia failed?
There are several reasons why Ethiopia was failed to implement and to realize these projects.
These reasons may be categorized into four that are political-economic, conjectural, internal
and organizational aspects. First of all, Ethiopia neither had adequate financial assistance from
the external resources nor internal resources. Secondly, Ethiopia was also lack of adequate
capacity in terms of studying, planning and implementing to proceed with such great projects.
Thirdly, in the context of the Cold War, Ethiopia’s vulnerability blurred the matters concerning
upstream and downstream relations in the basin.
38
Finally, the civil war in Ethiopia and ongoing
separatist movements in Eritrea and Tigray also prevented the country from developing large-
scale projects and constructions on the Nile River.
39
However, as it is stated in Table 1,
Ethiopian governments began to construct successful irrigation and hydropower projects on the
Nile River since the 1970s. Besides, when it comes to 2011, the Ethiopian government
announced the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) as the largest
project in the basin history.
36
Arsano, 167-168.
37
Ibid., 168.
38
Ibid., 169.
39
Swain, “Ethiopia, the Sudan, and Egypt,” 687.
V. Middle East Congress on Politics and Society Proceedings Book – Sakarya, 14-16 November 2020
148
Name of Dam
River
Year
(completed or started)
Power (MW)
Storage(m3)
Tekeze 5
Tekeze
2009-2010
300
9.2
Fincha
Fincha
1971-2013
134
1050
CharaChara
Blue Nile
2000
84
9126
Koga
Blue Nile
2008
Irrigation
80
Tana-Beles
Blue Nile
2011
460
Table 1: Ethiopia’s completed projects since 1970.
40
4. Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)
Although there are several failed hydropower and irrigation projects of Ethiopia in the 20th
century, the Ethiopian government declared its first immense project, known as Millennium
Dam and later on Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in 2011. When the Ethiopian
government announced its construction, the Middle East was in great turmoil in which Egypt
experienced the toppling of the president, Hosni Mubarak.
41
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) will be the largest dam in the African continent,
and it will be the tenth largest dam in the world. In terms of technical capacity, its height is
about 145 m, and its storage capacity is about 74 billion cubic meters. Besides, its size of the
reservoir is about 1800 km3, and its length of the reservoir is about 245 km. It is estimated that
after the end of the construction of GERD, it will generate 6000 MW electric power with its 16
turbines (per each 375 MW). There is no doubt that the GERD was a massive project when it
compared to other high dams such as Aswan on the Nile River.
42
When it comes to the reason why Ethiopia began to construct such a massive and vast project,
as it is stated by the officials of Ethiopia, the only reason for the construction of the GERD is
to generate hydropower. Even Ethiopian people who can easily access electricity usually
exposed to the lack of electricity in several times. In this context, Ethiopia also wants to put an
end the lack of electricity in several towns, villages and cities through GERD.
43
40
The data in the table taken from Youssef M. Hamada, The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Its Impact on
Egyptian Agriculture and the Potential for Alleviating Water Scarcity, 1st ed. 2017 edition (Springer, 2017): 52.
41
Salman M. A. Salman, “The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: The Road to the Declaration of Principles
and the KhartoumDocument,” Water International 41, no. 4 (June 6, 2016): 515,
https://doi.org/10.1080/02508060.2016.1170374.
42
Ibid., 516.
43
Firuze Yağmur Gökler, “Rönesans Barajı Krizinin Mısır-Etiyopya İlişkilerine Etkisi,” Ortadoğu Analiz,
11(92), 89.
V. Ortadoğu’da Siyaset ve Toplum Kongresi Tam Metin Kitapçığı – Sakarya, 14-16 Kasım 2020
149
Through generating hydropower, the Ethiopian government also envisages that the surplus of
this generation will be exported to neighbour countries in the region. For this reason, it can be
said that GERD will generate hydropower for the utilization of Ethiopian people, and it will
also contribute to the Ethiopian economy. In this regard, the selection of the site of GERD is
another important dimension of this exportation strategy of Ethiopia. In order to minimize the
transmission grid cost and reduce power conveyance losses in the exportation, the GERD is
located the nearest possible location.
