Localisation Requires Trust: An Interface Perspective on the Rohingya Response in Bangladesh

Abstract

Under the label of localisation local actors are promoted as important agents in humanitarian responses in the humanitarian sector's latest reform efforts. Opinions on the exact meaning and best practices of implementing localisation however diverge. Applying an interface perspective, this paper analyses how the Rohingya Response in Cox's Bazar became an arena of contestation, competition and sometimes convergence among different actors about localisation. The paper shows how misconceptions and divergent understandings of localisation as well as of best ways for implementing it were prevalent and hampered joint efforts of international and local humanitarian actors. Though both sides sought common ground and engaged in dialogue, conflicting views, interests and perceptions of self and other stood in the way for a common vision to emerge. Lacking trust between the international and local actors further intensified divisions. The paper thus argues that the humanitarian sector needs to engage in trust‐building efforts between the various actors involved in the humanitarian response if localisation is to be realised, including addressing underlying structural and systemic issues of (neo)colonialism, racism and classism.
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Localisation Requires Trust: An Interface Perspective on the Rohingya Response in Bangladesh
Kristina Roepstorff Department of Political Science, Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg
Abstract
Under the label of localisation local actors are promoted as important agents in humanitarian
responses in the humanitarian sector’s latest reform efforts. Opinions on the exact meaning and
best practices of implementing localisation however diverge. Applying an interface perspective, this
paper analyses how the Rohingya Response in Cox’s Bazar became an arena of contestation,
competition and sometimes convergence among different actors about localisation. The paper
shows how misconceptions and divergent understandings of localisation as well as of best ways for
implementing it were prevalent and hampered joint efforts of international and local humanitarian
actors. Though both sides sought common ground and engaged in dialogue, conflicting views,
interests and perceptions of self and other stood in the way for a common vision to emerge. Lacking
trust between the international and local actors further intensified divisions. The paper thus argues
that the humanitarian sector needs to engage in trust-building efforts between the various actors
involved in the humanitarian response if localisation is to be realised, including addressing
underlying structural and systemic issues of (neo)colonialism, racism and classism.
Keywords: Humanitarian Action, Localisation, Bangladesh, Rohingya Response, Local Non-
Governmental Organisations, Trust
1. Introduction
Localisation has become a key concept in the humanitarian sector, urging changes in funding
practices, partnership models and organisational structures to make the humanitarian response
more efficient, effective and emancipatory. Through commitments enshrined in international
documents such as the Grand Bargain (2016)
i
or the Charter for Change (2016)
ii
the humanitarian
sector seeks to put local actors and the affected population at the centre of a more contextualised
and sustainable humanitarian response (Gibbons et al. 2020). Through greater participation in the
planning and implementation of the humanitarian response it is hoped to mitigate the unequal
power relations prevalent in the humanitarian sector, where a handful of international actors
continue to dominate and determine the allocation of funds and aid priorities.
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2
Taking stock of the progress in the implementation of localisation, it becomes clear that the
humanitarian sector so far has not lived up to its commitments (Van Brabant and Patel, 2018, p. 8).
This may be attributed to a number of reasons. Apart from resistance to letting go of power and
money, localisation requires systematic change of the humanitarian sector and the ways
humanitarian organisations operate - something that is not bound to happen overnight (Gingerich
and Cohen, 2015, Harris and Tuladhar, 2019). What complicates matters further is that varying
definitions of localisation circulate in the humanitarian sector and it seems to be far from clear what
it actually means and how it should be implemented. As Van Brabant and Patel (2018, p. 6) note “the
key challenge for successful localisation is to know what ‘localisation’ means in practice”. Empirical
studies of localisation as an inherently contested process may shed some light on the opportunities,
but also obstacles for the realisation of the humanitarian sector’s localisation agenda (Pincock et al.,
2020).
This is not only an abstract issue in the international discourse, but also becomes tangible in specific
humanitarian arenas where conflicting ideas of the very meaning of localisation emerge when
different humanitarian actors meet and negotiate the humanitarian response (Hilhorst and Jansen,
2010). As socially constructed situations in which contests over issues, resources, values and
representations take place (Long 2001), these arenas become “battlefields of knowledge” (Long,
1992) in which actors and their understandings, interests and values are pitched against each other
(Long and Jinlong, 2009). The Rohingya Response in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, presents such a
humanitarian arena in which the conflict over differing understandings of localisation has surfaced.
Faced with continuing migration of Rohingya from neighbouring Myanmar of which a peak was
reached in August 2017 when almost one million fled from persecution and violence in their home
Rakhine state, Cox’s Bazar has become the site of a large-scale international humanitarian response.
Described by many as a ‘second influx’ – referring to the arrival of large numbers of international
humanitarian actors - the Rohingya Response also presents one of the first major interventions since
the humanitarian sector has committed itself to work “as local as possible, as international as
necessary” (Barbelet 2018).
Based on original qualitative empirical research conducted in Bangladesh in February and March
2019, this paper illustrates how localisation became a contentious issue in this particular
humanitarian arena. Findings are based on twenty semi-structured interviews with representatives
of local organisations and six semi-structured interviews with representatives of international
counterparts. Moreover, numerous informal meetings, discussions, a Focus Group Discussion (FDG)
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3
and visits to Camps in Ukhyia and Tekhnaf allowed for additional insights.
iii
The data was
subsequently transcribed and coded with MAXQDA for a better organisation and systematic analysis
of the same.
iv
The findings were then triangulated with available official data, newspaper articles
and reports by non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Following a constructivist-interpretive
methodology which “rests on the belief in the existence of (potentially) multiple, intersubjectively
constructed ‘truths’ about social, political, cultural, and other human events” (Schwartz-Shea and
Yanow, 2012, p. 4) and employing an interface analysis (Long 1999), the research was guided by an
interest in the encounters of international and local humanitarian actors in the context of the
Rohingya response in Bangladesh against the backdrop of the localisation agenda. The focus thereby
lied on the perceptions of local-non-governmental organisations (LNGOS) of the humanitarian
response, as these were generally considered ‘the local’ humanitarian actors in this particular
setting.
