No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the author.
Plato and the Socratic Dialogue
... 4 Therefore, the arguments of the Lesser Hippias should be seen as part of a larger pedagogical strategy, in which Socrates challenges both traditional and sophistic educational methods. Following the same line of thought, Kahn (1996, 114) notes that a strong background theme for the Lesser Hippias , as for the Ion, is the role of poetry in education. The aim of this paper is twofold: first, to offer a new interpretation of the dialogue which aims to do justice to the dialogue itself not only by seeking to defend and restore the value of the arguments unfolded in it, but also by attempting to show how these arguments are employed by Plato for a larger pedagogical and philosophical purpose; second, to illustrate, through this interpretation, the criticism Plato levels against traditional forms of education, values and their moral standards, with a view to justifying the philosophical life as the best way of life for a human being. ...
... For an elaborate discussion of the idea that Antisthenes is one of Plato's targets here, see e.g. Raeder 1905, 57; Kahn 1996, 121 ff. 13 Vlastos (1991, 276) claims that though ψευδὴς can mean " liar " and does so in many contexts, it need not-it does not always do so. For example (at 276 n. 130), a false statement need not be a lying one, i.e. intended to be thought true, or a person making false statements need not intend them to be thought true. ...
Uma questão básica ainda se coloca aos leitores do Hípias menor de Platão: como lidar com a conclusão final do diálogo, de que o homem bom pratica a injustiça voluntariamente, que parece profundamente inconciliável com o princípio atribuído a Sócrates de que “ninguém erra de propósito”. Contudo, se investigamos o texto mais de perto, encontramos indícios de que o posicionamento de Sócrates não é nem paradoxal nem contraditório com as posições filosóficas que ele estabelece nas outras obras de Platão. Ao contrário, o diálogo chega a uma conclusão definitiva. O homem justo se recusa a praticar a injustiça precisamente porque ele não deseja (βούλεσθαι) fazê-lo. O conhecimento do que é bom ou ruim (em outras palavras, do que favorece ou prejudica a alma) ativa exclusivamente o desejo pelo bem e, consequentemente, o poder de produzi-lo.
... M. Frede, 1992, p. 209-12, 219, on why Plato's use of the aporetic format implies that he does not commit to endorsing any of the arguments used. The proleptic (or ingressive) type of interpretation revived and elaborated by Kahn (1996) is a variation of the doctrinal reading since it assumes that the aporetic dialogues hint at specific solutions (in anticipation of the arguments of certain later dialogues; e.g., the Symposium in the case of the Lysis [1996, p. 267]). While I agree with Kahn's assessment that these dialogues function as a kind of aporetic prelude to constructive dialogues, my approach emphasizes that they don't preempt one specific solution. ...
In the Lysis, Socrates claims to be looking for an account of what kind of quality in another person or object stimulates friendship or love (philia). He goes through a series of proposals, refuting each in turn. In the end, he throws us back to the point from where the arguments started, declaring an aporetic outcome. What is the purpose of this apparently futile and circular inquiry? Most interpreters try to reconstruct a theory of friendship or love from the arguments of this dialogue. Against such a doctrinal reading, this essay defends an “aporetic reading” of the dialogue and connects it to its protreptic function. Starting with a preliminary discussion of what defines an aporetic dialogue and what distinguishes indirect protreptic from explicit protreptic discourse, the essay then analyzes the aporetic method of the Lysis, distinguishing it from aporetic discourse in some of his earlier dialogues. Finally, it analyzes how, and for what kind of audience, the Lysisfunctions as an indirect protreptic. This includes a comparison with the protreptic use of aporetic argumentation in the Euthydemus.
... For examples of this trend, see Taylor (1956) 135-6;Shorey (1965) 157; Klein (1965) 92;Philips (1965) 78; Eckstein (1968) 29-30; Grube (1935) 12; and Weiss (2012) 49-76. On the other side, see Hansing (1928); Gulley (1954) 194-5;Moravcsik (1970) 53;Irwin (1974) 753;White (1974) 289;Nehamas (1985) 29; Kahn (1996) 159-61; Dancy (2004) 221-36;Scott (2006) 87-94;Charles (2010) 128;and Benson (2015) 50. See also Gerson (1999) for an analysis of the recollection argument. ...
This paper concerns Plato’s characterization of the body as the soul’s tool. I take perception as an example of the body’s usefulness. I explore the Timaeus’ view that perception provides us with models of orderliness. Then, I argue that perception of confusing sensible objects is necessary for our cognitive development too. Lastly, I consider the instrumentality relationship more generally and its place in Plato’s teleological worldview.
