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A critical analysis of Markovian monism

DOI:10.1007/s11229-021-03075-x
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Majid D. Beni at Middle East Technical University
Majid D. Beni
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Abstract

Free Energy Principle underlies a unifying framework that integrates theories of origins of life, cognition, and action. Recently, FEP has been developed into a Markovian monist perspective (Friston et al. in BC 102: 227–260, 2020). The paper expresses scepticism about the validity of arguments for Markovian monism. The critique is based on the assumption that Markovian models are scientific models, and while we may defend ontological theories about the nature of scientific models, we could not read off metaphysical theses about the nature of target systems (self-organising conscious systems, in the present context) from our theories of nature of scientific models (Markov blankets). The paper draws attention to different ways of understanding Markovian models, as material entities, fictional entities, and mathematical structures. I argue that none of these interpretations contributes to the defence of a metaphysical stance (either in terms of neutral monism or reductive physicalism). This is because scientific representation is a sophisticated process, and properties of Markovian models—such as the property of being neither physical nor mental—could not be projected onto their targets to determine the ontological properties of targets easily.
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Vol.:(0123456789)
Synthese (2021) 199:6407–6427
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03075-x
1 3
A critical analysis ofMarkovian monism
MajidD.Beni1
Received: 30 September 2020 / Accepted: 4 February 2021 / Published online: 16 February 2021
© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. part of Springer Nature 2021
Abstract
Free Energy Principle underlies a unifying framework that integrates theories
of origins of life, cognition, and action. Recently, FEP has been developed into a
Markovian monist perspective (Friston etal. in BC 102: 227–260, 2020). The paper
expresses scepticism about the validity of arguments for Markovian monism. The
critique is based on the assumption that Markovian models are scientific models,
and while we may defend ontological theories about the nature of scientific mod-
els, we could not read off metaphysical theses about the nature of target systems
(self-organising conscious systems, in the present context) from our theories of
nature of scientific models (Markov blankets). The paper draws attention to differ-
ent ways of understanding Markovian models, as material entities, fictional entities,
and mathematical structures. I argue that none of these interpretations contributes to
the defence of a metaphysical stance (either in terms of neutral monism or reductive
physicalism). This is because scientific representation is a sophisticated process, and
properties of Markovian models—such as the property of being neither physical nor
mental—could not be projected onto their targets to determine the ontological prop-
erties of targets easily.
Keywords Free energy principle· Markovian monism· Fictional models·
Mathematical models
1 Introduction
Following in footsteps of Hermann von Helmholtz, Friston and colleagues have
launched a strong research program that subsumes theories of perception, cogni-
tion, action, and life under the umbrella of Free Energy Principle (Buckley et al.
I thank two anonymous reviewers of this journal for their insightful comments. Also, Wanja Wiese
read an earlier draft of this paper and provided precious comments. All of these debts are gratefully
acknowledged.
* Majid D. Beni
mbeni@metu.edu.tr
1 Department ofPhilosophy, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
... A question is whether to take a realist or an instrumentalist stance on FEP and its explanatory power (Colombo & Wright, 2016;Hohwy, 2014). More interestingly, in recent years the question of the realist fortitude of FEP (or lack thereof) has been entangled with the discussion of the model-based nature of FEP's theoretical claims (Andrews, 2021;Beni, 2021a;Kirchhoff et al., 2022;van Es, 2020). This is where we stand now: on one front, considerations of the model-based nature of the theoretical claims of FEP have been raised to substantiate an instrumentalist take on FEP (Colombo & Palacios, 2021;van Es, 2020;van Es & Hipolito, 2020), on the other, it has been remarked that despite the model-based nature of FEP, realism about FEP models is still a tenable option unless one wants to commit to what has been called a literalist fallacy (Kirchhoff et al., 2022). ...
... The first point is that Markov blankets or the probabilistic barriers that separate the internal and external states (or sensory and active states) are Bayesian network models that set conditional independence between inside and outside of given state spaces (Bruineberg et al., 2021;Pearl, 1988). Using Markovian models to articulate FEP has led to interesting discussions (Andrews, 2021;Beni, 2021a; van Es, 2020) (more on this in the next section). The second point is that not only there are philosophical discussions about implications of FEP for epistemology and philosophy of mind (Clark, 2016;Hohwy, 2013;Ramstead et al., 2019), FEP has been adopted into the foundation of a radically naturalist, scientifically informed philosophy of science. ...
... First of all, it has been generally argued that when unpacking philosophical aspects of FEP, we must have a care about conflating between the features of FEP models of living systems on the one hand and mind-independent features of those systems on the other (Andrews, 2021;Beni, 2021a (McMullin, 1985;Weisberg, 2007b) to argue that the amount of (either Galilean or generic) mathematical idealisation that may well distort the literal match between models and their target systems is consistent with scientific realism and does not need to lead to outright instrumentalism. ...
