The Ultimate Resource 2
... While the outcome of the bet was extremely favorable to Simon, its terms made it possible for his opponents to dismiss its relevance because of the volatility of commodity prices (that are also affected by political upheavals and technological changes), alternative timeframes (such as a different 10-year period) that would have favored Ehrlich, 4 the alleged ecological irrelevance of commodities (as compared to problems such as the destruction of natural capital), and claims that Ehrlich simply got his timing wrong in terms of unavoidable outcomes. 5 2 See, among others, Simon (1996; and Kuran (2000). 3 Simon's thoughts on pollution are summarized in chapters 15-18 of The Ultimate Resources 2 (1996). ...
... But contrary to the implications of many such writings on the subject, these events need not be seen as malign. Shifts to nuclear fission and to other new sources of energy may result in reduced total emissions even as total energy use goes up -as was the case in the U.K. and the U.S. over the years (Simon 1996 non-paginated). ...
... That so many well-meaning academics remain enthralled by scenarios of doom after two centuries of debates in which depletionist projections were repeatedly crushed by future developments is more puzzling. Simon (1996Simon ( , 1999) ventured a few explanations, such as how the training of biologists did not prepare them to understand market processes. Nonetheless, the fact that Paul Ehrlich keeps being showered with awards despite a remarkably erroneous track record can only make one wonder about academic incentives and feedback mechanisms in environmental science and policy. ...
Historian Paul Sabin’s The Bet aims to present the first full-fledged account of the 1980 wager about the future prices of five metals between biologist Paul Ehrlich and economist Julian Simon. Ehrlich predicted that a growing population would rapidly deplete the world’s finite supply of valuable resources, causing their price to rise. Simon countered that, in a market economy, prices and technological change would result in more efficient use of resources, new deposits discovered and substitutes developed, making resources less scarce and prices lower. Unfortunately, Sabin’s account of this bet is marred by a lack of historical perspective, an oversimplification of Simon’s theoretical framework, and a quest to find a middle ground between mutually exclusive positions.
... (OECD,2020). A large market size may also generate a higher demand for innovative goods, which in turn alters the human capital endowment, resulting in higher productivity (Kuznets, 1967;Kremer, 1993;Simon, 1996) When considering the influence of the global optimal population on sustainable economic growth, the aggregate demand-aggregate supply (AD-AS) model can effectively analyse the global optimal population. This model provides a framework to understand how population changes impact the overall economy through shifts in demand (AD) and supply (AS) curves. ...
The substantial population growth in recent years has stimulated economic expansion and technological innovation and provided opportunities for labour force increase and market expansion, generating a "demographic dividend", but at the same time, it has put a burden on ecological resources, which is not conducive to sustainable development. This paper argues that there is an optimal global population that can provide enough labour and market size to drive sustained economic growth while ensuring the well-being of future generations. Specifically, this paper determines the optimal population by comparing the marginal benefit (MB) and marginal cost (MC) generated by the additional population. It explores the virtuous cycle between population growth and economic development. The results show that better resource management and ecological protection measures are needed to ensure sustained economic growth and optimal population size and achieve long-term sustainable development.
... The human brain's creative potential has prompted researchers to call it the ultimate resource (Simon 1996;Naam 2013). Thus, it may seem obvious that people's education, skills and talents their human capital -should be of crucial importance for countries' economic growth, as demonstrated, e.g., by Hanushek and Woessman (2015) and Barro (2001). ...
In the wake of the Covid-19 crisis, the European Union must regain lost ground and create more favorable conditions for inclusive and sustainable economic growth. The best way to achieve this goal is by increasing the Union’s innovativeness. This effort requires extensive and broad-based institutional reforms aimed at strengthening the incentives for entrepreneurship. Innovative entrepreneurship requires collaborations with numerous agents that provide those skills and resources that the entrepreneur is lacking: inventors, key personnel, demanding customers, and early and later-stage financiers. Based on this ecosystem perspective, we propose reforms in the following six broad areas: (i) the rule of law and property rights, (ii) taxation, (iii) savings and finance, (iv) labor market regulations and social security, (v) entry and exit barriers in product markets, and (vi) human capital for entrepreneurship. The reforms would likely strengthen Europe’s innovation capacity at a time when it is needed more than ever.KeywordsEntrepreneurshipEuropean UnionInnovationInstitutionsPolicy reformRegulationSelf-employmentJEL CodesL26L5M13O38O52P14
... Anthropic-hazard is defined here as "(…) any human activity that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, social and economic disruption or environmental degradation" (UNDRR, 2017). Differently from what Simon (1981Simon ( , 1996 and Lomborg (2001) predicted, economic growth and technology are still insufficient to correct, balance or repair the impact of modern society on planet Earth. Moreover, they are risk drivers to technological disasters. ...
