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InfiniLooP: A simple and sustainable cryptographic currency decluttering and aggregation instrument

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Abstract and Figures

Since its inception, the cryptographic asset sector (CAS) has experienced an impressive amount of growth, including a series of market bubble events. Inspired by the success of early entrants into the CAS, a vast number of alternative cryptocurrencies (or 'altcoins') emerged. While many altcoins have been-and continue to be-successful, it must be noted that majority have done poorly. In fact, it has been estimated that more than 1,100 cryptocurrency projects have failed during the past 5 years. At some point, each failed project featured a community of users, many of whom believed that a particular developer or team had the-winning formula‖ to succeed in this increasingly crowded and competitive space. Unfortunately, many such communities have been deeply disappointed, yet continue to hope for a sustainable solution for asset/value recovery despite all evidence pointing to the contrary. For the purposes of this White Paper, we shall call such projects 'non-viable endeavors' or NVEs. Our group - InfiniLooP Initiative Developers (ILID) - set out to conduct a comprehensive market analysis in the area of NVEs. Our primary objective was to determine factors related to user and community perception of NVEs, including a set of value-based considerations related to willingness to swap NVE coins/tokens for coins originating from a new and viable project. Our secondary objective was to elucidate the most preferred type of replacement cryptocurrency asset (RCA) in accordance to its technical and social/community characteristics. Here, we present the findings of a comprehensive, 18-month survey of NVE communities, conducted by the ILID group. Primary outcome results of our survey show that approximately one-third of NVE owners would consider swapping their defunct assets for a new asset, preferably meeting a specific set of optimized conditions. Moreover, our data indicate that majority of those willing to proceed with an asset swap would favor a replacement asset that is a 'staking' or an 'interest-paying' alternative, and that an asset with an original/unique blockchain is preferred over a digitally-issued token. Based on the above data, our team implemented InfiniLooP - a staking asset with its own blockchain - as a simple and practical answer to the challenges faced by NVE cryptocurrency communities.
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1 EWMCI / InfiniLooP Developers: 2021
AbstractSince its inception, the cryptographic asset sector
(CAS) has experienced an impressive amount of growth,
including a series of market bubble events. Inspired by the
success of early entrants into the CAS, a vast number of
alternative cryptocurrencies (or ‗altcoins‘) emerged. While many
altcoins have been and continue to be successful, it must be
noted that majority have done poorly. In fact, it has been
estimated that more than 1,100 cryptocurrency projects have
failed during the past 5 years. At some point, each failed project
featured a community of users, many of whom believed that a
particular developer or team had the ―winning formula‖ to
succeed in this increasingly crowded and competitive space.
Unfortunately, many such communities have been deeply
disappointed, yet continue to hope for a sustainable solution for
asset/value recovery despite all evidence pointing to the contrary.
For the purposes of this White Paper, we shall call such projects
‗non-viable endeavors‘ or NVEs.
Our group InfiniLooP Initiative Developers (ILID) set out to
conduct a comprehensive market analysis in the area of NVEs.
Our primary objective was to determine factors related to user
and community perception of NVEs, including a set of value-
based considerations related to willingness to swap NVE
coins/tokens for coins originating from a new and viable project.
Our secondary objective was to elucidate the most preferred type
of replacement cryptocurrency asset (RCA) in accordance to its
technical and social/community characteristics.
Here, we present the findings of a comprehensive, 18-month
survey of NVE communities, conducted by the ILID group.
Primary outcome results of our survey show that approximately
one-third of NVE owners would consider swapping their defunct
assets for a new asset, preferably meeting a specific set of
optimized conditions. Moreover, our data indicate that majority of
those willing to proceed with an asset swap would favor a
replacement asset that is a ‗staking‘ or an ‗interest-paying‘
alternative, and that an asset with an original/unique blockchain
is preferred over a digitally-issued token. Based on the above
data, our team implemented InfiniLooP a staking asset with its
own blockchain as a simple and practical answer to the
challenges faced by NVE cryptocurrency communities.
