No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the author.
Demobilising far-right demonstration campaigns: Coercive counter-mobilisation, state social control, and the demobilisation of the Hess Gedenkmarsch campaign
Social Movement Studies
Abstract
Studies of social movements have often focused on mobilisation and campaigning; by comparison, demobilisation has received little attention. This article adds to the body of literature on demobilisation by examining one case of demonstration campaign demobilisation. The ‘Hess Gedenkmarsch’ campaign in Germany, initiated in the late 1980s and demobilised by the mid-1990s, is not only a case of a causal mechanism of demobilisation, but also particularly important within far-right social movement activity: it was the vanguard campaign in a emergent pattern of ‘demonstration politics’ by far-right groups in Germany. The case exhibits a process whereby anti-far-right activists effectively engaged in a sort of kamikaze counter-mobilisation, seeking to shut down far-right events; this, in turn, spurred state authorities to act, imposing coercive measures that demobilised the far-right campaign. This case illustrates a causal mechanism of negative demobilisation that can be observed in other demonstration campaigns, and is particularly relevant to other cases of far-right activism.
... This organisational practice has been met with an increased academic interest in non-institutional forms of far-right mobilisation, including social movements (Berntzen and Weisskircher 2016;Gattinara, Froio, and Pirro 2022) but also subcultures online and offline (Fielitz and Thurston 2019). Still, most of these studies have focused on specific actors (movements or subcultures), rather than exploring the dynamic interactions between different types of actors (but see Zeller 2022). ...
... Second, by focusing on campaigns as hybrid forms comprising social movements, but also parties, subcultures and media, we can focus on the relations between different types of players interacting with each other. Rather than being naturally opposed to each other, or to the contrary, being natural allies, parties and movements on the same side of the ideological spectrum often compete in terms of representing grievances and demands of their respective constituencies (Weisskircher and Berntzen 2019;Zeller 2022). In the Central and Eastern European context, authors have shown that 'the stronger a specific master-issue dimension is in party politics, the less salient that issue dimension is in protest politics' (Cisar and Vrablikova 2019). ...
... Countermobilization is another critical factor that may contribute to demobilization (Meyer and Staggenborg, 1996;Zeller, 2021). Voss, in her study of the American labour movement, clearly illustrates how the interplay between frames, countermobilization and the role of the state led to the collapse of the Knights of Labor (Voss, 1996). ...
The literature on political disengagement has proliferated since the global upsurge of mobilizations in late 2010. Studies show that disengagement is a highly dynamic process, shaped by the interaction of a multiplicity of factors at the micro-, meso- and macro-levels. The article reviews the principal factors related to disengagement, revealing their varied impact, the significance of agential factors and the context-specific nature of disengagement. Given the different forms and degrees of disengagement, scholars have begun to challenge strictly defined dichotomies such as engagement/disengagement. The article concludes by noting some blind spots in the literature and providing suggestions for future research.
... Beyond political strategies, far-right strength in the East is also linked to external factors, notably the lack of public opposition (for the importance of studying countermobilisation to the far right see Heinze & Weisskircher, 2022;Vüllers & Hellmeier, 2022;Zeller, 2021). The effective civil society mobilisation against the IB housing project in Halle being an exception, eastern far-right actors typically face less countermobilisation than in the West, creating comparatively favourable conditions for their local presence and regional strength. ...
... Beyond political strategies, far-right strength in the east is also linked to external factors, notably the lack of public opposition (for the importance of studying countermobilisation to the far right see Heinze & Weisskircher, 2022;Vüllers & Hellmeier, 2022;Zeller, 2021). The effective civil society mobilisation against the IB housing project in Halle being an exception, eastern far-right actors typically face less countermobilisation than in the west, creating relatively favourable conditions for their local presence and regional strength. ...