The research shows how divergent interpretations of localisation emerged in Cox’s Bazar,
challenging dominant discourses and practices prevalent in the humanitarian sector. Moreover, it
reveals how constructions of the self and other materialised in the context of localisation, with
attempts to legitimise and delegitimise certain actors or their ways of working. ‘Being local’ became
a resource in a competitive humanitarian arena in which the different actors were working against
each other. The research also found that below the surface laid a deep-seated mistrust between the
different actors, amplified by the separated spaces they inhabited. The paper thus concludes that in
order to fill localisation with meaning and implement it in humanitarian practice, the humanitarian
sector needs to turn its attention to trust-building between the different actors and invest in the
fostering of positive relationships between them. This requires also addressing underlying structural
and systemic issues of (neo)colonialism, racism and classism. Only then will constructive
negotiations in the humanitarian arena be possible, allowing for a much-needed shared vision of the
humanitarian response that is as local as possible, and as international as necessary to materialise.
2. The Rohingya Response and the Localisation of Humanitarian Action
In August 2017, almost one million Rohingya fled to neighbouring Bangladesh to escape persecution,
systematic discrimination, violence and the reprisals of the Myanmar military. The United Nations
(UN) and human rights experts speak of a textbook example of ethnic cleansing, which is now
investigated by the International Criminal Court.
v
This was however only the last episode of massive
displacement since the country's independence from British colonial rule in 1948. Already in 1962,
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1978 and 1991-1992, thousands of Rohingya had fled across the border to Bangladesh and sought
shelter in camps in the country’s southwestern region of Cox’s Bazar (Wake and Bryant, 2018, p. 3).
Others fled to countries such as India, Thailand, Malaysia and even Australia by land and sea. Though
boat migration continues till this date
vi
, it was in 2015 that the Rohingya made the headlines as boat
refugees when they drifted for weeks in the Andaman Sea after trafficking networks were destroyed
and those responsible arrested (Chaudhury and Samaddar, 2018; Amnesty International, 2015, p. 7;
UNHCR, 2015).
The dire humanitarian situation in Cox’s Bazar has its origin in the violent conflict in Myanmar's
Rakhine State, on the border to Bangladesh. Considered the most persecuted minority in the world
by the UN
vii
, the predominantly Muslim Rohingya differ both religiously and linguistically from the
majority Buddhist population in Rakhine and the rest of the country. Intercommunal violence, the
ongoing conflict with the Government and a nationwide strengthening Buddhist nationalism have
contributed to the continuing expulsion of the Rohingya from Myanmar (Cheesman, 2017; Burke,
2016, Ware and Laoutides, 2018; Prasse-Freeman, 2017; Leider, 2015). The situation has worsened
dramatically in recent years due to further military offensives, especially in the northern part of
Rakhine state. Violence escalated again in August 2017 when the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army
(ASRA) - a Rohingya group founded in 2016 - launched attacks on police posts in northern Rakhine.
The counteroffensive of the army and police, but also continued intercommunal violence, drove
around 700,000 Rohingya out of the country within two months (International Crisis Group, 2017).
Today, around 1.5 million of the estimated two million Rohingya live in exile, around one million of
them in camps in Cox’s Bazar, at the time of writing the largest refugee settlement in the world
(Wake and Bryant, 2019).
viii
The Humanitarian Response in Bangladesh
Faced with the high number of Rohingya entering the country, first the local population of Cox’s
Bazar and later the Government of Bangladesh expressed their solidarity and initiated various forms
of helping (Lewis 2019). In what could be best described as everyday humanitarianism (Richey, 2018)
or citizen aid (Fechter and Schwittay, 2019), ordinary people, local businesses and civil society actors
spontaneously responded to the needs of the Rohingya, offering food, shelter and money. Soon,
volunteers and organisations from other parts of the country arrived to offer their help (Lewis,
2019). After some weeks, the Government took control over the unfolding humanitarian situation
and the humanitarian response in Cox’s Bazar. In response to earlier arrivals of Rohingya the
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5
Government had already developed a National Strategy on Myanmar Refugees and Undocumented
Nationals in 2013. This now formed the basis for the National Task Force in charge of the response
(Lewis, 2019). Despite their longstanding presence in the country in general, and in Cox’s Bazar in
particular, the UN and international organisations had to renegotiate their role in the response,
accompanied by inter-agency discord over mandates and responsibilities. Humanitarian activities are
now coordinated by the Strategic Executive Group (SEG) in Dhaka, a body that is chaired by the
Resident Coordinator, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
ix
At the district level, the Refugee Relief and Repatriation
Commissioner (RRRC) works under the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief and is also
responsible to issue permissions to organisations wishing to work in the camps.
x
Within this
structural set-up, the District Commissioner (DC) is responsible for the operations among the
affected host community, while a Senior Coordinator (SC) coordinates the humanitarian response on
behalf of the humanitarian agencies (Lewis, 2019, p. 1890; Farzana, 2017, p. 149)
xi
. Thereby, the
Government follows a temporary policy and approach to the response with the ultimate goal to
repatriate the Rohingya as soon as possible (Farzana, 2017, 65ff.). This manifests itself in various
ways: for example, it introduced the term of Forcibly Displaced Citizens of Myanmar (FDCM) to avoid
the official refugee label and the rights that come with it (Lewis, 2019).
xii
Moreover, the policy to not
teach Bangla in the camp schools or allow Rohingya to work is geared towards preventing their long-
term integration into the Bangladeshi society (International Crisis Group, 2019).
xiii
Increasingly, the
Rohingya are framed as a security threat, leading to strict security measures in the management of
the camps including an internet blackout
xiv
and the construction of barbed wire fencing around the
camps.
xv
When the high number of people started arriving in August 2017, only five UN agencies and a
handful of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) were present and responded to
the situation. The international response was however quickly scaled up. The Government sought
international support to meet the growing humanitarian needs of the Rohingya who settled in
official and unofficial camps in Cox’s Bazar. In early 2018 the number had grown to twelve UN
agencies, and over 120 international and national NGOs working in the Rohingya Response (CDAC,
2018; Wake and Bryant, 2018, p. 7). Lewis (2019, p. 1891) observes:
“As the government, the army and the agencies took control of the situation, the
humanitarian arena was transformed into a more tightly governed and ordered refugee
space. Tensions emerged not only within the different levels of the formal response (for
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6
example between international and local NGOs, religious and secular agendas, and
government and non-state actors) but also with local responses.”
