Content uploaded by Elisabeth Krausmann
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Elisabeth Krausmann on Mar 25, 2021
Content may be subject to copyright.
10 | Loss Prevention Bulletin 277 February 2021
© Institution of Chemical Engineers
0260-9576/21/$17.63 + 0.00
Natech risk management in Japan after
Fukushima – What have we learned?
Elisabeth Krausmann*, Ana Maria Cruz#
*European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC), Italy
#Disaster Prevention Research Institute (DPRI), Japan
Safety practice
Introduction
Natural hazards, such as earthquakes, floods, extreme low
temperatures or lightning, can cause damage at hazardous
installations, resulting in loss of containment and so-called
natural hazard triggered technological (Natech) accidents
1
. Such
accidents are a recurring threat frequently encountered in the
wake of natural disasters
2,3,4
. In addition to direct impacts on public
health, the environment, economy and the supply chain, Natech
accidents can also hamper emergency response to the natural
disaster, creating an additional burden for crisis management
5
.
Natech risk is bound to increase in the future due to climate
change, which can affect natural hazard trigger frequencies and
severities, and human development, which increasingly puts
natural and technological hazards on a collision course.
The Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami
(GEJET)
On 11 March 2011, an undersea earthquake of magnitude
9 shook Japan and triggered a mega tsunami off the coast of
Honshu Island. When it ran ashore, the tsunami inundated over
400 km
2
of land, leaving a trail of devastation behind
6
. While the
earthquake produced very strong ground motion, shaking damage
to non-industrial buildings was limited, bearing testimony to the
effectiveness of Japan’s advanced earthquake preparedness
approach
7
. On the other hand, many hazardous installations
located in the disaster zone were damaged or destroyed by the
earthquake and/or tsunami. This suggests that even countries
with high levels of general earthquake preparedness may be at
Summary
The Great East Japan earthquake and tsunami in 2011
triggered multiple releases, fires and explosions at
chemical process installations. Based on the analysis of
available accident data, this article identifies the main
impacts and consequences and highlights gaps in Natech
prevention, preparedness and response. It also presents
changes in Natech risk management implemented in Japan
after the earthquake and tsunami.
Keywords: Natech, risk management, lessons learned,
earthquake, tsunami, Fukushima
risk of Natech accidents and that specific protection measures in
industry are required.
Natech accidents galore
Surveys by government agencies identified numerous Natech
accidents triggered by the GEJET, sometimes at the same
installation at the same time. The Japanese Fire and Disaster
Management Agency documented damage at 1404 oil storage
and petrochemical installations due to the earthquake and at 1807
facilities due to the tsunami
8
. The Japanese Nuclear and Industrial
Safety Agency collected data on earthquake- and tsunami-related
damage at 50 high-pressure gas facilities and 139 other hazardous
installations
9
. Another study analyzed 46 damage events based
on data from open sources including public company data and
interviews with competent authorities who were engaged in
regulatory, monitoring, and/or first response activities
7
. These
analyses concluded that while earthquake damage was frequent,
it mostly led to only minor impacts or spills, such as via tank roof
damage due to liquid sloshing caused by earthquake excitation,
stretching of and leaking from flanges and tank-pipe connections,
and damage to support structures. Tsunami damage, on the
other hand, was much more severe, causing tank flotation and
overturning, breaking of pipe connections, and ripping off of
valves, e.g. due to debris impact
10
(Figure 1). The inundation
exacerbated the triggered loss of containment (LoC) events by
dispersing flammable spills over wide areas and increasing the
ignition likelihood. Several large-scale fires were the result
11
.
Given the level of damage caused by the tsunami, many
hazardous material releases must have occurred during the GEJET.
However, aside from obvious LoC events that resulted in fires
and explosions, it was difficult to obtain concrete information on
releases of toxic or environmentally persistent substances in the
aftermath of the natural disasters
12
.