Keywords: Altcoins, Asset swap, Blockchain, Cryptocurrency,
Non-viable asset, Proof-of-Work, Staking, Token.
This work was prepared and submitted by InfiniLooP Initiative
Developers (ILID). It represents an 18-month-long effort to define non-
viable endeavors (NVEs) within the cryptocurrency space and to
identify the optimal characteristics of a proposed replacement
cryptocurrency asset (RCA). ILID is a joint venture between EWMCI,
LLC., and various other collaborating entities. Our common goal is to
improve the reliability, efficiency, transparency, and trust within the
cryptographic asset space.
I. INTRODUCTION
The overall growth of the cryptographic asset sector (CAS) has
been truly impressive since Bitcoin and other decentralized peer-to-
peer networks were first introduced in 2009 [1, 2]. During the writing
of this manuscript, the overall global CAS market capitalization
exceeded USD 1 trillion for the first time [3]. Yet despite this
impressive growth, most users within the CAS sphere have been left
behind, through a combination of „non-viable endeavors‟ (failed
cryptocurrency projects or NVEs); indiscriminate conversion of
mined or minted assets into large capitalization cryptocurrencies; and
all-too-numerous scams [4-7]. It has been noted that between 25%
and 33% of cryptocurrency projects have failed, and this failure rate
continues to be fairly constant [8]. The confluence of multiple
factors, including inadequate end-user education, lack of user-
friendly interfaces, hacking, and not infrequently unintentional
neglect, resulted in both escalating losses and distrust among
alternative cryptocurrency („altcoin‟) owners. In this manuscript, we
explore a simple proposed remedy that has the potential to address
many of the above concerns, create end-user value and help rebuild
the overall trust toward the CAS. The remedy is based on a concept
of „burn-swap‟ where NVE coins/tokens are destroyed in exchange
for a pre-specified amount of viable coins.
II. AIMS & OBJECTIVES
The primary objective of this study was to determine factors
associated with the attribution of value by NVE coin/token holders
toward such defunct assets. More specifically, our goal was to
describe various parameters that NVE holders consider when
determining actual or perceived value of digital assets with no
discernible use cases, community leadership, real-time price
discovery, or other critical infrastructure components.
Beyond the elucidation of factors associated with perceived end-
user value attribution toward NVE, our team‟s secondary objective
included the determination of the „optimal characteristics‟ of a
„replacement altcoin‟ (e.g., replacement cryptocurrency asset or
RCA) that would satisfy value-swap expectations of the majority of
participating NVE holders.
Finally, our tertiary objective was to determine the optimal
deployment platform for the NVE swap. Based on a combination of
above-mentioned RCA characteristics (as reported by market study
participants) and known technical performance of existing assets that
approximate such characteristics, a platform that best reflects the
largest number of „matching‟ parameters will be selected for
definitive project implementation.
III. METHODOLOGY
During a period of approximately 18 months (July 1, 2019
December 31, 2020) known cryptocurrency users on Discord and
Reddit social platforms were approached by the InfiniLooP Initiative
Developers (ILID) team. Among those who responded to our initial
contact attempts, a subset of users was identified who declared
ownership of NVEs.
INFINILOOP: A SIMPLE AND SUSTAINABLE CRYPTOGRAPHIC
CURRENCY DECLUTTERING AND AGGREGATION INSTRUMENT
By InfiniLooP Initiative Developers (ILID)
2 EWMCI / InfiniLooP Developers: 2021
Among members of the latter group (owners of NVEs) further
questions were asked, as follows:
[1] What type of NVE do you own?
[a] Blockchain-based (have own blockchain)
[b] Token-based (built on top of blockchain)
[c] Not sure / Do not know
[2] How did you initially acquire your NVEs?
[a] Free gift / airdrop / fork claim / etc.
[b] Purchased on exchange
[c] Other / Do not remember
[3] How did your NVEs lose value? [pick all that apply]
[a] Developer / team abandoned the project
[b] An exchange was hacked
[c] The coin or token had no use
[d] The infrastructure was poorly maintained
[e] Other factors
[4] Do you still value your NVE holdings?
