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FELIPE MARUF QUINTAS*
MARCUS IANONI**
RESUMO: Em geral, a literatura sobre o estado desenvolvimentista estuda a Ásia e a
América Latina, não a Escandinávia. Este artigo examina o caráter desenvolvimentista
do Estado ma Suécia, distinguindo-o como um caso especíco por suas instituições e
políticas combinarem a promoção simultânea da industrialização e da equidade social. O
artigo analisa o modelo sueco de desenvolvimento a partir de seu cerne, o Plano Rehn-
-Meidner (R-M), uma estratégia política de desenvolvimento liderada pelo Partido Social-
-Democrata Sueco (SAP). Argumenta-se que na Suécia a industrialização e a construção
dowelfare stateforam duas faces da mesma moeda. O Plano R-M desempenhou papel-
-chave na consolidação, entre 1945 e 1975, domodelo sueco. Combinou e articulou o
desenvolvimento econômico, centrado na industrialização, a redução das desigualdades
sociais e a estabilidade scal e monetária. Incrementou a complexidade produtiva e a
igualdade, unicou a política econômica e a política social, a industrialização planejada
e a redistribuição de renda. Estruturou-se mediante um amplo pacto de poder entre
trabalhadores, industriais, agricultores, representantes políticos eleitos pelo SAP e a
burocracia pública. Institucionalizou-se, sobretudo, pelo arranjo corporativista democrático
das negociações centralizadas de salário.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Suécia; Plano Rehn-Meidner; estado desenvolvimentista.
ABSTRACT: In general, the literature on the developmental state studies Asia and Latin
America, not Scandinavia. This article examines the developmental character of the state
in Sweden, distinguishing it as a specic case, because its institutions and policies combine
the simultaneous promotion of industrialization and social equity. The paper analyzes the
Swedish model of development, centered in Rehn-Meidner Plan (R-M), a political strategy
Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, vol. 41, nº 1, pp. 3-22, January-March/202
1
The Rehn-Meidner Plan and the Swedish
development model in the Golden Years
O Plano Rehn-Meidner e o modelo sueco
de desenvolvimento nos Trinta Gloriosos
3http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0101-31572021-3062 Revista de Economia Política 41 (1), 2021 •
*Mestre e Doutorando em Ciência Política pela Universidade Federal Fluminense – UFF, Rio de Janei-
ro/RJ, Brasil. E-mail: maruf.felipe09@gmail.com. Orcid: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9408-3406.
** Professor Associado do Departamento de Ciência Política e do Programa de Pós-Graduação em
Ciência Política da Universidade Federal Fluminense – UFF, Rio de Janeiro/RJ, Brasil. E-mail: marcus.
ianoni@gmail.com. Orcid: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6072-0518. Submitted: 1/June/2019; Approved:
3/June/2020.
4Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 41 (1), 2021 • pp. 3-22
of the national development headed by the Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP). It is
argued that in Sweden industrialization and the construction of the welfare state were two
sides of the same coin. The R-M Plan played a key role in consolidating the Swedish model
between 1945 and 1975. It combined and articulated economic development, centered
on industrialization, reduction of social inequalities, and scal and monetary stability. It
increased productive complexity and equality, unied economic policy and social policy,
planned industrialization and income redistribution. It was structured through a broad
power pact among workers, industry, farmers, political representatives elected by SAP
and public bureaucracy. It was institutionalized, above all, by the democratic corporatist
arrangement of centralized salary negotiations.
KEYWORDS: Sweden; Rehn-Meidner Plan; developmental state.
JEL Classication: O14; O21; N14.
INTRODUCTION
In general, studies on the developmental state focus on countries in East and
Southeast Asia or Latin America (Johnson, 1982; Amsden, 1989; Haggard, 1990;
Wade, 1990; Evans, 1995). It is not usual to approach the developmental charac-
ter of Scandinavian countries, generally classified as welfare states with a social
democratic profile (Esping-Andersen, 1990). In relation to Sweden, the traditional
focus on the social sciences prioritizes its welfare state, but does so leaving the re-
lated industrial transformation in the background. In this sense, the article aims to
fill this gap of social democratic development in the literature of political economy
and social sciences on the developmental state.1
Therefore, the analytical objective of the article is to provide evidence to ar-
gue about the simultaneously developmental and social character of the Swedish
State during the Golden Years (Trente Glorieuses), marked by the hegemony of the
Social Democratic Party, which ruled uninterruptedly from 1932 to 1976. The main
lever of the social state – Swedish developmentalist was the Rehn-Meidner Plan,
which was linked to a series of complementary tax, fiscal, credit and public invest-
ment policies in selected industrial segments.2
The central aspect of the Swedish developmentalist state was the execution of
the Rehn-Meidner Plan, linked to a series of complementary policies of a tax, fis-
cal, credit and public investment nature in selected industrial segments. The coor-
dination of the country’s economic and social policy was part of a national devel-
1 It differs, in terms of focus, from the article The Swedish Model: an alternative to macroeconomic
policy (Viana and Cunha, 2016), which seeks a more general understanding of the Swedish Model,
worried on the specific arrangement of macroeconomic policies of this model, without the emphasis on
economic and social development pursued here.
2 Social-developmentalism is understood here as the articulation, by the State, of developmentalist and
socialist policies of a universalist and redistributive nature, inserted in a democratic-representative
institutional framework, such as that existing in Sweden.
opment strategy supported by a socio-political and political-institutional coalition
among the key players in the development process: on the one hand, industrial en-
trepreneurs, workers and farmers and, on the other side, elected representatives and
public bureaucracy. Thus, there was specific coordination and articulation of eco-
nomic and social policies, aiming to ensure full employment, macroeconomic sta-
bility and reduction of social inequalities, in an environment of increasing indus-
trial productive complexity.
