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Gun Control Policy to Prevent Public Mass Shootings: Regression Lines of Discontinuety Study (Preprint)

Authors:
  • Northwestern.University - Feinberg School of Medicine

Abstract and Figures

BACKGROUND Public mass shootings are a significant public health problem that require systematic surveillance to inform policies that combat gun injuries. While there is widespread agreement that something needs to be done to stop public mass shootings, exactly which policies that entails varies such as the prohibition of assault weapons and large capacity magazines. OBJECTIVE Needs to be added METHODS The FAWB resulted in a significant decrease in public mass shootings, number of gun deaths and injuries. We estimate the FAWB prevented 11 public mass shootings during the decade the ban was in place. A continuation of the FAWB would have prevented 30 public mass shootings that killed 339 people and injured an additional 1139 people. RESULTS The FAWB resulted in a significant decrease in public mass shootings, number of gun deaths and injuries. We estimate the FAWB prevented 11 public mass shootings during the decade the ban was in place. A continuation of the FAWB would have prevented 30 public mass shootings that killed 339 people and injured an additional 1139 people. CONCLUSIONS This study demonstrates the utility of public health surveillance on gun violence. Surveillance informs policy on whether a ban on assault weapons and high capacity magazines reduces public mass shootings. As society searches for effective policies to prevent the next public mass shooter, we must consider the overwhelming evidence that assault weapon bans and/or large capacity magazine bans work. CLINICALTRIAL NA
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Original Paper
Impact of Firearm Surveillance on Gun Control Policy:Regression
Discontinuity Analysis
Lori Post1, PhD; Maryann Mason1, PhD; Lauren Nadya Singh1, MPH; Nicholas P Wleklinski2, MD; Charles B Moss3,
PhD; Hassan Mohammad1; Tariq Z Issa2, BA; Adesuwa I Akhetuamhen2, MD; Cynthia A Brandt4, MD, MPH; Sarah
B Welch1, MPH; James Francis Oehmke1, PhD
1Buehler Center for Health Policy and Economics, Feinberg School of Medicine, Northwestern University, Chicago, IL, United States
2Feinberg School of Medicine, Northwestern University, Chicago, IL, United States
3Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences, University of Florida, Gainsville, FL, United States
4Yale Center for Medical Informatics, Yale School of Medicine, Yale University, New Haven, CT, United States
Corresponding Author:
Lori Post, PhD
Buehler Center for Health Policy and Economics
Feinberg School of Medicine
Northwestern University
420 E Superior
Chicago, IL, 60611
United States
Phone: 1 203 980 7107
Email: lori.post@northwestern.edu
Abstract
Background: Public mass shootings are a significant public health problem that require ongoing systematic surveillance to test
and inform policies that combat gun injuries. Although there is widespread agreement that something needs to be done to stop
public mass shootings, opinions on exactly which policies that entails vary, such as the prohibition of assault weapons and
large-capacity magazines.
Objective: The aim of this study was to determine if the Federal Assault Weapons Ban (FAWB) (1994-2004) reduced the
number of public mass shootings while it was in place.
Methods: We extracted public mass shooting surveillance data from the Violence Project that matched our inclusion criteria
of 4 or more fatalities in a public space during a single event. We performed regression discontinuity analysis, taking advantage
of the imposition of the FAWB, which included a prohibition on large-capacity magazines in addition to assault weapons. We
estimated a regression model of the 5-year moving average number of public mass shootings per year for the period of 1966 to
2019 controlling for population growth and homicides in general, introduced regression discontinuities in the intercept and a time
trend for years coincident with the federal legislation (ie, 1994-2004), and also allowed for a differential effect of the homicide
rate during this period. We introduced a second set of trend and intercept discontinuities for post-FAWB years to capture the
effects of termination of the policy. We used the regression results to predict what would have happened from 1995 to 2019 had
there been no FAWB and also to project what would have happened from 2005 onward had it remained in place.
Results: The FAWB resulted in a significant decrease in public mass shootings, number of gun deaths, and number of gun
injuries. We estimate that the FAWB prevented 11 public mass shootings during the decade the ban was in place. A continuation
of the FAWB would have prevented 30 public mass shootings that killed 339 people and injured an additional 1139 people.