Disasters pose a major threat to cities’ development. Consequently, a lot of attention has been put into increasing urban capacity to withstand, adapt and grow no matter what kind of catastrophic event they go through. However, the majority of international campaigns and local actions to reach these objectives, focused exclusively in reducing vulnerabilities, have been proven insufficient to avoid disasters. As argued in this paper, this is because cities are not only vulnerable to disasters, but the epicenter of highly destructive global threats, which are mostly neglected. By using the latest disaster science terminology to examine hazard creation in the cities of Bangalore (India) and São Paulo (Brazil), it becomes clear that unplanned urban development can be considered anthropic-hazard driver. This finding highlights the need for urban planners, researchers and local governments to focus on reducing hazard-creation with the same enthusiasm as they are trying to reduce vulnerabilities in urban settings.
Natural resources are the foundation of the human economy. Every product or service produced in the economy and sold in the marketplace consumes natural resources. Land, fossil fuel, minerals, water, gases, timber, plant extracts and resins, and organisms are converted into goods and services and in this process financial capital is created in the marketplace. Resources provided by nature thus form the natural capital that the economy feeds upon.
Many studies have observed a correlation between beliefs regarding nature's resilience and (political) preferences regarding the organization of society. Liberal‐egalitarians, for example, generally believe nature to be much more fragile than libertarians, who believe nature to be much more resilient. Cultural theory explains this correlation by the idea that people are only able to see those risks that fit their preferred organization of society. This article offers an alternative, second explanation for the observed correlation: Both beliefs regarding nature's resilience and political preferences can be explained by the same cognitive biases toward ambiguous risk, that is, dispositions determining our expectations regarding the possible state of affairs resulting from our acts and their probabilities. This has consequences for political philosophy and the psychology of risk. In particular, there is a knowledge gap in psychology regarding the cognitive biases underlying the belief that despite ambiguity, experts can determine safe limits for human impacts on the environment.
Pecuniary externalities—costs imposed on third parties mediated through the price system—have typically received little philosophical attention. Recently, this has begun to change. In two separate papers, Richard Endörfer (Econ Philos 38, pp. 221–241, 2022) and Hayden Wilkinson (Philos Public Affairs 50: 202–238, 2022) place pecuniary externalities at center stage. Though their arguments differ significantly, both conclude pecuniary externalities are in some sense morally problematic. If the state is not called on to regulate pecuniary externalities, then, at the very least, individuals should be conscious of how their productive and consumptive decisions affect others by changing prices. We disagree. Both arguments fail, in that neither gives us reason to think pecuniary externalities are cause for moral concern. Unless a new argument emerges, pecuniary externalities should be left alone.
This paper introduces a theory of ownership that is rooted in Israel Kirzner’s theory of entrepreneurship – The Entrepreneurial Theory of Ownership. Its central idea is that natural resources are not available to us automatically as other approaches to justice implicitly assume. Before we can use a resource, we need to do preparatory work in the form of making an entrepreneurial judgement on it. This fact, as I argue, makes it possible to put private ownership as a natural right on a firm normative ground and answer many traditional challenges to private property.
Volume VI: Emerging and Peripheral Technologies covers technologies that have come to the forefront of the industry in the past 20 years. Descriptions of unique developments that are on the “periphery” of the areas covered in the first five volumes or in emerging areas of technology are included.
This mini-review aims at proving that waste-to-energy (WtE) is an essential cornerstone for circular economy (CE). Based on literature, the history of thermal waste treatment over the last 150 years is investigated, from open burning to WtE with resource recovery and final sink function. The results show that in the past incineration solved the issues it was designed for but often created new and sometimes even worse problems: The introduction of incineration in the 19th century improved urban sanitation, decreased waste volume and prolonged operational life of landfills. But it also polluted the environment, triggering an unprecedented scientific and engineering effort of all stakeholders. Today, WtE is one of the best investigated and optimized technologies in waste management. It enables the recovery of energy as heat and electric power and facilitates the ‘cleaning’ of cycles by the destruction of hazardous organic substances. Recent developments in resource recovery from WtE residues allow to recycle metals and, in the case of sewage sludge, even phosphorus by thermal recycling. Combined with carbon capture and storage technology, WtE stands for a quantifiable contribution to greenhouse gas reduction. Today, WtE is indispensable to reach the goals of CE, namely recycling of energy and materials, supplying safe final sinks for persistent organic substances and minimizing the need for sinks for hazardous inorganic substances.