Models of Life and the Life of Models under the Free Energy Principle: A cognitive realist perspective
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  • Jan 2022
This paper is generally concerned with the relationship between the model-based nature of the Free Energy Principle (FEP) and a realist stance on the said models. However, instead of defending realism directly, it starts by pondering the question of the origin of scientific models and asks what makes scientists’ attempt at making representational models of their environment so successful. In search of the answer, the paper develops a cognitive realist take on FEP, by arguing that not only constructing generative models and minimising their conveyed prediction error under FEP provides a basis for explicating the origins of scientific model making, but it also helps with precisifying the notion of similarity in the context of model-based science.
View
... In the present paper, I will focus on some methods for measuring the brain's functional/effective connectivity-such as Directed Acyclic Graphs, Directed Cyclic Graphs, and Dynamical Causal Models-to argue that some form of modularity (defined as information encapsulation) is indispensable to modelling coupling of brain areas under FEP. The argumentation strongly draws on a model-based conception of scientific practice (Godfrey-Smith, 2006;Weisberg, 2013) as well as some recent model-relative non-realist readings of FEP and its ingredients (such as Markov blankets) (Beni, 2021a;Ramstead et al., 2020;van Es & Hipolito, 2020). ...
... Tim Crane (2015), for example, has applied the model-based conception of science to his discussion of propositional attitudes and mental states of persons. FEP-theorists, too, began to appreciate the significance of scientific modelling (Beni, 2021a;Ramstead et al., 2020;van Es, 2020;van Es & Hipolito, 2020). I further this literature to argue that model relative partial segregation is indispensable to having viable models of the mechanisms of cognition and action in terms of predictive coding under FEP. ...
... It is possible to construe Markovian models in both realist and non-realist ways. In a non-realist understanding (Beni, 2021a;Ramstead et al., 2020;van Es & Hipolito, 2020), Markovian models are mainly formal tools that can be applied to any system with interior and exterior spaces at a high level of abstraction. This application of Markovian models is indeed scale-free. ...
A tale of two architectures: Free energy, its models, and modularity
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The paper presents a model-based defence of the partial functional/informational segregation of cognition in the context of the predictive architecture. The paper argues that the model-relativeness of modularity does not need to undermine its tenability. In fact, it holds that using models is indispensable to scientific practice, and it builds its argument about the indispensability of modularity to predictive architecture on the indispensability of scientific models. More specifically to defend the modularity thesis, the paper confutes two counterarguments that lie at the centre of Hipolito and Kirchhoff’s (2019) recent confutation of the modularity thesis. The main insight of the paper is that Hipolito and Kirchhoff’s counterarguments miss the mark because they dismiss a few rudimentary facts about the model-based nature of dynamical causal models and Markov blankets.
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... In addition, questions have been raised about the ontological implications of Markov blankets (Bruineberg et al. 2021). Finally, the abstract mathematical descriptions at the heart of the FEP, including the central notion of a Markov blanket, may be compatible with mutually exclusive accounts of the ontology of consciousness (Beni, 2021). ...
... They point to reductive materialism as their preferred interpretation because it enables one to identify a continuity between simple, non-conscious minds and complex conscious ones. Beni (2021) counters that Markovian monism would likely be better interpreted as a form of neutral monism because Markovian models do not supervene on the physical. ...
Keeping it Real: Research Program Physicalism and the Free Energy Principle
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The Free Energy Principle (FEP) states that all biological self-organizing systems must minimize variational free energy. The acceptance of this principle has given rise to a popular and far-reaching theoretical and empirical approach to the study of the brain and living organisms. Despite the popularity of the FEP approach, little discussion has ensued about its ontological status and implications. By understanding physicalism as an interdisciplinary research program that aims to offer compositional explanations of mental phenomena, this paper articulates what it would mean for the FEP approach to be part of research program physicalism and to corroborate a physicalist outlook. In doing so, this paper contributes both to philosophical discussions regarding the FEP approach and to the literature on physicalism. It does the former by explicating the metaphysical standing of the FEP approach. It does the latter by showing how cutting-edge research in the empirical sciences of the mind can inform our attitudes regarding physicalism.
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... One of these discussions is about the realist credentials of FEP's theoretical framework ). The discussion is interesting not least because some participants have delved into the issue of realism in light of the model-based nature of science (Andrews 2021;Beni 2021;Bruineberg et al. 2021;Ramstead et al. 2019;Wiese and Friston 2021). The debate reaches new heights in Colombo and Palacios's (2021) expressed scepticism about the plausibility of explanations ensued from FEP, on grounds of the conveyed mismatch between the physics assumption of FEP and properties of biological target systems. ...
Dosis sola facit venenum: reconceptualising biological realism
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Richard Levins’s (Am Sci 54(4):421–431, 1966) paper sets a landmark for the significance of scientific model-making in biology. Colombo and Palacios (Biol Philos 36(5):1–26. 10.1007/S10539-021-09818-X, 2021) have recently built their critique of the explanatory power of the Free Energy Principle on Levins’s insight into the relationship between generality, realism, and precision. This paper addresses the issue of the plausibility of biological explanations that are grounded in the Free Energy Principle (FEP) and deals with the question of the realist fortitude of FEP’s theoretical framework. It indicates that what is required for establishing the plausibility of the explanation of a target system given a model of that system is the dosage or the harmony between the generality and accuracy of explanatory models. This would also provide a basis for seeing how scientific realism could be a viable option with respect to FEP.