Localisation thereby soon emerged as a critical issue, with representatives of Cox’s Bazar’s civil
society becoming vocal in their demands for a more localised response (Wake and Bryant, 2018;
Barbelet, 2019).
Localising the Rohingya Response
Though the importance of local actors has long been acknowledged in the humanitarian sector, the
push for localisation grew strong during the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) that was held in
Istanbul in May 2016. As a result, donors and INGOS signed agreements and commitments to
localise humanitarian action. The main commitments revolve around issues such as a fairer
distribution of funds, the strengthening of local capacities and more equitable forms of partnership
(Van Brabant and Patel, 2018). Yet, the exact meaning of localisation and best ways of implementing
it remained vague (Wall and Hedlund, 2016; HLA, 2019; Fabre, 2017). Moreover, in the international
discourse on localisation that ensued, the label of the ‘local’ became used in reference to a variety of
actors, ranging from national and local authorities, civil society organisations at the national and
community level and the affected population itself. Though it is thus far from clear who these local
actors are that should profit from the localisation agenda, a strong focus on LNGOs as key actors can
be observed. This focus on LNGOs is not only apparent in a number of documents, reports and
studies by humanitarian organisations, but more so in the ways localisation is implemented in
practice (Roepstorff, 2020). This may be due to the fact that they are commonly among the first
responders to sudden-onset disasters (Zyck and Krebs, 2015) and are organised, registered entities
that operate over a longer period of time – thus making them more reliable partners than ad hoc
volunteer groups or social movements. These LNGOs form part of the local civil society, deeply
entrenched in the politics and social fabric of the particular locality.
In the specific context of Bangladesh, the vibrant civil society is characterised by longstanding
traditions of citizen action, resistance and social movements (Lewis, 2019; Quadir, 2015; Khan and
Rahman, 2007). Indeed, LNGOs were amongst the first to respond to the needs of the Rohingya in
August 2017. Though religion plays a powerful role in civil society action and is also an important
factor for understanding the national and international humanitarian assistance to the
predominantly Muslim Rohingya, national narratives of displacement, persecution and the freedom
struggle also inform acts of helping in Bangladesh (Lewis, 2019)
xvi
. Today, numerous LNGOs continue
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7
their work in Cox’s Bazar alongside an ever-more structured and formal response by the
Government and international actors.
xvii
Being confronted with a massive ‘influx’ of international
actors, the LNGOs soon organised to jointly fight for their interests and make their voices heard.
Thereby, being local became an important resource and legitimising factor for their engagement in
the Rohingya Response and localisation a contentious issue in Cox’s Bazar.
3. Localisation as a Bone of Contention: an Interface Perspective
Based on original data gathered during six weeks of field research in February and March 2019 in
Dhaka and Cox’s Bazar, this paper employs an interface analysis to better understand the
encounters between the international and local humanitarian actors in this particular humanitarian
arena and in light of the localisation agenda. Developed by the British sociologist and social
anthropologist Norman Long, the interface approach focuses on how encounters between actors
with different perspectives, experiences and worldviews are shaped by unequal power relations
(Gerharz, 2018).
xviii
These actors are active stakeholders with specific knowledge, resources and
scope of action – as well as ideas of the self, others and the context (Gerharz, 2018; Long, 1999).
However, interests and views of these actors are manifold and struggles over authority, status,
reputation and resources informed by the extent to which the actors see themselves capable of
manoeuvring within particular settings, responding with resistance, accommodation or compliance
in their everyday actions (Long, 1999; Scott, 1985). The interface perspective thus lends itself to the
analysis of localisation as a contentious issue in humanitarian arenas. Such an analysis can reveal
how the different actors through their discursive practices and in their encounters perpetuate, use,
manipulate and transform dominant discourses (Long, 2001) and how networks develop between
individuals or organisations which lead to the emergence of standardised modes of relating to non-
members and outsiders (Long, 1999), shedding light on social differentiation and conflict among
different actors in the humanitarian arena (Chiweshe and Bhatasara, 2016).
Applying the interface perspective to the Rohingya Response in Cox’s Bazar in general, and the issue
of localisation in particular, two main themes emerged: firstly, the juxtaposition of self and other
and respective identity constructions in order to legitimise own actions and deligitimise those of
others; and secondly, divergent interpretations of localisation to challenge dominant discourses and
practices of the humanitarian sector. Both were mainly informed by specific interests, the relative
position of power and competition over resources
xix
and reputation. However, at a deeper level,
what appeared as a main issue at the interface was the lacking trust between the different actors
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8
that seriously hampered the effectiveness of the humanitarian response and localisation to be
realised.
Who is the local: perceptions of self and other in Cox’s Bazar
One of the key questions that arise in the context of localisation is who should be considered as
local. An array of definitions of the local can be found in the discourse on localisation (Els 2018: 3,
Wall and Hedlund 2016). Different opinions exist for example regarding the inclusion of
internationally affiliated local organisations such as national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies,
local branches of INGOs, the private sector, individual volunteers, diaspora organisations or the local
staff of UN agencies and INGOs (Roepstorff, 2019; Wall and Hedlund, 2016; Barbelet, 2019;
Apthorpe and Borton, 2019). Another question that arises is to what extent there should be a
differentiation between national and local actors, with the latter being often equated with the
affected population. This is particularly debatable in forced migration contexts, where local
humanitarian actors to a large part represent the host rather than the displaced community – as was
the case in Cox’s Bazar. Moreover, actors may view themselves as more local in comparison to
others.