In line with the "localist" turn in populism studies, this chapter emphasizes the importance of subnational politics for understanding far-right strength. As a critical case, our focus on the federal state of Germany reveals that it is essential to consider the country's long-lasting east-west divide and the far right's regional stronghold of eastern Germany. First, we outline the key far-right players in party competition, protest politics, and subcultural milieus in (eastern) Germany. Second, we explain the far right's strength in the east, pointing to the importance of both the heritage of state socialism and the neoliberal transformation policies after "reunification". Third, we analyse the often-neglected role of far-right subnational politics in eastern Germany, underscoring their discursive appeal to subnational belonging, community, and identity as well as their seeking for subnational organisational strength and societal embeddedness. We conclude by contextualizing the strength of Germany's far right in the east and by highlighting broader lessons for scholarship on the far right.
... The literature on how democratic polities deal with right-wing extremism focuses on political and institutional actors at the expense of societal agency. Recent scholarly efforts to narrow the intellectual gap in the study of social movements and political parties (Tarrow 2021), have helped turn some attention to this agency, raising questions about the normative limits (Müller 2022) and real effectiveness (Castelli Gattinara, Froio & Pirro 2021;Hager et al. 2021;Vüllers & Hellmeier 2022;Zeller 2022) of societal mobilisation against the far right. ...
The literature on how democratic polities deal with right-wing extremism focuses on political and institutional actors at the expense of societal agency. This article offers a corrective by analysing antifascist mobilisation against one of the most extreme parties in Europe, Golden Dawn in Greece. It uses in-depth interviews with antifascists to sketch the developmental trajectory of Greek antifascism. It then utilises an original dataset of thousands of antifascist events to document spatial and temporal patterns of antifascist mobilisation. The article shows how antifascist mobilisation affected the developmental trajectory of the party and ultimately led to the conviction of its leadership.
The way social protest affects electoral outcomes remains a lacuna. This article helps fill this gap by examining how social protest against far right actors affects their electoral standing. The article utilizes a unique dataset of 4,745 local protest events to investigate how mobilization against the far right in Greece affected its electoral performance. The article finds that protest activity depressed the electoral results of the far right Golden Dawn by as much as 16%, after controlling for a number of important variables. The article identifies and specifies the patterns through which protests against the far right affect its electoral standing. Protests are effective when following the “tango” pattern—when there is close interaction of far right and anti-far right events. The timing of protest is also important and the article shows how the synchronization of protest and electoral cycles affects electoral outcomes. The article uses the findings to discuss the varying impact of protest across electoral cycles.
Zusammenfassung
Über das letzte Jahrzehnt hat die politische Mobilisierung von Rechts in Deutschland und Europa zugenommen. Insbesondere die Migrationsbewegungen seit 2015 waren für Netzwerke wie Pegida Anlass auf die Straße zu gehen. Auf der anderen Seite haben sich diverse zivilgesellschaftliche Akteure von antifaschistischen Gruppen über Gewerkschaften bis hin zu Kirchen organisiert, um in Form von Gegendemonstrationen ein Zeichen gegen Rechts und für Weltoffenheit zu setzen. Diese Mobilisierungsdynamiken von Protest und Gegenprotest fanden im Zuge der Konflikte um staatliche Maßnahmen zur Eindämmung der Corona-Pandemie ihre Fortsetzung. Proteste und Gegenproteste können zum einen Ausdruck einer bestehenden Polarisierung der Gesellschaft sein und bergen zum anderen das Risiko einer weiteren Polarisierung auf der Straße. Am Beispiel der Interaktion zwischen Pegida und der NoPegida-Bewegung diskutiert dieser Beitrag die möglichen Folgen von Gegenmobilisierung. Die Analysen legen nahe, dass Gegenproteste nicht zu einer Demobilisierung der Gegenseite führen. Nichtsdestotrotz können sie einen Positionierungsdruck auf politische Entscheidungsträger*innen ausüben, mediale Aufmerksamkeit für gesellschaftliche Konflikte generieren und die Vernetzung progressiver zivilgesellschaftlicher Akteure fördern.