Thus, in the so-called “Swedish model”, a national variant of the social dem-
ocratic model of capitalism (Amable, 2003), production and distribution were in-
terdependent dimensions, with a correlation between development and the wel-
fare state, between “social reforms intelligently planned” – of an egalitarian type
and conceived as investment – and productive development (Myrdal, 1977, p.
188-9). Sweden became, over this period, a modern and socially integrated indus-
trial state through the political control of economic development (Sejersted, 2011,
p. 172 and 483).
The paper will not address the complex, multifaceted and still controversial
process of crisis and collapse of the development model based on the Rehn-Meidner
Plan, which occurred in the 1970s and 1980s, due to the limited space for publica-
tion. The delimitation of the object in such a model serves the purpose of expand-
ing the framework of developmental literature by elucidating a successful and dis-
tinct case of development, executed in a democratic context and combined with an
egalitarian proposal.
The next section is intended for the national and international contextualiza-
tion of the Swedish model; the following shows the R-M Plan and its execution. In
the end, there is a brief final consideration.
HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
During the Golden Years, the articulation between production and distribu-
tion and between supply and demand was observed in the welfare states in the cen-
tral capitalist countries. State intervention and planning enabled these processes,
which simultaneously promoted industrialization, technological advancement, full
employment, the reduction of social inequalities, the expansion of the consumer
market and the public social apparatus (Shonfield, 1968).
Domestic and international factors contributed to these changes. Internally, the
broad commitment around these objectives, adding labor and business organiza-
tions and related parties, reinforced the state’s capacity to promote them. This pact
was strengthened due to the institutionalization of interclassist cooperation in dem-
ocratic corporatist arrangements then existing in most Western European countries.
Such arrangements strengthened the ideological perspective of political partnership
for the construction of industrialized social welfare states and favored the volun-
tary, formal and informal coordination of conflicts, thus conferring a specific way
of formulating and sustaining State decisions (Katzenstein, 1985).
5Revista de Economia Política 41 (1), 2021 • pp. 3-22
6Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 41 (1), 2021 • pp. 3-22
As for international conditions, the coalition and state activism referred to
were favored by the existence of the Bretton Woods System, especially two aspects
of the monetary and financial order led by the USA, namely, the dollar-gold stan-
dard and capital control. On the one hand, the fixed exchange rate regime allowed
for lower price volatility in the currency market. On the other hand, the control of
capital allowed the governments of the central capitalist countries to control the
international movement of short-term capital, to stabilize the exchange rate and
stimulate trade integration. This system guaranteed a sufficient degree of autono-
my for governments to implement monetary and fiscal policies appropriate to the
construction of welfare states, then an objective of national interest, given the ex-
isting social pact (Frieden, 2008; Helleiner, 1994). Furthermore, the post-war per-
spective of economic policy to pursue full employment was fundamental to the
Swedish model (Skidelsky, 2009).
In Sweden, the construction of a social democratic state of social welfare was
grounded and closely related to the perspective of a developmental state. The in-
crease in productivity levels, the nationalization of centers of accumulation and
technological innovation, the full use of the country’s physical capacity (including
the workforce) and the concentration of resources in the large national exporting
companies were central points of the political strategy of formation of a more egal-
itarian and affluent society.
For the Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP – Sveriges socialdemokratiska
arbetareparti), which ruled uninterruptedly from 1932 to 1976, the achievement
of a national development strategy simultaneously served the party’s programmat-
ic agenda – consolidated at the 1932 National Conference and the Program Post-
War 1944 – and the need to coalesce with social sectors other than industrial work-
ers, organized in the union center LO (Landsorganisationeni Sverige), which is still
the largest in the country. The forceful defense of a broad nationalization of indus-
try and the financial sector, proposed by the party until the 1920s, was abandoned,
replaced by leadership and state intervention, by the political planning of the econ-
omy, to develop the productive forces and place them at service of collective de-
mands, such as full employment and universalist social policies. This path would
lead to economic democratization (Bergström, 1992).
Since the historic parliamentary speech of SAP leader Per Albin Hansson in
1928, the Folkhemmet (home of the people) has been the normative principle of so-
cial democratic action, which pursued a broad national coalition between classes
and fractions of classes, to achieve government by participation competitive in dem-
ocratic-representative institutions, thus obtaining the political means to erect a wel-
fare state of a popular and universalist character (Esping-Andersen, 1992). This
SAP guideline is consistent with and illustrates that of the other social European
democrats (Przeworski, 1985).
In terms of political coalitions and institutions, the social democratic strategy
emerged from two decisive agreements that occurred in the 1930s, which lasted in
the following decades. The first was the agreement between SAP and the Agrarian
Party in 1932, called “Cow Agreement” (Kohanden in Swedish), in which workers,
7Revista de Economia Política 41 (1), 2021 • pp. 3-22
led by social democracy, agreed to grant subsidies and protection to agriculture, at
the expense of increase in the price of urban foodstuffs, obtaining in return the sup-
port of farmers and their representatives to the government’s economic recovery
program by increasing public investments in social protection, infrastructure works
and job creation. Such an agreement was decisive for the electoral victory and for
obtaining the social democratic majority in the Swedish parliamentary regime.