... 9 However, the other side of connectivistic paradigm is adequately overlooked by the representatives, who do not allow lack of knowledge regarding information structures of networks, unwillingness to be in this network and always to be active in it. It is also emphasized by the philosophical-reflexive definition of the foundations of theory, 10 which is based on the principles of leadership and cognition (Kahn, 2011). 11 Focusing on "theory" requires from actors not only learning of technology, but also an understanding of the nature of a learned phenomenon in its particular activity, the principles of the operation of explicit rules and conceptual definitions. ...
The aim of this study is to present an insight into the issue of technology and innovation reform with an emphasis on their integration into the social sciences. Using discourse analysis, we have reconstructed the basic elements of reforms and their reflections into a theory that changes not only in terms of content and terminology, but mainly in terms of logic and rationalization of new paradigms. These changes are reflected in the transformation of society, bringing new challenges and defining the relationship between innovation and society. An important outcome of the analysis is pointing out the change in values in society and their reflection in the form of challenges that respect changes in the labor market and educational policies of the various educational institutions.
... Plato's dialogues have been the subject of extensive and variegated scholarly attention, with the emphasis on their division into three periods, each marked by dialogues of quite a different nature. An alternative interpretation of the periodization, relevant for a study of Wittgenstein, was advanced by Charles Kahn (1996), who proposed viewing the differences in the several types of dialogues as reflecting changes in Plato's position on various topics. 8 There is a clear similarity between Kahn's interpretation of the role of dialogue in Plato's work and Wittgenstein's discussion, in the second part of the Investigations, of "changing aspect" (as will be exemplified below). ...
The dialogical character of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations has received scant attention in the literature, given the work's status in his total oeuvre, and is dismissed as a marginal as compared to the other differences between the Tractatus and the Investigations. The main lines of interpretation that have been proposed see dialogue as a rhetorical technique intended to present erroneous positions and then refute them, as an exemplification of what can be expressed in language (McGinn 1997; Rhees 1998), or as a reflection of Wittgenstein's informal teaching method (Malcolm 2001; Savickey et al. 1990). The present article adopts the perspective that Wittgenstein's use of dialogue makes it possible to track the various modes of language-acts, consonant with his directions to examine the daily use of language (Wittgenstein 2009, §116 and esp. §132), "when language is, as it were, idling." In his later inquiries, Wittgenstein frequently considers the nature of mental states, accompanied by an attempt to characterize the differences between them while at the same time dealing with the cases in which it is difficult to distinguish them. In this process he made a variety of uses of dialogue, each of which embodies a different aspect of language action. Subsequently I will demonstrate that these different uses are not haphazard. A scrutiny of the nature of the dialogue can help us understand the nature of the activity carried out of the state of consciousness. Finally, I propose a distinction among three main types of dialogue: technical, conversational, and reflexive.
... The method of the dialectic, which Plato describes in the Republic more extensively than in his other writings (Kahn 1996), is another major indication of the Platonic conception of intellectual virtues. Plato's dialectical method is the only 7 method that philosophers have at their disposal in order to reach episteme of the Forms and to the 'vision' of the good (VII, 532a-b, see also Taylor 1926, p. 285). ...
Several contemporary virtue scholars (e.g. Zagzebski in Virtues of the mind: an inquiry into the nature of virtue and the ethical foundations of knowledge, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996; Kvanvig in The intellectual virtues and the life of the mind, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 1992) trace the origin of the concept of intellectual virtues back to Aristotle. In contrast, my aim in this paper is to highlight the strong indications showing that Plato had already conceived of and had begun developing the concept of intellectual virtues in his discussion of the ideal city-state in the Republic. I argue that the Platonic conception of rational desires satisfies the motivational component of intellectual virtues while his dialectical method satisfies the success component. In addition, I show that Plato considers episteme as the primary intellectual virtue. Episteme, which is quite similar to Pritchard’s (in: Pritchard, Millar, Haddock (eds) The nature and value of knowledge: three investigations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) conception of understanding, is a cognitive achievement that cannot be attained by luck or testimony. The realization that Plato was the first to conceive of and develop the concept of intellectual excellences is not merely of historic significance. I illustrate, through the example of Zagzebski’s (1996) virtue theory, how the Platonic conception of intellectual virtues could prove promising in contemporary debates on virtue epistemology theories.
... Zeno believed in an a-temporal and motionless reality, while Parmenides argued that change is impossible, as when something changes loses its properties and thus does not exist anymore. An important counter argument originated from Heraclitus who argued for the dynamic aspects of a world in constant motion, change and flux 2 , reflected in the metaphor 'we step and we do not step in the same river, we are and we are not' (Blackburn, 2008;Campbell et al., 2010;Hammer, 2011;Kahn, 2013). An important ontological distinction that has greatly influenced the epistemology of change is the difference between the Aristotelian notion of a fixed concept of time as the 'number of movements in relation to the before and after' (Phys. ...