Conclusions: This study demonstrates the utility of public health surveillance on gun violence. Surveillance informs policy on
whether a ban on assault weapons and large-capacity magazines reduces public mass shootings. As society searches for effective
policies to prevent the next mass shooting, we must consider the overwhelming evidence that bans on assault weapons and/or
large-capacity magazines work.
(JMIR Public Health Surveill 2021;7(4):e26042) doi: 10.2196/26042
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KEYWORDS
firearm surveillance; assault weapons ban; large-capacity magazines; guns control policy; mass shootings; regression lines of
discontinuity
Introduction
Background
Approximately 44,000 people are killed and an additional
100,000 people are injured by a gun each year in the United
States [1,2]. Mass shooting fatalities, as a particular type of gun
injury event, account for <1% of all gun deaths [3] and have
largely been ignored until recently [4,5]; yet, mass shooting
events occur multiple times per year [6]. This information is
based on insights from firearm surveillance performed by a
variety of researchers, and state and federal agencies on
incidence, prevalence, risk factors, injuries, deaths, and
precipitating events, similar to the surveillance of infectious
diseases such as COVID-19 [7-21]. Teutch and Thacker [22]
defined public health surveillance as
the ongoing systematic collection, analysis, and
interpretation of health data, essential to the planning,
implementation, and evaluation of public health
practice, closely integrated to the dissemination of
these data to those who need to know and linked to
prevention and control.
Not only do surveillance systems generate hypotheses to test
but they also provide the data to test them.
The Federal Assault Weapons Ban (FAWB, also known as the
Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act)
included a ban on the manufacture for civilian use or sale of
certain semiautomatic firearms defined as assault weapons as
well as certain large-capacity magazines (LCMs). The Act was
in effect for 10 years from 1994 until it sunsetted in 2004.
Semiautomatic weapons (rapid fire) and assault weapons (second
grip plus other features) are distinct; however, the two are often
incorrectly conflated as similar [23-26]. Semiautomatic weapons
are defined as weapons that automatically load another cartridge
into a chamber, preparing the weapon for firing, but requiring
the shooter to manually release and press the trigger for each
round [23-26]. By contrast, automatic weapons are similarly
self-loading, but allow for a shooter to hold the trigger for
continuous fire [27]. Furthermore, the FAWB also prohibited
certain ammunition magazines that were defined as
“large-capacity” cartridges [28] containing more than 10 bullets
[29]. These LCMs can feed ammunition to semiautomatic
weapons that do not meet the criteria of being considered assault
weapons. Furthermore, LCMs are considered one of the most
important features of the FAWB as research has found a
relationship between bans on LCMs and casualty counts at the
state level [30-34]. The 10-year federal ban was signed into law
by President Clinton on September 13, 1994 [28].
Firearm surveillance data have been used to test potential policy
responses to prevent mass shootings, including the FAWB
[32,34-39], Extreme Risk Protection Orders (also known as red
flag laws) [40-45], and federal and state LCM bans [31,32,46].
In particular, it seems likely that the FAWB and LCM bans
have potential to affect mass shootings because they regulate
weapons and ammunition formats that are designed to enable
rapid discharge, which is a key feature in mass shooting
incidents [24,47]. Other types of gun deaths may not be
responsive to the FAWB or LCM bans. As an example, Extreme
Risk Protection Orders or “Red Flag” orders [43,48], which
temporarily prohibit at-risk individuals from owning or
purchasing firearms, may be effective for preventing firearm
suicides or domestic violence homicides [49] but less effective
for public mass shooters [50,51]. The prohibition of LCMs may
have no impact on firearm suicide because suicide decedents
only require one bullet to kill themselves [52].
Several studies during and after the FAWB attempted to
determine if gun policy that restricts the production and sale of
assault weapons and LCMs decreased gun deaths [53,54]. These
initial studies make meaningful contributions to the literature
because they describe what constitutes assault weapons,
magazine capacity, ballistics, and loopholes in the FAWB
legislation [3,53-57]. However, these studies have found little
to no evidence that these policies have had any overall effect
on firearm homicides, gun lethality, or overall crime [58-61].
Since deaths from public mass shootings comprise less than 1%
of all homicides based on our definition, testing whether or not
the FAWB/LCM ban has an impact on homicide would wash
out the effect. Since the FAWB/LCM ban may be effective at
specific types of gun deaths, sampling must be limited to specific
types of shooters over overall gun deaths or tests for lethality
[62,63]. Finally, the variation in research findings is related to
differences in research design, sampling frame, and case
definition of a public mass shooting [3,53-56,64,65].
