No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the authors.
Propaganda and Disinformation as a Security Threat
Abstract
This chapter identifies relevant security threats related to the spread of propaganda and disinformation under the new circumstances of the online environment and reacts to the findings and conclusions of the previous chapters. First, the securitisation of propaganda and disinformation is outlined, including the process of change from traditional military security and regime security to societal security. This goes hand in hand with the categorisation of current propaganda and disinformation actors with state and non-state backgrounds—authoritative regimes, illiberal political forces, or terrorists. The chapter then focuses on the strategies and tactics of contemporary creators of propaganda and disinformation and their impacts on targeted audiences, such as the disruption of democratic discourse and trust in institutions, election manipulation, the artificial increase of conflict in society, radicalisation, and support for anti-system actors, dangers to public security, the undermining of diplomacy, or the acquisition of control over the information networks and information environment. Based on this, current concepts of defence and protection relevant to Europe are discussed.
... We understand state-sponsored disinformation as a tool of propaganda (Martin 1982). Although there are broader definitions of propaganda (Ellul, 1973;Mareš & Mlejnková, 2021), in the context of this paper, propaganda is a form of political communication that seeks to persuade voters not through fact-based arguments but through a strong emotional, impulsive charge of communication. It usually relies on the creation of enemies, stereotyping, and the simplification of language, images, and content, and defines the election as a choice between different political systems (old vs. new, elite vs. power of the masses, good vs. evil), thus denying the legitimacy of political competition within a democratic framework. ...
Over the past decade, the Hungarian media system has become one of the most frequently cited illustrations of politically controlled, captured media systems. The starting point for this chapter is that the repression of media freedom and the establishment of political control over the media system cannot be understood without the broader constitutional, economic, and social context that has eroded the instruments available to counter attacks on media freedom. The Fidesz government has used unlimited public funds to create a media system that is the perfect vehicle for the spread of state disinformation. State disinformation is of such a scale and effectiveness that the term “firehose of falsehood”, used to describe Russian propaganda, is perfectly applicable. In the last part of this paper, we will present one of the emblematic instruments of this disinformation flood, the institution of the so-called national consultation.
... V roce 2014 pak dochází k eskalaci otevřené formy hybridní války, a to ve vazbě na krizi na Krymu a na Donbasu, která pak kulminovala v dalších letech (např. včetně vytváření polovojenských jednotek či číření dezinformačních narativů v kontextu "kauzy Skripal" a kauzy "Vrbětice" v ČR i ve světě (Mareš, Holzer, Šmíd 2020: 26-28;Mareš, Mlejnková 2021). Novou dimenzi hybridní války pak přinesla ruská invaze na Ukrajinu v únoru 2022 (Danics, Smolík 2023: 124). ...
This chapter aims to describe the spread of propaganda, fake news, and disinformation in Central Europe. In addition, it attempts to reveal the strategies used to disseminate these messages amongst societies which are vulnerable to disinformation. First, the spread of disinformation in the region is examined, taking into account the historical context. The chapter then provides an overview of the misleading narratives that accompanied the COVID-19 pandemic and war in Ukraine in Central European countries. In both cases, the key role of online and social media in the spread of disinformation is confirmed. The chapter concludes with a summary of strategies for counteracting these threats that have been applied in Central European countries.
This article examines Russian active measures in cyberspace, focusing on the implications for across security sectors. Initially, the study contextualizes the increasing reliance on cyberspace for conducting subversive activities that target military, political, societal, and economic structures, particularly after the Ukrainian Euromaidan in 2013. Utilizing a qualitative analysis of open-source data, the research identifies the diverse tactics employed by Russian actors, including sophisticated use of code and content to manipulate public perception and governmental processes. Key findings reveal that while activities in the military and political sectors are characterized by a high degree of technological sophistication, societal sectors predominantly face threats from disinformation campaigns. Notably, no significant cyber active measures were detected within the environmental sector. The study concludes that Russian cyber tactics are deeply embedded in their broader geopolitical strategy, necessitating robust countermeasures. Enhanced cybersecurity policies and international cooperation are recommended to bolster resilience against such foreign malign influences.