Objective:
The dominant theoretical perspective that guides treatment evaluations in addiction assumes linearity in the relationship between treatment and outcomes, viewing behaviour change as a 'before and after event'. In this study we aim to examine how the direction of the trajectory of the process from addiction to recovery is constructed in personal narratives of active and recovering users.
Design:
21 life stories from individuals at different stages of recovery and active use were collected and analysed following the principles of narrative analysis.
Results:
Personal trajectories were constructed in discontinuous, non-linear and long lasting patterns of repeated, and interchangeable, episodes of relapse and abstinence. Relapse appeared to be described as an integral part of a learning process through which knowledge leading to recovery was gradually obtained.
Conclusion:
The findings show that long-term recovery is represented as being preceded by periods of discontinuity before change is stabilised. Such periods are presented to be lasting longer than most short-term pre-post intervention designs can capture and suggest the need to rethink how change is defined and measured.
... Introduction to measurement and the philosophy of measurement 1.1 Examples from the history of philosophy "If he wasn't one of the greatest philosophers of the ancient Greece, he would have probably been the greatest poet", so or something similar said Nigel Warburton on Plato, during the presentation of his book A Little History of Philosophy at Waterstone's Piccadilly, London [War11]. An essay of Plato's skills as a dramatist can be found in the Theaetetus [Pla04,Kah13]. There, Euclid and Terpsion of Megara report a dialogue occurred about 30 years before between Socrates and the two mathematicians Theodorus and Theaetetus, Theodorus' disciple. ...
The Bureau International des Poids et Mesures (BIPM) is scheduled to publish in 2018 a new edition of the Brochure, with the definition of the seven base units of the International System (SI). The new definition, now circulating in draft, is the most substantial change in the SI since its foundation in 1875, at the signature of the Metre Convention: in fact, for the first time all base units (and thereafter also all derived units) will no longer be defined based on a real physical object (as the kilogram prototype), or on a known physical phenomenon of a known reference material (as the triple point of water), or on a thought experiment (as the force of attraction between two parallel wires, placed at known distance and carrying an electric current), but based on “constants of nature”, whose numerical values will be fixed. The epistemological value of this extraordinary event cannot be ignored: afterwards, all measurement instruments will be calibrated based on these constants, ideally fixed once and forever.
In this thesis, the author introduces first the approach to the concept of measurement with some examples from the history of philosophy: a path is traced, which starting from ancient Greek philosophy and through modern science, brings to the current definition of measurement in the International Vocabulary of Metrology, used nowadays as the isomorphism between measurement quantities (the physical magnitude: length, time, mass or others) and the real numbers. Then the ontological approaches to the process of measuring are shown: from subjective relativism, to operationism, to representationalism. Switching to measurement units, the importance in their standardization and in the creation of the SI is stressed, also as “moral media-
tors”. The new definitions of the second, the metre and the kilogram are then analysed (with the controversial fixation of the hyperfine splitting frequency of caesium atom, of the speed of light in vacuum and of Planck constant). Some critical arguments against the New SI are then presented: whether or not the Metre Convention is fulfilled; the difference between “constants of nature” and “technical constants”, with the meaning and consequences of their fixation; whether constants of nature are “true constants”, or they are “assumed to be constant”. Eventually, the problem of “true” constants of nature is critically addressed, according to either a realist or an idealist ontological point of view, showing where the New SI proposed by BIPM demonstrates to follow one or the other approach, referring back to the examples from the
history of philosophy presented in the introduction.
... Plato's dialogues have been the subject of extensive and variegated scholarly attention, with the emphasis on their division into three periods, each marked by dialogues of quite a different nature. An alternative interpretation of the periodization, relevant for a study of Wittgenstein, was advanced by Charles Kahn (1996), who proposed viewing the differences in the several types of dialogues as reflecting changes in Plato's position on various topics. 8 There is a clear similarity between Kahn's interpretation of the role of dialogue in Plato's work and Wittgenstein's discussion, in the second part of the Investigations, of "changing aspect" (as will be exemplified below). ...
The dialogical character of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations has received scant attention in the literature, given the work’s status in his total oeuvre, and is dismissed as a marginal as compared to the other differences between the Tractatus and the Investigations. The main lines of interpretation that have been proposed see dialogue as a rhetorical technique intended to present erroneous positions and then refute them, as an exemplification of what can be expressed in language (McGinn 1997; Rhees 1998), or as a reflection of Wittgenstein’s informal teaching method (Malcolm 2001; Savickey et al. 1990). The present article adopts the perspective that Wittgenstein’s use of dialogue makes it possible to track the various modes of language-acts, consonant with his directions to examine the daily use of language (Wittgenstein 2009, §116 and esp. §132), “when language is, as it were, idling.” In his later inquiries, Wittgenstein frequently considers the nature of mental states, accompanied by an attempt to characterize the differences between them while at the same time dealing with the cases in which it is difficult to distinguish them. In this process he made a variety of uses of dialogue, each of which embodies a different aspect of language action. Subsequently I will demonstrate that these different uses are not haphazard. A scrutiny of the nature of the dialogue can help us understand the nature of the activity carried out of the state of consciousness. Finally, I propose a distinction among three main types of dialogue: technical, conversational, and reflexive.
