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The Russo-Ukrainian Conflict
(Al Jazeera, 2017)
Bartosz Gierczak
May 8th, 2020
Dr. Chasek
INTL405-02
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The tensions between Ukraine and Russia have been visible since Ukraine gained its
independence in 1991. Ever since then Ukraine was one of the strongest Russian satellite states,
which was influenced by Russian politicians, oligarchs, and businesses. The Ukrainian
government was corrupt and inefficiently represented the needs of its constituents. The Orange
Revolution (2004-2005) that took place in Kyiv opposed the influence of Russian politics on
constitutionally independent Ukraine and indicated the Ukrainian willingness to institutionalize
its democracy. Nonetheless, Ukrainian society is ethnically, religiously, and linguistically divided
with some regions, e.g., the Donetsk and Luhansk Provinces and the Crimean Peninsula, strongly
identifying themselves as belonging to Russia. Russian military intervention in Crimea in 2014
initiated the international conflict between the two states. The analysis of these divisions among
society and different interests of domestic actors in Ukraine and Russia will guide my
examination of possible solutions to the conflict. Moreover, the interests of the outside
international actors such as the European Union, the United States, and the United Nations
demonstrate the difficulty in resolving the conflict due to a firm neo-imperial foreign policy
conducted by Vladimyr Putin. It will be argued that the Russo-Ukrainian conflict requires a third-
party involvement and international action because of Ukraine’s strategically crucial geopolitical
position and the deterioration of human rights on the Ukrainian territory.
Background
Ukraine is a relatively young state. It gained its independence in 1991 after centuries of being
partitioned between Poland and Muscovy and then Soviet rule. It is divided based on ethnicity
with Ukrainian majority and Russian minority, Russian and Ukrainian language, and religion,
i.e., “Orthodox Ukraine and “Catholic” Ukraine or differences between the Ukrainian Orthodox
Church of the Moscow Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyivan
Patriarchate” (Olzacka, 2017, 25). Moreover, because of these long-lasting divisions, the
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Ukrainian sense of identity is still developing, intensifying the problem. The last official census
in Ukraine was conducted in 2001, thus the information regarding Ukraine’s demographics is
very outdated. However, it gives an approximation that is necessary to understand this conflict. In
2001, it was reported that there were 77.8 % Ukrainians and 17.3 % Russians. Moreover, 67.5%
of the Ukrainian population spoke primarily Ukrainian and 29.6 % spoke Russian (Central
Intelligence Agency, 2001).
Percentage of Ethnic Russians in Ukraine by region in 2001 Ukrainian census
(Eurasian Geopolitics, 2014).
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Usage of the Russian language in macroregions of Ukraine
(Eurasian Geopolitics, 2014a)
As pointed out by Lakomy (2016, 282), “Ukraine has been an area of increasing
differences and tensions, partly inherited from difficult historical processes, and partly developed
during the post-Cold War era. It has become a country permeated by conflicting interests and
long-lasting divisions.” Due to its dependence, first, on the Soviet Union and, now, the Russian
Federation, several issues have emerged and complicated the relations between Russia and
Ukraine. While almost the entire Ukraine was controlled by the Russian Empire, there was an
important entity that marked its influence on the existing conflict in the Luhansk and Donetsk
regions. That entity was Novorossiya (“New Russia”). Novorossiya is a historical region
extending from Odesa to Donetsk and up north to Dnepropetrovsk. Russian sense of identity has
been developing in these areas since then. Moreover, it led to an assertion among the Russians
that the historical region ought to be under their control. The ethnic and linguistic differences
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were intensified by Ukraine’s long dependence on the Soviet Union and Russia, therefore
thwarting the development of a strong sense of national identity of Ukrainians. Furthermore,
having a status of a post-Soviet satellite state, even after official recognition of independence,
further deepened the conflicting positions regarding whether Ukraine should lean more towards
the West (the European Union) or the East (the Russian Federation).
Nonetheless, many Ukrainians, especially after gaining independence in 1991, preferred
to establish their own sense of Ukrainian identity free from Polish influence in the West and
Russian in the East. On multiple occasions, proponents of independent Ukraine stood in
opposition to Russian activities that were meant to consolidate their influence on the Ukrainian
government. Such was the case with the Orange Revolution in 2004 that resulted after forged
presidential elections in Ukraine. For years, the Ukrainians felt that they were denied means of
satisfying their fundamental needs, i.e. food, healthcare, and safety due to the despotic and
oligarchical control of Russia. Declaration of a pro-Russian candidate, Victor Yanukovych, as a
winner of the elections, motivated those who voted for a pro-European candidate, Viktor
Yushchenko, to start a series of protests in Kyiv’s Independence Square and other major cities. It
was a clear sign that the Ukrainians were fed up with being dependent on Russia. The European
Union’s mediating mission led by then President of Poland Aleksander Kwaśniewski was
successful to the extent that it provided grounds for settling the dispute within Ukraine. However,
as noted by Kamil Zwolski (2018, 182-183), it was perceived by the Russians as a Polish attempt
to distance itself from Russia by ridding Ukraine from its Eastern neighbor’s influence. The
conflict was resolved by the Ukraine’s Supreme Court, which ruled that the elections were
falsified, thus revoking the Central Election Commission’s results. In the repeated elections,
Yushchenko won and became the president whose goal was to minimize Russian influence in
Ukraine and to cease the oligarchical pressures on the government and its policies.
