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Natural gas – friend or foe of the environment? Evaluating the framing contest over natural gas through a public opinion survey in the Pacific Northwest
Abstract
A fierce debate is raging about the role of natural gas in North America’s energy mix. Once viewed as a bridge fuel for renewable energy, it is increasingly being characterized as hindering the energy transition. We explore public opinions about natural gas, its use and export, among residents in Oregon, Washington and British Columbia. While many of our respondents supported the continued use of natural gas in electricity generation and viewed it as relatively environmentally friendly, they did not feel that the benefits of fracking (increasingly the main source of natural gas production) outweigh its risks. Males, political conservatives, those who prioritized the economy over the environment, and those who didn’t subscribe to anthropogenic global warming felt more favorably toward natural gas. Furthermore, those who saw gas as more environmentally friendly were more supportive of gas usage and export, while those with pro-environmental views were less likely to support it.
... We anticipate that the interpretive politics of natural gasnamely the struggle to frame policy problems and related solutionswill increasingly reflect the perspectives of competing coalitions in support of and in opposition to deep decarbonization. Unpacking how natural gas is framed expressly regarding climate provides insight into how incumbent pro-fossil fuel coalitions and clean energy challengers conceive of natural gas as a "friend or foe" [19]. ...
... In focusing on the framing of natural gas, we contribute to emerging scholarship on bridge fuel discourse in the US and Canada [19,29,52]. Delborne et al. [5] provide a historical and contemporary overview of the development of bridge fuel narratives in US energy discourse, noting its emergence in tandem with US coal production as an alternative to oil/nuclear energy dependence. ...
Fossil fuel proponents and governments have framed natural gas as a “bridge fuel” necessary for a smooth global energy transition. However, environmental and climate justice groups warn that natural gas will lock in high carbon pathways, in addition to creating significant environmental harms and health risks for affected communities. This contestation around the framing of natural gas reflects a process of interpretive politics, namely the struggle of different actors to define policy problems and present potential solutions to influence policy outcomes. We explore the interpretive politics of natural gas in Canada by analyzing government climate plans and press releases produced by industry associations and other relevant, primarily non-governmental, organizations in the post-Paris era. We identify three distinct variations of the bridge fuel narrative around the purported clean energy benefits of natural gas driven by industry associations and provincial governments. Though the language of clean energy benefits is spreading, the meaning varies significantly by regional context. The malleable position of natural gas as a source of interpretive contestation has important implications for future coalition-building and decarbonization.
... Reasons for renewable support also differ by party: while Republicans express support when they anticipate economic opportunities associated with renewable energy development, Democrats tend to focus on renewables as a climate change solution (Gustafson et al., 2020). At the national level, Republicans typically have a more favorable opinion of natural gas than Democrats (Hazboun & Boudet, 2021) and are also more likely to support nuclear energy (Leppert, 2022). We draw attention to partisanship, here, as climate and energy are often viewed as highly polarized issues and political identities have been found to exert powerful in uences preferences (Mayer, 2019). ...
Rapidly building utility-scale energy infrastructure requires not only public support, but also political will across levels of government. This research explores determinants of opposition and support for large-scale energy projects among residents and local elected officials in Pennsylvania—a key transition state due its high solar potential, and where siting authority rests at the local level. This work extends prior research by using a conjoint to compare many project characteristics simultaneously, expanding the set of characteristics typically considered, sampling both the public and elected officials in a key transition state, and assessing the accuracy of public officials’ perceptions of their constituents. Using a conjoint experiment, we assess support for different characteristics of energy projects among a demographically representative sample of residents (n = 894) and a sample of local elected officials (n = 206). Key findings include that creation of permanent, union-wage jobs and cooperative community ownership increases support for energy projects and that solar projects are preferred over wind, nuclear, and natural gas power plants with carbon capture and storage. Support among both the public and local elected officials is lower when projects are owned by foreign companies. Strikingly, we find limited partisan differences in preferences for large scale renewable energy project characteristics, suggesting a promising path towards building bipartisan support for such projects. We also find, however, that local elected officials misperceive the preferences of their constituents, underestimating support for renewable energy and the importance of job creation. Given the role of local elected officials as key decision-makers regarding energy infrastructure development, their preferences and how they perceive their constituents’ preferences may dictate what types of energy projects are approved and what benefits they deliver to local communities.
... In Washington State, builders and utilities are fighting the state's recent building code changes phasing out natural gas use [25], and in May 2023, officials decided to pause the statewide mandate for electric heat pumps in new buildings due to the Berkeley ruling [26]. Unsurprisingly, the natural gas industry has been outspoken about the infeasibility and harm to consumers of these policies [25,27,28], and several industry groups have formed to promote the use of natural gas as a climate friendly fuel [29], an idea already prominent among members of the public [30]. On the other hand, American concern over climate change continues to rise and local and regional social movement activity around the country is directly targeting the use of natural gas and pushback against gas bans [31]. ...
In the absence of meaningful federal climate policy in the United States, states and local governments are poised to make a substantial contribution to decarbonization efforts. At present, over 70 local jurisdictions and two states have enacted building electrification policies that limit the use of natural gas in buildings and seek to “electrify” the building sector and reduce reliance on fossil fuels. In this case study, we examine building electrification policy passed in the City of Bellingham, Washington, in early 2022. We apply concepts from policy innovation and diffusion scholarship and propose a conceptual model that identifies factors likely to help or hinder electrification policymaking in local governments across the United States in the future.
... Prior research has offered conflicting assessments, with some findings showing little connection between beliefs about climate change and support for gas development 17 , whilst other findings point to strong relevance of climate change for informing attitudes towards gas extraction 18 . A recent US study reveals notable support for natural gas use as a 'bridge fuel' but opposition to some specific approaches for extracting gas, such as hydraulic fracturing 19 ; this comes as other research questions the role of gas as a 'bridge fuel' 20 and highlights the increasing policy debates over the 'bridge fuel' status 21 . The UK is currently heavily reliant upon gas for electricity production (36% of production in 2020-the highest from any source, followed by wind at 24%) 15 and heat (74% of all heating and hot water demand in buildings from gas) 22 . ...
Tense global politics, spikes in gas prices and increasingly urgent warnings about climate change raise questions over the future use of natural gas. UK longitudinal survey data reveal that beliefs about climate change increasingly reduced support for gas extraction between 2019 and 2022. Mounting public connections between climate and gas use suggest growing opportunities for climate communication to lower support for all fossil fuels, not just the more carbon-intensive oil and coal.