... Si atendemos al contenido de las tres refutaciones, se ha de admitir que los postulados sofistas frente a la opción filosófica socrática son negativos; porque sus discursos traslucen las incoherencias y contradicciones que hay en la doctrina que sustenta el modo de vida moral de sus interlocutores, frente a la fuerza ética del discurso socrático. En opinión de Charles Kahn (1996), la vergüenza de la que es víctima cada uno de los interlocutores -puesto que cada uno de ellos concluye su actuación bajo el rasero de la vergüenza-es fundamental para entender el sentido último del diálogo. Vergüenza que se hace ostensible en la violación del acuerdo que los dialogantes Gorgias, Polo y Calicles hicieron con Sócrates y con la verdad. ...
Resumen En este trabajo se investiga el contenido del diálogo que llevan a cabo Sócrates y tres sofistas de la época: Gorgias, Polo y Calicles, quienes fungen como interlocutores racionales. En el diálogo Gorgias de Platón se desarrolla, básicamente, el enfrentamiento entre los objetivos de la re-tórica con los de la ética. Consecuencialmente esta oposición se inscribe en una oposición más amplia: aquella que se evidencia entre la retórica, como instrumento de persuasión propia del discurso sofista, y la dialécti-ca como camino de la filosofía hacia la obtención de la verdad. Abstract In this paper, the content of the dialogue undertaken between Socrates and three sophists of his epoch: Gorgias, Polo and Calicles, who pretended to be rationalists, is studied. In the dialogue between Gorgias and Plato a clash of ideas as to the objectives of rhetoric and those of ethics is developed. As a consequence, this oposition becomes part of a greater debate, that in which rhetoric is classified as an instrument of persuasion, which is elemental in sophist discourse, and the dialectic becomes the path that philosophy uses to reach the truth.
... Plato linked the Socratic method to dialectic (understood as the use of question and answer methods in order to gain a clearer understanding or indeed a grasp of the truth of the matter) -in contrast to "eristic" (understood in terms of disputation for the sake of disputation or for some other rhetorical end) which characterised the discourses of the sophists -as a way of attaining knowledge and understanding in the epistemological as well as ethical domains. Platonic (and Socratic) dialectics have been studied in relation to persuasion (Morrow, 1950), discomfiture (Shorey, 1965), eristics and irony (Jackson, 1990;Vlastos, 1987), epistemology (Runciman, 1962, among many others), oppositions (Allen, 1961;Derrida, 1993), paradoxes (Demos, 1957), errors and fallacies (Robinson, 1940(Robinson, , 1942, method (Scott, 2002;Stenzel, 1940), "Socratic dialogues" and Plato's creativity (Kahn, 1996), educational activity (Teloh, 1986), to mention just a few studies. This paper is a speculative one to a significant degree that will draw upon a number of important philosophical sources. ...
Plato linked the Socratic Method to dialectic – in contrast to "eristic" which characterised the discourses of the "sophoi" – as a way of attaining knowledge and understanding in the epistemological as well as ethical domains. It will be argued here the Socratic Method, with some modifications, remains a functional and significant method in education, in spite of a number of critiques from some advocates of deconstruction and in spite of some recent emphases on "aporia" and the problematic nature of the Socratic "elenchos". It will also be argued that the "Socratic Method" far from being a tired or exhausted paradigm, can, with some modifications, allow for a significant degree of "play", just as it can provide, in the age of informatics, an important catalyst by which the creativity of learners in distant or regional areas can be stimulated as well as realised. This article has been peer-reviewed and accepted for publication in SLEID, an international journal of scholarship and research that supports emerging scholars and the development of evidence-based practice in education. © Copyright of articles is retained by authors. As an open access journal, articles are free to use, with proper attribution, in educational and other non-commercial settings.
Plato’s theory of recollection is classically treated as an account of “concept-acquisition” or “concept-possession,” explaining how the mind is able to employ general concepts, despite the senses only perceiving particulars. Against this, recent scholars (esp. Dominic Scott) have argued that recollection is not necessary for ordinary reasoning. Recollection is not about ordinary concepts that humans use; rather, recollection is a rare, prototypically philosophic affair that is satisfied by becoming aware of Forms or principles associated with them, which most people never experience. On this view, most people do not recollect. A third position accepts both views: there are two types of recollection in Plato, one concerned with ordinary cognition, and one concerned with philosophical awareness of the Forms. This paper argues for the narrow reading, focusing on the Phaedrus .