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Despite the great hopes of the Ukrainians, Yushchenko failed in fulfilling his promised
goals and Ukraine remained under Russian control and oligarchical influence on the corruptible
government. Polish initiative and attempts to tie Ukraine closer to the Western Europe, or
perhaps, to cut off the Russo-Ukrainian ties, interested the European Union, which had some
reservations regarding the Ukrainian European aspirations (Zwolski, 2018, 183). In 2008,
Poland’s foreign minister, Radosław Sikorski, and Sweden’s foreign minister, Carl Bildt,
proposed the Eastern Partnership initiative that would tie Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan,
Armenia, Georgia, and Belarus closer to the European Union. Despite some reservations about
this initiative, the European Commission (EC) accepted the proposal. It was possible because of
the increasing threat exhibited during the Russian military intervention in Georgia in 2008, the
election of a more sympathetic to the Eastern issues, president of France Nicholas Sarkozy, and
due the realization of the Western European countries that they needed Eastern European support
in the formation of the Mediterranean Union (Zwolski, 2018, 185). The negotiations between the
European Union and Ukraine aimed at establishing an Association Agreement that would
promote the institutionalization of democracy in Ukraine. It seemed like everything was ready for
the deal to be signed and the negotiations were supposed to be successfully concluded in
November 2013. The Ukrainian society was shocked when progressing relations with Western
Europe suddenly got worse and the Ukrainian government decided to focus on the Russo-
Ukrainian cooperation. Hence huge discontent was observed among the majority of Ukrainians,
especially those who lived in the West of the country. The re-adoption of the constitution from
2004 limiting the president's power was one of the demands but the reluctance of revolutionaries
towards President Yanukovych raised another goal—his resignation. The series of
demonstrations against Yanukovych and his decision to withdraw from the Eastern Partnership in
lieu of the Russian proposal for better economic relationship was called Euromaidan. It
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resembled the 2004 Orange Revolution; however, only to a certain extent. While after the Orange
Revolution there were still some hopes for ameliorating the situation in Ukraine, Euromaidan
should be considered as the immediate cause of the current war between Russia and Ukraine.
Putin’s decision to annex the Crimea in March 2014 and then support the pro-Russian
demonstrations in the Donbass area led to the emergence of the current conflict.
Russian and Ukrainian stakes
As it was shown, the conflict emerged around several issues. It is a complex interrelation
of ethnic, religious, political, and economic interests that concerns the international observers of
the conflict. Moreover, the role of the European Union in the conflict was emphasized by
Lakomy (2016), Mearsheimer (2014), and Zwolski (2018). To understand the conflict as a whole
it will be necessary to investigate the conflict issues, which can be categorized into five groups:
(1) Russian maintenance of post-Soviet states, (2) Ukraine’s sovereignty, (3) status of the
Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk, (4) Ukraine’s sense of national identity, and (5) international
alliances (with Ukraine being at the center of conflicting ideologies).
Russian maintenance of post-Soviet states
The Russian Federation has a long imperial history. Its sense of superiority and the need
to prove it permeates much of its society. Andreas Umland (2019, 38) emphasized the importance
of Ukraine for Putin and noted that it led to “largely manufactured, yet nevertheless widespread
collective agreement within large parts of Russia’s population about the rightfulness, justice and
legitimacy of Moscow’s various territorial, political, cultural and economic claims towards
Ukraine.” He added that Russian imperial expansion is “to the support, cohesion and longevity of
Putinist regime” (2019, 38). Putin’s regret of the collapse of the USSR that he expressed in 2018
during the Truth and Justice media forum reflects the general mood of the Russians (TASS,
2018). According to the survey conducted in 2017 by the Yuri Levada Analytical Center, 58 % of
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the surveyed population stated that it regrets the collapse of the USSR. Interestingly, the number
of people who regret the collapse of the Soviet Union decreased only by 8 percentage points from
1992. Moreover, over the past two decades, it was indicated that what the Russians have felt most
nostalgic about were the destruction of the unified economic system and the fact that people no
longer feel like they were part of a world superpower (Levada Center, 2017). It seems that the
Russians were thus taken away that which the Western Europeans have been enjoying for years.
The Russian government’s efforts to maintain spheres of influence in the post-Soviet states,
therefore, seem to attempt to reimburse this nostalgia by having control over these regions. Thus,
Putin’s behavior should be understood as reflective of the needs of the Russian society. However,
the extent to which he shapes it, in order to serve his personal interests, will be analyzed later on.
Nonetheless, it should be noted that the Russian maintenance of the post-Soviet states, such as
Ukraine, is an effort to unite the nation. Moreover, it is a response to the eastward expansion of
Western European states.
Ukraine’s sovereignty
Russia has been continuously interrupting Ukraine’s sovereignty since 1991. The
aforementioned causes of the Orange Revolution and the underlying causes of Euromaidan are
just examples of the Russian interference in its satellite state. President Putin would prefer to
control a person who is in control of the Ukrainian government rather than having to meander
around the provisions of international law or economic dependencies. That was the case with
Yanukovych, during whose presidency the lease on Russia’s naval base in Sevastopol (the
Crimean Peninsula) was prolonged until 2042, despite earlier efforts of Yushchenko to take this
strategically and economically crucial port. The deal was done in exchange for discounts on the
price of Russian gas that is imported to Ukraine. Moreover, many of the oligarchs who control
the economy of Ukraine (it was reported that the richest hundred Ukrainians’ value of assets was
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equivalent to 23% of Ukraine’s GDP (Datskevych, 2019)) and have business relations with the
Russian government, banks, companies, etc. Their influence on the ongoing conflict will be
discussed later on, however. Why then is Ukraine’s sovereignty more threatened than before?
Putin makes sure that his foreign policy actions are in line, or seemingly in line, with
international law. Despite the lack of recognition of Crimea as Russian by the majority of the
members of the United Nations, Crimea is practically governed by Russia. The war in Donbass is
more complicated; however, the precedent set by the annexation of Crimea puts into question
future foreign policy steps of Putin in regard to Ukraine and its sovereignty.
Status of Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk
The series of events that directly led to the annexation of Crimea were initiated “on
February 27th and 28th [2014], [when] pro-Russians seized important buildings in the Crimean
capital, Simferopol, and within days they organized a referendum…” (Blidaru, 2018, 52). The
referendum yielded surprising turnout and results with 83% of the Crimean population of which
97% voted “for” integration into the Russian Federation (CBS News, 2014). The Russian
campaign was successful because in only three weeks, without the use of force, solely using
diplomatic means seized all Ukrainian military bases and destroyed Ukrainian morale. As it was
already mentioned, the status of Crimea is still legally unclear. Putin’s concerns about the
security of Russian minorities are rebuffed by most governments and intergovernmental
organizations. Russia’s claims of the legality of their military intervention and calling a
referendum should not be considered as a response to secure Russian minority nor as acting under
Yanukovych’s invitation. There is yet much to be known about the details of Yanukovych’s
invitation as well as about the presence of Russian military troops in Crimea.
The referendum on the status of Crimea triggered other pro-Russian demonstrations, in
the Eastern-Ukrainian Donetsk and Luhansk provinces that border with the Russian Federation.