Storage tank farm fire, explosions and domino effect
due to earthquake
An example of a major Natech accident caused by the earthquake
were the fires and explosions at the LPG tank farm of a refinery in
Chiba. Damage to the support braces of a tank during the main
earthquake shock and buckling of the legs when the aftershock
hit, led to tank collapse and LPG release from the severed
connected pipes (Figure 2). The LPG spread and ignited, causing
several consecutive BLEVEs and eventually destroying all 17 tanks
Loss Prevention Bulletin 277 February 2021 | 11
© Institution of Chemical Engineers
0260-9576/21/$17.63 + 0.00
in the tank farm
7
. At least five explosions were documented, the
largest of which created a fireball with 600 m diameter
13
. Burning
missile projection and dispersion of LPG vapours triggered
releases from asphalt tanks adjacent to the tank farm, as well as
fires in two petrochemical complexes next to the refinery. Due to
the multiple release sources, it was decided to let the fires burn
until the fuel was exhausted. In the end, the fires at the LPG tank
farm burned for ten days.
Overall, 1142 residents had to be evacuated due to the
accident. Pieces of the destroyed tanks were later found in
residential areas over six km from the tank farm
7
. The accident
caused six injuries at the refinery, and three injuries at an adjacent
facility where a fire was triggered. The refinery only returned to
full operations two years after the accident.
Refinery fires due to tsunami
Another Natech accident whose pictures went around the world
was the multiple tsunami-triggered fires at a refinery in the Sendai
port area. The inundation depth at the site ranged from 2.5 to 3.5
m, killing four people and causing multiple loss of containment
events at the same time
7
. In the refinery’s loading facility, the
tsunami hit a tanker truck, breaking a pipe in the process and
releasing gasoline which ignited. It has been speculated that
sparking from collision of a truck with refinery units could have
been the ignition source
13
. The fire destroyed the entire loading
station and also engulfed adjacent sulphur, asphalt and gasoline
tanks (Figure 3). A large part of the western section of the refinery
was destroyed in the blaze. The fires were eventually extinguished
five days after the tsunami. In other refinery locations, LoCs
occurred when pipelines broke after direct tsunami impact (Figure
4), or when the tsunami waters caused a tank to float which broke
an attached pipe
7
. In both cases, heavy fuel oil was released but
did not ignite. In the second case the LoC was aggravated by an
open valve on the tank which underwent filling when the tsunami
hit. The earthquake caused minor spills on atmospheric tank roofs
due to roof vibration.
With an LNG tank from a different operator located immediately
to the south of the burning refinery section and tsunami-triggered
flammable releases in another industrial site south to the LNG
tank, there was also a high risk of a domino effect. Emergency
responders had to take great care to keep the releases from
igniting to avoid heat impingement on the LNG tank from two
sides which it might not have withstood without damage.
Figure 1 – Tank damage modes observed during the tsunami in 2011 (Adapted from Ibata et al. (2013)11)
Figure 2 – Buckling of tank legs due to earthquake
Figure 3 – Burned and melted tanks at a refinery in Sendai port
due to tsunami
H. Nishi
Floating
Wall buckling due
to external water
pressure
Wall buckling
due to local
uplifting
Collision with
floating object
Damage to piping
Sliding
Damage to
bottom plate due
to local uplifting
Overturning
Scouring Tank Sliding
failure
Damage to tank foundation
Tank deformation
TsunamiTsunami
C. Scawthorn
knowledge and
competence
assurance
12 | Loss Prevention Bulletin 277 February 2021
© Institution of Chemical Engineers
0260-9576/21/$17.63 + 0.00
Identifying the gaps
Analysis of the Natech accidents that occurred revealed a
number of gaps in Natech risk management
7
. For example, the
widespread damage and numerous LoC events suggest that
vulnerabilities existed due to industrial development in natural
hazard zones. With Japan being densely populated and subject
to many different types of natural hazard, land use planning
could not always keep industrial plants away from areas that
are prone to natural hazards. Where additional protection
measures were implemented to compensate for increased risks
due to location (e.g. sea walls), they were often found to be
insufficient, raising concerns as to the assumptions they were
based on.