... References to natural gas (n = 15), natural infrastructure (n = 2) and natural resources (n = 4) occupied the majority of space. While not directly relevant to our analysis on NbS, the presence of natural gas in the Pan-Canadian Framework is illustrative of Canada's belief in its potential as a 'transition' fuel for Asian markets (Tindall et al., 2020), as well as the perception that it is more environmental-friendly than other fossil fuels (Hazboun & Boudet, 2021). This pattern continued in the first and second Synthesis Report of the Pan-Canadian Framework, the Expert Panel on Climate Adaptation and Resilience Results (EPCARR), the Advisory Council on Climate Action, and the Expert Panel on Sustainable Finance, with zero references to NbS (see Figure 1 for more detail). ...
Political traction for nature-based solutions is rapidly growing as governments recognize their role in addressing the simultaneous climate and biodiversity crises. While there has been recognition of the role of Indigenous Peoples in nature-based solutions, there has also been limited academic review on their relationship. This paper explores how the Government of Canada’s conceptualization of nature-based solutions either support or prevent Indigenous sustainable self-determination. Drawing on past policy frameworks, we construct a novel four-dimensional sustainable self-determination policy lens focused on: Indigenous knowledge systems; Indigenous jurisdiction over land; the full and effective participation of Indigenous Peoples; and Indigenous Peoples as rights-holders to review a total of nine federal climate policy, planning, and science documents. Our analysis shows that while there is growing recognition of Indigenous rights, inclusion of Indigenous knowledge, and commitments to include the participation of Indigenous Peoples in the implementation of certain climate activities, there is a clear unwillingness to recognize Indigenous jurisdiction and Indigenous understandings of land as systems of reciprocal relations. Reframing nature-based solutions in the context of Canadian and international climate policy is essential not only to advance the self-determination of Indigenous Peoples, but also to create the ceremonial ground for Indigenous visions of nature-based solutions in order to address these joint crises.
• Key policy insights
• Despite a growing recognition of the role of nature-based solutions in climate policy, there is limited discussion of how current framings support or prevent Indigenous self-determination.
• Without such consideration, and the appropriate protection and recognition of Indigenous rights and jurisdiction, nature-based solutions risk perpetuating a form of climate colonialism that facilitates further violence and land dispossession against Indigenous Peoples.
• Framings of nature-based solutions could benefit from Indigenous ontologies to reframe discussions on the reciprocal connection between humans and nature, advancing a relational framework of nature-based solutions.
• A novel sustainable self-determination policy lens may assist Parties consider how, and in what capacity, they are considering the rights of Indigenous Peoples, as required by the Paris Agreement and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
... Public opinion scholars have sought to analyze factors shaping public perceptions of emerging shale gas expansion more broadly. An array of sociodemographic literatures identified that women and minority groups are more likely to have a higher perception of risks and are less supportive of emerging technologies [3,[14][15][16]. Previous studies found mixed effects of age, income, and education on perceptions of shale gas development [3,17,18]. ...
This paper examines whether public perceptions of the claimed advantages and disadvantages of fracking are consistent with an evidence-based assessment of the claimed advantages and disadvantages. Public assessments are obtained from an internet-based opinion survey in 2014 in six states: California, Illinois, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas. The survey presented eleven advantages and eleven disadvantages of fracking derived from local media stories, from advocacy claims made by pro- or anti-fracking groups, and from think tank pieces. Then the respondents were asked to indicate their feelings about how important each claimed advantage and disadvantage was to their support of/opposition to fracking. Scientific assessments regarding the same claims are compiled from available peer-reviewed literature and evidence-based reviews. We classify each claim as either (a) supported by the weight of the available evidence, (b) not supported by the weight of the available evidence, or (c) there is inadequate evidence to assess it. We find less consistency with respect to the disadvantages than advantages. Respondents perceive four disadvantages out of eleven as extremely important while there is inadequate evidence to assess them or the available evidence does not support them. Our comparison has interesting implications for understanding the controversy about fracking.
Rapidly building utility-scale energy infrastructure requires not only public support but also political will across levels of government. Here we use a conjoint experiment to assess preferences for large-scale energy projects among residents and local elected officials in Pennsylvania—a key transition state with high solar potential where siting authority rests at the local level. We find that residents prefer solar to other energy projects, and job creation and cooperative community ownership are associated with increased support. Public and elected official support decreases when projects are owned by foreign companies. We find limited partisan differences in preferences, suggesting a path towards bipartisan support for such projects. Elected officials misperceive their constituents’ preferences, underestimating support for renewable energy and the importance of job creation. As local officials are key decision-makers regarding infrastructure development, their preferences and perceptions of constituents’ preferences may dictate which energy projects are approved and what community benefits they deliver.
Earlier policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S. have often treated natural gas as a clean fuel due to its higher energy output per unit of carbon dioxide emitted compared to other fuels. However, recent local decarbonization initiatives seek to restrict residential uses of natural gas. Public support for such policies could be a key factor in determining whether local governments implement natural gas restrictions. It may also indicate the potential for state and federal governments to adopt similar measures. In this study, we conduct an online survey with 2,623 U.S. adults to demonstrate how public support for natural gas restrictions varies based on policy framing. These framings include (1) household economic costs, (2) industry positions, (3) health impacts, (4) contribution to climate change, and (5) political support. Our results show that public support for policies to ban natural gas in new construction is significantly influenced by the health impact of these policies. This finding suggests that U.S. citizens are sensitive to non-economic health frames when evaluating a policy proposal to phase out natural gas use. Meanwhile, factors such as monthly energy costs, industry support, climate effects, and political backing show only a weak influence on public opinion regarding these policies. Word Count: 10,700
Public perceptions of fracking and natural gas have received significant scholarly attention recently. However, opinion research is scant with respect to natural gas export (the transport and sale of natural gas from one country to another via pipeline or ship) and its associated economic benefits and environmental risks. Understanding public views on export, particularly in places where export facilities are proposed, is important because the U.S. has rapidly increased its natural gas exports overseas in the wake of the shale revolution. Moreover, such facilities have been targeted by anti-fossil fuel and climate activists as a weak link in the chain of the fossil fuel economy, particularly on the U.S. West Coast where proposals for export terminals have proven unsuccessful. Using a web-based opinion survey in the state of Oregon (n = 500), we evaluate risk and benefit perceptions of natural gas export and the role of socio-demographic, political ideology, and place-based factors in shaping these perceptions. We find that men, conservatives, urban residents, and those who perceive that their community’s economic identity is tied to extractive industries are less likely to perceive risks and more likely to perceive benefits from natural gas export. Respondents with a bachelor’s degree and those who perceive that their community’s economic identity is tied to renewable energy are more likely to perceive risks and less likely to perceive benefits. Whereas much of energy social science is focused on sites of extraction, our results contribute to the growing understanding of the social dimensions of energy export.
Policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the US have largely treated natural gas as a clean fuel due to its lower dioxide-to-energy content than other fuels. However, recent local decarbonization initiatives seek to ban residential uses of natural gas. Public support for such policies will determine whether other localities adopt natural gas bans and whether state and federal policies may follow. At the same time, several states adopted policies prohibiting natural gas bans. In this study, we show that public support for gas bans depends on policy design. Our survey experiment shows that health effects of proposed policies are associated with public support, whereas monthly energy costs, industry support, and information about climate effects and political support for the proposed policy do not influence public opinion.
Mail surveys have long been a staple of social science research. Properly conducted, they can gather representative data about a population that provides important generalizations about that population. High response rates are one crucial element of this capacity to make such generalizations. Response rates to mail surveys–especially those targeting general populations–have declined substantially over the years, even when employing standard “best practices” such as carefully crafted and pretested instruments, good explanations of research purpose, and multiple contacts. Our research group has a unique capacity to speak to declining response rates, having implemented mail surveys on natural resource-related topics–using relatively similar methods–for more than 45 years. We present the results of a longitudinal analysis of response rates to 191 surveys we conducted between 1971 and 2017 (response rates and methodological specifics carefully recorded over this time), documenting the changes in response rates over the years, and the factors associated with these changes. Variables assessed include topic saliency, the nature of the sample, timing, length and complexity of the questionnaire, and others. We find that year of implementation is a strong predictor of response rate, net of these other factors. We use these findings as a base from which to engage a larger discussion about strategies that social science researchers might use, both in terms of continued modifications to mail survey approaches and in moving towards other research methods.
Contrary to what is needed for reducing global GHG emissions, successive Canadian governments have placed fossil fuel production at the core of national economic development. This presents a puzzle: how should we understand contradictory political commitments to the Paris agreement and low carbon energy futures, on one hand, and the persistence of support for fossil fuel centered energy futures, on the other hand. Using a policy network perspective, we ask: Is the location of actors within a climate change policy network associated with their position on curtailing the Alberta oil sands development? Results show that actors’ social network positions are associated with their support for curtailing oil sands development. This network association persists even when the sectoral affiliation and climate change beliefs of actors are statistically controlled. Our results demonstrate that policy network analysis helps explain the persistence of the contradictory politics of fossil fuel development and support for decarbonization.
The U.S. and Canada continue to face major changes in energy production. Mounting awareness of the climate crisis has placed increasing importance on developing renewable energy sources, however, advances in fossil fuel extraction technology have opened vast domestic reserves of oil and natural gas. Public preferences for energy policy play a role in determining energy futures, but researchers rarely simultaneously compare public views across multiple renewable and non-renewable energies or across country boundaries. Here, we used a 2019 online survey sample (n = 1500) to compare predictors of support for eight fuel sources for electricity generation in British Columbia, Canada, and Washington and Oregon, USA. Results indicate the highest support overall for renewables (wind, solar, wave/tidal energy, geothermal) and the lowest for fossil fuels (coal and natural gas), nuclear, and hydropower. Mixed-effects regression modeling indicates that views on climate and the balance between environment and economy were consistent predictors of support across most energy types, while political ideology was less consistent. Perceived local importance of both extractive and renewable energy industries were significant predictors of support for some, but not all, energy sources, as were education and gender. Overall, our research suggests that while divisions persist in public energy preferences for both renewable and non-renewable sources, there is the broadest support for renewable energy technologies.
How do people envision the future energy system in the United States with respect to using fossil fuels, renewable energy, and nuclear energy? Are there shared policy pathways of achieving a decarbonized energy system? Here, we present results of an online survey ( n = 2,429) designed to understand public perceptions of the current and future energy mixes in the United States (i.e., energy sources used for electric power, transportation, industrial, commercial, and residential sectors). We investigate support for decarbonization policies and antidecarbonization policies and the relative importance of climate change as an issue. Surprisingly, we find bipartisan support for a decarbonized energy future. Although there is a shared vision for decarbonization, there are strong partisan differences regarding the policy pathways for getting there. On average, our participants think that climate change is not the most important problem facing the United States today, but they do view climate change as an important issue for the world today and for the United States and the world in the future.
The recent shift in the United States from coal to natural gas as a primary feedstock for the production of electric power has reduced the intensity of sectoral carbon dioxide emissions, but—due to gaps in monitoring—its downstream pollution-related effects have been less well understood. Here, I analyse old units that have been taken offline and new units that have come online to empirically link technology switches to observed aerosol and ozone changes and subsequent impacts on human health, crop yields and regional climate. Between 2005 and 2016 in the continental United States, decommissioning of a coal-fired unit was associated with reduced nearby pollution concentrations and subsequent reductions in mortality and increases in crop yield. In total during this period, the shutdown of coal-fired units saved an estimated 26,610 (5%–95% confidence intervals (CI), 2,725–49,680) lives and 570 million (249–878 million) bushels of corn, soybeans and wheat in their immediate vicinities; these estimates increase when pollution transport-related spillovers are included. Changes in primary and secondary aerosol burdens also altered regional atmospheric reflectivity, raising the average top of atmosphere instantaneous radiative forcing by 0.50 W m−2. Although there are considerable benefits of decommissioning older coal-fired units, the newer natural gas and coal-fired units that have supplanted them are not entirely benign. The recent shift in the United States from coal to natural gas for electric power has reduced the carbon dioxide emissions intensity of electric power production, but the other pollution-related impacts of this shift are not yet known. This study finds that, between 2005 and 2016, decommissioning coal-fired plants in the continental US saved an estimated 26,610 lives and 570 million bushels of corn, soybeans and wheat in their vicinities and also changed regional climate.