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Both of these provinces have the biggest percentage of ethnic Russians with 39% Russians in
Luhansk and 38.2% in Donetsk (Eurasian Geopolitics, 2014). Moreover, these provinces have the
largest, 92.7%, percentage of people who use the Russian language (Eurasian Geopolitics,
2014a). Donetsk and Luhansk are important regions due to their better-developed industry sector
and quite rich natural resources. Shortly after the beginning of the demonstrations, pro-Russian
groups established self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. According to
Lakomy (2016), Ukrainian domestic divisions constituted the initial source of the conflict. The
issues that Ukraine has been divided on are: perceptions of European integration, perceptions of
relations with Russia, perceptions of common history, language, and culture, perceptions of the
post-Euromaidan government, and ideologies (Banderism vs. communism) (Lakomy, 2016, 291).
The leading oligarchs support the pro-Russian groups and along with Russian military support
given to those groups they are serious concerns for the government of Ukraine and its current
president Volodymyr Zelensky.
Ukraine’s sense of identity
The need to strengthen the sense of national identity was recognized among the
Ukrainians. At the same time, this identity is quite complicated as Ukraine is a multiethnic state
with relatively large minorities, especially the Russians in the East. Moreover, it has been a target
of many spheres of influence, e.g. Poland, the Soviet Union/ Russian Federation. It was suggested
by Lakomy (2016) and Zwolski (2018) that one can understand the formation of Ukrainian
identity as a response to the complexity of its position vis-à-vis Poland, Russia, the European
Union, and, perhaps most importantly, vis-à-vis itself. Poland would feel more comfortable if
Ukraine served as a buffer EU member state between Poland and Russia. Polish initiatives
seemed to treat Ukraine instrumentally as a means of increasing Poland’s security. At the same
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time, the Ukrainians face Russia’s willingness to maintain its post-imperial state. Thus, Ukraine
is divided between its two neighbors and the development of the sense of their national identity is
thwarted by this division. Moreover, ideological differences that permeate the Ukrainian society
hinder the emergence of a strong and unified national identity. Some people, especially those
who live in Western Ukraine, would like to see themselves belonging to the European Union,
while the predominantly Russian East feels a stronger attachment to Russia.
International alliances (the West vs. Russia)
The conflict itself can be considered as a clash of two opposing ideologies represented by
the West on one side (the EU, the UN, NATO), and Russia on the other side. The European
Union along with NATO, the UN, many nongovernmental organizations, as well as the United
States represent the liberal democratic stance that is perceived by Russia as a threat to its
existence and the status of the world’s power. The Kremlin seems to be isolated and facing the
network of complex alliances attempts to minimize the influence of the Western ideology on
former Soviet states, which to a large degree are still influenced by the Russian Federation.
Mearsheimer (2014, 79-80) pointed out that the “West’s final tool for peeling Kyiv away from
Moscow has been its efforts to spread Western values and promote democracy in Ukraine and
other post-Soviet states, a plan that often entails funding pro-Western individuals and
organizations.” On the other hand, there is a Western concern for the respect of human rights in
Ukraine, as well as Russia, and the spread of communist and, paradoxically, nationalist ideology
in the East of the European Union. Moreover, due to the questionable legality of actions taken by
Russia, the conflict seems to be even more complicated as it is ideologically motivated but
having disputable positions in respect to the international law not only for Ukraine and Russia but
also the post-Soviet states, the European Union, as well as NATO.
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Relationships and Perceptions
There are several relationships and perceptions that have to be considered as they
influence the nature and, at the same time, the complexity of the conflict. There are at least two
divided positions within Ukraine, i.e., pro-European and pro-Russian. At the same time, the EU is
not necessarily interested in the accession of Ukraine to the Union, but it recognizes the strategic
importance of Ukraine. Russia, after succeeding in Crimea, knows that the international
community currently lacks means of stopping it.
Perceptions
Within Ukraine itself, as it was already argued, there are at least two perceptions
regarding the conflict. Lakomy deemed the call for the transformation of the Ukrainian
government in 2014 ambiguous. The pro-West/EU areas of Ukraine advocated “European
integration, liberal reforms, and, paradoxically, Bandera-nationalism” (Lakomy, 2016, 291). This
was all to the discontent of the pro-Russian areas of Ukraine. The pro-Western Ukrainians
constitute a majority of the Ukrainian population and thus their advocacy for respecting
Ukraine’s sovereignty has been supported by many Western European powers. Because of the
growing sense of national identity, there have been efforts to minimize Russian influence on
Ukraine, which, until the association agreement with the EU, relied significantly on Russian
imports, thus subjugating its economy to Russian decisions. Russia is supported by a minority of
pro-Russian Ukrainians (who identify themselves as Russians) and its annexation of Crimea was
recognized only by 19 members of the UN (e.g., Afghanistan, China, Cuba, North Korea), while
others still perceive the event as illegal. Russia and her supporters argue that they are trying to
protect people who identify themselves as Russians from the oppression which they could face
due to being a minority. Moreover, Russia considers Ukraine’s efforts to join the European Union
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as a threat to the Russian economy and also territorial integrity due to the spread of the “Western
ideology” closer to its borders. According to John Mearsheimer (2014, 77), the war in Ukraine
understood from a realist perspective, is an effect of “the EU’s expansion eastward and the
West’s backing of the pro-democracy movement in Ukraine.” In other words, one can notice a
certain continuity of events in Ukraine, which seems to be not necessarily a puppet of the Russian
Federation but perhaps a means of promoting the Western democratic ideology and, thus, an
object of calculations of the EU. The pro-Western Ukrainians hope that detaching from Russian
influence will allow institutionalizing democracy in that post-Soviet state. Ukraine is aware of
their dangerous geopolitical position vis-à-vis Russia which could set up a two-front military
offensive through the Crimean Peninsula and the Eastern border, where the illegal passages of the
Russian military have been taking place. The Ukrainians are also aware of their inability to face
Russia militarily since the latter has much more resources. The EU and the U.S. perceive Russian
offensive as evidence of Putin’s neo-imperial foreign policy, which threatens the Baltic States.