Our study differs from other studies that evaluated the efficacy
of the FAWB because we used economic methods and a
different outcome variable. Specifically, we focused on whether
the FAWB resulted in fewer public mass shooting “events,”
whereas other studies evaluated the number of gun injuries and
deaths that occurred during the course of a mass shooting.
Objective
The aim of this study was to test whether curbing access to
certain types of guns and magazineswill decrease mass shooting
events. We sought to empirically answer if there was a
relationship between the FAWB and a reduction in mass
shooting events.
Methods
Data Source
We created a firearm surveillance system based on the National
Institute of Justice–funded Violence Project dataset, which
culled mass shooting events from 1966 to 2019 [6]. Consistent
with earlier studies, we rely on the original Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) definition of a massacre, specifically where
4 or more people are killed within a single timeframe. We
differentiate our mass shootings from others in that our inclusion
criteria require the shootings to have occurred in a public setting.
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We adapted this definition to only include massacres that
involved gun deaths of 4 or more victims to isolate a particular
type of mass shooter [66]. Many firearm surveillance systems
that include mass shootings use a lower threshold of persons
shot and many do not include deaths. An FBI report on active
shooters in mass shooting events identified planning and
preparation behaviors that are central to prevention [67]. This
more narrow definition isolates premeditation, whereas broader
definitions may include shooters that are more reactive [68].
Our case definition does not include family annihilators or
felony killers because familicides are defined by the
victim-offender relationship, public massacres are defined by
location, and felony killings are distinguished by motive [69].
This differentiation is consistent with other mass shooting
studies [70-72].
We examined the annual number of public mass shootings
occurring between 1966 and 2019 that resulted in 4 or more
fatalities. The hypothesis was that the FAWB reduced the
number of public mass shootings per year during the period of
the ban. We used regression discontinuity analysis to test the
hypothesis. Regression discontinuity analysis is a standard
economist tool used in policy analysis taking advantage of
quasi-experimental designs [65,73].
Analyses
Regression discontinuity analysis allows for discontinuities or
shifts in both the intercept and the slope of the trend line at both
the onset and sunset of the FAWB. That is, we introduced
intercept shift parameters in 1995 and 2005, and trend shift
parameters for the periods 1995-2004 and 2005-2019. A
statistically significant shift in a parameter indicates a
discontinuity (ie, a finding that the FAWB had a statistically
significant effect on the number of public mass shootings). We
tested for statistical significance of the intercept and trend shift
parameters both independently and jointly. All statistical
inference was based on a significance level set at .05. We used
the Huber-White robust residuals, which attenuate problems of
autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, and some types of model
misspecification [74].
We then used the estimated model for two types of
counterfactual analysis. First, we used the model to predict the
number of public mass shootings that would have occurred had
the FAWB not been in place. The difference between this
counterfactual prediction and the modeled number of incidents
with the FAWB in place provided an estimate of the number of
public mass shootings that the FAWB prevented.
Second, we projected forward the number of public mass
shootings that would have occurred had the FAWB been
permanent (ie, continued from 2004 through to the end of the
sample period). We note that in some sense, this is an “out of
sample” exercise because even though the sample extends to
2019, the FAWB ended in 2004; thus, this exercise would not
pick up events in the past 15 years that would have augmented
or compromised the effects of the FAWB. The difference
between the modeled number of public mass shootings and the
projected counterfactual number of public mass shootings could
provide an estimate of the number of public mass shootings that
the FAWB prevented.
We performed a regression of the 5-year moving average of
public mass shootings on the US population in millions, the
homicide rate, and discontinuity variables to capture both the
effects of the FAWB and its discontinuation. We did not
introduce a trend line for the entire sample period because it is
highly collinear with the population variable. For the period of
the FAWB’s implementation, we originally introduced an
intercept shift, time trend, and shift in the homicide rate; for the
post-FAWB period, we introduced an intercept shift and a time
trend. Due to collinearity, we retained only the trend shift in
the final model for the FAWB period; for the post-FAWB
period, we retained both the intercept and the trend shift.