The outbreak of the pandemic, marked with many unknowns and uncertainty, provided a fertile ground for disinformation, conspiracy theories, and pro-Kremlin propaganda in the Czech Republic which was delivered through various communication channels. This is also the case of so-called “chain e-mails” forwarded especially among older people to substitute social networks. The main aim of the article is to reveal the nature and content of chain e-mails communicating Covid-19 with a special focus on narratives and its development. The article is based on the analysis of 2,056 unique Covid-19-related chain e-mails forwarded among people in the Czech Republic between March 2020 and May 2022. Next to revealing key targets, techniques, and narrative developments, the analysis contributes to a better understanding of disinformation, propaganda, and conspiracy theories in the Czech Republic and the (dis)information ecosystem in general. The final discussion is dedicated to the possibilities of how to address the negative effects of chain e-mails.
This book examines the shape, composition, and practices of the United States political media landscape. It explores the roots of the current epistemic crisis in political communication with a focus on the remarkable 2016 U.S. president election culminating in the victory of Donald Trump and the first year of his presidency. The authors present a detailed map of the American political media landscape based on the analysis of millions of stories and social media posts, revealing a highly polarized and asymmetric media ecosystem. Detailed case studies track the emergence and propagation of disinformation in the American public sphere that took advantage of structural weaknesses in the media institutions across the political spectrum. This book describes how the conservative faction led by Steve Bannon and funded by Robert Mercer was able to inject opposition research into the mainstream media agenda that left an unsubstantiated but indelible stain of corruption on the Clinton campaign. The authors also document how Fox News deflects negative coverage of President Trump and has promoted a series of exaggerated and fabricated counter narratives to defend the president against the damaging news coming out of the Mueller investigation. Based on an analysis of the actors that sought to influence political public discourse, this book argues that the current problems of media and democracy are not the result of Russian interference, behavioral microtargeting and algorithms on social media, political clickbait, hackers, sockpuppets, or trolls, but of asymmetric media structures decades in the making. The crisis is political, not technological.
How does a democracy deal with threats to its existence when those threats come from political parties that play the democratic game? This volume analyzes the experience of European democracies that survived the challenge of rising extremist movements during the inter-war years and compares them with the well-known cases of pre-Fascist Italy and Weimar Germany. The comparison of democratic crises that are all triggered by the rise of anti-system parties but then result in either regime survival or breakdown provides an important supplement to standard structuralist accounts focused on socio-economic variables. Although in many cases political regimes are socially overdetermined, in other cases democratic and anti-democratic tendencies are more evenly balanced, and the strategies of incumbents become crucial in steering the crisis towards democratic survival or breakdown. If, at the outset, incumbents enjoy some margin of maneuver, their coalitional choices and policy responses can be decisive in determining democracy's fate. Coalitional choices that stabilize democracy often require disregarding immediate electoral gains, and therefore are the object of intense struggles within those parties of government that are most electorally threatened by the rising extremist tide. Policy responses have to strike a difficult balance between repression and accommodation, and short- and long-term imperatives, to keep democracy on course during critical moments.
How do non-established far-right actors reach visibility in the media? While much research focuses on media visibility of progressive movements and established parties, little is known about the coverage of grassroots far-right mobilization. Inspired by insights from media studies, social movement literature, and scholarship on the far right, the paper suggests that media coverage is a function of the protest strategies of non-established far-right actors. To this end, We use a new dataset measuring political claims made on the websites of CasaPound Italia (CPI) and the Bloc Identitaire (BI), and from newspaper reports in France and Italy. We use logistic regressions to quantify increasing media coverage based on specific characteristics of mobilization (issue ownership, dramatization, confrontation and counter-mobilization). Focusing on two countries with comparable political contexts but major differences in other factors relevant to far-right mobilization (number of migrants, asylum seekers, perceived most important problem, and proximity to elections), we illustrate that news coverage is more likely when CPI and BI mobilize on immigration, engage in street protest, and create public controversy. While broader comparative evidence is needed, the paper offers a novel meso-level perspective on the interplay between far-right mobilization and media attention, and it sets out an innovative method to combine online and offline data for the study of protest in far-right politics.