Being aware of the conceptual vagueness of ’the local’ and its perceptual and relational nature
(Roepstorff 2019), I started my own research on localisation in the context of the Rohingya Response
by tracing self-identifications and ascriptions in this particular humanitarian setting. My search for
the local thus started with a scoping of the actors in Cox’s Bazar through two avenues: first and prior
to the field research, I talked to staff of humanitarian organisations to whom I had contact through
my own personal and professional network; second, I scanned documents, newspaper articles, social
media posts and the internet for additional cues. Thereby, I came across the Cox`s Bazar CSO-NGO
(CCNF), which is a network or forum of civil society actors in Cox’s Bazar with an own internet
presence in English and Bangla, sharing relevant information on the Rohingya Response, the
members of the networks and their activities.
xx
As the website states, these local and national NGOs
“are always fast responders to any disaster of humanitarian crises in Cox’s Bazar. As usual,
regarding the recent Rohingya crises in Cox’s Bazar, these NGOs and CSOs have come fast with
humanitarian supports. As the CSOs and NGOs working in Cox’s Bazar consider the current
Rohingya refugee problem as an extreme, complex and transitory problem for the people of
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9
this district, and they feel that a strong coordination is needed among the humanitarian
responders, they have formed this forum.”
The promotion and implementation of localisation is mentioned as one of the principal objectives of
the network. In fact, the forum, especially some of its most active members, turned out to be very
vocal in demanding their ‘right to localisation’. It was therefore natural to start my investigation with
the CCNF, but also other actors such as Government representatives, representatives from INGOs
and UN agencies as well as Rohingya were included in the empirical research to gain a better
understanding of localisation from an interface perspective.
In the interviews varying definitions of the local were expressed. In most cases, these served to
differentiate between the self and other and revealed a pattern of identity construction in which the
labels of the local and the international were clearly used in reference to the relative distribution of
power, money and resources. Moreover, the self-identification as local seemed to be used to stress
the own legitimacy of being engaged in the Rohingya Response and to delegitimise others.
xxi
Interestingly, the same organisation was perceived as local by some, while others ‘accused’ them of
being from outside Cox’s Bazar and therefore not really local. This was justified on the basis of the
location of the main office and whether it had been operating in Cox’s Bazar before the 2017
Rohingya Response. Others – mainly the ones that had their office in Dhaka – referred to themselves
still as local, qualifying this on the basis that they were operating in only a limited number of districts
and not the entire country. A pattern that thus materialised in the interviews was that the label of
the local was mainly used in reference to four factors: the time-span an organisation was working in
Cox’s Bazar; where the main office of the organisation was located; the area of operation/reach of
the organisation; and where the staff was from. Moreover, in almost all interviews being local was
linked to the idea of being first responders, the first ones on the scene to help. This included the
host community, which in the absence of donors, INGOs or national NGOs shared their food, let
people camp on their land and generally welcomed the Rohingya.
xxii
At the same time, LNGOs
emphasised their own unique role in responding to the needs of the Rohingya, setting themselves
apart from other local actors or national NGOs.
Nuances came to the fore – between the local and the more local. Many interview partners of
LNGOs made a distinction between the local and the “real local organisations”, the “very local” or
the “really really local”. These attributes were used in reference to organisations that were
considered particularly small in size, with limited capacity and resources, few projects and having
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10
their main office and origin in Teknaf or Ukhiya – the areas of Cox’s Bazar where the refugee camps
are located. One representative of an LNGOs used the description of “very local” in reference to a
NGO from Khulna, a different part of Bangladesh, highlighting the importance of embeddedness,
small size and limited operational reach for constituting the local. That the size mattered in the
identification of local became also clear when one organisation’s representative stressed several
times that they were local despite of their bigger size. Thus, the perception of a really local
organisation was linked to limited power, scope and resources. Yet, amongst the LNGOs some were
considered more powerful than others and referred to as big leaders, characterised by “being closer
to international organisations with better access to information and funding and having publicity”,
with more qualified staff. In the description of such a powerful organisation, one interviewee
concludes these were actually national organisations with “big presence in Cox’s Bazar”, showing
again how the local was used to describe a position of limited power and size.
Generally, the relationship between the different actors seemed to be simultaneously one of
competition and close cooperation to advance own and common interests. In what elsewhere has
been described as ‘competitive humanitarianism’ (Stirrat, 2006), INGOs were under pressure to find
and select suitable local partners, leading to rivalry between the different LNGOs. This found its
expression in the demand to distribute funds and projects more equally between the local partner
organisations. Indeed, that some organisations profited more from the funds available for the
humanitarian response than others was seen critically by many LNGOs. Contempt was expressed
about how INGOs only worked with the same few organisations that, as a consequence, grew in size
and power – and were accused of being overwhelmed and working beyond capacity. Reasons for
this bias towards certain organisations were seen by LNGOs representatives in their social capital,
including better English language proficiency, earlier working experience with international
organisations and therefore better networks to access funding. To emphasise their own legitimacy
and capacity, organisations that considered themselves as local – and therefore smaller in size and
with limited resources - stressed their comparative advantage over bigger or national ones. This was
justified on the basis of language and cultural proximity to the affected population and a continued
presence in the district, allowing for a more cost efficient and immediate response. Very commonly
the sentence was used “we are the pioneers in…”, “we were the very first ones…”, we are the only
ones”, indicating a competition between the LNGOs, which also reflected in the ways other
organisations were described. Being local thus became a resource in the competition over funds,
legitimacy and prestige against the background of the localisation agenda (Roepstorff, 2019). At the
same time, and in spite of these differences and tensions between the different actors, a high level
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11
of cooperation existed. Not only did the different actors organise within the CCNF (though some
were more active than others and views and standpoints were not uniform), smaller organisations
also profited from being sub-contracted by the larger ones. For some, this was the only way to work
in the Rohingya Response, as they often lacked the required registration with the Government.
xxiii
The identity of being local was not only construed in contrast to national, but of course also
international actors. At the time of research the relationships between local and international actors
were tensed, with international actors being perceived as “VIPs” with a lot of money, having their
offices in 5 star hotels, and their presence and operation being very costly.
xxiv
This may also be linked
to the ways international aid workers segregated themselves, a common phenomenon in
intervention contexts (Smirl, 2015; Autesserre, 2014). Due to security risks and separating
themselves in their ‘expat bubble’, international actors seemed to have very little social interaction
with the local population and their partners (Autesserre, 2014; Schuller, 2016; Roth, 2015).