Results
We identified a total of 170 public mass shooting events, the
primary outcome variable, with 4 or more fatalities between
1966 and 2019. The 5-year cumulative number of public mass
shootings is shown in Figure 1, providing a visualization of the
impacts of the FAWB on the number of shootings. The first
mass shooting occurred in 1966; hence, the first data point for
the cumulative number of shootings over the previous 5 years
occurs in 1970. For 1966 and 1967, the cumulative number of
public mass shootings was 3. This number then increased to 12
in 1993 and declined to 3 in 2004. After 2004, the cumulative
number of public mass shootings increased to 81 in 2019. The
last year of the ban, 2004, experienced the fewest public mass
shootings through 2019.
The regression results showed excellent explanatory power
(R2=0.94). The coefficient on population was positive and
statistically significant (.044, P<.001). This coefficient means
that for every increase in population of 1 million people, there
are an additional .044 public mass shooting events per year.
The coefficient on the homicide rate was negative and
statistically significant (–.249, P=.01). The coefficient on the
time trend for the FAWB period captures the effect of the
FAWB; this coefficient was negative and statistically significant
(–.187, P=.001). Using prediction models in combination with
regression slopes, we estimate that 11 public mass shootings
were avoided due to the FAWB. The intercept discontinuity for
2005-2019 was negative and statistically significant (–2.232,
P=.001), and the trend coefficient was positive and statistically
significant (.081, P=.001).
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Figure 1. Public mass shooting trend line using five year moving averages (1966-2019).
These results are graphed in Figure 2 in which the black stars
represent the actual data and the green line represents the
predicted numbers of public mass shootings from the regression
discontinuity model. A bending of the trend during the FAWB
period to become downward sloping at the end of the period is
apparent, as is the return of the upward trajectory upon
expiration of the FAWB. The red squares represent the projected
numbers of public mass shootings during the FAWB period had
there been no FAWB. The difference between the red squares
and the green lines represents the predicted number of public
mass shootings averted by the FAWB. The model predicts that
11 public mass shootings were averted over the period of
1995-2004.
The blue diamonds represent the projected effects of a
continuation of the FAWB through 2019 based on the observed
trend from 1995 to 2004. This projection indicates that 30 public
mass shootings would have been prevented from 2005 to 2019
had the FAWB been left in place.
Figure 2. Regression lines from discontinuity analysis of the federal assault weapons ban (1994-2004).
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Discussion
Principal Findings
In total, 1225 people were killed in a mass shooting over the
past 53 years with more than half occurring in the last decade,
a function of increases in mass shootings and weapon lethality
[62,63,75]. Public mass shooting fatalities and injuries far
outpace population growth [75]. Between 1966 and 2019, the
US population increased by 67% [76], whereas public mass
shooting deaths increased by over 5-fold. The rise in public
mass shootings throughout the sample period is in fact partially
a function of population growth and homicide rate, along with
the effects of the FAWB and its removal. An increase in the US
population of 1 million people was associated with an increase
of .040 (P<.005) public mass shootings per year. During the
post-FAWB period, the increase in population from
approximately 300 million in 2005 to 330 million in 2019 should
be associated with an increase of 1.2 public mass shootings per
year, compared to the actual increase of 4 public mass shootings
per year in the data (5-year moving average). After controlling
for population growth and homicide rate, a positive and
statistically significant coefficient (.081, P=.001) on the
2005-2018 trend was seen. This further indicates a separate,
nonpopulation trend of increasing violence operating during
the post-FAWB period. The negative coefficient on the homicide
rate invalidates the hypothesis that decreases in the numbers of
public mass shootings are simply reflections of an overall
decreasing homicide rate. The negative intercept discontinuity
is consistent with an effect of the FAWB that persists somewhat
beyond the immediate end of the ban. The positive trend
coefficient is consistent with the hypothesis that the FAWB was
associated with a decrease in the number of public mass
shootings, as the expiration of the FAWB was associated with
a shift from a downward trend to an upward trend in the number
of public mass shootings per year.
The most striking finding from this study is that there was a
reduction in the number of public mass shooting events while
the FAWB was in place. Using prediction models in
combination with regression slopes, we estimate that 11 public
mass shootings were avoided due to the FAWB. By projecting
what would have happened if the FAWB remained in place, we
found that there would have been significantly fewer public
mass shootings if the FAWB had remained in place to 2019.
