MODERNIZING RUSSIA PROJECT Part I: Society's View of Doing Business in Russia

Abstract

Over the last decade, the Kremlin’s policies have consistently traded Russia’s economic development for Russia’s great power status. As a result, Russia has experienced a significant economic slowdown. Recent efforts to extend President Vladimir Putin’s presidency will enable Moscow to continue these policies. But are these policies feasible in the long term? Few in-depth empirical studies have attempted to answer this question. To do so, CEPA and the Levada Center ran a series of surveys in Russia designed to explore the modernizing trends within Russian society. This report – the first in a series – focuses on Russians’ attitudes towards business and entrepreneurship in Russia.

Full text

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CEPA BRIEF
MODERNIZING
RUSSIA PROJECT
Part I: Society’s View of
Doing Business in Russia
Stepan Goncharov
Maria Snegovaya
Denis Volkov
April 2020

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Cover image: “Moscow, Russia” by Artem Beliaikin via Pexels.

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MODERNIZING RUSSIA PROJECT
Part I: Society’s View of Doing
Business in Russia
Denis VolkovDenis Volkov
Stepan GoncharovStepan Goncharov
Maria SnegovayaMaria Snegovaya
April 2020 April 2020

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The IssueThe Issue
The end of the Soviet Union brought increased opportunity for
private business, which had only operated in limited capacity
before 1991. But for private enterprise to ourish in Russia,
market-based reforms — including the rule of law and reliable
property rights — were needed. Boris Yeltsin introduced some of
them, but many businesses in the 1990s were still forced to depend
on protection rackets and relationships with criminals and security
services in order to operate. Under Vladimir Putin, conditions
temporarily improved but the business environment has largely
deteriorated as unjustied criminal prosecution of entrepreneurs
spread in the country followed by the 2008 nancial crisis. What
are the implications for Russians wanting to do business today?
From the Editor: The Russian political system has several distinctive
features: it is patrimonial (power and money/property are thoroughly
mixed); the rule of law is so weak that it cannot, as in the West, separate
power and property; property rights are weak and unstable; and informal,
personal politics often trump formal politics since institutions are also weak.
The distribution and redistribution of property among elites — often more
than dierences over issues — is thus a central dynamic of the system. On
the one hand, these characteristics make the emergence of state-dominated
oligarchic business almost inevitable. On the other hand, strengthening
property rights may help foster the development of a middle class where
small and medium businesses are the foundation of a more pluralistic
political system. In this CEPA/Levada brief, the authors explore popular
attitudes toward business and how they may be changing.

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Cyberwarfare and Critical Infrastructure, 4
ContentsContents
Key Takeaways 1
Introduction 2
Methodology 3
Attitudes Toward Entrepreneurs 4
Entrepreneurial Experience and Desire to Open a Business 7
Business Conditions in Russia 10
Pressure on Business 12
Questions for Further Study 14
Acknowledgements 14
Endnotes 15