Maybe as a consequence of that, also representatives of INGOs perceived of their local counterparts
quite critically. Reflecting the conflict that was already in full swing at the time of research, LNGOs
were believed to spreading rumours and instigating protests against international organisations and
not interested in participating in meetings they were invited to. Moreover, INGOs struggled with the
unclear mandate and wide-ranging activities of LNGOs, with some considered being more neutral
and independent from Government than others. It was also perceived that due to their
embeddedness in the local context, LNGOs faced pressures from both the host community as well as
Government authorities, thus only having limited space for action (Roepstorff, 2020). Also the
common emphasis of cultural proximity of LNGOs to the affected population was called into
question. Indeed, the claimed cultural proximity to the Rohingya stood in stark contrast to many
critical statements expressed in interviews and informal discussions during field research in Cox’s
Bazar. While the shared religion was often mentioned as a commonality, LNGOs or local staff of
INGOs repeatedly expressed strong irritations and disapproval with Rohingya religious and cultural
practices. As Palmer (2011) notes, religion might in fact not override political, social, and cultural
divisions.
xxv
In Cox’s Bazar, where the local humanitarian actors represent simultaneously the host
community, LNGOs were stakeholders in the conflicts that emerged due to the changing
demographics in the region
xxvi
, the environmental pressures due to the construction of the camps
(UNDP, 2018) and general problems associated with drug trade and human trafficking (Ahmed and
Mohiuddin, 2020, p. 210)
xxvii
. The conflict between the host community and the Rohingya was then
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12
also a central concern that was expressed by LNGOs and also informed the distinct ways in which
localisation was interpreted.
What was striking throughout formal and informal discussions was that the inclusion of the Rohingya
as local actors – and not only as ‘beneficiaries’ - was not something that was considered much at all
by LNGOs, or INGOs for that matter – but is one of the core aspects of localisation, which seeks to
put the affected population at the centre of the response (Wake and Bryant, 2018). This may be due
to the specific context of forced migration, where the local humanitarian actors do not overlap with
the affected population. But also where refugee-led organisations (RLOs) may legally register as
NGOs, as in the case of Uganda, both international and local actors routinely bypass them in the
humanitarian response (Pincock et al., 2020). In Cox’s Bazar, where Rohingya where not officially
allowed to work, they were trained as volunteers by both international and local organisations.
Furthermore, UNHCR encouraged political representation of the Rohingya and supported elections
in the camps
xxviii
. Official activities of Rohingya however remain rather limited, though grassroots
activism and self-organisation is growing among them.
xxix
Restrictive Government policies, a general
neglect of RLOs due to “a top-down perspective on refugee governance” (Pincock et al., 2002) and
the competition with local humanitarian actors that exclusively represented the host community
prevented the acknowledgement of Rohingya as local humanitarian actors in the spirit of the
localisation agenda – as actors in their own right that should receive direct funding for their
activities. Pincock et al. (2020) thus argue that localisation requires “much more attention to the role
of power and interests at the local level if RLOs are to be engaged as meaningful actors in
humanitarian assistance”. Refugee-led humanitarianism (Sharif, 2018) was however an aspect of
localisation that was not mentioned by none of the interview partners during field research –
including the Rohingya themselves.
Colliding worlds? Different perceptions and interpretations of localisation
In the interviews with LNGOs, most respondents themselves brought up the topic of localisation or
mentioned the Charter for Change and Grand Bargain. They had learned about it through
workshops, internet resources and spread of word. LNGOs surely profited from some of their leaders
having international exposure and networks, travels to Geneva were mentioned several times. Some
exceptionally active persons functioned as multipliers – they attended international trainings,
meetings and read the relevant documents and shared their knowledge about localisation with their
peers. That most of the leaders of LNGOs, who were to a large part also the founders of the same,
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13
had a high level of education, spoke English and had experience of working with INGOs, might have
helped in the dissemination of the information on localisation. When it came to the interpretation of
localisation recurrent topics emerged: divergent understandings of the ways localisation was to be
implemented; and a major trust-deficit between the different stakeholders that hampered a fruitful
dialogue and a shared vision of localisation to evolve.
Discussing the details of the commitments and changes localisation in the humanitarian sector
foresees, answers by representatives of LNGOs were very similar: localisation was mainly
understood as a way to channel funds and resources to Cox’s Bazar’s organisations and the host
community. It was stated that localisation meant to bring the funding to LNGOs, procure items for
the humanitarian response locally and hire local staff. It was generally understood that 25% of donor
funds were to be channelled directly to local and national organisations. Thereby, localisation was
also interpreted as giving priority to local over national organisations. This was justified on the basis
that national NGOs were not really local and not hiring local staff, but rather bringing them from
other parts of Bangladesh. The same accusation was made towards UN agencies and INGOs.
xxx
Though the CCNF pushed for localisation and sought dialogue with the Government, UN agencies
and INGOs to discuss ways to implement it in the Rohingya Response, little progress was attested by
LNGO representatives. One reason being mentioned was that the international actors themselves
had it not clear what localisation actually meant; or – as was supposed in several interviews – were
even not aware of or familiar with the concept. This seems to be a general problem: a study on
localisation shows a “persistent lack of awareness and confusion: beyond small circles in Europe and
perhaps North America and Australia, key commitments in the 2016 ‘Grand Bargain’ … and the
Charter for Change, are generally little known among the full spectrum of actors in aid-recipient
countries” (Van Brabant and Patel, 2018, p. 4). This was also criticised by LNGOs in the context of the
first Joint Response Plan (JRP), in which references to localisation were missing completely.
LNGOs further criticised lacking conflict sensitivity of INGOs and stressed the need to work on social
cohesion in the Rohingya Response. A whole-of-society approach was demanded (see also Post et
al., 2019). This reflected different priorities in the response and a major discrepancy in the
interpretation of localisation. INGOs were blamed to apply a narrow understanding of localisation,
reducing it to working through implementing partners. LNGOs, on the other hand, held the view that
a localised response had to involve the host community with the aim to foster social cohesion and
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14
counter potential conflicts. They thus demanded a broader understanding of localisation, as the
following statement by a representative of an LNGO illustrates:
“This is actually not true. Localisation is a vast thing. We have to think about the local
community, we have to think about the local government, we have to think about the local
expertise involvement, in planning, designing and also implementing.”