The analyses also suggest that preparedness in industry and
by authorities was generally low, indicating a need for improving
preparedness planning to include Natech scenarios and their
specific features which often render them more severe. This
includes the acknowledgment that cascading effects are
more frequent during natural disasters. For example, both the
operator of the refinery in Chiba and the competent authority
admitted they were not prepared for coping with an accident
of such severity. Also, there is a need to factor in conditions
in which equipment may be exposed to higher stresses than
those experienced during normal operation, such as during
maintenance.
The fires and explosions at the Chiba refinery also highlighted
the need for more active government oversight to monitor
compliance with safety regulations and to carry out inspections.
A combination of bad practice and violation of regulations was
the root cause of the accident. The collapsed tank was under
maintenance and had been filled with water already for 12
days when the earthquake struck. This almost doubled the
weight considered in its design basis, rendering it vulnerable to
earthquake impact. In addition, the manual override of a safety
valve on an LPG pipe continuously provided fuel to the fires and
allowed them to burn out of control
7
.
Attention to chemical releases, unless posing a clear and
immediate threat to the population or first responders, was low
during the GEJET as other issues had to take priority (managing
the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident and relief efforts
in the disaster-stricken areas). This resulted in a scarcity of
information on potential toxic hotspots or contamination levels
of disaster waste, possibly creating health hazards during
initial rescue operations, cleanup and reconstruction
12
. The
situation was complicated by a fragmentation of responsibilities
for environmental monitoring and cleanup between different
ministries and local government officials. This highlights a
lack of clear procedures on how to quickly identify chemical
contamination after natural disasters and the need to include
them in crisis response plans.
Accident analyses also identified a need to reassess the
role of utilities and lifelines for preventing accidents and/or
mitigating consequences which is often underestimated. Lack
of power, water (cooling, firefighting), transportation (site
access) or communication (coordinating response) can trigger or
exacerbate an accident, as well as increase the risk of cascading
effects
5
. At the refinery in Sendai, emergency response to the
fires was delayed as debris from the tsunami had obstructed
the access roads to the site. Firefighting could only start four
days after the GEJET. Also, due to ignition of sulphur and
subsequent toxic cloud formation, an evacuation order in a 2 km
zone around the refinery was issued, further delaying response
efforts
7
. If the specific characteristics of Natech accidents are
not taken into account in preparedness planning, managing the
accident successfully will be a challenge.
Other studies carried out after the GEJET highlighted the little
information and disaster preparedness of local governments and
residents for these types of events
14,15
. It was found that 65% of
the facilities surveyed in a study had no programs or activities
to communicate with the public regarding preparedness for
hazardous materials accidents
15
. Problems regarding the roles
and responsibilities of local and prefectural government during
the events, as well as confusion among affected residents
regarding the many evacuation orders given in the days that
followed the main earthquake shock were also identified
14
.
A new approach for Natech risk management in
Japan
In Japan, chemical accident risk management is regulated by
many different laws and regulations. At the time of the GEJET,
only Japan’s High Pressure Gas Safety Law explicitly addressed
Natech risks due to earthquake and tsunami, requiring
measures to be taken to reduce the associated accident risk
16
.
Figure 4 – Damaged pipelines and oil spill due to tsunami
impact
Figure 5 – Strengthening of tank supports in the Sendai
coastal area
GoogleEarth
E. Krausmann
Loss Prevention Bulletin 277 February 2021 | 13
© Institution of Chemical Engineers
0260-9576/21/$17.63 + 0.00
Following the GEJET, regulations and codes were amended, risk
management guidance was prepared and research projects were
launched to improve the protection of industrial facilities and
equipment during earthquakes and tsunamis.
For instance, Japan has modified the seismic code for high-
pressure gas storage tanks to minimise the damage to gas
storage facilities that can be impacted by long-period seismic
events causing liquid sloshing. The amended code also increases
the seismic resistance of the supporting frames of pipe braces
by reinforcing the intersection of the braces
17
(Figure 5). With
a trend towards larger storage tanks, which translates into
higher risks, adequate seismic design of the tank structure and
foundation has become even more important
18
.
Similarly, guidelines for managing earthquake risk at industrial
parks were developed
19
.This guidance, which focuses on
area-wide assessment at industrial agglomerates, addresses
performance levels and structural design issues but also
highlights prevention and mitigation measures with respect to
earthquake impact.