Consumer psychology refers to how people think and act within an economic role in market exchange. However, we know little about how consumers actually perceive these roles, or how they understand markets and economic activity more broadly. That is, we lack an understanding of the economic reasoning of non‐expert consumers, how it departs from formal economic reasoning, and why. The current paper is intended to address this gap. We provide an integrative review of research on lay economic reasoning that consistently reveals how differently lay consumers and economists think about markets. We propose a unifying mental model to explain these divergences. Suggest why it is reinforced by what lay consumers observe (and do not observe) through firsthand marketplace experience, and note its potential evolutionary basis. We then highlight how understanding lay economic reasoning can not only help explain a wide array of marketplace phenomena, but also provide a novel lens to help advance, generate, and better integrate theory across many active literatures within consumer psychology. Without markets, there are no consumers and there is no marketing. We therefore call for consumer psychologists to take ownership of the study of lay economic reasoning and make markets more central to marketing scholarship.
Growing evidence demonstrating clear threats to the sustainability of the ecosystems supporting human societies has given rise to a variety of sociological theories of human-environment interactions. These environmental impact theories fall into three general perspectives: human ecology, modernization, and political economy. These theories, however, have not been empirically tested in a common analytic framework. Here, a framework that relies on ecological principles is adopted and modified. Using a revised stochastic formulation of that framework and the most comprehensive measure of environmental impact to date—the ecological footprint—the factors driving the environmental impacts of societies are assessed. The overall findings support the claims of human ecologists, partially support the claims of political economists, and contradict the claims of modernization theorists. Basic material conditions, such as population, economic production, urbanization, and geographical factors all affect the environment and explain the vast majority of cross-national variation in environmental impact. Factors derived from neo-liberal modernization theory, such as political freedom, civil liberties, and state environmentalism have no effect on impacts. Taken together, these findings suggest societies cannot be sanguine about achieving sustainability via a continuation of current trends in economic growth and institutional change.
This article applies thematic analysis to the discourse of the environmental countermovement, focusing primarily on the mutually referencing contributions of Julian Simon, Friedrich von Hayek, and Ronald Reagan. Utilizing a close reading of these texts, it aims to describe how the subscribers to this discourse picture the human relationship with the natural world, and how this in turn enables them to believe that the market can overcome environmental limits indefinitely. This analysis brings to the fore a belief apparently underlying their faith in unending growth: that humankind is able to progressively convert nature into economic reality, whose essence is the limitless quality of the human mind.
This chapter points out that the destiny of human civilization has been a topic of intense debate at least since the end of the eighteenth century. This debate has been characterized, on the one hand, by Malthusians, who take the position that economic growth is limited and that if it overshoots planetary boundaries, this may pose an existential risk, and, on the other hand, Cornucopians, who trust that technological innovation and human ingenuity will be able to overcome any planetary—physical—limits to economic growth.
We derive and analyse a model with unusual features characterizing human activities over the long-run. First, human population dynamics draw heavily on consumer–resource modelling in ecology in that humans must consume biological resources to produce new humans. Second, the model also draws heavily from economic growth theory in that humans do not simply consume biological resources; they also produce the resources they consume. Finally, humans use two types of technology. Consumption technology affects the rate at which humans can extract resources. Production technology controls how effectively humans convert labour into new resources. The dynamics of both types of technology are subject to cumulative cultural evolutionary processes that allow both technological progress and regress. The resulting model exhibits a wide range of dynamical regimes. That said, the system is routinely sensitive to initial conditions, with wildly different outcomes given the same parameter values. Moreover, the system exhibits a basic fragility in the sense that human activities often lead to the endogenous extinction of the human species. This can happen gently, or it can follow periods of explosive human activity with super-exponential growth that ends in collapse.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘Evolution and sustainability: gathering the strands for an Anthropocene synthesis’.
Population issues and population policies have evolved considerably between the 20th and the 21st centuries. In the 1970s, most countries confronted rapid population growth, and this situation was particularly severe in Asia. Today, on the contrary, more than half of the world population is experiencing low fertility and population aging, and several countries with very low fertility are facing the prospect of depopulation. Only one region, i.e., sub-Saharan Africa, still experiences high fertility levels. Similarly, the discussions about whether and how to intervene on population trends have also evolved over the past 70 years. Demographically focused approaches to family planning provision were dominant views in the second half of the 20th century. However, since the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo in 1994, international population policy paradigms have been reframed to stress the freedom of couples and the reproductive rights of individuals. Consequently, policy interventions have favored client-focused and gender-sensitive approaches. Finally, to help chart the way forward, population policies will need to consider several key elements, broadening from a focus on support for family planning to an array of policy instruments including health, education, and culture, all of which shape future populations. This new policy framework includes the prioritization of interventions, policy consensus building, the selection of priority constituencies, the institutionalization and funding of policies, and the promotion of evidence-based and research-driven policies. In addition, in order to adapt their interventions to local contexts, population policies will need to be holistic, to promote integrated interventions, and to align with international development frameworks.