Full text https://rdcu.be/LAr5
The paper identifies and analyses the acts of electoral violence that occurred during the 2011 parliamentary and 2012 presidential elections in the Russian Federation, and connects them with the practices of modern authoritarian regimes. The analytical tool employed is based on an electoral violence research framework, which provides insight into the negative dynamics of an electoral competition and its outcomes. The authors argue that electoral violence is used to advance the Russian authoritarian regime, which is a modern form of authoritarian rule. By analysing the post-electoral turmoil and the response of authorities to public demonstrations, we depict the regime's ability to adapt its position to maximise outcomes in the political conflict and opportunistically select the best tool to achieve its goals. We further argue that Russia, with its authoritarian tendencies, utilises confrontation dynamics during elections in order to allow the politicisation of various latent conflicts (interest- or value-oriented) that are impossible to solve in the everyday depoliticised routine of the undemocratic system.
How do right wing extremist organizations throughout the world use the Internet as a tool for communication and recruitment? What is its role in identity-building within radical right-wing groups and how do they use the Internet to set their agenda, build contacts, spread their ideology and encourage mobilization? Manuela Caiani and Linda Parenti address and examine these questions, analysing the potential role of the Internet on the identity-building processes of right wing organizations in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and USA and how their use of the internet influences their mobilization and action strategies.
Based on an in-depth literature review, Research Fellow Dr. Alex P. Schmid explores the terms “radicalisation”, “de-radicalisation” and “counter-radicalisation” and the discourses surrounding them. Much of the literature on radicalisation focuses on Islamist extremism and jihadist terrorism. This is also reflected in this Research Paper which explores the relationship between radicalisation, extremism and terrorism. Historically, “radicalism” – contrary to “extremism” – does not necessarily have negative connotations, nor is it a synonym for terrorism. Schmid argues that both extremism and radicalism can only be properly assessed in relation to what is mainstream political thought in a given period. The paper further explores what we know well and what we know less well about radicalisation. It proposes to explore radicalisation not only on the micro-level of “vulnerable individuals” but also on the meso-level of the “radical milieu” and the macro-level of “radicalising public opinion and political parties”. The author reconceptualises radicalisation as a process that can occur on both sides of conflict dyads and challenges several widespread assumptions. The final section examines various counter-radicalisation and deradicalisation programmes. It concludes with a series of policy recommendations.
While the strategies of political actors and institutions have been largely analyzed with reference to cases of democratic breakdown, democratic survival has often been viewed as a consequence of socio–economic and cultural ‘preconditions’. The analysis of successful reactions to strong extremist challenges in three cases of democratic survival (Czechoslovakia, Finland and Belgium in the inter–war period) against the background of two cases of breakdown in the same historical context (Italy and the Weimar Republic) is a useful complement to this view. The analysis of the selected cases shows how a stable coalition of democratic forces can effectively protect the democratic system from dangerous extremist attacks by pursuing both repressive and inclusive strategies.
The 2014 Ukrainian crisis has highlighted the pro-Russia stances of some European countries, such as Hungary and Greece, and of some European parties, mostly on the far-right of the political spectrum. They see themselves as victims of the EU “technocracy” and liberal moral values, and look for new allies to denounce the current “mainstream” and its austerity measures. These groups found new and unexpected allies in Russia. As seen from the Kremlin, those who denounce Brussels and its submission to U.S. interests are potential allies of a newly re-assertive Russia that sees itself as the torchbearer of conservative values. Predating the Kremlin’s networks, the European connections of Alexander Dugin, the fascist geopolitician and proponent of neo-Eurasianism, paved the way for a new pan-European illiberal ideology based on an updated reinterpretation of fascism. Although Dugin and the European far-right belong to the same ideological world and can be seen as two sides of the same coin, the alliance between Putin’s regime and the European far-right is more a marriage of convenience than one of true love. This unique book examines the European far-right’s connections with Russia and untangles this puzzle by tracing the ideological origins and individual paths that have materialized in this permanent dialogue between Russia and Europe.