[a] Yes
[b] No
[5] If you answered “Yes” to question #4, provide 1-2 main
reasons why: ____________________________________
_______________________________________________
[6] If you answered “No” to question #4, provide 1-2 main
reasons why: ____________________________________
_______________________________________________
[7] Would you be willing to do a „burn-swap‟ where you
permanently destroy your NVEs in exchange for a viable
coin?
[a] Yes
[b] No
[8] If you answered “Yes” to question #7, provide 1-2 main
reasons why: ____________________________________
_______________________________________________
[Please continue to question #10]
[9] If you answered “No” to question #7, provide 1-2 main
reasons why: ____________________________________
_______________________________________________
[Please stop, survey successfully completed]
[10] If you were given an opportunity to „burn-swap‟ your
NVEs, which of the characteristics of the new or
proposed crypto asset would appeal to you the most? [pick
all that apply]
[a] A new token (built on top of blockchain)
[b] A new coin (with its own blockchain)
[c] I would prefer a mining coin
[d] I would prefer a staking coin or token
[e] A combination of mining / staking would be great
[f] The coin should have masternodes
[11] Please provide additional 1-3 desired characteristics, in
your opinion, of a „perfect‟ replacement asset: _________
_______________________________________________
Collected survey responses were analyzed using primarily
descriptive statistical methods, including simple qualitative (for open-
ended questions) and quantitative approaches (for categorical and
ordinal variables). Only completed surveys were utilized for study
purposes. Results of the survey were then utilized to determine “Top
3” most desirable candidate assets, according to the input provided by
survey respondents.
IV. STUDY RESULTS
A total of 372 cryptocurrency users were contacted anonymously
on Discord (www.discord.com) and Reddit (www.reddit.com)
platforms. A total of 40 Discord and 32 Reddit channels were utilized
during the study. Among contacted platform users, 236 responded to
initial solicitation (initial response rate of 63.4%). Of those, 133
individuals (56.4%) responded that they own NVEs. This group
constituted our definitive sample upon which further reported survey
results are based.
Among the 133 individuals who responded affirmatively regarding
NVE ownership, 108 (81.2%) completed their surveys. On average,
1.7 per-user reminders were required to attain survey completion.
Survey answers, by question, are provided in Figures 1-7 below:
Figure 1. Survey answers to Question #1, “What type of NVE do you
own?” [a] Blockchain-based (have own blockchain); [b] Token-based
(built on top of a blockchain); [c] Not sure / Do not know.
Figure 2. Survey answers to Question #2, “How did you initially acquire
your NVEs?” [a] Free gift / airdrop / fork claim / etc.; [b] Purchased on
exchange; [c] Other / Do not remember.
3 EWMCI / InfiniLooP Developers: 2021
Figure 3. Survey answers to Question #3, “How did your NVEs lose value
[pick all that apply]?” [a] Developer / team abandoned the project; [b] An
exchange was hacked; [c] The coin or token had no use; [d] The token‟s or
coin‟s infrastructure was poorly maintained; [e] Other factors. Note: due to
>1 answer allowed per respondent, the total may exceed 100%.
Figure 4. Survey answers to Question #4, Do you still value your NVE
holdings?[a] Yes; and [b] No.
Figure 5. Survey answers to Question #7, “Would you be willing to do a
„burn-swap‟ where you permanently destroy your NVEs in exchange for a
viable coin? [a] Yes; and [b] No.
Figure 6. Survey answers to Question #10, If you were given an opportunity
to „burn-swap‟ your NVEs, which of the characteristics of the new or
proposed crypto asset would appeal to you the most [pick all that apply]?” [a]
A new token (built on top of blockchain); [b] A new coin (with its own
blockchain); [c] I would prefer a mining coin; [d] I would prefer a staking
coin or token; [e] A combination of mining / staking would be great; and [f]
The coin should have masternodes. Note: due to >1 answer allowed per
respondent, the total may exceed 100%.