A gap exists in cross-technology and large-scale research about public support for energy infrastructure, particularly the influence of exposure on attitudes. We used a national panel sample of Canadians to explore drivers of support across ten energy technologies, comparing predictors such as exposure, political views, environmental values and sectoral employment with controls for demographics and geography. Exposure to a specific infrastructure was associated with support for four technologies, only one of which was renewable (solar); the others were nuclear, oil from non-tar sand sources and coal, the last of which had the strongest effect with exposure doubling the likelihood of support. However, noticing any infrastructure at all boosted support for all renewable technologies included as well as natural gas, increasing the likelihood of support for key renewables (wind, hydroelectricity, and solar) by 61-76%. Beyond the importance of noticing infrastructure, our results demonstrate that energy technology support follows relatively predictable lines in Canada, save for a general lack of urban-rural divide in attitudes. Results suggest that hiding energy infrastructure may be a barrier to renewable energy transitions, but first we need: more nuanced measurements of exposure and noticing, to understand the direction of causality between such variables and support; and, to explore the roles of energy literacy and gender.
The U.S. is now the global leader in natural gas production. The federal government is changing policies and priorities to expand natural gas export to foreign energy markets. Such an expansion requires increased pipeline capacity and the development of export terminals for shipping. While natural gas export is a burgeoning energy and environmental issue, we know little about what influences public support/opposition for the practice. Such information is vital to all levels of government and stakeholders. Using a national online survey sample (n = 1042), we examine what factors influence public support/opposition. Results of regression analysis indicate that supporters tend to be male, hold a bachelor's degree or higher, wealthier, politically conservative, and reference affective images of the economy, energy, and trade. In contrast, opponents tend to be women, politically liberal, and reference affective images related to keeping natural gas in the U.S., the environment, and hydraulic fracturing. Based on these findings, we discuss implications for energy policy, public communication about this issue, and future research.
The United States and Canada have been at the forefront of shale oil and gas development via hydraulic fracturing. Understanding public perceptions is important given the role that they may play in future policy decisions in both North America and other parts of the world where shale development is at a much earlier stage. We review 58 articles pertaining to perceptions, published between 2009 and 2015. Studies report mixed levels of awareness of shale operations, tending toward higher awareness in areas with existing development. While individuals tend to have negative associations with the term ‘fracking,’ views on shale development are mixed as to whether benefits outweigh risks or vice versa: perceived benefits tend to be economic (e.g., job creation and boosts to local economies) and risks more commonly environmental and/or social (e.g., impacts on water and increased traffic). Some papers point to ethical issues (e.g., inequitable risk/benefit distribution and procedural justice) and widespread distrust of responsible parties, stemming from perceived unfairness, heavy‐handed corporate tactics, and lack of transparency. These findings point to the contested, political character of much of the debate about hydraulic fracturing, and raise questions of what constitutes ‘acceptable’ risk in this context. We compare these results with research emerging in the UK over the same period. Future research should focus on nuanced inquiry, a range of methodologies and explore perceptions in varied social and geographical contexts. Both this and future research hold the potential to enhance public debates and decisions about shale gas and oil development. WIREs Clim Change 2017, 8:e450. doi: 10.1002/wcc.450
This article is categorized under: Perceptions, Behavior, and Communication of Climate Change > Perceptions of Climate Change
The Carbon Economy and Climate Mitigation > Policies, Instruments, Lifestyles, Behavior
Research suggests that previous, current, and prospective extractive industry activities influence perceptions of new development. Studies that have drawn this conclusion, however, have usually focused on specific projects in specific communities. Here, these factors are examined on an aggregate, national scale. Combining geospatial data on extractive industry activities and survey data from a nationally representative sample (N = 1061), the influence of extractive industry activities on support for fracking is studied. While limited evidence is found for the impact of proximity to oil and gas wells or production on support for fracking, employment levels in the natural resources and mining sector in the respondent’s county and residence in an area experiencing active oil and gas development significantly increase support for fracking. The results highlight the role of spatial and community factors in shaping support for energy development.
Shale gas proponents argue this unconventional fossil fuel offers a “bridge” towards a cleaner energy system by offsetting higher-carbon fuels such as coal. The technical feasibility of reconciling shale gas development with climate action remains contested. However, we here argue that governance challenges are both more pressing and more profound. Reconciling shale gas and climate action requires institutions capable of responding effectively to uncertainty; intervening to mandate emissions reductions and internalize costs to industry; and managing the energy system strategically towards a lower carbon future. Such policy measures prove challenging, particularly in jurisdictions that stand to benefit economically from unconventional fuels. We illustrate this dilemma through a case study of shale gas development in British Columbia, Canada, a global leader on climate policy that is nonetheless struggling to manage gas development for mitigation. The BC case is indicative of the constraints jurisdictions face both to reconcile gas development and climate action, and to manage the industry adequately to achieve social licence and minimize resistance. More broadly, the case attests to the magnitude of change required to transform our energy systems to mitigate climate change.
Addressing climate change and meeting our energy needs are two of the greatest challenges that societies face. Many obstacles hinder progress. The search for inexpensive and plentiful energy supplies appears to be at odds with climate change mitigation commitments. The desire for short-term (next 30 years) energy security has re-invigorated investment in fossil fuel technologies and led to a North American boom in hydraulic fracturing for shale gas (fracking). However, fracking contributes both directly and indirectly to greenhouse gas emissions, further driving anthropogenic climate change. Here we consider the implications and conclude that the expansion of fracking is incompatible with climate change mitigation.
Corporate advertising campaigns increasingly use environmental frames to promote their products and processes, many of which are neither sustainable nor environmentally friendly. This study examines ExxonMobil's recent efforts at green advertising, focusing specifically on their widely aired “Energy Solutions” television advertisements. We argue that ExxonMobil's use of a didactic, greenwashed frame stifles criticism and discourages examination of ideologies of consumption by exploiting the ethos of the scientist and highlighting technological solutions to problems that are deeply tied to a culture of consumerism. The definition of green energy is controlled by those with the power to generate persuasive public messages about the sources and production of energy. Counterframes, however, can be employed to turn a questioning eye upon the solutions advanced by ExxonMobil. We issue a call for green frames that help citizens and consumers critically examine the ecological integrity of all means of energy production, and that call attention to the ways in which the greenwashing of research and development initiatives can dissuade necessary action, including reduction of US energy consumption.