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Society’s View of Doing Business in Russia, 1
Only 14% of Russians have experience running
their own business and that number has
declined over the years. About a quarter of
the population (27%) would like to open their
own business. This group of respondents
includes the youngest Russians, respondents
with previous business experience, and more
educated and economically better-o citizens.
Those who want to start their own business
think that it will provide unique opportunities
for self-realization and the formation of a
sense of independence from the state, and
even open the possibility of moving to another
country.
Almost three-quarters of those polled found it
dicult to open a new business in Russia. And
only a fth of the population thought that the
business environment in Russia was improving.
A majority of respondents thought start-up
capital, connections to the authorities, and
state support were key preconditions to
creating a successful business. Most named
economic problems (high taxes, corruption,
lack of start-up capital and high loan rates) as
key impediments to doing so.
While respondents did not mention the
wide prevalence of illegal “raider” seizures
of business in Russia as a key obstacle to
success, over a third of our respondents were
aware of such practices. In addition, 40%
mentioned unjustied criminal prosecution
of entrepreneurs as impediments. Half of
the respondents reported a prevalence of
unlawful pressure on businesses from various
inspection bodies. The majority thought the
attacks of security ocials on entrepreneurs
are driven by the self-interest of state ocials
rather than desire to enforce the law. However,
only 6% of Russians were able to name specic
cases of unlawful pressure on entrepreneurs.
KEY TAKEAWAYS
Overall, the ndings indicate modernizing
attitudes of Russians toward private enterprise.
Most respondents think highly of businessmen
and their contributions to the development
of the country. These views are particularly
pronounced among younger, better educated,
and economically better o respondents. This
contrasts sharply with Putin’s own beliefs that
most businessmen are crooks, as well as the
state’s ongoing policies of prosecution and
seizure of private enterprises in Russia.1 The
results indicate the deepening divide between
the attitudes of the authorities and those of the
Russian population more broadly.
Contrary to general belief, Russians’ attitudes
toward entrepreneurs are positive and have
improved in recent years. Today they are at
their highest point (over 80% of respondents
believed that small and medium-sized
businesses beneted the country) in the 16
years since the Levada Center began measuring
responses to that question. In addition, many
Russians believe that some of the most
intelligent, talented, and capable people in
Russia work in business. Respondents see the
main contribution of Russian entrepreneurs to
the development of the country as the creation
of jobs and the contribution of taxes to Russia’s
budget.
At the same time, trust in the business sector
is much lower than that in other public and
political institutions — the army, president,
security services, and the church. This is
probably due to the widespread belief that
entrepreneurs evade taxes. Also, among
the most respected Russian businessmen,
respondents primarily named state-linked
oligarchs rather than entrepreneurs who
developed their own business from scratch.

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Society’s View of Doing Business in Russia, 2
Russia’s experience with entrepreneurship
is relatively short-lived. Throughout most of
the Soviet era, private business activity was
banned. By the end of the Soviet Union in 1991,
the state allowed a limited number of market-
based small businesses. Still, the conditions
needed for private enterprise to develop, such
as the rule of law and durable property rights,
were absent. The environment improved
under Boris Yeltsin, the rst president of the
Russian Federation, who launched multiple
free-market reforms, including privatization
and trade liberalization. A society emerged
in which private business and entrepreneurs
were a signicant and necessary component.
Doing business in the 1990s was challenging.
The absence of law enforcement forced
many business people to seek out protection
rackets from criminals and security services.
Violent clashes between business competitors
and illegal business practices spread.2 Yet the
1990s featured a rapid rise in the number of
enterprises — briey interrupted by the 1998
nancial crisis — mainly due to lower levels of
state interference in the economy.
After Vladimir Putin became president of
Russia at the end of 1999, business conditions
temporarily improved. A sharp spike in
commodity prices launched an extended
period of economic growth, while the
government introduced several economic
reforms to diversify the economy (such as the
2001 tax reform).
Soon after, however, Russian authorities
started exercising increasing pressure on
businesses. At rst the attacks focused on
big Russian oligarchs and media-magnates,
such as Boris Berezovsky, Vladimir Gusinsky,
and Michael Khodorkovsky, who were either
forced to leave the country or put in jail.
Over time, attacks on businessmen by state
authorities or state-linked businessmen spread
to smaller companies. This has been coupled
with a process of deprivatization in which
the state increasingly nationalized formerly
private enterprises. The Federal Antimonopoly
Service of Russia estimated that the share of
the state and state-owned companies to GDP
doubled from 2005 to 2015 from 35% to 70%.3
At least in part, these actions by the Russian
authorities were intentionally designed to
increase Russian citizens’ dependence on the
state.4
Originally these developments were oset
by a booming economy. However, following
the 2008 nancial crisis, economic growth
in Russia slowed down dramatically. This has
contributed to more interventionist policies by
the state at the expense of economic reforms.
These trends further undermined the business
climate and the country’s long-term growth
prospects. The economic situation further
deteriorated after Western countries imposed
sanctions on Russia following the illegal
annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas.
All these factors have led to the worsening of
the business environment in Russia. The share
of small and medium-sized businesses in
Russia’s GDP has remained two or three times
lower than that in developed countries: around
20% compared to 50-60%.5 As of January
2020, the share of SMEs fell in 2018 to its
2015 level.6 From August 2018 to August 2019,
about 7,000 enterprises closed in Russia.7
Did these troubling developments undermine
the willingness of the Russian population to
do business? How do Russians view business,
and what role does the Soviet legacy of seeing
businessmen as crooks play in it? Few in-depth
empirical studies have attempted to answer
INTRODUCTION