The second was the Saltsjöbaden Agreement in 1938, when the LO and SAP,
the main industrial federation, established a pact supported by the government. they
would maintain and deepen collaboration with the Social democratic government,
which has been in an informal course since 1932, as well as accepting the expan-
sion of the welfare state and the payment of higher salaries.
In this context of agreements, the commitment to industrialization was fully
assumed by the workers’ movement and by social democracy, which reinforced the
convergence of interests between workers and industrialists. From then on, collec-
tive bargaining would be the main form of conflict resolution and consensus build-
ing between employers and employees, this method being the foundation of the
democratic corporatist arrangement of centralized wage negotiations, which were
in force in the 1950s.
Certain fundamental political conditions for the realization of the development
strategy adopted after the Second World War (hereinafter II WW), such as disci-
pline in the production environment and the high degree of agreement around in-
creasing productivity, improving public services and general quality of life, were
created before the war conflict. Furthermore, Sweden’s neutrality and non-occupa-
tion during the Second WW, guaranteed by a government of national unity led by
the Social Democrats, preserved the country’s productive framework. Sweden
emerged from the conflict under advantageous economic conditions, as its robust
industrial park met the growing demand for capital goods from other European
countries that were being rebuilt (Gourevitch, 1986; Magnusson, 2000; Pontusson,
1996).
The spirit of interclassist cooperation then built, under the leadership of the gov-
ernment, served the interests of all parties involved. Economic development and the
construction of a welfare state were understood, by the main Swedish political agents
in the period, as interdependent variables that could be balanced in a positive sum
game to be coordinated by the social democratic government, whose party aban-
doned the idea of expropriating capitalists. Full employment, higher wages and the
expansion of social protection, aimed at by workers, farmers and the middle class,
depended on a higher level of sophistication and productive efficiency, which, in turn,
would not be achieved without a relative harmony in labor relations in the produc-
tion environment and without guaranteeing businessmen in the most advanced sec-
tors of the economy to obtain a profit margin compatible with the maintenance of
large capital investments necessary for development.
In turn, the social policies adopted in the period were not only aimed at com-
pensating workers for the exploitation of the labor force, but, above all, to boost
productive restructuring, giving priority to large national exporting companies (es-
8Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 41 (1), 2021 • pp. 3-22
pecially in the engineering sector, in which Sweden is based highlighted). In most
industries, private property coexisted with a wide range of political regulations, in
addition to the direct intervention of the State, through public companies, in order
to provide the infrastructure and services essential to economic development.
Throughout the social democratic period, large state-owned firms were creat-
ed, such as, among others, the development bank AB Industrikredit, in 1934; the
steelmaker NJA, in 1939; the war material company FFV, in 1940; the forestry
company ASSI, today Sveaskog, in 1941; the nuclear power company Atomenergi,
in 1947; the Rymdbolaget (Swedish Space Corporation, in English), in 1972. There
was also the complete nationalization of the mining company LKAB, in 1957, and,
in the 1960s, of some capital goods, building material and pharmaceutical compa-
nies. Post, telecommunications and railroads were state monopolies until the 1980s
and 1990s. However, the public business sector never employed more than 10% of
the workforce; the productive sector remained, for the most part, under private
control (Magnusson, 2000; Bohlin, 2014).
The Swedish Social Democratic Welfare State was, in essence, social-develop-
mental, as its main objective was to stimulate the country’s industrial development
together with the realization of full employment and the reduction of socioeconom-
ic inequalities. This articulation between development and social well-being, by the
fusion of economic and social policies, produced a positive sum game in the differ-
ent classes, so that the interclassist coalition and the successful results reinforced
each other (Esping-Andersen, 1992). This characteristic reached its peak with the
formulation and implementation of the Rehn-Meidner Plan from 1951.
ASPECTS OF THE SWEDISH DEVELOPMENT MODEL
Rehn-Meidner Plan
The heart of the Swedish model was the Rehn-Meidner Plan (hereinafter R-M)3,
whose name is due to its creators having been the economists, GöstaRehn and Ru-
dolf Meidner, both of the LO, whose 1951 congress ratified it. Successive govern-
ments executed it until 1983, when, due to the crisis in the Swedish model of de-
velopment, it was formally extinguished.4 Its formulators considered that Sweden’s
fundamental challenge after World War II was to maintain, at a high and rising lev-
el, the use of productive capacity (which had not been affected by the war), with-
3 The main points of this plan were disclosed in articles in the social democratic newspaper Tiden and
organized in the report The Union Movement and Full Employment (Fackföreningsrölelsenoch den
fullasysselsättningen). The main public policies have since been based on the plan’s guidelines.
4 This crisis, which started in the early 1970s and has been aggravated since the public debate on the
Wage Funds and the center-right electoral victory in 1976, was complex, involving domestic and
international factors. Its explanation is beyond the scope of this article.
9Revista de Economia Política 41 (1), 2021 • pp. 3-22
out generating inflationary distortions and inequalities. In a LO report (1953), Rehn
and Meidner argued that, since the free market does not guarantee full employment
and equality, the achievement of these objectives depended on an economic and po-
litical strategy. However, contrary to what Keynesianism advocated, government
planning took place on the supply side (above all ensuring labor mobility and the
formation of public savings), and not on the demand side. The economic thinking of
this Stockholm School was highly influential in the Swedish public debate, it antici-
pated much of Keynesianism and moved towards a dynamic conception of produc-
tive structures, which Keynes lacked (Erixon, 1996; Skidelsky, 1996).