Abstract
Despite the increasing socioenvironmental controversy over the use of horizontal drilling and
hydraulic fracturing technology in unconventional natural gas development (i.e., fracking), few
sociological studies have used citizen interview narratives to examine attitudes toward shale
fracking at the local level. Drawing on sociological research, discursive documents, and indepth
interview data collected from regional stakeholder groups/citizens, this article offers a
qualitative analysis of the environmental disputes and opportunity-threat impacts perceived
to surround natural gas exploration and hydraulic fracking in the Haynesville Shale region of
Louisiana. The narratives reveal that the fracking dispute largely revolves around divergent
diagnostic and prognostic beliefs about shale gas development, as well as whether the perceived
economic opportunities of development outweigh the alleged socioenvironmental risks to the
Haynesville community. Some conclusions about the utility of qualitative research for the study
of environmental controversies like fracking, as well as the potential future direction of the
growing national debate over shale gas and oil extraction, are discussed.
In April 2011, we published the first peer-reviewed analysis of the greenhouse gas footprint (GHG) of shale gas, concluding that the climate impact of shale gas may be worse than that of other fossil fuels such as coal and oil because of methane emissions. We noted the poor quality of publicly available data to support our analysis and called for further research. Our paper spurred a large increase in research and analysis, including several new studies that have better measured methane emissions from natural gas systems. Here, I review this new research in the context of our 2011 paper and the fifth assessment from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change released in 2013. The best data available now indicate that our estimates of methane emission from both shale gas and conventional natural gas were relatively robust. Using these new, best available data and a 20-year time period for comparing the warming potential of methane to carbon dioxide, the conclusion stands that both shale gas and conventional natural gas have a larger GHG than do coal or oil, for any possible use of natural gas and particularly for the primary uses of residential and commercial heating. The 20-year time period is appropriate because of the urgent need to reduce methane emissions over the coming 15–35 years.
This paper conducts an empirical analysis of the factors affecting U.S. public concern about the threat of climate change between January 2002 and December 2010. Utilizing Stimson’s method of constructing aggregate opinion measures, data from 74 separate surveys over a 9-year period are used to construct quarterly measures of public concern over global climate change. We examine five factors that should account for changes in levels of concern: 1) extreme weather events, 2) public access to accurate scientific information, 3) media coverage, 4) elite cues, and 5) movement/countermovement advocacy. A time-series analysis indicates that elite cues and structural economic factors have the largest effect on the level of public concern about climate change. While media coverage exerts an important influence, this coverage is itself largely a function of elite cues and economic factors. Weather extremes have no effect on aggregate public opinion. Promulgation of scientific information to the public on climate change has a minimal effect. The implication would seem to be that information-based science advocacy has had only a minor effect on public concern, while political mobilization by elites and advocacy groups is critical in influencing climate change concern.
Employing scientific explanations and hard data, this book shows why coal is such a problem, how the pro-coal forces got to be so powerful, and how those forces might be defeated through political activism.
Coal provided the energy to build modern civilization. This energy source raised standards of living, multiplied the earth's population, and enabled people in developed countries to enjoy leisure time. Today, we know that if we burn all the coal available, climate change will continue to increase. But the use of coal isn't purely an environmental issue; there are also political and economic forces at play. This book examines the politics and environmental impact of coal production and distribution, presenting a clear point of view—that we must shift away from coal use—backed by hard data and supplying specific prescriptions for opposing and regulating the coal industry.
Author John C. Berg explains how ending the burning of coal (and of oil and natural gas) is a political problem rather than a technical one; explodes the "clean coal" myth, providing scientific documentation of how burning coal emits more greenhouse gases per unit of energy than any other fuel; and describes how controlling coal use in the United States will also serve to restore the possibility of a meaningful international climate agreement. Additionally, readers will understand the critical importance of activism—from local to international—in spurring government regulation to control the coal industry, which can only be defeated politically.
Although party affiliation is a strong predictor of differences in citizen opinion about a wide range of public policy issues, the picture is more complex for unconventional gas development (UGD) through hydraulic fracturing. Using data collected in Colorado (n = 390) around the time of the highly polarizing 2016 Presidential Election, we conduct a latent class analysis based on individual perceptions of the possible risks and benefits of UGD. Instead of finding attitudes polarized along party lines, citizens in Colorado parsimoniously cluster into three substantially sized groups that cannot be explained by party identification and sociodemographic variables. We also test the value of group membership by assessing association with individual voting behavior at the hypothetical ballot box using language from actual measures filed for placement onto the 2016 Statewide Ballot in Colorado. Results suggest that attitudes toward UGD may be better explained by perceptions of potential costs/disadvantages and benefits/advantages rather than traditional sociodemographic and political party variables. This suggests that understanding public opinion on fracking means moving beyond our traditional conceptualization of opinion formation, even in today’s politically polarized environment.
This article offers a framework for analyzing and extending the recent wave of national “keep it in the ground” (KIIG) bans on fossil fuel exploration and production. We situate this discussion in new theoretical work on decarbonization acceleration and then present an overview of KIIG movement and policy development. Next, drawing on the burgeoning supply side climate policy literature, we outline major barriers to constraining fossil fuel development, then focus on identifying conditions most conducive for KIIG policy. These include locally-rooted campaigns, the development of a pro-KIIG constituency that is horizontally dense and vertically integrated, resonant message framing, and support by well-placed norm entrepreneurs. We argue that early national efforts to keep fossil fuels in the ground demark a critical juncture in global climate policy. Understanding the trajectory of these bans is a first step in extending these initiatives as part of the pathway to carbon neutrality by 2050.