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that question. To do so, CEPA and the Levada
Center ran a survey of the Russian population
designed to evaluate how Russians view
entrepreneurship, and what factors they name
as key obstacles to doing business in Russia.
Most studies that have examined the
development of entrepreneurship in Russia
have concentrated on entrepreneurs in large
businesses (Guriev and Rachinsky 2005;
Homan, 2002; Freeland, 2000; Hanson and
Teague, 2005; Frye, 2002).8 Few have analyzed
the societal attitudes toward entrepreneurs in
Russia, as well as factors that Russians view
as obstacles and preconditions to running a
successful business.
In 2019, CEPA and the Levada Center developed
a joint public opinion survey to gauge the state
of civil society in Russia. Three questions were
designed together, and then were elded in
Russia. Topics included attitudes of the Russian
population toward entrepreneurs, the rule
of law, and civic activism among the Russian
youth. The study is based on the results of
a nationwide representative survey of the
country’s adult population in November 2019.
1,600 people were interviewed. The margin of
error does not exceed 3.4%.
This analysis is complemented by results from
earlier Levada Center and VTSIOM surveys,
whose results have been published in both
countries.9
Popular attitudes toward entrepreneurship
in Russia today are at their highest point in
the 16 years since Levada began measuring
responses to that question. Moreover, attitudes
Figure 1. The number of enterprises in Russia (1995-2017). Data on enterprises and organizations of the
Russian Federation obtained from records of state registration of legal entities. Number of small enterprises
excludes micro businesses. Source: Russian Federal State Statistics Service.
METHODOLOGY
ATTITUDES TOWARD
ENTREPRENEURS

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Society’s View of Doing Business in Russia, 4
have been consistently improving over the past
seven years. Views were especially favorable
toward small and medium-sized enterprises.
About 80% of those polled believe that such
activity benets the country. Attitudes toward
big business are traditionally lower, but a
positive attitude toward them has prevailed
since 2013.
Positive attitudes toward small and medium-
sized businesses are found most often among
young, nancially well-o Russians who can
aord to purchase durable goods. The most
negative opinions are among low-income
citizens who barely have enough money
for food — that is, among those who cannot
imagine themselves as entrepreneurs and
probably have an aversion to wealthy people.
The positive responses probably also can be
explained by respondents’ own experiences
and ability to imagine themselves as small
entrepreneurs and self-employed. Focus
groups with younger Russians conducted in the
summer of 2019 showed that the boundaries
between legal and illegal entrepreneurship
are being blurred. Many small businesses
can exist in a gray zone without ocially
registering their business. As an example of
such companies, respondents cited the resale
of goods purchased from the rm AliExpress,
the provision of cosmetic services at home or
on social networks (“info-business”), and other
types of business that are harder for authorities
to detect. Such companies allow owners to
avoid paying high taxes and communicating
with government agencies, which in the views
of many respondents are associated with
corruption.
In addition to having a positive image of
entrepreneurs, many respondents also thought
that some of the most intelligent, talented, and
capable people in Russia work in that sector
(a view shared by 33% of the population).
Only the category of “scientist” was above
“entrepreneur” on the list of professions
that are attractive to the smartest people.
This view was shared by over 40% of young
(aged 18-24), well-o respondents, as well as
those respondents with experience running
their own business or wanting to open one.
Entrepreneurial status is an important goal for
this part of the population.
At the same time, according to other
measurements, condence in business among
the overall population is relatively low. This is
Figure 2. Support for Business in Russia is at an All-Time High.