Scarcity and growth analyses about energy include forecasting extraction rates of non‐renewable resources while taking into account technological progression. One mechanism, Moore's (1965) Law of technological improvement, encompasses experience enhanced steady cost reductions. Alternatively, synthesis technological change refers to unforeseen innovative breakthroughs. These trends relate to the Hubbert (1956, 1962) Curve of U.S shale oil extraction in the U.S. Lower 48 contiguous states. Price effects, drilling rigs and the price‐to‐drilling rig relationship are analyzed. Results show we are at peak U.S. shale oil, and could experience comprehensive decline. This implies Catton's (1982) “Age of Exuberance,” and “Carrying Capacity” drawdown.
The way our decisions and actions can affect future generations is surrounded by uncertainty. This is evident in current discussions of environmental risks related to global climate change, biotechnology and the use and storage of nuclear energy. The aim of this paper is to consider more closely how uncertainty affects our moral responsibility to future generations, and to what extent moral agents can be held responsible for activities that inflict risks on future people. It is argued that our moral responsibility to posterity is limited because our ability to foresee how present decisions and activities will affect future people is limited. The reason for this is primarily that we are in a situation of ignorance regarding the pace and direction of future scientific and technological development. This ignorance reduces our responsibility in a temporal dimension because in most areas it is impossible to predict the interests and resource needs of future generations. In one area, however, we have fairly reliable knowledge about future people. It is reasonable to assume that future human beings will have the same basic physiological (physical and biological) needs as we have. On this basis, it is argued that we can be held responsible for activities causing avoidable damage to critical resources that are necessary to provide for future physiological needs. Furthermore, it is suggested that it is prima facie immoral to impose risks upon future generations in cases where the following conditions are fulfilled: (1) the risk poses a threat to the ability of future generations to meet their physiological needs, and (2) the risk assessment is supported by scientifically based harm scenarios.
Vertical farming is a rapidly expanding type of indoor controlled environment agriculture whose promises have attracted widespread praise and considerable early-stage capital in recent years. Among vertical farming’s many claimed benefits, per-area productivity is frequently mentioned, proposing crop yields at least two orders of magnitude higher than outdoor field agriculture. These extremely high yields form the basis for a theory of land use change whereby yield-increasing technologies reduce or reverse the expansionary demands of lower-yielding farms, retaining or returning those areas to “wild nature”. In a sensational articulation of this kind of intensification, from 2007 to 2017 many vivid proposals portrayed centrally located skyscraper farms as a key strategy for building self-sufficient cities. This skyscraper articulation of vertical farming captured the public imagination and led to substantial investment into contemporary vertical farming facilities, the majority of which are in large suburban high-ceiling single-story warehouses. This paper traces the politics of vertical farming’s land-sparing narratives beginning early in the twentieth century, with a closer analysis of two contrasting historical examples: Othmar Ruthner’s 1960s tower greenhouses, which closely resemble the imaginary skyscraper farms of the 2010s; and Noel Davis’ 1980s PhytoFarms, which more closely resembles the well-funded warehouse vertical farms of the 2020s. This analysis suggests that, despite their high yields, the extremely high capital investments needed to build the precise controlled environments of today’s vertical farms preclude the profitable production of staple crops, rendering them unlikely to fulfil their land-sparing promises.
The development of the Austrian School of EconomicsAustrian School of Economics since the South Royalton Conference in 1974 has branched out in several directions. During the conference, three major areas of contention arose: the role of the entrepreneur, the relationship between economic calculation and knowledge problems, and the role of money in banking. In this chapter, we focus on the first two of these areas. We leverage Don Lavoie’s[aut]Don Lavoie analysis of two visions of planning that societies can pursue. The first vision of planning is the attempt to plan human society by using the state as a mechanism of central planning. The alternative vision is for human society to use the market mechanism to coordinate the disparate plans of millions of individuals. This latter system utilizes the knowledge of the participants embodied in market signals to allocate resources toward desired ends. These alternative visions of society are grounded in different institutional arrangements. We engage in comparative analysis of these institutions, and the knowledge they generate, to discuss modern Austrian contributions by studying attempts to engage in large-scale projects of non-comprehensive planning. Further, we consider how these alternative institutional arrangements affect and are affected by the entrepreneur. In doing so, we attempt to highlight a clearer understanding of the role of the entrepreneur in economic development.
This research focuses on the selection of policy strategy priorities in Kepahiang District in making a right decision to carry out priority scale development, with the method used in this research is to use a SWOT analysis approach. The results of this study concluded that the results of the weighting of the SWOT questionnaire, then the proposed alternative strategies that can be recommended are the Strength - Opportunity (SO) Strategy, a strategy that uses power to take advantage of opportunities with funding support from the central government in the form of transfers, the availability of facilities and economic infrastructure, developing tourism potential, and maintaining Kepahiang District as an agricultural / coffee granary area.