Current behavior
Currently, the conflict can be assessed as being in the stalemate. The number of conflict-
related casualties has significantly dropped. While in 2014 there were 2,082 conflict-related
civilian deaths, in 2019 there were only 26 of them (OHCHR HRMMU, 2019). There were
several ceasefire agreements that led to that decrease. The first two deals, Minsk I and Minsk II,
were agreed on in 2014 and 2015. Furthermore, there was a series of ceasefire agreements in
years 2018-2019: “harvest” ceasefire (1 July 2018), “school year” ceasefire (1 September 2018),
“new year” ceasefire (29 December 2018), “spring” ceasefire (8 March 2019), and “unlimited”
ceasefire” (21 July 2019). While all of the ceasefire agreements were not respected, the number
of casualties dropped immediately directly after the deal was done.
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Timeline of Civilian Casualties from 1 January 2018 to 15 November 2019
(OHCHR, 2019)
One of the biggest obstacles to effective implementation of the ceasefire agreement is the
hybridity of the conflict. In other words, the national armies do not really participate in the
conflict. It is rather fueled by militant groups supported and directed by the Kremlin.
Nonetheless, Russia denies any interference in the conflict. Although the irregular warfare tactics
dominate the conflict in Ukraine, there have also been observed regular warfare tactics, which
involved both of the armies, heavy military equipment, as well as the air force but, as noted by
Wójtowicz (2016, 111), it took place during the initial stages of the ongoing conflict.
Nonetheless, the separatist groups continue to attack Ukrainian soldiers. According to the
Ukrainian Independent Information Agency (UNIAN), the ceasefire agreement has been
continuously violated by Russia’s hybrid military, with the most recent thirteen attacks on the
Ukrainian army on March 2, 2020, wounding five Ukrainian soldiers (UNIAN, 2020). In
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December 2019, President Zelensky and President Putin participated in the Paris Peace Talks
during which they agreed to a prisoners’ exchange (Higgins, 2019). Moreover, the presidents of
the two conflicting states agreed on disengaging military forces in three unspecified regions of
Ukraine by the end of March 2020, and they agreed to have a meeting regarding the progress in
implementation of ceasefire (BBC News, 2019). Putin pointed out that because of Ukraine’s
inability to fulfill the provisions of the Minsk II deal requiring Ukraine to provide a special status,
through a constitutional change, to the Russian-speaking provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk,
Russia is still concerned about its minorities residing on the Ukrainian territory. Petro Burkovskyi
noted that “[t]his stance means that at some point in the not-too-distant future, Zelensky may find
himself forced to either freeze negotiations as his predecessor Petro Poroshenko did, or risk
provoking domestic unrest by accepting Russian peace terms that a majority of his fellow
Ukrainians regard as unacceptable” (Burkovskyi, 2019). While the conflict is ongoing and the
world observes sporadic separatist attacks on the Ukrainian soldiers, neither of the governments
seems to be ready to give up their claims.
Leaders & interests
The influence of particular leaders and their interests is crucial for the understanding of
the conflict, which is partially fueled by the complex relationship of the involved individuals as
well as their personal aims in the conflict.
In Russia, Putin is an undeniable leader of internal and external politics. For years, he
served in the Soviet army and then affiliated himself with politics. Putin is serving his fourth term
as the president; he once acted as president and was the prime minister twice. In total, he has
spent over twenty years governing Russia. Putin is seen as a continuator of the USSR with
expansionist ambitions. Putin wants Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk to be recognized as Russian
territories and, perhaps, that he himself is recognized as the savior of Russian minority oppressed
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on the Ukrainian territory. Putin wants to maintain the Russian position of great power in the
international arena, as well as his own position as the great leader of the Russian population. This
is evidenced by the constitutional amendments in 2008 that introduced a six-year presidential
term and by recent intended constitutional amendments that would allow Putin to run for a
president again, for the fourth time. Moreover, the presidential elections that took place in 2018
were initially planned to take place on March 11 but this date was changed to March 18, thus,
commemorating the annexation of Crimea. Valerie Sperling (2015, 282) noted that “At the center
of Putin’s macho aura is his image as a tough guy who will not allow Western countries to
weaken Russia by dictating what its domestic and foreign policies should be.” Such
representation of Putin parallels with the divided perceptions regarding the conflict and whether it
should be understood as the West’s fault, as suggested by Mearsheimer (2014), or Russian
aggressiveness and lack of respect for international law. In 2019, in an interview, Putin said that
“there are no common democratic standards” (Barber & Foy, 2019). This emphasizes the
difficulty in imposing predominantly Western European democratic ideology on a region that is
so divided in its perceptions of such ideology. According to Sperling, “Putin has fused a patriotic
nationalism with sexual politics to frame the Ukraine crisis as part of a cultural battle with an
amoral and untrustworthy West” (2015, 282). In order to achieve his goals, Putin openly blamed
NATO and the European Union for the crisis as they try to contain Russia. Moreover, the use of
propaganda shaped the Russian’s perception of their leader: “The Kremlin’s message is that Putin
will protect Russia’s national interests and the interests of Russians abroad, as in Crimea- and
will do so unapologetically” (Sperling, 2015, 283). That Putin has successfully maintained the
nostalgia for the Soviet tradition among Russian society can be observed based on the
aforementioned statistics. In 2017, 58% of the interviewed Russian population stated they regret
the collapse of the USSR, dropping from 66% in 1992 (Levada Center, 2017). Putin’s firm
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position in regard to the conflict, his diplomatic expertise gained during the last two decades of
governing the country, and his goals of uniting the Russian population hinder the resolution of
the conflict. Such a resolution might necessitate a fundamental change in the attitude of the
parties involved, yet Putin seems unshakeable, especially granted recent proposed constitutional
amendments.
While it is much easier to point to a single leader in Russia due to Putin’s long-lasting
high political position, the situation is not as clear in Ukraine. The Ukrainians have been
dissatisfied with their presidents’ inability to fulfill the election promises. After the Orange
Revolution Viktor Yushchenko promised de-Sovietization of the government; however, due to
divisions within his coalition, the reforms were thwarted and never implemented to the
dissatisfaction of the majority of Ukrainians (Barrett, 2018, 89). The next to come was Victor
Yanukovych whom Putin saw “as a pliable agent in Kyiv and helped the Party of Regions to
persuade Ukrainians that Yushchenko and his policies were a tool of Western Meddling” thus
leading to the election of the biggest enemy of the Western Ukrainians in 2004 (Barrett, 2018,
89). The Ukrainians approved Yanukovych’s leadership and, according to the GALLUP poll
(Ray, 2015), the approval rate was approximately 46%. Nonetheless, this approval rate quickly
dropped to 29% in 2011 only to remain at the same level until 2013.