As unconventional fossil fuel production expands in much of the world, so does controversy, and in many cases, public opposition. This study explores citizen perceptions, support, and opposition for several types of unconventional fossil fuel in the case study of Canada, where such production continues to grow. We use a nationally representative survey of Canadians (n = 1407) to assess citizen acceptance of oil sands development and natural gas development using hydraulic fracturing, as well as related infrastructure (specifically the Northern Gateway, TransMountain, and Energy East pipelines). We compare this acceptance to other forms of energy generation, namely conventional oil, coal, renewables, and nuclear. Across the Canadian sample, oil sands and pipelines tend to have less acceptance than renewables and conventional oil, but more acceptance than nuclear and coal power. Acceptance for unconventional fossil fuel development and infrastructure is consistently higher among respondents in Alberta (the province where most development occurs), where respondents perceive more economic benefits and less environmental and social costs. Within each region, acceptance levels are similar for oil sands and oil sands pipelines, while hydraulic fracturing has significantly lower acceptance within all regions. Regression analyses indicate consistent patterns: opposition to unconventional fossil fuel developments and infrastructure is predicted by higher biospheric-altruistic values and environmental concern, and support is predicted by higher egoistic and traditional values and higher trust in oil and gas companies. Results provide insights to policymakers and stakeholders, including regional differences in acceptance, and how citizens perceive oil sands related projects differently than hydraulic fracturing.
Since at least the 1970s, the idea that certain fossil fuels represent transitional fuels on the way to a lower-carbon energy future has persisted in energy discourse. In particular, natural gas has come to occupy a new identity in this discourse, shifting from what was once a negligible portion of the energy mix in the United States to one of the nation's most important energy resources. Though the “bridge fuel” metaphor was once fairly unambiguous in its meaning, the term has evolved over time to incorporate many visions of the future roles of coal and natural gas in the energy mix. To probe the variety of these meanings in public discourse, we assess the bridge fuel narrative in news articles and government publications as a means to understand the complexity and context of political debates over the unfolding future of natural gas. Using a qualitative coding scheme, we examine five different interpretations of the bridge fuel metaphor between 1988 and 2016. We argue that with its unique quality of facilitating both consensus-building and contestation, the bridge fuel metaphor's simplicity and accessibility belie its power to reveal changing expectations, values, and visions of the future of American energy.
We analyse data from the 2018 Eurobarometer survey to provide a debate on EU authority in the field of energy policy beyond the member states' preferences. More specifically, we look at why citizens are willing to confer authority to the EU in making energy policy and which policy priorities they indicate. Focusing on public opinion appears promising as the data reveals that European citizens have a more positive stance on allocating policy competences to the EU than the member states' governments. The descriptive analysis shows that most citizens prefer the Energy Union to prior-itise the promotion of renewable energy. This holds particularly true for citizens living in Western Europe that have a left-leaning ideology and who perceive climate change as an issue. For Central-East European citizens, especially those who are right-leaning and perceive energy security as a problem, the Energy Union should give priority to increasing energy security.
In the wake of the shale revolution and with continuing coal plant retirements, United States energy companies and fossils-rich states are increasingly seeking outlets to sell oil, gas, and coal overseas. Deepwater ports in the Pacific Northwest region are attractive for their proximity to Western energy fields, yet substantial opposition has emerged in response to proposals to expand export infrastructure in this region. We examine public response to oil, natural gas, and coal export using results of a 2018 survey (n = 960) fielded in Washington State. Results indicate that respondents were overall more opposed than supportive of expanding fossil fuels export, though there was more support for natural gas export than coal or oil. Respondents thought transporting oil by ship and natural gas and oil by railroad was risky, and they were most concerned about potential impacts to wildlife and fish habitat, water quality, and the global climate. We examined individual and contextual independent variables in regression models, and find that respondents who were male, politically conservative, didn’t think humans were causing global warming, and were more familiar with energy export were more supportive. Furthermore, living in eastern Washington, near a railroad, and near export facilities was related to higher support.
Energy’s central place in economic, political and social systems—and the broad impacts that energy choices have on the natural world and public health—mean that new technologies often spur public reactions. Understanding these public responses and their drivers is important, as public support can influence new technology adoption and deployment. Here I review the literature on public perceptions of and responses to a wide range of new energy technologies. Unlike previous reviews that tend to focus on particular technologies or types of technologies, this Review covers both large-scale energy infrastructure projects, such as utility-scale wind and solar, fossil fuel extraction and marine renewables, as well as small-scale, ‘consumer-facing’ technologies such as electric vehicles, rooftop solar and smart meters. This approach reveals broad trends that may facilitate communication between policymakers, technologists and the public, and support the transition to a more sustainable energy system. Public responses to new energy technologies can influence adoption and deployment. This Review brings together research on public perceptions of and responses to a wide range of energy technologies around the themes of technology, people, place and process.
Risk communication scholars have examined public perception of scientific consensus on a variety of politically controversial risk topics; social-psychological factors that shape such views (i.e., political ideology); and effects on issue attitudes. Few studies, however, have combined these antecedents and outcomes within a single framework – one that describes how politically polarized attitudes emerge via ideologically-divergent perceptions of scientific agreement. We address this shortcoming in the context of an emerging risk topic – unconventional oil and natural gas development (UOGD) in the United States – that is politically controversial and where scientific agreement on specific impacts along with value-laden assessments of benefit and risk are subjects of scholarly and public debate. Using a quota survey of United States adults (n = 700), we find that political conservatism heightened support indirectly via: (1) perceived scientific consensus that benefits outweigh the risks and, in turn, the belief that UOGD’s health, economic, and environmental impacts in the United States have been positive and (2) lower perception of scientific consensus that risks outweigh benefits, which likewise heightened beliefs that aforementioned impacts have been positive. We discuss implications for risk communication research related to energy development.
The Clean Power Plan (CPP) is the most ambitious effort to date to de-carbonize the U.S. energy system, promote alternative energy sources and assist communities that will be deleteriously impacted by the decline of traditional fossil fuels. The CPP has proven controversial, with critiques raised by diverse stakeholders. Currently, the future of the CPP is in doubt with the rise of President Trump’s decidedly pro-fossil fuel EPA. Despite the controversy around the CPP, little is known about how communities impacted by changes in the energy system view this policy. In this analysis, we present results from a survey of local policy actors in Colorado and Utah—states with diverse and ample energy resources. This analysis asks how factors like community economic identity, elite partisan cues and partisan identity influence support for the CPP. Results imply that local policy actors who view fossil fuels as locally significant are less likely to support the CPP, while community economic identity around alternative energy does not increase support (even though the CPP would benefit that sector). Elite partisan cues, surprisingly, did little to alter views about the CPP while party affiliation was a powerful predictor. Implications for the local dimensions of energy policy are discussed.