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... These considerations point, in our opinion, to a strongly instrumentalist understanding of Bayesian networks, and hence of Markov blankets, which would not justify the kinds of strong philosophical conclusions drawn by some from the idea of a Friston blanket (see e.g., cf. Andrews, 2020;Beni, 2021;Wiese & Friston, 2021 for some recent critical discussion). ...
Spatiotemporal constraints of causality: Blanket closure emerges from localized interactions between temporally separable subsystems
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  • Sep 2022
In this commentary, I first acknowledge points of common ground with the target article by Bruineberg and colleagues. Then, I consider how certain ambiguities could be resolved by considering spatiotemporal constraints on causality. In particular I show how blanket closure emerges from localized interactions between temporally separable subsystems, and how this points to valuable directions of future research. Finally, I close with a process note discussing the allegorical implications of the authors' creative title.
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... These considerations point, in our opinion, to a strongly instrumentalist understanding of Bayesian networks, and hence of Markov blankets, which would not justify the kinds of strong philosophical conclusions drawn by some from the idea of a Friston blanket (see e.g., cf. Andrews, 2020;Beni, 2021;Wiese & Friston, 2021 for some recent critical discussion). ...
The Emperor Is Naked: Replies to commentaries on the target article
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The 35 commentaries cover a wide range of topics and take many different stances on the issues explored by the target article. We have organised our response to the commentaries around three central questions: Are Friston blankets just Pearl blankets? What ontological and metaphysical commitments are implied by the use of Friston blankets? What kind of explanatory work are Friston blankets capable of? We conclude our reply with a short critical reflection on the indiscriminate use of both Markov blankets and the free energy principle.
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... Similarly, it is difficult to evaluate the corresponding general claim because there is not enough understanding of the mathematical theorem and how it maps onto real systems. Recently, however, Beni (2021) and Bruineberg et al. (2021) have critiqued the framework on grounds of its applicability to real systems. We are starting to see critical analysis of active inference from outside the tradition. ...
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Towards a Neutral-Structuralist Theory of Consciousness and Selfhood
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Recently, an information-theoretic structural realist theory of the self and consciousness has been put forward (Beni, M. D. 2019. Structuring the Self, Series New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Palgrave Macmillan). The theory is presented as a form of panpsychism. I argue against this interpretation and show that Beni’s structuralist theory runs into the hard problem of consciousness, in a similar way as the Integrated Information theory of consciousness. Since both of these theories are structuralist and based on the notion of information, I propose to use a solution that has been employed for Integrated Information Theory, namely introducing the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic structure and dynamics (intrinsic information and intrinsic structure). Making these metaphysical enhancements to Beni’s structuralist theory of consciousness will give the theory a better chance of overcoming the hard problem. In terms of the metaphysics of consciousness, it takes us beyond physicalism. I then suggest that the information-theoretic structuralist theory of consciousness should, instead of panpsychism and physicalism, be combined with neutral monist ontology which is a better fit. These reworkings could lead to an improved naturalistic account of consciousness – the neutral-structuralist theory of consciousness and the self.
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Recent decades have seen increasing attention given to the free-energy framework. This proposes that many of the phenomena we associate with life, intelligence and adaptation can be explained in terms of a single, mathematical precept: the free-energy principle. This is claimed to apply to the adaptive behavior of primitive organisms as much as it does to the physiological structures of human brains. The proposal is potentially of interest to theorists from multiple disciplines. But as presentations often make intensive use of mathematical notation, it can be hard to understand, even for experts. The present article presents an informal reconstruction, using schematic illustrations. Mathematical notation is largely avoided, while detail and precision are retained as far as possible. The specifically conceptual problems that come to notice in the reconstruction are highlighted and discussed.
View
Free-Energy Principle, Computationalism and Realism: a Tragedy
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The Emperor’s New Markov Blankets [2020 version]
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The free energy principle, an influential framework in computational neuroscience and theoretical neurobiology, starts from the assumption that living systems ensure adaptive exchanges with their environment by minimizing the objective function of variational free energy. Following this premise, it claims to deliver a promising integration of the life sciences. In recent work, Markov Blankets, one of the central constructs of the free energy principle, have been applied to resolve debates central to philosophy (such as demarcating the boundaries of the mind). The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we trace the development of Markov blankets starting from their standard application in Bayesian networks, via variational inference, to their use in the literature on active inference. We then identify a persistent confusion in the literature between the formal use of Markov blankets as an epistemic tool for Bayesian inference, and their novel metaphysical use in the free energy framework to demarcate the physical boundary between an agent and its environment. Consequently, we propose to distinguish between ‘Pearl blankets’ to refer to the original epistemic use of Markov blankets and ‘Friston blankets’ to refer to the new metaphysical construct. Second, we use this distinction to critically assess claims resting on the application of Markov blankets to philosophical problems. We suggest that this literature would do well in differentiating between two different research programs: ‘inference with a model’ and ‘inference within a model’. Only the latter is capable of doing metaphysical work with Markov blankets, but requires additional philosophical premises and cannot be justified by an appeal to the success of the mathematical framework alone.
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