Job Approval of Ukrainian Country Leaders (Ray, 2015)
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As it was already mentioned, Yanukovych was forced to flee Ukraine in 2014 before
concluding his presidential term. Newly elected president, Petro Poroshenko, had a similar plan
in mind regarding how Ukraine should be governed. Both Yanukovych and Poroshenko assumed
a somewhat ambivalent position towards the EU and Russia. They understood the necessity to
democratize their country but at the same time did not want to cut off Russia because of their
personal interests due to business connections with Russia and Russian oligarchs. The Ukrainian
population quickly realized that Poroshenko cannot cut off the Russian ties, which was shown in
the GALLUP poll results indicating a decrease of the approval for Poroshenko’s job by 30
percent points (Ray, 2015). Until 2019, the interests of Ukraine’s presidents were divided
between the reforms that would push Ukraine toward institutionalizing their democracy (e.g.
creation of bicameral parliament, local ballot lists for local elections, reassuring secularization of
the state) and maintaining good relationship with Russia, on which they depended economically.
Before the Euromaidan, President Yushchenko and President Yanukovych were both in favor of
uniting Ukraine, Ukraine’s accession to the EU and recognition of Ukraine as a regular member
of NATO. At the same time, neither of them wanted to cease the bilateral relationship between
Ukraine and Russia, due to the personal, mostly financial, interests. Coming to power in the midst
of the Euromaidan crisis, President Poroshenko recognized the need to resolve the conflict in the
Donbas region. He stated that “now the main mission is the unification of the state, the
establishment of peace and the eradication of lawlessness” (Luhn & Walker, 2014). That he did
not succeed in implementing almost any of the electoral promises can be concluded from the job
approval rating—only 17% of the participants indicated approval for Poroshenko’s job in 2015.
To the surprise of many international observers, Volodymyr Zelensky was elected the
president in 2019. The biggest obstacle for President Zelensky is his lack of political and
diplomatic experience. Before running for president, he was a comedian and a television celebrity
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in Ukraine. Nonetheless, his clear goals of stopping the oligarchical influence on the government
and national institutions, Ukraine’s accession to NATO and the EU, and ending the conflict in the
East of Ukraine reflected the hopes and desires of the majority of the Ukrainians. So far,
President Zelensky had met with Putin once in Paris, where they agreed to exchange of prisoners
and (failed) reinstitution of ceasefire. It is still a matter of time to assess Zelensky’s contribution
to the resolution of the conflict and institutionalization of democracy in Ukraine. Previous
presidents of Ukraine also announced that they would try to institutionalize democracy in
Ukraine; however, they were inefficient, corruptible, and did not have leverage in negotiations
with its neighbors.
Context
An analysis of the context of the conflict on three different levels, i.e., state, regional, and
global, is necessary for the appropriate assessment of possible options for the resolution of the
conflict.
State level context
On the state level, the prevalent issues are those of the division of the Ukrainian citizens, in
terms of both political ideology and national identity. Moreover, there are the obstacles posed by
economic inequalities and inefficient governmental institutions in Russia and Ukraine.
Nonetheless, one can notice a growing civil society and the emergence of strong
nongovernmental organizations in Ukraine.
Domestically, the Western region of Ukraine that sees itself as a prospective member of the
European Union is in constant opposition to the Eastern region, which considers itself to be a part
of Russia due to its history, language, and religion. On the other hand, the majority inhabiting the
region directly affected by the war are more strongly tied to Russian tradition, culture, and
language. Because of the divisions among the society, the sense of Ukrainian national identity is
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still underdeveloped. Olzacka (2017, 32) noted that the ideological differences between the
involved groups can be described as neo-Soviet separatists (an extension of the goal of the
“Russian World (Russkiy Mir), a Russian government-funded organization aimed at promoting
the Russian culture and language, and values that challenge the Western cultural tradition”) and
anti-Soviet nationalists. Thus, is also formed the identity of the Ukrainians who do not seem to
consider each other as fellow Ukrainians. The issue seems even more pressing due to the number
of affected people in the Donbas region. According to the latest update by Ukrainian Ministry of
Social Policy (2020), there are 510,764 registered internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the
Dontesk province, while in the Luhansk province there are 280,437 registered IDPs. This issue is
reflected in the economy of both regions. According to the OECD (2018, 63), Luhansk and
Donetsk provinces had a negative contribution to Ukraine’s national growth with -18.1% and
-45.5%, respectively.
Both Ukraine and Russia lack institutions that could serve as legitimate channels for
managing the conflict. Corruption seems to be the biggest obstacle to overcome. According to the
Corruption Perception Index prepared by Transparency International, Ukraine has only a score of
thirty on a 0-100 scale, where zero indicates highly corrupt and a hundred- very clean
(Transparency International, 2019). Furthermore, the unequal distribution of wealth does not
minimize the effects of the corruptible government. In both, Ukraine and Russia, wealth is
unequally distributed with the richest 10% controlling the economy. Interestingly, after the
Euromaidan, the percentage of income share held by the highest 10% in Ukraine increased, while
in Russia it decreased. While in Ukraine there was a steady increase of that factor since 2014, in
Russia such increase began in 2016. Not only does it escalate the ideological differences within
Ukraine, but it also results in the penchant for Russian support of the oligarchs, especially those
who control the region and depend on its productivity.
21
Ukraine- Income share held by the highest 10% (World Bank, n.d.)
Russia- Income share held by the highest 10%. (World Bank, n.d.)
22
Despite all of these complications to the conflict, there have been observed some positive
trends in the awakening and developing some sense of civil society in Ukraine. Barrett (2018, 98)
notes that the oligarchical influence is one of the biggest obstacles to introducing democratic
regime in Ukraine; however, “[t]he Euromaidan revolution breathed new life into democratic
reforms stalled in Ukraine, buttressed by a robust civil society and Western support.” This shift
towards more democratic reforms and higher civil activity was noted also by Olena Tregub
(2019) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2019). All of
them agree that despite some amelioration caused either by introducing anti-corruption reforms
or decreased tensions between political parties and their supporters, the civil society still faces
several obstacles to fully develop. Not only is the civil engagement disproportionally spread
across different Ukrainian regions, but it is also thwarted by some repressive policies and
corruption: “OHCHR documented 16 new attacks in the civic space during the reporting period,
against 18 individuals, namely journalists, human rights defenders, activists and members of the
LGBTI community” (OHCHR 2019, 18). Due to the active engagement of the civil society
organizations in the conflict, it will be necessary to consider the obstacles that they face and their
causes, e.g. corruption, oligarchical influence, ideological divisions, in order to suggest a
resolution to the conflict.