In addition, Tables 1-5 summarize results from open-ended,
qualitative questions, compiled by thematic categories (survey items
5, 6, 8, 9, and 11).
Table 1. Attributes of retained value provided by respondents who
indicated that their NVEs continued to have some degree of utility,
merit, or worth:
“Blockchain is forever, so short-term losses are to be
expected”
Someone will pick up and continue the project
Hope that the asset will be listed on a new exchange
“The coin / token has sentimental value to me”
“I spent too much time and effort to simply throw [these
coins/tokens] away”
For historical reasons, defunct coins / tokens are part of
“crypto history”
Defunct coins kept as a reminder of “lesson learned”
Table 2. Reasons provided regarding why NVEs no longer have any
attributed value, utility or worth:
“I no longer care about this [coin / token]”
“I am out of crypto in general”
“You get many tokens, one will eventually turn
profitable”
Aversion to scams with risk avoidance
Wasted enough time on crypto, not wasting any more
“There‟s one new coin every day”
Table 3. Reasons provided regarding why a „burn-swap‟ would be
considered favorably by a respondent:
My old coins would receive a „second chance‟
It could provide a viable way to reduce losses
If the new coin was PoS it would be easier to maintain
Newer crypto technology will be more reliable
“My SHA-256 altcoin is worthless and environmentally
unfriendly”
Replacement coin could have a stronger community
A successful „burn-swap‟ would consolidate the crypto
space
4 EWMCI / InfiniLooP Developers: 2021
Table 4. Reasons provided regarding why a „burn-swap‟ would not
be considered favorably by a respondent:
The space is already too crowded
“I don‟t need another [coin or token]”
There is no trust left in the space
Suspicion of a new / clever scam
“I am done with crypto”
The new coin will lose value just as the old one did
“One worthless asset for another?”
Table 5. Characteristics of a „perfect asset‟ according to those who
would be willing to proceed with a „burn-swap‟:
“A solid masternode coin that encourages HODL”
Merge-mined coin will prevent the blockchain from
stalling and eventually becoming obsolete
“Probably a new generation staking coin”
Improved, environmentally friendly proof-of-work (PoW)
protocol
A hybrid PoW/proof-of-stake (PoS) coin would be great
“Needs solid, reliable, long-term infrastructure”
“Token, preferably with staking ability”
“Definitely has to have its own blockchain”
General concerns about global warming and mining
equipment power consumption
“Would prefer a coin where you don‟t have to pay any gas
fees with another currency or token”
Governance discourages pump-and-dump
Distributed broadly to avoid network centralization or
concentration
V. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
In general, 39% of respondents reported that their NVEs have own
blockchain while 33% indicated that their NVEs are tokens.
Surprisingly, nearly 28% of respondents did not know whether their
NVEs were tokens or blockchain-based coins.
Majority of reported NVEs (68.5%) were either gifted, distributed
free-of-charge, received following a blockchain fork, or provided in
exchange for some task (e.g., social media postings). Approximately
27% of NVEs were purchased on cryptocurrency exchanges. About 1
in 20 respondents did not remember how they acquired their NVEs.
Respondents provided a fairly heterogeneous collection of answers
when asked about their understanding of how the NVEs lost value
over time. In about 31% of cases, the departure of a project developer
resulted in loss of asset viability. Approximately 37% of respondents
list losses from exchange hacks as a reason for the project‟s
deterioration. This was followed by about 23% who reported that
they attribute loss of value to lack of project utility. Nearly one-third
of respondents pointed to the loss of value being due to poor coin
infrastructure. Finally, about 16% of respondents were not sure
exactly as to why their NVEs sustained losses.
Overall, there was a majority consensus among respondents
regarding the willingness to exchange their NVEs in a „burn-swap‟
arrangement, with nearly 60% indicating a favorable response.
Finally, the most commonly selected characteristic of a „preferred‟
swap instrument (e.g., its most desirable features) would include a
new coin with own blockchain (37%) that features proof-of-stake
(PoS, 60%) block generation. Less commonly chosen options
included new token (utilizing an existing blockchain, 32%) and a
hybrid PoS/proof-of-work (PoW) block generation scheme (23%).