Despite the current ambivalence of the United States towards the Paris Agreement, national and local jurisdictions across the globe remain committed, and they are seeking ways to increase the ambition and effectiveness of their climate policies. One way forwards could be limiting the production — not just the consumption — of coal, gas and oil. Here we describe the rationale for, and CO2 emissions implications of, limiting oil production. Seven countries have recently imposed such limits, and we develop a case study for a potential addition to this group, the US state of California. We find that by ceasing the issuance of permits for new oil wells, California could reduce global CO2 emissions substantially and also enhance environmental justice in the state.
The extraction of oil and gas has increasingly shaped Canada’s economy and culture in recent years. As Canada attempts to move toward a low carbon economy, it is important to know how Canadians perceive the risks and opportunities associated with various energy sources. In particular, fracking, or hydraulic fracturing, is one such energy extraction technique that has received much media attention but little systematic research from social scientists in Canada. Drawing on survey data from a representative sample of citizens in a province that has utilized fracking extensively (British Columbia) and one that has placed a moratorium on its use (New Brunswick), this article examines public perceptions of the use of hydraulic fracturing. In particular, this paper explores the risks and opportunities people perceive from this technology in these different provincial energy contexts. The findings suggest that while New Brunswick residents saw more benefits and fewer risks from fracking than British Columbia residents, the variables shaping perceptions within each province were mostly similar. We argue that contemporary risk theorizing should more closely consider how people perceive opportunities associated with the use of this disruptive technology as well as how context shapes people’s perceptions.
With the rapid growth of unconventional oil and natural gas development transforming the U.S. economic and physical landscape, social scientists have increasingly explored the spatial dynamics of public support for this issue—that is, whether people closer to unconventional oil and gas development are more supportive or more opposed. While theoretical frameworks like construal‐level theory and the “Not in My Backyard” (or NIMBY) moniker provide insight into these spatial dynamics, case studies in specific locations experiencing energy development reveal substantial variation in community responses. Larger‐scale studies exploring the link between proximity and support have been hampered by data quality and availability. We draw on a unique data set that includes geo‐coded data from national surveys (nine waves; n = 19,098) and high‐resolution well location data to explore the relationship between proximity and both familiarity with and support for hydraulic fracturing. We use two different measures of proximity—respondent distance to the nearest well and the density of wells within a certain radius of the respondent's location. We find that both types of proximity to new development are linked to more familiarity with hydraulic fracturing, even after controlling for various individual and contextual factors, but only distance‐based proximity is linked to more support for the practice. When significant, these relationships are similar to or exceed the effects of race, income, gender, and age. We discuss the implications of these findings for effective risk communication as well as the importance of incorporating spatial analysis into public opinion research on perceptions of energy development.
‘Fracking’, or unconventional gas development via hydraulic fracturing (hereafter ‘UGD’), has been closely tied to global climate change in academic discourse. Researchers have debated the life cycle emissions of shale gas versus coal, rates of methane leakage from wellhead production and transmission infrastructure, the extent to which coal would be displaced by gas as a source of energy, the appropriate time-scale for accounting for the global warming potentials of methane and carbon dioxide, surface versus airborne methane measurements, and the effect of lowered energy prices on gas consumption. Little research, however, has examined the degree to which these potential connections between UGD and climate change are relevant to the general public. This article presents two surveys, one of a representative national (US) sample and one of a representative sample of residents in the Marcellus Shale region of Pennsylvania and New York. It examines whether respondents associated UGD with climate change, and the relationship between this association and their support for, or opposition to, UGD. The results reveal that beliefs about many other potential impacts of UGD explain more variation in support and opposition than do beliefs about UGD’s association with climate change. Furthermore, most other impacts of UGD are viewed as having more effect on quality of life if they were to occur, at least amongst the Marcellus Shale survey sample. The article concludes with implications of the findings for policy and communication on UGD.
Key policy insights
• Public opinion about unconventional gas development (UGD or ‘fracking’) is affected less by beliefs about its impact on global climate change, than about several other more local factors.
• Communication tailored to increase awareness of UGD’s impacts would likely be most effective when focusing on the local level, as opposed to national or global impacts.
• Messaging about UGD’s relationship with carbon emissions would have more effect in national-level discourse, as opposed to messaging targeted at communities experiencing or potentially experiencing development.
• To maintain credibility and societal trust, communication on the global climate impacts of UGD needs to be informative but non-persuasive.
Mounting evidence suggests that a large portion of the world's fossil fuel reserves will have to remain in the ground to prevent dangerous climate change. Yet, the fossil fuel industry continues to invest in new infrastructure to expand fuel supply. There appears to be a prevailing logic that extraction is inevitable, in spite of growing climate change concerns. Few political leaders seem to be willing to challenge this logic. The absence of adequate political action on climate change has sparked a burgeoning social movement focused on constraining fossil fuel supply. This article describes this movement, and explores the role that social mobilization may play in enabling policies that limit fossil fuel extraction. Drawing from literature on social mobilization and political change, this work: (1) discusses some of the social and political barriers to mobilization focused on restricting fossil fuel supply; (2) describes the pathways through which mobilization efforts may influence climate policy; and (3) highlights insights from studies of successful social movements that have relevance for the issue of fossil fuel extraction. The article concludes with directions for future research on social mobilization focused on supply-side climate policy.
Key policy insights
• Enacting policies to limit fossil fuel supply has proven challenging in many contexts.
• There is renewed interest in the role social movements may play in shifting the political landscape, to make it more likely that policies to restrict fossil fuel extraction may succeed.
• Effective social mobilization requires a combination factors aligning at the right time to influence policy outcomes, such as windows of political opportunity opening, and compelling framing that calls citizens to action.
• Critical examination of the factors that lead to movement success is necessary to understand the circumstances where social mobilization may influence supply-side climate policies.
Public opinion plays an important role in shaping the policy debate over hydraulic fracturing at both the state and national level. However, most Americans report having little to no information about this controversial practice that has transformed the U.S. energy market. Employing an experiment embedded on a nationally representative survey, we examine how citizens respond to arguments concerning the costs and benefits of fracking, and incorporate them into their policy preferences. Arguments emphasizing the economic benefits of fracking bolster support for the technique; however, these gains are completely canceled if paired with a discussion of fracking's environmental costs. Additionally, we find mixed evidence of partisan motivated reasoning in how this information is processed. Individuals whose partisan attachments and preexisting beliefs about global climate change conflict are particularly responsive to arguments about the benefits and costs of fracking. Our results have important implications for scholars and policymakers concerned with partisan polarization in public opinion toward energy and environmental policy.