This contribution deals with the phenomenon of foreign fighters in Ukraine. The author analyses risks and threats to the security of NATO countries connected with the activities of such fighters on the territory of Ukraine (including the separatist republics) and their return to their home countries. The development of the foreign fighter issue during the so-called Ukrainian crisis is described. Significant risks and threats connected with their engagement in the conflict and return home (i.e., propaganda, involvement in paramilitary units, threatening political opponents, etc.) are identified and assessed.
The growing influence of Russia on the Western far right has been much discussed in the media recently. This book is the first detailed inquiry into what has been a neglected but critically important trend: the growing links between Russian actors and Western far right activists, publicists, ideologues, and politicians. The author uses a range of sources including interviews, video footage, leaked communications, official statements and press coverage in order to discuss both historical and contemporary Russia in terms of its relationship with the Western far right. Initial contacts between Russian political actors and Western far right activists were established in the early 1990s, but these contacts were low profile. As Moscow has become more anti-Western, these contacts have become more intense and have operated at a higher level. The book shows that the Russian establishment was first interested in using the Western far right to legitimise Moscow’s politics and actions both domestically and internationally, but more recently Moscow has begun to support particular far right political forces to gain leverage on European politics and undermine the liberal-democratic consensus in the West. Contributing to ongoing scholarly debates about Russia’s role in the world, its strategies aimed at securing legitimation of Putin’s regime both internationally and domestically, modern information warfare and propaganda, far right politics and activism in the West, this book draws on theories and methods from history, political science, area studies, and media studies and will be of interest to students, scholars, activists and practitioners in these areas.
This book presents the first comprehensive analysis of Confucius Institutes (CIs), situating them as a tool of public diplomacy in the broader context of China's foreign affairs. The study establishes the concept of public diplomacy as the theoretical framework for analysing CIs. By applying this frame to in-depth case studies of CIs in Europe and Oceania, it provides in-depth knowledge of the structure and organisation of CIs, their activities and audiences, as well as problems, challenges and potentials. In addition to examining CIs as the most prominent and most controversial tool of China's charm offensive, this book also explains what the structural configuration of these institutes can tell us about China's understanding of and approaches towards public diplomacy. The study demonstrates that, in contrast to their international counterparts, CIs are normally organised as joint ventures between international and Chinese partners in the field of education or cultural exchange. From this unique setting a more fundamental observation can be made, namely China's willingness to engage and cooperate with foreigners in the context of public diplomacy. Overall, the author argues that by utilizing the current global fascination with Chinese language and culture, the Chinese government has found interested and willing international partners to co-finance the CIs and thus partially fund China's international charm offensive. This book will be of much interest to students of public diplomacy, Chinese politics, foreign policy and international relations in general.
Rawnsley, G. D. (2014). "Thought-Work" and Propaganda: Chinese Public Diplomacy and Public Relations after Tiananmen Square. In Auerbach, J., & Castronovo, R. (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Propaganda Studies. (pp. 147-162). (Oxford Handbooks of Literature). Oxford University Press
This chapter communicates research findings regarding what types of sociocultural information have operational relevance for military commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan. The findings in this chapter are the result of more than three years of experience with the Army's Human Terrain System (HTS), an experimental program to provide sociocultural knowledge to military units in two theaters of war. We review selected sociocultural knowledge requirements as articulated within a variety of U.S. military publications, including conceptual frameworks, handbooks, and military doctrine. We then describe the HTS research process to determine military sociocultural knowledge requirements, discuss command-directed and team-initiated research, and the concept of operational relevance. What commanders want and need to know is remarkably consistent between theaters and over time: the prime categories of knowledge are social structure; the political system (both formal and informal); the economic system (both formal and informal); and interests and grievances (particularly pertaining to security, intra- and extra-group conflict, and the administration of justice).