In 2021, dynamics and trends generated by the pandemic continued to unfold—not least among far-right social forces. Members of CARR’s Organisation Research Unit (ORU) have helped to reconnoitre these developments throughout the year with scholarly and policy publications (see the bibliography of members’ publications this year at the end of this introduction). Furthermore, several ORU members and other CARR Fellows participated in a project to identify proscribed right-wing extremist organisations in the United Kingdom and the states of the European Union. Further reporting about this project is forthcoming. In this report, ORU members take a conceptual approach to analysing the contemporary far right.
This study highlights the role that critical events play in the demobilization of protest campaigns. Social movement scholars suggest that protest campaigns demobilize as a consequence of polarization within the campaign or the cooptation of the campaign leaders. I offer critical events as an alternative causal mechanism and argue that protest campaigns in ethnically divided societies are particularly combustible, as they have the potential to trigger unintended or unorchestrated communal violence. When such violence occurs, elite strategies change, mass support declines, and the campaign demobilizes. An empirical investigation of the dynamics of the demobilization phase of the anti-foreigner protest campaign in Assam, India, between 1979 and 1985 confirms this argument. A single group analysis is conducted to compare the dynamics of the campaign before and after the communal violence by using time series event data collected from The Indian Express, a national newspaper. The study has wider implications for the literature on collective action, as it illuminates the dynamic and complex nature of protest campaigns.
Process-tracing in social science is a method for studying causal mechanisms linking causes with outcomes. This enables the researcher to make strong inferences about how a cause (or set of causes) contributes to producing an outcome. Derek Beach an.
This study examines the demobilization of the Ogoni protest campaign in the oil producing Niger Delta region of Nigeria in the mid-1990s. The contentious politics literature suggests that protest campaigns demobilize as a consequence of the polarization between radical and moderate protesters. In this study, we offer a different causal mechanism and argue that protest campaigns can demobilize before such polarization occurs if states respond to the expansion of a protest campaign with brutal and indiscriminate repression. Moreover, states can prevent the subsequent radicalization of a protest campaign followed by harsh repression by coopting the radicals and the remaining moderate elites while continuing to use repression to prevent collective action. Our conclusion assesses how relations between extractive industry firms and their local host communities have or have not changed in the twenty years since the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1995.
Despite the growing body of scholarship on burnout among social justice activists who are working on a variety of issues, from labor rights to queer justice, little attention has been paid to burnout among those whose activism focuses on issues of educational justice. To begin to address this omission and understand what supports might help social justice education activists mitigate burnout and sustain their activism, we analyzed interview data from 14 activists focused on activist burnout and its implications on movements for educational justice.. This analysis identified 3 major symptom categories of activist burnout and we gained insights into the culture of martyrdom in social justice education movements. These symptoms and the culture of martyrdom, by negatively impacting the health and sustainability of activists, threaten the efficiency and effectiveness of educational justice movements.
This article presents an overview of the writings on the extreme right party family of the third wave (1980–95). First, the prime criterion for the classification of the party family is discussed. Second, the main critiques of, and alternatives to, the term right‐wing extremism are evaluated. Third, the political parties that are generally considered to be members of the party family are identified. Fourth, subgroups within the larger party family are examined. In the conclusion, the various writings are structured on the basis of four theoretical schools within the broader study of right‐wing extremism.
Process-tracing in social science is a method for studying causal mechanisms linking causes with outcomes. This enables the researcher to make strong inferences about how a cause (or set of causes) contributes to producing an outcome. Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen introduce a refined definition of process-tracing, differentiating it into three distinct variants and explaining the applications and limitations of each. The authors develop the underlying logic of process-tracing, including how one should understand causal mechanisms and how Bayesian logic enables strong within-case inferences. They provide instructions for identifying the variant of process-tracing most appropriate for the research question at hand and a set of guidelines for each stage of the research process. © 2019 by Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen. All rights reserved.
