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Indian Lobbying Industry
Abstract
Lobbying is a well-established practice that has acquired the form of a service industry, generally operating in a scattered fashion as also in a non-tranparent manner in India. Lobbying in India, so far, has not been legalised however, it is neither declared illegal. In the recent few years, lobbying groups though have been constantlly demanding a regulatory framework for this sector, but as of now their advocacy didn’t bear any fruit. In the absence of any formal regulations, lobbying in India is mostly unorganized. As international business houses are targetting over a billion people in India, there are likely retraction from the legal contracts as also in the tax norms, they are engaing lobbyists to avail their acumen and soft skills to influence the decision making processes. Their services are needed not only to win the decisions in their favour but also to ensure avoidance of any legal provisions regarding bribery either within the national boundaries or overseas. In the world of Oriental wisdom the idea of lobbying is not espoused warmly. The overwhelming perception about lobby in India is that it interferes in the legal and ethical parameters of a decision-making process
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How lobbying by Indian Americans in the United States has influenced US foreign policy towards India?
Indian Lobbying and its Influence in US Decision Making looks at the ways in which Indian lobbying acts as a catalyst in transforming the US–India relationship in the post-Cold War era, the events that explain their formation, and factors that legitimize these groups as an institution in US politics.
This paper uses data from an enumeration of the nearly 7,000 interest organizations active in Washington politics to understand the kinds of interests that are likely to achieve representation in American national politics. Although much has been made of the arrival in Washington of many new citizens groups over the past two decades, business interests are overrepresented among organized interests there in terms of the number of interest organizations and the structure of interest representation. This overrepresentation takes place at the expense of the representation of the interests of broad publics and the poor. Further, in spite of the emergence over the past two decades of many organizations representing the interests of the previously underrepresented, the bias in the pressure system towards the interests of business and the well-off seems to have become more pronounced. Although there are complicated formal problems in attempting to harmonize the principle of political equality with the representation of interests by organizations and, therefore, in specifying what an unbiased pressure system would look like, it is clear that an unbiased pressure system would be quite different from what presently obtains.
Political corruption is one of the globe's most pressing yet seemingly permanent problems. It is a root cause of low growth and inequality, and plagues numerous nations throughout the world in varying degrees. In the past, it proved difficult to measure, and the political science literature on it was thin. In recent years, political scientists have greatly improved their analytical tools for analyzing and contextualizing corruption, and it is now a hot topic in the discipline. In Political Parties, Business Groups, and Corruption in Developing Countries, Vineeta Yadav examines corruption levels in sixty-four developing democracies over a twenty-year period. Her comparative focus is on Brazil and India, two of the most important developing nations. Drawing from a 2005-06 survey of Brazilian and Indian businesses that she conducted, Yadav finds that legislative institutions are central in determining the degree and type of corruption. Most importantly, in legislatures where the party holds sway (as opposed to individual legislators), the level of corruption is higher. Party costs are higher than that of any one legislator, which explains part of the difference. More fundamentally, the fact that different systems offer different incentives to business groups and legislatures explains why some systems are less corrupt than others. Given structural variation across democratic political systems, her book allows to predict which states are most susceptible to political corruption, and which reforms might best alleviate the problem. Available in OSO: http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/politicalscience/9780199735907/toc.html
In this readily accessible book Bardhan examines the political and social constraints on Indian development. In the newly added epilogue Bardhan comments on the process of liberalization in the 1990's and examines the feasibility of the exercise in the light of ground realities. This ambitious and controversial book is essential reading for students of economics, politics and the general interested reader.
Experimental evidence on gender differences demonstrates that women are generally less trusting and more reciprocating than men in Investment Games. However, existing studies typically use a narrow population consisting of college students. To test the robustness of these findings, we report on an experiment using 18-84-year old participants recruited from an online panel. While trusting gender differences are robust across age, with women less trusting than men, reciprocating behavior is not robust across age; gender differences in reciprocating behavior depend on age and amounts received in a complex manner. Regarding trusting behavior, we also find that men and women of all ages trust women and older people more than men and younger people. To understand trust better, we collected socio-economic and demographic information and experimentally measured how much subjects expected different partner types would return. While socio-economic and demographic information explain little of the trusting and reciprocating behavior, expectations explain nearly 50 percent of the reason women trust less than men and why more is sent to women and older people. However, even after controlling for expectations, gender and age differences remain significant in explaining trusting behavior.
A Neopluralist Perspective on Research on Organized Interests
- D Lowery
- V Gray
Lowery, D., & Gray, V. (2004). A Neopluralist Perspective
on Research on Organized Interests. Political Research
Quarterly, 57(1), 164-175. https://doi.org/10.1177/
106591290405700114
Pressure groups and democracy in India
- L P Misquitta
Misquitta, L. P. (1991). Pressure groups and democracy in
India. Bangalore, KA: Sterling Publisher Pvt. Ltd..