Furthermore, the so-called Land Resilience Basic Law
was enacted in 2013. This new law requires the adoption of
comprehensive countermeasures to ensure that major industrial
parks remain in operation following large earthquakes and
tsunami. Generally, industrial parks covered by this law are under
the jurisdiction of the prefectural government. In 2017, a Cabinet
bill modifying the High Pressure Gas Safety law, transferred
part of the oversight to local governments. This is important, as
industrial parks are located in highly populated coastal cities,
such as Osaka, and Kobe, that previously had little or no say
in the siting, permitting and inspection of facilities at industrial
parks located in their cities. It can also facilitate preparedness of
local residents for chemical and Natech accidents.
It is also important to note that the Great East Japan
earthquake and tsunami highlighted the need to prepare for
large-scale events that surpass design levels. Since then, the
country has been adopting a two-hazard level system when it
comes to earthquake and tsunami protection countermeasures.
The two-level system acknowledges the fact that protection
strategies should consider events below or equal to, and events
above the country’s design level requirements for infrastructure
systems and hard countermeasures
20
. Hazard level 1 (L1)
includes earthquakes of magnitude below or equal to Mw 8 and
return periods of several 10-100 years, while hazard level 2 (L2)
includes events of Mw 9 and return periods of 1000 years or
higher. In the latter case, protection measures should include
both hard and soft countermeasures, and the consensus that
some level of damage is inevitable.
Japan has been relatively quick in learning from past
accidents, amending regulations or implementing new ones
when needed to reduce the risk from future disasters. The
High Pressure Gas Safety Institute prepared risk assessment
guidelines, and training workshops have been carried out
around the country targeting industrial facility engineers, and
health and safety staff, among others. One area that is lagging
behind concerns risk information disclosure and efforts to
improve disaster preparedness of residents living near industrial
facilities. Recent typhoon- and flood-related Natechs in 2018
21,22
,
and 2019
23
have again called attention to the need for better
preparedness of local residents when faced with these types of
accidents, as well as the need for risk communication regarding
these types of risk.
Conclusions
Numerous Natech accidents were triggered by the Great East
Japan earthquake and tsunami, some of which with major
consequences. This may appear surprising considering the
advanced earthquake preparedness in Japan and its emergency-
management capacities. Analysis of the available accident data
confirmed the findings from other studies related to the dominant
damage and LoC modes due to earthquake and tsunami and
identified a number of gaps in Natech risk management at the
time of the natural disasters. Japan has quickly reacted to address
the main risk management deficiencies in industry revealed by
the GEJET. But also beyond Japan the GEJET has left a lasting
impression, and awareness of Natech risks has grown ever since,
triggering a learning effort globally.
References
1.
E. Krausmann (2016) Natural hazard triggered technological
(Natech) accidents – and overlooked type of risk?, Loss
Prevention Bulletin 250, 11, IChemE.
2.
A. Misuri, V. Casson Moreno, N. Al Quddus, V. Cozzani
(2019), Lessons learnt from the impact of hurricane Harvey on
the chemical and process industry, Reliability Engineering and
Systems Safety 190, 106521.
3.
P. Hudec, O. Lukš (2004) Flood at SPOLANA a.s. in August
2002, Loss Prevention Bulletin 180, 36, IChemE.
4.
S. Girgin (2011) The natech events during the 17 August
Kocaeli earthquake: aftermath and lessons learned, Natural
Hazards and Earth System Sciences 11, 1129.
5.
E. Krausmann, A. Necci, S. Girgin (2017) Natech emergency
management – rising to the challenge, Loss Prevention
Bulletin 254, 12, IChemE.
6.
N. Mori, T. Takahashi, M. Esteban (2012) The 2011 Tohoku
Earthquake Tsunami Joint Survey Group. 2012. Nationwide
post event survey and analysis of the 2011 Tohoku earthquake
tsunami, Coastal Engineering 54, 1250001.
7.
E. Krausmann, A.M. Cruz (2013) Impact of the 11 March
2011, Great East Japan earthquake and tsunami on the
chemical industry, Natural Hazards 67, 811.
