No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the author.
External Differentiated Integration: The Modalities of Turkey’s Opting into the European Union
With Brexit imminent, the debate on the need for differentiated integration (DI) by means of opting-out has gained new momentum. At the same time, non-member states decide to adopt European Union (EU) rules as exemplified by the European Neighbourhood Policy. In light of these opposing observations, we examine the EU's disposition to supply DI. We outline the strategic interactions of the EU member states or non-members in the context of two forms of DI: opting-out and inducing-in. In the case of opting-out, EU member states can refrain from adopting EU rules; inducing-in refers to providing non-member states with incentives to adopt EU rules. We show that the information asymmetries inherent to the strategic interactions result in a situation in which the EU is likely to supply opportunities to opt-out for member states to a much greater extent than necessary. Furthermore, the EU is likely to offer more compensation to non-member states in exchange for adopting EU rules than it would actually need to.
Differentiation is becoming an increasingly salient feature of European integration. The multi‐faceted European crisis and the subsequent Brexit vote (paving the way for a ground‐breaking case of differentiated disintegration) have led scholars and practitioners to think about the consequences of differentiated integration. This article draws on five well‐established models of differentiation experienced by countries both inside and outside the Union: the EEA model; the Danish model of (quasi‐)permanent differentiation; the Swedish model of de facto differentiation; the instrumental model; and the British model of differentiated disintegration. It addresses the different risks and opportunities that each of these models entail. The article further introduces the contributions to this Symposium, which aims at paving the way for future research on the consequences of differentiation in light of Brexit.
Brexit is a high‐stakes political process, but there is still no clear understanding of the political factors that underpin the various affiliation modes that the UK is currently debating. These are treated as quite static constructs, with emphasis on legal detail not the political and societal conditions that make them operate. What does the inclusion of the UK in the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement—which is the core component of the Norway model—do to that arrangement, itself a domestic Norwegian compromise? Will the arrangement continue to function, or will the UK's presence fundamentally alter or even abrogate the arrangement? This article spells out the specific political presuppositions that the Norway model rests on, and notes that the UK cannot emulate these. In addition, it argues that the more closely attached to the EEA agreement the UK is, the more precarious the arrangement will be.
At first glance, one might view the political differentiation in the European Union as a reflection of the autonomy of its member states, signifying flexibility and the dispersion of democratic control. However, under conditions of complex interdependence and economic integration, political differentiation can undermine the fundamental conditions for democratic self-rule. Political differentiation may cause dominance. It is argued in this article that we must move beyond Philip Pettit's conception of dominance as the capacity to interfere with others on an arbitrary basis, in order to properly identify the undemocratic consequences of differentiation. Political freedom is also a question of institutional provisions to co-determine laws. From this vantage point, differentiation raises the spectre of dominance in the form of decisional exclusion and the pre-emption of political autonomy. Drawing on a re-conceptualisation of dominance, the effects of differentiation on the possibility of self-rule are examined, and two systematic effects of political differentiation are identified. It is argued that segmentation is the systemic effect of differentiation in the vertical dimension of integration. Here, dominance occurs in the form of exclusion from decision-making bodies and the denial of choice opportunities. In the external horizontal dimension, the systemic effect of differentiation is hegemony. Some states are vulnerable to arbitrary interference and the pre-emption of public autonomy. The article discusses developments within the Eurozone as a case of segmentation and the statues of associated non-members as a case of hegemony. With regard to the latter, we are faced with the phenomenon of self-incurred dominance.
Below the surface of its central decision-making bodies, the European integration process has developed a dense web of transgovernmental ties that reach out to foreign regulators. Insofar as the latter gain formal participation rights in European Union (EU) regulatory bodies, this results into an external form of differentiated integration. Focusing on EU regulatory agencies, this contribution shows that external differentiation follows predominantly sector-specific functionalist dynamics that are only loosely coupled to Union overarching foreign policy prerogatives. In sum, these patterns highlight centrifugal dynamics of technocratic networking beyond the political confines of the EU's regional integration project.
The existing literature on party and government preferences on Europe mostly focuses on the integration process as a whole. In addition, studies of party-based Euroscepticism tend to offer competing typologies that present some terminological problems. With the increase in differentiation and the potential for disintegration, it is now important to deconstruct support for European integration per policy area. Accordingly, the main purpose of this contribution is to solve problems of existing conceptualizations of élite-based Euroscepticism by presenting a specific operationalization of support for European integration. Based on a qualitative analysis of party documents and élite interviews, such operationalization focuses on policies and policy areas where differentiation takes place, using a scale ranging from full opposition to full support for integration and taking into account internal divisions. This operationalization is then applied to three Nordic countries that have experienced different levels of (differentiated) integration since the early 1990s: Finland; Sweden; and Norway. The contribution concludes that whereas existing categorizations of Euroscepticism are useful to broadly understand élite preferences, operationalizing support for European integration per policy area where differentiation takes place can help understand the mainstreaming of Euroscepticism and offers a more accurate way of understanding new situations where parties supporting and opposing participation in European Union policies co-exist in coalition governments.