Regional level context
On the regional level, Russia, similarly to the European Union, treats Ukraine as a buffer state
that separates it from the Western European countries and, more importantly, NATO, whose
expansion is perceived as a threat by the Russians. Moreover, Russia’s geographic position, after
the annexation of Crimea is more beneficial as it practically governs the region and has
ownership over the naval base, which is so crucial for Russian military. The Western Ukrainians
are supported by its close EU members, who support them financially and technologically. What
23
unites Russia and Ukraine on the regional level is the burden imposed by the economic sanctions
while the conflict is lasting.
As it was already mentioned, Western Ukraine is ideologically more tied to the EU and the
democratic values, while Crimea and Eastern Ukraine are strongly connected with the post-Soviet
tradition. Ukraine is perceived by the ‘Western world’ as a buffer state between the ideologically
opposite Russia, which enjoys having a state separating it from the EU as well. These divisions
are important for the region, especially that, as reported by Maria Zolkina, in June 2019 the
majority of Ukrainians thought it was unacceptable to grant full amnesty for those fighting
against the Ukrainian army, hold local elections in occupied areas on militants’ conditions, or to
form local police, courts, and prosecutors’ offices in occupied territories exclusively by local
authorities (Zolkina, 2019). While the Donbas region found these options also unacceptable, over
30% thought that local elections on militants’ conditions as acceptable (Zolkina, 2019).
The proximity of Ukraine to the EU’s member states allows the financial and technical
support to be provided for the Ukrainians. This is certainly perceived as a threat by the Russian
government, which deems any approximation to Russia’s western neighbor as possible
endangerment. Before the conflict began, Russia used to supply gas to Ukraine; however, as
noted by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) “beginning in 2015, Ukraine has
significantly reduced its direct import of Russian natural gas and instead has received natural gas
shipments from Europe” (2017). Therefore, such clear support given to Ukraine by the EU gives
legitimate reasons for Putin to feel threatened by the gradual approximation of Ukraine to the EU.
Nonetheless, the European attempt to support Ukraine seems inefficient as “[m]uch of the gas
imported from Europe, however, originates in Russia and is brought into Ukraine via reverse
flows from central and eastern European countries” (United States Energy Information
Administration, 2017). Ukraine has a huge importance for the region as Ukraine’s pipeline
24
system is the main proxy of the gas imports in central Europe. Thus, when “Russia and Ukraine
have struck a deal that guarantees the flow of gas to Europe for a further five years, a day before
the expiry of the previous 10-year contract between their national governments” it relieved the
European leaders (Astrasheuskaya, Chazan, and Olearchyk, 2019). However, the deal does not
guarantee that Russia will not shut off the gas, again, forcing the Western and Central European
states to turn to an inefficient method of reversing the gas flow. This situation seems to deepen
the status of Ukraine as a buffer state that bears the responsibility for the international relations of
the neighboring countries.
The economic sanctions imposed on Russia by a variety of actors, such as the U.S. or the
European Union, initially affected the Russian economy. Its GDP fell from 2060 billion US
dollars (USD) in 2014 to 1282.7 USD in 2016. However, it increased since then to reported 1750
billion USD in 2019 (Trading Economics, 2020). This suggests that sanctions imposed on Russia
as a response to the annexation of Crimea and supporting the militant pro-Russian groups in the
Donbas region are not effective. It has to be noted that since 2014, Russia nonetheless spends
approximately 4 billion USD for the cost of maintaining Crimea and the Donbas region (UNIAN,
2019). Putin recognizes that it is crucial to maintain these regions because of the economic
importance of the Eastern Ukraine and military significance of the Crimea for Russia. While the
sanctions imposed on Russia had a minimal effect, they did limit the economic freedom of Russia
and demonstrated that the US and the EU are willing to use certain instruments to mitigate the
conflict. These regional implications complicate the resolution of the conflict as it seems that
none of the parties is ready to come to a consensus.
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Russia’s GDP (Trading Economics, 2020)
Global level context
On the global level, one can consider the conflict as the continuation of the ideological
battle between Russia, as an extension of the USSR, and the democratic, capitalist Western
ideology. Moreover, Russia’s permanent membership in the UN Security Council and the veto
power along with the status of a nuclear power puts Russia in an advantageous position compared
to Ukraine, which is not militarily supported and does not enjoy the international status anywhere
similar to that of Russia.
The ideological divisions within Ukraine reflect the ideological differences between
Russia and Western countries, especially the members of the EU and the U.S. As it was already
noted, Putin can be perceived as a continuator of the Soviet tradition, and thus Russian policies
can be understood to a certain extent as neo-Soviet. The annexation of Crimea, a geopolitically
critical peninsula, marked Russian expansion to the East of Ukraine. Former United States
ambassador to Ukraine, William B. Taylor, stated that Putin seems to conduct foreign policy
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“where powerful nations dominated and invaded less powerful nations, where nations established
spheres of influence that oppressed neighbors, leading to war and suffering” (Taylor, 2020). The
extension of the Soviet policies and the autocratic rule clash with the capitalist and democratic
Western idea of a peaceful world. Thus, the conflict has global implications, especially that “[i]n
the contest between democracies and autocracies, the contest between freedom and unfreedom,
Ukraine is the front line” (Taylor, 2020). While Russian expansion is perceived as a threat to the
balance of power established after World War II, the approximation of the European Union and
the United States to Russia by extending their spheres of influence in Ukraine can be perceived as
a threat to Russian security. As pointed out by Mearsheimer (2014, 80), “[w]hen Russian leaders
look at Western social engineering in Ukraine, they worry that their country might be next.”
Thus, Ukraine is undeniably the front line of several conflicting issues, e.g. territory, ideological
values, spheres of influence. Ukraine’s central position in the global perspective of the conflict
requires an analysis of the different means of approaching Ukraine by the West and Russia. Ryan
Barrett (2018) identified means of exerting soft and hard power by both the West and Russia.