In his Socratic dialogues, Plato seeks to vindicate the memory of Socrates by showing that Socrates' behaviour provides the model that the virtuous citizen ought to follow in his relationship with his state and its laws. Socrates offers a clear example of the consistency of the function of the common citizen with that of the wise man. In this respect, the possibility of a science of legal dynamics appears to be a subsidiary issue. If, however, one considers the fact that, according to Plato, the legal order is largely dependent on its acceptance by the ordinary citizen, one can argue that the Socratic dialogues contain hints of a theory of legal development. The purpose of the present paper is to explore and comment on Plato's views on legal development as a key element of social development, with particular attention being paid to his works Apology of Socrates and Crito. Although the focus of the discussion will be on the positive aspect of legal development, Plato's notion of lawlessness or anomie and its effects on the legal order will also be examined.
This article provides a rigorous defense of innate true belief in the Meno , to my knowledge, the first of its kind. While several commentators have proposed innate true belief in the past, the position has never been defended or explained in detail. Instead, the most thorough discussions of Plato’s innatism have opted for different innate objects. I defend my proposal against these recent alternatives by showing that the passages often thought to imply innate knowledge can arguably be better read in other ways. I then argue that they should be so read, because of an “awareness condition” Plato had on knowledge at the time.
Plato's moral realism rests on the Idea of the Good, the unhypothetical first principle of all. It is this, as Plato says, that makes just things useful and beneficial. That Plato makes the first principle of all the Idea of the Good sets his approach apart from that of virtually every other philosopher. This fact has been occluded by later Christian Platonists who tried to identify the Good with the God of scripture. But for Plato, theology, though important, is subordinate to metaphysics. For this reason, ethics is independent of theology and attached to metaphysics. This book challenges many contemporary accounts of Plato's ethics that start with the so-called Socratic paradoxes and attempt to construct a psychology of action or moral psychology that makes these paradoxes defensible. Rather, Lloyd Gerson argues that Plato at least never thought that moral realism was defensible outside of a metaphysical framework.
In this essay, the function of the poetic citations by Plato in his definitional dialogues will be elaborated. Plato, through Socrates’ interlocutors, uses poetic references as rational sources that supposedly can define the topics covered in these dialogues. The Socratic refutation will justify the insufficiency of the poetic tradition of the archaic period as a way of knowledge. Therefore, it can be shown that the use of poetic references has a fundamental role for Plato, who, in this way, clarifies the philosophical path as the only direction for universal knowledge.
Plato is a philosophical writer of unusual and ingenious versatility. His works engage in argument but are also full of allegory, imagery, myth, paradox and intertextuality. He astutely characterises the participants whom he portrays in conversation. Sometimes he composes fictive dialogues in dramatic form while at other times he does so as narratives. In this book, world-renowned scholar Malcolm Schofield illustrates the variety of the literary resources that Plato deploys to achieve his philosophical purposes. He draws key passages for discussion particularly, but not only, from Republic and the less well-known Laws and also shows how reconstructing the original historical context of a dialogue and of its assumed readership is essential to understanding Plato's approach. The book will open the eyes of readers of all levels of expertise to Plato's masterly ability as a writer and how an understanding of this is crucial if we are to appreciate his philosophy.
Siguiendo la propuesta de aquellos intérpretes que se ocupan de señalar continuidades en la metodología empleada por Platón a lo largo de su obra, en este trabajo consideraremos al diálogo Sofista como un punto de confluencia de la refutación de cuño socrático y el método hipotético expuesto en República. Específicamente, intentaremos identificar en aquella obra tardía el punto culminante de dicho método, i.e. el principio no hipotético aludido por Sócrates. Asimismo, esa tarea nos conducirá a pensar, por un lado, en la relación entre Platón y su maestro y, por el otro, en el lugar que le cabe al diálogo Sofista y a su interlocutor principal, el Extranjero de Elea, en el proyecto filosófico de Platón.