The R-M Plan was a proposal aimed at achieving productive restructuring,
strengthening the financial position of the State – to make it the main agent of eco-
nomic and social coordination – full employment and a low level of inflation, through
the articulation of wage policies, social, tax, fiscal, social security and financial. It
was supported by democratic corporatist arrangements, which operated as the insti-
tutional backbone of the socio-political coalition between workers, represented by
LO, and industrialists, represented by SAP (LO, 1953; Lundberg, 1985).
An axis of the plan was the solidarity wage policy, negotiated in each produc-
tive branch in nationally centralized corporatist instances and conducted by the
government. They started in 1951-1952 and lasted until 1983. At the end of that
period, SAP and some white-collar union associations withdrew from the negotia-
tions, formally ending the R-M Plan’s strategy5.
These centralized wage and salary negotiations established the principle of
equal pay for equal work, regardless of the companies’ profitability. Wages and sal-
aries started to be calculated by the nature of the work, and not by the financial
conditions of each company in particular, especially disadvantaging the less prof-
itable and efficient ones, who were, therefore, pressured to increase their produc-
tivity, under the risk of succumbing. Salary increases higher than the categories with
the worst pay were granted, intensifying the increase in costs for less complex com-
panies, with cheaper labor, and easing for more complex ones, with more expen-
sive labor. This forced the first type companies to increase their efficiency and pro-
ductivity in order not to disappear from the market, while allowing the second type
companies a certain profit margin necessary for investment in high level produc-
tion, generating jobs, income and contributing significantly for the country’s devel-
opment. Wages and s alary increases and economic growth are now linked.
In addition, the relative moderation of wage and salary readjustments in the
best-paid categories prevented a dizzying and potentially inflationary increase in
demand and served the strategy of reducing wage and salary inequalities among
the various categories of workers, contributing to achieving the goal of a more egal-
itarian and more productive society. Based on these official guidelines, salary in-
creases could be negotiated directly between workers and industrialists, according
to their interests, through the mediation of the respective class associations.
5 Negotiations were decentralized until they were finally closed in 1990 (Hibbs and Locking, 2000).
10 Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 41 (1), 2021 • pp. 3-22
The objective was that, by compressing profits, but not wages and salaries, the
less efficient and sophisticated firms would fail due to the inability to cope with the
increase in the price of the labor force, especially the one with the lowest qualifi-
cation and remuneration. Due to the austerity of capital, and not of work – hence
its solidarity character –, social democratic policy favored industrial restructuring
for the benefit of more complex, advanced and exporting firms, especially in the
engineering sector.
This wage and salary policy with a strong egalitarian content was designed to
serve as an industrial restructuring policy, directing capital and labor to large and
highly complex national companies. In these terms, it obtained support from the
main industrialists for the process of simultaneously economic and socio-equal de-
velopment promoted by the social democratic governments. The compression of
profits also served to pressure the unions to moderate the demands for wage in-
creases, so as not to make firms and therefore jobs unfeasible. This wage modera-
tion, especially in the higher-paid categories, prevented overheating demand and
sharply rising inflation, while reducing social inequalities (Alexopoulos and Cohen,
s/d; LO, 1953; Otter, 1980; Pontusson, 1996; Hibbs and Locking, 2000; Magnus-
son, 2000; Sejersted, 2011; Schön, 2012; Bohlin, 2014; Viana and Cunha, 2016).
As shown in Table 1, during the R-M Plan, wage inequality was reduced. But,
after the end of this model, starting in 1983, they started to grow again.
Table 1: Wage dispersion index in Sweden
1962-1970 1970-1983 1983-1993
Total Dispersion -0,34 -0,61 +0,49
Intra-industry -0,26 -0,63 +0,39
Intra-plant NA -0,598 +0,41
Inter-industry -0,50 -0,58 +0,76
Interplant NA -0,46 +0,56
Source: Hibbs and Locking (1995, p. 100).
The solidarity wage policy was associated with the active human resources pol-
icy, a set of social policies aimed at training and reallocating the workforce, which
directed large public resources to training and qualification programs for workers,
job changes and mobility subsidies of employees (given the large rural exodus in
the period). These measures stimulated the displacement of the workforce to the
largest firms, with higher levels of employability and wage remuneration.
One of the main institutional means of State intervention in this field was the
Swedish Labor Market Council (AMS), created in 1948. It was a planning and co-
ordination agency for that market. Its administration was composed of represen-
tatives of employees and employers (Magnusson, 2000; Sejersted, 2011). The total
11Revista de Economia Política 41 (1), 2021 • pp. 3-22
number of jobs in the Swedish industry jumped from 783,800 in 1953 to 938,843
in 1963, with the metal-mechanical and engineering sectors accounting for 131,434
new jobs and about 85% of the industrial jobs generated (Alexopoulos and Cohen,
s/d, p. 45). The greater industrial mechanization, part of the process of productive
restructuring, did not lead to the creation of pockets of unemployment, due to the
greater absorption of labor in the service sector – including those of public utilities
and infrastructure –, which is closely linked to industrial dynamics. Graph 1 shows
the changes in the Swedish occupational structure in the period analyzed and Graph
2 shows how the transfer of labor has benefited the most technologically advanced
productive sectors, to the detriment of the less sophisticated ones.
The public resources of the active human resources policy grew rapidly and
vigorously, from 1.1% of the government budget in 1955 to 3.7% in 1960 (Boh-
lin, 2014, p. 121). Thus, the public authorities trained the surplus labor to be relo-
cated in capital and technology intensive companies and with increasing demand
for workers, which avoided unemployment due to structural transformations in the
productive sector.