Masternode (19%) and pure PoW (9.3%) coin options were least
preferred.
Qualitative results of our survey indicated that respondents who
continue to attribute value to their NVEs have a highly individualized
approach, without clear consensus on a single factor or cause (Table
1). Similarly heterogeneous comments were provided by the group
that no longer attributes any value to their NVEs (Table 2). The
„second chance‟ and related themes were readily evident when
respondents were asked about potential positive aspects of the „burn-
swap‟ (Table 3). The tone among those who did not consider „burn-
swap‟ to be an effective option was largely resigned, cautious, and
characterized by distrust (Table 4).
Participants in the survey provided some insightful comments
regarding the desired characteristics of a potential new „burn-swap‟
conduit (e.g., destination or replacement coin). This was a qualitative,
open-ended question (Table 5). Respondents indicated that some of
the most appealing characteristics included the presence of PoS
feature [8], built in mechanisms for rewarding „long-term‟ investors
[9], some form of incentive for HODL (e.g., “hold on for dear life”)
behaviors [10, 11], and an independent blockchain without “gas” fees
[12, 13]. Merge-mining was mentioned as one of the potential
solutions to maintain long-term blockchain viability [14, 15]. Another
important aspect brought forth by our respondents was the assurance
of wide distribution of the replacement asset, with specific concerns
pertaining to the risks associated with either intentional or
unintentional centralization [16, 17].
VI. DISCUSSION
The current study was conducted with a specific goal of
determining the feasibility of a „burn-swap‟ option as an avenue for
value creation within the niche of defunct/non-viable cryptocurrency
projects. This growing segment of cryptocurrency endeavors now
numbers in 1,000‟s and represents a unique opportunity for
consolidation of the all-too-fragmented cryptographic asset space [18,
19]. Our strategy is based on the creation of a „made-to-order‟
replacement instrument that will be offered in a „burn-swap‟ fashion
to holders of NVEs who verifiably destroy (e.g., burn) their non-
viable asset(s). A community of dedicated members would follow,
given the stated HODL tendencies of the majority of „burn-swap‟
survey participants.
Within the overall niche of NVEs, there are several distinct
subtypes of non-viable projects: (a) poorly functioning coins or
tokens with inherently flawed design; (b) coins or tokens with poorly
managed infrastructure or security; (c) coins with communities that
are either disengaged or too small to sufficiently support the project;
(d) projects without a clearly stated goal, mission, of function; and (e)
lack of use-case compounding the above issues [20-25]. An
overarching theme, communicated loudly by our survey respondents,
is that they expect any replacement asset to have effectively
addressed many if not all of the above limitations of NVEs.
Assuming that a loyal community of users who voluntarily „burn-
swap‟ their long-term NVE holdings for a new asset will form as a
result, the most important aspects of constructing the swap option
will be the assurance of excellent levels of security, high reliability,
good infrastructure, and the provision of viable long-term use-case(s).
If one assumes that the successful development of use-case(s) will be
among top goals of the founding group (ILID / EWMCI) then the
ultimate determinant of sustainable adoption of the new asset will be
technical reliability, infrastructure, and safety.
This brings us to the more granular consideration of the technical
(and thus security and reliability) considerations regarding the
proposed project. Taking guidance from our survey respondents, the
top answers regarding key characteristics of the optimal „destination
coin‟ for the „burn-swap‟ included a combination of a cryptocurrency
project with its own blockchain and a PoS-based consensus algorithm
5 EWMCI / InfiniLooP Developers: 2021
(Figure 6). The latter combination also effectively addresses the
environmental impact concerns raised by our respondents (Table 5).
The remainder of our discussion will now focus on various options
that could potentially satisfy all of the above parameters.