The aftermath of the 2011–2012 Russian social movement Za chestnye vybory (For Fair Elections) challenges the common assumption that sees mass mobilisation as leading to positive outcomes for civil society. This article argues that the movement, by failing to institutionalise cooperative ties and secure popular support, had ambiguous outcomes for civil society. While repression surely played a role in this outcome, choices made by movement leaders during demobilisation should not be overlooked: one part of the movement became radicalised while another made a premature attempt to enter formal politics, thus hindering the movement’s later attempt to institutionalise.
In all probability, the moment that opposition to the National Front (NF) is mentioned, it is the Anti-Nazi League (ANL) which springs to mind. This organisation, formed in late 1977, grew rapidly to become the Front’s most memorable opponent. In its first year, it recruited some 40,000–50,000 members, distributed over five million leaflets and sold around one million anti-Front badges and stickers. Such was the level of its popular support, the Anti-Nazi League was widely regarded as the largest extra-parliamentary movement since the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in the early 1960s.1 By mobilising mass opposition to the National Front, and by smearing the Front with the lethal Nazi label, the Anti-Nazi League has been judged an unqualified success. Many claim that the ANL was largely responsible for the electoral demise of the National Front at the end of the 1970s and have urged others, such as opponents of the Front National in France, to follow its example.2 But in point of fact, support for the National Front may have already peaked by the time the Anti-Nazi League was launched. Moreover, the concentration on the activities of the Anti-Nazi League has meant that the work of other anti-fascist groups that either pre-dated or paralleled the ANL has been largely ignored. This narrow focus has also precluded wider consideration of other sources of anti-fascism. It may well have been the case, for instance, that hostility from the mainstream media impeded the National Front more than the activities of opposition groups. Certainly this was the view of the National Front, who after the 1979 general election identified the media and not the ANL as its ‘number one enemy’.3
Mehr als 25 Jahre nach seinem Tod ist Rudolf Heß eine der bedeutendsten Figuren der extremen Rechten. Kein anderer Anlass hat es bisher geschafft, neonazistische Mobilisierungen und Inszenierungen so nachhaltig zu beeinflussen wie das Gedenken an den Hitler-Stellvertreter. Um ihn rankt sich eine mythisch verklärte Erzählung, in der es weniger um historische Fakten als um eine bestimmte Botschaft geht: Rudolf Heß als Sinnbild für Treue, Ehre, Opferbereitschaft, Standhaft igkeit und Pflichterfüllung in einem Abenteuer voll Hinterlist und Verrat.
Since the 1970s, catalogs of protest events have been at the heart of research on social movements. To measure how protest changes over time or varies across space, sociologists usually count the frequency of events, as either the dependent variable or a key independent variable. An alternative is to count the number of participants in protest. This article investigates demonstrations, strikes, and riots. Their size distributions manifest enormous variation. Most events are small, but a few large events contribute the majority of protesters. When events are aggregated by year or by city, the correlation between total participation and event frequency is low or modest. The choice of how to quantify protest is therefore vital; findings from one measure are unlikely to apply to another. The fact that the bulk of participation comes from large events has positive implications for the compilation of event catalogs. Rather than worrying about the underreporting of small events, concentrate on recording large ones accurately.
How do social movements die? Some explanations highlight internal factors like factionalization, whereas others stress external factors like repression. Christian Davenport offers an alternative explanation where both factors interact. Drawing on organizational, as well as individual-level, explanations, Davenport argues that social movement death is the outgrowth of a coevolutionary dynamic whereby challengers, influenced by their understanding of what states will do to oppose them, attempt to recruit, motivate, calm, and prepare constituents while governments attempt to hinder all of these processes at the same time. Davenport employs a previously unavailable database that contains information on a black nationalist/secessionist organization, the Republic of New Africa, and the activities of authorities in the U.S. city of Detroit and state and federal authorities.