Throughout history, factors of radicalization have involved social and economic conditions and issues of identity. Patterns of Islamist radicalization in Europe reflect the historical experience of European Muslim communities, particularly their links to their home countries, the prevalence of militant groups there, and the extent to which factors of radicalization in Muslim countries transfer to European Muslim diasporas. Eurojihad examines the sources of radicalization in Muslim communities in Europe and the responses of European governments and societies. In an effort to understand the scope and dynamics of Islamist extremism and terrorism in Europe, this book takes into account recent developments, in particular the emergence of Syria as a major destination of European jihadists. Angel Rabasa and Cheryl Benard describe the history, methods, and evolution of jihadist networks in Europe with particular nuance, providing a useful primer for the layperson and a sophisticated analysis for the expert.
Estonsko: koncept psychologické obrany
- T Červeňová
The Art of Darkness: Deception and Urban Operations
- S Gerwehr
- R W Glenn
A Brief History of Propaganda During Conflict. Hague: International Centre for Counter
- H J Ingram
Falešné hranice: Příběhy akce „Kámen“ 1948-1951 [Fake Borders: The Story of Action “Stone
- V Jandečková
An Unholy Alliance: The European Far Right and Putin’s Russia. Brussels: Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies
- A Klapsis
Factbox: Track Facebook’s Fight Against Disinformation Campaigns in 2019
- Reuters
The City of Denver to Falsely Report a Climate Emergency
- M E Sakas
- L Fendt
YouTube, the Great Radicalizer. The New York Times
- Z Tufekci
National Security Audit. Prague: Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic
- Vláda České Republiky
Desinformbyuro: 80 let sovietskoy sluzhbe desinformacyi
- E Zhirnov
Anexe Krymu (Annexation of Crimea)
- J Buchar
The Year in Review: Network of Excellence. Dublin: The VOX-Pol Network of Excellence in Research in Violent Political Extremism
- M Conway
- M Courtney
MCDC Countering Hybrid Warfare Project: Understanding Hybrid Warfare a Multinational Capability Development Campaign Project. London: Multinational Capability Development Campaign
- P J Cullen
- E Reichborn-Kjennerud
Putin’s Hydra: Inside Russia’s Intelligence Services. London: European Council on Foreign Relations
- M Galeotti
China Joins the Global Disinformation Order. The Strategist
- P N Howard
- S Bradshaw
The Kremlin’s Trojan Horses: Russian Influence in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom
- A Polyakova
Psychological Defence: Vital for Sweden’s Defence Capability
- N H Rossbach
The European Union Versus External Disinformation Campaigns in the Midst of Information Warfare: Ready for the Battle? Brugge: College of Europe
- M Scheidt
Political Strategies for Revolutionary War
- R H Shultz
Der Überfall auf den Sender Gleiwitz im Jahre
- J Runzheimer
Lügen im Netz: Wie Fake-News, Populisten und unkontrollierte Technik uns manipulieren
- I Brodnig
Under the Shadows of Swords: Propaganda of the Deed in the History of Terrorism. Doctoral thesis
- K K Campion
Assessing the Credibility of the ‘Abu Hafs Al-Masri Brigades’ Threats
- Y Carmon
What’s in a Name? Psychological Operations Versus Military Information Support Operations and an Analysis of Organizational Change
- D Cowan
- C Cook
What Does It Mean When ISIS Claims Responsibility for an Attack? National Public Radio
- G Myre
- C Domonoske
Weaponising News: RT, Sputnik and Targeted Disinformation. London: King’s College London
- G Ramsay
- S Robertshaw
Výzkum pro volební studio ČR
- Median
The Kremlin’s Trojan Horses: Russian Influence in Denmark
- A Polyakova
Internet Trolling as a Hybrid Warfare Tool: The Case of Latvia. Riga: NATO Starcom CoE
- A Spruds
- A Rožukalne
- K Sedlenieks
- M Daugulis
- D Potjomkina
- B Tölgyesi
Violent Extremism and Terrorism Online
- M Conway
- M Courtney