Looking for a well-established, safe, secure, and environmentally
friendly PoS platform featuring its own blockchain, several viable
options arise. The first and perhaps the most user-friendly option is
the NXT blockchain [26]. Within its original design, it was intended
to be easily „cloneable, as long as the undertaking party agrees to a
highly customized public licensing agreement [27]. In addition to
providing built-in staking ability, the NXT platform also facilitates a
highly simplified process of creating token-like assets and currencies
that can be exchanged in a manner similar to Ethereum tokens [28-
31].
The second candidate PoS platform can be broadly characterized
as any project that is a „descendant of Peercoin,‟ with 100‟s of
downstream forks and related projects successfully thriving within
the highly competitive cryptocurrency environment [32, 33]. Among
the most recognized derivations of the original Peercoin are well-
known projects like Novacoin and Blackcoin [34, 35]. Novacoin
utilizes a hybrid PoW and PoS consensus algorithm [36, 37], while
Blackcoin takes this paradigm a bit further and provides only an
initial, short-lived PoW epoch, followed by an exclusively PoS
consensus project life span [34].
The third possible option was to design an Ethereum-based token
that would feature characteristics similar to those desired by our
respondents [38]. Although Ethereum and other platforms that allow
for relatively easy creation of tokenized assets (e.g., V Systems,
Waves, Tron, etc.) provide attractive alternatives, the end-user
dependence on a „parent blockchain‟ and potentially expensive „gas
fees‟ makes this option less optimal from user independence
standpoint [39, 40]. At least initially, the benefits of such
implementations appear to favor the „parent blockchain‟ over the
newly created token. We believe that our survey respondents are
mostly aware of the above limitations, and thus prefer a replacement
asset with an independent blockchain.
Asset scarcity is another important consideration when it comes to
newly issued cryptographic coins and tokens. All-too-often, the initial
period following the introduction of a new cryptocurrency is
characterized by significant volatility, and most frequently steep
declines in price [41, 42]. This well-described phenomenon
represents a formidable challenge for all stakeholders, from
cryptocurrency end-users to regulators [6]. One way to minimize the
dual specter of volatility and early value loss following market
introduction of cryptographic assets is the optimization of the initial
distribution characteristics and the rate of pre-programmed new
coinage generation. To this end, the initial distribution of our RCA
will be highly restricted and very much self-selected (e.g., long-term
investors in NVEs will have to make a conscious decision to destroy
non-viable assets to receive the proposed RCA). In addition, the
inflation rate of the proposed new coin will be limited to 1.8% during
the initial 12 months, with built-in progressively restrictive
inflationary restrictions (e.g., fixed annual supply versus increasing
overall universe of existing coins). When compared to a typical
inflation rate of an efficient market economy, the RCA will be
„relatively deflationary‟ in character [43]. Finally, up to one-third of
the initial coin supply may become destroyed if unclaimed during the
„burn-swap‟ or other promotional activities taking place prior to
January 1, 2022.
Although not specifically included in the current survey, most
long-term holders of NVEs indicated that they would not be very
likely to liquidate their newly acquired coins or tokens immediately
after the „burn-swap‟ but most stopped short of committing to a long-
term HODL strategy. Although „exit‟ or „dump‟ behaviors may well
shape the early value determination for the new coin, it is unlikely
that such market action would have long-lasting effects on the coin‟s
viability and/or value.
VII. SYNTHESIS
Based on our overall survey findings, stated end-user preferences,
and a combination of pragmatic technical and logistical
considerations, the most logical course of action was to utilize a
Peercoin-based staking platform that could provide a sustainable,
long-term alternative for those interested in a „burn-swap‟
arrangement for their existing NVEs. Such option, if properly
implemented, would be consistent with the majority of user-requested
features, including the emphasis on environmentally friendly, PoW-
independent blockchain consensus mechanism(s) [44, 45].
The specific prototype coin selected by our team is Blackcoin [34].