How can we get inside popular collective struggles and explain how they work? Contentious Performances presents a distinctive approach to analyzing such struggles, drawing especially on incomparably rich evidence from Great Britain between 1758 and 1834. The book accomplishes three main things. First, it presents a logic and method for describing contentious events, occasions on which people publicly make consequential claims on each other. Second, it shows how that logic yields superior explanations of the dynamics in such events, both individually and in the aggregate. Third, it illustrates its methods and arguments by means of detailed analyses of contentious events in Great Britain from 1758 to 1834.
Changes in threats perceived by activists, partisan identification, and coalition brokerage are three mechanisms that help to explain the demobilization of the antiwar movement in the United States from 2007 to 2009. Drawing upon 5,398 surveys of demonstrators at antiwar protests, interviews with movement leaders, and ethnographic observation, this article argues that the antiwar movement demobilized as Democrats, who had been motivated to participate by anti-Republican sentiments, withdrew from antiwar protests when the Democratic Party achieved electoral success, if not policy success in ending the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The withdrawal of Democratic activists changed the character of the antiwar movement by undermining broad coalitions in the movement and encouraging the formation of smaller, more radical coalitions. While the election of Barack Obama had been heralded as a victory for the antiwar movement, Obama's election, in fact, thwarted the ability of the movement to achieve critical mass.
Social movement campaigns help create the networks and collective identities needed to build social movement communities, which in turn support subsequent collective campaigns. This article examines the interactions between movement communities and campaigns using the case of the 2000 World March of Women in Montreal. We find that movement community resources and networks, mobilized by leaders in stable movement organizations and institutions, support campaigns. Centralization, diversity, and size of movement communities affect campaign mobilization. Movement campaigns alter movement communities by creating bonds that form the basis for subsequent campaigns and by keeping movement communities politicized. Prior campaigns generate public consciousness, put issues on the public agenda, create new frames and discourse, forge connections to new constituents, and leave behind new networks, coalition organizations, leaders, and activists. Our research contributes to an understanding of the connections between the submerged networks of social movement communities and the contentious politics of movement campaigns.
Why might social movements be highly contentious at one point in time and demobilize shortly after? Based on ethnographic fieldwork, this article examines the dynamics of demobilization of popular movements in a context of patronage politics. I argue that demobilization in these contexts results from relational processes creating a “dual pressure” stemming “from below” and “from above.” In social environments where patronage is pervasive, poor people develop survival strategies relying on clientelistic arrangements. They participate in a social movement organization (SMO) to voice their rights, but also to address pressing survival needs by gaining access to resources. These expectations of constituents create a pressure “from below” on leaders of an SMO, which respond by securing resources obtained through alliances with national political actors. In turn, these alliances create a pressure “from above,” because local leaders reciprocate this national support by eschewing the organization of collective actions. Drawing on data culled from 12 months of fieldwork on an Argentine peasant movement, this article inspects the interconnections between popular movements and patronage politics to refine our understanding of demobilization processes; contribute to discussions regarding the role of culture on contentious politics; and shed light on current demobilization trends in Latin America.
Movement-countermovement interaction is an ongoing feature of contemporary social movements and, indeed, of contemporary politics. Yet the interplay of contending movements is understudied and undertheorized. This article begins to remedy this deficit by arguing that new work on political opportunity structure provides important insights and significant theoretical leverage for this study. Through a review of the literatures on countermovements and political opportunity, this article argues that this interaction increases when states enable but do not satisfy challengers. This article presents a general framework of theoretical propositions for understanding the interplay of movements and their opponents to animate and guide subsequent research.