Remarkably, although it is intuitive that the removal of assault
weapons and magazine clips will reduce the lethality of a mass
shooting, we observed an inverse relationship between
weapons/ammunition and mass shooting events, meaning that
mass shooters may be less likely to perpetrate a mass shooting
without rapid fire military-style weapons. This is an independent
effect, which indirectly leads to fewer injuries and deaths.
DiMaggio et al [64] also found evidence of a decrease in public
mass shootings during the ban; however, their study period was
shorter and was restricted to 51 public mass shootings. Unlike
our study, they implicitly modeled public mass shootings as a
random instance of general gun homicides that had a high death
count [64]. In contrast, our findings suggest that public mass
shootings are a unique type of premeditated gun violence. We
found that prior to enactment of the FAWB, the rate of public
mass shootings was increasing. During enactment of the FAWB,
there was a downward trend of mass shooting events. After the
FAWB was lifted, public mass shootings increased dramatically.
Firearm homicides in general follow no such patterns.
This effect was not found in the work of Koper, Roth, and
colleagues [53-55]; however, their inclusion of all gun homicides
masks the ban’s effect on mass shootings. Even though Peterson
and Densley’s [77] work focused on perpetrator histories and
not the FAWB, their findings that ease of gun access is
characteristic of public mass shooters further supports our study.
We restricted the inclusion criteria to public mass shootings to
specifically test the effectiveness of the FAWB on public mass
shooting events.
Regardless of the FAWB, bringing a semiautomatic rifle with
high magazine capacity to a massacre significantly increases
the number of fatalities and injuries. The increase in deaths is
a function of rapid fire and increased ballistic energy. The
increase in injuries is also a function of rapid fire and
high-capacity magazines, enabling the shooter to shoot more
people in crowded venues quickly before the crowd can disperse
or hide. When controlling for the FAWB, the use of assault
rifles decreased by half during implementation of the ban and
tripled after the ban was lifted. This is a particularly important
finding given that the FAWB had loopholes and that overall
violent crime is decreasing [78]. First, all people with an assault
weapon prior to the FAWB were allowed to retain their
semiautomatic weapons [54,64]. Second, without a buyback
program, semiautomatic weapons remained in the community
[54,64]. Third, the ban did not target some military assault-like
weapons [54,64]. Finally, a major loophole found in gun control
legislation is that buyers can bypass background checks by
purchasing their weapons and ammunition from gun shows,
through illegal purchasing, or legally purchasing their guns and
ammunition from another gun owner [57,63,79-87]. Even with
these loopholes and issues, there was still a significant reduction
in public mass shootings during the FAWB. These loopholes
indicate that most people who purchase assault weapons do not
become mass shooters; however, mass shooters require assault
weapons and LCMs to carry out a mass shooting. Ban
effectiveness might have improved if all assault weapons were
included in the FAWB.
Some recent studies have specifically analyzed the effects of
LCM bans on the incidence of public mass shootings. In a
review of state legislation, Webster et al [88] found that bans
of LCMs were associated with a significant reduction in the
incidence of fatal public mass shootings. This study shows that
the FAWB, which included a ban on LCMs, was associated
with fewer fatalities and injuries during mass shootings in
addition to fewer public mass shooting events. Koper et al [27]
previously reported that 19% of public mass shootings resulting
in 4 or more fatalities included the use of LCMs, while only
10% involved an assault weapon. Klarevas et al [29] found a
similar pattern in shootings of 6 or more people, in which 67%
of shooters utilized LCMs, whereas only 26% utilized an assault
weapon. Because our study only looked at effects of the FAWB,
which included an LCM ban, we were only able to determine
the combined effects of limiting assault weapons and LCMs.
To be clear, the reduction in the number of public mass
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shootings, and resulting fatalities and injuries, may be a function
of the ban on assault weapons, assault weapons plus LCMs, or
only LCMs. We cannot separate out their independent effects
at the national level.
Unlike our study, Webster et al [88] did not evaluate the
incidence of assault weapons used in public mass shootings.
Rather, they focused on fatalities from public mass shootings
vs public mass shooting events. Although Webster et al [88]
utilized the FBI Supplemental Homicide Report as their dataset,
which is a voluntary reporting measurement system prone to
errors in reporting, their findings are applicable to our analysis.