During this period, in connection with the active human resources policy, there
was also the expansion, universalization and improvement of basic education and
public health, in order to increase the quality of life, technical training and, conse-
quently, the productivity of workers (Magnusson, 2000). As a result of these social
reforms, public spending jumped from 10% to 20% of GDP in the 1930s to 50%
in 1975 (Sejersted, 2011, p. 319).
Graph 1: Composition of employment in Sweden (%)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
1945 1950 1960 1965 1970 1975
Agriculture/forestry/hunting/
fishing
Manufacturing, Civil
Construction and Mining
Trade
Transport, storage and
communication
Services (including utilities)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1953 1955 1957 1959 1961 1963
Metallurgy, metal-
-mechanics and
engineering
(including Volvo)
Textile
Others
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
200 largest private firms 50 largest private firms
1942
1960
1964
Source: Own elaboration from Alexopoulos and Cohen (s/d, p. 42).
12 Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 41 (1), 2021 • pp. 3-22
Graph 2: Distribution of jobs in Swedish industry (%)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
1945 1950 1960 1965 1970 1975
Agriculture/forestry/hunting/
fishing
Manufacturing, Civil
Construction and Mining
Trade
Transport, storage and
communication
Services (including utilities)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1953 1955 1957 1959 1961 1963
Metallurgy, metal-
-mechanics and
engineering
(including Volvo)
Textile
Others
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
200 largest private firms 50 largest private firms
1942
1960
1964
Source: Elaborated by Alexopoulos and Cohen (s/d, p. 45).
Political interventions in social assistance were not merely aimed at compen-
sating the most vulnerable, but at integrating them, as wage earners, into a more
efficient productive environment (as shown in Table 2) with a greater capacity for
payment, giving them the status of workers, rather than of underprivileged. State
intervention and planning in the supply of labor, through a functional social poli-
cy for industrial development, complemented the economic restructuring role of
wage policy, facilitated the transfer of the workforce from the least productive sec-
tors to the most efficient ones, and also contributed for the State to adjust the in-
dustrial workers to the productive transformations and to the new demands of
qualifications and skills required by the companies (LO, 1953; Shonfield, 1968;
Pontusson, 1996; Viana and Cunha, 2016).
Thus, the R-M Plan’s vision of economic development was based on an increas-
ing concentration of factors of production in an ever-decreasing number of nation-
al firms, generally established before World War II, of an export character and of-
ten with a well-defined (usually family) owner, without the characteristic
pulverization of contemporary share ownership. There was a deliberate policy of
favoring the concentration of capital in large national companies that are highly
competitive internationally, in order to become champions in productivity, employ-
ability and payment of wages. In addition, the capital concentration aimed to allo-
cate investments with gains in scale and efficiency. The R-M Plan operated an eco-
nomic policy of artificial selection of companies so that only those that favor
accumulation, social welfare and competitiveness in international trade would sur-
vive, with the democratization of the benefits of technical progress. Thus, it was
possible to mitigate, within a moderately socializing bias, the private character of
the profits of large companies (Högfeldt, 2004).
13Revista de Economia Política 41 (1), 2021 • pp. 3-22
Table 2: Annual Income and Productivity growth
(in%) by industrial segment, 1950-1975
Segment Growth Rate Growth of Productivity
Chemical 8,4 7, 4
Steel and Metallurgy 6,8 5,9
Engineering 6,7 5,9
Paper and Cellulose 67, 1
Wood 4,7 4,9
Mining 4,2 6,8
Graphic 4,2 4,7
Foods 2,9 3,8
Textile 0,9 5,2
Source: Adapted from Schön, 2012, p. 267.
Of the 442 sectors studied by a government commission in the 1960s on con-
centration of ownership, 228 were controlled by a small number of companies, in-
cluding the mining, metallurgy, chemistry, electronics and paper sectors. In 1960,
fifteen proprietary families controlled 41% of the largest companies (Högfeldt,
2004, p. 530). According to data for 1964, the 293 largest private companies em-
ployed about 735,000 workers, corresponding to 27% of the workforce employed
and 35% of those hired in the private sector.
Specifically in the industrial sphere (counting the state and private sectors), the
concentration was even more acute: in 1964, companies that had one to four em-
ployees corresponded to 55% of the total, but employed only 3% of the industrial
workforce; the 274 firms with more than 500 employees were 9% of total industries,
but employed more than half of industrial workers. In 1963, the 200 largest indus-
trial firms employed 49% of workers and produced 52% of manufactured goods.
That same year, the 100 largest industrial firms employed 43% of the workforce and
produced 46% of manufactured goods (Commission on Industrial and Economic
Concentration, 1977, p. 29-31; Magnusson, 2000, p. 214-5).
Since the II WW, the concentration of the workforce has increased, as shown
in Graph 3:
14 Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 41 (1), 2021 • pp. 3-22
Graph 3: Ratio (in %) of the private sector workforce
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
1945 1950 1960 1965 1970 1975
Agriculture/forestry/hunting/
fishing
Manufacturing, Civil
Construction and Mining
Trade
Transport, storage and
communication
Services (including utilities)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1953 1955 1957 1959 1961 1963
Metallurgy, metal-
-mechanics and
engineering
(including Volvo)
Textile
Others
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
200 largest private firms 50 largest private firms
1942
1960
1964
Source: Own elaboration from Comission on Industrial and Economic Concentration, 1977, p. 29-31.
Complementary Policies to the Rehn-Meidner Plan
The R-M Plan, although it was the main component of the Swedish model, was
not the only one. Complementary policies, in the tax, fiscal, credit and public in-
vestment areas, acted in synergy with the R-M Plan in the construction of nation-
al development.