European integration has grown increasingly differentiated. EU member countries now integrate at different speeds and frequently resort to opt-out clauses, while occasionally voicing deep discontent with the direction of the integration process. Nevertheless, European integration essentially remains a single-track enterprise, whereby member countries move in the same direction under the same set of EU institutions. Offering a novel perspective on EU integration, we argue that the real puzzle is not why integration has become differentiated but rather why it has not become more differentiated. Using a simple formal model to illustrate and deepen our argument, we throw new light on the bewildering coexistence of unity, discontent, and differentiation in the European project. We show that a twin-track Europe would likely leave more EU members discontented.
The deepening of the EU's acquis communautaire, transformations of the European continent, and intensifying webs of interdependence have, since the 1990s, prompted a progressing blurring of the functional boundaries of the European Union. Whereas the integration project has produced externalities early on, the EU has engaged in an active promotion of its norms and rules beyond the member states, designing concentric circles of flexible ‘EUropean’ integration. This article offers a typology of these evolving external circles of EU rule-export focusing on the European Economic Area, Swiss-EU bilateralism, the stabilization and enlargement policy towards the candidate countries of the Western Balkans, the European Neighbourhood Policy and countries beyond the neighbourhood. Drawing on the theoretical notion of external governance, it will be shown these outer circles of ‘EUropean’ integration fall into three groups. While the first group, the ‘quasi-member states’ of Western Europe, combine far-reaching regulatory alignment with limited opportunities for organizational inclusion in EU structures, the Eastern and Southern neighbours face less legalized forms of rule transfer along with the establishment of parallel regional organizational structures. Links with countries beyond the neighbourhood finally stress the functionally differentiated rather than political and territorial dynamics of EU external governance.
The failure of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in bringing about democratic change in the European Union (EU)'s neighbourhood starts with the EU's limited effectiveness in shaping outcomes of international negotiations according to the ambitious objectives it pursues. This paper argues that this is not primarily a problem of a lack of actorness, however. The EU does have one message and speaks with a single voice but pursues conflicting goals. Rather than the lack of internal cohesiveness, it is the ENP's substantive inconsistency in seeking to promote effective and democratic governance that undermines the EU's external effectiveness. While the ENP conceives of the two objectives as complementary, the democratization of (semi-)authoritarian countries entails the risk of their destabilization at least in the short run. As a result, promoting effective and democratic governance become conflicting objectives. The lower the level of political liberalization and the higher the instability of a country, the more ineffective the EU is in asserting a democratic reform agenda in the ENP Action Plans, clearly favouring stability over change.
What is the effect of European Union (EU) enlargement on differentiated integration? And is it driven by the relative bargaining power of old and new member states or by the equal or even preferential treatment of weaker candidates? This article analyses differentiation in EU treaty and secondary law across the EU's six enlargement rounds. It shows that exemptive differentiation privileging the new member states has been more frequent than discriminatory differentiation. Whereas there is some evidence that poorer new members suffer more strongly from discrimination, most of the variation in differentiation across new member states is explained by differences between enlargement rounds. In addition, the EU grants poorer candidates more time to fully adopt the EU acquis. The analysis suggests that bargaining between old and new member states over differentiation is constrained by the equal and even preferential treatment of weaker candidates.
Differentiated integration has been the subject of political discussion and academic thought for a long time. It has also become an important feature of European integration since the 1990s. By contrast, it is astonishing how poor our research and knowledge about the phenomenon is. Whereas there is an abundance of conceptual work and some normative analysis, positive theories on the causes or effects of differentiated integration are rare. Empirical analysis has concentrated on a few important cases of treaty law (such as EMU and Schengen) while there is no systematic knowledge about differentiated integration in secondary law. The aim of this article is therefore twofold: to review the existing typological and theory-oriented research and to outline a research agenda striving for systematic empirical and explanatory knowledge.
The concept of external governance seeks to capture the expanding scope of EU rules beyond EU borders. This article elaborates the theoretical foundations of this concept, differentiates the various institutional modes through which external governance takes place and suggests a set of hypotheses addressing the conditions under which EU external governance is effective. Here, we contrast institutionalist explanations, which are the most germane to an external governance approach, with competing expectations derived from power-based theories and approaches emphasizing the role of domestic factors in the target countries.