Limitations
Although we found statistically significant decreases during the
FAWB, we cannot isolate aspects of the policy that are attributed
to the decline. Most notably, the FAWB also included LCMs
during the ban. It may be that the type of gun and/or the type
of magazine resulted in a decline. Indeed, assault weapons and
LCMs provide the means to carry out a mass shooting; however,
there are likely other factors beyond this study that partially
explain the radical increase in public mass shootings in the
post-FAWB period. For example, the FAWB was in place from
1994 to 2004, which is the same time period that the US
population largely adopted the internet, along with associated
social communication software and websites. This may have
resulted in better tracking of public mass shootings or increased
media coverage. Because our study specifically targeted the
federal legislation, we omitted state-level gun policies such as
state-level prohibitions on certain types of guns, LCMs, or more
lethal types of bullets. It is likely that the internet serves as a
contagion and as a guide to potential mass shooters, allowing
them to access weapons and multiple stories about other mass
shooters [62,67,89,90].
Conclusions
In summary, public mass shootings are a unique and specific
type of homicide by a gun. We found evidence that public mass
shootings are qualitatively different from general homicides
because after the FAWB expired, mass shooting events increased
while general homicides decreased. The increase in public mass
shootings was more dramatic in the final 10 years of the study
period following the end of the FAWB. We suspect that these
outcomes may be improved by removing existing semiautomatic
weapons with large bullet capacity by creating a buyback
program for all rapid-firing weapons. Moreover, the legislation
would be strengthened if it closed loopholes that allow gun
buyers to get around the background check legislation and other
purchase prohibitions by exempting gun shows and internet or
person-to-person purchases, which were exempted from the
FAWB and LCM ban [87].
Acknowledgments
The Violence Project Mass Shooter database generated data for our surveillance. This study was financially supported by the
Buehler Endowment at Feinberg School of Medicine.
Conflicts of Interest
None declared.
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Abbreviations
FAWB: Federal Assault Weapons Ban
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation
LCM: large-capacity magazine
Edited by G Eysenbach, T Sanchez; submitted 19.02.21; peer-reviewed by T Alcorn; comments to author 12.03.21; revised version
received 24.03.21; accepted 30.03.21; published 22.04.21
Please cite as:
Post L, Mason M, Singh LN, Wleklinski NP, Moss CB, Mohammad H, Issa TZ, Akhetuamhen AI, Brandt CA, Welch SB, Oehmke JF
Impact of Firearm Surveillance on Gun Control Policy: Regression Discontinuity Analysis
JMIR Public Health Surveill 2021;7(4):e26042
URL: https://publichealth.jmir.org/2021/4/e26042
doi: 10.2196/26042
PMID: 33783360
©Lori Post, Maryann Mason, Lauren Nadya Singh, Nicholas P Wleklinski, Charles B Moss, Hassan Mohammad, Tariq Z Issa,
Adesuwa I Akhetuamhen, Cynthia A Brandt, Sarah B Welch, James Francis Oehmke. Originally published in JMIR Public Health
and Surveillance (https://publichealth.jmir.org), 22.04.2021. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
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copyright and license information must be included.
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Background: The COVID-19 pandemic has had a profound global impact on governments, healthcare systems, economies, and populations around the world. Within the East Asia and Pacific region, some countries have mitigated the spread of the novel coronavirus effectively and largely avoided severe negative consequences, while others still struggle with containment. As the second wave reaches East Asia and the Pacific, it becomes more obvious that additional SARS-CoV-2 surveillance is needed to track recent shifts in the pandemic, rates of increase, and persistence. Objective: The goal of this study is to provide advanced surveillance metrics for COVID-19 transmission that account for speed, acceleration, jerk, persistence, and weekly shifts in the pandemic, to better understand country risk for explosive growth and those who are managing the pandemic successfully. Existing surveillance coupled with our dynamic metrics of transmission will inform health policy to control the COVID-19 pandemic until an effective vaccine is developed. We provide novel indicators to measure the transmission of disease. Methods: Using a longitudinal trend analysis study design, we extracted 330 days of COVID data from public health registries. We use an empirical difference equation to measure the daily number of cases in East Asia and the Pacific as a function of the prior number of cases, the level of testing, and weekly shift variables based on a dynamic panel model that was estimated using the generalized method of moments (GMM) approach by implementing the Arellano-Bond estimator in R. Results: Based on standard surveillance metrics, Indonesia, Philippines, and Myanmar are concerning because they have the largest new caseloads at 4,301, 2,588, and 1,387 respectively. However, when looking at the acceleration of new COVID-19 infections, we find that French Polynesia, Malaysia, and Philippines have the rates at 3.17, .22, and .06 per 100,000. These three countries also rank highest in jerk at 15.45, .10 and .04 respectively. Conclusions: Two of the most populous countries in East Asia and the Pacific, Indonesia and the Philippines, have alarming surveillance metrics. These two countries rank highest in new infections in the region. The highest rates of speed, acceleration and positive upwards jerk belong to French Polynesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Positive rates of speed, acceleration and upwards jerk are more likely to result in explosive growth. While all countries in East Asia and Pacific need to be cautious in regards to opening their countries because outbreaks are likely to occur in the second wave of COVID-19, the country of greatest concern remains the Philippines. Based on standard and enhanced surveillance, the Philippines has not gained control of the COVID-19 epidemic, which is particularly troubling because the country ranks 4th in population in the region. Without extreme and rigid social distancing, quarantines, hygiene, and masking to reverse trends, the Philippines will remain on the global top 5 list of worst COVID-19 outbreaks resulting in high morbidity and mortality. The second wave will only exacerbate existing conditions and increase COVID-19 transmissions.