44
5. GERD and its impact on the Ethiopian-Egyptian relations
As soon as Ethiopia announced the construction of GERD, Egypt and Sudan determinedly
expressed their strong opposition to the GERD. The initial Egyptian opposition towards GERD
can be categorized into three groups. The first opposition was related to the uninterrupted flow
of Nile water from Ethiopia to Egypt. The second Egyptian opposition was mainly concerned
with agricultural areas in the country that Egypt claimed the outstanding portion of its irrigated
lands would be turned into the desert as a result of the project. Finally, Egypt also considered
Aswan High Dam, claiming that GERD will cause a remarkable decrease in AHD’s generation
of hydropower.
45
There are four main significant disputes among Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt concerning the
project. The first dispute is mainly related to the filling the dam. In this context, Ethiopia wants
to fill the dam in a maximum of three years while Egypt demands Ethiopia for seven or more
years. By filling the dam in a maximum of three years, Ethiopia aims to complete the whole
construction in 2023. On the other hand, the second disputed issue among the parties is
concerned with the leaving amount of water from the river. In this regard, Ethiopia wants to
leave about 35 billion m3 waters, while Egypt demands about 40 billion m3 waters. The third
issue among the parties is related to the raining condition of the region. In this respect, Egypt
claims that raining conditions and wet and dry seasons has to be taken into consideration while
filling the dam. The final disputed issue is concerned with large scale dams and small scale
dams in Sudan and Egypt. In this regard, Egypt wants to hold Aswan and other small scale
dams in the country as the full capacity in order to minimize the possible drought effects.
46
44
Wossenu Abtew and Shimelis Behailu Dessu, The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile, 1st ed.
2019 edition (Springer, 2018): 79.
45
Salman, “The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam,” 516.
46
“Mısır ve Etiyopya’yı Savaşın Eşiğine Getiren Hedasi Barajı’nın Açmazları,” Anadolu Ajansı, accessed
November 24, 2020, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/misir-ve-etiyopya-yi-savasin-esigine-getiren-hedasi-baraji-
nin-acmazlari/1678185.
V. Middle East Congress on Politics and Society Proceedings Book – Sakarya, 14-16 November 2020
150
Table 2: Ethiopia’s future hydropower and irrigation projects.
47
Although a strong Sudanese stance against the GERD diminished for several beneficial results
of the GERD for the country, Egyptian opposition continued to increase. Since Ethiopia notified
neither Sudan nor Egypt, and it did not provide available information about the project; the
Egyptian stance against the GERD became harder. However, these three countries agreed on
the diplomatic solution for the GERD crisis that they began to diplomatic talks with each other.
The first example of this diplomatic activity is the International Panel of Experts, and the second
crucial diplomatic negotiation was the Declaration of Principles in 2015.
5.1. The International Panel of Experts (IPoE)
In order to relieve the tension concerning the GERD among the riparian countries, Ethiopia
took an essential step by inviting the water ministers of Sudan and Egypt to the international
panel which composed of four international experts
48
and two experts from each country. The
International Panel of Experts (IPoE) mainly examined the documents of the dam design and
also visited the dam site. After that, the IPoE published a consensus report which was signed
by the three countries.
49
47
The data in the table taken from Youssef M. Hamada, The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Its Impact on
Egyptian Agriculture and the Potential for Alleviating Water Scarcity, 1st ed. 2017 edition (Springer, 2017): 53-
54
48
International experts composed of an environmental expert, a socio-economics expert, a dam engineering
expert and a water resources and hydrological modeling expert.
49
Abtew and Dessu, The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile, 134.