Los símiles de la línea y la caverna expuestos en la República de Platón son una de las imágenes más impactantes e influyentes de la historia de la filosofía, pero también la expresión fundamental de la filosofía platónica. En ellos se despliegan las fases del proceso formativo del filósofo hacia la contemplación de las Ideas y del Bien y su consecuente retorno para hacerse cargo de los otros. El guía en ese camino es Sócrates, quien desarrolla su «arte de la conversión», un arte que adecúa sus medios de enseñanza al nivel intelectual y moral de sus interlocutores. Así, Raúl Gutiérrez nos propone leer la obra maestra de Platón siguiendo el camino trazado en estos símiles. Vistos de esta manera, los símiles sirven de clave hermenéutica del diálogo en su conjunto, pero, al mismo tiempo, ellos mismos son iluminados por los resultados de esa lectura. En el capítulo final, el autor aplica su propuesta a uno de los diálogos más enigmáticos de Platón, el Parménides
In Phaedo 115c-e Socrates scornfully rebukes Crito for enquiring how Socrates should be buried for Crito had not been persuaded by the previous arguments that burying Socrates’ body is not equal to burying Socrates. A parallel account is found in Aelian ( Var. Hist . I . 16. 4-5) and Diogenes Laertius (D.L. II . 35) where Apollodorus is rebuked for attempting to persuade Socrates that he should be bothered how his remains would be clothed when laid out. Several scholars have suggested this should not be considered a copy of Plato but an early proto-type written by one of his contemporaries with particular regard to Euclides of Megara. While this thesis has been criticized, further evidence will be examined in this article (Stob. IV . xxxv.33) where the character of Apollodorus cites an unnamed Megarian examining this same argument but with conclusions different from those in Plato. Here the Megarian concludes that though the body may be separate from the soul we still show care and grief for the remains. The argument is both cogent and non-metaphysical in approach but characterized from a Socratic perspective. In the conclusions, I will attempt to reopen the case for a Euclidean origin of the Crito vignette in Phaedo 115c-e.
En este trabajo se discute el método de las hipótesis que Platón emplea en la segunda parte del Parménides, el cual, según se dice en el propio diálogo (135d-e), es una réplica del empleado por Zenón de Elea. La discusión es especialmente relevante porque la interpretación de la relación entre las hipótesis sobre lo Uno y el método zenoniano determina el modo en que se entiende el diálogo en su conjunto y las pretensiones del autor al redactarlo. Se pretende aquí demostrar la semejanza entre los métodos de ambos filósofos y su utilidad en el filosofar platónico.
A la luz de la propuesta arendtiana de espacio público, en este artículo se analiza uno de los conceptos que más interés está despertando en el contexto de la llamada filosofía política continental: lo común. Desde una revisión comparada con la obra de C. Laval y P. Dardot enfrento los siguientes interrogantes: ¿Qué perspectivas abre la obra arendtiana en la actual reflexión sobre lo común como principio político articulador? ¿Qué nuevas cuestiones suscita la idea de espacio público como comunidad política de Arendt al confrontarla con la propuesta de lo común?
Özet
İnsanlık tarihi boyunca var eden (ler) ve var olanlar arasındaki ilişki tartışılagelmiştir. Bu da doğal olarak Tanrı-âlem-insan arasındaki bağlantıda kozmolojiye kilit bir rol vermektedir. Yaratılışın mahiyetine dair oluşan merak, evrenin varlığa getirilmesi ile ilgili kozmik boyutta bir kısım teorilerin çıkmasına sebebiyet vermiştir. Bu noktada Antik dönemin en önemli filozoflarından biri kabul edilen Eflâtun, özellikle Timaios diyaloğunda kozmolojiye dair önemli tespitlerde bulunmaktadır. Timaios diyalogu, öz olarak Tanrı-evren-insan ilişkisini ve bunlar arasındaki varlık hiyerarşisini belirleyen üç adet metafizik makaleden oluşmaktadır. Devlet’in bir devamı niteliğindeki diyalog Atlantis mitiyle başlar, sonrasında göksel cisimleri anlatır. Bunlar akıl, nefis ve küre şeklinde sıralanan Tanrı’nın ilk olarak yarattığı ikincil Tanrılar yani feleklerdir. İkinci makale dört elementin nitelikleri ve evrenin oluşundaki yerini tartışır. Üçüncü makale ise insanın yaratılması ile Tanrı ve Tanrı’nın ilk yarattığı felekler arasındaki ontik ve kozmik ilişki anlatılır. Timaios diyaloğunda Eflâtun, kaotik düzensizlikten uzak, evrenin bir yaratıcısı, yaşatıcısı ve düzenleyicisi olduğunu savunur. Eflâtun’un Tanrısı Demiurgos, ilkel kaos durumunu düzenli ve planlanmış bir kozmosa dönüştüren mitsel bir karakterdir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Tanrı, Felek, Eflâtun, Timaios.
Abstract
Throughout the history of humanity, the relationship between creative power and creation
has been discussed. This, of course, gives cosmology a key role in the connection between God-world-human. The curiosity about the nature of creation has led to the emergence of some cosmological theories about the creation of the universe. At this point, Plato, considered the most important philosopher of the ancient period, makes important
determinations about cosmology especially in the Timaios dialogue. The Timaios dialogue consists of three metaphysical articles that essentially determine the relationship between God and the universe and the human being and the hierarchy of existence between them.