In this chapter we attempt to analyze if commodities are, as common belief holds, always a good hedge against inflation. We do so, first, by identifying the theoretical implications of using commodities as a hedge in a portfolio. More specifically, in what conditions this strategy would hold, given that building such a hedge implies primarily doing so in the forwards/futures markets. Secondly, we attempt to see what the effects of being long commodities were during the last two cycles in a theoretical, equal-weighted portfolio, by using the ETF Invesco DB Commodity (DBC) as a proxy for this strategy. Later, we analyze the behavior of commodities vis a vis inflation as measured by the US CPI for the larger period 1960–2021. We find that only a strategy combining both a short time frame, and a very precise in–out game plan (timing between its implementation, in conjunction with an upward change in inflation expectations), is compatible with the idea of commodities as a good hedge in inflationary scenarios. Conversely, if such a strategy is implemented in any other scenario (including after inflation expectations increase), commodities turn not only into an expensive hedge, but also into an ineffective one that negatively affects returns. In addition, we also analyze the subjects of decarbonization and its impact on agricultural commodities, and topics of inflation and currencies.
List of works referred to in Armstrong & Green (2022) The Scientific Method
The study sought to test the applicability of Hotelling’s rule to gold extraction in South Africa. In environmental economics, Hotelling’s rule has come to be a pillar of the exhaustible resources framework and in addition to this, it has presented essential insights into the consumption and extraction of non-renewable resources. According to Hotelling’s Rule, the extraction path in competitive market economies will, under certain circumstances, be socially optimal. An extraction path that is not socially optimal compromises the welfare of future generations. The welfare of South Africa’s present population, particularly in the future, will be greatly determined by the stock of natural resources available. Currently, the production processes deplete natural resources in a way that is not sustainable. For instance, South Africa’s gold reserves are becoming depleted at a rate that, within 25 to 33 years, will mean the end of the industry on which South Africa’s economy has been built. This raises questions regarding how much of these non-renewable resources (gold) should be extracted today, and how much should be saved for future use or for future generations. Is gold being depleted more rapidly than the optimisation level suggested by Hotelling’s Rule? In order to empirically test Hotelling’s Rule, the study was guided by previous literature that had sought to test it, namely, the previously used graphical analysis and autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach to assess the applicability of Hotelling’s Rule. The results showed that there seems to be no significant relationship between interest rates and gold processes. This shows that Hotelling’s Rule does not hold in South Africa. The results of the study suggested that the gold extraction in South Africa is not following a social optimal path. The study recommended that the government come up with measures that prolong the lifespan of the gold reserves. These included research and development to promote technological innovations in the mining sector.
A quarter of the total increase in emissions is attributable to the growth of emissions per capita, whereas three quarters are due to population growth. This evidence notwithstanding, demography in climate‐economy models typically follows exogenous trends. We develop a climate‐economy integrated model with endogenous fertility through a quality‐quantity trade‐off. The decentralization of the social optimum requires two complementary instruments, a carbon pricing policy and family planning interventions. Global population increases and reaches a peak, depending on the scenario, between 11.6 billion in the social optimum and 14.6 billion if only carbon prices are implemented. Fertility costs, i.e. the net present value of the climate‐related costs per child, are in 2020 estimated to be about 22 thousand Euro in the social optimum and about 88 thousand Euro in the Second‐Best with Fertility‐Taxes scenario. Carbon pricing tends to have a rebound effect as it increases population growth leading to higher future emissions. Our results highlight the effects of fertility choices and global population on climate change, quantifying the cost of neglecting the interaction. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
Julian Simon’s understanding that the human mind is the “ultimate resource” is fundamental yet unincorporated in the teaching of introductory economics. Incorporating this understanding into ECON 101 would improve instruction. I here explain what such an incorporation might look like.
Outside of economics (and even within), Julian Simon is mostly remembered for his famous bet on resource prices against biologist Paul Ehrlich. The bet is frequently used to illustrate how some environmental scares are exaggerated. In the rare instances when more details are added, the emphasis is always on how the role of innovation in promoting socio-economic progress which, directly or indirectly, solves environmental problems. However, Simon had a rich and complex view of the role of institutions in modulating the pace of socio-economic progress (broadly defined) and the extent of environmental problems. In this paper, I highlight the unappreciated institutional conditions that Simon placed in his work. Institutions that foiled or distorted the market process had, in Simon’s view, the dual effect of reducing living standards and amplifying environmental problems. I show, using the case of climate change, that Simon’s forgotten nuances can help explain modern environmental problems such as climate change. Most notably, it allows a subtle shift from claiming that climate change is anthropogenic (i.e. man-made) to claiming that climate change is “statogenic” (i.e. government-made). This emphasis on government-made pollution can be extended to numerous environmental problems.