Name of Dam
River
Year (start date)
Power
Contractor
Jema
Jema
Karadobi
Blue Nile
2023
1600
ENSAP
Border
Blue Nile
2026
1400
ENSAP
Mabil
Blue Nile
2021
Beko Abo
Blue Nile
2000
ENSAP
Mendaya
Blue Nile
2030
1700
ENSAP
Chemoda/Yeda
Chemoga
2015
278
China
Baro I
Sobat
Baro II
Sobat
V. Ortadoğu’da Siyaset ve Toplum Kongresi Tam Metin Kitapçığı – Sakarya, 14-16 Kasım 2020
151
According to the report published by the IPoE, it is clear that GERD will not bring damage to
the water security of Egypt and Sudan. There are also several beneficiary impacts of GERD for
all countries in the basin. For example, more than 20 billion cubic meters of waters will be
saved from evaporation thanks to the GERD; it will also prevent the damage caused on the
riverbanks in case of flooding and over-flooding in the region; it will also help to reduce
sedimentation in the downstream countries.
50
5.2. Declaration of Principles
Another important diplomatic step among the parties to solve the disputes about the sharing and
utilization of the Nile waters and GERD related matters is the Declaration of Principles which
was signed in Khartoum in 2015. At the ceremony of the declaration, while the Ethiopian Prime
Minister confirmed that GERD would not harm Egypt and Sudan; Egyptian President Abdel
Fattah el-Sisi stressed the importance of the cooperation. On the other hand, Sudanese president
Omar al-Bashir defined the Declaration of Principles as a historic achievement.
51
When it comes to the specific principles of the declaration, it is composed of ten principles that
the first one is mainly related to general conditions and terms up to international law. The
second principle significantly stresses the importance of regional integration and cooperation
among the riparian countries, mainly Egypt and Sudan, in the basin.
52
In this respect, it can be
said that Ethiopia has usually emphasized the primary goal of the GERD as the production of
hydropower, adding that this generated hydropower will also be utilized by Egypt and Sudan
as well. On the other hand, the third and the fourth principles focus on the general law of
transboundary water utilization in terms of equitable utilization and not to causing harm that
can be traced back to Helsinki International Law Association in 1966 and UN Convention in
1997.
53
The fifth principle of the declaration is quite crucial in that it considers the filling of the dam
and implementation of the IPoE report and dam operation. However, the principle does not
solve the problem regarding filling the dam and leaving the amount among the parties by just
giving specific duties to the IPoE and the Technical National Committee (TNC) regarding the
50
“From a Barrier to a Bridge, ” Al Jazeera, accessed November 24, 2020,
https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2013/11/6/from-a-barrier-to-a-bridge/.
51
“Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan Sign Accord on Nile Dam,” Al Jazeera, accessed November 25, 2020,
https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2015/3/24/egypt-ethiopia-and-sudan-sign-accord-on-nile-dam.
52
“Full Text of ‘Declaration of Principles’ Signed by Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia - Politics - Egypt,” Ahram,
accessed November 25, 2020, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/125941/Egypt/Politics-/Full-text-
of-Declaration-of-Principles-signed-by-E.aspx.
53
Abtew and Dessu, The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile, 139.
V. Middle East Congress on Politics and Society Proceedings Book – Sakarya, 14-16 November 2020
152
implementation of the final report of the IPoE. Another critical principle is related to
confidence-building that Ethiopia gave priority t Sudan and Egypt concerning the purchasing
power generated by the GERD. Egypt has also guaranteed the available data information about
the construction through the seventh principle in which these three countries agreed on
providing the necessary information.
54
The eighth principle is mainly related to the dam safety that Ethiopia also approved the
implementation of the IPoE report regarding dam safety. The relevant report mainly suggested
Ethiopia that the construction, design and management of the dam should follow the
international standards.
55
The ninth principle of the declaration concerns with the sovereignty
and territorial integrity. Since there are several accusations regarding the support of illegal
groups in their countries each other, the parties agreed on the respect for territorial integrity and
sovereignty.
56
There is another dimension of this situation that separation of South Sudan from
the Sudan and Eritrea from Ethiopia is considered as a Nile related matters.
For this reason, to get more benefits from the river, the countries agree on the importance of
territorial integrity and sovereignty each other. Finally, the last principle is that the parties will
solve the GERD related disputes following diplomacy and diplomatic tools. If the parties cannot
settle the disputes, they have the right to call for the mediator and conciliator.