This resonates with current discussions on localisation, especially in displacement settings, where a
whole-of-society approach is promoted to include the host community as a key stakeholder in
shaping the humanitarian response at the local level (HLA, 2019, p. 7). That increasing attention to
social cohesion is now being given in the Rohingya Response could be attributed to the ways LNGOs
succeeded in challenging dominant discourses and practices. However, as the above statement
shows, the Rohingya themselves were not included as local actors in the suggested broader
understanding of localisation.
Localisation was also interpreted in terms of capacity development and local ownership by LNGOs.
Although the Government clearly stressed the temporary nature of the humanitarian response in
Cox’s Bazar and engages in negotiations with the Myanmar Government regarding the return of the
Rohingya (Lewis, 2019, p. 1886; Farzana, 2017), LNGOs doubted that this was to happen soon. They
openly expressed their concern that international funding would decrease and international actors
leave to turn their attention to other humanitarian hotspots. As one local aid worker put it:
“when the international organisation will leave or they have no fund who will bear the
whole responsibility of Rohingya people? Obviously local government, local NGO and the
host community. So we basically try to convey the message that the international
organisations and UN agencies should support local NGOs for their capacity in terms of
funding, their training and providing some system or technology that the international
organisation have.”
Capacity development was thus deemed necessary in order to make the response sustainable and
one of the key aspects of localisation. Here respondents highlighted a discrepancy between their
understanding of capacity and the ones used by INGOs. They criticised INGOs for defining capacity in
terms of resources, number of staff or vehicles, not valuing the capacity of LNGOs that manifested
itself in their in-depth context knowledge, proximity to the affected population and language skills
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15
(see also Wake and Bryant, 2018). This is a dominant practice of the international aid sector, which
tends to value technocratic expertise and organisational capacity over context knowledge and
associated forms of capacity (see also Barbelet, 2019; Autesserre, 2014). Yet, and though local
organisations highlighted their comparative advantage, they generally acknowledged that
international interveners had more capacity, technical knowledge and experience in managing
refugee camps. As most of the LNGOs were founded in the 1990s in response to the destruction
caused by cyclones in the region, they had not been working in the camps before 2017 and thus
expressed a strong willingness to learn from their international partners. Though capacity
development trainings were being offered, the dominant format of in-house trainings was however
considered ineffective by many LNGOs. It was argued that only through working jointly capacity
could be developed. Staff poaching further undermined the already limited capacity, something all
respondents – including some INGO representatives - mentioned as one of the major challenges for
their organisation and defying capacity development.
xxxi
The issue of capacity development was mainly linked to adequate forms of partnerships. Despite of
an envisioned complementarity, a number of INGOs seem to continue directly implementing their
projects or enter into very hierarchical partnerships.
xxxii
Some respondents complained about INGOs
directly implementing their projects, thus sidelining LNGOs and therewith not fostering capacity
development or making use of local experience and knowledge. Where partnerships were in place,
they were characterised by a clear hierarchy. Strikingly, frequently the term partner was used
interchangeably with source of funding in formal and informal discussions with LNGOs. LNGOs were
acting as implementing partners of international organisations – or as intermediaries who sub-
contracted the “really local” organisations, who then implemented the projects in the camps. As a
consequence, LNGOs called for “partnerships with dignity”, in which the organisations would meet
on eye level and not as “contractor and vendor”. This also included being involved in the design of
projects. INGOs were accused of arriving with ready-made project designs without consulting the
community or LNGOs. Interestingly, one representative of a LNGOs was very critical of their own
approach, saying that projects were designed “in AC rooms” and just implemented by them, without
consulting the local community. Having little own funds and capacities, they felt dependent of the
decisions of UN agencies or INGOs, with only little room to design projects themselves. This seemed
to lead to a mirroring of the practices of INGOs. Lacking ownership thus was a key concern of LNGOs.
Another point that was raised was the lacking visibility of local partners in the annual reports by
INGOs. This was perceived as a proof of missing respect of local partners who felt carrying at least
half the responsibility for the successful implementation of the projects.
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16
Unquestionably, partnerships are considered a key element in building local capacities in
humanitarian settings (Smillie, 2001). The importance to partner with local organisations is thus
widely recognised in the humanitarian sector and already well established in the Principles of
Partnership (2007)
xxxiii
and next to the issue of direct-funding of local actors has taken centre-stage in
the localisation discourse (Barbelet 2019). Yet, the very way partnership is understood and practiced
in many intervention contexts is characterised by a dependence of local partners on their
international counterparts in terms of funding, accountability and management of projects (Smillie,
2001), something that was also criticised by LNGOs in Cox’s Bazar.
It is the trust, stupid!
While the lacking implementation of more equitable partnerships – or ‘partnerships with dignity’ –
may stem from a variety of reasons, the research showed that lacking trust on all sides hampered
effective communication between the different stakeholders and was at the core of the problem
(see also Wake and Bryant, 2018). A recent study supports this finding, stating “many examples of
partnership practices which are least conducive to localisation reflect a lack of trust and respect”
(Christian Aid et al., 2019: 5). As partnerships are in essence about relationships (Houghton, 2011),
the strong ‘us’ versus ‘them’ thinking that also involved the othering of partners and revealed
stereotypical thinking of ‘the local’ and ‘the international’ emerged as a underlying theme in the
research (see also Autessere, 2014; Roth, 2015).
Intriguingly, most of the issues LNGOs raised are addressed in the international discourse on
localisation and reflected in the key commitments of the localisation agenda – but seem to have not
been successfully translated into humanitarian practice in Cox’s Bazar and elsewhere. The language
and specific terms that were used by LNGOs showed that most of them were well aware of these
commitments and the ongoing debate on localisation. In light of the perceived lacking
implementation in their daily work, international actors were thus accused of not living up to their
promises and commitments. Furthermore, representatives from LNGOS criticised the missing
visibility of their contribution to the response, limited participation and inclusion in project-design,
no access to direct funding and partnership relations that instead of fostering capacity development
were at best hierarchical in nature. In short: the response in Bangladesh to a large extent replicated
the entrenched practices of the humanitarian sector, with no major changes in the ways aid was
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17
delivered or local actors became involved in the humanitarian response. Thus, UN agencies and
INGOs were accused of only paying lip service to localisation, with little action following.