Exploring the reasons behind the difference in the outcomes of three mining projects in Bulgarian municipalities. The focus is put on the economic development, media coverage and institutional framework. The results suggest that lack of regulation in line with the responsibilities of the stakeholders is the main reason behind the volatility of the expected outcomes.
The family is an institution within which exchange takes place. The state depends on the productivity of families for its current and future revenues. Yet, work on family policy often ignores the role of local knowledge, incentives, and special interests, while families themselves are often overlooked in accounts of the unintended consequences of public policy. The work of Julian Simon is a notable exception. Building upon his insights about the family’s production of children in particular, this paper offers a way to think about family policy that is consistent with both family economics and public choice. I conclude by applying some basic principles to better understand three patterns: the gap between intended and actual fertility in the developing world today, the lack of successful pro-natal public policy, and the oscillation of totalitarian family policy.
Using economic reasoning, Julian Simon offered crucial insights into a range of pressing issues including the environment, immigration, and economic development. The main lesson from Simon’s scholarship is that the ultimate resource does not reside in the ground (natural resources), or even in the accumulated wisdom and knowledge in books and scientific journals (human capital), but in the imagination of people. Through their purposeful actions, people turn their thoughts and aspiration into a new reality that enables immense improvements in the human condition. In making this argument, Simon articulated the core ideas of Ludwig von Mises, F.A. Hayek, and Israel Kirzner regarding the discovery and use of knowledge in society, and the role of entrepreneurship as the prime mover of progress. This paper makes this intellectual connection clear.
Families produce people. This presents a problem for autocratic regimes. On the one hand, familial production benefits the autocrat by augmenting the future productivity of the labor force. On the other hand, familial production threatens the autocrat by drawing current resources and loyalty away from the collective. This paper presents a theory of autocratic family policy in which the deciding factor is how much present control over resources an autocrat is willing to forego for future control. I apply this theory to the Soviet Union, arguing that the somersault of Soviet family policies (1917–1944) was a response to this tradeoff under different conditions.
Green political theory has a problem: it fails to account for human ingenuity. As a result, it has always struggled to refute the technologically optimistic notion that, in an era of rapid technological development, new technologies will materialise to resolve environmental ills. From ecologism’s first emergence, this idea has been its opponents’ ultimate recourse. It is especially significant because it denies the constitutive claim of ecologism that environmental problems require political solutions. It is in this claim that the green alternative to modernity and its ideologies is advanced. Yet, green scholars have never successfully refuted technological optimism; indeed, ecologism has always lost the scholarly battles over technological change, even as technology has failed to mitigate environmental catastrophe in the real world. This article’s green theory of technological change alters this: it shows that the green belief that technological development is unpredictable is in fact well-founded. In so doing, it buttresses the green challenge to modern political ideologies and justifies the movement for ecologism in the world. In short, it reasserts the claim that the natural is political and reinforces the need for a distinctly green version of political theory.
The article argues that the debate between “the limits to growth” movement and Julian Simon could be reconstructed and reinterpreted in the light of three pairs of models that map three distinct levels of discussion: (i) a “model of man” and (ii) a model of institutional structure and design, both encompassed by (iii) a model of --what the contemporary literature calls-- the Social-Ecological System (SES). Ultimately the “the limits to growth” problem is not so much about resources and demographics, as it is about SES and their resilience. Moreover, at a first glance, the debate between the proponents of the “the limits to growth” movement and Julian Simon seems to be about empirical data and predictive models. However, on a closer look, behind the positive analysis there is a much deeper structure, of a normative bent, which has a decisive influence on the perspective and approach one adopts regarding the proposed themes.
The article examines the rapid and frequent transitions between periods of affluence and periods of real famine that occurred during the long reign of the Egyptian ruler al-Mustanṣir (1036–1094), as well as the correlation between these transitions and the fluctuations in the annual rise in the Nile flow which determine the availability of grain and food prices. The authors conclude that: (1) The transitions between affluence and dearth occurred under the same competent administration, and under the rule of the same Caliph. Therefore, the administration was not the only reason for these transitions; (2) The ruler (al-Mustanṣir) attempted, nevertheless, to identify affluence with himself and his reign and was blamed for the periods of scarcity; (3) Well-dated historical sources are the only way to follow the climatic and societal occurrences in a yearly resolution. No proxy data are sensitive enough to detect such changes and to reconstruct the historical and social processes that followed the climatic anomalies; and (4) Two or three years of insufficient rises of the Nile were sufficient to decrease the availability of food, reflected in price rises, food riots, and even famine. Two or three decades of stability were enough to enable the accumulation of wealth.