Work on repression within the social movements literature has largely focused on state-based and coercive repression, despite both the empirical importance of private and non-coercive forms of protest control and the theoretical leverage studying other forms of protest control could offer. This paper argues that scholars should shift from studying repression, which as a terminology carries connotations about state-based and coercive action, and instead focus on the “social control of protest.” The paper then manufactures a literature on private forms of protest control, culling existing work from disparate fields and literatures. These works are organized using a previously published typology of repressive forms that covers such diverse actions as vigilantism and countermovement violence. This organization reveals that empirical research has been done on private protest control even if it has not been named as such or been connected to a coherent body of scholarship on the subject. The paper then examines possible directions for future research that could facilitate the growth of scholarship on private protest control.
This article uses social movement and organization theory to develop a set of concepts that help explain social movement continuity. The theory is grounded in new data on women's rights activism from 1945 to the 1960s that challenge the traditional view that the American women's movement died after the suffrage victory in 1920 and was reborn in the 1960s. This case delineates a process in social movements that allows challenging groups to continue in nonreceptive political climates through social movement abeyance structures. Five characteristics of movement abeyance structures are identified and elaborated: temporality, purposive commitment, exclusiveness, centralization, and culture. Thus, social movement abeyance structures provide organizational and ideological bridges between different upsurges of activism by the same challenging group.
Activists make strategic decisions about how to pursue their claims, but strategy is hard to study and the topic is underdeveloped theoretically. Here, we contribute to the developing academic literature on social movement strategy by offering a theoretical framework that emphasizes three distinct, albeit interrelated, movement choices: arenas of action, advocacy tactics, and demands. This framework allows us to infer strategy at the movement level through the analysis of events data. Using events data from the New York Times from 1959 to 1996, in conjunction with historical accounts of abortion politics in the United States, we analyze the development of the strategies of the anti-abortion and abortion rights movements. We demonstrate the utility of this framework, and show how movement strategies are affected by both political opportunities and the actions of countermovements, whose activists respond to the same political opportunities. We conclude with a discussion of the complications of assessing movement strategy and call for more research on the topic.
Berlin: Prenzelberg Dokumentation e
- Antifaschistischen Nachrichten
Antifaschistischen Nachrichten. (1994). "Antifa Nachrichten 1993." Köln: Nadir.orgGNN-Verlag.
https://www.nadir.org/nadir/periodika/antifa{\_}nachrichten/an-93-18.txt.
"Antifaschistischer Sommerkalender." 1990. Berlin: Prenzelberg Dokumentation e.V. https://
www.antifa-nazis-ddr.de/1990/08/.
Antifa: The Anti-Fascist Handbook
- M Bray
Bray, M. (2013). Antifa: The Anti-Fascist Handbook. Melville House Publishing.
Verfassungsschutzbericht
Bundesministerium des Innern. (1994). Verfassungsschutzbericht 1993. Bonn: Bundesministerium
des Innern, Deutschland.
Bundesministerium
des
Innern.
(1995).
Verfassungsschutzbericht
1994.
Berlin:
Bundesministerium des Innern, Deutschland.
Bundesverfassungsgericht. (2001). "1 BvQ 13/01." Karlsruhe: Bundesverfassungsgericht. https://
www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2001/03/qk20010324{\_}
1bvq001301.html.
How Social Movements Die
- C Davenport
Davenport, C. (2015). How Social Movements Die. Cambridge University Press.
Hamburg: Zeit-Verlag Gerd Bucerius GmbH & Co
- F Drieschner
Drieschner, F. (1990). "Die Vorhänge zuziehen." Hamburg: Zeit-Verlag Gerd Bucerius GmbH &
Co. KG. https://www.zeit.de/1990/35/die-vorhaenge-zuziehen/komplettansicht.
Rechte „Heß-Pilger“ linken Polizei
- K Klingelschmitt
Klingelschmitt, K. (1993). "Rechte "Heß-Pilger" linken Polizei." Berlin: Die Tageszeitung (TAZ).
https://taz.de/!1604129/.
Wunsiedel Hess Gedenkmarsch
- K Klocke
Klocke, K. (1990). "Wunsiedel Hess Gedenkmarsch." Hamburg: Spiegel TV GmbH. https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=fSQ{\_}ocrxqnw.