Another important axis of the Swedish Model was the tax policy adopted. Swe-
den, historically a low-tax country, had, until the 1970s, a less progressive tax re-
gime than that of other OECD countries. While corporate taxes were below the
European average, individual income taxes and taxes on social security were above
(Sejersted, 2011, p. 321). The proportion of indirect taxes was higher than that of
direct taxes. At the end of the 1960s, 55% of tax revenue came from indirect tax-
es (Magnusson, 2000, p. 222). This trend was strengthened mainly after the intro-
duction of a sales tax in 1960, initially at 4.2% and which was increased in the
1960s and 1970s, reaching 11.1% in 1968 and 17.6% in 1975 (Steinmo, 1988, p.
428). The option of social democratic governments, during this period, for a tax
policy based on indirect taxes aimed to save the profits from high taxation since
wage policy was already compressing them. The idea of capitalist impoverishment
was out of the question.
In fact, since 1938, tax policy has sought to encourage an increase in private
investment by favoring the concentration of capital in large corporations, to the
detriment of small and medium-sized companies, to accelerate the pace of econom-
ic and social restructuring. Due to the compression of profits by solidary wage pol-
icy, taxation was not so costly for large companies, as long as they were conditioned
to increased productivity and technological level, which they, due to their larger
15Revista de Economia Política 41 (1), 2021 • pp. 3-22
scale of production, could sustain more efficiently than small companies and aver-
ages. Subsidies and tax incentives were applied to investments in machinery, con-
struction and R&D. In the case of R&D expenses in the industrial sector, 90% was
financed by the firms themselves (Steinmo, 1988; Högfeldt, 2004). It is estimated
that at least 59% of industry growth in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s was due to
the technology factor (Magnusson, 2000, p. 203-4).
As Table 3 demonstrates, the Swedish tax burden was, for most of the Glori-
ous Thirty, less than that of other Western European countries. While taxes were
relatively low for the amount reinvested in companies, they were high for what was
distributed to shareholders. In this way, the government encouraged productive in-
vestments and discouraged the stock market and accumulation without collective
purposes (Schön, 2012).
Table 3: Tax-to-GDP ratio(%)
Countries 1933 1950 1960 1975
Sweden 18,9 21,0 28,7 46,6
Norway 25,1 - 32,0 44,7
Denmark 20,1 19,8 25,3 43,0
Finland 20,1 27,8 1 7, 5 37,5
Netherlands 18,6 30,3 30,4 46,9
Germany 23,0 30,1 33,9 35,2
France 26,3 30,2 33,4 36,9
Italy 30,6 - 27,0 32,3
GreatBritain 25,2 33,1 27,3 36,7
USA 23,4 23,9 27,5 30,3
Source: Adapted of Magnusson (2000, p. 189).
One of the great innovations of the Swedish Model was the expansion, quan-
titative and qualitative, of the Investment Fund (hereinafter IF), linked to the Cen-
tral Bank. The IF, created in 1938, was improved and increased especially from
1955. The government offered subsidies to investments made in machinery and
R&D, requiring that 40% of the profits (before taxes) obtained be deposited, with-
out taxation and without remuneration for interest, in an account with the Central
Bank, thus reducing the total to be affected by the tax burden. The amount would
be returned to companies in times of economic slowdown or recession, under au-
thorization from the Central Bank, in order to stimulate investments, guarantee
jobs and overcome the crisis. It would also be possible to redeem up to 30% of the
amount, without paying taxes, after five years. The government had the right to
16 Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 41 (1), 2021 • pp. 3-22
decide for what purpose the amount released would be used. In the 1960s, the gov-
ernment’s priority for using the Fund was regional development.
The IF, therefore, was a powerful countercyclical and developmental govern-
ment instrument, while allowing the State to control the profit margin of large com-
panies and mobilize it for national development purposes, which would not have
been possible if companies were allowed use their profits freely (Bohlin, 2014; Hög-
feldt, 2004; Lundberg, 1985; Pontusson, 1996; Schön, 2012; Steinmo, 1988).
A central objective of the Swedish Model, already defended in the R-M Plan,
was to form a growing public saving in relation to the private one, to strengthen
the financial position of the State vis-à-vis the private sector, allowing the former
to exercise greater power over capital and credit. In this way, the public power
would increase its capacity to coordinate its investments aimed at simultaneously
industrial and social development (Lundberg, 1985).
In 1950, private savings accounted for 90% of the total, in 1960 it was 75%
and in 1970 it was less than 55% (Otter, 1980, p. 154). The moderately restrictive
fiscal policy, but technically adaptable to economic cycles, was one of the most im-
portant components of the R-M Plan for contributing to the increase in public sav-
ings (Erixon, 1996).
However, the primary instrument of collective savings formation was the pub-
lic pension fund ATP (Allmänna Tjenstepensionen), created in 1959. This central-
ized, compulsory and centralized state pension fund guaranteed to all elderly peo-
ple an income equivalent to two thirds of their income obtained in the best 15 years
of the professional history of each worker. Despite the resistance of business sec-
tors to the creation of the ATP, it was instrumental in expanding social security, as
well as in increasing the developmental capacity of the State, since its creation was
also aimed at forming the public savings necessary to finance transformation proj-
ects productive (Myrdal, 1960). Therefore, support for citizens in old age was cou-
pled with the strengthening of the State’s financial capacity to guide credit and in-
vestments. This was possible due to the fact that the ATP, which grew rapidly to
reach 50% of GDP in the 1970s, was a source of public investments in infrastruc-
ture, especially housing, and partnerships with the private sector (Högfeldt, 2004;
Katzenstein, 1985; Lundberg, 1985).