The dialogue, which is a continuation of the state dialogue, starts with the myth of Atlantis and then tells the celestial objects. These are the first creations of God, which are arranged in the form of mind, spirit and sphere. They are secondary gods/the paralysis. The second article discusses the properties of the four elements and their place in the formation of the universe. The third article describes the ontic and cosmic relationship between the creation of man and the celestial/paralysis that God first created. In the Timaios dialogue, Plato argues that he is a creator, a keeper and a regulator of the universe, far from chaotic disorder. Demiurgos, the God whom Plato believes, is a mythical character that transforms primitive chaos into a regular and planned cosmos.
Key Words: God, Celestial/Paralysis, Plato, Timaios.
The general aim of this contribution is to explore how Plato conceives the relationship between understanding and desire in human action and to establish, on this basis, the role that he attributes to the education of desire in his account of moral education. To this end, I will focus on the Symposium, where Plato pays unprecedented attention to the ethical value of desire and its distinctive place within the psychology of moral virtue. I shall argue that the role of understanding in Plato’s moral education is not to control or to sublimate desires, but rather to inform them. It is only by integrating desires according to the understanding of beauty that the soul or moral character of the agent becomes genuinely beautiful and thus accomplishes its intrinsic erōs.
This chapter offers a consideration of shame as an emotion that educates the desires by providing an interpretation of Plato’s Gorgias. In the dialogue, Socrates uses the emotion of shame in order to awaken the desire for the good at the expense of the desire for power as he questions his interlocutors about their conception of the good life. In doing so he provides the reader with arguments for the moral value of shame. Shame, in the dialogue, is understood both as conventional shame, in terms of the awareness of a discrepancy between one’s opinions and the norms of the polity, and as moral shame, in terms of the experience of an internal contradiction between one’s desires and the innate desire for the good. Socrates rehabilitates conventional shame in the face of the sophistic argument that it is a disingenuous emotion. He also relies on moral shame as part of the elenchus which is his mode of questioning that is meant to promote self-knowledge and help the interlocutor not to live at odds with himself. The chapter argues that the understanding of shame in Plato’s Gorgias provides an interesting corrective to liberal theories of shame that can be found in the philosophies of John Rawls and Martha Nussbaum.
Reseña de Gutiérrez, D. Sócrates y la práctica de la espiritualidad (2019).
In Plato’s Republic, Socrates contrasts dianoetic reasoning to dialectic, his preferred method of inquiry and demonstration. Though dianoetic is unable to yield knowledge, when practiced correctly it may serve as a “prelude” to dialectic. Socrates adopts the dianoetic method in his use of the city/soul analogy to investigate justice and its effects on the soul in Books 2–4 and 8–9. Significantly, conclusions from these arguments have had great influence on interpreters of Plato’s political and moral philosophy in the Republic. Here, I argue that the dianoetic status of Socrates’ investigation has implications for how we should read the dialogue: Socrates’ conclusions should be considered not as stopping points but as road signs in guiding us to the dialectical path. I support this thesis by (1) explaining dianoetic reasoning and contrasting its correct and incorrect use, (2) drawing parallels between the correct use of dianoetic reasoning and Socrates’ use of the city/soul analogy in the Republic, and (3) showing how this dianoetic investigation may serve as a prelude to dialectic for the reader.
Although philosophy of mind is a hot topic in contemporary philosophy, Ancient theories of the mind are not usually taken into consideration. In this Introduction we briefly focus on some of the reasons why the Ancient conceptions of the mind tend not to be considered seriously any more. We try to account for why it is still reasonable to study some theories that apparently have been overcome by contemporary science of the mind. Although one can grant that Ancient theories of the mind may not be a starting point for a contemporary philosopher of mind, we suggest that the approaches of the Ancient philosophers still provide insights to those who are interested in investigating the mind-body problem. Ancient discussions of the mind, we hold, should not be taken as archeological pieces that can be easily neglected. Even though we recognize that some ingredients of Ancient theories in fact are ‘archeological’ (especially those elements related to physiological aspects), we hold that their philosophical analysis, inasmuch as it can contribute to clarifying problems that have not been resolved yet, can be dealt with seriously. Finally, this Introduction also describes briefly the contents of this book.
If the ideal city described at length in Plato’s Republic is a perfect and philosophically attractive encapsulation of Plato’s political philosophy, why does Plato go on to write the Laws—which also describes an ideal city, albeit one very different from the Republic? The fundamental challenge of scholarship concerning the Laws is to supply a comprehensive account of the dialogue that explains all aspects of it while also distinguishing the Laws from the Republic in a way that does not devalue the Laws as a mere afterthought to the Republic. Past attempts at meeting this challenge, I argue, can be classified under the headings of the democratic, legal, and demiurgic approaches. Although each is prima facie plausible, each also faces its own set of problems. Furthermore, none are truly capable of explaining the Laws in its full specificity; the intricate array of customs, regulations, and practices making up the life of the city described form a complex totality not reducible to the concept of democracy, the rule of law, or demiurgy. ^ Instead, I propose a fundamentally new approach to interpreting the Laws, the systematic approach, which I claim is responsive to the deepest and most innovative tendencies within the dialogue. Specifically, the proper way of conceiving the shift from the Republic to the Laws, I argue, lies in Plato replacing the concept of “cadre” in the former with the concept of a self-governing “system” in the latter. As I deploy these notions, a cadre is a small group of specially qualified individuals, while a system is a large population whose members or constituents affect, and interact with, one another in orderly ways. Each of these concepts gives rise to a corresponding model of government. Under the cadre model, all power is assigned to a small minority of specially qualified individuals, and under the system model, power is periodically rotated between members of a group in accordance with both laws and the extra-legal patterns of social and cultural norms. I use this framework to mount a series of linked investigations into various aspects of the society described in the Laws.