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Society’s View of Doing Business in Russia, 5
especially the case when compared to their
high condence in other public and political
institutions — the army, the presidency,
security services, and the church. Only a
quarter of respondents trust small business
unconditionally; only 16% trust large business.
These results suggest that ordinary citizens
also have a more complicated view of Russian
entrepreneurs: while people say they have a
positive attitude to business, not everyone is
ready to trust individual entrepreneurs. This
nding is probably connected to widespread,
continuing belief in the dishonest behavior of
business people, that they evade taxes, and try
to claim state assistance. In the case of large
businesses, this idea is a legacy of the belief
that the 1990s were a period of the unjust and
unlawful enrichment of elites rather than the
still prevailing view that one cannot honestly
get rich in Russia, as about 70% of Russians
said in a 2015 poll.10
Figure 3. Where Russia’s Smartest, Most Talented People Work.
Figure 4. Contributions of Russian Business to Development.

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Society’s View of Doing Business in Russia, 6
However, the suspicious attitudes toward
big business did not prevent Russians from
identifying Russian businessmen, primarily
those associated with state corporations,
as among the most respected gures in the
country. This view includes the so-called
“oligarchs” who made their fortunes in the
1990s: Roman Abramovich, Alisher Usmanov,
Mikhail Prokhorov, and Mikhail Khodorkovsky.
Entrepreneurs who independently created
their own business from scratch — Sergey
Galitsky, Pavel Durov, Oleg Tinkov, Evgeny
Chichvarkin — were not named in the top
places in our “rating.”
Interestingly, this list includes Pavel Grudinin
among the most respected businessmen.
Grudinin became famous after having
participated in the 2018 presidential race as
a Communist Party candidate. In the eyes of
respondents, he seems to be an example of
a socially responsible businessman: he makes
money and builds housing for his employees.
Figure 5. Confidence in Russia’s Institutions.
Roman Abramovich 3
Alisher Usmanov 2
Pavel Grudinin 2
Mikhail Prokhorov 2
Sergey Galitsky 1
Pavel Durov 1
Mikhail Khodorkovsky 1
Oleg Tinkov 1
Evgeny Chichvarkin 1
Grigory Anikeev 1
Alexey Miller 1
Vladimir Potanin 1
Oleg Deripaska 1
Suleiman Kerimov 1
German Sterligov 1
Figure 6. Russians Prioritize State-
Connected Businessmen Over Self-
Made Entrepreneurs.

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Society’s View of Doing Business in Russia, 7
The top ve “most respected” businessmen,
according to respondents who want to
start their own business, are as follows:
Roman Abramovich, Pavel Grudinin, Mikhail
Prokhorov, Alisher Usmanov, and Pavel
Durov. Muscovites primarily named Mikhail
Khodorkovsky, Alisher Usmanov, Pavel Durov,
Roman Abramovich, Mikhail Prokhorov, and
Pavel Grudinin. Residents of large cities were
more likely to mention Roman Abramovich,
Mikhail Prokhorov, Alisher Usmanov, and
Sergey Galitsky. Respondents, particularly
those who wanted to start their own business,
much more frequently named state-linked
businessmen rather than people who launched
their own business from scratch. This suggests
that respondents prioritized state-connections
to other important business qualities, such as
talent and innovative ideas.
According to the survey, only 14% of Russians
have experience running their own businesses
— primarily those who are self-employed or
those who are owners of small and medium-
sized enterprises. People in this group are
usually between 30 and 55 years of age and
have a higher education. This proportion
includes those 3% of respondents who are
currently running their own business and
another 11% who have had such experience
in the past. The data also suggest that very
few people in Russia were running their own
business at the moment of the survey.
ENTREPRENEURIAL
EXPERIENCE AND
DESIRE TO OPEN A
BUSINESS
Figure 7. Willingness to Start One’s Own business.