According to him, Russia’s hard power means were: the military intervention, interfering in
elections, and manipulating lucrative energy contracts (Barrett 2018, 82). The most evident
element of exerting soft power on Ukraine is Russian propaganda that emphasizes the importance
of the historical ties between the two states. On the other hand, “[t]he West has relied on financial
aid to bolster civil society groups” (Barrett 2018, 82). This support can be considered as an
exertion of both hard and soft power. While the financial aid can be perceived as an element of
the hard power politics, the conditions on which it is granted characterizes the West’s soft power.
The EU and the US require that there is a more welcoming environment for a variety of pro-
democratic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Ukraine so that the civil society groups
can function more efficiently and safely. Thus, as noted by Barrett (2018, 98), it also makes the
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NGOs to be immersed by the West’s soft power as “NGOs are pushing the Rada [Ukrainian
parliament] to endorse liberal values that lead to more transparency, less corruption, and more
legal protections for citizens.” Nonetheless, there is no military support in Ukraine; there are no
troops sent to the front line of the conflict. Some might argue that the international community
should take more decisive steps to resolve the conflict. Proponents of more active participation in
the conflict by the EU, NATO, and the US have to bear in mind that Russia is a nuclear power. A
military offensive against Russia could potentially trigger a nuclear response, thus both sides are
trying to avoid this mutually destructive scenario. Russia also has a permanent membership in the
United Nations Security Council that grants a veto power. Thus, it seems almost impossible to
implement any Security Council resolution regarding the conflict without Russia’s approval. The
Russo-Ukrainian war reflects the global tensions that have been shaping international relations
after World War II. The ideological binary between democratic West and neo-Soviet Russia
permeates the current conflict in the East of Ukraine and poses a serious obstacle to the resolution
of the conflict.
Options
The Russo-Ukrainian war, as it has been shown throughout this analysis, is complex. A
variety of interrelated causes, a long history that ties together but also divides the society, strong
spheres of influence from countries with opposing ideologies, a broad network of influential
groups and individuals with a variety of interests contribute to the complexity of the conflict.
Moreover, the two opposing perceptions, the Western and Russian, of the conflict both have
legitimate grounds for their claims and further complicate the resolution of the war. I will
consider three options for resolving the conflict concluding that transitioning to a pan-European
security agreement involving Russia can be the most effective, especially long-term, solution.
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Option 1: Military intervention
Let’s consider the effectiveness of potential military intervention in Ukraine. NATO
could send its troops to the Donbas region to fight the militia groups there. This would satisfy
those who are expecting more active participation of the EU and the US in the conflict. There is a
steady confusion in regard to the status of the separatist groupings, which allegedly are supported
by the Russian government and even Russian troops. Such a move would, nonetheless, put into
question the legitimacy of the intervention since, as Russia claims, there are Ukrainians on the
separatists’ side that fight for freedom from Ukraine’s rule. Not only would it set a precedent for
such questionable interventions in the future in similar circumstances, but also it would
potentially trigger a nuclear response from Russia. Moreover, in order to try to eradicate Putin’s
neo-Soviet ideology from Eastern Europe, it would be necessary to hold him responsible for
political crimes. However, there is no evidence that would incriminate him. This option is rather
improbable as it would infringe Russian sovereignty- value so promoted by the West. The rebels
fighting at the Russo-Ukrainian border are not officially confirmed to be Russian army members,
thus a military intervention would be directed against civilians—action prohibited by the
international law. Moreover, Russia’s claim that it protects the rights of its minority on Ukrainian
territory further suggests that military intervention should not be used as it would go against
Russia’s obligation to protect its nation. Russia would treat any military offensive on its territory
as an existential threat. Rational politicians, aware of Russian nuclear capabilities, would never
choose this option as it could lead to a mutually destructive nuclear combat.
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Option 2: Donetsk and Luhansk Referendum, Russian Crimea & Ukraine’s accession to the EU
and NATO.
While the annexation of Crimea is still not recognized as legal by the majority of the
United Nations member states, I believe that changing this position could serve as negotiating
leverage between the West and Russia. It would send a signal to Putin indicating that the West is
ready to negotiate. This could be done conditionally, depending on whether Russia declares that
it will not interfere with the EU and NATO accession referendum in Ukraine. Moreover, Russia
would have to cease the support that it has been providing to the separatist groups in the Donetsk
and Luhansk provinces, thus allowing for a referendum on the status of Donetsk and Luhansk.
This option seems to satisfy the democratic requirements of the West; however, it also gives a
precedent for an illegal annexation of foreign territory. Russian expansionist ambitions are
considered a serious threat to the balance of power and stability and peace of Europe.
Recognizing Crimea as Russian would reassure Putin about his diplomatic leverage and ability to
pursue his neo-Soviet goals. Moreover, what makes this option less likely is the lack of certainty
about the results from both referenda. The referendum on the status of Donetsk and Luhansk
would have to proceed first to determine whether these territories should remain part of Ukraine
or become Russian. If the regions remained part of Ukraine, they would participate in the second
referendum on the EU and NATO accession. If Donetsk and Luhansk became legally Russian, it
would suggest that Ukraine has participated in the conflict without regard for Russian minorities
on their territory. It would also undermine the legitimacy of Ukraine’s supporters, which intended
to protect human rights and Ukraine’s sovereignty but instead fueled the conflict. Moreover, it
would strengthen the position of Russia vis-à-vis other great powers. Furthermore, even if the
Ukrainians chose to be part of the EU, it would take time to adjust the current social, political,
and economic conditions to the requirements set by the EU Ukraine has been considered as a
30
potential member by both the EU and NATO; however, it has not achieved the required levels of
economy or the rule of law. Therefore, this option, however, has some potential, is rather an
ineffective and unlikely one.
Option 3: European Cooperative Security System—mediation.