8.
H. Nishi (2012) Damage on hazardous material facilities, In:
Proc. Intl. Symposium on engineering lessons learned from
the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake, Tokyo, Japan, 1-4
March 2012.
9.
Y. Wada, M. Wakakura (2011) Japan Report, 21st Meeting
of the OECD Working Group on Chemical Accidents, Paris,
France, 5-7 October.
10.
T. Ibata, I. Nakachi, K. Ishida, J. Yokozawa (2013) Damage
to storage tanks caused by the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and
tsunami and proposal for structural assessment method for
cylindrical storage tanks, In: Proc. 7th Intl. Conf. & Exhibition
on Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG 17), Houston, TX, 16-19 April.
11.
A. Hokugo, T. Nishino, T. Inada (2011) Damage and effects
caused by tsunami fires: Fire spread, fire fighting and
evacuation, Fire Science and Technology 30(4), 117.
12.
W.A. Bird, E. Grossman (2011) Chemical aftermath—
contamination and cleanup following the Tohoku earthquake
and tsunami, Environmental Health Perspectives 119(7),
A290.
14 | Loss Prevention Bulletin 277 February 2021
© Institution of Chemical Engineers
0260-9576/21/$17.63 + 0.00
13.
S. Zama, H. Nishi, K. Hatayama, M. Yamada, H. Yoshihara,
Y. Ogawa (2012) On damage of oil storage tanks due to
the 2011 off the Pacific Coast of Tohoku earthquake (Mw
9.0), Japan, In Proc: 15th World Conference on Earthquake
Engineering, Lisbon, Portugal, 24-28 September.
14.
J. Yu, A.M. Cruz, A. Hokugo (2017) Households’ risk
perception and behavioral responses to Natech accidents
following the Great East Japan earthquake and tsunami, Intl.
Journal of Disaster Risk Science 8(1), 1.
15.
J. Yu, A.M. Cruz, E. Piatyszek, M. Lesbats, A. Tardy, A.
Hokugo, H. Tatano (2017) A survey of impacts on industrial
parks caused by the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake and
tsunami, Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries
50 (Part B), 317.
16.
A.M. Cruz, N. Okada (2008) Consideration of natural
hazards in the design and risk management of industrial
facilities, Natural Hazards 44, 213.
17.
E. Krausmann, R. Fendler, S. Averous-Monnery, A.M.
Cruz, N. Kato (2017) Status of Natech risk management,
In: Natech risk assessment and management – Reducing
the risk of natural-hazard impact on hazardous installations,
Elsevier, Amsterdam.
18.
Architectural Institute of Japan (2010) Design
recommendations for storage tanks and their supports with
emphasis on seismic design, Sub-committee for design of
storage tanks, 2010 ed.
19.
Institute for Disaster Mitigation of Industrial Complexes
(2016) Guidelines for earthquake risk management at
industrial complexes, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan.
20.
A. Suppasri, P. Latcharote, J.D. Bricker, F. Imamura (2016)
Improvement of tsunami countermeasures based on lessons
from the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake and tsunami —
Situation after five years, Coastal Engineering Journal 58(4),
1640011.
21.
Y. Araki, A. Hokugo, A.T.K. Pinheiro, N. Ohtsu, A.M. Cruz
(2020) Explosion at an aluminum factory caused by the July
2018 Japan floods: Investigation of damages and evacuation
activities, Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process
Industries, doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2020.104352.
22.
N. Ohtsu, A. Hokugo, Y. Araki, Y. Sato, A.M. Cruz, H. Park
(2020) Evacuation behavior of vulnerable people during
western Japan’s heavy rain and aluminum factory explosion
in 2018, Journal of the Japan Association of Fire Science and
Engineering (submitted)
23.
A. Misuri, A.M. Cruz, H. Park, E. Garnier, N. Ohtsu, A.
Hokugo, I. Fujita, S. Aoki, V. Cozzani (2020) Flood triggered
oil spills: Lessons from the Natech accident in Saga
prefecture in August 2019, In: Proc. 57th Natural Disaster
Science Symposium, Natural Disaster Research Council,
Japan, September.