57
Although there are several diplomatic steps to solve the bilateral and trilateral disputes
regarding the Nile River and the GERD, high tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia has
continued to increase. For example, the dam filling question is still not solved by the parties,
and Ethiopia began to fill the dam without consultation with Egypt and Sudan. For this reason,
as a result of the increasing tension, the Ethiopian government deployed several missiles around
the construction site of the GERD. As a response to the Ethiopian step, Egyptian President
Abdel Fattah el-Sisi called for the Egyptian Army to be “at the highest level of preparedness,
ready to defend Egypt’s national security”.
58
54
Ibid., 139
55
Ibid., 135.
56
“Ethiopia Blames Egypt for State of Emergency,” Voice of America, accessed November 25, 2020,
https://www.voanews.com/africa/ethiopia-blames-egypt-state-emergency.
57
Abtew and Dessu, The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile, 140.
58
The New Arab, “Ethiopia ‘Deploys Missiles’ as Nile Dispute with Egypt Escalates,” Alaraby (The New Arab),
accessed November 25, 2020, https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2020/5/19/ethiopia-deploys-missiles-
as-nile-dispute-with-egypt-escalates.
V. Ortadoğu’da Siyaset ve Toplum Kongresi Tam Metin Kitapçığı – Sakarya, 14-16 Kasım 2020
153
Conclusion
Sharing and utilization of the waters of the Nile River have always been problems between the
riparian countries in the Nile basin. During the colonial era, the British administration
effectively got much more benefit from the river to increase cotton production in Sudan and
Egypt. For this reason, the British developed a specific Nile policy by signing several
agreements with other colonial actors. After the independence of Egypt in 1922, and Sudan in
1956, agreements in the colonial period were renewed between the new actors. After that Egypt-
British Agreement in 1929 and Egypt-Sudan Agreement in 1959 were signed. As a result of
these agreements, Egypt and Sudan, though they are not upstream countries in the basin,
benefited from the waters of the river when it compared to other countries in the region.
After the end of the Cold War, other riparian countries, mainly Ethiopia, in the basin began to
criticize the agreements in the colonial era, and they declared them as outdated agreements. For
this reason, diplomatic activities among all riparian countries gained momentum, and the Nile
Basin Initiative (NBI) was established in 1999. However, it also did not solve the Nile related
problems, and the signification of the Cooperation Framework Agreement among the four
upstream countries in the basin in 2010 multiplied the problems. Further, the Ethiopian
government’s declaration of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in 2011 trebled the
problems.
Although Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia took several diplomatic steps such as the International
Panel of Experts (IPoE) and the Declaration of Principles, existed problems such as dam filling
and leaving amount continues to increase among the countries. Currently, the Ethiopian
government completed about %70 of the construction, and it started to fill the dam. Although
there are several statements and military threats between Ethiopian and Egyptian officials about
the GERD related questions, the Ethiopian government determinedly continues to construct it.
Taking Ethiopia’s future projects on the Nile River, stated in Table 2, into consideration;
however, they are small-scale when it compared to GERD, Egypt needs to find some way to
agree with Ethiopia to get benefit from the GERD and other prospective dams of Ethiopia in
the future.
V. Middle East Congress on Politics and Society Proceedings Book – Sakarya, 14-16 November 2020
154
Bibliography
Abtew, Wossenu, and Shimelis Behailu Dessu. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the
Blue Nile. 1st ed. 2019 edition. Springer, 2018.
Arab, The New. “Ethiopia ‘Deploys Missiles’ as Nile Dispute with Egypt Escalates.” Alaraby.
The New Arab. Accessed November 25, 2020.
https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2020/5/19/ethiopia-deploys-missiles-as-
nile-dispute-with-egypt-escalates.
“Disputed Nile Agreement Signed,” Al Jazeera, Accessed November 22, 2020.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2010/5/14/disputed-nile-agreement-signed.
“Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan Sign Accord on Nile Dam,” Al Jazeera, Accessed November 25,
2020. https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2015/3/24/egypt-ethiopia-and-sudan-sign-
accord-on-nile-dam.
“Ethiopia Blames Egypt for State of Emergency,” Voice of America, Accessed November 25,
2020. https://www.voanews.com/africa/ethiopia-blames-egypt-state-emergency.
Firuze Yağmur Gökler, “Rönesans Barajı Krizinin Mısır-Etiyopya İlişkilerine Etkisi,”
Ortadoğu Analiz, 11(92), 88-91.
“From a Barrier to a Bridge,” Al Jazeera, Accessed November 24, 2020.
https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2013/11/6/from-a-barrier-to-a-bridge/.
“Full Text of ‘Declaration of Principles’ Signed by Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia - Politics -
Egypt.” Ahram, Accessed November 25, 2020.
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/125941/Egypt/Politics-/Full-text-of-
Declaration-of-Principles-signed-by-E.aspx.
Hamada, Youssef M. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Its Impact on Egyptian
Agriculture and the Potential for Alleviating Water Scarcity. 1st ed. 2017 edition.
Springer, 2017.
Mbaku, Mwangi S. Kimenyi and John Mukum. “The Limits of the New ‘Nile Agreement’”
Brookings (blog), November 30, 1AD. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-
focus/2015/04/28/the-limits-of-the-new-nile-agreement/.
“Mısır ve Etiyopya’yı Savaşın Eşiğine Getiren Hedasi Barajı’nın Açmazları.” Anadolu Ajansı,
Accessed November 24, 2020. https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/misir-ve-etiyopya-yi-
savasin-esigine-getiren-hedasi-baraji-nin-acmazlari/1678185.
Muhammed Tandoğan, and Osman Kağan Yücel. “Nil’in Paylaşılması Meselesi: Hidro-
Diplomasi Bağlamında Mısır, Sudan ve Etiyopya Rekabeti.” Dumlupınar Üniversitesi
Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, no. 53 (July 2017): 107–20.
Salman, Salman M. A. “The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: The Road to the Declaration
of Principles and the Khartoum Document.” Water International 41, no. 4 (June 6,
2016): 512–27. https://doi.org/10.1080/02508060.2016.1170374.
“South Sudan Set to Sign New Nile Agreement, ” Al Jazeera, Accessed November 22, 2020.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/6/20/south-sudan-set-to-sign-new-nile-
agreement.
Swain, Ashok. “Ethiopia, the Sudan, and Egypt: The Nile River Dispute.” The Journal of
Modern African Studies 35, no. 4 (December 1997): 675–94.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X97002577.
Terje Tvedt. “About the Importance of Studying the Modern History of the Countries of the
Nile Basin in a Nile Perspective.” In The River Nile in the Post-Colonial Age, edited by
Terje Tvedt, 1–11. Bristol, UK: I.B. Tauris, 2010.
“Some Conceptual Issues Regarding the Study of Inter-State Relationships in River Basins.” In
The Nile River in the Post-Colonial Age, edited by Terje Tvedt, 237–46. Bristol, UK:
I.B. Tauris, 2010.
V. Ortadoğu’da Siyaset ve Toplum Kongresi Tam Metin Kitapçığı – Sakarya, 14-16 Kasım 2020
155
The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Ministry of Water Resources. “Ethiopian Water
Sector Strategy,” n.d., 37.
“CFA Nile Basin Intitative (NBI).” Accessed November 22, 2020.
https://nilebasin.org/nbi/cooperative-framework-agreement.
“Who We Are | Nile Basin Intitative (NBI).” Accessed November 22, 2020.
https://nilebasin.org/nbi/who-we-are.
William L. Cleveland. Modern Ortadoğu Tarihi. Translated by Mehmet Harmancı. 1.baskı.
İstanbul: Agora, 2008.
Yacob Arsano. “Institutional Development and Water Management in the Ethiopian Nile
Basin.” In The River Nile in the Post-Colonial Age, edited by Terje Tvedt, 161–78.
Bristol, UK: I.B. Tauris, 2010.