A great example of ATP’s contribution to Swedish industrial and social devel-
opment was the financing, between 1965 and 1974, of the Million Programme
(Miljonprogrammet) housing project. The national government and the municipal-
ities, both in charge of carrying out the works, fulfilled the goal of building one
million high-end popular housing in ten years, drastically reducing the housing def-
icit (Strömberg, 1992). IKEA, a large Swedish furniture company, directly bene-
fited from this program, owing to it a good part of its strong expansion in the
period (Daunfeldt et al., 2017). The national white goods industry, especially Elec-
trolux, also benefited from the explosion in demand (Erixon, 1996, p. 28).
In addition, other policies illustrate how the Swedish state has boosted na-
tive industry and well-being at the same time using ATP resources. In 1962, SEK
(Svensk Exportkredit) was created, a state-owned company focused on financ-
17Revista de Economia Política 41 (1), 2021 • pp. 3-22
ing the export of Swedish firms. The State, from 1965, started to provide loans
and subsidies for the creation and installation of companies in selected regions,
aiming to reduce regional inequalities. It also created a company aimed at ac-
quiring and restructuring industries in regions with economic difficulties. Nu-
merous state-owned commissions, portfolios, agencies and companies were cre-
ated with a view to industrial diversification and growth, such as the
Economic Planning Commission in 1962; the Investment Bank of Sweden, in
1967, to channel public savings from ATP to high-risk but promising invest-
ments from an economic and social point of view; the Ministry of Industry, in
1969, and, inside, the Statensindustriverk, created in 1973 to identify industri-
al sectors to be stimulated; the Industrial Policy Council; a technological devel-
opment agency; the Swedish Development Corporation; and a state-owned
holding company, Statsföretag AB (Katzenstein, 1985; Bohlin, 1999; Zander
and Zander, 1996). Public universities (with a sharp expansion in the number
of students in higher education, which jumped from 20,000 in 1950 to 120,000
in 1970), advanced research centers, state-owned companies and the defense
sector, which now have additional ATP resources, they were important poles of
knowledge generation made available to the largest Swedish firms, within a gov-
ernmental conception of knowledge as a central component of economic growth
(Bohlin, 2014; Högfeldt, 2004).
ATP, together with the strong expansion of the tax burden in the 1960s and
1970s (Table 3), also expanded the fiscal space for directing public resources to
the development of strategic and specific sectors. Investments in infrastructure
were also expanded, especially in energy, telecommunications, highways and mil-
itary purchases of automobiles and national planes (Bohlin, 2014; Erixon, 1996;
Högfeldt, 2004; Schön, 2012; Sejersted, 2011).
The formation of public savings through the ATP was part of a broad state
regulation of the financial sector, which partially preceded the social democratic
governments, although they significantly strengthened it, which was essential to
the success of the R-M Plan. This financial regulation, essential for strategic plan-
ning (Helleiner, 1994, p. 165), aimed to maintain macroeconomic stability, the
primacy of production over speculation, the country’s economic and social devel-
opment and a high degree of nationalization of capital (Oxelheim, 1990). The
strong relationship that has existed since the 19th century between banks and in-
dustries has come to be strongly controlled by the State, in order to be directed
towards social democratic political objectives. The Central Bank (Riksbank), sub-
ordinate to Parliament, was instrumental in the political administration of the
currency, in accordance with government objectives. Although the financial sec-
tor remains private, a wide range of political regulations has made it an instru-
ment of national development (Myrdal, 1960).
18 Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 41 (1), 2021 • pp. 3-22
Among the nationalist financial control6 previous to the social democratic
governments, preserved by them, stand out: the prohibition, since the 19th cen-
tury, of foreign ownership in the banking, housing and mining sectors, and the
limitation, since 1916, in up to 20% of the voting right foreigners in natural re-
source companies. From the Social Democrats, new controls were added: in the
1930s, the right of foreigners to share ownership in companies listed on the
Stockholm Stock Exchange was intended only for unrestricted shares, which cor-
responded to a maximum of 20% of the voting capital of companies, while re-
stricted shares were only allowed to be owned by Swedish individuals or insti-
tutions (Högfeldt, 2004, p. 525 and 534). In 1939, the Exchange Control Act
was introduced, which gave the Central Bank a monopoly on foreign currency
transactions (Bergh, 2011). Exchange control and, above all, capital movement
was strictly applied, especially from 1949 to 1973. In 1951, the regulation of in-
terest rates was established by parliamentary legislation in a range defined by
the Riksbank and linked to the discount rate, strengthening the political posi-
tion of the monetary authority vis-à-vis the banks (Oxelheim, 1990; Larsson and
Söderberg, 2017).
Several other financial regulations were also introduced in that decade,
strongly applied in the 1950s and 1960s. In 1952, liquidity quotas were intro-
duced to prioritize loans from private banks to the financing of the national trea-
sury and the housing sector, in addition to punitive interest rates for loans con-
sidered non-priority, cash quotas (cash quotas) and control of new bond issues.
The objective of these measures was to guarantee the financing of state-led eco-
nomic and social development (Oxelheim, 1990; Magnusson, 2000; Larsson and
Söderberg, 2017).
As a result of such controls, all made possible by the Bretton Woods System,
the exchange rate remained stable. In 1949, a 30% exchange rate devaluation
was decided, in addition to restrictions on imports (later suspended). These po-
litical-administrative measures aimed to contain the increase in imports and en-
courage exports at a time of high European demand for Swedish manufactures,
since the productive park was not affected by the war (Magnusson, 2000, p. 203).