We test the theory of ecologically unequal exchange that manifests in FDI ecological havens and FDI ecological halos by focusing on the two modes of entry of FDI, GFDI, and cross-border M&A sales and investigating their impact on the ecological footprints of nations. We apply a dynamic panel methodology, based on an “IPART” theoretical model. We find that first, overall, GFDI tends to be more harmful to ecosystems than cross-border M&A. Second, we find evidence of ecologically unequal exchange, since, in developed nations, the harmful effects of GFDI occur through increases in the consumption EF and imports EF, while in developing countries, the GFDI burden is born by foreign activity-related footprints, the imports EF and export EF, both of which are related to being a part of a product supply chain leading to exporting activity. Third, cross-border M&As tend to harm the ecosystems of developing countries, where they increase consumption EF and the production EF, demonstrating an FDI ecological haven effect. Based on these findings, we make distinct policy recommendations for the two types of FDI.
Progressing beyond the given has been a key modern tendency. Yet modern societies are currently facing the problem of how to put limits on progress, expansion, and growth, live within them, and preserve (rather than transcend) the present. Drawing on economic sociology scholarship on valuation and morality in economic life, this article develops and applies the term economization to analyze the enactment of limits on progress. The question of end-of-life care—when to stop medical efforts to prolong life, postpone death, and advance the scientific frontier—serves as an illustrative empirical case that sheds light on limit-setting in general. My analysis of this case combines historical, ethnographic, and in-depth interview data on US palliative care clinicians, who specialize in making life-and-death decisions in acute care hospitals.
In the wake of the corona crisis, the European Union must regain lost ground and create more favorable conditions for inclusive and sustainable economic growth. The best way to achieve this goal is by increasing the Union’s innovativeness. This effort requires extensive and broad-based institutional reforms aimed at strengthening the incentives for entrepreneurship.
Innovative entrepreneurship requires collaborations with numerous agents that provide those skills and resources that the entrepreneur is lacking: inventors, key personnel, demanding customers, and early and later-stage financiers.
Based on this ecosystem perspective, we propose reforms in the following six broad areas: (i) the rule of law and property rights, ii) taxation, iii) savings and finance, iv) labor market regulations and social security, v) entry and exit barriers in product markets, and (vi) human capital for entrepreneurship. The reforms would likely strengthen Europe’s innovation capacity at a time when it is needed more than ever.
Objective
This paper provides the first comprehensive assessment of the outcome of Paul Ehrlich and Stephen Schneider's counteroffer (1995) to economist Julian Simon following Ehrlich's loss in the famous Ehrlich‐Simon wager on economic growth and the price of natural resources (1980‐1990).
Methods
Literature review, data gathering and critical assessment of the indicators and proxies suggested or implied by Ehrlich and Schneider. Critical assessment of Simon's reasons for rejecting the bet. Data gathering for his alternative indicators.
Results
For indicators that can be measured satisfactorily, the balance of the outcomes favors the Ehrlich‐Schneider claims for the initial ten‐year period. Extending the timeline and accounting for the measurement limitations or dubious relevance of many of their indicators, however, shifts the balance of the evidence towards Simon's perspective.
Conclusion
Although the outcomes favour the Ehrlich‐Schneider claims for the initial ten‐year period, Ehrlich and Schneider.s indicators yielded mixed results in the long run. Simon's preferred indicators of direct human welfare would yield largely favourable outcomes if the bet were extended into the present. Based on this, we claim that Simon's optimistic perspective was once again largely validated.
Objective
This paper provides the first comprehensive assessment of the outcome of Paul Ehrlich's and Stephen Schneider's counteroffer (1995) to economist Julian Simon following Ehrlich's loss in the famous Ehrlich‐Simon wager on economic growth and the price of natural resources (1980‐1990). Our main conclusion in a previous article is that, for indicators that can be measured satisfactorily or can be inferred from proxies, the outcome favors Ehrlich‐Schneider in the first decade following their offer. This second article extends the timeline towards the present time period to examine the long‐term trends of each indicator and proxy, and assesses the reasons invoked by Simon to refuse the bet.
Methods
Literature review, data gathering, and critical assessment of the indicators and proxies suggested or implied by Ehrlich and Schneider. Critical assessment of Simon's reasons for rejecting the bet. Data gathering for his alternative indicators.
Results
For indicators that can be measured directly, the balance of the outcomes favors the Ehrlich‐Schneider claims for the initial ten‐year period. Extending the timeline and accounting for the measurement limitations or dubious relevance of many of their indicators, however, shifts the balance of the evidence towards Simon's perspective.
Conclusion
The fact that Ehrlich and Schneider's own choice of indicators yielded mixed results in the long run, coupled with the fact that Simon's preferred indicators of direct human welfare yielded largely favorable outcomes is, in our opinion, sufficient to claim that Simon's optimistic perspective was largely validated.