Differentiated integration is a durable feature of the European Union and a major alternative for its future development and reform. This book provides a comprehensive conceptual, theoretical and empirical analysis of differentiation in European integration. It explains differentiation in EU treaties and legislation in general and offers specific accounts of differentiation in the recent enlargements of the EU, the Euro crisis, the Brexit negotiations and the integration of non-member states. Differentiated integration is a legal instrument that European governments use regularly to overcome integration deadlock in EU treaty negotiations and legislation. Instrumental differentiation adjusts integration to the heterogeneity of economic preferences and capacities, particularly in the context of enlargement. By contrast, constitutional differentiation accommodates concerns about national self-determination. Whereas instrumental differentiation mainly affects poorer (new) member states, constitutional differentiation offers wealthier and nationally oriented member states opt-outs from the integration of core state powers. The book shows that differentiated integration has facilitated the integration of new policies, new members and even non-members. It has been mainly ‘multi-speed’ and inclusive. Most differentiations end after a few years and do not discriminate against member states permanently. Yet differentiation is less suitable for reforming established policies, managing disintegration, and fostering solidarity, and the path-dependency of core state power integration may lead to permanent divides in the Union.
The European Union (EU)-Turkey customs union (CU) has led to a significant level of integration between a non-member country and the EU and therefore represents an example of external differentiated integration. Turkey’s relations with the EU, until recently, have been largely motivated by its membership objective. However, Turkey’s membership prospects have recently been diminishing, due both to mutual estrangement because of Turkey’s ever-deteriorating performance on EU-mandated reforms and the current difficulties challenging European integration. Under these circumstances, concerns regarding structural problems and conjunctural challenges have forced both parties to revise the CU. This study aims to explain how the parties should revise it to tackle the challenges posed by current economic relations. It argues that building broader and deeper economic integration with a certain degree of collective policy-making capacity will be crucial for furthering relations, which may thereby contribute to Turkey’s accession process in a longer term.
This article investigates the evolving relationship between the European Union (EU) and Turkey following the 2015 refugee crisis. It argues that post-crisis relations have become predominantly functional, measured by strategic EU-Turkey partnership based on interdependence as well as the EU’s relative retreat from political membership conditionality. This is particularly demonstrated by the March 2016 EU-Turkey ‘refugee deal’ whereby functional cooperation deepened amidst material and normative concessions that the EU granted Ankara. The article concludes that although functionalism is set to guide the relations beyond the question of Turkey’s EU accession, a future EU-Turkey external differentiated integration arrangement remains uncertain due to pending challenges.
Judicial reform has been part and parcel of democratization process among countries preparing for European Union accession. The literature on EU enlargement, political conditionality conceptualizes the EU’s role in promoting rule of law and judicial reforms in its external neighbourhood, especially in the candidate states as largely positive. However, in the Turkish case, the EU’s political conditionality in judicial reform presents a mixed picture. This paper provides a qualitative case study with the aim to assess the conditions under which backsliding occurs. The paper’s main proposition is that this backsliding in judicial reforms and rule of law is due to the interplay of the relative weakness of the EU’s political anchor and the relative strength of the domestic struggles facing political elites. Judicial reforms emerge as a visible aspect of backsliding as it has become a key priority area for the EU. This paper assesses to what extent the changing pace and direction of judicial reforms have been driven by a mix of factors; the EU’s political conditionality as well as the domestic costs of adaptation.
Turkey’s relations with the European Union are at a stalemate, with accession negotiations effectively frozen. Yet, Turkey opts into the EU acquis in multiple policy areas, where its voluntary compliance-prior to or an alternative to accession, could be conceptualized as external differentiated integration. We analyse Turkish compliance into the EU acquis in one policy area: Development policy. We assess Turkey’s opting into the EU rules on development policy from the perspective of three key factors, institutional structure, volume of aid and geographical focus. We argue that Turkey’s alignment with the EU development acquis is most visible in the institutional structure of Turkish foreign aid, and its increasing volume. Yet, there is also a highly visible divergence between Turkey and the EU in terms of geographical focus, acting as an element of competition in development policy. The transformation of Turkey’s development policy enhances Turkey’s opting into the EU acquis.
Turkey’s accession to the European Union (EU) is one of the most controversial cases in its enlargement policy. Both external and domestic factors complicate its accession, bringing forth questions on geographical, cultural borders of Europe as well as the limits of EU’s institutional capacity. While Turkey’s accession seems to be farther away, it is, nonetheless, functionally integrated to the EU in multiple ways, ranging from trade, common foreign and security policy, justice and home affairs to energy cooperation. It is, therefore, critical to assess whether alternative modes of integration are possible for Turkish–EU relations, going beyond formal membership. To do so, the paper draws upon the in-depth interviews conducted with Turkish and EU officials in 2013, 2015 and 2016. The paper evaluates the degree of differentiated integration between Turkey and the EU, and assesses the trajectory of this functional integration in related policy areas and proposes multiple new avenues to further this cooperation.