The Beast Reawakens. Little, Brown; Company
- M Lee
Lee, M. (1997). The Beast Reawakens.. Little, Brown; Company.
The rise of the Ku Klux Klan: Right-wing movements and national politics
- R Mcveigh
McVeigh, R. (2009). The rise of the Ku Klux Klan: Right-wing movements and national politics.
University of Minnesota Press.
Der Mythos stirbt zuletzt: Neonazistisches Gedenken, der Kriegsverbrecher Rudolf Heß, antifaschistische Diskussion. rat -reihe antifaschistischer texte
- P O'hara
- D Schlueter
O'Hara, P., & Schlueter, D. (2002). Der Mythos stirbt zuletzt: Neonazistisches Gedenken, der
Kriegsverbrecher Rudolf Heß, antifaschistische Diskussion. rat -reihe antifaschistischer texte.
Pezolt, P. (2006). Rechtsextremistische Aktionen in Wunsiedel. In D. Staack &
S. Schwentuchowski (Eds.), Versammlungen: Rechtliche, Strategisch-Taktische, Politische,
Pyschologische Und Ethische Fragen (pp. 252-286). LIT Verlag.
Wunsiedel wehrt sich gegen den Aufmarsch der Rechtsextremisten
- P Pezolt
Pezolt, P. (2008). "Wunsiedel wehrt sich gegen den Aufmarsch der Rechtsextremisten." Freiheit
Und Recht, no. 1-2: 1-8. Feldkirchen-Westerham: Bund Widerstand und Verfolgung (BWV-Bayern) e.V. https://www.bwv-bayern.org/component/content/article/3-suchergebnis/25-wunsiedel-wehrt-sich-gegen-den-aufmarsch-der-rechtsextremisten.html.
"Polizei schützte Neonazi-Aufmarsch in Oberfranken." (1989). Berlin: Neues Deutschland
Druckerei und Verlags GmbH. https://www.nd-archiv.de/artikel/1969389.polizei-schuetzteneonazi-aufmarsch-in-oberfranken.html.
Capturing the streets’: Demonstration marches as a political instrument of the extreme right in contemporary germany
- F Virchow
Virchow, F. (2007). 'Capturing the streets': Demonstration marches as a political instrument of the
extreme right in contemporary germany. In M. Reiss (Ed.), 'The Street as Stage': Protest Marches
and Public Rallies Since the Nineteenth Century (pp. 295-310). Oxford University Press.
Creating a European (neo-Nazi) movement by joint political action
- F Virchow
Virchow, F. (2013a). Creating a European (neo-Nazi) movement by joint political action? In
A. Mammone, E. Godin, & B. Jenkins (Eds.), Varieties of Right-Wing Extremism in Europe (pp.
197-214). Routledge.
Wunsiedel Ist Bunt - Nicht Braun! Die Auseinandersetzungen Um Das Heß-Grab Verändern Die Politische Kultur
- F Virchow
Virchow, F. (2013b). »Wem die Straße gehört«: Wunsiedel als symbolischer Ort der
Demonstrationspolitik der extremen Rechten. In J. Hasse, G. Rosenthal, & J. Twisselmann
(Eds.), Wunsiedel Ist Bunt -Nicht Braun! Die Auseinandersetzungen Um Das Heß-Grab
Verändern Die Politische Kultur (pp. 171-185). bfdt/BPgR.
Wunsiedel: Stadt Wunsiedel
- Stadt
Wunsiedel Stadt Chronik 1974-1991." (1991). Wunsiedel: Stadt Wunsiedel. https://wunsiedel.de/
leben-in-wunsiedel/stadtportrait/chroniken-von-wunsiedel/.
“Die Vorhänge zuziehen
- F Drieschner
Rechtsextremistische Aktionen in Wunsiedel
- P Pezolt