The question arises why localisation was only partially, if at all, implemented in Cox’s Bazar. Apart
from the reasons often mentioned such as the lacking will to yield power or share resources –
reasons that surely played a role in Cox’s Bazar – it is argued here that a deep-rooted trust deficit on
all sides presented a main obstacle to the realisation of localisation. This indicates the importance to
engage in trust-building efforts between the various actors if localisation is to be realised. Indeed,
trust is a key factor affecting inter-organisational cooperation and the willingness for organisations
to establish collaborative relationships (Stephenson, 2005, p. 343; van Gorp, 2014, p. 624), for
donors to provide funding and for the affected population to accept humanitarian aid (Slim, 2019).
As Schneiker (2020, p. 26) henceforth argues in reference to competitive environments, trust is not
the only condition for cooperation, but it is an essential one. Thus, it is argued here that though
“going local” may be important in addressing the trust deficit prevalent in the humanitarian
sector
xxxiv
, trust is a prerequisite for going local in the first place. It seems a chicken and egg
situation.
Different definitions and attempts to categorise trust have been suggested for different kinds of
networks (Stephenson, 2005, p. 344; Awasthy et al., 2019; Schneiker, 2020; Newell and Swan, 2000;
Searle et al., 2018). Studies on the issue of trust in humanitarian action thereby have focused
primarily on the cooperation between INGOs, donor-recipient relations or perceptions of
humanitarian assistance by the affected population. These studies offer important insights for
understanding the issue of trust in the context of the localisation agenda. Schneiker (2020, p. 36) for
instance finds that sharing the same identity as humanitarian actors is an important element for
trust-building in such large, unstable networks humanitarian responses normally represent and in
which actors cannot base their trust on the experience of past interactions. Identity-based trust may
however easily lead to exclusion of actors that are perceived as different – as in the case of LNGOs
and INGOs in Cox’s Bazar. These studies however commonly do not address more structural and
systemic factors that clearly feed the trust-deficit and hamper localisation: the legacies of
colonialism, racism, classism and unequal power relations experienced in the daily interactions of
people in the humanitarian arena (Steinke and Hövelmann, 2021; Katwikirize, 2020; Rejali, 2020).
Conclusion
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18
It is in intervention contexts such as the humanitarian response in Cox’s Bazar, that struggles over
meanings and practices arise (Long and Jinlong, 2009). Interface analysis allows us to “look more
closely at the question of whose interpretations or models...prevail in given scenarios and how and
why they do so” (Long, 1999). Interface analysis shows that the implementation of localisation is not
simply a top-down process, “since initiatives may come as much from below as from above” (Long,
1992, p. 19). Though international actors had more power to shape the response, local actors used
different strategies to challenge the ways the response was carried out and the localisation was
implemented. The international norm of localisation thus found its way into the specific local
context, in which local actors are not passive recipients of global discourse, but construct their own
discourse on localisation (Chiweshe and Bhatasara, 2016).
Looking at the intersecting lifeworlds of international aid workers and local humanitarian actors and
applying an interface perspective, the research showed how the Rohingya Response in Cox’s Bazar
became an arena of contestation, competition and sometimes convergence among different actors
about the meaning of localisation. LNGOs had developed their own vision of localisation that not
always converged with the one of international actors. The research exposed how the divergent
understandings of localisations and best ways to implement it prevalent in Cox’s Bazar created
conflict and hampered joint efforts of international and local humanitarian actors (see also Coast
2019; Mission Report 2018). Though both sides tried to find common ground and engaged in
dialogue, conflicting views, interests and perceptions of self and others seemed to stand in the way
for more constructive relationships to emerge.
Trust-building efforts and a respectful attitude should therefore not only be central to nurture good
partnerships, but to more generally improve the humanitarian response and make localisation a
reality. This may entail, among many other things, material and spatial considerations to foster
positive relationships and social interactions with LNGOs and the host community (Smirl, 2015, p.
80; Autessere, 2014, p. 174). However, it also requires addressing the more fundamental issues of
power imbalance and the effects of (neo)colonialism, racism and classism in the humanitarian sector
and the need to decolonise humanitarian action. While the political economy, the competition over
funding and prestige clearly led to tensions between the different actors, the problematic
relationships cannot be understood without taking into account the more systemic and structural
factors that shape humanitarian action. Legacies of colonialism, experiences of racism as well as
classism and elitism cast their shadows, not only on the practices of INGOs, but also their local
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.

19
counterparts. Implementing localisation thus requires a more fundamental shift in current
humanitarian practice, something that will surely take some time.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Saima Sultana Jaba for her excellent research assistance, the Office for Gender
Equality at the Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg for funding the research stay in
Bangladesh, as well as the Centre for Genocide Studies (CGS), University of Dhaka, to host and
support me. I want to also thank the three anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on a
previous version of this article. I am particularly grateful to all interview partners in Bangladesh who
gave me their precious time and shared their knowledge and views with me.
Funding
The research stay in Bangladesh was funded by the Office for Gender Equality at the Otto-von-
Guericke University Magdeburg.
Correspondence
Dr. Kristina Roepstorff, Department of Political Science, Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg,
Germany. Email: kristina.roepstorff@ovgu.de
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Endnotes
i
In the Grand Bargain, donors and humanitarian organisations committed themselves to making the humanitarian response as
local as possible, notably by channelling up to 25% of the funds directly to local and national actors by 2020.
ii
The Charter for Change is an initiative of various humanitarian NGOs, intended to increase funding for local NGOs from the
Global South by 20% until the year 2018. It demands to more systemically involve local and national partners in the
development and implementation of projects and to acknowledge the efforts of local actors through better public visibility.
iii
The research also included informal discussions with Rohingya outside and inside the camps, visits of camps hospitals,
schools and meetings with three Majhis (appointed Rohingya leaders in the camps) as well as an observation of a training of
Rohingya volunteers on Gender-Based Violence. Insights were only incorporated in this analysis of local civil society
organisation’s perceptions of the international response where considered providing additional information. This is, however a
limitation to the study and Rohingya views on localisation and the response by international and local organisations would pa int
a more complete picture.
iv
In line with research ethics, all references have been anonymised to prevent the actual or potential identification of research
participants.
v
See: https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/09/564622-un-human-rights-chief-points-textbook-example-ethnic-cleansing-myanmar,
last accessed 04.07.2020; see also: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41566561, last accessed 04.07.2020.
vi
See: https://reliefweb.int/report/indonesia/rescued-rohingya-grateful-local-support-concerns-grow-boats-still-sea, last
accessed 01.07.2020.