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However, over two-thirds of respondents (67%)
do not want to open their own business, while
only 27% want to do so. When interpreting
these results, it is important to note that this
intent to open one’s own business does not
necessarily translate into action. Only a few
will eventually do so. Moreover, the number
of people who are willing to open their own
business in Russia has declined since 2008, as
demonstrated by VTSIOM survey data, which
has traced this over time.11
Younger respondents and respondents who
already had business experience (below
the age of 25) at the time of the survey
demonstrated a higher willingness to open their
own business. This nding is conrmed by the
data in other studies.12 Among these groups,
the number of people who want to start their
own business exceeds the sample average
almost twofold (over 50% in each group). Also,
men more often than women, as well as more
educated and better-o social groups, tend to
indicate more often their interest in opening
their own business.
It is noteworthy that the desire to do business is
also signicantly higher among those who are
Society’s View of Doing Business in Russia, 8
Figure 8. Experience Running Own Business.

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aware of instances of attacks on business. The
respondents believe that such cases happen
primarily to large businesses (the below data
on specic examples of such attacks on
business seems to conrm this hypothesis).
Hence these respondents likely believe that
such attacks will not aect them personally.
In our focus groups with young people run in
the summer of 2019, respondents who said
they wanted to start their own business think
that it provides unique opportunities for self-
realization and the formation of a sense of
independence from the state, and even the
possibility of moving to another country. Earlier
studies by Levada report similar ndings:
a poll run in August 2018 showed that the
main incentive for Russian respondents to
start their own business was not so much the
opportunity to earn money, but the desire to
be independent and to work for themselves.13
Moreover, only one in ve Russians (19%)
believes that it is easy to open a new business
in Russia today; the majority (72%) holds the
opposite opinion. The results coincide with
the results of a comparative study by Global
Entrepreneurship Monitor: only about 20% of
Russians believe that opening a business in
the country is easy.14 This is signicantly lower
than in Western Europe (in France this gure
is a little less than 40%; in the United States
45%; in Sweden, Poland, and the Netherlands
above 70%).
Somewhat more optimistic are people who
want to start a business (27%) and those
with business experience (70%). Moreover,
the same 19% of optimists believe that the
conditions for doing business in Russia over
the past 10-15 years have rather improved.
Most think that these conditions are likely to
worsen (38%) or will not change (29%). Those
who already have business experience (as
well as respondents who are currently working
as entrepreneurs or managers) have worse
assessments of the situation on this issue.
Up to 60% of such respondents believe the
situation will get worse; it has become more
dicult for them to conduct business.
Figure 9. Business Conditions in Russia.

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What preconditions are needed to start
a successful business in the view of our
respondents? Most of our respondents
primarily named starting capital (63%). Then,
by a large margin, about a quarter of the
respondents named government connections
and the presence of state support (27%);
entrepreneurial talent, and a good business
idea (26%); perseverance and determination
(24%). Russians do not deem special business
education or previous business experience
necessary to open their own business.
When analyzing the results of the study,
we noticed a dramatic dierence in views
between those who think about starting
a business and those who already have a
business. The former more often name start-
up capital, a need for a good business idea,
and psychological qualities like persistence
(the youngest respondents under 25 have
similar views: start-up capital and a need for
a business idea). The latter group, those with
experience in doing their own business, name
completely dierent conditions for success.
In addition to starting capital, respondents
commonly named other factors important for
starting a successful business: government
connections; state support; and only then a
need for a good business idea. Against the
background of such answers, the views of
respondents without any entrepreneurial
experience may seem idealistic and naive.
How many of them will succeed if they enter
the business with wrong expectations?
Almost a third of our respondents chose
state support as a necessary precondition
for a successful business in response to the
above question. To elaborate on this issue,
we asked them an additional question about
who is worthy of such assistance. Almost
all (93%) agree that the state should provide
support to small businesses. Indeed, virtually
all respondents could nd themselves in the
position of a small entrepreneur. Against such
assistance were, above all, the lowest-income
respondents.
Society’s View of Doing Business in Russia, 10
BUSINESS CONDITIONS
IN RUSSIA
Figure 10. Preconditions to a Successful Business.