Chapter
Following high-profile mass shootings in the United States, there are policy debates about gun regulation; yet, for the most part, these stall. This chapter suggests that an alternative way to frame this issue would be through “bullet control,” centering on the ammunition used. In order to inflict the greatest degree of damage possible, mass shooters tend to carry large quantities of bullets and large-capacity magazines with them. Harm-inducing bullets, such as hollow-points which penetrate certain parts of the body, have been used in previous mass shootings. Policy proposals could center on these areas to reduce harm in a mass shooting. Another regulation could focus on mandating background checks for ammunition. Interviews were conducted with six participants with knowledge of gun policies and/or gun violence prevention advocacy. Findings from interviews indicate support for these policy proposals. Discussed are ways to increase public support for these proposals via framing strategies. Also deliberated is whether the current political climate is conducive to pass legislation.
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Do bans on large-capacity magazines (LCMs) for semiautomatic firearms have significant potential for reducing the number of deaths and injuries in mass shootings? The most common rationale for an effect of LCM use is that they allow mass killers to fire many rounds without reloading. LCMs are known to have been used in less than one third of 1% of mass shootings. News accounts of 23 shootings in which more than six people were killed or wounded and LCMs were known to have been used, occurring in the United States in 1994–2013, were examined. There was only one incident in which the shooter may have been stopped by bystander intervention when he tried to reload. In all of these 23 incidents, the shooter possessed either multiple guns or multiple magazines, meaning that the shooter, even if denied LCMs, could have continued firing without significant interruption by either switching loaded guns or changing smaller loaded magazines with only a 2- to 4-seconds delay for each magazine change. Finally, the data indicate that mass shooters maintain such slow rates of fire that the time needed to reload would not increase the time between shots and thus the time available for prospective victims to escape.
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This article provides an overview of current knowledge about the relationship between mental illness, violence, homicides, and suicides, with a view towards crafting sensible public policy options for reducing gun violence towards self or others. With this knowledge as a backdrop, the limitations of the federal National Instant Background Check System (NICS) as both over-inclusive and under-inclusive in identifying people with mental illness who pose potential risks are discussed. Finally, the article describes emerging approaches for identifying and removing firearms from persons who pose potential risks of gun violence towards self or others, including Extreme Risk Protection Orders ("Red Flag Laws") and other options.
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In response to the continued expansion of "red flag" laws allowing broader classes of people to petition a court for the removal of firearms from individuals who exhibit dangerous conduct, this paper argues that state laws should adopt a double-filter provision that balances individual rights and government public safety interests. The main component of such a provision is a special statutory category - "reporting party" - that enables a broader social network, such as co-workers or school administrators, to request that a law enforcement officer file a petition for an Extreme Risk Protection Order (ERPO). A double-filter provision would not give reporting parties a right to file a court petition directly. Instead, parties would file a request for petition with law enforcement officers (first filter), who must seek an ERPO from the court if they find the reporting party's information credible. That information is then transmitted to the court (second filter) as a sworn affidavit of the reporting party. The goal is to facilitate a balanced policy model that (1) widens the reporting circle in order to feed more potentially life-saving information into the system, (2) mitigates the risk of erroneous deprivation of constitutionally protected due process and Second Amendment rights.