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24
vii
See: https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/rohingya/?SF_monthly=70141000001Afj9AAC, last accessed 30.06.2020.
viii
The exact number is not clear, for some estimations see: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/infographic-top-rohingya-
hosting-countries/1563674, last accessed 04.07.2020; https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/09/who-are-the-rohingya-
and-why-are-they-fleeing-myanmar/, last accessed 03.07.2020; and https://www.unhcr.org/rohingya-emergency.html, last
accessed 04.07.2020; See also: https://www.nrc.no/news/2018/august/coxs-bazar-the-worlds-largest-refugee-settlement/., last
accessed 03.07.2020.
ix
The SEG coordinates the activities with the Government and the National Task Force.
x
See the RRRC website: https://rrrc.portal.gov.bd/site/page/5201d4ea-ee43-4c13-af54-2e73aeb1ec48/Activities, last accessed
28.06.2020.
xi
For an overview chart see:
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/08_rohingya_refugee_respon
se_coordination_mecha.pdf, last accessed 04.07.2020.
xii
Bangladesh is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention. However, this view was also stated in an Interview with a
Government representative in Cox’s Bazar, February 2019.
xiii
Interviews with local and international aid workers, Cox’s Bazar and Kutupalong camp, March 2019. See also:
https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/12/04/are-we-not-human/denial-education-rohingya-refugee-children-bangladesh, last
accessed 04.07.2020.
xiv
See: https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/2020/03/10/rohingya-refugees-internet-ban-bangladesh, 29.6.2020.
xv
https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/rohingya-crisis/2020/02/15/home-minister-barbed-wire-fencing-underway-around-
rohingya-camps, last accessed 29.06.2020.
xvi
This was a common trope in conversations with aid workers, and also taxi drivers or colleagues at the University of Dhaka.
xvii
During field research, I learned from a Government representative that there were 220 NGOs listed at the beginning of the
Rohingya Response in August 2017. However, only a few remained active over time. Another interview partner referred to 200
INGOs operating in Cox’s Bazar.
xviii
Long defines an interface as “the critical point at which structural discontinuity is most likely to occur between different social
system, areas or levels of the social order due to variable normative values and social interests” (Long, 1993, p. 217).
xix
The Rohingya Response was internationally funded with USD 692,538,707
in 2019, see: https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/719/flows?order=directional_property&sort=asc, last accessed 06.02.2021.
xx
The CCNF describes itself as “a network of local CSO and NGOs”, though throughout the website text references to both
local and national NGOs are to be found. See http://www.cxb-cso-ngo.org/origin/, last accessed 8.6.2020.
xxi
Religion also played an important role in legitimising and delegitimising certain actors, whether it was Hindu and Christian
organisations accused of missionary activities in the camps, or Muslim organisations for spreading extremism.
xxii
Though one interview partner conceded that the IFRC was one of the first responders. A number of INGOs were already
present in Cox’s Bazar (Wake and Bryant, 2018, p. 7) and the UNHCR acted as leader of the international relief operation and
facilitated repatriation already in 1978 (Farzana, 2017, p. 72).
xxiii
According to Bangladeshi NGO law, NGOs have to register with the NGO Affairs Bureau (NGOAB). For projects, NGOs need
to either have a FD6 (development projects) or FD7 (relief work) approval. For working in the Rohingya Response a FD7
approval is required. As a sub-contractor (or sub-recipient, as they were called), of a registered NGO smaller organisations
evaded this limitation.
xxiv
But also amongst international actors hierarchies were observable, with UN agencies being named the most powerful actors
not only by local but also INGOs.
xxv
Moreover, while helping Muslim brothers and sisters surely informed everyday humanitarianism in Cox’s Bazar, the
Government’s attempt to curtail radicalisation in the country and in the camps banned three Islamic NGOs from operating in
Cox’s Bazar in 2017 (Lewis 2019).
xxvi
The Rohingya make up one-third of the population in Teknaf and three-quarters in Ukhiya (Wake and Bryant, 2018, p. 8).
xxvii
See for example: https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2019/12/5ddbafa04/taking-traffickers-worlds-largest-refugee-site.html,
last accessed 04.07.2020.
xxviii
https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2019/08/26/Rohingya-refugees-vote
xxix
https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2018/11/27/bangladesh-rohingya-strike-highlights-growing-refugee-
activism?utm_campaign=recirc
xxx
The conflict between local and international organisations then revolved and escalated around one issue: the claim that
international organisations were not hiring local staff. At the time of the research, a movement in Ukhiya and Teknaf demanded
the hiring of more local staff, culminating in physical attacks on the infrastructure of international organisations and threats of
violence against aid workers.
xxxi
Offering considerable higher salaries, skilled local staff joined UN agencies or INGOs Local organisations claimed that they
felt under pressure to calculate low salaries for the budget proposals to donors in order to win in a competitive bidding process
– a view that conflicted with an international aid worker’s assessment: “it's up to them to then look after their staff cost… they
give me like very tiny numbers and then they complain they cannot pay, I cannot identify for you what is your salary."
xxxii
See: https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/2020-03/Partnerships%20for%20humanitarian%20action%20-
%20challenges%20for%20large%20INGOs.pdf, last accessed 05.07.2020.
xxxiii
The Global Humanitarian Platform (GHP) endorsed the Principles of Partnership (PoP) in 2007. It laid the foundation for a
shared understanding of how food partnerships contribute to a more humanitarian action. The commitments revolve around the
issues of See: Equality, Transparency, Results-Oriented Approach, Responsibility and Complementarity
https://www.icvanetwork.org/principles-partnership-statement-commitment, last accessed 05.07.2020.
xxxiv
See Ireland at Fordham University Lecture by Dr. Jemilah Mahmood, Under-Secretary General for Partnerships,
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 06 February 2020: https://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/speech/trust-
deficit-humanitarian-action-going-local-address/, last accessed 02.02.2021.
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