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Society’s View of Doing Business in Russia, 11
Popular attitudes toward businesses under
international sanctions are less clear. While
most respondents (55%) back state support for
sanctioned Russian businesses, a signicant
share of them (38%) are against it. Opinions
are almost evenly divided on the issue for
state-owned companies: negative sentiments
slightly prevail (51%), but 44% are still in favor.
And in both cases, respondents probably refer
to large companies, which (in the opinion of
many Russians) do not require assistance.
We also asked our respondents which
factors complicated doing business in Russia.
Respondents most frequently named high taxes
as the main impediment to doing business in
Russia: 42% of respondents chose this answer.
Among other answers, they named corruption
and the need to pay bribes, the lack of start-
up capital, and high-interest rates on loans.
These answers were named by over a quarter
of respondents (26-29%).
Less often, respondents named low consumer
demand and population insolvency, that is,
low purchasing power of the population (22%),
overregulation of the economy, lack of proper
state support, and poor economic conditions
(16-19%). Only one in ten respondents named
pressure on business by security ocials, and
only 5% mentioned Western sanctions.
People with entrepreneurial experience
primarily name high taxes, high-interest rates
on loans, and low consumer demand (that is, the
relative poverty of the population) among key
obstacles to doing business in Russia. Opinions
of Muscovites dier quite substantively from
the sample average. In their answers about
the problems of Russian business, Muscovites
primarily named corruption and bureaucracy.
High taxes was only the third most popular
response.
Overall, according to the average Russian
citizen, economic problems (high taxes,
corruption, lack of start-up capital, and high loan
rates) are the critical impediment to running
one’s own business. When it comes to their
relations with the Russian state, respondents
are primarily concerned about corruption, the
inability to avoid bribes in resolving issues, and
insucient state support.
By contrast, in a dierent Levada study of
large business representatives, respondents
Figure 11. Need for State Assistance.

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Society’s View of Doing Business in Russia, 12
primarily emphasized the problems of state
interference.15 In that survey, respondents
complained about the lack of guarantee of
private property, exposure of Russian courts to
the inuence of big businesses and prominent
ocials (the notorious “administrative
resource”), the threat of losing business as a
result of a raider seizure, pressure from security
ocials, etc. Therefore, we decided to ask a
few additional questions about what ordinary
citizens think about the possible pressure on
business from various government bodies.
We asked our respondents about how
common, in their opinion, the following illegal
actions are in Russian business today, and
whether entrepreneurs themselves evade
taxes. A third of respondents (33%) said that
illegal “raider” seizure of someone else’s
business is widespread in Russia (the sum
of the answers “are ubiquitous” and “fairly
common”). Even more (40%) spoke about the
prevalence of cases of unjustied criminal
prosecution of entrepreneurs. About half of
our respondents (49%) named the practice of
unlawful pressure on business from various
inspection bodies and inspections. In the view
of ordinary citizens, this is the most common
form of inuence on business by state bodies.
Importantly, respondents with business
experience cite the prevalence of all four
phenomena more often than the general
population. Also, Muscovites, respondents
with higher education, and also those who
are personally aware of cases of pressure
on business by security ocials name these
problems relatively more often than other
groups. This is probably because these social
groups belong to more politically informed
social strata in Russian society.
Despite the widespread belief that
entrepreneurs evade taxes, more than half of
Figure 12. Obstacles to Doing Business in Russia.
PRESSURE ON BUSINESS