Few attempts have been made to develop a systematic normative analysis of where differentiated integration may need justification, and by what standards. This contribution argues that differentiated integration should be evaluated by a standard of how far it improves the management of externalities. That standard allows for disagreement at the European level on what values best justify choices between differential and uniform integration.
Yet it is none the less a standard that member states may need to follow if they are to meet their obligations to their own publics to secure values of democracy, freedom and justice. Whether, in addition to obligations to their own publics, member states owe one another any obligations that constrain choices of differentiated integration, can then be answered by investigating how far they accord one another rights in the course of managing externalities between themselves. The example of banking union illustrates the argument.
The neighbouring countries of the European Union (EU) have gradually developed ‘a stake’ in its internal market. This contribution asks to what extent and how the EU is expanding its economic community based on an analysis of the different neighbourhood models of deep economic integration, including current discussions about their future development. It shows that the EU's neighbourhood relations range from narrow, bilateral, static models to broad, multilateral, dynamic models and that a shift in this direction can be observed over time. The EU increasingly attempts to ensure market homogeneity beyond its borders by concluding agreements which include a dynamic adaptation to the evolving relevant acquis, its uniform interpretation as well as an independent surveillance and judicial enforcement.
The EU accession aspirations of the de jure European country Turkey remain a highly contested issue. Due to the national preferences and mainly socio-cultural resentment in some EU Member States and due to its limited integration capacity, the EU offered Ankara a discriminatory ‘full membership minus’. The current EU law and the various paradigms of ‘differentiated integration’ do not only provide the spatial, temporal and thematic scope for a conceptual framework on accession alternatives, they also limit it. In this context, the gradual integration/membership concept could be an interesting option for both parties. The depreciation of full membership in the case of Turkey has weakened the EU conditionality policy in general. On the other hand, ‘external’ flexibilization can help to overcome deadlock by allowing the Member States and accession candidates such as Turkey to co-operate at different levels of integration.
The European Union has played the most important role in stimulating political change in post-World War II Europe. Turkey had to become more democratic in order to attain candidacy for EU membership in the second half of the 1990s, and when it became a candidate, it had to adopt sweeping political reforms in order to fulfil the EU's accession criteria so that accession negotiations could begin. Thus, this article proposes that Turkey's EU candidacy since 1999 has stimulated Turkish political and legal reforms and intensified the Europeanization process in Turkey. The article analyzes the political reforms in Turkey in the light of EU membership and argues that Turkey's Europeanization is greatly motivated by the EU.
This contribution develops a theory of the impact of differentiation on integration and unity among EU member states and discusses empirical evidence from four policy areas. According to the theory, the centripetal effects of closer co-operation among willing EU members on initially unwilling non-participants are strongly influenced by the character of the respective policy area in terms of public goods theory. The eventual participation of initially reluctant member states, which leads to the re-establisment of long run unity despite short run differentiation, is most likely in policy areas involving excludable network effects, and most unlikely in areas dealing with common pool resource problems (the four remaining types of goods ranking in between these two extremes). The theoretical conclusions are supported by empirical evidence from four EU-related policies: the successful three show strong characteristics of excludable network goods (EMU, Schengen and the Dublin Convention), while the one which has proved extraordinarily difficult so far involves a common pool resource problem (tax harmonisation).
The relationship between Turkey and the EU entered a new phrase on October 3, 2005 with the opening of Turkey’s accession negotiations. This paper proposes that the specific juncture that European integration finds itself in and the perceptions of Turkey’s fit into Europe are the main variables around which member states’ preferences and the European public’s position on the Turkish accession are shaped. This is different from arguing that Turkey’s adoption of the EU acquis would determine its accession. Turkey’s adoption of the EU acquis/criteria is necessary but not sufficient on its own, as other factors will shape Turkey’s accession. These factors are the convergence of member states’ interests, the public approval and the EU’s internal dynamics. This paper concludes by arguing that the interplay of the utilitarian concerns, the ideational factors and the EU’s internal dynamics is the key to understand the conditions under which Turkey’s accession talks will proceed.
- Kennett Dyson
Multi-Speed Europe? Differentiated Integration in the External Relations of the European Union
- Juha Jokela
The EU-Turkey Deal in Front of the Court of Justice of the EU: An Unsolicited Amicus Brief
- Narin Idriz
- Dirk Leuffen