Resumo: Tendo em vista o problema de Sócrates, quer dizer, a questão de saber em que medida as fontes que nos falam sobre o pai da filosofia são válidas em termos históricos, este trabalho tenta se posicionar em relação ao problema a partir de uma crítica à postura cética, a fim de inserir a comédia de Aristófanes como fonte imprescindível para um modo de resolver a questão.
Palavras-chave: Filosofia Antiga, Sócrates, Platão, Aristófanes.
This article challenges the long-standing belief that Plato is an early proponent of the division of labor on account of the political proposals advanced in the Republic. In contrast, I contend that the Republic offers a radical critique-rather than any endorsement-of job specialization and its accompanying psychological orientation toward acquisitiveness. The article begins with a methodological section that attempts to explain the origin of the common misreading of Plato's works and forwards an interpretive framework for situating arguments raised in the Platonic dialogues in their dramatic and dialogic contexts. Having established these hermeneutic principles, the article proceeds to analyze the shifting significance of job specialization within the imaginary cities that are considered in the Republic and concludes that the dialogue ultimately critiques job specialization insofar as it prevents the individual from harmonizing his own soul and hinders his actualization of his natural job to philosophize.
P. Erlangen 4 is papyrus fragment of an ancient Greek, “Socratic” dialogue discussing cures for the (desire) of the beautiful—and, by implication, the meaning of moral beauty itself. Previous discussions have made general comparisons with the works of Plato, Xenophon and Aeschines. Prior to its philosophical analysis, I will re-examine the fragment, suggesting new reconstructions of the text, accompanied by an English translation. Although the precise authorship still remains a mystery, I will attempt to show that its philosophical language, argument and dramatic background are closer to the remains of Antisthenes than other Socratic writers and in particular to one of his Alcibiades compositions. The possibility will then be considered that it originated in one of his works or with one of his immediate followers.
I argue against a formidable interpretation of Plato’s Divided Line image according to which dianoetic correctly applies the
same method as dialectic. The difference between the dianoetic and dialectic sections of the Line is not methodological, but
ontological. I maintain that while this interpretation correctly identifies the mathematical method with dialectic, (i.e., the method of philosophy), it incorrectly identifies the mathematical method with dianoetic. Rather, Plato takes dianoetic
to be a misapplication of the mathematical method by a subset of practicing mathematicians. Thus, Plato’s critique of dianoetic
is a not a critique of mathematics, as such, but of mathematicians.
In this article the author offers a reading of mimetic style (lexis) as it is presented in book 3 of Plato's Republic with the aim of disclosing the importance of style in the acquisition and employment of knowledge—whether scientific or ethical. In fact, the author argues that a careful reading of Socrates' words in the text occasions the idea that reflection on the way that we imitate our inherited content—the ethos, the comportment, in which we exhibit that content—makes visible a potential to appropriate received content and imitated knowledge in original and wakeful ways. In consequence, the author argues that it might be style, not content, that harbors the capacity for us to take a genuine, critical responsibility for our inherited concepts.
In this paper, I make a case for interpreting the Lysis as a dialogue of definition, designed to answer the question of "What is a friend?" The main innovation of my interpretation is the contention - and this is argued for in the paper - that Socrates hints towards a definition of being a friend that applies equally to mutual friendship and one-way attraction - the two kinds of friend relation very clearly identified by Socrates in the dialogue. The key to understanding how the two different kinds of friendship can have a common definition is to appreciate that the property of being a friend has a relational character.
Plato links pleasure with illusion, and this link explains his rejection of the view that all desires are rational desires for the good. The Protagoras and Gorgias show connections between pleasure and illusion; the Republic develops these into a psychological theory. One part of the soul is not only prone to illusions, but also incapable of the kind of reasoning that can dispel them. Pleasure appears good; therefore this part of the soul (the appetitive part) desires pleasures qua good but ignores reasoning about what is really good. Hence the new moral psychology of the Republic, not all desires are rational, and thus virtue depends on bringing one's non-rational desires under the control of reason.
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any references for this publication.