This is primarily because of the co-presence of features desired by
our respondents and a well-proven history of reliability and
blockchain security [46-49]. Compared to an NXT or Ethereum-type
system, Blackcoin derivatives are somewhat more difficult to
implement, but offer a truly unique and independent blockchain
platform. There is also an added advantage for „burn-swap‟ recipients
who retain full control of the consensus process something that
would not be possible if the swap asset required a „parent blockchain‟
for its functioning (inclusive of added fees and bandwidth-specific
considerations) [50, 51]. Further details of the „burn-swap‟
destination blockchain, “InfiniLooP,” are provided in Table 6 below.
Table 6. Key characteristics of the prototype replacement
cryptocurrency asset (RCA) to be employed during the proposed
„burn-swap‟ offer:
Initial hybrid PoW + PoS mining epoch, designed to
generate sufficient base currency for distribution and
network stability; PoW epoch ends with block 7,500
Eco-friendly, smart contract enabled PoS network, with a
deflationary overall annual inflation rate of
approximately 1% (note: actively staking users will earn
proportionately higher returns as it is expected that only
a minority of participants will participate in the minting
process)
Average block time is approximately 1 minute, with about
1,440 blocks generated every 24 hours
Approximate reward per block: 1.50 coins (PoS)
Approximate block size: 500-1,000 bytes
Maturation (PoS): 500 blocks; Confirmations
(network): 10 blocks; Minimum stake confirmations:
500 blocks; Difficulty retargeting with every block
Minimum transaction fee: 0.0001 coins, with
recommended adjustment to 0.001 to make dust attacks
highly unprofitable
VIII. PROPOSED PROJECT GOVERNANCE
Given fairly extensive experience with Peercoin-based derivative
projects, their overall performance record shows high levels of
dependability and blockchain security. Despite these positive leading
indicators, one must not become complacent and overly reliant on
well-established instruments within the cryptographic asset sphere.
There are two main reasons for such caution: (a) the ever-present, and
actively evolving, risk of as yet unforeseen security breaches and
6 EWMCI / InfiniLooP Developers: 2021
exploits; and (b) traditionally described blockchain system
vulnerabilities that are inherent to the consensus mechanisms
operations (e.g., the “51% attack” and related concepts) [52-56].
Specific measures taken by the new project team in an effort to
address the above concerns will include a multi-pronged approach
dedicated to establishing, maintaining, and protecting long-term
viability of the „burn-swap‟ destination staking blockchain. First, we
will allocate a significant (but not fully disclosed) amount of new
coins toward what we call a “perma-stake.” These coins will be
forever allocated to staking and will not be allowed to be sold or
destroyed, effectively providing a „masternode-like‟ effect by
stabilizing the network and providing ongoing protection against 51%
attacks. Second, we intend to implement immediate measures to
prevent the so-called dust attacks,‟ primarily by making transaction
costs associated with sending „dust‟ (e.g., fractional amounts spread
over a wide number of addresses) very expensive for the sender [56].
Third, we plan a group governance process where project leadership,
consisting of coin holders, will be eligible to vote on project-specific
proposals and initiatives. Absolute majority of actively participating
(e.g., non-passive) members of the community will be required for
any implementations to proceed. This will prevent „fire-and-forget‟
decision-making and will ensure that decisions will rest with those
members who deem the project to be sufficiently important for their
direct presence and input.
IX. CONCLUSION
Our 18-month-long market study, designed to investigate the most
optimal „burn-swap‟ asset, resulted in a community mandate to
design a PoS blockchain-based project that will be environmentally
friendly and will incorporate key features outlined by the majority of
our survey respondents. We acknowledge that the proposed solution
is not perfect, but we would like to emphasize that the overall
construct outlined herein represents a solid foundation for future
sustainable growth and development of the newly conceived project.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The InfiniLooP Initiative Developers (ILID) and EWMCI, LLC.,
would like to thank all study respondents. Their participation made
this important work possible. We would also like to thank various
cryptocurrency / blockchain project leaders for their valuable input
and constructive criticism. The formation of our final plan was
profoundly and very positively influenced by their collective wisdom
and experience.
CONTACT
EWMCI: https://ewmci.info
InfiniLooP Discord: https://discord.gg/m7TaCD7
Reddit Community: https://www.reddit.com/r/InfiniLooP/
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