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Offenders with Autism Spectrum Disorder: A Case of Diminished Responsibility?
... " (CCC, 1985, s. 16). For many people with mental disorders (including persons with IDD), this may not be a suitable strategy because an impairment may play a role in their offense but it does not alter their ability to appreciate the nature of their actions (Hall & Jones, 2020). This leaves plenty of space and gaps for persons with mental disorders to slip through or be vulnerable to inadequate responses within the criminal justice system. ...
... Because of their disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses, however, they do not act with the same level of moral culpability . . . Finally, there is growing recognition that persons with autism spectrum disorder and FASD are at least two diagnostic groups that may have an intact IQ (i.e., the mental equivalency of an adult), yet the case for diminished responsibility ought to be considered (Hall & Jones, 2020;Chandler, 2015). ...
The role of nonjudicial officers occupies a hidden space in the U.S. judicial system. Statutorily sanctioned in many jurisdictions, such officers have a wide range of duties and responsibilities, including hearing certain pretrial motions in criminal cases and making decisions as to conditions of probation for sex offenders. These latter officers are frequently not lawyers, and there is significant evidence that many of the basic rudiments of the criminal trial process are often not honored. There has been virtually no consideration of this phenomenon in the scholarly literature, and absolutely no consideration from the perspective of therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ). An investigation into TJ’s basic inquiry into whether legal rules, procedures, and lawyer roles need to be reshaped suggests that TJ is not practiced in the systems under discussion here.
... " (CCC, 1985, s. 16). For many people with mental disorders (including persons with IDD), this may not be a suitable strategy because an impairment may play a role in their offense but it does not alter their ability to appreciate the nature of their actions (Hall & Jones, 2020). This leaves plenty of space and gaps for persons with mental disorders to slip through or be vulnerable to inadequate responses within the criminal justice system. ...
... Because of their disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses, however, they do not act with the same level of moral culpability . . . Finally, there is growing recognition that persons with autism spectrum disorder and FASD are at least two diagnostic groups that may have an intact IQ (i.e., the mental equivalency of an adult), yet the case for diminished responsibility ought to be considered (Hall & Jones, 2020;Chandler, 2015). ...
This article introduces the remaining articles in the issue.
... " (CCC, 1985, s. 16). For many people with mental disorders (including persons with IDD), this may not be a suitable strategy because an impairment may play a role in their offense but it does not alter their ability to appreciate the nature of their actions (Hall & Jones, 2020). This leaves plenty of space and gaps for persons with mental disorders to slip through or be vulnerable to inadequate responses within the criminal justice system. ...
... Because of their disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses, however, they do not act with the same level of moral culpability . . . Finally, there is growing recognition that persons with autism spectrum disorder and FASD are at least two diagnostic groups that may have an intact IQ (i.e., the mental equivalency of an adult), yet the case for diminished responsibility ought to be considered (Hall & Jones, 2020;Chandler, 2015). ...
This article examines issues regarding legal capacity and criminal responsibility relating to persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities (IDD). We examined the case of a 28-year-old male identified as having the mental age of an 8-year-old, accused of four counts of possessing child pornography in Ontario, Canada. If convicted, the offenses carried a minimum mandatory sentence of 1-year imprisonment. The defense attorney argued that since persons are not criminally responsible when they are chronologically less than 12 years old, the same ought to be extended to those with a mental age of less than 12. The Crown prosecutor asserted that the defense's connection of disability to a lack of capacity reverts our conceptualization of persons with IDD back to a time when they were infantilized. Using therapeutic jurisprudence as a framework, we examined whether problem-solving courts (e.g., mental health court) could be used to address the needs of a person with IDD and offer a different understanding and potential solution to nonjudicial decision makers that satisfies the principles of both criminal responsibility and public safety.
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