Unconventional oil and gas technology such as hydraulic fracturing ("fracking") has created a boom in production in the United States. In this paper we add to the growing literature on public perceptions of risk and benefits related to fracking using data from Colorado. We find that trust in the oil and gas industry is powerful predictor of a range of risk and benefit perceptions while other ostensibly important variables-such as the extent of local drilling or the perceived economic significance of the oil and gas industry-have little role in risk and benefit perceptions. The effect of trust is robust across several different types of risk and benefits perceptions and survives the inclusion of an array of control variables. Moving forward, we suggest researchers work to understand the factors which create public trust in the oil and gas industry.
A growing area of research has addressed public perception of unconventional oil and natural gas development via hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”). We extend this research by examining how geographic proximity to such extraction interacts with political ideology to influence issue support. Regression analysis of data from a fall 2013 national telephone survey of United States residents reveals that as respondents’ geographic distance from areas experiencing significant development increases, political ideology becomes more strongly associated with issue support, with the liberal-partisan divide widening. Our findings support construal level theory's central premise: that people use more abstract considerations (like political ideology) the more geographically removed they are from an issue. We discuss implications for studying public opinion of energy development as well as for risk communication.
Natural gas has significant potential carbon benefits over coal when used for electricity generation, but these benefits can be offset by emissions of fugitive methane or delays in the adoption of near-zero carbon technologies. We analyze the time-evolution of radiative forcing from both natural gas and coal-based electricity generation by calculating average radiative forcing over an interval of time from greenhouse gas emissions under a range of assumptions for fugitive methane leakage, electricity generation efficiency, and delays in the adoption of near-zero carbon technologies. We find that leakage rates of between 5.2% and 9.9% are required for natural gas to result in greater mean forcing than coal over the next 100 years. We show that natural gas infrastructure with modest leakage could remain in place for 1.5–2.4 times the time interval that coal generation would have persisted prior to replacement with near-zero carbon technologies before the climate benefits of replacing coal with natural gas are negated. Natural gas can serve a viable bridge away from coal-based generation if avoiding longer-term climate impacts is prioritized, fugitive methane emissions are minimized, and the large-scale transition to near-zero carbon alternatives is unlikely to happen in the near-term.
There is growing recognition of the need to understand public attitudes to energy sources, such as shale gas, and to feed these into decision-making. This study represents the first detailed UK experimental survey of public perceptions of shale gas fracking, including analysis of the effects of different messages and the relative influence of different audience, message and contextual factors on support and risk perceptions in respect of shale gas fracking. Using an online survey (N = 1457) of the UK public, we find considerable ambivalence about shale gas, but also greater awareness of potential risks than benefits. Prior knowledge is associated with more favourable attitudes, although demographics, political affiliation and environmental values are strongest influences on perceptions. When provided with environmental or economic information about shale gas, participants became more positive - irrespective of their prior values or whether information is framed in terms of losses or gains. As expected, prior attitudes predict how information is received, with more attitude change amongst the most ambivalent respondents. We conclude that additional information about shale gas is more likely to be effective changing attitudes if focussed on this 'undecided' group. Studies of this type are important for policy makers and industry alike.
This paper provides an analysis of public attitudes toward fracking use and policies with an eye toward factors that help us account for differing levels of support. Using data from a national survey of American adults, we found that women and people residing in urban areas are slightly more inclined to oppose fracking and to favor more regulation in terms of drilling operations and company chemical disclosure requirements than men or people living in rural areas. Our key findings, however, are that opposition to fracking and support for current or increased levels of regulation are strongly related to Democratic Party identification and to pro-environmental policy attitudes. We conclude by suggesting that a tendency for people to view fracking as an environmental rather than an energy issue has potentially important implications for the implementation of locally based regulatory requirements.
Extraction of natural gas from shale rock in the United States (US) is one of the landmark events in the 21st century. The combination of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing can extract huge quantities of natural gas from impermeable shale formations, which were previously thought to be either impossible or uneconomic to produce. This review offers a comprehensive insight into US shale gas opportunities, appraising the evolution, evidence and the challenges of shale gas production in the US. The history of US shale gas in this article is divided into three periods and based on the change of oil price (i.e., the period before the 1970s oil crisis, the period from 1970s to 2000, and the period since 2000), the US has moved from being one of the world's biggest importers of gas to being self-sufficient in less than a decade, with the shale gas production increasing 12-fold (from 2000 to 2010). The US domestic natural gas price hit a 10-year low in 2012. The US domestic natural gas price in the first half of 2012 was about 80–100/barrel, or $14–17 per million BTU. Partly due to an increase in gas-fired power generation in response to low gas prices, US carbon emissions from fossil-fuel combustion fell by 430 million ton CO2 – more than any other country – between 2006 and 2011. Shale gas also stimulated economic growth, creating 600,000 new jobs in the US by 2010. However, the US shale gas revolution would be curbed, if the environmental risks posed by hydraulic fracturing are not managed effectively. The hydraulic fracturing is water intensive, and can cause pollution in the marine environment, with implications for long-term environmental sustainability in several ways. Also, large amounts of methane, a powerful greenhouse gas, can be emitted during the shale gas exploration and production. Hydraulic fracturing also may induce earthquakes. These environmental risks need to be managed by good practices which is not being applied by all the producers in all the locations. Enforcing stronger regulations are necessary to minimize risk to the environment and on human health. Robust regulatory oversight can however increase the cost of extraction, but stringent regulations can foster an historic opportunity to provide cheaper and cleaner gas to meet the consumer demand, as well as to usher in the future growth of the industry.
Public opinion about energy can be understood in a unified framework. First, people evaluate key attributes of energy sources, particularly a fuel's cost and environmental harms. Americans, for example, view coal as relatively inexpensive but harmful, natural gas as less harmful but more expensive, and wind as inexpensive and not harmful. Second, people place different weights on the economic and environmental attributes associated with energy production, which helps explain why some fuels are more popular than others. Americans' attitudes toward energy are driven more by beliefs about environmental harms than by perceived economic costs. In addition, attitudes about energy sources are largely unrelated to views about global warming. These findings suggest that a politically palatable way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is through regulation of traditional pollutants associated with fossil fuels, rather than a wholly new carbon policy.