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our respondents (53%) believe in the selsh
motives of law enforcement agencies. Only
30% of respondents think that the actions of
security ocials are a response to the illegal
actions of businessmen. A noticeably larger
number of respondents (40%) believe that the
actions of the security forces are driven by
the desire to extort a bribe or squeeze out a
business.
Russians are only vaguely familiar with cases of
raider seizure of business (a common practice
in Russia of illegal seizure of business entities
by state authorities and security services). Only
a quarter of respondents (25%) mentioned that
they knew of specic cases of pressure on the
business by security ocials. And only a quarter
of them (that is only about 6% of Russians) were
able to name specic names of businessmen or
companies who have been subjected to such
pressure. Among most often mentioned were
Yevgeny Chichvarkin and the Euroset case,
Sergey Petrov and the Rolf group, and Mikhail
Khodorkovsky and the Yukos case.16 Pavel
Durov and Pavel Grudinin were mentioned less
often, and only a few respondents mentioned
Yandex, the bankruptcy of Transaero Airlines,
and the Baring Vostok cases. Better familiarity
of respondents with the cases of Yukos and
Euroset may have to do with the fact that both
took place back in the 2000s when the media
in Russia was more independent and hence
people had more access to information about
illegal attacks on business by state authorities.
Respondents with business experience
provide contradictory opinions. On the one
hand, they conrm the common belief that
Russian entrepreneurs often evade taxes. And
yet they still explain law enforcement agencies’
prosecution of business by the desire “to
extort a bribe, to squeeze out a business.”
Figure 13. Prevalence of Illegal Practices in Russia.