In addition, nominal interest rates were kept at a low level, and real interest
rates reached negative levels; to avoid inflationary pressures, bank credit was ra-
tioned, which was basically directed to the politically priority sectors: hydroelec-
tric infrastructure works, agricultural restructuring and modernization and, above
all, popular housing in urban areas. Political regulations also aimed to give pub-
lic authorities control over the timing of investments (Bohlin, 2014; Larsson and
Söderberg, 2017).
6 Here, economic nationalism is understood, aimed at preserving control and ownership of economic
operations in the country in Swedish hands. For an analysis of the relationship between economic
nationalism and developmentalism, cf. Bresser-Pereira (2018).
19Revista de Economia Política 41 (1), 2021 • pp. 3-22
Most of the productive investments came from large national companies in
the public and private sectors, which constituted a highly nationalized economic
system. In the period covered by this article, foreign direct investments never ex-
ceeded 0.8% of GDP, oscillating between 0.2% and 0.4% between 1969 and
1975 (Zander and Zander, 1996). From 1950 to the 1990s, foreign capital never
controlled more than 10% of the listed assets in the country (Högfeldt, 2004). In
addition to strong controls and regulations, Sweden’s failure to enter the Europe-
an Economic Community made it unattractive to foreign investors. As Francis Se-
jersted stated, “according to the regulations of the Social Democratic regime, it was
within the national boundaries that the business community had to arrange its af-
fairs. [...] It was also part of Social Democratic policy to retain control by means
of a certain degree of protection from internationalization and an excessively open
economy”(Sejersted, 2011).
Furthermore, the activity on the Stockholm Stock Exchange was practically in-
significant between the 1950s and 1970s, since the total stock value traded on it
was insignificant in relation to the sum of the market value of the companies list-
ed on it (Waldeström, 2014, p. 30).
This means that Swedish capital was basically dependent on production, not
speculation. The Swedish financial system, in line with other European countries
and unlike the North American, was based on credit, strictly regulated by a central
bank subordinated to the government, and not on the capital market. This factor
was crucial for the maintenance of an economy based on physical factors (indus-
try, public services, commerce, etc.), not fictitious as corporate bonds.
As shown in Tables 4, 5 and 6, the R-M Plan’s duration was marked by con-
sistent economic growth, development of the industry and physical and social in-
frastructure, full employment and monetary stability. The strong expansion of the
public sector resulted from the expansion of the scope of state intervention to ad-
dress the political objectives of the governing coalition, above all that of building
an industrialized welfare state, whose companies were national champions in in-
ternational trade. The virtuous combination of economic growth, industrial devel-
opment and redistributivism ensured, to a large extent, the success of the model.
Table 4: Sweden’s macroeconomic indicators (1950 a 1980) (%)
Period GDP per capita Inflation Unemployment
1950-55 2.0 5.4 1. 8
1955-60 3.3 3.7 1. 8
1960-65 4.7 3.7 1. 5
1965-70 3.3 4.4 1. 8
1970-75 2.3 8.0 2.1
Source: Adapted of Bohlin (2014, p. 123).
20 Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 41 (1), 2021 • pp. 3-22
Table 5: Annual Growth (in %) of Industrial Production, 1938-80
Countries Industrial Production 1938-80
Japan 14,26
Sweden 11,82
Italy 9,50
Canada 8,19
USA 7,39
France 6,02
England 5,14
Netherlands 4,99
Western Germany 2,42
Source: Adapted of Ignácio Rangel, 2005 [1985], p. 444.
Table 6: Average annual productivity growth (%) by sector
Sector 1945-50 1950-60 1960-65 1965-69
Agriculture 3.9 -1.4 -0.8 -0.1
Forestry 6.1 1. 9 0.9 2.9
Industry 7. 7 3.9 8.0 5.3
Electricity, gas etc. 7. 0 7. 1 7. 9 6.4
Construction 4.9 2.3 7. 2 2.3
Trade 7. 5 3.9 5.7 3.4
Communications 4.0 3.9 4.3 4.6
Housing 3.2 5.8 5.7 4.9
Private Services 3.8 3.6 6.0 3.1
Publicservices 5.1 3.5 3.3 4.8
Source: Magnusson (2000, p. 209).
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
The Swedish model of economic and social development, advocated by the
R-M Plan, is a relevant case of the articulation of three dimensions of politics: the
constitution of allies, the democratic conquest of the government to change state
institutions and the formulation and implementation of successful public policies.
Social democratic governments, supported socio-politically by a broad formal and
informal coalition among workers, industrialists and farmers, mediated politically
and institutionally by the Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP), during the peri-
21Revista de Economia Política 41 (1), 2021 • pp. 3-22
od analyzed, carried out an innovative route of planned action, which remodeled
the relations of production and distribution, feeding back the economic and social
dimensions of development. Productive development, led by industry, was the main
lever of the welfare state, providing full employment, an increase in the wage bill,
national control of technological advances and, consequently, an increase in the
collection base for the implementation of social policies. At the same time, the wel-
fare state has contributed to training the workforce and ensuring its longevity and
productivity, accelerating its geographical and sectoral mobility and adapting it
both to the growing technical imperatives and to the objective of increasing inter-
nal and external demand, important fora demographically limited country. As a re-
sult, Sweden has reached a material level of development that today still places it
internationally as a benchmark for economic development and social equality.
Swedish state must be considered as a specific case of developmental state, since it
combined, in a democratic regime, industrialization and equity.
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