Warning about dire effects of climate change on armed conflict is a recent variation of a scenario that has been promoted by environmental pessimists for over two centuries. The essence is that human activities lead to resource scarcities that in turn will generate famine, pestilence, and war. This essay reviews three stages of the argument: first, the original Malthusian thesis that focused on food production. Second, the broader neoMalthusian concern from the 1970s about limits to growth and developing scarcities in a range of necessities. And recently, the specter of climate change. In each phase, the Malthusians have met firm opposition from environmental optimists, who argue that emerging scarcities can be countered by human ingenuity, technological progress, and national and international economic and political institutions and that environmental change is not in itself a major driver of human violence. In the third phase, the Malthusian case appears to be stronger because human activities have reached a level where they have a truly global impact. Environmental optimists still insist that these problems can be overcome by human ingenuity and that the long-term trend towards less violence in human affairs is unlikely to be reversed by climate change. The stakes seem higher, but the structure of the debate remains largely the same.
During the universal demographic transition, the traditional type of population reproduction, characterized by high mortality and high fertility, is transformed into a type of reproduction in which both components are at a low level. The demographic transition is not taking place in a social vacuum, but under the influence of many social factors, including the growth of education and economic development. Reducing child mortality is a sine qua non for changing reproductive behavior. Declines in mortality and fertility are usually separated by long periods when population growth is accelerating. The population explosion is fading away in most countries of Asia and Latin America because they have passed the main part of the demographic transition. In Africa, the decline in child mortality began later and is still in the incipient phase. As a result, fertility, although declining in recent decades in most countries, is declining slowly and remains high. The region as a whole is in the early stage of the demographic transition: the population is growing rapidly and it is not expected to stabilize until the end of the century. Most of the economic and social consequences of rapid population growth are negative. Their conceptualization takes place within the framework of the neo-Malthusian paradigm, which made it possible to substantiate demographic policy based on family planning programs that have proven their effectiveness in different regions of the world. The negative, and sometimes disastrous, consequences of rapid population growth are particularly pronounced in Africa. Anti-Malthusianism is less inclined towards scientific argumentation, and its main goal is not pragmatic solutions to problems, but ideological proclamations, although some anti-Malthusian concepts have positive potential. The concept of the demographic dividend, developed in recent decades, makes it possible to remove the contradictions between two opposing paradigms, since it shifts the emphasis from the negative consequences of rapid population growth to the positive consequences of changes in the population age structure during the demographic transition. The demographic transition in Africa needs to be accelerated, and policies are able to do this without relying on the impractical assumptions of fast economic growth. Three interrelated factors are critical: development of education, radical reduction in child mortality and strengthening of family planning programs.
A brief summary of the natural science understanding of the gravity and urgency of climate change is presented as an essential building block for the social science analysis in subsequent chapters. It documents that fossil-fuel emissions are the principal causes and the atmosphere is the main carbon sink. It shows that concepts like the net change in atmospheric carbon (emissions compared to carbon withdrawals) and carbon budget are more valid than oft-used, misleading indicators of improvement like carbon intensity (emissions per GDP). The chapter documents differences in emissions for various types of fossil fuels, including different types of oil. It elucidates limitations of the social influence of science, particularly its contradictory characteristics as ineffective when warning of danger yet inspiring faith in its omnipotence to master nature so as to maintain fossil-fuelled practices. The chapter also assesses the concept of the Anthropocene.
The development of science, technology, and rational organization led to beliefs that humans were mastering nature, even replacing it. This belief collapsed when nature struck back with epidemics, earthquakes, tsunamis, hurricanes, technological accidents, etc. Even technological innovations unleashed harmful forces of nature, such as global warming. This chapter argues that faith in mastering nature was not eliminated but reformed: faith 1.0 replaced by faith 2.0. To avoid costly sacrifices to mitigate global warming, there is faith that just-in-time technological fixes will enable societies to ride climate changes. Technological improvements of efficiency, robustness, adaptation, and resilience will give humanity capacities to manage whatever nature hurls at society. Since technological success is uncertain, it amounts to faith in the unforeseeable. The chapter underscores the importance of the distinction between hope for technological solutions and reliance on them.
The fossil-fuelled climate crisis brings risk and uncertainty, whereas solutions would bring safety and sustainability. The work of the pre-eminent social scientist of risk, Ulrich Beck, is critically assessed. Risk, risk assessment, and uncertainty are distinguished and scrutinized, as are risk calculability and cultural perceptions of risk, and the actualization of risk into disaster examined. Beck’s arguments that staging is needed to translate scientific findings into popular understanding, and that climate risk is hard to stage, are evaluated. Common stagings are assessed: ‘scare’em to death’, dramatic iconic images, and presenting the climate crisis as opportunities. Beck’s staging framework is then turned right side up by investigating the more significant staging of safety and of discounting danger. Several strategies are examined: staging of faith in market miracles, of mitigation as a job killer, of fossil fuels as poverty reduction, of blamelessness, and of fossil-fuel critics as hypocrites.
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