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Society’s View of Doing Business in Russia, 14
Regardless of how justied these beliefs
are, they negatively aect business climate,
create signicant obstacles to opening new
businesses, and constrain the entrepreneurial
activity of the population.
From where does the discrepancy between
the positive view of businessmen and lack of
trust toward businessmen come?
What specic steps can be taken to best build
a functioning regulatory regime to govern
Russian business?
Some democratic countries — France for
example — have a large state role in business.
Can Russia build a functioning free market
economy based on that model?
Would more eective business education
cure some of the perennial problems of state-
business relations?
This publication has beneted greatly from
comments by Ksenia Agapeeva, Lev Gudkov,
Donald Jensen, Andrey Kolesnikov, Pavel
Malyi, Kirill Rogov, and Brian Whitmore.
Figure 14. What Explains Pressure on Business by State Agencies?
QUESTIONS FOR
FURTHER STUDY
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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1 Владимир Рувинский, “Кто считает предпринимателей жуликами,” Ведомости, 12 марта
2020, https://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/articles/2020/03/12/825097-predprinimatelei-zhulikami.
2 Federico Varese, The Russian Mafia: Private Protection in a New Market Economy (Oxford:
Oxford University, Press, 2001).
3 Yekaterina Mereminskaya, “Russian Anti-Monopoly Service: State Doubles Presence
Over Past Decade,” The Moscow Times, September 29, 2016, https://www.themoscowtimes.
com/2016/09/29/russian-state-doubles-economy-presence-over-past-decade-a55529.
4 Алексей Кузнецов, “Борис Березовский считает, что российские власти
целенаправленно уничтожают независимый от государства бизнес,” Радио Свобода, июля
21, 2004, https://www.svoboda.org/a/24187407.html; Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss,
“The Myth of the Authoritarian Model: How Putin’s Crackdown Holds Russia Back,” Foreign
Aairs, 87(1), 2008, pp. 68-84.
5 Руслан Марченко, “Доля малого бизнеса в ВВП России вновь снизилась,” Секрет фирмы,
января 28, 2020, https://secretmag.ru/news/dolya-malogo-biznesa-v-vvp-rossii-vnov-snizilas.htm.
6 Ibid.
7 Роза Алмакунова, “Без юрлица: в России за год закрылось почти 700 тыс. Предприятий,”
октября 25, 2019, https://iz.ru/935870/roza-almakunova/bez-iurlitca-v-rossii-za-god-zakrylos-
pochti-700-tys-predpriiatii.
8 DE Homan, The Oligarchs. Wealth and Power in the New Russia (Oxford, Public Aairs Ltd:
2002); Chrystia Freeland, Sale of the Century: Russia’s Wild Ride from Communism to Capitalism
(New York: Crown Business, 2000); Philip Hanson and Elizabeth Teague, “Big Business and
the State in Russia,” Europe-Asia Studies 57:5 (2005), pp. 657-680; Timothy Frye, “Capture or
Exchange? Business Lobbying in Russia,” Europe-Asia Studies 54:7 (2002), pp. 1017-1036; and
Sergei Guriev and Andrei Rachinsky, “The Role of Oligarchs in Russian Capitalism,” Journal of
Economic Perspectives 19:1 (2005), pp. 131-150.
9 Denis Volkov, Stepan Goncharov, and Maria Snegovaya, “Not Doing Business in Russia,”
CEPA, April 1, 2020, https://www.cepa.org/not-doing-business-in-russia; “Not Doing Business в
России,” Ведомости, марта 22, 2020, www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/articles/2020/03/22/825892-
doing-business?shared_token=b75e0338670ba423a9866a144e0496d257406846&clid=
IwAR36XFlHJbSHiaf9kFU9LycrXYFRGQdRDGW7-G6-p36tlOAxblSG9Wyyjeo; ОСНОВНЫЕ
ВЫВОДЫ, “Как заниматься бизнесом в России,” Levada, March 18, 2020, www.levada.
ru/2020/03/18/kak-zanimatsya-biznesom-v-rossii/?clid=IwAR17559AlvCVGYBjrcfETQHUWw
xI-8bWdoR0MOudZCH5fYQD9zhirxHSyB8; and “Бизнес — благо для страны: как россияне
полюбили предпринимателей,” The Bell, марта 18, 2020, https://thebell.io/biznes-blago-dlya-
strany-kak-rossiyane-polyubili-predprinimatelej/.
Endnotes

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Society’s View of Doing Business in Russia, 16
10 “Опрос: 70% россиян уверены, что в стране невозможно честно зарабатывать
миллионы,” gazeta.ru, July 14, 2015, https://www.gazeta.ru/lifestyle/news/2015/07/14/n_7375157.
shtml.
11 “Предпринимательство в России: отношение россиян, барьеры,” ВЦИОМ, Февраля 20,
2019, https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:o9WFYFX63FAJ:https://wciom.
ru/index.php%3Fid%3D236%26uid%3D9565+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.
12 Andrei Kolesnikov and Denis Volkov, “Pragmatic Paternalism: The Russian Public and the
Private Sector Carnegie,” Carnegie Moscow Center, November 20, 2018, https://carnegie.ru/
commentary/78155.
13 Ibid.
14 О.Р. Верховская, К.А. Богатырева, Д.М. Кнатько, М.В. Дорохина, and Э.В. Шмелева,
“ГЛОБАЛЬНЫЙ МОНИТОРИНГ ПРЕДПРИНИМАТЕЛЬСТВА,” Россия 2018-2019, https://gsom.
spbu.ru/les/folder_17/otchet_n_rgb.pdf.
15 A. Мовчан and Д Волков, “Неполитические реформы,” Исследование мнений
бизнесменов, https://carnegie.ru/2018/09/27/ru-pub-77353.
16 “Prosecutors Seek Arrest Of Russian Mobile-Phone Tycoon,” RFE/RL, January 23, 2009,
https://www.rferl.org/a/Prosecutors_Seek_Arrest_Of_Russian_MobilePhone_Tycoon/1373962.
html.

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