The Russo-Ukrainian conflict has a set of complex underlying causes and long-lasting
grievances. Conflicts that have a long history and are fueled by strong ideologies require
meticulous approach to their resolution with an emphasis on changing the attitudes of the parties
involved. Rogozinska (2019, 177), analyzing the conflict as a type of a hybrid war, pointed out
that it “consists of using a whole range of political, diplomatic, military, informational, economic
and cultural means, which are appropriately selected and combined in such a way that their
synchronized use will bring about the intended results.” This poses yet another difficulty in
resolving the conflict as such a resolution would have to address all of these means of conducting
the war. What I am about to propose involves both a top-down and bottom-up approaches. I think
that it is necessary to address the ideological differences in the European security system to have
a leverage in the negotiations with President Putin—top-down approach. Moreover, it will be
necessary to address the underlying ideological divisions in the regions mostly affected by
pursuing a bottom-up approach through democratic means, i.e. referenda.
Russia on multiple occasions offered an inclusive solution to European security. It was first
proposed by Mikhail Gorbachev in his “Europe as a Common Home” manifesto presented to the
Council of Europe in 1989. He called for cooperative security dynamic with acceptance of
American influence in Europe (Zwolski, 2018, 188). Moreover, in 2008, then president of Russia,
Dmitry Medvedev “proposed a European security treaty for the whole continent… [in which] all
countries should participate, but not as members of NATO or the EU, but as individual states”
(Zwolski, 2018, 189). A similar idea was expressed by Vladimyr Putin who envisioned a pan-
31
European inclusive space. On any of the occasions, these proposals were rejected by other
European states and organizations or rebuffed by the foreign policy of the proposing parties
themselves. As was mentioned in the analysis, the ideological divisions are deeply-rooted
underlying causes of the conflict. I think that finding a mediator that could relax the tensions
between Ukraine and Russia, as well as between Russia and the West is a necessary step towards
resolution of the conflict. Due to the ideological divisions on a global scale, it is necessary for
the mediator to be perceived as neutral by both Ukraine and Russia. Kriesberg and Dayton (2017)
mention that one of the difficulties for a mediator is the adversaries’ stance on their interests and
lack of willingness to negotiate. Zelensky and Putin already met up once and announced they
would have a second meeting; however, due to the COVID-19 pandemic it will not take place
anytime soon. The channels of communication between the two countries have opened.
Nonetheless, it would be the role of the mediator to level out the differences between the two
presidents and provide the means to proceed in constructive negotiations. I believe that a team of
mediators led, perhaps, by Prince of Monaco Albert II would satisfy Putin and Zelensky. Albert
II is not perceived as a representative or fervent advocate of either democratic capitalism or neo-
Soviet autocracy, and the Principality of Monaco does not enjoy a full European Union
membership. The task of such a mediator would be to persuade both sides to unconditionally stop
military offensives and to declare willingness to transition from a competitive security system to
a cooperative one, just like Gorbachev did. Establishment of such a system would hinder the role
of NATO; however, exclusion of the US from participating, and even having a say, in this
agreement seems to be necessary for Russia to even consider it. This would create more peaceful
and stable relations between all European states, thus also contributing to the elimination of the
ideological differences. Not only would this agreement boost the European economy but,
perhaps, also loosen up the tensions between Western European states and Russia. It would be the
32
role of the mediator to allow Ukraine and Russia to assess the benefits and potential losses
resulting from establishing such a system. The mediator would have to show that overall long-
term benefits surpass the losses, in order to persuade Russia to give up Crimea, granted their
naval base contract would be extended until 2100. In the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, a
referendum would indicate whether these territories should belong to Russia or Ukraine. The
Russian minority in Ukraine and the Ukrainian minority in Russia should be granted a right to
relocation based on their sense of belonging within five years after the referendum on the status
of Donetsk and Luhansk provinces. This would prevent future potential claims of rescuing the
minorities on foreign territory. While this option seems to address all the complexities that
underlie and emerged during the conflict, it also seems to depend on the mediator’s skills and
ability to address two completely different politicians—an inexperienced Zelensky and confident
and experienced Putin. Russia might not be willing to give up its claims over Crimea and Ukraine
might find this deal too dangerous. Moreover, the success of such resolution depends to a large
degree on the development of the circumstances around the COVID-19 pandemic and its
consequences, especially economic ones, on the region.
Conclusion
The tensions in Russo-Ukrainian relations have shaped over hundreds of years. The major
issues that concern the two parties are the ideological differences, the historical
interconnectedness, Russified and undemocratic governmental institutions, limited freedom,
corruption, personal interests of the most influential individuals, and many more. The complexity
of the underlying causes of the conflict makes it difficult to address it. The precedent set by the
annexation of Crimea in 2014 gave rise to the ongoing hybrid war in the East of Ukraine and
concerns European states regarding future steps of Russia. Russian maintenance of post-Soviet
states and Putin’s quest for uniting the nation seem to legitimize their claims. At the same time,
33
Ukraine’s lack of a strong sense of national identity and growing pro-Russian movements further
complicate the resolution, which needs to address these issues in order to have functional
fundaments to work on. The perceptions of and relationships within the conflict reflect the
ideological division of Ukrainian society. It can be divided into pro-Western and pro-Russian
groups with both of them having legitimate claims thus requiring finding an agreeable
compromise. While the conflict is localized at the moment, and frozen due to the COVID-19
pandemic, it is necessary to attempt to address it using means different than sanctions, which
proved to be inefficient as they forced the EU members to provide costly support to Ukraine and
did not significantly affect the GDP of Russia over the past four years. The possible
consequences of a military intervention make such an action improbable as it would lead to a
nuclear war. Moreover, taking into consideration Putin’s bargaining power and diplomatic
experience, one can assume that any democratic efforts that the West tries to apply in the East of
Ukraine or towards Russia will not be accepted by Putin. Therefore, the mediator between
Ukraine and Russia would have to use the idea of a cooperative security system in Europe as
leverage in the negotiations primarily with Putin, in order to bring peace to Ukraine and cease the
ongoing conflict. A could enhance the channels of communication between President Zelensky
and President Putin and level out the differences between them. While each of their interests
seem legitimate, there will be some degree of consensus required to reach in this conflict. The
Russo-Ukrainian relations should be continuously observed. The ideological, political, economic,
and diplomatic differences fuel the conflict. There are people dying at the Eastern border of
Ukraine. It is necessary to bring the conflict to peace; however, at the same time, demonstrating a
high level of respect towards both minorities and majorities inhabiting the mostly affected
regions. Moreover, the socio-economic consequences concerning broader region, and even the
entire country, have to still be closely analyzed.
34
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